

OFFICE OF THE DEMOCRATIC LEADER

Interview of
CHRISTOPHER WYLIE

Conducted by

NANCY PELOSI
and
ADAM SCHIFF

Wednesday, April 25, 2018

2:48 - 7:37 p.m.

AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION

Diversified Reporting Services, Inc.

(202) 467-9200

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

P R O C E E D I N G

MS. PELOSI: I am going to call to order this evening the interview of Christopher Wylie, former director of research for Cambridge Analytica.

I would now like to yield to the distinguished ranking member of the committee, Mr. Schiff.

MR. SCHIFF: Thank you, Madam Leader. We appreciate your conducting this hearing under your auspices here in your office.

Good afternoon, Mr. Wylie.

This is a transcribed interview of Christopher Wylie, a former employee of Cambridge Analytica, who has recently come to light as a whistleblower regarding the company's alleged improper acquisition and use of more than 50 million Facebook profiles.

Mr. Wylie, we are very grateful for your coming this distance to speak with us today.

MR. WYLIE: It's my pleasure.

MR. SCHIFF: As part of the ongoing criminal -- congressional investigation -- criminal, too, perhaps -- into Russia's interference in the 2016 U.S. election, House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, who was

1 also an ex officio member of the House Permanent Select
2 Committee on Intelligence, has graciously offered to
3 host us for your interview. We greatly appreciate her
4 support in exploring the important allegations that
5 stem from your whistleblowing and reporting by UK's
6 Channel 4 News.

7 We have invited our colleagues from the
8 Majority to participate today, and hope that they will
9 join us, although as yet we think that is unlikely.

10 Before we begin, I want to say a few things
11 for the record. Questioning today will be conducted by
12 Members and staff. During the course of this
13 interview, Members and staff may ask questions during
14 their allotted time period. Some questions may seem
15 basic, but that is because we need to clarify and
16 establish certain facts and understand the full
17 dimensions of the situation. Please don't assume that
18 we know any facts you have not previously disclosed as
19 part of any other investigation or review.

20 This interview will be conducted at an
21 unclassified level. We ask that you give complete
22 replies to questions based on your best recollection.

1 If a question is unclear, or you are uncertain in your
2 response, please let us know. And if you do not know
3 the answer to a question, or cannot remember, simply
4 say so.

5 You are entitled to have counsel present
6 during your interview. If at any time you need to take
7 a break, just let us know. We appreciate your
8 accommodation by traveling here to Washington, D.C. for
9 the interview.

10 At this time, if counsel could please state
11 your name for the record.

12 MS. ALLEN: My name is Tamsin Allen.

13 MS. PELOSI: Ranking Member, if I just may
14 thank counsel and Mr. Wylie for being here today, thank
15 you. And I am going to yield because I -- hopefully I
16 will be able to come back.

17 MS. ALLEN: May I make a small preliminary
18 observation, which is I understand that it is -- that
19 today is being transcribed. There may be something --
20 some answers that Chris would like to give, but he's
21 not able to give in public because there is an ongoing
22 criminal investigation in the UK, and we don't want to

1 say anything that could prejudice that investigation in
2 public.

3 So it may be that we are going to need to ask
4 to -- for those things to be excised from the
5 transcript in future. So I just wanted to give you
6 that heads up.

7 MS. PELOSI: Thank you.

8 MR. SCHIFF: Okay, thank you. And this will
9 be a closed interview, so down the road, should we
10 decide to release the transcript, we will reach out to
11 you first, and see if there are any particular
12 sensitivities that we can try to work our way through.

13 MS. ALLEN: Thank you.

14 MR. SCHIFF: All right. Well, I'm going to
15 start out with a few very basic introductory questions,
16 and then we will pass it on to my colleagues.

17 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

18 MR. SCHIFF: If I could start at the very
19 beginning, how did you come to work for SCL Group?

20 Who was a part of SCL at the time that you
21 joined?

22 And what can you tell us about the formation

1 of SCL?

2 MR. WYLIE: Sure. So I joined SCL Group as
3 director of research in June 2015. That was after I
4 was introduced to Alexander Nix and several other
5 senior staff members at SCL through a mutual contact
6 that I had when I previously was working for the
7 coalition government in the United Kingdom for the
8 liberal democrat side.

9 I got hired in part because the previous
10 research director died in Kenya and they had an
11 opening. And also, the firm was looking to expand its
12 capacity in data analytics, cyber.

13 It's important to understand that, firstly,
14 this was prior to Cambridge Analytica being formed. At
15 the time the firm was predominantly a military
16 contractor, so its clients included the UK Ministry of
17 Defense and also the United States Department of
18 Defense, as well as several other NATO countries'
19 militaries or defense ministries.

20 At the time several countries -- so in the
21 United States DARPA, which is the U.S. military
22 research agency, and in the United Kingdom DSTL, which

1 is DARPA's equivalent, were looking at how to better
2 understand the proliferation of ideas online and, more
3 generally, studying influence in social networks.

4 So it was quite appealing for the firm to
5 bring on somebody -- to bring on a research director
6 who had much more experience in data science,
7 analytics, and generally building profiles of people
8 based on different data sets and predicting behavior.

9 Does that answer your question, or --

10 MR. SCHIFF: It does. Now, when you joined
11 SCL, how many employees did SCL have?

12 How -- was it only in the UK?

13 Did it have a Canadian presence also, or --

14 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. So when I joined, it was --
15 most staff were based in London. So it's important to
16 understand this is a British company, it's a British-
17 registered company. There was a -- it wasn't, when I
18 joined, a very large company. There was probably
19 about, in total, amongst the entire group of companies
20 -- because there is different divisions -- about 20 or
21 so staff.

22 The company had a network of contacts around

1 the world. They had partnerships with local firms, or
2 had offices around the world, or had consultants or
3 contractors that were based in different countries,
4 mostly for contract acquisition.

5 The Canadian office that I think you are
6 referring to was set up after I joined.

7 MR. SCHIFF: So at the time you joined, was
8 there only one office in the UK, but there were
9 employees --

10 MR. WYLIE: There were --

11 MR. SCHIFF: -- in other parts of the world
12 who were --

13 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, it was -- there was one
14 office in London that was there, or -- let me correct
15 myself.

16 There were several offices in London for each
17 of the different divisions. In terms of offices around
18 the world, they would have contractors or people that
19 they would have on retainer who either would have a
20 small office in that country if there was ongoing
21 projects, or there would be a partner firm where one
22 person would be on retainer at a local firm with

1 contacts in that country.

2 MR. SCHIFF: And when you started at SCL, how
3 well capitalized was SCL? Where did the investors come
4 from? What kind of revenues did it have at that time?

5 MR. WYLIE: I'm not privy to the exact figures
6 at that time, so I can't give you a specific answer.
7 But it wasn't, you know, a very -- it wasn't a very
8 large -- it wasn't a large company. But I can't give
9 you an exact figure of revenue.

10 MR. SCHIFF: And the Mercers, did they come
11 along after you had joined?

12 MR. WYLIE: Yes. So if it's helpful, I can
13 give you sort of a rough timeline.

14 MR. SCHIFF: Sure, that would be great.

15 MR. WYLIE: So I joined in June 2013. The --
16 and as I said before, the sort of purpose of me joining
17 SCL Group was, essentially, to do research and
18 development, to gain better capacity in data analytics
19 and targeting and profiling online, because that's
20 something that they knew that their clientele,
21 particularly on the military side, would be interested
22 in.

1 Several months after I joined -- so this would
2 be around either the end of September or the beginning
3 of October 2013 -- is -- I believe October -- is when I
4 first met Steve Bannon. So at the -- when I joined --
5 and I can't give you an exact date as to when some of
6 these meetings happened, but Alexander Nix went to the
7 United States because he got introduced to Steve
8 Bannon.

9 And Steve was, at the time, sort of setting up
10 Breitbart UK, so he was going back and forth between
11 the United States and the UK. So it was fortuitous
12 timing for him. He was looking, essentially, to expand
13 his ability to build what we would now call the alt-
14 right --

15 MR. SCHIFF: I'm sorry, when you met Bannon,
16 had he already had an affiliation with SCL?

17 MR. WYLIE: No. He had several meetings in
18 the United States that I wasn't privy to.

19 MR. SCHIFF: So this was when Nix was trying
20 to establish --

21 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, so Alexander Nix first
22 started meeting with him after an introduction from a

1 mutual contact.

2 When Steve Bannon first came over to the
3 United States and met with me, it was -- he was -- I
4 was just told to go and speak with him, and he just had
5 lots of questions, namely about research into sort of
6 culture, and what is culture, and has culture changed.

