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THE FEDERAL RESEARCH SECURITY ENTERPRISE

Wednesday, July 15, 2026

House of Representatives,

select committee on the Strategic Competition Between

the United States and the Chinese Communist Party,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 390, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Moolenaar [chairman of the committee] presiding.

Chairman Moolenaar. The select committee will come to order.

Good morning, everyone. Thank you for being here.

The United States leads the world in scientific discovery because we have built a research enterprise that is rooted in openness, innovation, and excellence. American taxpayers invest billions of dollars each year in fundamental research to advance national security, our economy, and human knowledge.

The discoveries made in our laboratories today have become the technologies that drive commercialization, sustain our industrial base, and protect our Nation tomorrow.

Our free and open society is the envy of the world, and we value the scientific contributions Chinese Americans and members of the Chinese diaspora have made to our Nation.

The Chinese Communist Party has a different agenda. It seeks to exploit American taxpayer-funded research. Its policies have long emphasized leveraging foreign universities, laboratories, and researchers to accelerate China's scientific, technological, economic, and military development.

Some of those policies explicitly encourage overseas Chinese communities and individuals with cultural or familial ties to China to acquire knowledge and expertise in service of the Chinese Government's national objectives.

China's military-civil fusion strategy erases the distinction between civilian and military innovation. And the CCP's 2017 national security law makes clear there is no such thing as a truly private company in China.

Scientific discoveries, commercial technologies, and academic partnerships are expected to serve the priorities of the CCP, including the modernization of the People's Liberation Army.

China has openly declared its ambition to become the world's leading technological power and to build a military capable of challenging the United States and its allies.

China's theft and diversion of American technology and research is not theoretical. It is documented through criminal prosecutions, intelligence assessments, congressional investigations, and the Chinese Government's own public strategies.

The issue before us is not whether this occurs, but rather what we need to safeguard taxpayer-funded research against China's exploitation.

At Duke University, Pentagon-funded research on military stealth technologies was ultimately diverted to China and reportedly contributed to stealth capabilities associated with the J-20 fighter aircraft.

We have a responsibility to ask one question: Should American taxpayer dollars be used for research with entities within China's defense research and military industrial base? The commonsense answer is no.

Subsidizing an adversary that exploits our openness for malign purposes, commits human rights abuses, and seeks to displace the United States is unacceptable.

Over the past 2 years, the select committee has extensively documented research security vulnerabilities. Our report "Fox in the Henhouse" identified approximately 2,400 recently published publications involving Department of War funding and Chinese institutions, including more than half involving entities within China's defense research and industrial base.

I want to thank Secretary Hegseth and his Department for acting on that report's recommendations.

The Pentagon has now strengthened post-award monitoring, enhanced compliance mechanisms, and prohibited research involving entities which had been publicly identified by the U.S. Government as posing national security and other risks.

Our investigation into the Department of Energy identified roughly 4,350 publications involving Chinese entities. This included more than half connected to Chinese defense institutions, more than 200 involving the Seven Sons of National Defense universities, and dozens involving

Chinese supercomputers linked to China's nuclear weapons enterprise.

DOE is taking some positive steps to correct these problems, but challenges remain, and we look forward to discussing today how DOE can move faster to close those remaining gaps.

I also want to thank the National Science Foundation for its proactive approach to update their research security policy to prohibit NSF funds from being used to conduct research with entities identified on U.S. Government restricted entity lists.

Finally, the committee's investigative work on NASA demonstrated that meaningful reform is possible. NASA strengthened its policies, established a dedicated research security office, improved oversight, and suspended active awards that appear inconsistent with agency requirements and Federal law.

What the Pentagon, NSF, and NASA have done should be the standard across the Federal Government, which is why I, along with Senator Jim Banks, introduced the Securing Innovation and Research from Adversaries Act.

This legislation simply codifies what the Department of War has done and establishes these clear government-wide prohibition on the use of Federal research funds for collaborations with entities and individuals on U.S. Government blacklists.

The American people deserve and expect the discoveries that they fund will strengthen our Nation and secure our future. They do not expect those investments to accelerate the ambitions of China -- a strategic competitor that openly seeks technological and military dominance at the expense of the United States. That is the challenge before us today.

I now recognize Ranking Member Khanna for his remarks.

[The statement of Chairman Moolenaar follows:]

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Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership in convening this important hearing.

I represent Silicon Valley, one of the most innovative regions on Earth, and I see up close what American science can do. So let me start where I think we all agree.

Democrats, Republicans, scientists and researchers, and every American agrees that we need to protect research security.

Our cutting-edge research cannot be weaponized by the People's Liberation Army or dual-use entities, not quantum, not sensitive AI, not the breakthroughs that keep America safe.

I have zero tolerance for the CCP stealing what American scientists build, and so do the career officials in front of us.

The CCP is running a deliberate campaign to acquire our most sensitive research. That is real, it is a persistent challenge, and we need to stop it.

On that issue, we look forward, Mr. Chairman, to working in a joint effort.

But we cannot protect American research while the administration is dismantling the very people and programs that protect it. The President's own budget request proposed devastating cuts to the three agencies before us today, including 26 percent cuts to the NSF research security office, NSF's inspector general, both of which help keep our research secure.

The President also proposed capping the indirect costs on grants at just 15 percent. This is money universities use to fund their research security efforts.

Meanwhile, DOGE fired every civil servant at NSF, NIH, and DOE that our scientists relied on to assess security risks. The administration even fired every member of the board overseeing the NSF.

You cannot claim the high ground on research security while firing the people who do it and cut the programs that fund it. If we are serious about research security, we need to put our money

where our mouth is.

But it goes deeper than budgets. The bigger question is: Why does the CCP want our research so badly? Because it is the best in the world.

America leads. We lead because of a formula that took generations to build: open research, the best universities, and attracting the world's best talent.

That leadership is what the administration is putting at risk.

With the administration's relentless cuts to funding science, attacks on foreign talent, many top scientists are moving their research elsewhere or not coming here in the first place. And due to Federal funding cuts, the number of students admitted to Ph.D. programs this fall fell by 15 percent.

Even while overall Ph.D. enrollment is declining, China remains our top source of science doctoral students. Nearly 80 percent of America's billion-dollar startups were founded by an immigrant or have an immigrant as a key leader.

If we turn these people away, without exception, with visa crackdowns and a climate of suspicion, they won't stop innovating. They will just do it somewhere else.

And in the past year that is exactly what we have seen -- American scientists moving their labs to China, Europe, and beyond because the administration cut off their funding.

Universities are already being defunded because of their perceived politics. And now OMB is proposing to hand the final say over Federal research grants to political appointees.

Far too many American scientists have faced unfounded discrimination and xenophobia through the failed China Initiative, which left us weaker in our competitiveness and innovation.

It is a false choice between being tough on China and protecting civil rights. We can have zero tolerance for CCP theft and zero tolerance for civil rights violations at the same time.

So the path forward:

First, fund and staff research security.

Second, protect what makes us great, our research funding, research environment, and

attracting the world's best talent.

Third, protect the civil rights of every researcher.

Fourth, keep funding the world's best research.

That is how we keep our research out of the hands of the People's Liberation Army, and that is how we make sure the next great discovery happens right here at home.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

[The statement of Mr. Khanna follows:]

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Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you, Ranking Member Khanna.

If any other member wishes to submit a statement for the record, without objection, those statements will be added to the record.

I now submit for the record, without objection, a statement from Chairman Babin of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

[The information follows:]

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Chairman Moolenaar. Now I would like to introduce our witnesses today.

Dr. Rebecca Keiser is the Acting Chief of Staff and Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy at the National Science Foundation. She oversees NSF's research security strategy and has been instrumental in developing policies to protect Federally funded research while ensuring the United States remains the global leader in science and innovation.

Mr. Jeremy Ison is Senior Policy Advisor to the Under Secretary for Science at the U.S. Department of Energy. In this role, he advises DOE leadership on science policy and research security and has been involved in the Department's efforts to strengthen protections for Federally funded research in the national laboratory system.

Dr. Patricia Valdez is the Chief Extramural Research Integrity Officer at the National Institutes of Health. In that role she provides strategic leadership on NIH's research security and integrity policies, including efforts to address foreign interference, research misconduct, and the protection of taxpayer-funded biomedical research.

With that. I want to welcome all of our witnesses today, and thank you for being here.

Dr. Keiser, you are now recognized for your opening remarks.

STATEMENTS OF DR. REBECCA KEISER, ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF AND CHIEF OF RESEARCH SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGY, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION; MR. JEREMY ISON, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND DR. PATRICIA VALDEZ, CHIEF EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH INTEGRITY OFFICER, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH

STATEMENT OF REBECCA KEISER

Ms. Keiser. Chairman Moolenaar, Ranking Member Khanna, and members of the select committee, my name is Dr. Rebecca Keiser, Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy and Acting Chief of Staff at the U.S. National Science Foundation.

It is an honor to be with you to discuss how NSF is working to protect critical U.S. taxpayer investments in R&D and in our domestic STEM challenge from malign foreign actors.

Research security is a vital part of the NSF mission and is essential to U.S. economic and national security. NSF works closely with partners in Federal law enforcement, including the NSF OIG and the intelligence community, as well as other Federal R&D funders.

