



Director of National Intelligence

2 February 2026

The Honorable Mark R. Warner
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable James A. Himes
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Vice Chairman Warner and Ranking Member Himes:

I have received your letter regarding my presence at the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) execution of a Search Warrant on The Office of the Clerk of The Court of Fulton County, Georgia on 28 January 2026. For a brief period of time, I accompanied FBI Deputy Director Bailey and Atlanta Acting Special Agent in Charge Pete Ellis in observing FBI personnel executing that search warrant, issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia pursuant to a probable cause finding. My presence was requested by the President and executed under my broad statutory authority to coordinate, integrate, and analyze intelligence related to election security, including counterintelligence (CI), foreign and other malign influence and cybersecurity. The FBI's Intelligence/Counterintelligence divisions are one of the 18 elements that I oversee.

In twelve FBI Field Offices across the country, including the Atlanta Field Office, the senior FBI official (Assistant Director in Charge or Special Agent in Charge) is dual-hatted as my Domestic DNI-Representative. The Domestic DNI-Rep program was established in 2011 through a Memorandum of Understanding between the ODNI and FBI. Domestic DNI-Reps are distributed by region and focus on specific domestic issues of concern or interest, including threats to critical infrastructure. I have visited several of my Domestic DNI-Reps at FBI Field Offices across the country. While visiting the FBI Field Office in Atlanta, I thanked the FBI agents for their professionalism and great work, and facilitated a brief phone call for the President to thank the agents personally for their work. He did not ask any questions, nor did he or I issue any directives.

ODNI's Office of General Counsel has found my actions to be consistent and well within my statutory authorities as the Director of National Intelligence.

I address your questions as follows:

1. Election Security is a National Security Issue

Interference in U.S. elections is a threat to our republic and a national security threat. The President and his Administration are committed to safeguarding the integrity of U.S. elections to ensure that neither foreign nor domestic powers undermine the American people's right to determine who our elected leaders are. Towards that effort, the President tasked ODNI with taking all appropriate actions under my statutory authorities towards ensuring the integrity of our elections and specifically directed my observance of the execution of the Fulton County search warrant.

As I publicly highlighted on 10 April 2025, ODNI has been actively reviewing intelligence reporting and assessments on election integrity since I took office. As part of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center's (NCSC) responsibility to lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters related to election security, NCSC personnel travelled with me to Fulton County to support this effort. They were not present during the execution of the warrant.

2. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has Broad Authority to Coordinate, Integrate, and Analyze Intelligence Related to Election Security

To preserve the integrity of our elections, we must understand whether there has been foreign or other malign interference in our elections, and whether vulnerabilities exist in our election infrastructure that could be exploited in future elections. To enable this, it is critical that the Intelligence Community (IC) work with interagency partners like the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and other IC elements to ensure coordination of efforts and intelligence sharing and integration.

Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides the DNI with robust authority to coordinate and integrate national intelligence, which includes intelligence pertaining to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence threats to election processes and infrastructure (e.g., election voting systems and software, voter registration databases). This includes direction for the DNI to have access to all national intelligence (consistent with other law), as well as authority to establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the IC to ensure timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of national intelligence.

Section 119C of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, requires that ODNI maintain a capability to analyze and integrate intelligence on foreign attempts to

influence U.S. policy or public opinion, and to give assessments and warnings to policymakers and Congress.

Section 6508 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2020 provides for the DNI to designate a National Counterintelligence Officer within the NCSC to lead, manage, and coordinate CI matters related to election security. This responsibility includes addressing risks posed by foreign powers to election infrastructure such as voting systems and voter registration databases. NCSC's CI integration, coordination, and outreach responsibilities under the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, and delegated authorities as the National Intelligence Manager for CI in accordance with Executive Order 12333 and Intelligence Community Directive 900, are leveraged to support these efforts.

Through Executive Order 13848, *Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election*, first issued on 12 September 2018, the President declared a national emergency on the threat of foreign interference in U.S. elections and directly tasked the DNI with assessing foreign interference after every federal election. That assessment must identify the nature of any foreign interference and any methods employed to execute it, the persons involved, and the foreign government or governments that directed, sponsored, or supported it. That Executive Order also directed the heads of all federal agencies to provide any relevant information to the DNI to execute that direction. President Biden extended this national emergency on 9 September 2022 and President Trump did so again on 29 August 2025, demonstrating a bipartisan commitment towards addressing this threat to the integrity of our elections.

Pursuant to Presidential Policy Directive 4, issued by President Obama on 26 July 2016, ODNI is the lead federal agency for intelligence support for coordinating responses to any significant cyber incidents, which may include intelligence related to the cybersecurity of election systems. Furthermore, pursuant to National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), issued by President Biden on 30 April 2024, ODNI is the lead agency for intelligence support to any significant cyber incident to critical U.S. infrastructure, to include election infrastructure. Finally, ODNI is the lead intelligence agency in the Joint Cyber Planning Office, which coordinates and oversees the nation's strategy to secure critical cyber infrastructure, including cyber infrastructure used for elections.

3. ODNI will not irresponsibly share incomplete intelligence assessments concerning foreign or other malign interference in U.S. elections

As I publicly stated on 10 April 2025, there is information and intelligence reporting suggesting that electronic voting systems being used in the United States have long


been vulnerable to exploitation that could result in enabling determined actors to manipulate the results of the votes being cast with the intent of changing the outcome of an election. ODNI and the IC continue to collect and assess all available intelligence concerning this threat to ensure the security and integrity of our elections.

Searching through intelligence holdings and conducting assessments with analytic rigor and excellence is an arduous and often time-consuming process. However, that process ensures that the IC's finished intelligence products are objective, independent of political considerations, and based on all available sources. I will share our intelligence assessments with Congress once they are complete.

Section 501(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, specifically highlights that the congressional accountability requirements of that Act do not require that the President obtain approval from the congressional intelligence committees *before* initiating a significant intelligence activity. Moreover, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia issued the search warrant on The Office of the Clerk of The Court of Fulton County under seal. As such, I have not seen the warrant or the evidence of probable cause that the DOJ submitted to Court for approval. Therefore, the ODNI had no ability, authority or responsibility to inform the Committees about the search warrant ahead of its execution.

If you have questions, you may contact Sara Lynn Colley, Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Legislative Affairs, at (703) 275-2032.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Tulsi Gabbard', written in a cursive style.

Tulsi Gabbard

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Cc:

The Honorable Mike Johnson
The Honorable John Thune
The Honorable Charles E. Schumer
The Honorable Mitch McConnell
The Honorable Christopher Coons
The Honorable Tom Cotton
The Honorable Hakeem Jeffries
The Honorable Ken Calvert
The Honorable Betty McCollum
The Honorable Eric A. "Rick" Crawford

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