7 The research that I was looking at was in whether we
8 can take data sets from different sources and predict
9 psychological disposition.

10 One of the things I spoke to him about was if
11 you -- there is something called the psycholexical
12 hypothesis, which is that there is meaning and
13 information encoded in language. And so when you look
14 at how different languages describe certain things, and
15 the different kinds of adjectives that we use, there
16 may be a latent construct there.

17 And so, just to translate that into something
18 more tangible, the words that we use to describe
19 ourselves as people, in terms of personality traits,
20 are often the same words that we would use to describe
21 cultures sort of more generally. So if you just
22 indulge a stereotype for example, what are Italians

1 like? They might be more passionate, they might be
2 more extroverted. What are Germans like? They might
3 be more organized, more diligent, more rule-oriented,
4 right? And that there might be some kind of latent
5 construct there that could be measured and engaged in
6 some way.

7 Because I said to him, I said, "If you are
8 interested in culture change, you first have to define
9 what culture is, and -- because if you're -- if you
10 just have this sort of amorphous construct, you can't
11 actually do anything with it." So that was quite
12 appealing to him because the research that we were
13 doing in terms of profiling people in terms of
14 personality traits likely could extend to culture,
15 because culture is just an aggregation of people. If
16 you think about what are the units of culture, the
17 units of culture are people.

18 And so he continued having meetings with
19 Alexander Nix. He very much liked the idea of working
20 with a military contractor, because when he talks about
21 culture wars, I think he literally intends those words
22 in the sense that if you want to fight a war you need

1 to build an arsenal of weaponry. And who better to go
2 and contact than a military contractor?

3 So, after having sort of several months of
4 meetings, I got introduced -- I got flown over to New
5 York, and I got introduced to Robert Mercer, Rebekah
6 Mercer. Steve Bannon also was at this meeting. And --

7 MR. SCHIFF: So this would have been early
8 2014?

9 MR. WYLIE: This would have been -- we're now
10 the end of November. So by -- so the -- it happened
11 quite quickly. So there was -- October is when I first
12 met Steve Bannon. He -- we had several meetings and
13 conference calls. And then, sort of mid to the end of
14 November, that's when I went to New York to meet with
15 the Mercers.

16 So Alexander Nix joined me at that meeting,
17 Steve Bannon was there, Robert Mercer was there,
18 Rebekah Mercer was there. And that meeting --
19 essentially, we just spoke about the research that we
20 were doing.

21 One of the sort of impressions that I got was
22 that --

1 MR. SCHIFF: Before you tell me your
2 impression, if I could --

3 MR. WYLIE: Yeah?

4 MR. SCHIFF: -- what do you know of the
5 financing of SCL before the Mercers entered the
6 picture?

7 Did they have any patrons like the Mercers?

8 Did they have --

9 MR. WYLIE: No. At the -- they weren't -- it
10 wasn't -- they didn't have any sort of patrons or sort
11 of wealthy backers at that level, at that sort of
12 billionaire level. So they were going -- they made
13 money through just predominantly contracts with
14 military clients.

15 MR. SCHIFF: You know, there has been
16 speculation and sometimes reporting that SCL may have
17 received Russian financial backing through oligarchs or
18 otherwise. Did that ever come to your attention,
19 either in the period before the Mercers came along --

20 MR. WYLIE: So --

21 MR. SCHIFF: -- or after?

22 MR. WYLIE: At the time I wasn't aware of

1 that. Although I have heard that, for example, Vincent
2 Tchenguiz, who was one of the shareholders at the time,
3 had quite a few Russian contacts, business partners,
4 that sort of thing. Although when Cambridge Analytica
5 was set up, he was removed as a shareholder, as I
6 understand it. I don't know the particulars of that,
7 but the impression that I got was that the lawyer --
8 the Mercer lawyers were concerned about some of his
9 previous business dealings.

10 MR. SCHIFF: So he was a investor prior to the
11 Mercers coming along?

12 MR. WYLIE: I don't know if I would -- I don't
13 know if he was an investor or merely just a shareholder
14 in some capacity.

15 MR. SCHIFF: And can you spell his name for
16 us?

17 MR. WYLIE: I couldn't, sorry. I can get you
18 the spelling of the name.

19 MR. SCHIFF: And was Dmitry Firtash one of his
20 cohorts that -- you mentioned that he -- that you had
21 heard there might be --

22 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

1 MR. SCHIFF: -- business partners of his --

2 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. I -- so to be clear, I've
3 never met Dmitry Firtash, but my understanding was that
4 he was an associate of some -- in some way. But I
5 wasn't involved in those meetings.

6 MR. SCHIFF: So, in terms of foreign
7 investment prior to the Mercers, there is nothing that
8 you have firsthand knowledge about?

9 MR. WYLIE: Not in terms of things that I saw
10 directly, just simply what I was sort of generally told
11 at the time.

12 MR. SCHIFF: Anything that you have heard
13 indirectly that we might investigate further, in terms
14 of Russian finance or --

15 MR. WYLIE: What I can do is I can make a note
16 of that, and then speak to Tamsin and look through some
17 of the documents. If that's something that you're
18 interested in, I can come back with you with an answer
19 on that.

20 MR. SCHIFF: Oh, very much so.

21 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

22 MR. SCHIFF: Thank you.

1 MR. WYLIE: I just don't want to misspeak
2 whilst I'm --

3 MR. SCHIFF: No, I appreciate that.

4 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

5 MR. SCHIFF: So I cut you off when you were
6 describing the meeting you had --

7 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

8 MR. SCHIFF: -- with the Mercers and Steve
9 Bannon --

10 MR. WYLIE: So the impression that I got
11 originally was that, you know, Robert Mercer, you know,
12 he made his money in -- you know, he was quite
13 technical as a guy. He has a Ph.D. in computational
14 linguistics. So he understands algorithms; he made all
15 this money in algorithms.

16 The impression that I got, or at least what
17 Alexander Nix said, was -- sort of the carrot on the --
18 you know, on the stick, was if we were able to sort of
19 predict behavior of each individual person in a
20 particular country like the United States more
21 accurately than anybody else, you know, for the
22 financial sector, if you're looking at investments, if

1 you can predict consumer trends before anyone else
2 could, that would be quite useful. And so, it made
3 sense that Robert Mercer would be interested in that.

4 But it turns out that, you know, he's already
5 a billionaire, so he doesn't need to make more money,
6 and he was more interested in what Steve Bannon was
7 interested in, which is, you know, can you change a
8 culture, and how would you do that, and how would you
9 quantify a culture, how would you quantify people, and
10 what could you do -- what kind of interventions could
11 you do in order to, you know, shift a cohort of people
12 from here to here.

13 So we spoke about some of the research that we
14 were doing as a firm. Just to be clear, most of that
15 research wasn't at the time in the United States. But
16 because we were looking at fundamental human traits
17 that would be generally applicable anywhere, he decided
18 to invest.

19 So a decision was made that, rather than
20 setting up -- rather than acquiring SCL, a new company
21 would be set up, registered in Delaware. So Steve
22 Bannon picked the name Cambridge Analytica. That

1 company was set up in part because, as I understand it,
2 there are restrictions on what a foreign company and
3 foreign nationals are allowed to do with respect to
4 elections and foreign agent restrictions.

5 So they -- the lawyers were fairly clear that
6 they needed an American entity to operate in the United
7 States. And also, from an optical perspective, a
8 Republican billionaire acquiring a foreign military
9 contractor to then work in American politics probably
10 wouldn't -- someone would notice that.

11 So Cambridge Analytica was set up. The deal
12 was essentially that Robert Mercer, through one of his
13 investment vehicles, would put in \$15 million US into
14 that company as start-up capital. The elections
15 division of SCL Group would become a minority
16 shareholder of Cambridge Analytica. Robert Mercer
17 would become the majority shareholder of Cambridge
18 Analytica.

19 SCL would then assign its intellectual
20 property to Cambridge Analytica. Cambridge Analytica,
21 in return, would license back that intellectual
22 property to SCL Group, and then also offer it an

1 exclusive service provision contract, so that any
2 clients of Cambridge Analytica would have to be
3 serviced by SCL Group using the intellectual property
4 that it sort of cycled through Cambridge Analytica.

5 So, to be clear, Cambridge Analytica, to the
6 best of my knowledge, never had any staff. The -- it
7 only had intellectual property rights and it was where
8 the money from Robert Mercer was originally deposited.

