

Immigrant Sanctuary Policies and Crime-Reporting Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis of Reports of Crime Victimization to Law Enforcement, 1980 to 2004

American Sociological Review
2021, Vol. 86(1) 154–185
© American Sociological
Association 2021
DOI: 10.1177/0003122420978406
journals.sagepub.com/home/asr



Ricardo D. Martínez-Schuldt^a 
and Daniel E. Martínez^b 

Abstract

Sanctuary jurisdictions have existed in the United States since the 1980s. They have recently reentered U.S. politics and engendered contentious debates regarding their legality and influence on public safety. Critics argue that sanctuary jurisdictions create conditions that threaten local communities by impeding federal immigration enforcement efforts. Proponents maintain that the policies improve public safety by fostering institutional trust among immigrant communities and by increasing the willingness of immigrant community members to notify the police after they are victimized. In this study, we situate expectations from the immigrant sanctuary literature within a multilevel, contextualized help-seeking framework to assess how crime-reporting behavior varies across immigrant sanctuary contexts. We find that Latinos are more likely to report violent crime victimization to law enforcement after sanctuary policies have been adopted within their metropolitan areas of residence. We argue that social policy contexts can shift the nature of help-seeking experiences and eliminate barriers that undermine crime victims' willingness to mobilize the law. Overall, this study highlights the unique role social policy contexts can serve in structuring victims' help-seeking decisions.

Keywords

sanctuary policies, Latinas/Latinos, crime reporting, National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)

Sanctuary jurisdictions are geographic areas, such as cities, counties, or states, with policies that attempt to limit cooperation between local officials, such as service sector bureaucrats or law enforcement, and the federal government in immigration enforcement (Collingwood and Gonzalez O'Brien 2019; Kittrie 2006; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019; Menjivar et al. 2018). Sanctuary jurisdictions have existed in the United States since the 1980s, but the past few years have

seen a rise in contentious political debates regarding their legality and influence on public safety (Martínez, Martínez-Schuldt, and

^aUniversity of Notre Dame

^bUniversity of Arizona

Corresponding Author:

Ricardo D. Martínez-Schuldt, University of Notre Dame, 4053 Jenkins Nanovic Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556

Email: rmarti23@nd.edu

Cantor 2018). In 2017, for example, 150 bills related to immigrant sanctuaries were introduced into state legislatures, with a majority of the bills (59 percent) being restrictive or anti-sanctuary in some form (Collingwood, El-Khatib, and Gonzalez O'Brien 2019). Drawing on a larger politicized discourse that links immigration to crime, critics argue that sanctuary jurisdictions violate federal law and create criminogenic conditions that threaten local communities (see, e.g., Executive Order 13768).

Proponents of the policies, including mayors, city council members, sheriffs, police chiefs, and academics, maintain that immigrant sanctuaries actually enhance public safety by increasing the likelihood that members of immigrant communities report crime victimization to local police or cooperate with law enforcement investigations (Kittrie 2006). Higher levels of cooperation and trust in law enforcement emerge because sanctuary policies counter or prevent legal cynicism from developing within immigrant communities (Kittrie 2006; Martinez et al. 2018). Legal cynicism, or the belief that legal institutions and the criminal justice system are illegitimate, inhibits crime victims and witnesses who are members of immigrant communities from interacting with law enforcement due to perceptions that doing so will render them, their friends, their families, or fellow community members vulnerable to deportation (Kirk et al. 2012; Menjivar et al. 2018; Theodore and Habans 2016).

Research shows that the U.S. immigration enforcement system fosters widespread legal cynicism in immigrant communities (Theodore and Habans 2016; Zatz and Smith 2012). Since the 1990s, the immigration system has undergone a process of devolution, whereby the federal government has granted local officials elevated powers and expanded roles in immigration enforcement (Abrego et al. 2017; Armenta 2017; Coleman 2007; Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008; Kubrin 2014; Meissner et al. 2013). Members of immigrant communities, regardless of their immigration status, have been subject to greater scrutiny

and social control at the local level (Kanstroom 2007), which has led to allegations of discrimination and racial profiling during routine traffic stops (Capps et al. 2011; Meissner et al. 2013) and the widespread confinement of immigrants, especially black and Latino men, in immigrant detention centers with frequent reports of mistreatment and abuse (Abrego et al. 2017; Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Hernández et al. 2018; Phillips, Hagan, and Rodriguez 2006).

Mutual trust and cooperation between residents and local institutions like law enforcement are integral to the safety and well-being of communities (Desmond, Papachristos, and Kirk 2016; Skogan and Frydl 2004). A primary way people mobilize the law and receive justice is by notifying law enforcement of criminal victimization experiences (Black 1973). The state's formal mechanisms of social control often hinge on the criminal justice system reacting to denizens' reports of crime (Gottfredson and Gottfredson 1988; Reiss 1992). Furthermore, the mobilization of formal control through the criminal justice system can enhance public safety in communities where informal social control mechanisms are inhibited by weak private and parochial social networks (Carr 2003). In the absence of informal and formal mechanisms of control, violent subcultures promoting extralegal retribution may develop and further undermine public safety (Anderson 1999; Sampson 2012). Immigrant and non-immigrant members of communities thus stand to benefit from an overall increase in trust and cooperation between residents and local institutions.

Previous studies have only speculated as to whether sanctuary policies build institutional trust between immigrant community members and law enforcement (Gonzalez, Collingwood, and El-Khatib 2017; Lyons, Vélez, and Santoro 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019; Wong 2017). Rather than directly analyze patterns in attitudes or behaviors indicative of institutional trust, prior research has assessed if sanctuary policies are directly related to county-, city-, or state-level crime

patterns (Gonzalez et. al 2017; Kubrin and Bartos 2020; Wong 2017) or if they moderate the crime-buffering effects of immigration (Lyons et al. 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019). Researchers have not yet directly examined if crime victims' probabilities of reporting crime incidents to law enforcement systematically vary across immigrant sanctuary policy contexts. Such evidence would suggest that levels of institutional trust are higher in immigrant sanctuary contexts.

We address this gap in the research by examining 25 years of data (1980 to 2004) on more than 35,000 incidents of violent crime victimization and 135,000 incidents of property crime victimization. We merge a variety of data sources, including the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS): MSA Data, to construct a longitudinal and multilevel dataset of crime victimization incidents nested in the core counties of the 40 largest U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Two central research questions guide our analyses. First, *are crime victims more likely to report victimization in the context of sanctuary policies?* Second, given the conjecture in the literature, *are the macro-level effects of sanctuary policies exclusive to ethno-racial minority victims who are most likely to be socially connected to immigrant communities?*

This article has broader theoretical implications for the study of victims' help-seeking decisions (Xie and Baumer 2019a). A large body of evidence demonstrates that incident- and individual-level characteristics consistently shape decisions to report crime victimization to the police (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010; Felson et al. 2002; Gottfredson and Hindelang 1979; Skogan 1984; Xie and Baumer 2019a). Fewer studies directly assess how socio-environmental conditions structure crime-reporting behavior (but see Baumer 2002; Desmond et al. 2016; Gutierrez and Kirk 2017; Xie and Baumer 2019a), which has led to calls for greater attention to the macro-level contexts within which victimization occurs (Goudriaan and Nieuwbeerta 2007; Xie and Baumer 2019b). We contribute to this line of investigation by demonstrating

how social policy contexts can interact with victims' personal characteristics to structure help-seeking behavior. We argue that social policy contexts can shift the nature of help-seeking experiences and eliminate barriers that undermine crime victims' willingness to mobilize the law.

THEORETICAL INSIGHTS ON DECISIONS TO REPORT CRIME VICTIMIZATION

Micro-Level Explanations

Research into the correlates of crime-victimization reporting spans academic disciplines, but empirical studies have focused on the role of micro-level factors, especially the characteristics of crime incidents (Xie and Baumer 2019a). Researchers consistently find that decisions to notify law enforcement are influenced by the severity of crimes, or the extent of physical, emotional, and material costs of victimization (Copes et al. 2001; Gottfredson and Hindelang 1979). Micro-level research typically mobilizes rational choice models to argue that post-victimization decisions are a function of cognitive processes that follow a simple "cost-benefit" calculation, whereby victims weigh the potential costs of involving law enforcement against potential benefits (Skogan 1984:120). With minor or less severe incidents, there is little to gain from calling the police. If a victim sustains serious injuries or experiences significant property loss, or if an offender utilizes a weapon (and poses a continued threat to the individual or larger community), there may be greater benefits to involving law enforcement.

Other micro-level approaches emphasize that individuals' attitudes toward the police shape decisions (Xie and Baumer 2019a). Rather than following cost-benefit analyses, people make decisions about whether to engage with police in relation to the levels of legitimacy they attribute to law enforcement and the criminal justice system (Anderson 1999; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tankebe 2013). Experiences with procedural

injustice can foster negative dispositions toward police, which reduces people's willingness to seek support from law enforcement (Carr, Napolitano, and Keating 2007). Some studies conclude that attitudes toward law enforcement are significant determinants of decisions to notify police (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tankebe 2013), but the evidence remains mixed (Xie and Baumer 2019a).

The logic of micro-level perspectives on post-victimization decisions can be extended to explain why immigrant community members may be less willing to interact with law enforcement. For immigrant community members, reporting crime victimization or cooperating with investigations may introduce a perceived or real risk that irregular immigration statuses will come to light (Menjívar et al. 2018; Theodore and Habans 2016). In so far as deportation (or the risk of deportation) is a salient cost of interacting with law enforcement, members of immigrant communities may be systematically less likely to interact with the police. Fussell (2011:595) finds that a similar process, referred to as the "deportation threat dynamic," plays out in the context of labor rights violations and results in migrant workers being hesitant to contact labor enforcement agencies when confronting exploitative working conditions (see also De Genova's [2002] discussion of deportability). Alternatively, the devolution of immigration enforcement, which has elevated the power and expanded the role of local police in immigration enforcement (Coleman 2007), may challenge the view that local law enforcement are primarily concerned with street-level crimes, thereby undermining law enforcement's institutional legitimacy in immigrant communities.

Macro-Level Explanations: Black's Theory of Law

Black's (1976) theory of law offers greater insights on why and how immigrant community members may or may not mobilize the law by notifying the police about crime victimization experiences, particularly across different immigrant policy contexts. Indeed, Black's (1976) theoretical approach

has guided several studies of victims' decisions to call the police (Avakame, Fyfe, and McCoy 1999; Baumer 2002; Copes et al. 2001; Gottfredson and Hindelang 1979; Xie and Lauritsen 2012), but it has not yet been explicitly applied to the case of immigrant communities. According to Black (1976:2), "law," broadly defined as "governmental social control," is a quantifiable characteristic of societies that can be captured by a number of measures, including the rate by which victims notify law enforcement that a crime has occurred. High rates of police notification indicate greater levels of law for a particular social group or in a specific geographic setting.

Black (1976) further argues that social phenomena such as law vary in relation to different aspects of social life. Of the aspects of social life Black (1976) identifies, three are of particular relevance to a theoretical understanding of immigrant community members' mobilization of law: stratification, morphology, and social control. Stratification, or the "vertical aspect of social life" (Black 1976:17), refers to group-based differences in social rank and access to material resources. According to Black (1976), members of structurally advantaged groups have greater access and are more likely to mobilize law (e.g., by calling the police when victimized). Drawing on Black's (1976) theory of law, we would expect that victims in immigrant communities, especially Latinos, are systematically less likely to call the police because of their greater exposure to structural disadvantages (Hoynes, Page, and Stevens 2006; Lynch 2016). The concept of morphology, which refers to the broader "horizontal" relationships among society members, including group-based levels of societal integration,¹ also implies that immigrant community members are less likely than other groups to mobilize the law (Black 1976). As past research reveals, transformations in the U.S. immigration enforcement system, including the devolution of immigration enforcement, the criminalization of immigration, the separation of families, and mass deportation, have disrupted and further marginalized immigrant

communities, which is theorized to undermine their ability or willingness to mobilize law (Kanstroom 2007; Menjívar, Abrego, and Schmalzbauer 2016; Stuart, Armenta, and Osborne 2015; Theodore and Habans 2016).

Finally, Black (1976:107) distinguishes law as governmental social control from other forms of social control such as “etiquette, customs, ethics, bureaucracy, and the treatment of mental illness.” Theoretically, formal and informal forms of social control vary inversely such that formal social control (i.e., law) is lower in areas with greater levels of alternatives. Given that immigrant communities possess uniquely high levels of informal social control due to the importance of social capital and the density of social ties (Martinez 2006), we would expect less mobilization of law in immigrant communities.

