

Suspend the Rules and Pass the Bill, S. 2736, With an Amendment
**(The amendment strikes all after the enacting clause and inserts a
new text)**

115TH CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

S. 2736

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AN ACT

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.

TITLE I—UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 101. Policy.
Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.

TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
- Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
- Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.
- Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.
- Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
- Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership.
- Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
- Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
- Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.
- Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.
- Sec. 211. New Zealand.
- Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.
- Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law.
- Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
- Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.
- Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.

TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.
- Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic summits.
- Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.
- Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
- Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.
- Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.
- Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.
- Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conservation.
- Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women's economic rights.

TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 401. Findings.
- Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.
- Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.
- Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.
- Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement.
- Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.
- Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.
- Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance.
- Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.
- Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights defenders.
- Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

2 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) The Indo-Pacific region—

2 (A) represents nearly 50 percent of the
3 global population;

4 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic
5 economies in the world; and

6 (C) poses security challenges that threaten
7 to undermine United States national security
8 interests, regional peace, and global stability.

9 (2) The core tenets of the United States-backed
10 international system are being challenged, including
11 by—

12 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili-
13 tarization of artificial features in the South
14 China Sea and coercive economic practices;

15 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu-
16 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and

17 (C) the increased presence throughout
18 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to
19 in this Act as “ISIS”) and other international
20 terrorist organizations that threaten the United
21 States.

22 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re-
23 gion continues to transform, presenting opportuni-
24 ties and challenges to United States economic inter-
25 ests.

1 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter-
2 est in defending human rights and promoting the
3 rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although
4 many countries in the region have improved the
5 treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific gov-
6 ernments continue to commit human rights abuses
7 and place restrictions on basic human rights and po-
8 litical and civil liberties.

9 (5) Without strong leadership from the United
10 States, the international system, fundamentally root-
11 ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment
12 of United States, regional, and global interests. It is
13 imperative that the United States continue to play
14 a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by—

- 15 (A) defending peace and security;
16 (B) advancing economic prosperity; and
17 (C) promoting respect for fundamental
18 human rights.

19 (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia,
20 the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy
21 of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
22 held a series of hearings on United States leadership
23 in the Indo-Pacific region, in which—

- 24 (A) experts, including Representative
25 Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci,

1 Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador
2 Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr.
3 Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the secu-
4 rity challenges, economic opportunities, and im-
5 peratives of promoting the rule of law, human
6 rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific re-
7 gion; and

8 (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dil-
9 lon Professor of Government at the John F.
10 Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
11 University, testified, “As realistic students of
12 history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role
13 the United States has played since World War
14 II as the architect and underwriter of regional
15 stability and security has been essential to the
16 rise of Asia, including China itself. But they be-
17 lieve that as the tide that brought the United
18 States to Asia recedes, America must leave with
19 it. Much as Britain’s role in the Western Hemi-
20 sphere faded at the beginning of the twentieth
21 century, so must America’s role in Asia as the
22 region’s historic superpower resumes its place.”.

23 (7) The United States National Security Strat-
24 egy (referred to in this Act as the “National Secu-

1 rity Strategy”), which was released in December
2 2017, states—

3 (A) “A geopolitical competition between
4 free and repressive visions of world order is tak-
5 ing place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region,
6 which stretches from the west coast of India to
7 the western shores of the United States, rep-
8 represents the most populous and economically dy-
9 namic part of the world. The United States in-
10 terest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends
11 back to the earliest days of our republic.”; and

12 (B) “Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex-
13 cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit-
14 ment to established alliances and partnerships,
15 while expanding and deepening relationships
16 with new partners that share respect for sov-
17 ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule
18 of law. We will reinforce our commitment to
19 freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution
20 of territorial and maritime disputes in accord-
21 ance with international law. We will work with
22 allies and partners to achieve complete,
23 verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on
24 the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-pro-
25 liferation regime in Northeast Asia.”.

1 **TITLE I—UNITED STATES POL-**
2 **ICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRAT-**
3 **EGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**
4 **REGION**

5 **SEC. 101. POLICY.**

6 It is the policy of the United States to develop and
7 commit to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehen-
8 sive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for
9 the Indo-Pacific region that—

10 (1) secures the vital national security interests
11 of the United States and our allies and partners;

12 (2) promotes American prosperity and economic
13 interests by advancing economic growth and develop-
14 ment of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic commu-
15 nity;

16 (3) advances American influence by reflecting
17 the values of the American people and universal
18 human rights;

19 (4) supports functional problem-solving regional
20 architecture; and

21 (5) accords with and supports the rule of law
22 and international norms.

23 **SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.**

24 It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States—

25 (1) to work with United States allies—

1 (A) to confront common challenges;

2 (B) to improve information sharing;

3 (C) to increase defense investment and
4 trade;

5 (D) to ensure interoperability; and

6 (E) to strengthen shared capabilities;

7 (2) to strengthen relationships with partners
8 who—

9 (A) share mutual respect for the rule of
10 law;

11 (B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade;

12 and

13 (C) understand the importance of civil so-
14 ciety, the rule of law, the free and reliable flow
15 of information, and transparent governance;

16 (3) to support functional problem-solving re-
17 gional architecture, including through the Associa-
18 tion of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Eco-
19 nomic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit;

20 (4) to emphasize the commitment of the United
21 States—

22 (A) to freedom of navigation under inter-
23 national law;

24 (B) to promote peaceful resolutions of
25 maritime and territorial disputes; and

1 (C) to expand security and defense co-
2 operation with allies and partners, as appro-
3 priate;

4 (5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve
5 complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization
6 of North Korea;

7 (6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule
8 of law, and advocate for transparent governance;

9 (7) to develop and grow the economy through
10 private sector partnerships between the United
11 States and Indo-Pacific partners;

12 (8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade
13 agreements in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner
14 and build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific
15 committed to free markets;

16 (9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific
17 countries—

18 (A) to pursue high-quality and transparent
19 infrastructure projects;

20 (B) to maintain unimpeded commerce,
21 open sea lines or air ways, and communication;
22 and

23 (C) to seek the peaceful resolution of dis-
24 putes; and

1 (10) to sustain a strong military presence in the
2 Indo-Pacific region and strengthen security relation-
3 ships with allies and partners throughout the region.