9 But the offices and staff were all based out of SCL
10 Group in London.

11 MR. SCHIFF: So what was the point -- I know
12 you were privy to some of the discussions about the
13 organization of all this.

14 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

15 MR. SCHIFF: What was the point of that rather
16 Byzantine structure, if it was designed to meet
17 American legal requirements in terms of not having
18 foreigners influence decision-making and campaigning?
19 That doesn't seem to overcome that problem, if then
20 those people are actually employed in the United
21 States. It's just where the IP is held and licensed
22 back.

1 MR. WYLIE: So it wasn't my decision to do
2 that. It was a decision made between Alexander Nix,
3 Steve Bannon, and Robert Mercer to set it up that way.

4 The problem I think that they encountered is
5 that if you are going and acquiring the intellectual
6 property of a company, a large part of servicing that
7 is people who are experienced and know how that
8 actually works, and how to use it. And all of those
9 people, you know, were British or European or other
10 foreign nationals.

11 And so, that, you know -- and one of the
12 things that I published was some of the legal advice
13 that Cambridge Analytica got. I'm not sure if you've
14 seen that memo to Steve Bannon and Robert Mercer that
15 -- even the fact that Alexander Nix was the CEO was
16 questionable because he was a foreign national. So the
17 whole thing was --

18 MR. SCHIFF: Was that legal memo written prior
19 to the incorporation of Cambridge Analytica?

20 MR. WYLIE: No, it was written after. So --

21 MR. SCHIFF: Because I would -- then what
22 drove the -- that rather odd structure?

1 MR. WYLIE: Right. So my understanding was
2 that it was also in part a way -- so I think -- to be
3 honest, I think it was because Robert Mercer wanted
4 something that was his own, but it couldn't be SCL.

5 The other advantage of having Cambridge
6 Analytica in the United States was that, at least to my
7 knowledge -- so I am not a U.S. elections law or
8 finance expert, so you need to consult an expert on
9 that, but my understanding was that an advantage of
10 having a company that services campaigns is that if you
11 are the shareholder of that company, when you invest
12 money into that company, it does -- it's not counted in
13 elections reporting as a campaign donation, because you
14 are an owner of a company investing more resources or
15 capital into that company.

16 So it created a vehicle whereby you could do a
17 lot of research and development, ultimately for the
18 benefit of your preferred campaigns, but it wasn't a
19 reportable campaign donation because when you're
20 investing in a company you're an investor.

21 MR. SCHIFF: I mean that, I imagine, would be
22 true if you have more than one client. If you are

1 doing this all in the service of the same client, then
2 it would simply be probably an ineffectual effort at
3 circumvention.

4 But it sounds like, if that were the goal, you
5 could do that with a very different structure than
6 Cambridge Analytica. I mean any form of incorporation
7 of Cambridge Analytica you would be able to invest in,
8 and therefore subsidize the work that that firm is
9 doing.

10 I guess what I'm trying to figure out is
11 whether there was some -- what the rationale was for
12 that -- the license-back structure and that particular
13 form of holding of intellectual property.

14 MR. WYLIE: I -- to be honest, I found it
15 confusing, also. And it's something that -- that's
16 what Alexander Nix and Steve Bannon wanted, so that's
17 what the lawyers ended up setting up.

18 It -- I think one of the -- again, one of the
19 problems is that if you -- you could -- if you had only
20 set up Cambridge Analytica as an independent, separate,
21 American company with no license-back, you would then
22 have to staff it. And so the problem with that is that

1 the -- all the people who knew about it -- it's --
2 you're essentially buying the IP without any of the
3 brains behind it.

4 And so that, I think, would have created a
5 problem with actually creating a functional company,
6 because normally, when you acquire a company or create
7 a start-up, you know, the foundational team or the
8 experts sort of are part and parcel of that company.

9 MR. SCHIFF: Right, I see.

10 MR. WYLIE: So it would have sort of created a
11 -- there would have been no point in really doing it,
12 because a lot of the value is actually in the people
13 who had experience in the UK.

14 MR. SCHIFF: I see. Okay. I think my time is
15 up.

16 Mr. Quigley?

17 MR. QUIGLEY: Thanks for being here. And for
18 the record, you -- again, you left SCL when?

19 MR. WYLIE: In November of 2014. I sent in my
20 notice in July, at the end of July 2014, and then I
21 phased out my involvement until November.

22 MR. QUIGLEY: After you left, were you able to

1 continue to be aware of what was going on within the
2 company? Did you have --

3 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

4 MR. QUIGLEY: -- people there? Did you
5 have --

6 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

7 MR. QUIGLEY: How did that work?

8 How much do you know of what was still going
9 on, and how --

10 MR. WYLIE: Because when I -- when Cambridge
11 Analytica was formed, I was responsible for building
12 out the teams. I was responsible for building out all
13 of the different teams.

14 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay.

15 MR. WYLIE: So I had very good working
16 relationships with most people there, because I
17 previously worked on projects.

18 MR. QUIGLEY: And we're talking about how many
19 people?

20 MR. WYLIE: By the time I left, probably
21 around 40 to 50, give or take. I can provide you with
22 the exact number, if that's of interest.

1 MR. QUIGLEY: And approximately how many of
2 those 40 to 50 did you stay in touch with?

3 MR. WYLIE: Give or take, 15, 15 or so. But
4 they were the sort of the leadership tier of each of
5 the teams.

6 MR. QUIGLEY: How many teams were there?

7 MR. WYLIE: You had data science, you had
8 psychology, creative and messaging, operations. Around
9 six or seven.

10 MR. QUIGLEY: How did you stay in touch with
11 them? Email? Social media?

12 MR. WYLIE: I would just see -- I mean it was
13 based in London and I was living in London, so I --

14 MR. QUIGLEY: You saw them.

15 MR. WYLIE: I see them all the time. Yeah,
16 yeah.

17 And then they would send me updates, or
18 forward me emails, or tell me what's happening.

19 MR. QUIGLEY: And that relationship, those
20 relationships, that communication to this day continues
21 in your --

22 MR. WYLIE: Continued until --

1 MR. QUIGLEY: Obviously, some of it got
2 hampered --

3 MR. WYLIE: Until they all started leaving.
4 The problem for a lot of them was that when they joined
5 the company -- after Steve Bannon took over, the
6 company took a much more hard line on the types of
7 research that we were going to do, particularly in the
8 United States.

9 MR. QUIGLEY: Cambridge, or --

10 MR. WYLIE: Cambridge Analytica.

11 MR. QUIGLEY: Right.

12 MR. WYLIE: It's sort of difficult to --

13 MR. QUIGLEY: That's fine.

14 MR. WYLIE: So, to be clear, all the staff
15 were technically SCL staff, because CA didn't have any
16 staff, but operating under the brand or the name
17 Cambridge Analytica.

18 MR. QUIGLEY: Well, I just -- I want to
19 understand. So the staff were all getting paid by SCL.

20 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

21 MR. QUIGLEY: But they were -- how many --
22 what percentage were just doing Cambridge stuff?

1 MR. WYLIE: Most, if not all, because -- I
2 mean it's very hard to distinguish between the two.

3 MR. QUIGLEY: Right.

4 MR. WYLIE: Because, you know, if you are
5 speaking to an American client, it's -- you put on your
6 Cambridge Analytica hat. You know, you use your
7 Cambridge Analytica email. But if you're speaking to,
8 you know, a Brit or foreign -- other foreign client,
9 you might be speaking to them as SCL Group.

10 MR. QUIGLEY: So you've heard the expression
11 "shell company," right?

12 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

13 MR. QUIGLEY: Would you refer to Cambridge as
14 that?

15 MR. WYLIE: In a -- so I'm not sure if that
16 word has a specifically legal meaning in the United
17 States, but in the sort of general parlance sense --

18 MR. QUIGLEY: Right.

19 MR. WYLIE: -- yes, I think that would be a
20 completely fair assessment.

21 MR. QUIGLEY: How many of the people that you
22 are staying in touch with knew what was going on with

1 the Trump campaign?

2 MR. WYLIE: A couple of them.

3 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay.

4 MR. WYLIE: The company first started engaging
5 what later became Donald Trump's campaign in the spring
6 of 2015. So actually, very shortly after I left.

7 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay.

8 MR. WYLIE: And I have that confirmed in
9 writing, actually, from SCL's lawyers.

10 So despite the fact that -- despite the Trump
11 campaign saying that they -- the company, you know,
12 only started engaging with them in August 2016, they
13 actually started meeting with Corey Lewandowski, who
14 then later became the campaign manager for Donald
15 Trump, before Donald Trump had even announced that he
16 was considering running for President.