A Multilevel, Contextualized Help-Seeking Framework

In an effort to integrate insights from the extant micro and macro perspectives, Xie and Baumer (2019a) proposed a multilevel, contextualized theoretical framework to provide a more holistic explanation of help-seeking behaviors,² which includes crime victims’ decisions to notify law enforcement. The authors concede that help-seeking outcomes are a function of cognitive processes, but by integrating multiple perspectives, Xie and Baumer’s (2019a:226) framework emphasizes that “crime incidents, individual, interpersonal, sociostructural, and cultural factors” all affect post-victimization decisions.

According to the multilevel help-seeking model, determinants of decision-making can be organized into three key conceptual groups: victimization and harm, personal/household characteristics, and the external environment (Xie and Baumer 2019a). Measures of victimization and harm, as emphasized in much of the micro-level research, capture the severity of criminal incidents, such as the extent of harm caused to a victim or the value of property lost or destroyed (Copes et al. 2001; Gottfredson and Hindelang 1979; Skogan 1984). Personal/household characteristics

refer to people’s attitudes toward institutions (Anderson 1999; Carr et al. 2007; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tankebe 2013), as well as victim attributes that are demonstrated or theorized to be related to help-seeking behaviors, such as membership within a structurally disadvantaged ethnic/racial group or a differentially integrated social group (Black 1973). Finally, external environments refer to the characteristics of the broader social contexts within which victimization occurs, including victims’ social networks, local community/neighborhood of residence, or larger macro-level units such as cities, counties, MSAs, or states. Notwithstanding a few notable studies (Baumer 2002; Desmond et al. 2016; Gutierrez and Kirk 2017; Xie and Baumer 2019b), the external environmental correlates of police notification remain understudied (Xie and Baumer 2019a).

Xie and Baumer’s (2019a) multilevel, contextualized help-seeking framework makes a number of theoretical contributions to the literature on victims’ decisions to notify law enforcement, but two insights are particularly relevant for understanding immigrants’ crime-reporting behavior in sanctuary policy contexts. First, as thoroughly discussed by Xie and Baumer (2019a), the multilevel, contextualized help-seeking framework emphasizes that victims’ decisions to call the police can be directly shaped by the characteristics of the external environment within which victimization occurs. As evidence, Gutierrez and Kirk (2017) find that crime reporting is inversely related to the relative size of the immigrant population across MSAs, with the negative effect being stronger for violent crime than for property crime. The authors acknowledge that their study cannot identify the underlying mechanisms suppressing crime reporting, but Gutierrez and Kirk’s (2017) findings (see also Xie and Baumer 2019b) are consistent with a number of theoretical expectations derived from micro-level perspectives (Skogan 1984), Black’s (1976) theory of law, and the broader multilevel, contextualized help-seeking framework (Xie and Baumer 2019a). An implication of past multilevel research is that social scientists must be attuned to how contextual

factors may be relevant to crime victims' decisions to seek help following victimization. In our study, we are particularly interested in how variation in immigrant sanctuary policy contexts structures crime victimization reporting to law enforcement.

Second, and most important to the present study, the multilevel, contextualized help-seeking framework implies that external environmental conditions can moderate the effects of victimization, harm measures, and victims' personal/household attributes (Xie and Baumer 2019a). That is, the effects of victimization and harm or personal/household characteristics, such as victims' ethno-racial identity, may vary by social contexts, and social contextual effects may be conditional on victim characteristics and the nature of criminal incidents.

A relatively small body of literature has investigated cross-level interactions in the context of help-seeking behavior (Baumer 2002; Goudriaan and Nieuwebeerta 2007; Xie and Baumer 2019b). Baumer (2002), for example, considers a number of theoretically expected cross-level interactions, but only finds that the nonlinear effect of neighborhood disadvantage on the reporting of simple assault is somewhat stronger for black versus non-black victims. Goudriaan and Nieuwebeerta (2007) find that juvenile victims' willingness to seek assistance from school employees varies across combinations of two factors: (1) whether the offender is a schoolmate, and (2) the location of the incident (i.e., on or off school grounds). In contrast to studies documenting cross-level interactions, Xie and Baumer (2019b) find no evidence that the inverse relationship between immigrant neighborhood concentration in new immigrant destinations and reporting behavior varies by victims' race and ethnicity; this suggests members of immigrant communities in new immigrant receiving areas are uniformly affected by a lack of community social integration or the development of legal cynicism.

Based on prevailing theories of crime victimization reporting, we expect members of immigrant communities are less likely to report crime victimization. In light of Xie

and Baumer's (2019a) framework, however, we also anticipate that the underlying mechanisms deterring or encouraging victims' help-seeking behavior vary in relation to the characteristics of the external environments within which victimization occurs. As mentioned, we are specifically interested in the role of immigrant sanctuary policies in shaping crime victims' decisions to notify law enforcement. Given the focus of our study, we briefly discuss the literature on immigrant sanctuary policies before situating the mechanism-based policy effects in a multi-level help-seeking framework.

IMMIGRANT SANCTUARY POLICIES

Prior research provides a detailed overview of the history of sanctuary policies in the United States, noting that these policies are often enacted at the local level in response to federal action or inaction in matters related to immigration enforcement (Bau 1994; Kittrie 2006; Martinez et al. 2018; Ridgley 2008). The stated purpose of these policies is often to better integrate members of immigrant communities and to signal that local leaders and institutions are receptive and responsive to the needs of immigrant groups (Kittrie 2006; Lyons et al. 2013; Martinez et al. 2018). Between 1979 and 2008, at least 65 cities or local law enforcement agencies adopted sanctuary policies in some form,³ and various local governments continue to propose and implement such policies (Collingwood et al. 2019). For instance, in 2014, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) identified 608 counties, of the almost 2,500 counties reviewed, as sanctuary jurisdictions (Wong 2017).

Contemporary Sanctuary Policies and Their Critics

Contemporary sanctuary policies take a variety of forms. Some policies stipulate that local law enforcement will refuse to comply with ICE requests to detain unauthorized immigrants for extended periods of time so ICE can

assume custody, except in situations where they are holding someone for serious violent crimes or other felonies.⁴ Other policies state that city officials or employees will not make inquiries into individuals' immigration status unless otherwise required by law. Given these complexities, Kitzie (2006) developed a parsimonious typology clarifying the various forms and functions of contemporary sanctuary policies, suggesting they generally consist of "don't ask," "don't enforce," or "don't tell" components. "Don't ask" policies limit local officials' role in inquiring about people's immigration status; "don't enforce" policies limit their ability to make arrests or detain people solely for an immigration violation, and "don't tell" policies limit communication between local and federal officials regarding people's immigration status (Kitzie 2006:1455). Immigrant sanctuaries may adopt policies that take on one or a combination of these three forms. Regardless of how they fit within Kitzie's typology, contemporary sanctuary policies are largely consistent with the U.S. Justice Department's (2007:44) definition of "state laws, local ordinances, or departmental policies limiting the role of local law enforcement agencies and officers in the enforcement of immigration laws."

Sanctuary ordinances are not without opposition. Criticism of sanctuary policies is in part predicated on the belief that they have caused "immeasurable harm to the American people and to the very fabric of our Republic" (Executive Order 2017:8799). From this perspective, such policies threaten public safety because they "encourage illegal immigration and undermine federal enforcement efforts" (Garcia 2009:1). Anti-sanctuary rhetoric, as illustrated by President Trump's 2017 Executive Order 13768 titled "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States," often links immigrants to criminality at the individual level, and immigration to crime at the macro level,⁵ despite substantial evidence to the contrary (Bersani, Loughran, and Piquero 2014; Light and Miller 2018; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019; Ousey and Kubrin 2018; Powell, Perreira, and

Mullan Harris 2010). As an indication of the dangers posed by sanctuary jurisdictions (and immigrants), opponents often draw on anecdotal incidents in which removable non-citizens commit acts of violence (Yee 2017).

Recent research has assessed the claims made by critics of sanctuary policies, at least with regard to their criminogenic effects. As of yet, no empirical evidence supports the claim that sanctuary policies systematically foster crime. Rather, studies consistently find either no evidence of a relationship or a negative association between sanctuary policies and crime (Gonzalez et al. 2017; Kubrin and Bartos 2020; Lyons et al. 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019; Wong 2017). As an explanation for their findings, some scholars speculate that sanctuary policies may strengthen community social control and reduce crime by enhancing the trust immigrants place in social institutions, especially local law enforcement (Lyons et al. 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019).

Specifically, sanctuary policies may enhance institutional trust by mitigating victims' fears that they or their friends, family, and surrounding community members will be at risk of deportation if crime victims and witnesses cooperate with local law enforcement. In effect, immigrant sanctuary policy contexts may (1) mitigate the structural conditions that would otherwise deter members of immigrant communities from contacting the police (Black 1976), (2) assuage fears related to real or imagined threats of deportation (Menjívar and Bejarano 2004), or (3) prevent the development of legal cynicism (Lyons et al. 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019). Thus, sanctuary policy contexts may shift the nature of help-seeking experiences, thereby increasing the likelihood of law mobilization.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

We integrate the expectations of the sanctuary-crime literature with a multilevel, contextualized model of help-seeking behavior to develop hypotheses in response to our two research questions: *Are crime victims more*

likely to report victimization in the context of sanctuary policies? Are the macro-level effects of sanctuary policies exclusive to ethno-racial minority victims who are most likely to be socially connected to immigrant communities? As described below, our data source on crime victimization incidents allows us to categorize victims according to their self-identified ethnicity and race. For the purposes of this study, we collapse respondents into four distinct ethno-racial groups: black, Latino, white, and other. The group “other” includes individuals who identify as Asian, American Indian, Indian, Pacific Islander, and bi- or multi-racial—it does not include anyone who identifies as “Latino.” We do not expect sanctuary policy contexts to have a uniform direct effect on crime victimization reporting, but we do expect the following:

Hypothesis 1: Latino victims will be more likely to report violent and property crime victimization to law enforcement if they reside in MSAs with sanctuary policies.

Hypothesis 2: “Other” victims (i.e., people who are neither black, Latino, nor white) will be more likely to report violent and property crime victimization to law enforcement if they reside in MSAs with sanctuary policies.

We expect the effects of immigrant sanctuary policy contexts will be specific to Latino and “other” victims for several reasons. First, during our study period, a relatively larger proportion of Latino and the group we refer to as “other” were foreign-born, compared to black and white victims. An analysis of the 5 percent Public Use Microdata Samples from the U.S. Census reveals that 26 to 40 percent of Latinos, and 43 to 49 percent of the “other” group were foreign-born in 1980, 1990, and 2000 (Ruggles et al. 2015). In contrast, only 4 to 5 percent of the white population, and 3 to 6 percent of the black population, were foreign-born. Second, unauthorized migrants disproportionately originated from Latin American countries during our study period, particularly Mexico, and from Asia, although to a much lesser extent. For example, 71 to 79

percent of unauthorized migrants originated from Mexico, Central America, or South America from 1990 through 2000 (Passel and Cohn 2016). Taken together, these demographics suggest Latinos are much more likely to be members of immigrant communities, unauthorized immigrants, or members of mixed-status families⁶ compared to white and black individuals. Given these latter two considerations, we expect Latino and “other” victims will be more responsive to changes in sanctuary policy contexts relative to black or white victims.

DATA, MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES, AND ANALYTIC SAMPLE

To assess if patterns in crime-victimization reporting vary across sanctuary policy contexts, we draw on a variety of data sources. First, our dependent variable and information on victimization incidents come from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS): MSA Data. The NCVS is a nationally representative survey of U.S. households that includes information on the crime victimization experiences of household members who are at least 12 years old (Lauritsen and Schaum 2005). The NCVS: MSA Data, made available in 2007, combines annual information from 1979 through 2004,⁷ including subnational geographic identifiers, for the core counties of the 40 largest metropolitan areas in the United States (U.S. Department of Justice 2007). The NCVS: MSA Data has been a major source of data for researchers interested in understanding subnational patterns in criminal victimization (Gutierrez and Kirk 2017; Xie and Lauritsen 2012; Xie et al. 2012).

As part of the NCVS, respondents who have experienced crime victimization indicate whether they reported their victimization to law enforcement. For the purposes of our analyses, we construct a binary variable indicating whether victims reported these incidents to law enforcement. This dichotomous indicator serves as our dependent variable.

Because prior research suggests correlates of reporting behavior vary by the type of victimization experienced (Gutierrez and Kirk 2017), we separately analyze patterns in the reporting of violent (e.g., completed or attempted rape, robbery, or assault) and property (e.g., completed or attempted theft, motor vehicle theft, or burglary) crime victimization. As noted in Table 1, 47 percent of violent crime victimization incidents and 35 percent of property crime incidents were reported to local law enforcement during our study period.