4 **TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED**
5 **STATES SECURITY INTERESTS**
6 **IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

7 **SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

8 (a) **DEFINED TERM.**—In this section, the term “ap-
9 propriate committees of Congress” means—

10 (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the
11 Senate;

12 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
13 Senate;

14 (3) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

15 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the
16 House of Representatives;

17 (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
18 House of Representatives; and

19 (6) the Committee on Ways and Means of the
20 House of Representatives.

21 (b) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There
22 are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of
23 State, the United States Agency for International Devel-
24 opment, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense,

1 \$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through
2 2023, which shall be used—

3 (1) to advance United States foreign policy in-
4 terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in
5 recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and
6 programs in the furtherance of United States strat-
7 egy;

8 (2) to improve the defense capacity and resil-
9 iency of partner nations to resist coercion and deter
10 and defend against security threats, including
11 through foreign military financing and international
12 military education and training programs;

13 (3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral
14 engagements, particularly with the United States'
15 most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet
16 strategic challenges, including—

17 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the
18 People's Republic of China; and

19 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear
20 and ballistic missile programs of the Demo-
21 cratic People's Republic of Korea;

22 (4) to build new counterterrorism partnership
23 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing
24 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations

1 that pose a significant threat to the United States,
2 its allies, and its citizens' interests abroad;

3 (5) to help partner countries strengthen their
4 democratic systems, with a focus on good govern-
5 ance;

6 (6) to ensure that the regulatory environments
7 for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner
8 countries are transparent, open, and free of corrup-
9 tion;

10 (7) to encourage responsible natural resource
11 management in partner countries, which is closely
12 associated with economic growth; and

13 (8) to increase maritime domain awareness pro-
14 grams in South Asia and Southeast Asia—

15 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and
16 coast guard training efforts with Southeast
17 Asian countries;

18 (B) by expanding cooperation with demo-
19 cratic partners in South Asia, including Ban-
20 gladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka;

21 (C) through intelligence sharing and other
22 information-sharing efforts; and

23 (D) through multilateral engagements, in-
24 cluding by involving Japan, Australia, and
25 India in such efforts.

1 (c) COUNTERING CHINA’S INFLUENCE TO UNDER-
2 MINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appro-
3 priated pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made available
4 for United States Government efforts to counter the stra-
5 tegic influence of the People’s Republic of China, in ac-
6 cordance with the strategy required under section
7 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper-
8 ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014
9 (division K of Public Law 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and
10 in consultation with the appropriate committees of Con-
11 gress.

12 (d) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pur-
13 suant to subsection (b) may be made available for Inter-
14 national Military Education and Training and Foreign
15 Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of the
16 Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as
17 “Burma”).

18 (e) PHILIPPINES.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—None of the amounts appro-
20 priated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made
21 available for counternarcotics assistance for the Phil-
22 ippine National Police unless the Secretary of State
23 determines and reports to the appropriate commit-
24 tees of Congress that the Government of the Phil-
25 ippines has adopted and is implementing a counter-

1 narcotics strategy that is consistent with inter-
2 national human rights standards, including inves-
3 tigating and prosecuting individuals who are credibly
4 alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up
5 extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of
6 human rights in the conduct of counternarcotics op-
7 erations.

8 (2) EXCEPTION.—The limitation under para-
9 graph (1) shall not apply to funds made available—

10 (A) for drug demand reduction, maritime
11 programs, or transnational interdiction pro-
12 grams; or

13 (B) to support for the development of such
14 counternarcotics strategy, after consultation
15 with the appropriate committees of Congress.

16 (f) CAMBODIA.—None of the amounts authorized to
17 be appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made
18 available for United States assistance programs that ben-
19 efit the Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of
20 State certifies and reports to the appropriate congres-
21 sional committees that the requirements under section
22 7043(b)(1) of division K of the Consolidated Appropria-
23 tions Act, 2018 (Public Law 115–141) have been met.

1 **SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE-**
2 **GION.**

3 (a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United
4 States Government—

5 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co-
6 operation and Security between the United States
7 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960,
8 and all related and subsequent bilateral security
9 agreements and arrangements concluded on or be-
10 fore the date of the enactment of this Act;

11 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
12 tween the United States and Japan in promoting
13 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

14 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
15 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
16 the United States and Japan.

17 (b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI-
18 ANCE.—The United States Government—

19 (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty
20 Between the United States and the Republic of
21 Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and all
22 related and subsequent bilateral security agreements
23 and arrangements concluded on or before the date of
24 the enactment of this Act;

25 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
26 tween the United States and South Korea in pro-

1 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;
2 and

3 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
4 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
5 the United States and the Republic of Korea.

6 (c) UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The
7 United States Government—

8 (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Be-
9 tween Australia and the United States of America,
10 done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and all
11 related and subsequent bilateral security agreements
12 and arrangements concluded on or before the date of
13 the enactment of this Act;

14 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
15 tween the United States and Australia in promoting
16 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

17 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
18 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
19 the United States and Australia.

20 (d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The
21 United States Government is committed to the Mutual
22 Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines
23 and the United States of America, done at Washington
24 August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral
25 security agreements and arrangements concluded on or be-

1 fore the date of the enactment of this Act, including the
2 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Ma-
3 nila April 28, 2014.

