

United States House of Representatives Select Committee on China
Protecting American Innovation: The Federal Research Security Enterprise
Questions for the Record Submitted to the Honorable Mr. Jeremy Ison
July 15, 2026

QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE ANDRE CARSON

Q1. When a young, brilliant scientist sees colleagues' grants frozen or projects terminated for political reasons, they often move to the private sector or to foreign labs entirely. What is the agency's assessment of the cumulative loss of intellectual capital specifically in high-tech fields like quantum computing over the last 18 months, and how do we quantify that as a national security risk in itself?

A1. Department of Energy (DOE) recognizes that attracting and retaining exceptional scientific talent is essential to U.S. leadership and national security, particularly in fields such as quantum information science, where specialized expertise takes years to develop. Loss of that talent can move expertise to strategic competitors, disrupt specialized research teams, delay to critical projects or programs, and reduce the Nation's capacity to train the next generation of scientists.

Because individual career decisions reflect multiple factors, DOE cannot reliably isolate the effects of particular funding actions over an 18-month period. That measurement limitation does not diminish the national security importance of attracting and retaining specialized scientific talent or the need to account for talent effects in U.S. science and technology policy.

Q2. Given the current landscape of federal mandates, how would you describe the overall state of compliance across U.S. research institutions regarding research security laws and policies?

A2. Compliance across U.S. research institutions is improving, but it remains uneven as Federal research security requirements expand and become standardized. Many institutions have strengthened their disclosure, training, certification, and internal review processes. In DOE's experience, institutions generally engage constructively with the Research Technology and Economic Security (RTES) Office to address identified concerns and implement required mitigation. Constructive engagement is important, but it does not substitute for complete disclosure, effective controls, and continued compliance. DOE is establishing clearer and more consistent expectations, supporting

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effective implementation, and applying oversight so that compliance reduces risk while preserving collaboration essential to U.S. scientific leadership.