In addition to our dependent variable, the NCVS: MSA Data provides other relevant information on the nature of victimization and harm in a given incident as well as personal/household characteristics of victims. We leverage these data to control for victims' sex (female or male), age (continuously measured⁸), educational attainment (no high school, high school, or college graduate), marital status (married or not married), and homeownership (yes or no). We also include measures unique to violent and property victimization that may affect crime victims' willingness to seek intervention by law enforcement (Felson et al. 2002; Skogan 1984). Our analyses of violent crime include binary measures for whether a gun or other weapon was present and if the victim was injured. The analyses of property crime include a measure of the value of property lost, damaged, or stolen. We account for the relational distance between victims and offenders (see Black's [1976] discussion of morphology) by including a categorical variable that indicates if victims knew the offender (*offender: known*), if the offender was a stranger (*offender: stranger*), or if victims were unsure whether they knew the offender (*offender: don't know*). Including the victim-offender relationship measure would reduce the analytic sample of the property-victimization models by about 94 percent due to substantial missing data. We thus limit our inclusion of the victim-offender relationship measures to our analyses of violent crime incidents.

Given our second research question, we are interested in examining how, if at all,

ethno-racial minority victims differentially respond to changes in immigrant sanctuary policy contexts. NCVS respondents report their racial identity and if they are of Hispanic origin (we refer to this group as Latinos). We draw on these measures to construct a variable that groups victims into four categories: black, Latino, white, and other (e.g., Asian, American Indian). The NCVS allows us to further disaggregate the "other" group by racial identification, but we preserve this broad category because it only comprises about 3 percent of the violent and property crime samples. In contrast, white, black, and Latino individuals make up 68, 17, and 12 percent, respectively, of the violent crime sample, as well as 71, 15, and 11 percent of the property crime sample. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the incident-level variables used in our analyses across the samples of violent and property crime victimization incidents.

Following prior research, we capture our focal independent variable, whether a sanctuary policy was adopted within an MSA between 1980 and 2004, from a list of sanctuary jurisdictions identified by the National Immigration Law Center (NILC)⁹ in 2008 (Gonzalez et al. 2017; Lyons et al. 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019). NILC organizes its list of local sanctuary jurisdictions by U.S. states, briefly describes each policy, and provides links to municipal documents for verification. The policies listed by NILC vary in form but conform in procedural function with Kittrie's (2006) typology and the U.S. Department of Justice (2007) definition of sanctuary jurisdictions. Following prior research (Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019), we consulted additional sources¹⁰ to update NILC's list. Ultimately, we only found one MSA (Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria in the NCVS: MSA Data) within which a sanctuary policy was adopted during our study period but that was not included on NILC's list.¹¹

Our measure of sanctuary policy adoption is a dichotomous indicator of the presence (1) or absence (0) of one or more sanctuary policies, regardless of type, within an MSA

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Incident-Level Variables Used in the Analysis

	Violent Crime Victims				Property Crime Victims			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dependent variable								
Reported to law enforcement	.47	.50	.00	1.00	.35	.48	.00	1.00
Victimization and harm								
Injury sustained: yes	.46	.50	.00	1.00				
Weapon present: gun	.12	.32	.00	1.00				
Weapon present: none	.69	.46	.00	1.00				
Weapon present: other	.19	.39	.00	1.00				
Value of property lost ^a					4.33	2.07	.00	11.65
Personal characteristics								
Age	29.21	12.98	14.50	60.00	35.11	13.93	14.50	60.00
Edu. attainment: college grad.	.18	.38	.00	1.00	.26	.44	.00	1.00
Edu. attainment: high school	.49	.50	.00	1.00	.53	.50	.00	1.00
Edu. attainment: no high school	.33	.47	.00	1.00	.21	.41	.00	1.00
Ethnicity/race: Latino	.12	.33	.00	1.00	.11	.32	.00	1.00
Ethnicity/race: black	.17	.37	.00	1.00	.15	.35	.00	1.00
Ethnicity/race: white	.68	.47	.00	1.00	.71	.46	.00	1.00
Ethnicity/race: other	.03	.18	.00	1.00	.03	.18	.00	1.00
Home ownership: yes	.48	.50	.00	1.00	.55	.50	.00	1.00
Married: yes	.27	.44	.00	1.00	.44	.50	.00	1.00
Sex: female	.42	.49	.00	1.00	.54	.50	.00	1.00
Offender: don't know	.01	.12	.00	1.00				
Offender: known to victim	.50	.50	.00	1.00				
Offender: stranger	.49	.50	.00	1.00				
Observations								
MSAs	40				40			
MSA-years	996				996			
Incidents	35,329				136,053			

^aLog value.
Note: Values displayed prior to mean centering.

(j) during a specific year (t). That is, we do not distinguish between the various types of policies identified by Kittrie (2006). We lag the passage of sanctuary policies by one year to account for a potential delay in the diffusion of victims' awareness of the policies (see also Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019). If a policy is adopted in MSA (j) in 1999, for example, then MSA (j) is recorded as having a sanctuary policy in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. After we lagged the policy measure, 140 of the MSA-years (14 percent) had at least one sanctuary policy enacted at some point during the study period (see Table 2). Although not specified in Tables 1 and 2, about 20 percent of both the violent and property crime samples (7,239 violent crime incidents and 26,549 property crime incidents) occurred within an immigrant sanctuary policy context.

The remaining macro-level variables in our analyses come from the U.S. Decennial Census (1980, 1990, and 2000) and pooled data from the American Community Survey (ACS, 2005 to 2009). We obtained annual tabular data for the consistent core counties in each MSA within the NCVS: MSA Data for each year available and aggregated county-level sociodemographics to the MSA level. Our models include MSA-level measures identified as being related to crime-reporting behavior (Baumer 2002; Felson et al. 2002; Gutierrez and Kirk 2017; Xie and Baumer 2019b) and to the adoption of immigrant sanctuary policies—including educational attainment of the population (*percent college graduates*) and the percent of the voting population who voted for the Democratic candidate (*percent Democratic voters*¹²) in presidential elections (Collingwood and Gonzalez O'Brien 2019; Gonzalez et al. 2017; Lyons et al. 2013). The rest of the macro-level measures include *percent black*, a measure capturing the relative size of the male population between ages 15 and 34 (*percent crime-prone population*), *percent immigrant*, *percent Latino*, *percent owner-occupied homes*, and a structural disadvantage index (*disadvantage index*). Similar to prior

research, we generate the *disadvantage index* by combining several measures of structural disadvantage (Light and Miller 2018; Ousey and Kubrin 2014). We calculate the average for four standardized measures: the percent of children living in single-parent homes, percent of adults with no high school degree, percent of unemployed adults, and percent of the population living in poverty (see also Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019). The coefficient of reliability, or Cronbach's alpha, for the measures that constitute our index of structural disadvantage is .77, which suggests the instrument is reliable. Following prior research interested in macro-level correlates of crime and crime reporting, we use linear interpolation to account for inter-census years (Sharkey et al. 2017; Xie et al. 2012).

After combining data from the five sources, we have complete information on 35,329 incidents of violent crime victimization and 136,053 incidents of property crime victimization. These incidents occurred in 40 different MSAs across 25 years (1980 to 2004). Because of missing annual data for some MSAs, we yield 996 MSA-year observations (out of a potential 1,000). Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all MSA-level variables, including the measures used to construct the *disadvantage index*.

ANALYTIC APPROACH

We use multilevel logistic regression to assess patterns in victims' crime-reporting behavior over time and across MSAs. We estimate and present results from multilevel models in place of standard logistic regression models for three important reasons. First, our theoretical framing, which bridges the immigrant sanctuaries literature with recent developments in the scholarship on post-victimization decisions, is inherently concerned with the extent to which crime-reporting behavior is a function of multilevel processes (Xie and Baumer 2019a). A multilevel modeling approach allows us to directly investigate how much of the variation in crime reporting, at the micro level, is a function of differences

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of MSA-Year Characteristics ($N = 996$), 1980 to 2004

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
External environmental characteristics				
Sanctuary policy ^a	.14	.35	.00	1.00
% Black	13.69	8.19	1.26	36.43
% College graduates	29.57	6.61	14.75	51.77
% Crime-prone population	7.57	1.19	5.17	13.61
% Democratic voters	47.55	9.43	22.65	76.35
% Immigrant	12.71	9.70	1.89	50.94
% Latino	12.95	12.74	.52	59.72
% Owner-occ. homes	61.82	7.83	27.31	81.71
Disadvantage index	.00	.86	-1.75	2.34
% Children in single-parent homes	9.16	1.57	5.24	13.09
% No high school degree	18.06	4.86	7.87	34.99
% Unemployed	5.75	1.27	2.87	11.66
% Poverty	10.97	2.78	4.24	19.76
MSA population ^b	14.57	.59	13.07	16.08

^aPolicy adoption lagged one year.

^bLog value.

Note: Values are prior to group-mean centering.

across higher-order units (MSAs and MSA-year). Furthermore, we are interested in how effects of micro-level factors, specifically victims' ethno-racial identification, vary across macro-units (i.e., random coefficients) and whether the inclusion of cross-level interactions can explain variance in micro-level effects across MSAs. We expect the reporting behavior of Latinos and "other" victims will vary across MSA-years and will be a function of sanctuary policy adoption. Again, a multilevel modeling approach allows us to more directly investigate our research questions and expectations. Second, the NCVS: MSA Data contains samples of crime incidents repeatedly nested within MSAs over the study period (1980 to 2004). As such, the NCVS: MSA Data comprises crime victimization incidents (level-1) nested in MSA-years (level-2) nested in MSAs (level-3), or an inherent multilevel structure (see also Xie et al. 2012). Finally, as described below, results of maximum likelihood tests suggest multilevel models with random intercepts at the MSA and MSA-year levels and random slopes for *ethnicity/race: Latino* and *ethnicity/race: other* are preferable to other models, including standard logistic regression models.¹³

We leverage the longitudinal nature of our data to estimate within- and between-MSA effects. Within-effects, which account for time-invariant unobserved factors by only considering within-unit variation across time (Allison 2009), are considered more suitable for causal inference (Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran 2019). To disentangle within-effects from between-effects, we use a hybrid modeling approach wherein we include observed measures of the MSA-year characteristics along with additional measures of the MSA sample means in our analytic models (Allison 2009; Fairbrother 2014; Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran 2019). Equation 1 reflects our models of the log odds of whether a property or violent victimization experience was reported to law enforcement for a given incident (y_{ij}), where i denotes an incident, t denotes a time point, and j denotes a specific MSA:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{ij} + \beta_2 x_{tj} + \beta_3 \bar{x}_j + \beta_4 time_{tj} + v_j + u_{ij} + e_{ij} \quad (1)$$

In addition to incident-level predictors (e.g., victim ethnicity/race, age, sex, injuries sustained) depicted by x_{ij} , Equation 1 illustrates that we decompose all MSA

characteristics, x_{ij} , into (1) x_{ij} , or the observed MSA-year measure, and (2) \bar{x}_j , or an average MSA measure for the study period. As a substantive illustration, the macro-level variable *sanctuary policy* is decomposed into a longitudinal component (*sanctuary policy* under the “MSA characteristics: within-effects” heading in Tables 3 and 8), which represents the timing of policy adoption between 1980 and 2004 within each MSA, and a cross-sectional component (*sanctuary policy* under the “MSA characteristics: between-effects” heading in Tables 3 and 8), which reflects the proportion of years for which a policy exists within each MSA over the study period. In practical terms, the within-effects can be interpreted as how changes in MSA characteristics over time correlate with shifts in reporting behavior over time within each MSA (e.g., how reporting behavior compares before and after the adoption of a sanctuary policy). In contrast, the between-effects can be interpreted as how crime victimization reporting behaviors differ across MSAs depending on varying average levels of MSA characteristics (e.g., how early policy adopters compare to later adopters and non-adopters). The random intercepts for *MSA*, *MSA-year*, and *incidents* are reflected by v_j , u_{ij} , and e_{ij} , respectively.