The security of the U.S. research ecosystem is the responsibility of the Federal Government, as well as the recipients of Federal research dollars, and NSF counts Congress as an important partner in this work.

For example, earlier this year, NSF worked closely with the committee to review and strengthen safeguards governing access to NSF-funded computing resources through the NSF ACCESS program.

We are grateful for that collaboration and remain committed to working with Congress to bolster U.S. research security efforts in response to current and evolving threats.

Under the first Trump administration in 2019, NSF commissioned a report by the JASON to

inform NSF's approach to research security. It found that a group of governments, notably the People's Republic of China, were improperly attempting to benefit from the global research ecosystem.

As co-chair of the NSTC's Subcommittee on Research Security, NSF collaborated with OSTP and agency partners on the development of NSPM-33, which was released in January 2021, to provide clear research security direction to the community.

It is my office at NSF, OCRSSP, that stewards the agency's research security efforts, including those responsive to NSPM-33 and enacted legislation.

This work is a matter of protecting American competitiveness and national security and requires continued vigilance, culture change, and accountability.

In fact, NSF recently published a Dear Colleague letter notifying the research community of the agency's intent to implement a policy in fiscal year 2027, which the chairman just mentioned, to prohibit the use of NSF funds to support research collaboration with entities named on restricted entities lists.

Under the policy, institutions will be responsible for ensuring funds are not used to support prohibited collaborations and for maintaining appropriate oversight to identify and address potential noncompliance before NSF funds are expended.

The policy also prohibits NSF funds from being used by senior or key personnel with active positions with or funding from these restricted entities.

This policy bolsters the NSF TRUST framework, which guides NSF's assessment of grant proposals for potential national security risks.

NSF has also implemented a prohibition on funding for researchers that participate in a malign foreign talent recruitment program, including certification requirements of both research institutions and senior personnel on NSF awards. Researchers must also certify they have taken research security training to qualify to apply for NSF funding.

To advance our understanding of the full scope, potential challenges, and nature of the research security field through scholarly evidence, NSF established the Research on Research Security Program and funded the first cohort of awards just last year.

Accountability is also vital to NSF's research security efforts, and NSF works very closely with its OIG in this regard.

NSF has taken and will continue to take swift action in response to OIG referrals. NSF has taken actions, such as terminations, suspensions, and debarments. Collectively, NSF has recovered, put to better use, or protected from misuse over $20 million.

Safeguarding taxpayer investments in research and innovation is central to U.S. national security and international competitiveness.

NSF welcomes international collaboration and understands that such collaborations can advance the frontiers of science for the benefit of the American people.

The research community, industry, individual researchers, and the U.S. Government must work together to identify, understand, and address the risks posed to the research ecosystem by foreign actors that do not share those values and improve awareness of these risks through increased communication and information sharing.

NSF remains committed to this, and we look forward to continuing to work with you on this vitally important issue.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I welcome your questions.

[The statement of Ms. Keiser follows:]

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Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ison, you may now proceed.

STATEMENT OF JEREMY ISON

Mr. Ison. Chairman Moolenaar, Ranking Member Khanna, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Energy's commitment to research security.

I serve as Chief of Staff to the Under Secretary for Science at the Department of Energy.

The Office of the Under Secretary for Science stewards ten national labs, provides scientific support to all 17 DOE national laboratories, as well as oversees major basic research programs in advanced computing, fusion, nuclear and high energy physics, basic engineering sciences, and biological and environmental research.

I have spent much of my 18 years at DOE working the intersection of counterintelligence, national laboratory security, and research security policy.

Earlier in my career, my counterintelligence work focused on China-related threat issues, investigations, and oversight across DOE's national laboratory complex.

I later helped develop and implement Department-wide research security policies across multiple administrations.

I share that background because this issue is not theoretical to me. I have seen how foreign governments try to exploit research environments, and I recognize the importance of disciplined, targeted, and executable responses.

The People's Republic of China has publicly documented policies and programs designed to acquire foreign science and technology and to align overseas expertise with national strategic

objectives. That reality requires the Department to protect taxpayer-funded research, intellectual property, and data.

That is why DOE has spent years building a research security framework that is stronger than it was a decade ago. DOE has long maintained foreign national access controls, counterintelligence capabilities, export control requirements, cybersecurity, physical security protections, and laboratory security programs.

I stress this: Access is not automatic and mitigations are in place if access is granted.

DOE continues to build on that foundation with more specific tools for the threats we face today.

In the national laboratory environment, one of the most important steps has been the development and use of the Science and Technology Risk Matrix.

That tool helps DOE and the laboratories identify unclassified areas of science and technology where breakthroughs could have significant national security or economic security implications. It gives decisionmakers a common way to think about the sensitivity of the work before access decisions are made.

DOE has also strengthened policy for foreign government-sponsored affiliated activities through DOE Order 486.1A. That policy prohibits participation on malign foreign talent recruitment programs involving countries of risk and places restrictions and disclosure requirements on other foreign government-sponsored affiliated activities.

It provides the Department a clear basis to address undisclosed obligations, conflicted commitments, and foreign programs designed to divert U.S.-funded research or expertise.

Those tools matter because the national laboratories are complex research environments. They include open science, proprietary work, user facilities, sensitive unclassified capabilities, and classified national security work.

A risk-based system allows DOE to support legitimate mission work while applying strong

controls where the technology, affiliation, access, or conduct creates greater risks.

DOE has also made significant progress on financial assistance. Through the Office of Research, Technology, and Economic Security, DOE now has a dedicated capability to evaluate research technology and economic security risks before and after funds are awarded and as risks change.

As part of award decisions where the risks can be managed, DOE can impose mitigation terms and monitoring requirements. Where risks cannot be mitigated, DOE can decide that funding not proceed.

Finally, research security must include American STEM talent development. Long-term security is not achieved only by restricting risks, it also requires building the American scientific and technical workforce that will lead in the technologies that matter most.

DOE's national laboratories are not only research institutions, they are training grounds for the next generation of U.S. scientists, engineers, and national security professionals.

The United States must remain the world leader in scientific innovation. DOE is congressionally directed to achieve major scientific technological advances. That mission requires exceptional talent across the United States and where appropriate and secure around the world.

The goal is not to close off American science, it is to make sure that collaboration is transparent, accountable, mission-aligned, and protected.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Mr. Ison follows:]

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Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you very much.

Now let's turn to Dr. Valdez.

STATEMENT OF PATRICIA VALDEZ

Ms. Valdez. Chairman Moolenaar, Ranking Member Khanna, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the National Institutes of Health.

My name is Patricia Valdez, and I serve as NIH's Chief Extramural Research Integrity Officer. For nearly a decade, I have led NIH's efforts to strengthen research security, promote research integrity, and address foreign interference in federally funded biomedical research.

NIH is the world's largest public funder of biomedical research, supporting discoveries that improve health, drive innovation, and strengthen America's leadership in science and technology.

With that investment comes a responsibility to ensure that taxpayer-funded research is conducted with integrity, transparency, and accountability.

Research security is fundamental to that responsibility. Safeguarding federally funded biomedical research from foreign interference helps protect America's scientific leadership, economic competitiveness, and national security.

NIH is committed to protecting the U.S. biomedical research enterprise while recognizing that appropriately managed international scientific collaborations remain essential to scientific progress and U.S. competitiveness.

Our approach is designed to protect both security and openness through clear disclosure requirements, risk-based oversight, strong institutional partnerships, and close coordination with our Federal partners.

Since 2018, NIH has significantly strengthened its research security program. We have updated disclosure requirements regarding foreign support, conflicts of interest, and conflicts of commitment; implemented mandatory research security training and a prohibition on participation in malign foreign talent recruitment programs; and enhanced our ability to identify potential disclosure noncompliance and indicators of foreign interference.

Most recently, NIH introduced a new approach to managing foreign collaborations by replacing traditional foreign subawards with linked foreign subprojects.

Under this model, foreign collaborators receive separate directly linked awards, providing NIH with greater transparency into foreign research activities, stronger financial accountability, improved tracking of Federal funds, and enhanced oversight of international collaborations, while continuing to support legitimate global scientific partnerships.

Throughout the grant lifecycle, NIH employs a risk-based approach to research security. We review disclosures submitted with grant applications and throughout the award period to identify potential concerns, including undisclosed foreign research support, conflicts of interest and commitment, scientific and budgetary overlap, participation in malign foreign talent recruitment programs, and threats to the integrity of the peer review system.

To ensure these reviews are conducted consistently and objectively, NIH uses a decision matrix to assess potential foreign interference involving covered individuals and senior key personnel.

Active participation in a malign foreign talent recruitment program is automatically disqualifying, while other foreign activities are evaluated individually based on the specific facts and circumstances, allowing NIH to distinguish between legitimate international scientific collaboration and activities that present unacceptable risks.

Most compliance matters are resolved through collaborations with recipient institutions. When evidence indicates potential fraud or other violations of Federal law, NIH coordinates closely

with the HHS Office of Inspector General and the Department of Justice. When matters of national security arise, we work with the HHS Office of National Security.

