

**Suspend the Rules and Pass the Bill, H.R. 1477, With an Amendment**

**(The amendment strikes all after the enacting clause and inserts a new text)**

116<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
1<sup>ST</sup> SESSION

# H. R. 1477

To require a threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence in Venezuela, an assessment of foreign acquisition of CITGO assets in the United States, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 28, 2019

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ (for herself, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mr. SOTO, Ms. MUCARSEL-POWELL, and Ms. SHALALA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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## A BILL

To require a threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence in Venezuela, an assessment of foreign acquisition of CITGO assets in the United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Russian-Venezuelan  
3 Threat Mitigation Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) The Russian Federation’s increased pres-  
7 ence in the Western Hemisphere is of concern to the  
8 United States and our allies in the region.

9 (2) In December 2018, the Russian Federation  
10 sent two Tu–160 nuclear-capable bombers to Ven-  
11 ezuela for joint exercises with the Venezuelan mili-  
12 tary. The Tu–160 can carry conventional or nuclear-  
13 tipped cruise missiles with an estimated maximum  
14 range of around 3,000 miles.

15 (3) Russian and Venezuelan forces took part in  
16 a joint 10-hour exercise across the Caribbean in De-  
17 cember 2018 with the Tu–160 nuclear-capable  
18 bombers.

19 (4) Nicolas Maduro and his regime have turned  
20 to the Russian Federation, one of its strongest polit-  
21 ical allies, for financial support during its current  
22 economic crisis and to counter international support  
23 for Juan Guaido.

24 (5) In January 2018, Russia sent contractors  
25 linked to the Wagner Group to provide security for  
26 Nicolas Maduro.

1           (6) Nicolas Maduro secured loans from the  
2           Russian Federation to be repaid through future oil  
3           exports, but fell behind on those payments in 2017.  
4           News reports in December 2018 suggest that Rus-  
5           sian State oil company Rosneft has lent Venezuelan  
6           state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA)  
7           \$6.5 billion partly as prepayment for crude oil, \$3.1  
8           billion of which remained outstanding as of the end  
9           of September 2018.

10           (7) In 2016, PdVSA secured a \$1.5 billion loan  
11           from Rosneft, and PdVSA used 49.9 percent of its  
12           shares in United States-based and Venezuelan-  
13           owned company CITGO as collateral. A Venezuelan  
14           default could lead to potential Russian ownership of  
15           United States energy infrastructure.

16           (8) At the conclusion of a 3-day visit to Moscow  
17           in December 2018, Maduro announced \$6 billion  
18           worth of Russian investment pledges focused on the  
19           oil and mining sectors as well as the export of  
20           600,000 tons of Russian wheat to Venezuela to  
21           cover its 2019 needs.

22   **SEC. 3. THREAT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY TO COUNTER**  
23                           **RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN VENEZUELA.**

24           (a) **THREAT ASSESSMENT.**—Not later than 120 days  
25           after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary

1 of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional  
2 committees an assessment on Russian-Venezuelan security  
3 cooperation and the potential threat such cooperation  
4 poses to the United States and countries in the Western  
5 Hemisphere.

6 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 30 days after the  
7 submission of the threat assessment required under sub-  
8 section (a), the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-  
9 propriate congressional committees a strategy to counter  
10 threats identified in such assessment from Russian-Ven-  
11 ezuelan cooperation.

12 (c) FORM.—The threat assessment required under  
13 subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but  
14 may include a classified annex.

15 (d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “appro-  
16 priate congressional committees” means the Committee on  
17 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the  
18 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

19 **SEC. 4. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF CITGO**  
20 **ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
22 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall  
23 transmit to the appropriate congressional committees an  
24 assessment of the national security risks posed by poten-

1 tial Russian acquisition of CITGO’s United States energy  
2 infrastructure holdings.

3 (b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “appro-  
4 priate congressional committees” means the Committee on  
5 Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and  
6 the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Rep-  
7 resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, the  
8 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on  
9 Banking of the Senate and the Committee on Financial  
10 Services of the House of Representatives and the Com-  
11 mittee on Banking of the Senate.

12 **SEC. 5. ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PA-**  
13 **ROLE.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—An alien who the Secretary of  
15 State or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a des-  
16 ignee of one of such Secretaries) knows, or has reason to  
17 believe, is an alien who is acting or has acted on behalf  
18 of the Russian Government in direct support of the Ven-  
19 ezuelan security forces is—

20 (1) inadmissible to the United States;

21 (2) ineligible to receive a visa or other docu-  
22 mentation to enter the United States; and

23 (3) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or pa-  
24 roled into the United States or to receive any other

1 benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act  
2 (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

3 (b) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The issuing consular officer,  
5 the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Home-  
6 land Security (or a designee of one of such Secre-  
7 taries) shall, in accordance with section 221(i) of the  
8 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)),  
9 revoke any visa or other entry documentation issued  
10 to an alien described in subsection (a) regardless of  
11 when the visa or other entry documentation is  
12 issued.

13 (2) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A revocation  
14 under paragraph (1) shall—

15 (A) take effect immediately; and

16 (B) automatically cancel any other valid  
17 visa or entry documentation that is in the  
18 alien's possession.

19 (c) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS  
20 HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT OR FOR NATIONAL SECU-  
21 RITY REASONS.—

22 (1) INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—This sec-  
23 tion shall not apply to an alien if admitting the alien  
24 into the United States is necessary to permit the  
25 United States to comply with—

1 (A) the Agreement regarding the Head-  
2 quarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake  
3 Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force  
4 November 21, 1947, between the United Na-  
5 tions and the United States; or

6 (B) other applicable international obliga-  
7 tions of the United States.

8 (2) NATIONAL SECURITY.—The President may  
9 waive the application of this section to an alien if  
10 the President—

11 (A) determines that such a waiver is in the  
12 national interest of the United States; and

13 (B) transmits to the Committee on For-  
14 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives  
15 and the Committee on Foreign Relations a no-  
16 tice of and justification for such waiver.

17 (d) TERMINATION.—This section shall terminate on  
18 the earlier of—

19 (1) the date that is one year after the date of  
20 the enactment of this Act; or

21 (2) the date on which the President certifies to  
22 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of  
23 Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Re-  
24 lations of the Senate that the Government of Ven-  
25 ezuela has returned to a democratic form of govern-

1       ment with respect for the essential elements of rep-  
2       resentative democracy as set forth in Article 3 of the  
3       Inter-American Democratic Charter.

4       (e) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term “Ven-  
5       ezuelan security forces” includes the following:

6               (1) The Bolivarian National Armed Forces, in-  
7       cluding the Bolivarian National Guard.

8               (2) The Bolivarian National Intelligence Serv-  
9       ice.

10              (3) The Bolivarian National Police.

11              (4) The Bureau for Scientific, Criminal and Fo-  
12       rensic Investigations of the Ministry of Interior, Jus-  
13       tice, and Peace.

14       **SEC. 6. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.**

15       The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of  
16       complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010,  
17       shall be determined by reference to the latest statement  
18       titled “Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation” for this  
19       Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record  
20       by the Chairman of the Committee on the Budget of the  
21       House of Representatives, provided that such statement  
22       has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.