4 (e) THAILAND.—The United States Government is
5 committed to—

6 (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assist-
7 ance Between the Government of the United States
8 of America and the Government of Thailand, done
9 at Bangkok October 17, 1950;

10 (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Trea-
11 ty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and

12 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral security
13 agreements and arrangements concluded on or be-
14 fore the date of the enactment of this Act, including
15 the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-United
16 States Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok Novem-
17 ber 15, 2012.

18 **SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

20 (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese ac-
21 tions that seek—

22 (A) to further constrain space for civil so-
23 ciety and religion within China; and

24 (B) to undermine a rules-based order in
25 the Indo-Pacific region;

1 (2) encourages China to play a constructive role
2 in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect
3 for the rule of law and international norms;

4 (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and
5 comprehensive relationship with China—

6 (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and

7 (B) by addressing areas of disagreement,
8 including over human rights, economic policies,
9 and maritime security; and

10 (4) is committed to working with China on
11 shared regional and global challenges, especially—

12 (A) upholding and strengthening the rules-
13 based international system; and

14 (B) the denuclearization of North Korea.

15 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
16 gress that the United States should—

17 (1) welcome a decision by China to change
18 course and pursue a responsible results-oriented re-
19 lationship with the United States and engagement
20 on global issues;

21 (2) encourage China to play a constructive role
22 in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and

23 (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un-
24 dermine the rules-based international system.

1 **SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

3 (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic
4 partnership between the United States and India in
5 promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific re-
6 gion;

7 (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening
8 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
9 the United States and India; and

10 (3) is committed to—

11 (A) the New Framework for the United
12 States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar-
13 lington, Virginia on June 28, 2005;

14 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech-
15 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;

16 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-
17 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on
18 January 25, 2015;

19 (D) the United States-India Joint State-
20 ment on Prosperity Through Partnership,
21 issued on June 26, 2017; and

22 (E) all related and subsequent bilateral
23 and security agreements and arrangements con-
24 cluded as of the date of the enactment of this
25 Act.

1 (b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress
2 makes the following findings:

3 (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De-
4 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Pub-
5 lic Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751
6 note) requires the recognition of India as a major
7 defense partner.

8 (2) The designation of India as a major defense
9 partner, which is unique to India—

10 (A) institutionalizes the progress made to
11 facilitate defense trade and technology sharing
12 between the United States and India;

13 (B) elevates defense trade and technology
14 cooperation between the United States and
15 India to a level commensurate with the closest
16 allies and partners of the United States;

17 (C) facilitates technology sharing between
18 the United States and India, including license-
19 free access to a wide range of dual-use tech-
20 nologies, after taking into account national se-
21 curity concerns; and

22 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination
23 on defense strategy and policy, military ex-
24 changes, and port calls in support of defense

1 cooperation between the United States and
2 India.

3 **SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER-**
4 **SHIP.**

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that the United States should—

7 (1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the
8 United States-Association of Southeast Asian Na-
9 tions (referred to in this section as “ASEAN”) rela-
10 tionship to a strategic partnership;

11 (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping
12 build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi-
13 cally integrated, and socially responsible community
14 of nations that has common rules, norms, proce-
15 dures, and standards which are consistent with
16 international law and the principles of a rules-based
17 Indo-Pacific community;

18 (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-
19 ter greater integration among its members;

20 (4) recognize the value of—

21 (A) ASEAN engagement with economic,
22 political, and security partners within Asia and
23 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu-
24 ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-
25 way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and

1 (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as
2 activities under the United States–ASEAN
3 Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement
4 and the United States-ASEAN Connect, which
5 demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the
6 ASEAN Economic Community and build upon
7 economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific re-
8 gion;

9 (5) support efforts by the nations comprising
10 ASEAN—

11 (A) to address maritime and territorial dis-
12 putes in a constructive manner; and

13 (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, dip-
14 lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter-
15 national arbitration mechanisms, consistent
16 with international law, including through the
17 adoption of a code of conduct in the South
18 China Sea to further promote peace and sta-
19 bility in the Indo-Pacific region;

20 (6) support efforts by United States partners
21 and allies in ASEAN—

22 (A) to enhance maritime capability and
23 maritime domain awareness;

24 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and
25 use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pa-

1 cific region that are critical to ensuring the se-
2 curity and free flow of commerce;

3 (C) to counter piracy;

4 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking
5 activities such as the trafficking of persons,
6 goods, and drugs; and

7 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of
8 countries or regional organizations to respond
9 to emerging threats to maritime security in the
10 Asia-Pacific region; and

11 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a
12 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the
13 Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling with respect
14 to the case between the Republic of the Philippines
15 and the People's Republic of China.

16 (b) REPORT ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR EN-
17 GAGEMENT WITH ASEAN.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
20 nually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Sec-
21 retary of State, in consultation with other Federal
22 agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate
23 congressional committees on a strategic framework
24 to administer programs, projects, and activities of
25 the United States to support diplomatic and eco-

1 nomic engagement between the United States and
2 ASEAN member countries for the 10-year period be-
3 ginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

4 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under
5 paragraph (1) shall address the following elements
6 of United States strategy:

7 (A) Promoting commercial engagement be-
8 tween the United States and member countries
9 of ASEAN.

10 (B) Helping member countries of ASEAN
11 use sustainable, efficient, and innovative tech-
12 nologies in their respective energy sectors.

13 (C) Supporting economic conditions in
14 member countries of ASEAN that promote in-
15 novation, the creation of new businesses, sus-
16 tainable growth, and the education of the re-
17 gion’s future innovators, entrepreneurs, and
18 business leaders.