The within-effect components illustrated in Equation 1 are analogous to the within-effect or fixed-effect estimates derived from models that include MSA dummies¹⁴ (Allison 2009; Fairbrother 2014; Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran 2019). Importantly, recent research demonstrates that standard approaches to estimating within-unit effects do “not yield a genuine within estimator of cross-level interaction effects” and are “likely to yield biased estimates of cross-level interactions” when working with repeat cross-sectional data structures (Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran 2019:194–5). Therefore, we follow the methodological approach outlined by Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran (2019) to manually control for effect heterogeneity in our cross-level interactions that would otherwise be ignored by traditional approaches to within-unit estimation. In doing so, we produce and report

the genuine within-effects of our cross-level interactions of interest. Given our focus on cross-level interactions, we also mean center *incident-level* factors and specify random coefficients for the level-1 variables interacted with level-2 conditions (*ethnicity/race: Latino* and *ethnicity/race: other*) across the models (Bauer and Curran 2005; LaHuis and Ferguson 2009). We estimate separate models for property and violent crime victimization using maximum likelihood estimation.¹⁵

Finally, a number of scholars have identified issues that arise in the interpretation of logistic regression coefficients or odds ratios as well as with comparisons of effect sizes between groups (i.e., interactions) and across models (Long and Mustillo 2018; Mood 2010; Williams 2009). In particular, unobserved heterogeneity affects coefficient estimates, even when unobserved variables are uncorrelated with observed independent variables (Long and Mustillo 2018; Mood 2010). Given this concern, we provide a supplementary investigation into any statistically significant cross-level interactions. Specifically, we use results from our regression models to estimate average discrete changes in predicted probabilities and provide tests of statistical significance (Long and Mustillo 2018).

RESULTS

Reports of Violent Crime Victimization

Table 3 presents results from three multilevel logistic regression models of the log odds that incidents of violent victimization were reported to law enforcement. The bottom section of Table 3 includes the variance components of the random intercepts for *MSA* and *MSA-year* as well as for the random slopes of *ethnicity/race: Latino* and *ethnicity/race: other* (see Model 1). Similar to prior research on outcomes related to crime victimization (Xie et al. 2012), the random components of the level-2 and level-3 intercepts in a multilevel model with

no covariates (available upon request) reveal that the majority (about 98 percent) of the variation in the dependent variable is attributable to incident-level or level-1 variation (i.e., $(\frac{\pi^2}{3}) / ((\frac{\pi^2}{3}) + [Var(MSA)] + [Var(MSA-year)]) = .98$). Despite *MSAs* and *MSA-years* accounting for only a limited proportion of the variance, results of likelihood ratio tests (available upon request) indicate that a three-level model allowing for random variation at each level and with random slopes for *ethnicity/race: Latino* and *ethnicity/race: other* is a significant improvement over a model with no random slopes, which, in turn, is preferable to both a two-level model (incidents nested in *MSA-years*) and a standard logistic regression model (LaHuis and Ferguson 2009; Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016). The likelihood ratio tests and Wald tests indicate that the slope variance of *ethnicity/race: Latino* and *ethnicity/race: other* is significant (Hox 2010). Based on the variance components presented at the bottom of Table 3, the variables included in Model 1 account for about 93 percent of level-3 variance and 59 percent of the level-2 variance, as the variance of the random intercepts are reduced from .014 to .001 (*MSAs*) and from .046 to .019 (*MSA-years*).

Model 1 also displays the fixed effects (i.e., the non-random components) of the measures of victimization and harm, victims' personal characteristics, and external environmental characteristics—although it does not include cross-level interactions. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the interpretation of effects relevant to our specific research questions and corresponding hypotheses. Additionally, we concentrate on the within-effects (see the coefficients listed under the “MSA characteristics: within-effects” headings) given their suitability for causal inference (Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran 2019). First, we find no evidence that sanctuary policy adoption, in general, is associated with crime-reporting behavior. In Model 1, the longitudinal component of *sanctuary policy* (.033) is not statistically significant. As previously discussed, though, we expected the effect of sanctuary

policy context to be conditional on victims' ethno-racial minority status (*ethnicity/race: Latino*, *ethnicity/race: other*).

Second, black victims have greater odds of reporting violent victimization to law enforcement, by about 18 percent ($e^{.165} = 1.18$; $p < .001$), although neither Latino nor “other” victims are statistically different from white victims in their crime-reporting behavior. Recall that we allow the coefficients of *ethnicity/race: Latino* and *ethnicity/race: other* to vary across *MSA-years* (i.e., random slopes). In both instances, Wald and likelihood ratio tests indicate that the slope variance components are statistically significant (Hox 2010; LaHuis and Ferguson 2009). According to the variance estimates presented in Model 1, 95 percent of the random *ethnicity/race: Latino* effect estimates, taking into account slope variation, fall between $-.674$ and $.830$ across *MSA-years*. The interval for the *ethnicity/race: other* estimate is larger, ranging from -1.498 to 1.344 across *MSA-years*. These estimates suggest there is no uniformly negative or positive effect on the likelihood that Latino and “other” victims report their violent victimization to law enforcement. Moreover, this finding clearly demonstrates that contextual differences are at the core of differences in reporting behavior for a subset of our sample. In some *MSAs*, Latino and “other” victims are more likely to report victimization; the opposite is true in other *MSAs*.

Models 2 and 3 investigate whether variation in the effects of *ethnicity/race: Latino* and *ethnicity/race: other* across *MSA-years* is related to changes in immigrant sanctuary policy context within *MSAs* over time. Consistent with our expectations, we find that Latino victims have greater odds of reporting violent crime victimization after passage of a sanctuary policy within victims' *MSA* of residence. That is, the within-effect component of the interaction term *Latino* \times *sanctuary policy* is positive and statistically significant ($p < .01$). This suggests the odds of Latinos reporting crime victimization to law enforcement is greater in the years following adoption of sanctuary policies within their *MSAs* of residence.

Table 3. Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Victims' Log Odds of Reporting Violent Crime Victimization to Law Enforcement, 1980 to 2004

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Victimization and harm						
Injury sustained: yes	.614***	.024	.612***	.024	.611***	.024
Weapon present: gun	1.286***	.039	1.284***	.039	1.281***	.039
Weapon present: other	.543***	.030	.539***	.030	.540***	.030
Personal characteristics						
Age	.017***	.001	.017***	.001	.017***	.001
Edu. attainment: college grad.	.185***	.038	.182***	.038	.185***	.038
Edu. attainment: high school	.310***	.028	.307***	.028	.310***	.028
Ethnicity/race: Latino	.078	.044	.146**	.049	.049	.039
Ethnicity/race: black	.165***	.033	.164***	.033	.165***	.033
Ethnicity/race: other	-.077	.081	-.091	.066	-.064	.095
Home ownership: yes	-.033	.024	-.034	.024	-.034	.024
Married: yes	.337***	.028	.338***	.028	.334***	.028
Sex: female	.393***	.024	.392***	.024	.391***	.024
Offender: don't know	.220*	.095	.219*	.095	.222*	.095
Offender: stranger	.118***	.024	.120***	.024	.115***	.024
MSA characteristics: within-effects						
Sanctuary policy ^a	.033	.067	.026	.067	.033	.067
% Black	.006	.020	.006	.020	.007	.020
% College graduates	-.017	.013	-.016	.013	-.016	.013
% Crime-prone population	.055	.056	.050	.055	.060	.056
% Democratic voters	-.001	.005	-.001	.005	-.002	.005
% Immigrant	-.012	.013	-.010	.013	-.012	.013
% Latino	.017	.016	.014	.016	.016	.016
% Owner-occ. homes	-.006	.018	-.005	.018	-.009	.018
Disadvantage index	-.038	.099	-.012	.099	-.031	.099
MSA population ^b	-.776**	.300	-.806**	.299	-.776**	.298
Latino × sanctuary policy			.502**	.170		
Other × sanctuary policy					-.060	.335
MSA characteristics: between-effects						
Sanctuary policy ^a	-.144	.093	-.114	.092	-.158	.093
% Black	-.001	.020	-.001	.020	-.003	.020
% College graduates	-.011	.014	-.014	.014	-.009	.015
% Crime-prone population	-.017	.057	-.008	.056	-.015	.057
% Democratic voters	.008	.006	.008	.006	.008	.006
% Immigrant	.009	.014	.007	.014	.011	.014
% Latino	-.010	.017	-.007	.017	-.010	.016
% Owner-occ. homes	.006	.018	.005	.018	.008	.018
Disadvantage index	-.165	.120	-.193	.119	-.167	.120
MSA population ^b	.736*	.302	.768*	.301	.740*	.300
Latino × sanctuary policy			-.838***	.200		
Other × sanctuary policy					-.040	.412
Year fixed effects (1980 to 2004)	Yes		Yes			
Constant	.781	.620	.706	.612	.575	.645
Var(MSA)	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001
Var(MSA-year)	.019	.007	.018	.007	.020	.007
Var(ethnicity/race: Latino)	.147	.051	.084	.044		

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Var(ethnicity/race: other)	.526	.216			.483	.209
Observations						
Level-3, MSAs	40		40		40	
Level-2, MSA-years	996		996		996	
Level-1, Incidents	35,329		35,329		35,329	

^aPolicy adoption lagged one year.

^bLog-value.

Note: Victimization and harm and personal characteristics are mean centered. *Weapon present: none*, *edu: less than high school*, *ethnicity/race: white*, and *offender: known* are reference categories. Models include control for NCVS survey redesign, and interactions account for effect heterogeneity in *ethnicity/race: Latino* and *ethnicity/race: other*.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

Wald and likelihood ratio tests indicate that the random component of *ethnicity/race: Latino* remains significant after accounting for the cross-level interaction between *ethnicity/race: Latino* and *sanctuary policy*. However, the cross-level interaction between *sanctuary policy* and *ethnicity/race: Latino* accounts for a relatively large share of the variance in *ethnicity/race: Latino* effect across MSA-years. Inclusion of the cross-level interaction term reduces the variance component of *ethnicity/race: Latino* (in a model omitting a random component for *ethnicity/race: other*) from .133 to .084, or a reduction of about 37 percent.

Finally, we find no evidence of a significant cross-level interaction between the sanctuary policy measure and *ethnicity/race: other*. Inclusion of the cross-level interactions accounts for little of the variance in *ethnicity/race: other* effect (see Model 3). Therefore, we fail to find evidence in support of our second hypothesis, at least in relation to “other” victims of violent crime.

Predicted Probabilities of Reporting Violent Crime Victimization

To better illustrate the relative magnitudes of our effect estimates, Table 4 provides probabilities and group differences in probabilities (average discrete changes in probabilities)

for combinations of victims’ ethno-racial identities and the presence or absence of a sanctuary policy (Long and Mustillo 2018). The predicted probabilities are derived from Model 2 in Table 3.

The first column in Table 4 displays the predicted probabilities that Latino, black, white, and other victims report violent crime victimization to law enforcement in an area without a sanctuary policy. Consistent with the substantive results presented in Model 2 in Table 3, Latino and black victims have slightly higher probabilities of reporting violent crime victimization to police (both around 50 percent) compared to white victims (about 47 percent). Although not displayed in Table 4, these differences in probabilities for Latino and black victims, when compared to white victims, are statistically significant ($p < .01$ and $p < .001$, respectively). The predicted probability of reporting victimization for “other” victims is not significantly different from white victims, but it is significantly lower than the probability for Latino victims ($p < .01$) and black victims ($p < .001$).

The second column in Table 4 displays the predicted probabilities for a hypothetical situation in which sanctuary policies are adopted within victims’ MSAs of residence. The probabilities of reporting crime victimization for black, white, and “other” victims remain

Table 4. Average Discrete Change in Predicted Probabilities of Reporting Violent Crime Victimization to Law Enforcement (Other Variables Set at Observed Values)

	Baseline	Following Policy Adoption	Difference
Ethnicity/race: Latino	.498	.614	.116**
Ethnicity/race: black	.502	.508	.006
Ethnicity/race: white	.465	.471	.006
Ethnicity/race: other	.445	.451	.006
<i>Difference in effect of sanctuary policy adoption</i>			.110**

Note: Estimates derived from Table 3, Model 2.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

relatively stable in the context of sanctuary policies. Although there is an increase in the probabilities by less than one percentage point (.006), the differences between the baseline and post-policy adoption estimates for black, white, and “other” victims are not statistically significantly different from zero. In contrast, the predicted probability that Latino victims report violent crime victimization increases from 49.8 to 61.4 percent. The estimated difference for Latinos of about 12 percentage points is statistically significant ($p < .01$). The difference in the *effect* of sanctuary policy contexts for Latinos versus the other three ethno-racial groups is presented in the bottom-right corner of Table 4. According to our estimates, the difference in the policy-context effect (.110) is also statistically significant ($p < .01$). Taken together, results in Tables 3 and 4 reveal that the presence of sanctuary policies moderates the effect of ethno-racial identification on the likelihood that victims report crime victimization to law enforcement. The results can also be interpreted as implying that the effect of sanctuary policy contexts is specific to victims who identify as Latino. Ultimately, Latino victims have higher probabilities of reporting violent crime victimization to law enforcement *after* a sanctuary policy has been adopted within their MSA of residence.