17 MR. QUIGLEY: What date would that be,
18 roughly?

19 MR. WYLIE: It would have -- it was the spring
20 of 2015, and I can get you the exact date in writing.

21 MR. QUIGLEY: The spring of what, 2015?

22 MR. WYLIE: The -- 2015, yeah.

1 MR. QUIGLEY: And so you understood that the
2 Cambridge staff was meeting with Corey Lewandowski.

3 MR. WYLIE: Yes, and I have it confirmed from
4 SCL's own lawyers that they were.

5 MR. QUIGLEY: And when was there, to your
6 understanding, a formal agreement that they would work
7 together?

8 MR. WYLIE: That I don't have.

9 MR. QUIGLEY: And you say that there is a
10 couple that you stayed in touch with that were, you
11 know, working on the Trump -- or working with the Trump
12 campaign?

13 MR. WYLIE: That --

14 MR. QUIGLEY: Or embedded? You tell me what
15 the --

16 MR. WYLIE: Who were around during the
17 beginnings of the work for the Trump campaign. They
18 then left because they found that uncomfortable.

19 MR. QUIGLEY: How -- and do you know roughly
20 when they left? You know, what time frame?

21 MR. WYLIE: I don't have that exact date. I
22 can probably --

1 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay.

2 MR. WYLIE: -- get that for you.

3 MR. QUIGLEY: Sure, yeah. Did they tell you
4 why they were uncomfortable?

5 Or I forgot the word. Is that right?

6 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, uncomfortable, yes, because
7 the -- most of the staff who originally joined
8 Cambridge Analytica were not conservatively-minded
9 people.

10 MR. QUIGLEY: They didn't like the President's
11 -- the candidate's policies.

12 MR. WYLIE: Not just his policies, because
13 Donald Trump is a very particular kind of --

14 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay.

15 MR. WYLIE: -- candidate. So --

16 MR. QUIGLEY: He wasn't just a Republican --

17 MR. WYLIE: He wasn't just -- there is a big
18 difference between working for, you know, a Jeb Bush
19 type Republican and a Donald Trump type Republican.

20 MR. QUIGLEY: When we talk about this in
21 reference to -- and my colleagues will get into more
22 detail -- the issues as related to the Facebook data

1 and how that was used by Cambridge and the Trump --
2 were any of them making you aware of that before they
3 were involved in the Trump campaign?

4 Or was that prior to that information, or that
5 data being switched over?

6 MR. WYLIE: With respect -- so your -- if I
7 can just rephrase your question, your question is about
8 whether or not the Trump campaign was using
9 misappropriated Facebook data.

10 MR. QUIGLEY: Right. Did they know? Did you
11 know?

12 MR. WYLIE: They didn't -- I can't confirm
13 that, but I can explain how it would be technically
14 very difficult to achieve anything that they do without
15 that data, given the timeframe that they say they did
16 the work.

17 MR. QUIGLEY: Yes, can you walk us through
18 that?

19 MR. WYLIE: So the Facebook data -- so maybe I
20 will just quickly explain how that project got set up,
21 and then what the utility of it was.

22 So in the spring of 2014, after the investment

1 was made into Cambridge Analytica, the next step in the
2 project was to figure out how to acquire a scaled data
3 set on personally identifying Americans. So -- which
4 means it's addressable data. It has their name, it has
5 some kind of thing that I can match to the electoral
6 register, and that is also useful for modeling very
7 nuanced human constructs, which are very difficult to
8 model. So it had to be sort of a high-quality type of
9 data, and there had to be a lot of it.

10 When we started working with several of the
11 professors at the Psychometrics Centre at the
12 University of Cambridge, they had access to
13 applications that were authorized by Facebook that
14 allowed them to collect not just the data on the user
15 of that app, but also the data of the friends of that
16 app.

17 MR. QUIGLEY: And you approached them? They
18 didn't approach you? The Cambridge folks.

19 MR. WYLIE: It was a mutual introduction. So
20 it's difficult to say who approached whom, because --

21 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay.

22 MR. WYLIE: -- we had people who previously

1 were at Cambridge who did their psychology degrees
2 there, and so it was just sort of a mutual
3 introduction. But --

4 MR. SCHIFF: Can I interrupt you for just one
5 second?

6 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

7 MR. SCHIFF: Just for clarification.

8 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

9 MR. SCHIFF: At the point that you're trying
10 to get a data set to move forward on the culture-
11 changing project of Bannon and Mercer's, this takes
12 place after Cambridge Analytica is formed? So this is
13 not being done by SCL, pre-Cambridge Analytica?

14 MR. WYLIE: There was some preliminary
15 research that SCL did prior to Cambridge Analytica
16 being formed in 2013, which was designed to be sort of
17 a bit of an exploratory project in the United States,
18 because the company hadn't, to my knowledge, hadn't
19 worked in the United States before. And also, a
20 validation or a sort of -- a proof of concept, or at
21 least showing promise of methods. That was done in
22 Virginia, in Fairfax County and Tidewater, the

1 Tidewater region of Virginia.

2 So there was data collected there, and various
3 sort of pilots of different experiments that was done
4 that Robert Mercer used to sort of base some of his --
5 because he wanted to see, you know, could you do this
6 kind of -- you can -- you know, sure, you might be able
7 to do this in country X or Y, but does it -- can you do
8 it in the United States?

9 So -- but to my knowledge, that wasn't
10 necessarily done for a -- any particular campaign,
11 although I do recall meeting with various Republican
12 affiliated campaigners who were interested in it, but
13 they weren't the client, if that makes sense. It was
14 sort of just a general R&D type project.

15 Just to get back to the Facebook data, so the
16 benefit of the application that Kogan offered was that
17 we could replicate existing peer-reviewed methods that
18 the Psychometrics Centre had sort of validated in their
19 research, and published that in journals. So, from a
20 sort of best practice or scientific perspective, we are
21 replicating what has already been validated in research
22 and published in journals.

1 So that made sense, and also the fact that
2 what he offered allowed a very rapid scaling of a data
3 set because, rather than collecting data one by one,
4 each time somebody would join that app the app would
5 give you access to, you know, 200, 300 other people who
6 were friends with them on Facebook. So then you can
7 imagine how much quicker -- you know, it scales, you
8 know, at 300 times faster than if you were to do it 1
9 by 1 by 1 by 1.

10 So SCL -- and it was SCL that technically paid
11 for that project -- put in around 800 to \$900,000 US,
12 just on that data harvesting, which then -- and it then
13 transferred the rights to that to Cambridge Analytica.

14 That data then formed the basis of the algorithms for
15 every single algorithm that was developed at the
16 company.

17 So the reason why that's important is because
18 they may say we didn't use Facebook data on the Trump
19 campaign, but if the algorithms that you have built for
20 your company were all built using Facebook data, it's
21 -- it becomes a slightly semantic difference because
22 you don't actually -- when it comes to targeting

1 people, you don't actually use the Facebook data
2 directly, you use it to build an algorithm that then
3 creates your target universe of people.

4 So, it's like saying I don't use petrol, I
5 just drive a car. Well, if the car is powered by
6 Facebook data, you are indirectly using petrol
7 gasoline. If that makes sense.

8 So the thing that I find difficult to believe,
9 without -- because, the thing is, the company has never
10 offered any evidence that they used any other data
11 sets, right? And it would have been very simple for
12 them to do. They've been asked by the British inquiry
13 to provide that information, but Alexander Nix decided
14 not to show up to his hearing.

15 When you look at the testimony of Brittney
16 Kaiser, who was at the testimony at the British inquiry
17 last week -- Brittney Kaiser was the business
18 development director -- she makes reference to seeing
19 emails about the use of Facebook data as recently as
20 last year. So someone you might want to actually speak
21 with is Brittney Kaiser. Does that --

22 MR. QUIGLEY: Yes. In the end, to the extent

1 that you know, were any of the people you followed
2 embedded in the Trump campaign later on?

3 MR. WYLIE: They weren't embedded in the sense
4 that they went to the United States. They were --

5 MR. QUIGLEY: The San Antonio operation we
6 hear about.

7 MR. WYLIE: The -- yeah, Project Alamo, or
8 whatever it was called. They were based in London.

9 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay.