19 (D) Working with member countries of
20 ASEAN to improve the policy and regulatory
21 environment for growth, trade, innovation, and
22 investment.

23 (E) Supporting the regional integration ob-
24 jectives of member countries of ASEAN under
25 the ASEAN Economic Community.

1 (F) Partnership opportunities with the
2 governments of other countries friendly to the
3 United States that have committed to a high
4 set of standards for investment and develop-
5 ment with ASEAN, as determined by the Sec-
6 retary of State.

7 **SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI-**
8 **LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.**

9 It is the sense of Congress that the President should
10 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security co-
11 operation between the United States, South Korea, and
12 Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and
13 other defense-related initiatives.

14 **SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

15 It is the sense of Congress that—

16 (1) the security dialogue between the United
17 States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad-
18 dress pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific
19 region in order to promote—

20 (A) a rules-based order;

21 (B) respect for international law; and

22 (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and

23 (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment,
24 rather than to replace, current mechanisms.

1 **SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH-**
2 **EAST ASIA.**

3 (a) INDONESIA.—The United States Government is
4 committed to—

5 (1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive
6 Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010;

7 (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De-
8 fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26,
9 2015; and

10 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
11 curity agreements and arrangements between the
12 United States and Indonesia concluded on or before
13 the date of the enactment of this Act.

14 (b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is
15 committed to—

16 (1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive
17 Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;

18 (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the
19 Comprehensive Partnership between the United
20 States of America and Malaysia, done in Wash-
21 ington September 13, 2017; and

22 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
23 curity agreements and arrangements between the
24 United States and Malaysia concluded on or before
25 the date of the enactment of this Act.

1 (c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is
2 committed to—

3 (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Be-
4 tween the United States of America and the Repub-
5 lic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partner-
6 ship in Defense and Security, done at Washington
7 July 12, 2005;

8 (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree-
9 ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7,
10 2015; and

11 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
12 curity agreements and arrangements between the
13 United States and Singapore concluded on or before
14 the date of the enactment of this Act.

15 (d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is
16 committed to—

17 (1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive
18 Partnership, done at Washington December 16,
19 2013;

20 (2) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision
21 Statement on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on
22 June 1, 2015;

23 (3) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision
24 Statement, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and

1 (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
2 curity agreements and arrangements between the
3 United States and Vietnam concluded on or before
4 the date of the enactment of this Act.

5 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that the United States should deepen diplomatic,
7 economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas
8 of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia,
9 Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

10 **SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.**

11 (a) UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It
12 is the policy of the United States—

13 (1) to support the close economic, political, and
14 security relationship between Taiwan and the United
15 States;

16 (2) to faithfully enforce all existing United
17 States Government commitments to Taiwan, con-
18 sistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Pub-
19 lic Law 96–8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six
20 Assurances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan
21 in July 1982; and

22 (3) to counter efforts to change the status quo
23 and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both
24 sides of the Taiwan Strait.

1 (b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.—The President should
2 conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan
3 that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future
4 threats from the People’s Republic of China, including
5 supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate
6 asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile,
7 survivable, and cost-effective capabilities, into its military
8 forces.

9 (c) TRAVEL.—The President should encourage the
10 travel of highlevel United States officials to Taiwan, in
11 accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–
12 135).

13 **SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.**

14 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
15 ings:

16 (1) The Government of the Democratic People’s
17 Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter-
18 national community by illicitly developing its nuclear
19 and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United
20 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006),
21 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270
22 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017),
23 and 2397 (2017).

24 (2) The Government of the Democratic People’s
25 Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights

1 abuses against its own people and citizens of other
2 countries, including the United States, the Republic
3 of Korea, and Japan.

4 (3) The United States is committed to pursuing
5 a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo-
6 ple's Republic of Korea through a policy of max-
7 imum pressure and engagement, in close concert
8 with its partners.

9 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT
10 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S RE-
11 PUBLIC OF KOREA.—

12 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of
13 the United States to continue to impose sanctions
14 with respect to activities of the Government of the
15 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, persons act-
16 ing for or on behalf of such government, or other
17 persons in accordance with Executive Order 13551
18 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property
19 of certain persons with respect to North Korea), Ex-
20 ecutive Order 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating
21 to imposing additional sanctions), Executive Order
22 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking
23 the property of certain persons engaging in signifi-
24 cant malicious cyberenabled activities), Executive
25 Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to

1 blocking the property of the Government of North
2 Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohib-
3 iting certain transactions with respect to North
4 Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg.
5 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions
6 with respect to North Korea), as such Executive or-
7 ders are in effect on the day before the date of the
8 enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's
9 Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit
10 activities described in such Executive orders, includ-
11 ing actions in violation of the United Nations Secu-
12 rity Council resolutions referred to in subsection
13 (a)(1).

14 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter-
15 minating any sanction with respect to the activities
16 of the Government of the Democratic People's Re-
17 public of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of
18 such government, or any other person provided for
19 in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the
20 Secretary of State, in consultation with the Sec-
21 retary of the Treasury, shall submit a report to the
22 appropriate congressional committees justifying the
23 termination of the sanction and explaining the rela-
24 tionship between such termination and the cessation
25 of any illicit activity that violates any of the United

1 Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in
2 subsection (a)(1) by such Government or person.
3 The reporting requirement under this paragraph
4 shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act.

6 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
7 subsection shall be construed to limit the authority
8 of the President pursuant to the International
9 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
10 et seq.).

11 (c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT
12 TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S RE-
13 PUBLIC OF KOREA'S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
14 PROGRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the
15 objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and
16 ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's Re-
17 public of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
18 dismantlement of such programs.