Recent information from the 2018 NCVS helps illustrate and contextualize the 12 percentage-point difference between Latinos before and after policy adoption as reported in Table 4. According to the NCVS, around 14

percent, or over 800,000, of the around 6 million violent crime incidents in 2018 involved Latino victims (U.S. Department of Justice 2019). If 62 percent of violent crime incidents involving Latino victims were reported to law enforcement, rather than the 50 percent reported in Table 4, more than 90,000 additional incidents of violent crime would have been reported to police nationwide. As previously mentioned, the efficacy of the U.S. criminal justice system in the social control of crime predominately relies on law enforcement officials reacting to denizens’ reports of crime (Reiss 1992), which makes it crucial that residents mobilize the law when victimized (Black 1973).

Parallel Trends and Alternative Timings of Sanctuary Policy Adoption

Estimates derived from hybrid modeling strategies, similar to other procedures that focus on within-unit effects, assume that outcomes across comparison groups have common or parallel time trends (Auspurg, Brüderl, and Wöhler 2019; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2019). For the present study, the assumption is that patterns in the crime-reporting behavior of Latinos residing in MSAs that adopted sanctuary policies during the study period are equivalent to the patterns of other groups *prior to any changes in policy* (Kahn-Lang and Lang 2020). Furthermore, it is assumed that the reporting behavior of Latinos in MSAs with sanctuary policies

Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models of Adjusted Reporting Trends

	Latinos vs. Other Groups (combined)		Latinos ^a vs. Other Groups (separated)	
	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Time trend				
Year (1980 to 2003)	-.002***	.001	-.003*	.001
Group differences				
Latinos, eventual sanctuaries	-.029	.023	Ref.	
Black, eventual sanctuaries			.069**	.024
White, eventual sanctuaries			-.005	.024
Other, eventual sanctuaries			-.016	.024
Latinos, non-sanctuaries			.059*	.023
Black, non-sanctuaries			.094***	.023
White, non-sanctuaries			.025	.023
Other, non-sanctuaries			-.021	.023
Interaction (Group × Year)				
Latinos, eventual sanctuaries	-.001	.002	Ref.	
Black, eventual sanctuaries			-.001	.002
White, eventual sanctuaries			.001	.002
Other, eventual sanctuaries			.000	.002
Latinos, non-sanctuaries			.000	.002
Black, non-sanctuaries			.000	.002
White, non-sanctuaries			.001	.002
Other, non-sanctuaries			.001	.002
Constant	.503***	.008	.474***	.017
Model R ²	.117		.485	
Observations	196		196	

^aLatinos, eventual sanctuaries is the set reference group.

Note: Year measured as 1980 = 0, 1981 = 1, . . . , 2003 = 23.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

would have followed the common trend of other groups had the policies never been adopted. Although it is possible to test for differences in preexisting trends, it is important to note that failing to find evidence of diverging trends is not, itself, evidence of *no difference* in time trends, nor is it confirmation that the counterfactual assumption is not violated (Kahn-Lang and Lang 2020). Still, we investigate whether there is evidence of diverging preexisting trends across groups in Table 5.

To test for differences in preexisting trends, we use the results presented in Model 2 in Table 3 to calculate adjusted probabilities of reporting violent crime victimization to law enforcement across MSAs where sanctuary policies were not adopted from 1980 through 2004 and MSAs within which sanctuary policies were eventually adopted during our study

period. Given our main findings (Model 2, Table 3), we further disaggregate the reporting trends of each of the four ethno-racial groups identified in our study across the two types of MSAs. Importantly, we exclude all cases from MSA-years with existing sanctuary policies so that the *eventual sanctuaries* groups (see Table 5) only consist of Latino victims in MSAs prior to the actual adoption of sanctuary policies. The exclusion of Latino victims in MSAs *after* policy adoption facilitates a comparison of preexisting trends in reporting patterns between Latinos in *eventual sanctuaries* and the other groups. If the assumption of preexisting parallel trends is violated, we expect to find evidence of different time trends in groups' rates of reporting crime victimization prior to the adoption of sanctuary policies across MSAs. We use

Table 6. Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Victims' Log Odds of Reporting Violent Crime Victimization to Law Enforcement with Sanctuary Policy Adoption Led by 1 and 3 Years, 1980 to 2004

	Sanctuary Adoption Led 1 Year		Sanctuary Adoption Led 3 Years	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Victim characteristics				
Ethnicity/race: Latino	.083	.050	.083	.051
Ethnicity/race: black	.165***	.033	.165***	.033
Ethnicity/race: other	-.089	.066	-.088	.066
MSA characteristics: within-effects				
Sanctuary policy	-.089	.066	.073	.058
Latino \times sanctuary policy	-.035	.094	-.029	.090
Observations				
MSA	40		40	
MSA-year	996		996	
Incidents	35,329		35,329	

Note: Model contains all other measures and specifications noted in Table 3, Model 2. Full results are available upon request.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

ordinary least squares to calculate the parameter estimates displayed in Table 5.

Table 5 reports results from two separate models. In the first model, presented in the left column, we compare Latinos in eventual sanctuaries to all other groups combined into one reference category (e.g., white individuals in eventual sanctuaries and Latinos in non-sanctuaries). Although we find evidence of a general decline in rates of reporting violent crime victimization over the study period, we fail to find evidence that the time trend for Latinos in eventual sanctuaries is significantly different from the reference group's time trend. The second model in Table 5 compares Latinos in eventual sanctuaries to each of the seven other groups individually. Again, the second model reports a general decline in rates of reporting across time, but we fail to find evidence that the time trend of Latinos in eventual sanctuaries is significantly different from the time trends of the other groups.

Table 6 further investigates the sensitivity of the results presented in Model 2 of Table 3 to alternative timings of sanctuary policy adoption. Rather than *lag* policy adoption by

one year to allow for policy diffusion, as we do in our main analyses, the models presented in Table 6 *lead* policy adoption by one and three years. So, if a sanctuary policy was adopted within an MSA in 2000, we recode the policy as being adopted in 1999 (left column of Table 6) or 1997 (right column of Table 6). Thus, policies are coded as occurring one or three years earlier than what transpired in reality. We expect leading policy adoption will *weaken* the estimated effects of our cross-level interactions in Table 3 because we are pooling MSA-years that should, theoretically, have no policy effects with MSA-years that should have policy effects. Alternatively, it is possible that some other unobserved antecedent macro-level condition (e.g., pro-immigrant local cultures) affects both the probability that sanctuary policies are adopted and the likelihood that Latino victims report crime victimization. If this assumption is correct, the variables that lead policy adoption should maintain their significance because they capture the presence of the unobserved macro-level characteristics that result in passage of the policies in the first place.

Table 7. Multilevel Logistic Regression Model of Victims' Log Odds of Reporting Violent Crime Victimization to Law Enforcement with Sanctuary Policy Adoption Weighted by Latino Population Coverage, 1980 to 2004

	Sanctuary Policy Weighted by Coverage of Latino Population	
	Coef.	SE
Victim characteristics		
Ethnicity/race: Latino	.144**	.048
Ethnicity/race: black	.164***	.033
Ethnicity/race: other	-.091	.066
MSA characteristics: within-effects		
Sanctuary policy	.129	.095
Latino \times sanctuary policy	.633**	.231
Observations		
MSA	40	
MSA-year	996	
Incidents	35,329	

Note: Model contains all other measures and specifications noted in Table 3, Model 2. Full results are available upon request.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

In both models presented in Table 6, we fail to find any evidence of a statistically significant cross-level interaction between Latino self-identification and one- and three-year leads of sanctuary policy adoption. Although not displayed in Table 6, subsequent analyses (available upon request) fail to find evidence of significant conditional effects in terms of predicted probabilities (Long and Mustillo 2018). We interpret these results as additional evidence that the adoption of sanctuary policies during our study period affected Latinos' post-victimization decisions. There is something unique about the help-seeking behavior of Latino violent-crime victims within MSAs after sanctuary policies are adopted.

Alternative Measures of Sanctuary Policy Adoption

Table 7 investigates the sensitivity of the results presented in Model 2 of Table 3 to an alternative measurement of sanctuary policy adoption. The models in Table 3 treat MSA-years as having immigrant sanctuary policies if a policy is passed within any of the MSA's

core counties. We estimate additional models wherein we weight exposure by the proportion of an MSA's total Latino population that is covered by an immigrant sanctuary policy (for a similar approach, see Xie et al. 2012). If, for example, no Latinos lived in a core county that adopted a sanctuary policy, we would not treat the MSA as possessing a sanctuary policy (i.e., *sanctuary policy* = 0). If 50 percent of an MSA's Latino population lived in a core county that adopted a sanctuary policy, we would weight the policy by half (i.e., *sanctuary policy* = .5).

The results in Table 7 reveal that our weighted measure of sanctuary policy exposure is positively (.633) associated with the log odds that Latinos report crime victimization. The cross-level interaction is also statistically significant ($p < .01$). The estimate suggests Latinos' odds of reporting crime victimization increase as the relative size of the Latino population exposed to a sanctuary policy within the victim's MSA of residence increases. Estimates of the change in predicted probabilities based on the model presented in Table 7 are similar to those presented in Table 4.

Reports of Property Crime Victimization

Table 8 reports results of the multilevel logistic regression models of victims' log odds of reporting property crimes to law enforcement. Prior research suggests the ecological correlates of reporting property crime victimization may differ from those of violent victimization (Gutierrez and Kirk 2017). The models in Table 8 provide additional tests of our hypotheses in the context of property crime victimization. We were unable to achieve convergence of maximum likelihood estimation with models that include all covariates, random intercepts, and random components for both *ethnicity/race: Latino* and *ethnicity/race: other*. Following the analytic strategy described by Barr and colleagues (2013), we examined the results of the non-converged models and found that the slope variance of *ethnicity/race: other* was near zero, suggesting there is little variation in the effect of *ethnicity/race: other* across MSA-years. We then omitted the random component of *ethnicity/race: other*, re-estimated the model, and achieved convergence when specifying random intercepts and a random slope for *ethnicity/race: Latino*. As such, we exclude analyses of interactions between sanctuary policy context and *ethnicity/race: other* for the remainder of the article and, instead, focus on potential interactions involving *ethnicity/race: Latino*.

As with Table 3, the bottom section of Table 8 includes the variance components of the random intercepts at the *MSA* and *MSA-year* levels. Additionally, Model 4 reports the variance component for the random slope of *ethnicity/race: Latino*. Similar to the violent crime model, the variance components of the level-2 and level-3 intercepts in the multilevel model with no covariates (available upon request) indicate that almost all (about 99 percent) of the variation in the dependent variable is attributable to incident-level or level-1 variation (i.e., $(\frac{\pi^2}{3}) / ((\frac{\pi^2}{3}) + [Var(MSA)] + [Var(MSA-year)]) = .99$). Results of likelihood ratio tests (available upon request)

suggest a three-level model allowing for random variation at each level is a significant improvement over a two-level model and standard logistic regression model (LaHuis and Ferguson 2009; Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016). Although Wald and likelihood ratio tests indicate the variance component on the random slope is not significant, LaHuis and Ferguson (2009) note it is still possible to uncover significant cross-level interactions. We investigate this possibility in Model 5.

Model 4 in Table 8 provides a baseline assessment of the correlates of crime reporting without consideration of any cross-level interactions. When compared to Model 1 in Table 3, there is one notable difference relevant to our research questions and hypotheses. We find that Latinos have significantly lower odds, by about 10 percent, of reporting property crime victimization to law enforcement ($p < .001$) relative to white victims. As in our assessment of violent crime, however, we find no evidence that changes in sanctuary policy context are directly associated with crime victimization reporting behavior.

Model 5 in Table 8 examines whether the effect of *ethnicity/race: Latino* varies across immigrant sanctuary policy context. We find no evidence to support this hypothesis. In Model 5, there is no significant interaction between *ethnicity/race: Latino* and the within-effect component of *sanctuary policy*. Furthermore, subsequent investigation of predicted probabilities yields no evidence of moderation (results available upon request). Thus, our results suggest that in the case of reporting crime victimization, the conditional effect of immigrant sanctuary policy context is unique to violent crime victims' likelihood of reporting their experiences to law enforcement.