Our efforts are producing measurable results. Since 2018, NIH has received more than 700 allegations involving potential foreign interference and related disclosure concerns and identified possible noncompliance in 273 matters.

Most will resolve through administrative action by NIH and recipient institutions, including recovery of $21.9 million for 49 cases.

And coordination with the HHS Office of Inspector General and the Department of Justice led to the recovery of an additional $17.7 million for six cases.

We have also seen a significant increase in institutional self-disclosures, reflecting stronger oversight and a growing culture of compliance across the research community.

NIH closely coordinates with Federal partners to strengthen policies, improve information sharing, harmonize disclosure requirements where appropriate, and provide research security guidance to the research community.

Research security is essential to protecting the integrity of the Nation's biomedical research enterprise and ensuring that taxpayer-funded research advances U.S. interests.

NIH remains committed to strengthening its research security program while supporting the international scientific collaborations that continue to drive discovery, innovation, and America's leadership in biomedical research.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Ms. Valdez follows:]

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Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you, Dr. Valdez.

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.

I would like to begin for all the witnesses with a yes-or-no question.

Do you believe that Federal research funds should be used to support research involving individuals or entities that appear on U.S. Government restricted entity lists?

Dr. Keiser?

Ms. Keiser. No, I don't, hence we released our draft policy in that regard.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Mr. Ison?

Mr. Ison. No, we do not.

Chairman Moolenaar. Dr. Valdez?

Ms. Valdez. So NIH does follow all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements governing collaboration, including any restrictions established by Congress and the executive branch. That said, we are discussing this.

Chairman Moolenaar. Okay.

Does your agency have a policy that prohibits the use of Federal research funds to support research involving individuals or entities that appear on U.S. Government restricted entity lists?

Dr. Keiser?

Ms. Keiser. Through our Dear Colleague letter, we communicated to the community our intent to develop such a policy, along with the draft policy.

It is draft right now because it does need to go through a public comment period, because we are going to require a certification by all of the key personnel, as well as by institutions once the policy comes into effect, that they are not collaborating on the NSF projects with a restricted entity and they are also not receiving funds or have an appointment with such restricted entities.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Mr. Ison?

Mr. Ison. So let me clarify things here.

So we view this as a risk factor, a high risk factor for the Department in terms of making decisions. And so if this is something that is disclosed or something that is discovered, we certainly would not be comfortable with that. But we do not have enacted policy. We are currently reviewing a policy to implement.

Chairman Moolenaar. Dr. Valdez?

Ms. Valdez. So we do regularly screen our awards to determine whether or not individuals are collaborating with entities on the restricted lists. And as Mr. Ison mentioned, we also consider that a risk factor. So it is something that is definitely considered.

Chairman Moolenaar. First of all, I appreciate, Dr. Keiser, your efforts to do the Dear Colleague and to get feedback towards a policy.

Let me ask you this, Mr. Ison and Dr. Valdez. Why has your agency not implemented a policy to stop taxpayer-funded research collaboration with groups? These groups have already been identified by the Federal Government as presenting national security, military, export control, sanctions, or human rights concerns.

I recognize you are using the term "high-risk factor," but given the fact that these are already on entity lists that the Federal Government has designated to be dangerous for the United States, why wouldn't you have a policy on that?

Mr. Ison. I will go first.

So we are currently reviewing the NSF policy. It was just announced last week. This is something that we are studying inside the Department.

We have a series of mitigations that are in place that I am happy to discuss today. It includes the Science and Technology Risk Matrix for protecting critical and emerging technologies

that are unclassified. We have, as I noted in my testimony, the Foreign Government Sponsored or Affiliated Activities order. These are attempts -- as well as many other things. Updates to DOE order 142.3C, the Unclassified Foreign National Access Program.

The Department has a longstanding layered approach to ensure that we have a managed research environment to mitigate risks posed by these types of collaborations and types of interactions.

Ms. Valdez. Yeah, as I mentioned, this is something that we are definitely discussing, particularly after seeing NSF's policy come out. We agree that it is a concerning risk factor. And it is something that when we do identify this, we do take appropriate mitigation steps to alleviate the risk or mitigate the risk.

So, again, something that we are discussing, and absolutely see the concerns.

Chairman Moolenaar. Well, thank you for that.

And I would just say that I appreciate the discussions are ongoing, but I do believe now is the time for action. And the best way to mitigate the risk would be to develop a policy, publish the policy, so that our entire Federal Government has a consistent standard that can be known throughout the research community.

So thank you.

And with that, I recognize the ranking member for his questions.

Mr. Khanna. Thank you to all of you for your public service.

Dr. Keiser, the CHIPS and Science Act requires the NSF to maintain an Office of Research Security with at least four full-time staff and a Chief of Research Security. How many people were employed in that office at the end of 2024 compared to today?

Ms. Keiser. At the end of 2024, we had ten people in the Research Security Office.

We currently have five, which does meet the requirement in CHIPS and Science. Of course, we would love to build and have more, and we are in the process, actually, of hiring additional folks

for the office. We have announcements out on the street.

I want to say, though, that we consider research security a responsibility across the Foundation. And so we communicate with our research directorates that they need to have representatives focused on research security as well. Program officers do need to as well, and they are required to take research security training so that we all focus on these issues.

Mr. Khanna. I appreciate that. And why was it reduced from ten to five?

Ms. Keiser. We had folks who did take the Deferred Resignation Program and early retirements as part of that opportunity. That was their choice.

So they were not let go. They did choose to leave the Foundation. And so now we need to rehire.

Mr. Khanna. Do you think it was better when there were ten people as opposed to five?

Ms. Keiser. Research security always benefits from having more people in the office. And that is why, of course, we have announcements out to build up the office even more.

I do have to say, though, that we are, in addition to focusing on numbers of people in the office, we are focusing on scaling up our research security analytics and harmonizing and streamlining our processes.

The intent going forward is to have research security reviews as part of the overall merit review process so that we could integrate things in and have a good workflow so that it is less workload on the office and we are also able to assess our proposals for research security issues at scale.

Mr. Khanna. Thank you.

Mr. Ison, do you agree that these indirect costs which have been capped, that many times those cover research security efforts at universities?

Mr. Ison. I do not have a position on that. I am happy to take that back and get you an answer.

Mr. Khanna. Does anyone on the panel have an opinion on it?

Okay.

Do you think in general the country could benefit from more funding on research security?

Ms. Keiser. Yes. I think that funding always is, of course, important in research security.

We do focus quite a bit on the fact that this is a joint responsibility, and the fact is that the community as well needs to take on these efforts.

Now, a lot of the information in research security is publicly available information. And a lot of what is good research security are good practices overall in research, and looking at your partnerships, looking at your collaborations carefully.

And a lot of that doesn't require additional resources. It just requires a good practice of research overall.

As an example --

Mr. Khanna. I just have 1 minute. So I just have one more question, Dr. Keiser.

How concerned are you about this 15 percent reduction of Ph.D.s in the United States?

Ms. Keiser. I am very concerned. We need to build up the U.S. Ph.D. workforce. And, as you know, we funded the largest class of graduate research fellows this past year ever because we want to make sure that we build up the U.S. Ph.D. workforce.

Mr. Khanna. Why do you think there is this decline.

Ms. Keiser. I am not an expert, of course, in the decline or in the numbers of U.S. Ph.D.s in this country. I am sure it is a very complex issue. We would be happy to take that back and get you more information.

Mr. Khanna. Well, I appreciate it. I appreciate all the witnesses.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you very much.

Representative LaHood.

Mr. LaHood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank our witnesses for your valuable testimonies here today.

I want to start off, I think over the course of this committee, since its existence as a special committee, has shown and highlighted that the CCP plays by a different set of rules and standards than every other industrialized country in the world.

China has demonstrated through IP theft, forced technology transfers, coercive trade tactics, funding of SOEs, that they will exploit any tool at its disposal to undermine our national security and steal our intellectual capital.

And I also serve on our House Intelligence Committee, and I believe it is existential that we win the strategic competition against the CCP when it comes to AI, quantum, and obviously advanced chip manufacturing.

But brain power and intellectual know-how is at the center of this competition. And, obviously, that starts with our world class academic and research institutions in the United States.

As you may know, last year this Congress, with the work of this committee, passed legislation, the COINS Act, that created targeted restrictions for outbound U.S. investments that would fund military or advanced technology capabilities of our foreign adversaries, including the CCP, and this committee recognized the national security threat posed by those outbound investments.

In order to fortify our national security, I believe the U.S. needs full transparency and visibility into the vulnerabilities of these investments, and that includes investments in federally funded research. And we need to have a unified Federal agency approach to ensure U.S. capital and know-how in sensitive technologies and dual-use applications are not further ceded to our foreign adversaries.

In my home State we have the Argonne National Lab that is located in Lemont, Illinois. From quantum computing to advanced energy technologies, the work at Argonne is fundamental to America's research now and for the future and the development of that ecosystem. We count on many world class academic institutions, including Northwestern University and the University of

Illinois, as partners with that.

My question to you, Mr. Ison, is can you talk about the current DOE guidance in place that provides Argonne and the other national labs and these universities with effective mitigation plans to protect from theft in federally funded research?