10 MR. WYLIE: But I can follow up with you on
11 that, because I can also -- I can give you a list of
12 names of people who might be helpful with respect to
13 that particular --

14 MR. QUIGLEY: It's hard for us -- you were
15 there, and you know these folks, and so --

16 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

17 MR. QUIGLEY: In my short time that I have
18 left, ultimately what is of interest to us is Cambridge
19 Analytical people must have known that this information
20 was inappropriately gained, and it was going to be
21 used, and then that fact was going to be used for -- to
22 help the Trump campaign.

1 Can we know, or do we know if the Trump
2 campaign personnel were -- was aware of that fact?

3 MR. WYLIE: This is something that will be
4 discoverable in the next few months, with the inquiries
5 in Britain and the investigation in Britain. So I
6 can't offer you a definitive answer specifically to the
7 Trump campaign, with respect to the use of Facebook
8 data.

9 But what I can tell you is how difficult it
10 would be. They used -- and in their own words -- used
11 the algorithms that were developed using that --

12 MR. QUIGLEY: Trump? You're referring to the
13 Trump campaign?

14 MR. WYLIE: Sorry, I am referring to Cambridge
15 Analytica.

16 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay.

17 MR. WYLIE: Cambridge Analytica used
18 algorithms, the algorithms that I am talking about that
19 were developed using the misappropriated Facebook data,
20 up until the summer of 2016. They then claim that they
21 stopped using it.

22 The problem with that claim is that, in order

1 to develop what they developed, it took several million
2 dollars and months and months and months and months and
3 months and months of work. And so it's like saying we
4 had a house that we built, and then we knocked it down
5 and the next day we rebuilt it in a day. It -- from a
6 technical perspective, their explanation does not make
7 sense.

8 It also doesn't make sense because the data
9 sets that they claim to have used on the Trump
10 campaign, the commercial data sets that they claimed to
11 use on the Trump campaign that replaced the Facebook
12 data, one of the things that I can provide is internal
13 assessments of those data sets that show that those
14 data sets weren't sufficient to accurately model the
15 concepts that they --

16 MR. QUIGLEY: So let me try to summarize real
17 quick. The Cambridge Analytical people had to know
18 what they were using was information at least derived
19 from the original --

20 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

21 MR. QUIGLEY: -- poisonous tree.

22 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

1 MR. QUIGLEY: And it's virtually impossible
2 that the information that was ultimately used in the
3 Alamo operation, or whatever, wasn't derived from the
4 same source.

5 MR. WYLIE: Well, the other point that I would
6 make is that --

7 MR. QUIGLEY: Would you say that's correct?

8 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. Well, I would -- I find it
9 -- they have not yet offered an explanation --

10 MR. QUIGLEY: Of where any of the other data
11 could have come from.

12 MR. WYLIE: -- how they did that.

13 MR. QUIGLEY: Right.

14 MR. WYLIE: Because that is, in my view,
15 pulling off a miracle. If they did that, they are the
16 -- you know, that's very impressive.

17 MR. QUIGLEY: And they didn't have another
18 source for the data.

19 MR. WYLIE: No. This is the problem with
20 their explanation, is that -- one of the things that I
21 can show you is that the data that they claim to use
22 doesn't work for what they claimed they did for the

1 Trump campaign by -- so it doesn't make sense that you
2 replaced the Facebook-derived information with this
3 consumer data set, because I know that that consumer
4 data set doesn't work for what you claim it does.

5 MR. QUIGLEY: And finally, the people who are
6 embedded in Texas would have had to at least known
7 this, and that you're suggesting that in the coming
8 short period of time the inquiry in Great Britain will
9 detail this and let us know more.

10 MR. WYLIE: The parliamentary -- so the
11 parliamentary inquiry is going to demand Alexander
12 Nix's presence if he continues to refuse to -- if he
13 keeps skipping his hearings.

14 In addition, there is an ongoing investigation
15 led by the information commissioner's office in the UK.

16 There is also an element of that investigation with
17 the National Crime Agency, which is the British FBI.
18 And if there is relevant information for the American
19 authorities, my understanding is that the National
20 Crime Agency will be coordinating with the FBI and
21 Department of Justice on those.

22 MR. SCHIFF: Thank you, Mr. Quigley. I just

1 have a couple of follow-up questions and then I'm going
2 to pass to my colleague, Mr. Himes.

3 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

4 MR. SCHIFF: You mentioned that Cambridge
5 Analytica, or SCL, paid \$800,000 or \$900,000 to acquire
6 one of the early data sets from Kogan. Is that
7 correct?

8 MR. WYLIE: Those -- so what I can provide to
9 you is the invoices and payment transactions that were
10 made to the platforms that were recruiting participants
11 to join the apps. So it details how many people joined
12 the apps, and how much did that cost. And if you add
13 up all the invoices, it's between 800 and \$900,000.

14 MR. SCHIFF: So was Kogan the developer of the
15 apps that --

16 MR. WYLIE: Facebook was the developer of the
17 app.

18 MR. SCHIFF: And what was Kogan's role, then,
19 vis a vis the apps and the --

20 MR. WYLIE: So all Facebook -- well, I should
21 correct myself. Facebook provides what's called the
22 API. That's like a bridge. And so it sort of is the

1 bridge that allows you to access the system. You have
2 to develop sort of the interface of the app, as it
3 were. So in that respect, Kogan was the developer of
4 the app; Facebook was the authorizer of the app.

5 The role that Kogan offered was twofold.
6 Firstly, he had the rights to the app that had these
7 permissions that Facebook rented. Secondly, he was an
8 expert in psychometrics. And so he also developed a
9 lot of the psychological surveys that were then used on
10 the app to -- for people to answer, so that -- which
11 became the -- what's called the training set for the
12 algorithms.

13 So that data, the answers from the surveys
14 would be related to that person's Facebook data, and
15 then relationships between how they answered and what
16 they liked on Facebook would then develop the algorithm
17 to them profile all of their friends.

18 MR. SCHIFF: So what's the nature of the
19 service that Kogan was providing to Cambridge SCL, in
20 terms of the acquisition of the data from Facebook?

21 It --

22 MR. WYLIE: He sort of -- he had the app. So

1 he offered the use of the app.

2 MR. SCHIFF: So were there payments to him,
3 essentially, like a consultant --

4 MR. WYLIE: So --

5 MR. SCHIFF: -- and then payments to the
6 intermediary companies that actually did the physical
7 harvesting of the data on Facebook?

8 MR. WYLIE: So, originally, Kogan said -- and
9 I believed him at the time -- that he was interested in
10 working on this data acquisition project because it
11 would have given his team at Cambridge access to
12 funding that he couldn't otherwise have got through an
13 academic grant with almost no sort of strings attached
14 or reporting rules, or all of that. And he wanted to
15 take that data set that was then created and set up an
16 academic institute with it to sort of explore this
17 emerging field called computational psychology, or
18 computational sociology, which is sort of blending
19 computer science with psychology.

20 So, the original agreement that SCL/CA had
21 with Kogan was that he wouldn't actually get -- he
22 wouldn't make any profits. He would pass the invoices

1 from the recruitment platforms that were used -- so
2 that was Amazon, MTurk, and a company called Quatrics
3 -- and that SCL would then pay those invoices on his
4 behalf.

5 So what I can provide to the committee is the
6 -- some of the payment transactions that showed that
7 SCL was just paying for them directly. That made sense
8 to me at the time, because it -- his motivation seems
9 to be setting up this institute, so it wasn't setting
10 up a company, it wasn't, you know, going out and doing
11 anything with it, it was to do academic research.

12 One of the things that Facebook told me after
13 the fact was that they were informed by Kogan that his
14 activities were also for academic purposes. So that
15 was my understanding, and that's what Facebook told me
16 was also their understanding. You need to ask Facebook
17 about that.

18 However, after I left Cambridge Analytica,
19 Kogan went back to Alexander Nix and decided to
20 negotiate a more commercial contract. And it became
21 apparent that he was interested not just, I guess, in
22 this academic institute, but then also commercializing

1 that data and further deepening his relationship with
2 Cambridge Analytica.

3 And so, the institute that he talked about --
4 and I can provide you with emails that talk about sort
5 of conceptualization -- actually never got set up. So
6 I'm not sure exactly what happened there, but he went
7 down a path that was quite different than what
8 originally in my understanding was.

9 MR. SCHIFF: Now, you're probably more
10 familiar with this than I am; I think I've only seen a
11 summary of what Aleksandr Kogan has had to say.