19 (d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE
20 THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE
21 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
23 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180
24 days thereafter for the following 5 years, the Sec-
25 retary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, in

1 consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury,
2 shall submit a report to the appropriate congress-
3 sional committees that describes actions taken by
4 the United States to address the threats posed by,
5 and the capabilities of, the Democratic People’s Re-
6 public of Korea.

7 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under
8 paragraph (1) shall include—

9 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the
10 United States to identify strategies and policies,
11 including an assessment of the strengths and
12 weaknesses of such strategies and policies—

13 (i) to achieve peaceful
14 denuclearization of the Democratic Peo-
15 ple’s Republic of Korea; and

16 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by
17 the ballistic missile program of the Demo-
18 cratic People’s Republic of Korea;

19 (B) an assessment of—

20 (i) potential road maps toward peace-
21 ful denuclearization of the Democratic
22 People’s Republic of Korea and the elimi-
23 nation of the nuclear and ballistic missile
24 threats posed by the Democratic People’s
25 Republic of Korea; and

1 (ii) specific actions that the Demo-
2 cratic People's Republic of Korea would
3 need to take for each such roadmap to be-
4 come viable;

5 (C) a summary of the United States strat-
6 egy to increase international coordination and
7 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or
8 multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement
9 and interdiction, to address the threat posed by
10 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the
11 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which
12 shall include—

13 (i) a description of the actions taken
14 by the Secretary of State, or designees of
15 the Secretary, to consult with governments
16 around the world, with the purpose of in-
17 ducing such governments to fully imple-
18 ment the United Nations Security Council
19 resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1);

20 (ii) a description of the actions taken
21 by such governments to fully implement
22 United Nations Security Council resolu-
23 tions related to the Democratic People's
24 Republic of Korea;

1 (iii) a list of countries with govern-
2 ments that the Secretary has determined
3 are noncooperative with respect to imple-
4 menting the United Nations Security
5 Council resolutions referred to in sub-
6 section (a)(1); and

7 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and
8 increase cooperation with respect to the
9 Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
10 with the governments of the countries on
11 the list described in clause (iii);

12 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the
13 national export control regimes of countries
14 that are members of the United Nations, and
15 multilateral export control regimes, that are
16 necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with re-
17 spect to the Democratic People's Republic of
18 Korea pursuant to the United Nations Security
19 Council resolutions referred to in subsection
20 (a)(1); and

21 (E) an action plan to encourage and assist
22 countries in adopting and using authorities nec-
23 essary to enforce export controls required by
24 United Nations Security Council resolutions.

1 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required
2 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi-
3 fied form, but may include a classified annex.

4 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) representatives of the United States shall
7 use the voice and vote of the United States in all
8 international organizations, as appropriate, to advo-
9 cate for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s
10 Republic of Korea from such organizations, until
11 such time as the Democratic People’s Republic of
12 Korea meets its commitments under the United Na-
13 tions Security Council resolutions referred to in sub-
14 section (a)(1); and

15 (2) the Secretary of State should work to in-
16 duce countries to meet their commitments under the
17 United Nations Security Council resolutions referred
18 to in subsection (a)(1), including by considering ap-
19 propriate adjustments to the diplomatic posture and
20 foreign assistance of the United States with govern-
21 ments that the Secretary has determined are non-
22 cooperative with respect to implementing the United
23 Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in
24 subsection (a)(1).

1 **SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND.**

2 The United States Government is committed to—

3 (1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on No-
4 vember 5, 2010, which reaffirmed close ties and out-
5 lined future practical cooperation between the
6 United States and New Zealand;

7 (2) the Washington Declaration, signed on
8 June 19, 2012, which strengthened the defense rela-
9 tionship by providing a framework and strategic
10 guidance for security cooperation and defense dia-
11 logues; and

12 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
13 curity agreements and arrangements between the
14 United States and New Zealand concluded on or be-
15 fore the date of enactment of this Act.

16 **SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that
18 the United States should—

19 (1) support strong United States engagement
20 with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji,
21 Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States
22 of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
23 Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and
24 Vanuatu;

1 (2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of
2 the South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ-
3 ing—

4 (A) fisheries and marine resource con-
5 servation;

6 (B) environmental challenges and resil-
7 ience;

8 (C) global health;

9 (D) development and trade; and

10 (E) people-to-people ties; and

11 (3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific
12 Islands, as appropriate, to support the rule of law,
13 good governance, and economic development.

14 (b) UNITED STATES-COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIA-
15 TION.—It is the sense of Congress that the Compacts of
16 Free Association entered between the United States and
17 the Freely Associated States (Republic of Marshall Is-
18 lands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Repub-
19 lic of Palau)—

20 (1) enhance the strategic posture of the United
21 States in the Western Pacific;

22 (2) reinforce United States regional commit-
23 ment;

24 (3) preempt potential adversaries from estab-
25 lishing positional advantage; and

1 (4) further self-governance, economic develop-
2 ment, and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated
3 States.

4 **SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT;**
5 **PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.**

6 (a) FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.—It is the policy of
7 the United States—

8 (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of
9 Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation,
10 and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region,
11 in accordance with applicable international law; and

12 (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations
13 to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South
14 China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter-
15 national law.

16 (b) JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.—
17 It is the sense of Congress that the President should de-
18 velop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with
19 United States allies and partners to conduct joint mari-
20 time training and freedom of navigation operations in the
21 Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the
22 South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international
23 system benefitting all countries.

24 **SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.**

25 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
2 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
3 gress” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of
5 the Senate;

6 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
7 the Senate;

8 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of
9 the House of Representatives; and

10 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
11 the House of Representatives.