Mr. Ison. Thank you for that question.

So the Department has a managed research and environment. What that entails is we have built on a multi-decade approach to physical security, cyber controls, export controls, and added things with this new adversarial approach to S&T acquisition, as I mentioned in my testimony, to protect things that traditionally did not have traditional protections.

The S&T Risk Matrix is something that we built back in 2019 during the President's first term. We sat down with the chief research officers of the national laboratories, explained to them that certain countries were making investments in certain critical emerging technologies, certain countries were using illicit as well as licit techniques to acquire that technology, and three, they were having success in making progression in those topics.

And so we challenged them to develop a list of research areas that have a red, yellow, green categorization, red areas being the topics that have the national security or economic security implications if there are breakthroughs, and then in turn to restrict the access to countries of risk foreign nationals.

So this is a tool that we use across the complex. We also have, as I mentioned earlier, our foreign government-sponsored affiliated activity. So we have a layered approach for conflict of interest, conflict of commitment, restrictions, and a prohibition for talent program participation, in particular applying to China and the countries of risk.

I should note that the Department was the first agency to come out with a public definition and prohibition in 2019 for talent program participation. So it has been a very positive risk mitigation.

So all of these policies and tools that have been incorporated into the contracts for the M&O contractors that manage the national labs, this is the type of guidance we provide to them.

We, of course, have counterintelligence offices that provide support to all the national laboratories. I think that is something to stress here. DOE is unique in that we are a member of the IC, and we have intel as well as counterintel that support the Department's mission for protection.

Thank you.

Mr. LaHood. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Representative Krishnamoorthi.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Research security is obviously a national priority, but, unfortunately, research is insecure not just because of external threats, but because of internal ones due to unprecedented cuts posing, I think, an existential threat to our research.

Dr. Keiser, according to NSF's own website, NSF grants have helped make breakthroughs in science, from smartphones to LASIK eye surgery.

But as we found on your website, when President Trump returned to office he proposed to cut, according to your website, almost 60 percent of NSF's funding for fiscal year 2026. That is what it says on your website, right?

Ms. Keiser. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And, Dr. Valdez, NIH has made breakthroughs in science-related Alzheimer's, cancer, and other diseases.

And, yet, according to NIH's website, President Trump proposed a 40 percent cut. That is from your website. That is what it says right here, right?

[Chart.]

Ms. Valdez. Correct.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And, Mr. Ison, same story at DOE. In fact, according to DOE's own website, this year Trump wants a 20 percent cut at the very lab that Darin LaHood just mentioned. Argonne Lab in my home State of Illinois down to $754 million. That is what it says here, right?

Mr. Ison. I agree that is what it says, yes.

[Chart.]

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And while President Trump wants to cut funding, China is investing. This spring, OECD showed that China has topped the U.S. in R&D spend. We are killing the very research that we are attempting to protect, and that is wrong.

I want to transition to my next topic.

Unfortunately, these cuts are part of a larger effort against science, which has real-life impacts.

Dr. Valdez, I see that your postdoc training was in immunology, right?

Ms. Valdez. Yes.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. So let's consider vaccines and their importance.

Secretary Kennedy has repeatedly cast doubt on vaccine safety and efficacy. And last year, the periodical Science reported that NIH ended over 30 grants on vaccine usage.

[Chart.]

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And, now, according to the UCLA Health periodical reporting here, lower vaccination rates caused measles to reach a 30-year high, and measles is soaring again in 2026. That is what UCLA is reporting, right?

Ms. Valdez. Yes.

[Chart.]

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Next, let's take screwworm. Forbes reported that last year DOGE

ended a USAID project dedicated to eradicating New World screwworm, a flesh-eating parasite that threatens livestock.

And now, over 180,000 animals and 2,000 humans across the Americas have contracted this deadly disease screwworm. It has reached the U.S. And as we can see here, the CDC actually activated an emergency response center. Isn't that what it says, Dr. Valdez?

Ms. Valdez. Yes, that is what it says.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Next, let's take Ebola. Last year, the periodical Science reported that Trump closed a network of NIH centers for research in emerging infectious diseases like Ebola. The stop-work order called the research, quote, "unsafe for Americans and not a good use of taxpayer funding," close quote.

And now, The New York Times reports that a U.S. citizen tested positive for Ebola in Congo as the outbreak continues to spread. That is what we see reported here, Dr. Valdez, right?

Ms. Valdez. That is right.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Research security is important, but health security is paramount. And these cuts are literally killing us right now.

[Photo.]

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Let me turn to my final topic.

Here is a picture of Ardem Patapoutian. Ardem moved to the U.S. as a teenager, worked Domino's at night, attended the University of California, and in 2021, after a long career of distinguished research, won the Nobel Prize for discovering how humans sense touch.

But Trump froze Ardem's NIH grant to research new pain treatments. Within hours of Ardem posting about these cuts, China offered to move his lab to, quote, "any city, any university he wanted with guaranteed funding for 20 years." Luckily, Ardem said no.

Dr. Keiser, China wants our talent. And you have previously testified in the Science and Technology Committee that China is actively reaching out to researchers to recruit them, right?

Ms. Keiser. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. A poll from the periodical Nature pointed out that 75 percent of U.S. scientists are considering leaving the U.S.

Look, Trump's cuts are driving away talent. Trump's cuts are making us less healthy. Trump's cuts are leaving us with nothing left to steal. Research needs to be secure, but if there is no research left to steal, what is the point?

Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Representative Hinson.

Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning to our witnesses. Thank you for coming to testify about a very important topic to Iowans.

It is no secret that our academic institutions have become susceptible to influence from malign actors and that the CCP is leading the charge to take advantage of our schools and our tax dollars to go into those institutions.

So I think it should be concerning to all of us that they have found ways to manipulate that and undermine our values, our way of life, and our safety.

I would like on focus today on Department of Energy, which is truly the heart of our country's basic and physical research and will be, of course, leading the next frontier for energy availability and security.

Back home in Iowa, we are very blessed to have the Ames National Laboratory conducting research into rare earth minerals, critical minerals, magnetics, and so much more. They regularly partner with our institutions, including Iowa State University, allowing our students to have those hands-on experiences in an advanced lab setting.

It was just last summer we welcomed Secretary Wright for a tour of the Ames Laboratory to

see up close that work that will help to change the future of our energy needs for years to come.

So, Mr. Ison, my question is for you today. I am sure you can agree that securing our Nation's energy needs from both a supply perspective and a safety perspective is a top priority, and that includes, of course, recognizing where some shortfalls exist on the security side. It should be a top priority there, given how the CCP has been able to access some of our premier institutions.

But I want to address how federally funded research like what is happening at the Ames National Lab could be at risk of abuse from serious actors from within the CCP, especially with those possibly linked to the Chinese military and their web of state-sponsored organizations.

So can you talk a little bit to how Department of Energy really triages the risks of foreign influence at the institutions? And then what review systems do you have in place to make sure those Federal grants are vetted properly during that review process?

Mr. Ison. Great. Thank you for that question.

So the way that the Department approaches research security is essentially in two buckets, funding buckets. We, of course, fund the national laboratories. We also fund financial assistance. And, consequently, we have different risk mitigations attached to each of those.

So as I mentioned earlier, the Department's approach for the national labs is using physical security, our counterintelligence presence, export controls. There is a vetting process that has been enhanced over the years.

I should note that the vetting requirement was congressionally passed in 2000, attached to an NDAA, specifically identifying certain sensitive countries' foreign nationals, as being required prior to access.

Mrs. Hinson. Do you think we need to do more there now, knowing what we know now about their influence and their efforts to intervene here?

Mr. Ison. That is a great question.

So we recognize -- and citing some of my oral testimony, coming from a counterintelligence

background -- our collaboration with the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence within the Department as policy recommenders, as well as policy decisionmakers, is exceptionally important. We recognize the evolving threats, and correspondingly, we exhaust our policies to mitigate that threat.

For instance, and there is a lot to discover here, for the Foreign Talent Recruitment Program prohibition back in 2019, we evolved our policy based upon discussions with inside the Department.

That did not discover enough. So we expanded the scope to include all these other types of activities -- in-kind support, Chinese Scholarship Council, offers of future employment -- as restricted activities that have to go all the way to the Secretary for approval for laboratory employees. So the bar is very, very high.

In terms of our vetting system that we have in place, we have piloted a new risk management framework that the Department initiated in March of this year and now we have fully implemented across the complex.

That applies a tiered vetting approach. We have included additional requirements under the foreign national and classified foreign national access order. So there is additional information foreign nationals have to provide, which in turn allows our counterintelligence professionals in the field to be able to make better assessments and better advice and recommendation.

And, lastly, on foreign national access -- but, again, there is much to cover -- we have an escalation clause that is now included as a requirement for the laboratories. And what that means is that our local counterintelligence officers will make a recommendation to laboratory leadership.

If it is high risk, as the criteria that we can discuss would indicate, then IN through counterintelligence has the opportunity, the authority to escalate, and ultimately to Under Secretary for Science, or in NSA with flag officers, that have to make those determinations.

Mrs. Hinson. So a lot of that expertise -- and I know I am out of time, Mr. Chairman -- a lot of that expertise is happening on the local level.