12 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

13 MR. SCHIFF: He takes issue with the idea that
14 he provided this data to Cambridge Analytica SCL.

15 MR. WYLIE: Right.

16 MR. SCHIFF: Is he being hyper-technical about
17 this, in the sense that it was -- the invoices went to
18 other entities and he was just the facilitator, or --

19 MR. WYLIE: I --

20 MR. SCHIFF: How do you explain that?

21 MR. WYLIE: I take issue with a lot of his
22 statements because, for me, I feel like he is being, as

1 you said, slightly overly technical with his
2 interpretation of the situation.

3 You know, when you, for example, transform
4 data -- so you squish some data together or you split
5 some data apart, rename it, whatever, that is called a
6 derivative. So if I take two columns, male and female,
7 and I merge them into one column called gender, that is
8 a derivative of those two columns. The information
9 conveyed is the same.

10 So, one of the things that he provided is
11 derivative information from Facebook data. And so he
12 takes the position that that's not Facebook data,
13 that's a derivative and, therefore, it's not prepped to
14 say Facebook data.

15 But one of the things that I can provide to
16 you is the explanation of the process, which is what he
17 explained to the company at the time, which is -- makes
18 very clear that this is Facebook-origin data and it's
19 being processed in this way, and this is what you get
20 after we've processed it in this particular way to make
21 it easier for you to use.

22 MR. SCHIFF: And last question. At the time

1 that Cambridge is working with Kogan, does this -- does
2 it predate Bannon, or is it all post-dating Bannon?

3 Basically, is the relationship either done or
4 solidified with Kogan for the very purpose of meeting
5 the kind of Mercer-Bannon idea of --

6 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

7 MR. SCHIFF: -- gathering this data and being
8 able to apply it in their culture war?

9 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. So we started the project
10 with Kogan after the Mercers invested in Cambridge
11 Analytica and after Steve Bannon took over. So it --
12 and the point of the project was because after they set
13 up Cambridge Analytica, the Mercers and Steve Bannon,
14 they then came to us and said we need to have
15 everything ready, essentially, by September 2014,
16 which, to me, seemed sort of outrageously ambitious.

17 And then -- but it was actually because Steve
18 wanted to actually try it out in the 2014 mid-terms.
19 So he wanted to be able to pass on this to campaigns to
20 use, which meant that the deadline was essentially
21 September. And so, the benefit of Kogan's process was
22 that it scaled -- I mean we were able to acquire that

1 data set in sort of two-and-a-half months. So that's
2 how quick it was.

3 And so, from Steve Bannon's perspective, that
4 was ideal because he got what he wanted. He got this
5 massive data set in the time frame that would allow him
6 to then apply these algorithms targeting for the 2014
7 mid-terms.

8 MR. SCHIFF: Thank you.

9 Mr. Himes?

10 MR. HIMES: Thank you. Just one question, but
11 it's a big question. And I'm going to ask you to step
12 away from the chronology, which is important. But it
13 would be helpful to me and, I suspect, to the committee
14 if you could tell us a little bit more about the
15 concepts that we're talking about here.

16 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

17 MR. HIMES: Psychometrics, computational
18 psychology, micro-targeting -- I have been swimming in
19 those terms for a long time and I am not sure I fully
20 understand them. So a three-part question.

21 One is I've got a personal Facebook page, I
22 follow my college roommates around, I like a piece of

1 music and a pair of shoes every once in a while.

2 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

3 MR. HIMES: In terms that that a guy can
4 understand, what is the aspiration here, in terms of
5 what the Trump campaign was trying to do?

6 Can you just walk us through an example about
7 how you take my data, use micro-targeting
8 psychometrics, et cetera, to achieve some end? Can you
9 just walk us through that example? That's question --
10 part one of the question.

11 Part two is what do you think was actually
12 done? In other words, you made an interesting comment
13 earlier, which was that there was a different set of
14 data which could not be used to actually achieve the
15 goal that was --

16 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

17 MR. HIMES: That's part two.

18 Then part three is Dr. Kogan has questioned
19 the effectiveness of any of this. In part three is
20 this, in the context of elections, not burning down a
21 new restaurant in Sri Lanka --

22 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, yeah.

1 MR. HIMES: -- which we read about, but in the
2 context of elections, is there evidence that this is
3 effective?

4 In other words, are we actually looking into
5 whether election law was violated, or are we actually
6 looking into whether the election was altered through
7 this mechanism?

8 MR. WYLIE: Sure. So I will start with your
9 first question. So let me just quickly define some of
10 the things that I've talked about, just so that you --
11 so psychometrics is the measurement of psychological
12 constructs. The reason why it's an area of research is
13 because human psychology is not directly measurable,
14 like different chemicals in your blood or in your
15 nervous system, where you can literally measure the
16 exact amounts of something. So psychometrics is the
17 study of the best way to measure discrete constructs
18 like personality traits, for example.

19 Micro-targeting is where you take data, a
20 baseline data set on voters -- whether that's consumer
21 data, social data, et cetera -- and look for
22 relationships between that data and what's called a

1 target variable.

2 A target variable is anything that you want to
3 predict for. So --

4 MR. HIMES: On the --

5 MR. WYLIE: I mean, yes, it's a -- yeah.

6 MR. HIMES: Okay.

7 MR. WYLIE: So -- and then, to your question
8 about how is Facebook data useful, when you look
9 particularly at human psychological constructs like
10 personality traits, right, certain kinds of information
11 give you better insight or information.

12 So when you look at consumer data sets,
13 knowing that somebody shops at Wal-Mart, for example,
14 isn't very indicative of who they are as a person,
15 because it might be that they are close to a Wal-Mart,
16 or it might be that their socio-economic status, you
17 know, dictates that they shop at, you know, a discount
18 store. So it doesn't mean that, you know, you shop at
19 Wal-Mart because you're this type of person,
20 psychologically.

21 So the advantage of social data -- so Facebook
22 data or Twitter data, for example, or Instagram data,

1 or what's called click stream data, which is sort of
2 your browsing history -- is that you are curating your
3 identity in a way that is much more insightful for the
4 constructs, for the psychological constructs that we
5 want to measure.

6 So, if you just take a step back and just
7 imagine that you're on a date, for example, a first
8 date, the questions that you ask -- you know, what kind
9 of music do you listen to, what kind of movies do you
10 watch, you know, what do you like to do for fun -- the
11 reasons you ask those questions is because you are
12 developing, you know, an intuition as to who is this
13 person.

14 And when you think about the things that
15 you're liking on Facebook, even though they sort of
16 seem innocuous when you're liking them individually --
17 you're liking this particular brand of clothing, or
18 you're liking this particular music band -- when you
19 look at it collectively, actually you're creating a
20 profile of who you are, as a person.

21 And so the advantage of Facebook data is that
22 the types of information that you're revealing about

1 yourself is indeed strongly related to personality
2 traits. And secondly, you're putting it all in one
3 place, which makes it really easy to acquire, because I
4 just need to look at your likes page, and it's all in
5 one place. And then I can learn a lot about you from
6 just looking at that.

7 Does that --

8 MR. HIMES: Yes, thank you.

9 MR. WYLIE: -- answer your question?

10 MR. HIMES: I think part two, which is what I
11 hope you're getting to, is what is the objective,
12 therefore, and the promise to somebody like the Trump
13 campaign? That I can identify who you are, or is it
14 that I can change your behavior, or both?

15 MR. WYLIE: Both, because in order to change
16 your behavior, you first have to identify how that
17 person thinks and engages.

18 So if I'm going -- so, for example, if you
19 look at different traits like openness, for example.
20 So higher degrees of openness -- that's things like
21 curiosity, novelty-seeking, tolerance for ambiguity,
22 these types of things -- correlated to liberal views,

1 which makes sense, because if you're open to new ideas,
2 that generally means that you're more liberal.

3 The inverse, where you're not, you're less
4 curious, you don't like new things, you're more likely
5 to be a conservative.

6 Knowing the level of that trait helps me be
7 able to speak to you, because, on one hand, somebody
8 who is higher on openness might be enticed by something
9 new, so I might use language about how this is new, or
10 this is changing, or this is revolutionary. If
11 somebody is lower in openness, I wouldn't use that
12 language.

13 So it helps you identify how a person engages
14 with information and then, secondly, if you can
15 identify how they engage with information, you can
16 better curate your message to that person.

17 Perhaps a more tangible example in politics is
18 when you think about something, sort of the most
19 generic political message, jobs in the economy -- you
20 hear a lot of politicians talk about jobs in the
21 economy. And when you look at polling, lots of people
22 say it's important. But one of the things that we

1 found is that, actually, it's a socially rehearsed
2 answer. So people say that jobs and the economy is
3 important because they think it should be, but that
4 doesn't mean that they actually care, because they
5 already have a job.