12 (2) ISIS.—The term “ISIS” means the Islamic
13 State of Iraq and Syria.

14 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
15 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
16 telligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the
17 Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate Federal offi-
18 cials, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees
19 of Congress that contains an assessment of the current
20 and future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-
21 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in South-
22 east Asia that pose a significant threat to the United
23 States, its allies, and its citizens interests abroad.

24 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
25 section (b) shall include—

1 (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-
2 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af-
3 filiated fighters in Southeast Asia;

4 (2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked,
5 al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-
6 affiliated fighters expected to return to Southeast
7 Asia from fighting in the Middle East;

8 (3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of
9 ISIS-linked, al Qaeda-linked, and other various ex-
10 tremist group affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia;

11 (4) the current resources available to combat
12 the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other
13 violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in South-
14 east Asia, and the additional resources required to
15 combat such threat;

16 (5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of
17 ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex-
18 tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively
19 in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines,
20 Indonesia, and Malaysia;

21 (6) a description of the capabilities and re-
22 sources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter
23 violent extremist groups; and

24 (7) a list of additional United States resources
25 and capabilities that the Department of Defense and

1 the Department of State recommend providing to
2 governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent ex-
3 tremist groups.

4 **SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.**

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that there should be robust cybersecurity coopera-
7 tion between the United States and nations in the Indo-
8 Pacific region—

9 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity
10 threats, including state-sponsored threats;

11 (2) to share best practices to combat such
12 threats;

13 (3) to strengthen resilience against
14 cyberattacks, misinformation, and propaganda; and

15 (4) to strengthen the resilience of critical infra-
16 structure.

17 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
18 are authorized to be appropriated \$100,000,000 for each
19 of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to enhance coopera-
20 tion between the United States and Indo-Pacific nations
21 for the purposes of combatting cybersecurity threats.

22 **SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE**
23 **INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

1 (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and
2 other weapons of mass destruction, and their means
3 of delivery, constitutes a threat to international
4 peace and security;

5 (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal-
6 lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il-
7 licit use, and the proliferation to and from North
8 Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies,
9 and other weapons of mass destruction;

10 (3) notes efforts by China and Russia—

11 (A) to expand and modernize their respec-
12 tive nuclear arsenals, including through signifi-
13 cant research and development resources in
14 hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced
15 technologies; and

16 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear
17 technologies; and

18 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many
19 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear en-
20 ergy for a variety of peaceful applications.

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that the United States Government should under-
23 take all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effec-
24 tive arms control and nonproliferation policies in the Indo-

1 Pacific region to limit the further spread of weapons of
2 mass destruction and their means of delivery.

3 **TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED**
4 **STATES ECONOMIC INTER-**
5 **ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**
6 **REGION**

7 **SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
9 ings:

10 (1) According to the United States Chamber of
11 Commerce, by 2030—

12 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class
13 population will be living in Asia; and

14 (B) 59 percent of middle class consump-
15 tion will take place in Asia.

16 (2) According to the Asian Development
17 Bank—

18 (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat-
19 eral or regional trade agreements; and

20 (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian
21 countries are under negotiation or concluded
22 and awaiting entry into force.

23 (3) Free trade agreements between the United
24 States and 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region

1 (Australia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea)
2 have entered into force.

3 (4) The member states of the Association of
4 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section
5 as “ASEAN”), as a group—

6 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in
7 the world; and

8 (B) have a combined gross domestic prod-
9 uct of \$2,400,000,000,000.

10 (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member
11 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015,
12 and the total value of bilateral trade between the
13 United States and ASEAN member states has in-
14 creased by 78 percent since 2004.

15 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by
16 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers
17 in the United States was \$77,000,000,000, while the
18 United States 2015 trade surplus of services pro-
19 vided to consumers in ASEAN member states was
20 \$8,000,000,000.

21 (7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council,
22 goods and services exported from the United States
23 to ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in
24 the United States.

25 (8) According to the Business Roundtable—

1 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei,
2 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
3 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re-
4 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global
5 gross domestic product in 2017; and

6 (B) United States bilateral trade with the
7 other nations referred to in subparagraph (A)
8 supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States.

9 (9) According to the United States National Se-
10 curity Strategy—

11 (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic
12 Cooperation “remain centerpieces of the Indo-
13 Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for
14 promoting an order based on freedom”; and

15 (B) the United States will “work with
16 partners to build a network of states dedicated
17 to free markets and protected from forces that
18 would subvert their sovereignty.”.

19 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
20 gress that trade between the United States and the na-
21 tions in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the
22 United States economy, United States exports, and jobs
23 in the United States.

1 **SEC. 302. INDO-PACIFIC TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILAT-**
2 **ERAL AGREEMENTS, AND REGIONAL ECO-**
3 **NOMIC SUMMITS.**

4 Congress supports—

5 (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade
6 agreements with partners that—

7 (A) comply with trade obligations and re-
8 spect, promote, and strictly adhere to the rule
9 of law; and

10 (B) increase United States employment
11 and expand the economy;

12 (2) formal economic dialogues that include con-
13 crete, verifiable, and measured outcomes;

14 (3) negotiations under the auspices of the
15 World Trade Organization, including negotiations to
16 enter into appropriate plurilateral and sectoral
17 agreements;

18 (4) full implementation of the World Trade Or-
19 ganization's Trade Facilitation Agreement by Indo-
20 Pacific countries; and

21 (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing
22 high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
23 tion forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group
24 of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in
25 the Indo-Pacific region.

1 **SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNER-**
2 **SHIP.**

3 The President should seek to develop to negotiate a
4 comprehensive economic engagement framework with the
5 Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

6 **SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI-**
7 **TATION.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to
9 produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build-
10 ing and trade facilitation strategy, including leveling the
11 playing field for American companies competing in the
12 Indo-Pacific region.