And I saw you shaking your head, too, so I am assuming you are in agreement on many of these policies.

I look forward to working with both of you to make sure you have what you need to keep these bad actors out and make sure, again, we are able to do what we need to be competitive.

So thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Representative Castor.

Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to our witnesses for being here and all that you do to protect our scientific enterprise.

Research security is an important issue, and there is no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party is always trying to exploit the openness of our research ecosystem and steal our cutting-edge research.

But I am very concerned that what is happening here, self-inflicted by the current administration, is doing much more harm than the outside security threat.

I am so proud of American scientists and researchers. They have kept us and our whole research and scientific enterprise the crown jewel among nations across the globe, and that has served us very well. They are our greatest asset in the strategic competition with China.

But right now what we have been experiencing over the past year and a half are very significant budget and staffing cuts that undermine important research security that helps us guard against the CCP, but undermining our entire scientific research enterprise.

It is shocking that now China is in the lead when it comes to R&D investments. That is not acceptable in the United States of America. And the Trump administration now has canceled or frozen more than 7,800 research grants here at home, slashing billions of dollars in critical research funding.

Dr. Valdez, NIH is the crown jewel. Folks are proud of it. Every dollar we invest we get multiples back on treatments and cures. Medical research in America saves lives, it saves money.

Thousands of professionals have been forced out of the National Institutes of Health. And halfway through the fiscal year, the NIH has only spent about 15 percent of the $38 billion it has for grants and contracts.

I hear it at home from my academic institutions, my cancer research center, researchers having to leave because they don't have any certainty in their grants. The delay has led to the suspension of research projects and of ended careers now.

Do you anticipate that NIH will be able to fully execute its scientific research funding this fiscal year?

Ms. Valdez. Yes. Grant management staff are working very hard at the moment to get those funds out so that it is --

Ms. Castor. With only 15 percent being distributed so far?

Ms. Valdez. Yes, that is the plan, and we definitely are working hard to do that.

Ms. Castor. Dr. Keiser, just a few months ago the Trump administration dismissed all 22 members of the National Science Board. That is the governing body of the National Science Foundation that advises Congress and the President on science and engineering. It helps guide the budget. That group helps provide continuity on long-term research priorities.

What is the justification for just sending an email to these public servants that are guiding our scientific enterprise?

Ms. Keiser. The National Science Board is appointed and serves at the discretion of the President. And so I respectfully defer that question, given that they are Presidentially appointed.

Ms. Castor. They are appointed for 6-year staggered terms to ensure that kind of continuity and independence. What this does is it truly undermines America's leadership in science; it disrupts grant approval, it slows research progress.

And if you were going to say, "China, what would you do to sabotage America's scientific leadership in the world?" I think that would be one of the things at the top of the list.

The same, Mr. Ison, at our national laboratories. They, again, are the crown jewel, the envy of the world when it comes to research and innovation and energy.

How do you justify substantial budget and scientific and personnel cuts to our national laboratories at a time that we are trying, we are in this strategic competition with the Chinese Communist Party?

Mr. Ison. I will have to defer that question. I am here to testify about the PRC targeting national laboratories and financial assistance. So thank you.

Ms. Castor. I understand. It was more of a rhetorical question.

But the call is coming from inside the house; that horror movie. Yes, we need to ensure that research security is funded adequately. But, gosh, we need to make, we need to keep the United States of America preeminent in the world when it comes to scientific research in health, in energy, all across the board. And right now this administration is taking a hatchet to our leadership, and that is not acceptable.

I yield back my time.

RPTR MOLNAR

EDTR HOFSTAD

[10:59 a.m.]

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Representative Newhouse.

Mr. Newhouse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate everybody being here to discuss this very important topic.

And I have to tell you, I am more concerned now than I was before the hearing started, not pointing fingers at just anybody in particular on the panel or administration. What we are witnessing has been going on for a long, long time.

And I have a couple basic questions that I would like you to, if you can, answer. It could be under the heading, "We don't know what we don't know," but, basically, what have we lost? What kind of stuff is now out of our hands that shouldn't be?

Anybody know? Is that too long a list to ask to respond in 5 minutes?

Ms. Keiser. I think it is very challenging in the areas of fundamental research, because, sir, most of the challenges we face are the theft of the know-how itself, right, and also the unethical recruitment of the people. We have heard about people who have departed this country and have gone to the PRC -- top talent. We have seen many cases where the valuable, gold ideas of our folks are being taken by those in adversarial countries.

And this is why we have to focus diligently -- and, as you have heard, we all are -- on focusing on safeguarding our system. What we don't want to do, however, is close our system down --

Mr. Newhouse. No, I agree with that. And I appreciate the sentiment there.

But I hope what I can agree with you at the end of my questions -- in reference to Chairman Moolenaar's ask, especially to you, Mr. Ison and Dr. Valdez, in reference to the NSF policy that you coordinated with the Department of War restricting the research collaboration with entities

that are on our list of bad actors.

What I am looking for is a clear commitment on the part of your agencies that, yes, absolutely, we are working toward that because we want to close this door. We want to make sure that we are not losing not only the individuals but the information and the research results.

So can I hear that, that strong commitment from both of you?

Mr. Ison. So, as I noted earlier, the policy at NSF, in their Dear Colleague letter, came out last week. We are currently reviewing it, and we understand what has been identified there, and happy to work with you and this committee over the coming months.

Thank you.

Ms. Valdez. I want to say, we clearly understand the risks, and, you know, this is something that, you know, I, myself, can't say, you know, "We are doing this tomorrow," but, again, it is something that we are discussing seriously, because, you know -- completely understand the risks. It is something that, in the meantime, we are mitigating where we can.

Mr. Newhouse. So I still don't hear that -- maybe the words that matter on the paper, yes, but -- you are committed to the goal. Is that fair to say?

Ms. Valdez. We are committed to the goal, absolutely.

Mr. Newhouse. Mr. Ison, is that --

Mr. Ison. We are absolutely committed to the goal of managing risk. And the way that we have done this is through things like the S&T Risk Matrix, talent program prohibitions, and the serious mitigations on the financial-assistance side, which I am happy to elaborate on.

Mr. Newhouse. Well, you guys are obviously steeped in this stuff much more than we are, but I am just looking for that -- because a lot of people are listening to this. We invest a lot of money into these programs, and we want to make sure that we protect them as strongly as we possibly can.

So my district is home to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, which I am very proud of.

A lot of it, the research projects, are conducted there.

Mr. Ison, I want to understand how DOE's research-security strategies provide those safeguards we have been talking about but still remain flexible for potential widescale adoption or commercialization. It is a really tough thing to balance, but could you elaborate on that? I know you talked about it some.

Mr. Ison. Absolutely. And that is a great question.

So, as I mentioned earlier, we have these various mitigations across the complex -- S&T Risk Matrix, talent program prohibition, vetting, enhanced vetting, for foreign national access, right? So we -- and I think all three of us would agree -- need to strike the right balance from protecting as well as promoting.

So the Office of Technology Commercialization inside the Department of Energy is responsible for initiatives to promote commercialization of technologies. So, when areas have reached that high level of technology-readiness level, that is when we would move forward with those.

But, again, we have to be cognizant that it is a balancing act. We do want to promote commercialization, benefit U.S. interests, as well as protect what is important.

Mr. Newhouse. Yeah, I appreciate that.

Well, 5 minutes goes by quickly. I would love to continue talking to you guys about this, but thank you for being here.

Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

And I do want to alert the members, we will have a little bit of time for followup questions, if it is of interest.

Representative Tokuda.

Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you all for being here today.

A really quick yes-or-no question for all of you. Do you support bans in general based strictly on nationality -- not on affiliation, not on risk, but just nationality -- yes or no?

Ms. Keiser. No, not at all.

Mr. Ison. We do not. However, Congress has passed, with the --

Ms. Tokuda. With the Nuclear --

Mr. Ison. -- NDAA '25, section 312 -- 112 prohibits country-of-risk foreign nationals in the weapons laboratories.

And so I want to be very clear that, there, it is congressionally mandated, and we will execute --

Ms. Tokuda. I understand that.

Mr. Ison. And then citizenship is one factor in terms of evaluating risk.

Ms. Tokuda. But just based on that, yes -- I am assuming it is a "yes, but" I am hearing from you, Mr. Ison, that we have precedent, legislative precedent --

Mr. Ison. We have a legislative precedent that has directed the Department to do this, and it is a risk factor.

Ms. Tokuda. Thank you.

Dr. Valdez?

Ms. Valdez. Right, we wouldn't -- no, we don't support restriction.

Ms. Tokuda. Thank you.

You know, I just ask this question because we have had a lot of discussion today about how our National Labs are the crown jewel, I heard it referred to. And it is not just the physical labs that make it the crown jewel, make it the tip of the spear, in terms of leading research domestically but especially globally; it is the people that sit inside of it.

And I think we can all agree that, while we have a lot of home pride right now, especially celebrating our 250th birthday, the very best and the brightest aren't necessarily just U.S.-born

and -bred as well.

We want to make sure, literally, that we take all of the vetting processes, Mr. Ison, that you said is in place, very rigorous -- access is not guaranteed -- but the very best researchers are sitting in those labs.