CONCLUSIONS

Sanctuary policies (in various forms) have existed in the United States since the 1980s. State, county, and municipal officials have adopted sanctuary policies in an effort to resist the devolution of federal immigration enforcement and, in some instances,

Table 8. Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Victims' Log Odds of Reporting Property Crime Victimization to Law Enforcement, 1980 to 2004

	Model 4		Model 5	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Victimization and harm				
Value of property lost ^a	.544***	.004	.543***	.004
Personal characteristics				
Age	.013***	.001	.013***	.001
Edu. attainment: college grad.	.397***	.021	.396***	.021
Edu. attainment: high school	.283***	.018	.283***	.018
Ethnicity/race: Latino	−.109***	.025	−.091***	.029
Ethnicity/race: black	−.029	.019	−.030	.019
Ethnicity/race: other	−.021	.036	−.022	.036
Home ownership: yes	−.011	.014	−.011	.014
Married: yes	.098***	.014	.099***	.014
Sex: female	.186***	.013	.186***	.013
MSA characteristics: within-effects				
Sanctuary policy ^b	.062	.037	.063	.037
% Black	.004	.010	.003	.010
% College graduates	.008	.007	.008	.007
% Crime-prone population	.000	.033	.002	.033
% Democratic voters	−.005	.003	−.005	.003
% Immigrant	.003	.007	.003	.007
% Latino	−.022*	.009	−.023**	.008
% Owner-occ. homes	−.011	.009	−.011	.009
Disadvantage index	.157**	.054	.159**	.054
MSA population ^a	.028	.160	.020	.160
Latino × sanctuary policy			.028	.104
Other × sanctuary policy				
MSA characteristics: between-effects				
Sanctuary policy ^b	−.089	.099	−.094	.096
% Black	.005	.011	.007	.011
% College graduates	−.025*	.010	−.031**	.011
% Crime-prone population	−.032	.040	−.031	.039
% Democratic voters	.010*	.005	.008	.005
% Immigrant	−.005	.008	−.003	.008
% Latino	.024*	.010	.006	.015
% Owner-occ. homes	.011	.010	.009	.010
Disadvantage index	−.265**	.097	−.309**	.098
MSA population ^a	−.091	.165	−.050	.166
Latino × sanctuary policy			−.109	.123
Year fixed effects (1980 to 2004)	Yes		Yes	
Constant	.594	.689	.743	.674
Var(MSA)	.009	.003	.008	.002
Var(MSA-year)	.004	.002	.004	.002
Var(ethnicity/race: Latino)	.029	.018	.027	.018
Observations				
Level-3, MSAs	40		40	
Level-2, MSA-years	996		996	
Level-1, Incidents	136,053		136,053	

^aLog-value.
^bPolicy adoption lagged one year.
Note: Victimization and harm and personal characteristics are mean centered. *Edu:* less than high school and *ethnicity/race:* white are reference categories. Models include control for NCVS survey redesign, and interactions account for effect heterogeneity in *ethnicity/race: Latino*.
p* < .05; *p* < .01; ****p* < .001 (two-tailed tests).

to promote immigrant integration into local communities. Some policymakers and political actors publicly express concern that sanctuary policies threaten public safety and systematically foster crime, arguing that such policies attract criminally-inclined noncitizens, promote criminal behavior among noncitizens, and shield noncitizens who engage in criminal behavior from deportation. As evidence of such claims, critics of sanctuary policies cite isolated yet highly publicized incidents of violence committed by deportable noncitizens in sanctuary jurisdictions. In contrast, other policymakers, law enforcement officials, and some scholars contend that sanctuary policies engender trust between immigrant communities and local institutions and in doing so, promote the safety and well-being of all residents, regardless of immigration status. Against the backdrop of this political discourse, scholars have increasingly conducted research on the broad topic of sanctuary policies (Collingwood et al. 2019; Collingwood and Gonzalez O'Brien 2019; Gonzalez et al. 2017; Kubrin and Bartos 2020; Lyons et al. 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019; Wong 2017).

Empirical studies on the sanctuary-crime link, specifically, are relatively limited in number. The few existing studies have found that sanctuary policy adoption either has no effect or modestly reduces macro-level crime (Gonzalez et al. 2017; Kubrin and Bartos 2020; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019; Wong 2017). In addition, some researchers have found that sanctuary policies enhance the inverse relationship between immigrant concentration and crime (Lyons et al. 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019). To explain these crime-buffering effects, scholars have speculated that sanctuary policies foster trust between migrant communities and local institutions, improve individuals' willingness to cooperate with crime investigations, and increase the likelihood that immigrants report crime victimization to law enforcement (Lyons et al. 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019). To our knowledge, no study has empirically examined how

the adoption of sanctuary policies affects help-seeking behavior. Instead, prior research has provided sophisticated analyses of crime data across varying immigrant sanctuary contexts with different units of analyses, and then only offered conjecture about how sanctuary policies engender changes in individual-level behaviors relevant to crime control (i.e., odds of notifying law enforcement about crime victimization).

Our study contributes to the existing body of research by situating expectations derived from the sanctuary-crime literature (Lyons et al. 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019) within the context of a multilevel, contextualized help-seeking framework (Xie and Baumer 2019a). Theoretically, immigrant sanctuary policy contexts should mitigate structural conditions, such as weak societal integration (Black 1976), that deter members of immigrant communities from reporting crimes to the police, build institutional trust within immigrant communities (Lyons et al. 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez 2019), and ease fears of deportation (Menjívar and Bejarano 2004). As a consequence of these processes, members of immigrant communities or persons socially connected to immigrants should be more likely to report victimization to law enforcement in immigrant sanctuary policy contexts.

Our analyses of more than 35,000 incidents of violent crime and 130,000 incidents of property crime across 40 MSAs and over 25 years find that Latinos have a higher probability (by 12 percentage points) of reporting violent crime victimization to law enforcement after a sanctuary policy is adopted within their MSA of residence. We do not find any evidence that other ethno-racial groups' odds or probabilities of notifying police after victimization vary across sanctuary policy contexts. Crime-reporting behavior is a primary way *individual* victims mobilize the law to receive justice (Black 1973), but we argue that local community members stand to benefit from an increase in crime reporting by Latino victims. Local-level mechanisms of formal social control are generally contingent

on the criminal justice system reacting to denizens' reports of crime (Gottfredson and Gottfredson 1988; Reiss 1992). Furthermore, researchers suggest that effective forms of formal control can deter crime and enhance public safety in areas where informal mechanisms of control based on reciprocal social ties and collective efficacy are otherwise thwarted by weak social networks and structural disadvantage (Carr 2003).

An implication of the criminal justice system's reactive nature is that its effectiveness rests on its perceived legitimacy within local communities and the willingness of local residents to actively engage with law enforcement. Prior research reveals that negative personal interactions with the police, as well as high-profile cases of police misconduct, can undermine the legitimacy of law enforcement and negatively affect rates of police notification (Carr et al. 2007; Desmond et al. 2016). Beyond personal experiences and police misconduct, local policy contexts can shape community members' attitudes toward police as well as their behavior following victimization. In the case of immigrant communities, scholars have noted that local policies related to U.S. immigration enforcement may engender legal cynicism and reduce institutional trust in law enforcement and the criminal justice system (Menjívar et al. 2018; Theodore and Habans 2016; Zatz and Smith 2012). Importantly, our central finding that Latino violent crime victims are more likely to report victimization after sanctuary policies are adopted within their MSAs of residence suggests that changes in local policies may also increase the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system—at least to the extent that crime victims are more willing to report victimization.

Several factors may help further elucidate why sanctuary policies are relevant to the decisions of Latino violent crime victims but not other ethno-racial groups in our sample. Relative to the black and white populations in the United States, Latinos are more likely to be foreign-born. Latinos are thus more likely to respond favorably to

sanctuary policy adoption given that they, their family members, or members of their broader communities stand to benefit most from shifts in policy contexts related to immigration enforcement or the social control of immigrants. Additionally, unauthorized immigrants overwhelmingly arrived to the United States from Mexico and Central American countries (i.e., over 70 percent during our study period), suggesting Latinos may be more likely to be undocumented, members of mixed-status families, or connected to deportable noncitizens via their immediate social networks. Research finds that the looming threat of deportation, particularly as immigration enforcement has devolved to local authorities, has led to a chilling effect whereby immigrant community members are less willing to access public services for which they are eligible and less amenable to trusting related institutions (Fix and Zimmerman 2001; Pedraza and Zhu 2015; Vargas 2015; Vargas and Pirog 2016). The media has documented instances in which unauthorized Latino immigrants have made victimization reports to local law enforcement, only to be placed in deportation proceedings (Silva 2018). Knowledge of these events may diffuse across communities, weaken Latinos' trust in (or increase their fear of) local-level law enforcement, and discourage migrants or their family members from reporting crime victimization. Therefore, Latinos may disproportionately benefit from the protections offered, or at least claimed, by subnational sanctuary policies.

The effects of immigrant sanctuary policy contexts on crime-reporting behavior appear to be limited to violent crime. Latino victims, relative to white victims, have lower odds of reporting property crime victimization, but we find no evidence that the negative effect associated with Latino identity is mitigated after sanctuary policies are adopted within MSAs. The divergent findings between violent and property crime victimization may be due to the differing natures of these experiences. Property crime victimization may be viewed as less serious, so Latinos may be less

inclined to engage with the criminal justice system even in the context of pro-immigrant policy contexts at the local level. Regardless, our finding that Latinos are more likely to report violent crime victimization after sanctuary policies are passed within their MSAs of residence is encouraging for proponents of sanctuary policies.

Our study also holds broader implications for research related to help-seeking behaviors (Xie and Baumer 2019a). Consistent with micro- and macro-level theoretical expectations, prior studies reveal how experiences with victimization and harm as well as personal characteristics influence whether victims mobilize the law and seek justice (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010; Felson et al. 2002; Gottfredson and Hindelang 1979; Skogan 1984). Recently, scholars have called for greater attention to the role of external environments within which victimization occurs (Xie and Baumer 2019a). Our empirical investigation of the NCVS: MSA Data implies that the majority of the variation in whether crime victims call the police is a function of micro-level factors and, unsurprisingly, we find little evidence that changes in macro-level conditions at the MSA-level during our study period are directly associated with police notification. However, we caution scholars from ignoring external environmental conditions altogether. In the present study, social policy effects are observable in the context of cross-level interactions (e.g., *Latino* \times *sanctuary policy*). Our results suggest that social policy effects, or other effects of the external environment, may be conditional on micro-level circumstances. In the case of sanctuary policies, we argue that immigrant sanctuary policy contexts shift the nature of help-seeking experiences for Latinos and eliminate barriers that may otherwise undermine victims' willingness to mobilize the law and seek justice (Menjívar et al. 2018; Theodore and Habans 2016; Zatz and Smith 2012). Future studies of help-seeking behaviors may better identify the role of external environmental conditions (e.g., within neighborhoods, counties, MSAs,

states) by situating their theoretical expectations within a multilevel, contextualized framework and by investigating theoretically motivated cross-level interactions (Xie and Baumer 2019a).

The analyses presented here are not without limitations. First, although we leverage the longitudinal nature of our dataset and use a novel hybrid method to correctly estimate the "within-effect" component of our cross-level interactions (Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran 2019), which are more appropriate for drawing causal inferences (Allison 2009), our estimates are not impervious to sources of bias. We have striven to account for external environmental conditions that are demonstrated or theorized to be related to both help-seeking behavior (Baumer 2002; Felson et al. 2002; Gutierrez and Kirk 2017; Xie and Baumer 2019b) and the passage of sanctuary policies (Collingwood and Gonzalez O'Brien 2019; Gonzalez et al. 2017; Lyons et al. 2013), but it is possible that some other unobserved time-varying condition has led us to over or underestimate the extent to which sanctuary policies condition the probability that Latino victims notify law enforcement. Our supplemental analysis presented in Table 6 provides additional evidence that Latinos' probabilities of reporting crime victimization are systematically higher in the years after sanctuary policies have been adopted, which suggests a unique effect due to or parallel to the adoption of immigrant sanctuary policies. Still, it is important that future scholars attempt to replicate our findings using alternative methods for causal inference.

Second, our study is also limited by the scope of the NCVS: MSA Data, which only provides geographic-identified information of crime victimization up to 2004. Our analyses do not consider the more recent wave of sanctuary policies (Collingwood, Gonzalez O'Brien, and Tafoya 2020). Future research should attempt to replicate our analyses with more recent victimization data that include measures of victims' subnational, geographic locations within the United States. Doing so will expand our understanding of immigrant

sanctuary policy contexts beyond the 25-year period we consider. The continued criminalization of immigration and the devolution of immigration enforcement over the past decade, as well as the recent anti-immigrant positions of the Trump administration, may have undermined local-level attempts to integrate immigrant communities. In addition, the NCVS: MSA Data does not contain information on respondents' immigration status. Immigrants—particularly non-naturalized and unauthorized immigrants—should be most sensitive to sanctuary policies given their precarious status. Due to data limitations, we are only able to model patterns in Latino crime-reporting behavior in accordance with changing policy contexts. If sanctuary policies have no effect on the behavior of Latino *citizens* but do affect noncitizen Latinos, then our effect estimates are likely understated. Alternatively, our results may imply that sanctuary policy contexts operate beyond their theorized influence on immigrant

behavior. The effects of immigrant sanctuary policy contexts on help-seeking behavior may extend more broadly to members of immigrant communities, regardless of victims' specific immigration status.