13 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
14 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may
15 be necessary to carry out subsection (a).

16 **SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should takes steps
18 to strengthen the enforcement of United States intellec-
19 tual property laws as a top priority, including taking all
20 appropriate action to deter and punish commercial cyber-
21 enabled theft of intellectual property.

22 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
23 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-
24 after for the following 5 years, the President shall submit
25 a report to Congress that—

1 (1) describes the efforts of the United States
2 Government to combat intellectual property viola-
3 tions and commercial cyber-enabled theft in the
4 Indo-Pacific region, particularly the People's Repub-
5 lic of China; and

6 (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of
7 priority areas for United States engagement and ca-
8 pacity building assistance.

9 (c) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There
10 are authorized to be appropriated to the United States
11 Trade Representative such amounts as may be necessary
12 to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities designed to
13 build capacity in the identified priority areas described in
14 the annual report required under subsection (b).

15 **SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.**

16 (a) **INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.**—

17 (1) **STRATEGY.**—Not later than 180 days after
18 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
19 thereafter for the following 5 years, the President
20 shall establish a comprehensive, integrated,
21 multiyear strategy to encourage the efforts of Indo-
22 Pacific countries to implement national power strat-
23 egies and cooperation with United States energy
24 companies and the Department of Energy national
25 laboratories to develop an appropriate mix of power

1 solutions to provide access to sufficient, reliable, and
2 affordable power in order to reduce poverty, drive
3 economic growth and job creation, and to increase
4 energy security in the Indo-Pacific region.

5 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

6 There are authorized to be appropriated \$1,000,000
7 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to
8 carry out paragraph (1).

9 (b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the
10 sense of Congress that the United States should explore
11 opportunities to partner with the private sector and multi-
12 lateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian
13 Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable
14 electricity in the Indo-Pacific region, including Myanmar
15 (historically known as “Burma”).

16 **SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in co-
18 operation with the Administrator of the United States
19 Agency for International Development, should increase re-
20 gional engagement in the areas of environment, health,
21 education, and infrastructure development with the Lower
22 Mekong countries, including—

23 (1) assisting in the development of programs
24 that focus on forecasting environmental challenges
25 and resilience;

1 (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on
2 sustainable uses of forest and water resources with
3 the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong
4 Basin and access to safe drinking water;

5 (3) assisting with education enrollment and
6 broadband internet connectivity, particularly English
7 training and connectivity in rural communities; and

8 (4) improving global health in the Lower
9 Mekong countries, including—

10 (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate;

11 and

12 (B) helping regional partners to track and
13 treat malaria and tuberculosis.

14 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
15 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
16 through 2023, the Secretary of State, in cooperation with
17 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
18 national Development, shall submit a report to Congress
19 that includes—

20 (1) a list and evaluation of Lower Mekong Ini-
21 tiative activities since its inception in 2009;

22 (2) a strategy for any increased regional en-
23 gagement and measures of success for the activities
24 described in paragraph (1); and

1 (3) an accounting of funds used to execute
2 Lower Mekong Initiative activities.

3 **SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH**
4 **AND NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION.**

5 It is the sense of Congress that the President should
6 encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pa-
7 cific region and United States private sector interests with
8 operations and investments in the region to deploy agri-
9 culture practices that—

10 (1) conserve natural resources; and

11 (2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable
12 lands and water bodies.

13 **SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN'S**
14 **ECONOMIC RIGHTS.**

15 It is the sense of the Congress that the United States
16 should—

17 (1) support activities that secure private prop-
18 erty rights and land tenure for women in developing
19 countries in Asia, including—

20 (A) establishing legal frameworks to give
21 women equal rights to own, register, use, profit
22 from, and inherit land and property;

23 (B) improving legal literacy to enable
24 women to exercise the rights described in sub-
25 paragraph (A); and

1 (C) increasing the capacity of law enforce-
2 ment and community leaders to enforce such
3 rights;

4 (2) work with Asian civil society, governments,
5 and multilateral organizations to increase the capa-
6 bility of disadvantaged women and girls in Asia—

7 (A) to realize their rights;

8 (B) to determine their life outcomes;

9 (C) to assume leadership roles; and

10 (D) to influence decision-making in their
11 households, communities, and societies; and

12 (3) seek to expand access to appropriate finan-
13 cial products and services for women-owned micro,
14 small, and medium-sized enterprises in Asia.

15 **TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED**
16 **STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-**
17 **PACIFIC REGION**

18 **SEC. 401. FINDINGS.**

19 Congress makes the following findings:

20 (1) The promotion of human rights and respect
21 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in
22 the United States' national security interest.

23 (2) Continued support for human rights, demo-
24 cratic values, and good governance is critical to a

1 successful United States diplomatic strategy in the
2 Indo-Pacific.

3 (3) Strong support for human rights and de-
4 mocracy in the Indo-Pacific region is critical to ef-
5 forts to reduce poverty, build rule of law, combat
6 corruption, reduce the allure of extremism, and pro-
7 mote economic growth.

8 (4) There are serious concerns with the rule of
9 law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North
10 Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all
11 been identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”.

12 (5) There have been unacceptable human rights
13 developments in—

14 (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been
15 identified by Freedom House as “Partly Free”,
16 and the Department of State has declared that
17 the violence against the Rohingya constitutes
18 ethnic cleansing;

19 (B) the Philippines, which has been identi-
20 fied by Freedom House as “Partly Free”, and
21 where there are continued disturbing reports of
22 extra-judicial killings; and

23 (C) China, where forced disappearances,
24 extralegal detentions, invasive and omnipresent

1 surveillance, and lack of due process in judicial
2 proceedings remain troublesome.