I ask this question because there is a proposed NDAA amendment that could come up this year in the House that would prohibit Chinese nationals from physical access to our National Labs. And I would like to ask you, what would the impact on research conducted in our National Labs be if this were to pass? What kind of research projects would this have impacted?

Chinese researchers make up not a nominal, or minimal, amount of researchers that are sitting in our National Labs and need access, physical access, to our labs. So, if this NDAA amendment were to pass, what would the impact be on research here in the United States?

Mr. Ison. So I can't comment on the specific legislation, but I would say that I think it is very important, as a first principle, that the Department has been congressionally mandated to execute missions in fundamental research, applied topics, as well as national-security topics. This is what Congress has directed us to do.

We operate in an environment of risk, and we have tools, as I mentioned earlier, with the S&T Risk Matrix, our risk management framework, to mitigate that risk. We operate in an environment of risk, and we have processes, procedures to mitigate it.

Ms. Tokuda. Anyone else want to take a stab at this?

Ms. Keiser. We focus on behaviors and actions when we look at assessments of risk. And so we look at all of our grants and look at the risks across the board and have those pulled out.

So I think that is really important, that we equally apply our risk assessment across the board.

Ms. Valdez. And, likewise, our focus is on behavior, not citizenship, ethnicity, or -- at all. So I want to make that clear.

Ms. Tokuda. So, if I am hearing you all, if we arbitrarily apply simply a nationality test, no

other risk factors that are already embedded in many of the rigorous protocols that exist, it sounds like you will not be able to potentially meet your congressional mandate to be to conduct critical research in areas that are being done at the National Labs.

Could you agree to that? You would lose researchers potentially, again, simply based not on risk, not any kind of a [inaudible], but simply nationality? Yes or no, you will lose researchers, critical researchers that have been leading projects? You can't say which ones, because that is a -- you know, you could probably provide that later.

But will we not be cutting you off at the knees in terms of meeting these congressional mandates to do research in important areas?

Ms. Valdez. I will say that that definitely would restrict the number of individuals that can participate in the research.

Ms. Keiser. I do have to say, a big focus of the National Science Foundation, however, is making sure that we promote the U.S. workforce, as well, and STEM workforce here.

So it has to be a both. It has to be that we, of course, promote those who choose to stay in the United States, as well as make sure that we have that organic U.S. workforce promoted.

Ms. Tokuda. I 100 percent agree, but I think we also know that a significant amount of those who do their doctoral and research work from other countries -- India and China -- do, in fact, stay on beyond 5 and 10 years and contribute meaningful, long-term research for the benefit of the United States. So to exclude them, again, would be not making sure that the best and brightest are sitting in our crown jewels.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Representative Suozzi.

Mr. Suozzi. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. I want to apologize for being in and out of the meeting. I have a Ways and Means markup right now.

To the witnesses also, I apologize.

Let me just tell you a couple things about me before I ask my questions.

Number one is, I am really concerned about China and the Chinese Communist Party and their malign activities. And they are trying to steal intellectual property from us. They are cheating on a regular basis. I, like I think most of the members of this committee, are very concerned by the Chinese Communist Party and their efforts to try and steal information from us on a regular basis.

I am also, in my district, am home to the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratories and the Feinstein Institute. I am very close by to the Brookhaven National Labs. I am very concerned about the cuts that have taken place in this administration to a lot of research. I am concerned in learning in this hearing about the cuts that have been made to the security personnel in each of your different departments as well as general research grants. I am concerned about the politicization of the granting of grants by political appointees as opposed to career folks.

I am also a first-generation American. My father was born in Italy and faced tremendous discrimination. After serving in World War II and going to Harvard Law School, he couldn't get a job at a law firm, because nobody liked the Italians after World War II because they had teamed up with the Germans during World War II, and he faced tremendous discrimination. Went on to live a great American success story.

So, with all those things in mind, I want to ask a couple of you a couple questions.

Dr. Keiser, are you concerned about the cuts to the National Science Foundation?

Ms. Keiser. I have to say, we are in a process now of building. And, to me, it is beyond -- first of all, we are very appreciative of the appropriation that NSF has received from Congress. But what we need to focus on is how we spend our funding.

Mr. Suozzi. But are you a career person?

Ms. Keiser. I am a career person.

Mr. Suozzi. Are you concerned about the cuts that have taken place to NSF already?

Ms. Keiser. We have to build and we have to focus on --

Mr. Suozzi. So you are not upset about the cuts that have already taken place?

Ms. Keiser. I -- you know, my personal feelings are not what I am here to talk about. I am here to talk about how we do good spending --

Mr. Suozzi. Mr. Ison, are you concerned about the cuts that have taken place?

Mr. Ison. The Department will execute the President's budget.

Mr. Suozzi. Dr. Valdez, are you concerned about the cuts?

Ms. Valdez. Well, I need to clarify one thing, is that, you know, my team, research security, we have not experienced cuts ourselves, but I understand there are cuts elsewhere.

But, again, I don't have any comment on --

Mr. Suozzi. So your security team is whole right now?

Ms. Valdez. That is right.

Mr. Suozzi. And how about your security team, Mr. Ison? Is it whole, or are you trying to build it?

Mr. Ison. We have a very robust research-security process as well as team. We have an Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence --

Mr. Suozzi. Has it been cut, or is it the same as it has always been?

Mr. Ison. -- and we are always looking to enhance the capabilities.

It is adequately supporting the risk management framework that we have.

Mr. Suozzi. So was it cut at all or not?

Mr. Ison. Was what cut?

Mr. Suozzi. The security team cut, the size?

Mr. Ison. There were no cuts that I am aware of. There are --

Mr. Suozzi. It is the same number of people it has been for the past, let's say, 3 or 4 years?

Mr. Ison. I think that there -- so, yes, individuals have left that have worked in research

security --

Mr. Suozzi. Have they been replaced?

Mr. Ison. I am not aware. I will have to take that back for you.

Mr. Suozzi. Okay.

And, Dr. Keiser, I heard you speak earlier about how you had 10 people, you went down to 5, and you are going to try and hire more people back.

Ms. Keiser. Yes, sir.

Mr. Suozzi. I am concerned about the fact that Energy and NIH have not developed a policy yet, also, as the chairman was pointing out earlier, regarding security policy and entities that have been identified already. And that is something -- that can't wait. I mean, that is like hair-on-fire, we gotta get moving on this stuff. That is not like we are in discussions. There has to be a goal set and a date set and say, "We are going to have a policy regarding this soon." And I know that you don't do that yourselves; you have to listen to higher-ups. But, I mean, we should be advocating, as I think the chairman is, that these policies be set up as quickly as possible.

So we have to try and stop these malign influences from having access to our data. My concern is, we have to balance that with, at the same time, that there are a lot of Chinese-Americans or there are Chinese nationals that have come to school in America or research in America that are very important to our institutions, and we can't allow the concern we have with the Chinese Communist Party to discriminate against people.

We heard the balance between our security concerns and our civil-rights concerns. That is a very tough thing to do. And it is important that we try to work together -- Democrats and Republicans, professionals, career people, and political people -- to find that balance. But that is why we need these policies to be developed and done so now.

Because we all, I think, Democrats and Republicans, each of you as professionals, want to protect the security of the United States of America and not give an unfair, untoward advantage to

our adversaries, the Chinese Communist Party, while at the same time not discouraging people who are brilliant scientists from working here in the United States of America.

So I want to thank all of you for your professionalism and for your devotion to our country. We appreciate it very much.

And I yield back.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Now we are going to have a second round for those who have additional questions.

And I would like to begin -- Mr. Ison, during our DOE research-security investigation, the committee received concerning allegations regarding DOE's Office of Research, Technology, and Economic Security, RTES -- specifically, that RTES practice is always to get to a "yes" on vetting awards, not to conduct vetting on National Lab scientists who are covered individuals, and that some program offices have pressured analysts to downgrade the assessed risk of research collaborations with China to avoid imposing safeguards.

Mr. Ison, can you state unequivocally whether or not these allegations are true?

Mr. Ison. So thank you for that question.

So, since these allegations have been raised to us by the committee, our Office of General Counsel has been leading an investigation. So that investigation is incomplete.

But we take those allegations very serious. It would be unacceptable if those allegations ended up being true. And we will look forward to getting back to this committee through the appropriate channels at the conclusion of that investigation.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Dr. Keiser, NSF manages and funds, to the tune of $65 million, the SECURE Center to strengthen research security across the U.S. research enterprise. Yet several universities participating in the SECURE Center have been identified in our committee's investigations as involving high-risk research collaborations with Chinese military entities or

U.S.-Government-entity-listed institutions.

Should American taxpayers trust institutions with research-security failures to establish and promote research-security standards?

Ms. Keiser. We appreciate the information that this committee and that your team provided to us.

When we received the information, we immediately went to the awardees and asked them to respond, specifically respond, to what was in there. We reviewed the responses, and although we did not see violations of terms and conditions, we are very open to additional information that this committee is bringing forward, and we will look into those.