Finally, we only consider the role of sanctuary policy contexts in shaping crime victims' help-seeking behavior in terms of their willingness to call the police. As mentioned, federal immigration enforcement efforts have led to a chilling effect whereby members of immigrant communities, especially people in mixed-status families, are hesitant to engage with other social institutions and access public benefits, in spite of their eligibility (Fix and Zimmerman 2001; Pedraza and Zhu 2015; Vargas 2015; Vargas and Pirog 2016). Future research may consider how, if at all, sanctuary policies or other external environmental conditions structure trust in institutions beyond law enforcement as measured through attitudinal and other behavioral measures.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Two-Way, Fixed-Effects Logistic Regression Models of Victims' Log Odds of Reporting Violent Crime Victimization to Law Enforcement, 1980 to 2004

	Model A1		Model A2	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Victimization and harm				
Injury sustained: yes	.609***	.027	.609***	.027
Weapon present: gun	1.275***	.038	1.274***	.038
Weapon present: other	.541***	.032	.541***	.032
Personal characteristics				
Age	.017***	.001	.017***	.001
Edu. attainment: college grad.	.184***	.050	.184***	.050
Edu. attainment: high school	.308***	.034	.309***	.034
Ethnicity/race: Latino	.053	.790	.047	.055
Ethnicity/race: black	.160***	.038	.160***	.038
Ethnicity/race: other	-.080	.066	-.081	.066
Home ownership: yes	-.034	.030	-.033	.030
Married: yes	.332***	.030	.332***	.030
Sex: female	.391***	.035	.390***	.035
Offender: don't know	.217*	.101	.217*	.101
Offender: stranger	.117***	.035	.116***	.034
MSA characteristics				
Sanctuary policy ^a	-.030	.067	.024	.061
% Black	.013	.024	.011	.024
% College graduates	-.014	.020	-.015	.020
% Crime-prone population	.044	.072	.048	.073
% Democratic voters	-.001	.006	-.002	.006
% Immigrant	-.010	.013	-.010	.013
% Latino	.012	.022	.014	.022
% Owner-occ. homes	-.005	.028	-.004	.028
Disadvantage index	-.005	.111	-.016	.110
MSA population ^b	-.722*	.322	-.732*	.329
Latino × sanctuary policy	.533***	.149		
Other × sanctuary policy			.004	.244
MSA fixed effects ($j - 1$ dummies)	Yes		Yes	
Year fixed effects (1980 to 2004)	Yes		Yes	
Constant	9.389	4.946	9.472	5.070
Level-1, incidents	35,329		35,329	

^aPolicy adoption lagged one year.^bLog-value.

Note: Victimization and harm and personal characteristics are mean centered. *Weapon present: none*, *edu: less than high school*, *ethnicity/race: white*, and *offender: known* are reference categories. Models include control for NCVS survey redesign, and interactions account for effect heterogeneity in *ethnicity/race: Latino* and *ethnicity/race: other*.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

Table A2. Two-Way, Fixed-Effects Logistic Regression Model of Victims’ Log Odds of Reporting Property Crime Victimization to Law Enforcement, 1980 to 2004



	Model A3	
	Coef.	SE
Victimization and harm		
Value of property lost ^a	.543***	.008
Personal characteristics		
Age	.013***	.001
Edu. attainment: college grad.	.397***	.026
Edu. attainment: high school	.284***	.026
Ethnicity/race: Latino	−.116***	.020
Ethnicity/race: black	−.029	.031
Ethnicity/race: other	−.018	.032
Home ownership: yes	−.011	.016
Married: yes	.099***	.017
Sex: female	.186***	.017
MSA characteristics		
Sanctuary policy ^b	.065	.037
% Black	.005	.012
% College graduates	.007	.008
% Crime-prone population	−.011	.047
% Democratic voters	−.006	.004
% Immigrant	.003	.009
% Latino	−.022*	.009
% Owner-occ. homes	−.011	.013
Disadvantage index	.149*	.064
MSA population ^a	.035	.252
Latino × sanctuary policy	.023	.073
MSA fixed effects (<i>j</i> − 1 dummies)	Yes	
Year fixed effects (1980 to 2004)	Yes	
Constant	−3.298	3.760
Level-1, incidents	136,053	

^aLog-value.
^bPolicy adoption lagged one year.
Note: Victimization and harm and personal characteristics are mean centered. *Edu: less than high school* and *ethnicity/race: white* are reference categories. Models include control for NCVS survey redesign, and interactions account for effect heterogeneity in *ethnicity/race: Latino*.
p* < .05; *p* < .01; ****p* < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Acknowledgments

We thank Carmen Gutierrez, Christoph Spörlein, Karam Hwang, the editors of the *American Sociological Review*, and four anonymous reviewers for helpful comments, suggestions, or assistance with this study.

ORCID iDs

Ricardo D. Martínez-Schuldt  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2672-466X>
Daniel E. Martínez  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6773-4269>

Notes

1. Note that morphology can also refer to levels of intimacy between victims and offenders (Black 1976). Law is more likely to be mobilized when there is greater relational distance between people. So, we would expect people to be more likely to report victimization to law enforcement when crime incidents involve strangers relative to incidents when persons know each other.
2. Although we focus on police notifications of victimization, Xie and Baumer (2019a) call attention to the fact that crime victims may also seek assistance

- and support from family members, friends, or other institutions such as social services agencies.
3. See <http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-LocalLawsResolutionsAndPoliciesLimitingImmEnforcement.pdf>.
 4. See San Francisco's Due Process for All and Sanctuary 96-16 ordinance.
 5. A recent study of Texas residents found that public opinions of sanctuary policies are correlated with county-level demographic changes related to the Latino population, rather than actual exposure to crime (Collingwood et al. 2019).
 6. We use the term "mixed-status family" to refer to family structures composed of at least two individuals with differing immigration statuses (e.g., a U.S. citizen child living with an unauthorized parent).
 7. In 1992, a redesign in the NCVS survey affected respondents' reporting of some violent crime victimizations (Kindermann, Lynch, and Cantor 1997). To account for this, we include a dichotomous indicator for whether the survey took place before or after the redesign (see also Xie, Lauritsen, and Heimer 2012).
 8. NCVS: MSA Data records respondents' ages categorically. We construct a continuous measure by using midpoint scoring.
 9. Again, see <http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-LocalLawsResolutionsAndPoliciesLimitingImmEnforcement.pdf>.
 10. See, for example, <https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States>.
 11. The following MSAs (as defined in the NCSV: MSA Data) adopted a sanctuary policy within at least one of their core counties during our study period: (1) Baltimore, (2) Chicago, (3) Cleveland-Loraine-Elyria, (4) Houston, (5) Los Angeles, (6) New York, (7) Philadelphia, (8) Portland, (9) San Diego, (10) San Francisco, (12) Seattle, and (13) Washington, DC.
 12. The *percent Democratic voters* measure was derived from David Leip's atlas of U.S. Presidential elections (see <https://uselectionatlas.org/>). The database includes county-level voting records for 1980 through 2016. In addition to overall votes cast per county, the database registers the number of votes cast for the Democratic and Republican candidates. We record the total number of votes cast for each core county in the NCVS: MSA Data as well as the total number of votes cast for the Democratic candidate. We aggregated the county-level voting data to the MSA-level, and we calculate the percent of votes cast during each election for the Democratic candidate. Finally, consistent with prior research that analyzes the macro-level correlates of crime and victimization, we use linear interpolation to account for inter-election years (Sharkey, Torratts-Espinosa, and Takyar 2017; Xie et al. 2012).
 13. We replicated the models presented in Tables 3 and 8 using standard logistic regression with maximum likelihood estimation. The estimates, which are available upon request, result in the same substantive conclusions.
 14. In addition to the models presented in Tables 3 and 4, we also followed the methodological corrections outlined by Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran (2019) to estimate within-unit interaction terms using a two-way fixed-effects analytic approach (i.e., logistic regression models including MSA and year indicator variables). The models, which are presented as Models A1, A2, and A3 in the Appendix, lead to substantive conclusions identical to those drawn from Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 and Model 5 in Table 7. The similarity in the results is not surprising given that the hybrid modeling approach and fixed-effects models are both estimating within-unit effects (Allison 2009).
 15. Linear probability models (available upon request) produced substantively similar results.

References

- Abrego, Leisy, Mat Coleman, Daniel E. Martínez, Cecilia Menjivar, and Jeremy Slack. 2017. "Making Immigrants into Criminals: Legal Process of Criminalization in the Post-IIRIRA Era." *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 5(3):694–715.
- Allison, Paul D. 2009. *Fixed Effects Regression Models*. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
- Anderson, Elijah. 1999. *Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City*. New York: WW Norton.
- Armenta, Amada. 2017. *Protect, Serve, and Deport: The Rise of Policing as Immigration Enforcement*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Auspurg, Katrin, Jose Brüderl, and Thomas Wöhler. 2019. "Does Immigration Reduce the Support for Welfare Spending? A Cautionary Tale on Spatial Panel Data Analysis." *American Sociological Review* 84(4):754–63.
- Avakame, Edem F., James J. Fyfe, and Candace McCoy. 1999. "'Did You Call the Police? What Did They Do?' An Empirical Assessment of Black's Theory of Mobilization of Law." *Justice Quarterly* 16(4):765–92.
- Barr, Dale J., Roger Levy, Christoph Scheepers, and Harry J. Tily. 2013. "Random Effects Structure for Confirmatory Hypothesis Testing: Keep It Maximal." *Journal of Memory and Language* 68(3):1–43.
- Bau, Ignatius. 1994. "Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Local Government Cooperation with the INS." *Berkeley La Raza Law Journal* 7(1):50–71.
- Bauer, Daniel J., and Patrick J. Curran. 2005. "Probing Interactions in Fixed and Multilevel Regression: Inferential and Graphical Techniques." *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 40(3):373–400.
- Baumer, Eric P. 2002. "Neighborhood Disadvantage and Police Notification by Victims of Violence." *Criminology* 40(3):579–616.