3 (6) according to the National Security Strategy,
4 the United States—

5 (A) will “support, with our words and ac-
6 tions, those who live under oppressive regimes
7 and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and
8 the rule of law”;

9 (B) “may use diplomacy, sanctions, and
10 other tools to isolate states and leaders who
11 threaten our interests and whose actions run
12 contrary to our values”; and

13 (C) “will support efforts to advance wom-
14 en’s equality, protect the rights of women and
15 girls, and promote women and youth empower-
16 ment programs”.

17 **SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.**

18 The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef-
19 forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery
20 in the Indo-Pacific region.

21 **SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.**

22 It is the sense of Congress that—

23 (1) United States Government officials should
24 lead by example—

1 (A) by continuing to advocate for freedom
2 of the press in the Indo-Pacific region; and

3 (B) by engaging with the press corps at
4 every appropriate opportunity; and

5 (2) the United States should advocate and sup-
6 port a Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the
7 Indo-Pacific to convene government and civil society,
8 including journalists, to discuss and address the
9 challenges facing press freedom in the Indo-Pacific
10 region.

11 **SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PER-**

12 **SONNEL.**

13 It is the sense of Congress that—

14 (1) United States embassies and consulates in
15 the Indo-Pacific region should have personnel, as ap-
16 propriate, who are dedicated to reporting on and ad-
17 vancing United States democracy, human rights,
18 labor, anti-corruption, and good governance policy
19 interests; and

20 (2) appropriate resources should be made avail-
21 able to carry out such activities.

22 **SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-**

23 **TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT.**

24 The Secretary of State should, as appropriate—

1 (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional
2 dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re-
3 garding human rights and religious freedom viola-
4 tions;

5 (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people
6 exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par-
7 ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and

8 (3) establish educational exchanges and capac-
9 ity-building programs emphasizing civil society devel-
10 opment.

11 **SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS**

12 **HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY.**

13 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
14 gress that the United States should continue to work with
15 ASEAN to improve the capacity of ASEAN to address
16 human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in
17 Southeast Asia.

18 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the
19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
20 after consultation with the Administrator of the United
21 States Agency for International Development, shall submit
22 a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees to
23 increase cooperation with ASEAN to promote human
24 rights, democracy, and good governance in Southeast
25 Asia.

1 (c) CONTENTS.—The strategy submitted under sub-
2 section (b) should include—

3 (1) an assessment of the types of United States
4 Government resources available to support increased
5 cooperation; and

6 (2) an assessment to identify entities within
7 ASEAN that the United States could potentially
8 support or partner with to promote human rights,
9 democracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia.

10 **SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA.**

11 The President is encouraged to continue efforts to en-
12 hance freedom of information access with regard to North
13 Korea.

14 **SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANC-**
15 **TIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES**
16 **ASSISTANCE.**

17 (a) SANCTIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that the
18 President should impose targeted financial penalties and
19 visa ban sanctions, in accordance with applicable law and
20 other relevant authorities, on any individual or entity
21 that—

22 (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms;

23 or

24 (2) engages in censorship activities.

1 (b) SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—It is
2 the sense of Congress that the President should, in accord-
3 ance with applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise
4 alter United States economic assistance to any country
5 that has engaged in serious violations of human rights or
6 religious freedoms.

7 **SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

8 (a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PA-
9 CIFIC REGION.—

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
11 appropriated \$210,000,000, for each of the fiscal
12 years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy,
13 strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law,
14 transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific
15 region, including for universities, civil society, and
16 multilateral institutions that are focusing on edu-
17 cation awareness, training, and capacity building.

18 (2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appro-
19 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made
20 available for United States Government efforts, led
21 by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
22 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy,
23 the rule of law, and human rights in the People's
24 Republic of China.

1 (3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to
2 paragraph (1) shall be made available for non-
3 governmental organizations to support activities pre-
4 serving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable
5 development, education, and environmental conserva-
6 tion in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autono-
7 mous Region and in other Tibetan communities in
8 China, India, and Nepal.

9 **SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS.**

10 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term
11 “human rights defenders” means individuals, working
12 alone or in groups, who nonviolently advocate for the pro-
13 motion and protection of universally recognized human
14 rights and fundamental freedoms if the advocacy of such
15 issues may result in the risk of safety or life.

16 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
17 gress that human rights defenders in the Indo-Pacific re-
18 gion have been facing increased difficulties with the rise
19 of unprecedented crackdowns and conflicts.

20 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
21 are authorized to be appropriated \$1,000,000 for each of
22 the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to provide critical as-
23 sistance to human rights defenders through the Depart-
24 ment of State’s Human Rights Defenders Fund.

1 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
2 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
3 through 2023, the Secretary of State, in cooperation with
4 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
5 national Development, shall submit a report to Congress
6 that includes—

7 (1) a list and evaluation of the Human Rights
8 Defenders Fund activities since its inception;

9 (2) a strategy for any increased regional en-
10 gagement and measures of success for the activities
11 described in paragraph (1); and

12 (3) an accounting of funds used to execute the
13 Human Rights Defender Fund activities.

14 **SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIA-**
15 **TIVES.**

16 There are authorized to be appropriated \$25,000,000
17 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to support
18 Indo-Pacific young leaders initiatives, including the Young
19 Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN Youth
20 Volunteers Program, and other people-to-people exchange
21 programs that focus on building the capacity of democ-
22 racy, human rights, and good governance activists in the
23 Indo-Pacific region.

1 **SEC. 412. SAVINGS PROVISION.**

- 2 Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing
3 the use of military force.