Now, part of the reason why we did our new policy that we introduced is for the very reasons that the committee has expressed concerns about, that we do need to address these concerning collaborations with restricted entities by being very clear across the board to institutions about what is prohibited on NSF funding and what is not.

And so I am very confident on this policy going forward to address the concerns that you expressed.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Dr. Valdez, does the NIH consider the national-security implications of proposed research and research collaborations when conducting pre-award due diligence and proposal reviews?

Ms. Valdez. We do. We have a very robust system to look at risk during the whole lifecycle of the award. And, you know, as I mentioned, we have a decision matrix that is posted online where we look at factors including, you know, foreign affiliation, foreign funding, talent programs -- talent recruitment programs. And when we identify concerns, we go to the institutions.

Now, if we learn more and there appears to be an egregious concern -- there may be some, you know, civil concerns or criminal concerns -- we will raise that to our Office of the

Inspector General. And if there is a national-security concern, we can raise those to the HHS Office of National Security.

So, because we are a funding agency, we do rely on our agency partners to be able to assist us when it comes to the national-security concerns.

Chairman Moolenaar. And just a followup question, Dr. Valdez.

Biomedical research is one of China's strategic priorities, and the CCP has made significant investments to acquire foreign biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and genomics.

What specific steps has NIH taken to protect federally funded biomedical research from foreign exploitation? And where do you believe additional authorities or resources are needed?

Ms. Valdez. Right. So we have taken steps to protect the controlled-access data -- so human data. There is now a restriction that individuals that are located in institutions in China or other foreign countries of concern can no longer access that data. Human bio-specimens cannot be shared with or sent to organizations in China or associated with China.

So we definitely take this very seriously, and we look forward to hearing other thoughts on, you know, what else we can do. But I think, you know, we do conduct due diligence on all awards as they are going through, as they are being conducted, so we hope that that will catch any type of concerns.

And, like I said, we do work closely with our other offices and our interagency partners when there are national-security concerns.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you very much.

Representative Tokuda.

Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just wanted to follow up on Representative Suozzi's line of questioning. I think what he was getting at was not just cuts but overall attrition -- how many people, how many employees have you lost in the past 18-plus months right now.

And I think, as it was mentioned earlier on the dais, the NSF workforce fell by about 30.3 percent. NIH lost about 1,000 employees, with a potential additional 1,200 anticipating leaving as well. And the Department of Energy lost more than 2,600 employees as well. So I do think the fundamental question is, you have this accelerating rate of attrition, a chilling effect almost, that I see happening right now.

In addition to that, you have proposed budget cuts to the Office of the Inspector General, the Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy Office -- millions of dollars -- which will reduce your capacity to follow up on, you know, the claims made by this committee for you to actually investigate.

Do you feel you have the workforce right now to both respond to this committee, to be able to keep that same rigor in terms of protocols to keep our research safe, and meet the missions and congressional research mandates that you have been given, as a result of all of these staff losses that we have seen over the last 18 months?

Ms. Keiser. We have a robust hiring plan at NSF. And, as Acting Chief of Staff, I know this well because I, every day, receive the proposed hires, the names of the candidates, to approve. And we are hiring; we are hiring up.

We are focusing quite a bit on early career staff. We are focusing on research-security staff --

Ms. Tokuda. But I guess the question for me, Dr. Keiser, is -- I appreciate that. I am glad that you are hiring up. But you are already still at a delta. You have lost a considerable amount of people.

Do you think you are -- again, I would rather us be adding, not subtracting, not even trying to get back to ground and level where we were.

Do you feel fundamentally -- I don't want to run out of time here -- that a result of the kinds of actions you all have seen -- proposed budget cuts, whether Congress was able to fill that hole that

the administration was proposing or not, the DOGE-ing that we saw, the restrictions on research, the freezing of funding, all of these things -- do you feel you can overcome what has been a massive chilling effect on research? And how long is it going to take us to dig ourselves out of this hole?

I fear that, generationally, we have lost researchers and individuals willing to commit themselves to the United States and to our National Labs as a result of the actions that we have seen.

Ms. Keiser. We are building, and we are focusing on funding good science that is selected through our merit review process. Just yesterday, we announced several new research innovation engines. And these are exciting projects that are focused on fundamental research across the region.

So we are building an exciting ecosystem, and we are continuing to do that.

Ms. Tokuda. Anyone else want to weigh in on this?

If not, I would just say -- you know, I will yield back my time, Chair -- I appreciate that you are building, but, honestly, you are still filling a hole, a giant hole, that was left as a result of the exodus, the mass exodus, of research that we have seen from all three of your institutions. We are going to have to do it faster.

And, quite frankly, the kinds of xenophobic, nationalist policies that we are seeing right now are not going to help us get the very best and brightest and help you build versus just fill back what you have lost.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Representative Nunn.

Mr. Nunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You have remained laser-focused on this issue with the China Select Committee and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, identifying the bipartisan nature of this.

I want to thank the National Science Foundation for awarding Iowa and Nebraska the

RuralSTAMINA biomanufacturing engineering grant. This brings $160 million of investment into biomanufacturing and agricultural innovation over the next decade into the entire region. With NSF's investment, Iowa is turning federally funded research into world-class results. Your leadership on this is huge.

And we are bringing breakthrough technologies from our top-tier research labs and universities straight to our factory floors, to our advanced manufacturing, and strengthening our rural workforce, ensuring that the future of America's bio innovation is happening not only in America but right in the heartland of this country.

Iowa, and particularly Iowa State, has been a leader in this space, bringing together partnership across State lines, with over 70 public-private partners, including both the University of Iowa, Des Moines Area Community College, many of our startups and venture capitalists -- the list goes on. This is a story of success, being led by our team here. We are very, very thankful on this front.

I also want to take caution here, because, as you will also note, we are going to point to some of the ongoing challenges and gaps in this space. And while we want to grow it here, we also want to make sure that it is maintained here.

Look, we saw this firsthand in the Monsanto case that took place in my State. Both myself and my colleague, Representative Hinson here, know that the Chinese actively target the type of development that is happening in the United States.

Just miles up the road from my house, we had a Chinese national come and steal seed corn right out of the ground to take it back to China to replicate. And this was in 2011, when you could still steal corn right out of the ground. Now you can just go on a computer and take that intellectual property theft.

This threat has only grown more sophisticated since that time. In just the last 2 years, Federal agents have foiled two separate plots by CCP agents to smuggle pathogens, including fungus

the FBI and the Department of Justice called a potential agro-terrorism weapon, into research labs, including in the chairman's own home State.

When the CCP steals from our fields and threatens our food supply, they threaten our national security. And they are finding more and more endemic ways to do that.

That is why I introduced this year's PLANT Act to put up commonsense guardrails to aggressively hold bad actors accountable who exploit regulatory loopholes and commit agro-terrorism right here on U.S. soil, with maximum penalties for anyone linked to adversaries like the Chinese Communist Party.

And the CCP is aggressively targeting American technologies at every stage, whether it is in private research or whether it is in our university labs. This means research security cannot stop at the university gates or end the moment a Federal grant is awarded.

So, Dr. Keiser, I would like to speak with you. It is no secret that our innovation pipeline includes every sector, as we just highlighted here. Many breakthroughs generated by NSF initiatives like RuralSTAMINA can be designed to scale and commercialized through our private industries.

Do you believe the current research-security efforts at NSF sufficiently protect the taxpayers' innovation as they transition out of the university labs and on to the open market?

Ms. Keiser. Thank you for mentioning that. And we are very excited about RuralSTAMINA as well. It is one of the research innovation engines that we celebrated yesterday.

And I am glad that you mentioned it and the research-security efforts, because built in to the Research Innovation Engines Program, as well as our programs that are more on the cusp of innovation and commercialization, we have built in research-security efforts. We do research-security assessments of those proposals. We do our due diligence, and we focus on that.

We also do it for our Small Business Innovation Research program and STTR program. And we have focused a large cadre of contractors specifically on that space because of our concerns. It

is growing because a lot of university academics, as you know, are starting businesses.

Mr. Nunn. That is right.

Ms. Keiser. And that is a good thing. It is very exciting. But there is also an increased research-security risk that we have to focus on.

Mr. Nunn. Dr. Keiser, I could not agree with you more. Thank you for being a resource to our hometowns on this, our innovators, and our universities.

Look, 20 years in counterintelligence, and we know there are 40,000 shell companies operating here with direct ties to the CCP. The very fact that they could be in the supply chain and stealing our best technology is something we collectively, on both sides of the aisle, I think, have a responsibility to fight. You are helping to lead that charge, and I want to thank you personally.

With that, I yield the remainder of my time to the chair.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you very much.

Representative Hinson.

Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to directly follow up on my colleague from Iowa's line of questioning around intellectual property.

So thank you, Representative Nunn, for setting this up for me.

Because he did mention, you know, the stealing of the seed directly out of the cornfields of Iowa, near Bondurant, in Polk County. The same thing happened in Dysart, in Tama County, in my congressional district. The Chinese businessman was conspiring to steal those seeds directly from the farm. And so we know, when you talk about intellectual property, Iowans know that firsthand, how far China will go, literally digging in our fields to steal, to dominate the global market.