- Baumer, Eric P., and Janet L. Lauritsen. 2010. "Reporting Crime to the Police, 1973–2005: A Multivariate Analysis of Long-Term Trends in the National Crime Survey (NCS) and National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)." *Criminology* 48(1):131–86.
- Bersani, Bianca E., Thomas A. Loughran, and Alex R. Piquero. 2014. "Comparing Patterns and Predictors of Immigrant Offending among a Sample of Adjudicated Youth." *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 43(11):1914–33.
- Black, Donald. 1973. "The Mobilization of Law." *Journal of Legal Studies* 2(1):125–49.
- Black, Donald. 1976. *The Behavior of Law*. New York: Academic Press.
- Capps, Randy, Marc R. Rosenblum, Christina Rodriguez, and Muzaffar Chishti. 2011. "Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local Immigration Enforcement." Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Carr, Patrick J. 2003. "The New Parochialism: The Implications of the Beltway Case for Arguments Concerning Informal Social Control." *American Journal of Sociology* 108(6):1249–91.
- Carr, Patrick J., Laura Napolitano, and Jessica Keating. 2007. "We Never Call the Cops and Here Is Why: A Qualitative Examination of Legal Cynicism in Three Philadelphia Neighborhoods." *Criminology* 45(2):445–80.
- Coleman, Mathew. 2007. "Immigration Geopolitics beyond the Mexico-US Border." *Antipodes* 39(1):54–76.
- Collingwood, Loren, Stephen El-Khatib, and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien. 2019. "Sustained Organizational Influence: American Legislative Exchange Council and Diffusion of Anti-Sanctuary Policy." *Policy Studies Journal* 47(3):735–73.
- Collingwood, Loren, and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien. 2019. "Public Opposition to Sanctuary Cities in Texas: Criminal Threat or Immigration Threat?" *Social Science Quarterly* 100(4):1182–96.
- Collingwood, Loren, Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien, and Joe R. Tafoya. 2020. "Partisan Learning or Racial Learning: Opinion Change on Sanctuary City Policy Preferences in California and Texas." *Journal of Race and Ethnic Politics* 5(1):92–129.
- Copes, Heath, Kent R. Kerley, Karen A. Mason, and Judy Van Wyk. 2001. "Reporting Behavior of Fraud Victims and Black's Theory of Law: An Empirical Assessment." *Justice Quarterly* 18(2):343–63.
- De Genova, Nicholas P. 2002. "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31:419–47.
- Desmond, Mathew, Andrew V. Papachristos, and David S. Kirk. 2016. "Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community." *American Sociological Review* 81(5):857–76.
- Executive Order No. 13768, 3 C.F.R. 8799-8803. 2017.
- Fairbrother, Malcolm. 2014. "Two Multilevel Modeling Techniques of Analyzing Comparative Longitudinal Survey Datasets." *Political Science Research and Methods* 2(1):119–40.
- Felson, Richard B., Steven F. Messner, Anthony W. Hoskin, and Glenn Deane. 2002. "Reasons for Reporting and Not Reporting Domestic Violence to the Police." *Criminology* 40(3):617–48.
- Fix, Michael, and Wendy Zimmerman. 2001. "All Under One Roof: Mixed-Status Families in an Era of Reform." *International Migration Review* 35(2):397–419.
- Fussell, Elizabeth. 2011. "The Deportation Threat Dynamic and Victimization of Latino Migrants: Wage Theft and Robbery." *The Sociological Quarterly* 52(4):593–615.
- Garcia, Michael J. 2009. "'Sanctuary Cities': Legal Issues." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- Giesselmann, Marco, and Alexander W. Schmidt-Catran. 2019. "Getting the Within Estimator of Cross-Level Interactions in Multilevel Models with Pooled Cross-Sections: Why Country Dummies (Sometimes) Do Not Do the Job." *Sociological Methodology* 49(1):190–219.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya, and Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo. 2013. "Latino Immigrant Men and the Deportation Crisis: A Gendered Racial Removal Program." *Latino Studies* 11(3):271–92.
- Gonzalez, Benjamin, Loren Collingwood, and Stephen Omar El-Khatib. 2017. "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration." *Urban Affairs Review* 55(1):3–40.
- Gottfredson, Michael R., and Don M. Gottfredson. 1988. *Decision-Making in Criminal Justice: Toward the Rational Exercise of Discretion*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
- Gottfredson, Michael R., and Michael J. Hindelang. 1979. "A Study of the Behavior of Law." *American Sociological Review* 44(1):3–18.
- Goudriaan, Heike, and Paul Nieuwebeerta. 2007. "Contextual Determinants of Juveniles' Willingness to Report Crimes." *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 3(2):89–111.
- Gutierrez, Carmen M., and David S. Kirk. 2017. "Silence Speaks: The Relationship between Immigration and the Underreporting of Crime." *Crime and Delinquency* 63(8):926–50.
- Hagan, Jacqueline, Karl Eschbach, and Nestor Rodriguez. 2008. "U.S. Deportation Policy, Family Separation, and Circular Migration." *International Migration Review* 42(2):64–88.
- Hernández, David, John M. Eason, Richard Abel, Andrew McNeely, and Patrick Rubio-Goldsmith. 2018. "With Mass Deportation Comes Mass Punishment: Punitive Capacity, Health, and Standards in US Immigrant Detention." In *Routledge Handbook on Immigration and Crime*, edited by H. V. Miller and A. Peguero. New York: Routledge.
- Hoynes, Hilary W., Marianne E. Page, and Ann Huff Stevens. 2006. "Poverty in America: Trends and

- Explanations." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20(1):47–68.
- Hox, Joop J. 2010. *Multilevel Analysis Techniques and Applications*. New York: Routledge.
- Kahn-Lang, Ariella, and Kevin Lang. 2020. "The Promises and Pitfalls of Differences-in-Differences: Reflections on 16 and Pregnant and Other Applications." *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics* 38(3):613–20.
- Kanstroom, Daniel. 2007. *Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kindermann, Charles, James P. Lynch, and David Cantor. 1997. *The Effects of the Redesign on Victimization Estimates*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.
- Kirk, David, Andrew V. Papachristos, Jeffery Fagan, and Tom R. Tyler. 2012. "The Paradox of Law Enforcement in Immigrant Communities: Does Tough Immigration Enforcement Undermine Public Safety?" *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 641(1):79–98.
- Kittrie, Orde F. 2006. "Federalism, Deportation and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police." *Iowa Law Review* 91:1449–508.
- Kubrin, Charis E. 2014. "Secure or Insecure Communities?" *Criminology & Public Policy* 13(2):323–38.
- Kubrin, Charis E., and Bradley J. Bartos. 2020. "Sanctuary Status and Crime in California: What's the Connection?" *Justice Evaluation Journal* (<https://doi.org/10.1080/24751979.2020.1745662>).
- LaHuis, David M., and Matthew W. Ferguson. 2009. "The Accuracy of Significance Tests for Slope Variance Components in Multilevel Random Coefficient Models." *Organizational Research Methods* 12(3):418–35.
- Lauritsen, Janet L., and Robin J. Schaum. 2005. "Crime and Victimization in the Three Largest Metropolitan Areas, 1980–98." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
- Light, Michael T., and Ty Miller. 2018. "Does Undocumented Immigration Increase Violent Crime?" *Criminology* 56(2):370–401.
- Long, J. Scott, and Sarah A. Mustillo. 2018. "Using Predictions and Marginal Effects to Compare Groups in Regression Models for Binary Outcomes." *Sociological Methods and Research* (<https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124118799374>).
- Lynch, Michael J. 2016. "The Ecological Distribution of Community Advantage and Disadvantage: Power Structures, Political Economy, Communities, and Green-State Crime and Justice." *Critical Criminology* 24:247–62.
- Lyons, Christopher J., Maria B. Vélez, and Wayne A. Santoro. 2013. "Neighborhood Immigration, Violence, and City-Level Immigrant Political Opportunities." *American Sociological Review* 78(4):604–32.
- Martínez, Daniel E., Ricardo D. Martínez-Schuldt, and Guillermo Cantor. 2018. "Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime." *Sociology Compass* 12(1):1–13.
- Martínez, Ramiro, Jr. 2006. "Coming to America: The Impact of the New Immigration on Crime." Pp. 1–19 in *Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity, and Violence*, edited by R. Martínez Jr. and A. Valenzuela Jr. New York: New York University Press.
- Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D., and Daniel E. Martínez. 2019. "Sanctuary Policies and City-Level Incidents of Violence, 1990 to 2010." *Justice Quarterly* 36(4):567–93.
- Meissner, Doris, Donald M. Kerwin, Muzaffar Chishti, and Claire Bergeron. 2013. "Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery." Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Menjívar, Cecilia, Leisy J. Abrego, and Leah C. Schmalzbauer. 2016. *Immigrant Families*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Menjívar, Cecilia, and Cynthia Bejarano. 2004. "Latino Immigrants' Perceptions of Crime and Police Authorities in the United States: A Case Study from the Phoenix Metropolitan Area." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27(1):120–48.
- Menjívar, Cecilia, William Paul Simmons, Daniel Alvord, and Elizabeth Salerno Valdez. 2018. "Immigration Enforcement, the Racialization of Legal Status, and Perceptions of the Police." *Du Bois Review* 15(1):107–28.
- Mood, Catrina. 2010. "Logistic Regression: Why We Cannot Do What We Think We Can Do, and What We Can Do About It." *European Sociological Review* 26(1):67–82.
- Ousey, Graham C., and Charis E. Kubrin. 2014. "Immigration and the Changing Nature of Homicide in US Cities, 1980–2010." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 30:453–83.
- Ousey, Graham C., and Charis E. Kubrin. 2018. "Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Contentious Issue." *Annual Review of Criminology* 1:63–84.
- Passel, Jeffrey S., and D'Vera Cohn. 2016. "Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrants Holds Steady since 2009." Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
- Pedraza, Francisco I., and Ling Zhu. 2015. "The 'Chilling Effect' of American's New Immigration Enforcement Regime." *Pathways* Spring:13–17.
- Phillips, Scott, Jacqueline Maria Hagan, and Nestor Rodríguez. 2006. "Brutal Borders? Examining the Treatment of Deportees during Arrest and Detention." *Social Forces* 85(1):93–109.
- Powell, Darci, Krista M. Perreira, and Kathleen Mullan Harris. 2010. "Trajectories of Delinquency from Adolescence to Adulthood." *Youth and Society* 41(4):475–502.
- Reiss, Albert J. 1992. "Police Organization in the Twentieth Century." *Crime and Justice* 15:51–97.
- Ridgley, Jennifer. 2008. "Cities of Refuge: Immigration Enforcement, Police, and the Insurgent Genealogies

- of Citizenship in US Sanctuary Cities." *Urban Geography* 29(1):53–77.
- Ruggles, Steven, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, and Matthew Sobek. 2015. "Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0 [dataset]." Minneapolis: University of Minnesota (<http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0>).
- Sampson, Robert J. 2012. *Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schmidt-Catran, Alexander W., and Malcom Fairbrother. 2016. "The Random Effects in Multilevel Models: Getting Them Wrong and Getting Them Right." *European Sociological Review* 32(1):23–38.
- Schmidt-Catran, Alexander W., and Dennis C. Spies. 2019. "Immigration and Welfare Support in Germany: Methodological Reevaluations and Substantive Conclusions." *American Sociological Review* 84(4):764–68.
- Sharkey, Patrick, Gerard Torrats-Espinosa, and Delaram Takyar. 2017. "Community and the Crime Decline: The Causal Effect of Local Nonprofits on Violent Crime." *American Sociological Review* 82(6):1214–40.
- Silva, Daniella. 2018. "Immigrant Faces Deportation after Calling Police for Help." *NBCS News* (<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/immigrant-faces-deportation-after-calling-police-help-n847801>).
- Skogan, Wesley G. 1984. "Reporting Crimes to the Police: The Status of World Research." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 21(2):113–37.
- Skogan, Wesley, and Kathleen Frydl. 2004. *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Stuart, Forrest, Amada Armenta, and Melissa Osborne. 2015. "Legal Control of Marginal Groups." *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 11:235–54.
- Sunshine, Jason, and Tom R. Tyler. 2003. "The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing." *Law & Society Review* 37(3):513–48.
- Tankebe, Justice. 2013. "Viewing Things Differently: The Dimensions of Public Perceptions of Police Legitimacy." *Criminology* 51(1):103–35.
- Theodore, Nik, and Robert Habans. 2016. "Policing Immigrant Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in Immigration Enforcement." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42(6):970–88.
- U.S. Department of Justice. 2007. "Cooperation of SCAAP Recipients in the Removal of Criminal Aliens from the United States (Audit Report 07-07)." Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General Audit Division.
- U.S. Department of Justice. 2019. "Criminal Victimization, 2018." Washington, DC: Office of Justice Program, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
- Vargas, Edward D. 2015. "Immigration Enforcement and Mixed-Status Families: The Effects of Risk of Deportation on Medicaid Use." *Children and Youth Services Review* 57:83–89.
- Vargas, Edward D., and Maureen A. Pirog. 2016. "Mixed-Status Families and WIC Uptake: The Effects of Risk of Deportation on Program Use." *Social Science Quarterly* 97(3):555–72.
- Williams, Richard. 2009. "Using Heterogeneous Choice Models to Compare Logit and Probit Coefficients across Groups." *Sociological Methods and Research* 37(4):531–59.
- Wong, Tom K. 2017. "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy." Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.
- Xie, Min, and Eric P. Baumer. 2019a. "Crime Victims' Decisions to Call the Police: Past Research and New Directions." *Annual Review of Criminology* 2:217–40.
- Xie, Min, and Eric P. Baumer. 2019b. "Neighborhood Immigrant Concentration and Violent Crime Reporting to the Police: A Multilevel Analysis of Data from the National Crime Victimization Survey." *Criminology* 57(2):237–67.
- Xie, Min, and Janet L. Lauritsen. 2012. "Racial Context and Crime Reporting: A Test of Black's Stratification Hypothesis." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 28(2):265–93.
- Xie, Min, Janet L. Lauritsen, and Karen Heimer. 2012. "Intimate Partner Violence in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: The Contextual Influences of Police and Social Services." *Criminology* 50(4):961–92.
- Yee, Vivian. 2017. "Judge Blocks Trump Effort to Withhold Money from Sanctuary Cities." *The New York Times* (<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/us/judge-blocks-trump-sanctuary-cities.html>).
- Zatz, Marjorie S., and Hilary Smith. 2012. "Immigration, Crime, and Victimization: Rhetoric and Reality." *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 8(1):141–59.

Ricardo D. Martínez-Schuldt is an Assistant Professor of Sociology and a Faculty Fellow in the Institute for Latino Studies at the University of Notre Dame. His research examines processes of international migration in the North American migratory system, with a focus on Mexican immigration to the United States. Additionally, he conducts research on the neighborhood and city-level correlates of crime, crime reporting behavior, and officer-involved shootings.

Daniel E. Martínez is an Associate Professor in the School of Sociology and a co-director of the Binational Migration at the University of Arizona. His research focuses on undocumented immigration, deportation, the criminalization of immigration, and ethnoracial identification among Latinos.