



Questions for the Record

Protecting American Innovation: The Federal Research Security Enterprise

7/15/2026

Representative John Moolenaar (Chairman of the Select Committee on China) – MI-2

Witness – Dr. Patricia Valdez

- 1. The Department of War (DOW) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) have concluded that entities appearing on U.S. government restricted-party lists present risks that warrant prohibition rather than mitigation. Why does the National Institutes of Health (NIH) believe taxpayer-funded biomedical research should continue to support collaborations involving entities that the U.S. government has already designated for national security, military, proliferation, export-control, sanctions, or human rights concerns? Please explain what factors distinguish NIH's position from that of DOW and NSF.**

NIH Response:

NIH's mission is to advance biomedical research while protecting the integrity and security of the research enterprise. Our current approach is to evaluate potential research security concerns using established policies, required disclosures, and a



case-specific risk assessment process. We continually evaluate whether our policies remain appropriate and effective.

On July 28, 2026, after the date of this hearing, the Administration released the [U.S. Government Policy for Stopping High-Risk Life Sciences Research](#).¹ Not only does this policy prohibit dangerous gain-of-function research, but it also prohibits NIH funding of life sciences research involving entities of concern, *i.e.*, research conducted outside the United States by an institution of concern or an individual of concern. The policy instructs the Director of National Intelligence, Secretary of State, Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a list of entities of concern for the purposes of this policy. NIH supports this policy and will implement these prohibitions as required.

- 2. During the July 15, 2026 hearing, NIH acknowledged that collaborations involving entities appearing on U.S. government restricted-party lists present significant research security concerns and stated that such relationships are considered during NIH's risk review process. DOW has already implemented a prohibition on such collaborations, and the NSF has publicly announced its intent to do the same. Will NIH commit to adopting a comparable prohibition on the use**

¹ [whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/USG-Policy-for-Stopping-High-Risk-Life-Sciences-Research_July-2026.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/USG-Policy-for-Stopping-High-Risk-Life-Sciences-Research_July-2026.pdf)



of NIH funds for collaborations involving entities appearing on U.S. government restricted-party lists? If not, please explain why NIH believes a mitigation-based approach is preferable to prohibition.

NIH Response:

As stated above, NIH's mission is to support biomedical research that improves health. At the same time, we take our responsibility to safeguard taxpayer-funded research very seriously. We work closely with our federal partners that have national security responsibilities and use our established review and oversight processes to identify and address research security concerns while supporting the biomedical research enterprise. We continually evaluate our policies to ensure they remain effective and consistent with applicable authorities. We also continually monitor the changing risk landscape and adapt to new threats as they arise.

After the date of the hearing, the Administration published the [U.S. Government Policy for Stopping High-Risk Life Sciences Research](#),² which will further strengthen NIH oversight of taxpayer funded research by prohibiting NIH funding to entities of concern as designated by the policy.

² Ibid



3. During the July 15, 2026 hearing, NIH testified that it reviews disclosures and utilizes a decision matrix to assess potential foreign interference and research security risks. Please describe in detail NIH's national security review process for grant applicants, collaborators, subrecipients, and senior/key personnel. Specifically, does NIH conduct screening against U.S. government restricted-party lists, Chinese defense research and industrial base entities, foreign military-affiliated institutions, malign foreign talent recruitment programs, or other national security-related databases? If so, please identify the screening mechanisms utilized and the actions taken when a concern is identified.

NIH Response:

NIH reviews required disclosures submitted by recipients, including information related to foreign components, other support, and senior/key personnel. Potential research security concerns are evaluated through an established review process that considers the facts of each case and, when appropriate, involves coordination with relevant federal partners. Depending on the circumstances, NIH may request additional information, impose award conditions, delay an award pending resolution, or take other appropriate administrative actions. While NIH is not a national security agency, NIH does use databases that identify affiliations and collaborations with entities on U.S. government



restricted-party lists for these reviews. Our [process](#)³ and [matrix](#)⁴ can be found on our website.

³ grants.nih.gov/policy-and-compliance/policy-topics/foreign-interference/handling-allegations

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grants.nih.gov/sites/default/files/NIH%20Decision%20Matrix%20for%20Assessing%20Potential%20Foreign%20Interference%20for%20Covered%20Individuals%20or%20Senior%207%2026%2024%20clean.pdf