So the ag sector and biotech are equally as important as many of the critical research projects that your agencies are handling. And I want everyone listening to know that we are committed to helping to protect our research and the intellectual property from the CCP.

So, Dr. Keiser, I want to follow up on my first line of questioning, because I saw you were both in agreement on some of the blocks that need to exist and the checks and balances that need to exist, to make sure we are vetting people properly while still making sure we are not closing things down. You said we don't want to completely shut everything off, right? We want some open collaboration there as well.

So thank you for your efforts to protect NSF there, but can you speak to -- and kind of wanted to follow up on my first question about, is there more that Congress needs to do here? You have policies in place to make sure that these protections are being executed, but do we need to be doing more to proactively give you the tools to properly vet things?

Ms. Keiser. One of the big areas that we are focusing quite a bit on and I think would be very helpful is, we need increased authorities for information-sharing among our agencies. Many times, we, NSF, will see an issue with a particular research project that involves particular researchers and we are limited in sharing that information and those concerns with other agencies.

As an example, we just did some due diligence on NSF ocean infrastructure proposals, and we found several that had ties to restricted entities. And these are in areas such as deep-sea mineral extraction, underwater positioning and navigation, sea-floor cables. As you can imagine, these are areas that are vital to our national security, and when we find issues, we need to be able to share those with our fellow agencies.

So that type of thing and that type of structure to be able to share information would be very helpful.

Mrs. Hinson. Yeah. Well, I mean, if you look at prohibited entities lists, as they stand right now, those should match, right? You want to make sure that every single malign actor is being recognized by every single government agency. So one hand needs to know what the other hand is doing.

I think that is also important from a taxpayer-protection perspective, because you think about

us utilizing those resources effectively. We can avoid duplicative efforts if you are able to talk more. So I would be excited to work with your office and with you directly on what more we can do there.

What about State and local partners? I mean, obviously, we talk about Iowa State University collaborating with Department of Energy. Is there more that we need to do on authorities so that you can have those same conversations with those partners as well?

Mr. Ison. So I think one gap that I have noticed over the years is a lack of clearances for -- security clearances available for university employees.

I think sometimes -- and perhaps more than sometimes -- it is important for university professionals, as well as other types of decision-makers, to have the opportunity to receive classified briefings so that they are fully informed of the threat and understanding why we might make recommendations or various types of mitigations. And I don't think it necessarily needs to be expansive in terms of how many people have those clearances, but I do think that there needs to be a process where those types of things are facilitated a little bit more easily.

Mrs. Hinson. Yeah. Well, and certainly understanding a full context of why they are working on something and those immediate threats and how important -- time is of the essence, right? We understand time is money.

Did you have anything to add, Dr. Valdez, to that?

Ms. Valdez. I agree with them.

I will mention that I do appreciate Congress raising this issue. I think the more that this issue is raised with the community so people understand, you know, what the problems are and what the concerns are, I think is important. So I appreciate it. Thank you.

Mrs. Hinson. All right. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Representative Newhouse.

Mr. Newhouse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, thank you all for being here with us. Appreciate it very much.

Let me start with you, Dr. Valdez.

It is my understanding that the NIH has issued roughly 8,600 fewer awards than the average in fiscal years 2021 through 2024. This is about a 21-percent decline in awards and a 13-percent decline in obligated funding. As you can imagine, it has impacted a lot of universities, such as Washington State University in my own district, who are currently waiting many proposals that are pending.

First of all, NIH has made a lot of progress implementing disclosure requirements and foreign support reporting, conflict-of-interest oversight, and security safeguards on research, all of which is much appreciated. And thank you very much for putting those in.

But I would like to understand your insight as to why institutions are still experiencing delays. And to follow up on that, what is the plan to reduce the backlog that is growing of pending proposals while still maintaining a rigorous research integrity standard?

Ms. Valdez. Yeah. Thank you for the question.

You know, regarding the research integrity and risk-screening, we have put systems in place that make those security-risk-screens faster for the grants management staff.

And I will say, the plan is to get the money out and to get the funds out. Staff are working incredibly hard right now to get that done.

And so we absolutely understand the concerns, and we do plan to get all the proposals out and get the funds out that we should by the end of the fiscal year. So that is something ongoing.

And, you know, we do have a lot of focus on research integrity. You know, each of the funding institutes has their own research-integrity officer. And so, when there are concerns identified, those are brought to my attention, the central Office of Extramural Research.

And we do a lot of, you know, training as well. So I think the staff, you know, program officials who are reviewing the potential awards, are very knowledgeable. And so they bring concerns to us as well.

So I think, you know, having the staff understand what red flags to look for is important. And having, again, the resources and the systems that we have in place is helpful as well, as far as identifying the risks.

But we do understand, and we do hope to get -- we plan to get the money out by the end of this fiscal year.

Mr. Newhouse. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Dr. Keiser, if I could ask you a question, in your testimony, you discussed the NSF's role on JCORE's Research Security Subcommittee and underscored the value of collaboration between the NSF, the DOE, and the NIH.

So let me ask you: In your opinion, at present, does the Federal Government have sufficient oversight to coordinate research security across agencies? Or do information silos create gaps that could allow broader risk patterns and repeat offenders to perhaps go undetected?

Ms. Keiser. We work really closely together. And we were talking before -- we have been working for years together, and so we have built these relationships among our agencies. And we do work very closely with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, as well as OMB, on these issues.

I think the big challenge as it is, as I mentioned before: the limits and authorities on information-sharing that we do need to overcome.

The other big challenge is something that Jeremy also mentioned, is that we have very close relationships with the intelligence community and with law enforcement; however, some of the information is classified, and we work in an unclassified setting. And so we are limited in the type of information, in some cases, that we can provide out to the research community itself when we see

issues in cases.

So increased clearances is one way to deal with that. Thinking about ways we could work with the intelligence community to declassify some of the information so that we can provide more out is another way to deal with this issue.

And I think a third thing is, we are still in a process of culture change with the community. This is significant culture change. Labs are open places. And, again, we don't want to close them down, but the putting safeguards in place has to be an all-of-government effort to work with the community on that culture change.

Mr. Newhouse. Good. Thank you very much. Perfect timing.

I appreciate, again, all of you being here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Moolenaar. Thank you.

Representative Nunn.

Mr. Nunn. Well, Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to engage on a couple of additional items here.

Dr. Keiser, we have talked about this and you highlighted in your written testimony that we can't just play defense in this space when it comes to what the Chinese Communist Party is aiming to do to U.S. tech here. We also have to out-innovate -- something that all three of you, I want to compliment you, from Energy to NIH to certainly what NSF is doing to stay ahead of our adversary in this space.

One of these things we are working on is expanding the AI voice. Specifically, we have a bill -- it is called the Artificial Intelligence Voices Act -- and does exactly that by expanding NSF's current role in our innovative programs around AI to invest resources into building the domestic talent we have, particularly in under-resourced and, I will say, in rural parts, which is most of the America outside of Silicon Valley. This is a really important part of our opportunity to be able to

compete with a near-peer adversary like China, is that we are using all of the resources available to us, all the talent that is right here in America.

I would like to ask you, do you agree that initiatives like this to really be able to cultivate artificial intelligence across the country, including in rural America, for our students is essential for strengthening America's domestic workforce? And can this help us win the race?

Ms. Keiser. While I can't comment on pending legislation --

Mr. Nunn. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Keiser. -- I can say, of course, that, you know, we need to provide knowledge and information on how to use AI and cultivate that AI workforce across this country.

It is an essential part of what NSF focuses on. It is our bread and butter, as you know, is workforce development. We are working with the Genesis Mission on this. We have the National AI Research Resource, NAIRR. And we are working on an effort called AI-Ready America for this very reason.

So thank you very much for bringing that up.

Mr. Nunn. Thank you, Dr. Keiser.

Mr. Ison, I want to speak to you too. If we are going to win the artificial-intelligence race with any country, but particularly with China, who has, you know, built a mega-data-center about every 6 weeks, it seems like, there is a lot of energy consumption that is going to be required for this.

Now, the Chinese will use anything to power these, whether it is dirty coal, whether it is fossil fuels, whether it is any energy resource they can create. The U.S. has to be much more intelligent about how we not only provide the power grid for an artificial-intelligence network but also how we keep those data centers going.

Can you talk to us about what we are doing to be competitive in this space and not allow China to just dominate us, not just by the data centers themselves but by the energy consumption that is going to be required, without driving up all of our energy bill at the end of the day as well?

Mr. Ison. Thank you for that question.

My expertise is on PRC targeting the S&T ecosystem in the United States. So I am here to discuss those and the mitigations that we have in place. I am happy to take that question back for you.

Mr. Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think that is an important question for all of us here. In order for us to be effective, both on the tech side -- we have to be able to have the resources available, particularly the AI. And that is only going to happen when we have the energy, the water, and, to Dr. Keiser's point, the workforce to make those systems successful.

With that, Mr. Chair, thank you very much. I yield the remainder of my time.

Chairman Moolenaar. All right. Thank you.

And I want to also just thank our witnesses for your candor and just the straightforward approach you have had.

And questions for the record are due 1 week from today.

[The information follows:]

******** COMMITTEE INSERT ********

Chairman Moolenaar. And, without objection, the committee hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]