6 And so, when we start to sort of unpack what a
7 job is, one of the things that we found was that
8 actually, if we cite jobs don't matter, you know,
9 achievement matters, it's -- the feeling that
10 achievement that I get matters, or the sense of
11 security matters, or the respect that I get from my
12 children when I come home matters, that resonated a lot
13 more with people, particularly when we matched it to
14 particular traits that meant that, you know, you were
15 higher in achievements driving, or you were more
16 anxiety-prone, so you liked things about feeling safe
17 and secure. If that -- does that kind of make sense?

18 So it's about translating abstract constructs
19 or concepts like jobs and the economy, which sort of --
20 people kind -- which sort of goes over people's heads,
21 into something that actually resonates with who you
22 are. But who you are is different from this person and

1 this person and this person.

2 So I might translate why a job is important to
3 you differently than to this person than to that
4 person. Does that --

5 MR. HIMES: It does, yeah. And if you could
6 just sort of move on to --

7 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

8 MR. HIMES: That was quite helpful. So what
9 was -- what's your understanding of what was actually
10 done by the campaign?

11 MR. WYLIE: Right.

12 MR. HIMES: And my last question was do you --
13 is there a reason to believe that this was effective
14 and actually changed --

15 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

16 MR. HIMES: -- people's voting behavior?

17 MR. WYLIE: So I very strongly disagree with
18 Kogan's assessment of the effectiveness of profiling.
19 And the reason I do is because, first of all, I've seen
20 it work, myself. Secondly, you don't have to take my
21 word for it, I can provide you with copious amounts of
22 peer-reviewed academic research in top psychology

1 journals and top data science journals that show that
2 this works. If it didn't work, Facebook wouldn't have
3 value. If you could not target people effectively
4 using Facebook data, Facebook data would, therefore, be
5 useless, and the company would have no value.

6 MR. HIMES: Does that statement apply to the
7 electoral context?

8 I mean I got it when I'm buying shoes and that
9 sort of thing, but the electoral context?

10 MR. WYLIE: Sure. But it is -- yes. Yes, it
11 does.

12 MS. SPEIER: Proof?

13 MR. WYLIE: Sorry?

14 MS. SPEIER: What kind of proof do you have?

15 MR. WYLIE: I can send you papers, if you
16 would like. I can explain more about it, or I can
17 follow up with documentation if that is -- if you
18 prefer.

19 MR. HIMES: I think that would -- we have
20 limited time, so --

21 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

22 MR. HIMES: And I really appreciate the

1 background. So that would be great.

2 I asked a group of experts who happened to be
3 presenting as to -- the same question, and they all
4 sort of said, well, this is scary stuff. In the
5 electoral context there is not a lot of peer-reviewed
6 data that -- peer-reviewed conclusions that suggest
7 that it actually does affect the -- and I asked U.S.
8 electoral.

9 But I guess, again, I don't want to -- we need
10 to get back to the chronology.

11 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

12 MR. HIMES: The last piece -- so yes, the
13 answer is please do, if you wouldn't mind sending us --

14 MR. WYLIE: I am happy to.

15 MR. HIMES: -- whatever you have that is about
16 the electoral context.

17 But I don't want to lose this piece of -- you
18 said something very interesting, which was that the
19 data that they had didn't allow them to do what they
20 said they would do for the campaign.

21 MR. WYLIE: Right. So the data -- the
22 commercial data sets that they had -- so, first of all,

1 when Alexander Nix says 4,000 to 5,000 "data points,"
2 what he is actually referring to is actually the
3 feature set.

4 Feature set, if you just think about it simply
5 as, like, column titles -- so what he's saying is there
6 is there is 4,000 to 5,000 column titles. That doesn't
7 mean that those are filled with data.

8 So when you look at what's called the coverage
9 rate, so that's, in this column, how much -- how many
10 records are filled with an observation for that column.

11 You have some features that have 2 percent, 5 percent,
12 you know, 10 percent, which means that you actually
13 have something called a highly sparse matrix, which
14 means that it's -- you have a lot of possible features,
15 but it's mostly empty.

16 And what that means is that it actually isn't
17 very helpful, because if you only have information on
18 two percent here, two percent here, two percent here,
19 what it means is that when you look at an actual
20 individual record, there might be 5,000 columns, but
21 there is only two observations, three observations of
22 the information about them, which is not sufficient to

1 profile those people.

2 And also, when you look at the correlation
3 values of those features against things like Democrat
4 or Republican Party affiliation, the highest
5 correlation that I can recall -- and I can provide you
6 guys with this -- was around .2, which is not reliable,
7 as a value.

8 So, the problem that I have with their
9 narrative is that, unless they somehow did something in
10 the couple of weeks in between leaving Ted Cruz's
11 campaign and beginning Donald Trump's campaign that
12 somehow magically fixed this problem, I don't see how
13 they could have done it.

14 If that -- does that -- and they haven't
15 actually provided an answer to that.

16 MR. HIMES: Okay, thank you. I will yield
17 back.

18 MR. SCHIFF: Ms. Speier, just one last
19 question along the lines Mr. Himes was asking.

20 You know, one of the talking points, one of
21 the alternate narratives is the data we got from
22 Cambridge Analytica wasn't really that valuable. We

1 actually relied far more on the Republican National
2 Committee for their data.

3 Now, the RNC, I don't think, has any kind of
4 data sets like we're describing, or --

5 MR. WYLIE: Not to my knowledge.

6 MR. SCHIFF: -- you're describing.

7 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

8 MR. SCHIFF: I don't think the Democratic
9 Party does, either. But I wanted to ask you what you
10 make of that argument.

11 Is that just an effort to minimize the
12 significance of the work that was done?

13 MR. WYLIE: So one of the observations that I
14 had whilst I was there -- because I -- during the
15 latter end of my time at Cambridge Analytica they
16 started introducing me to a lot of Republican
17 consultants. That was one of the things that prompted
18 me eventually to leave the company.

19 But one of the things that I observed was the
20 tribalism that existed within the various sort of
21 consulting class of the Republican Party. And one of
22 the things that they didn't like sort of internally was

1 newcomers, particularly foreign newcomers, coming in
2 and telling them what to do.

3 So with respect to Ted Cruz's campaign and
4 some of the various other campaigns that they worked on
5 early on, there was a lot of tension there because, you
6 know, you have a new company essentially encroaching on
7 their turf. That was one of the observations that I
8 made.

9 The other thing to keep in mind also is that
10 the company doesn't necessarily always do its work for
11 clients, per se. So one of the things that I saw
12 whilst I was there was work that Mercer or Bannon
13 wanted to fund, but didn't necessarily have an overt
14 client.

15 And that, I think, is in part, when you're
16 looking at the broader perspective of what this company
17 ultimately was for, in terms of changing culture, you
18 don't need a candidate to do that. You don't need a
19 PAC to do that. If you just want to go out and do
20 research and put stuff out onto the Internet, you can
21 go and do that.

22 And so, one of the things to just remember is

1 that it's not necessarily true that all of their work
2 happened officially for the client, and that some of
3 the work would happen sort of in parallel to the client
4 -- also in part because if you do stuff in parallel you
5 don't have to ask permission of the client to go and do
6 it.

7 MR. SCHIFF: Ms. Speier?

8 MS. SPEIER: You have said over and over that
9 Cambridge Analytica did this and Cambridge Analytica
10 did that.

11 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

12 MS. SPEIER: But if I understand correctly,
13 there is no office for Cambridge Analytica in the
14 United States, and no employees.

15 MR. WYLIE: They might -- they have an
16 address.

17 MS. SPEIER: Okay, but there is -- the
18 functionality of Cambridge Analytica took place in
19 London.

20 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, yeah. The -- so the
21 overwhelming majority -- there were some U.S.-based
22 staff who were American. But they were in a very --

1 that was a very small minority of the people. And
2 their job was mostly sort of, like, organizing travel
3 and arrangements when people were coming to the United
4 States. So they weren't necessarily in senior
5 positions, with the exception of Steve Bannon, who is
6 American and was also working in a senior capacity.

7 But the overwhelming majority of staff members
8 were based in London or -- all of them were paid by
9 SCL. And they were at the SCL office, which also
10 converted into the Cambridge Analytica office whenever
11 you wanted to change the letterhead. Like there were
12 two sets of letterhead.

13 MS. SPEIER: Got it.

14 MR. WYLIE: Two sets of email, two sets of
15 letterhead, two sets of everything. There were -- as I
16 recall, there were -- you had different numbers, so one
17 card would say this and the answering machine would be
18 Cambridge Analytica --

19 MS. SPEIER: The vast majority of persons that
20 worked at SCL were foreign nationals.

21 MR. WYLIE: At least 90 percent.

22 MS. SPEIER: At least 90 percent.

1 MR. WYLIE: At least 90 percent.

2 MS. SPEIER: Were any of them embedded in the
3 Trump campaign, that you know of? Because this was
4 after you left, correct?

5 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. My understanding was that
6 there were data scientists -- and I've seen photographs
7 of this -- who were at the Alamo site, the site in
8 Texas, who were not American citizens, but were working
9 for Cambridge Analytica.

10 And if -- I can try to get you some of those
11 photos, if --

12 MS. SPEIER: Okay, that would be great.
13 Alexander Nix, after the expose in England, was, I
14 guess, fired or terminated from --

15 MR. WYLIE: Suspended.

16 MS. SPEIER: Suspended from Cambridge
17 Analytica. But since it's really just a shell, is he
18 still at SCL?

19 MR. WYLIE: That I do not know. What I do
20 know is that he wasn't terminated, he was suspended.
21 And I've been approached by their internal
22 investigator, so I know that they're doing some kind of

1 internal investigation.

2 But my understanding is that he hasn't
3 actually left the company, he's merely on leave.

4 MS. SPEIER: Who is the biggest shareholder of
5 SCL?

6 MR. WYLIE: Of SCL? I can't say definitively,
7 but I can actually get you that information.

8 MS. SPEIER: Could you get it?

9 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

10 MS. SPEIER: I mean if you can get us any of
11 the names of those --

12 MR. WYLIE: Oh, for -- yes, yes. In fact,
13 it's -- we can just get it from -- yeah. Yeah, that's
14 fine, yeah.

15 MS. SPEIER: The Internet Research Agency had
16 -- are you familiar with it?

17 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

18 MS. SPEIER: And they bought lots of Facebook
19 ads.

20 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

21 MS. SPEIER: They were peculiar, for many of
22 us that looked at them, because they didn't seem to be

1 necessarily promoting one candidate or another. They
2 were trying to create universes of people who were
3 supporters of Black Lives Matters or gun rights
4 supporters. Is that a typical technique that's used in
5 this kind of data mining to then be able to --

6 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. So one of the things that's
7 important to remember is that the origin of Cambridge
8 Analytica came from SCL Group, which was -- is a
9 military contractor. And so, when you look at
10 information operations for military projects or
11 counter-extremism projects, you -- there are certain
12 techniques and approaches that you would use that you
13 wouldn't necessarily use normally in any other context.

14 So, for example, if I am the U.S. military, I
15 can't send a marketing campaign to ISIS, because if it
16 says sponsored by the U.S. Army or Uncle Sam says no,
17 right, that's not a credible message. So I can't use a
18 standard marketing or advertising approach to interfere
19 with the operations of ISIS.

20 So, instead, there is something called
21 informational dominance, which is a sort of a -- one of
22 the -- a key concept, which is that in your opponent's

1 universe you want to gain access to as many channels of
2 information that affect the decision-making of your
3 target as possible so that you can inject information
4 into those channels, and then exploit mistakes or
5 altered perceptions of that target.

6 When you look at, for example, the Internet
7 Research Agency or, more generally, some of the things
8 that Cambridge Analytica was doing, the goal was to
9 change a person's perception of what's happening.

10 So the difference between that approach and a
11 standard political ad is that when you send out an ad
12 from your campaign or from your PAC, it is very overt
13 in the sense that I am trying to convince you of
14 something, this is what my message is. And often you
15 have to even label it as a political act. But the
16 source of it is apparent.

17 The reason that is important is because when
18 somebody looks at it they know that they're seeing an
19 ad.

20 If you want to change someone's perception of
21 something, you will send them information that looks --
22 that is not branded in that way, and that may look like

1 a blob, that may look like a news source, that may look
2 like just a chat room with regular people talking.

3 And if you take this notion of gaining
4 informational dominance, and you take your target and
5 you put -- you inject sort of ads, or blogs, or various
6 digital context everywhere where they travel through
7 the Internet, whether you're clicking or -- whether
8 they're on a search engine, whether they're on
9 Facebook, they start to see all of this information,
10 and it starts to change how they think about a
11 particular issue, or what is real and what is not real.

12 And so that is something that is quite
13 problematic with the approach that the company uses,
14 because that is a fundamental denial of someone's
15 agency, because if they start to think that something
16 is real when it's not, then they aren't making a free
17 choice when they're going and voting, because they're
18 basing it on a warped perception.

19 And so, fundamentally, what I have a real
20 problem with ethically about how the company operates
21 is that warping someone's perception may be appropriate
22 if you're trying to interfere with an extremist

1 organization's recruitment ability, or that -- you
2 know, if you're in a conflict situation.

3 But when you take that same approach and apply
4 it to an election, you know, it -- on one hand, agency
5 doesn't matter because you're -- this is the enemy. On
6 the other hand, you're treating every single voter in
7 the same way that you would treat the enemy, and you're
8 warping their perception, which is -- does that --

9 MS. SPEIER: Yes. We've been told that
10 professional --

11 MR. SCHIFF: One -- I just wanted to let you
12 know we have a series of three votes.

13 MR. WYLIE: Okay.

14 MR. SCHIFF: We're going to continue to go
15 through the votes, unless you wanted a break.

16 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

17 MR. SCHIFF: And -- but Members will be
18 rotating in and out.

19 MR. WYLIE: Okay, sure, sure.

20 MS. SPEIER: Okay. So Professor Kogan in
21 Russia.

22 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

1 MS. SPEIER: Do you know anything about his
2 work there?

3 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

4 MS. SPEIER: Could you tell us about it?

5 MR. WYLIE: Sure. So he was based -- so, with
6 respect to his Russian work, he was based at St.
7 Petersburg University. And the research focused on
8 online trolling and something called dark triad traits,
9 which is Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and Narcissism.
10 I can go -- explain more about what that is, if you
11 would like, or does that --

12 MS. SPEIER: So in St. Petersburg as well, was
13 he at the Internet Research Agency?

14 MR. WYLIE: He was --

15 MS. SPEIER: Was he in contract with them at
16 all, or engaged with them at all?

17 MR. WYLIE: The Internet Research Agency?
18 That I don't know.

19 What I do know is that he was flying back and
20 forth between London and Russia at the time that he was
21 managing the data harvesting operation. He was meeting
22 with various people in Russia about the project that he

1 was doing.

2 I was told at the time that he was giving sort
3 of academic talks, or academic meetings about it, about
4 the processes and the size of the data and what they're
5 doing with it.

6 MS. SPEIER: This is what year?

7 MR. WYLIE: This was 2014.

8 MS. SPEIER: And how often would he go to
9 Russia?

10 MR. WYLIE: When I was there it was several
11 times. I couldn't give you an exact number, but I can
12 go back into my email and count the number of times
13 that he said he was in Russia if that's helpful.

14 MS. SPEIER: Okay, that would be helpful. So
15 -- but you have no reason to know that there was any
16 relationship that existed either with SCL or Mr. -- or
17 Professor Kogan and the Internet Research Agency, but
18 they were in the same city.

19 MR. WYLIE: Not the Internet Research Agency
20 in particular. But I can explain more broadly what my
21 concerns are --

22 MS. SPEIER: Okay, go ahead.

1 MR. WYLIE: -- with respect to Russia.

2 So first, the -- we have --

3 MS. SPEIER: Figure out how much time we have
4 left in the vote.

5 We've just got to make sure we get in for the
6 vote.

7 MR. WYLIE: Oh, no worries. Voting is
8 important.

9 MR. SCHIFF: Just pause one second --

10 MS. SPEIER: Okay, all right. Let's -- we
11 will go vote and come back, all right?

12 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

13 MS. SPEIER: Just hold your thought.

14 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

15 MR. SCHIFF: We will be back in about --

16 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, no worries.

17 (At 4:16 p.m., a brief recess was taken.)

18 REP. SCHIFF: Ms. Speier?

19 REP. SPEIER: So you were telling us the
20 Russia connection.

21 MR. WYLIE: Sure. So just to recap, we had --
22 we have -- at the time that -- sorry.

1 MS. ALLEN: I was just reminding you where you
2 were, my concerns.

3 MR. WYLIE: Oh, right. Sorry. So at the time
4 of the Facebook harvesting project, Dr. Kogan was also
5 working back and forth between London and St.
6 Petersburg -- he was also going to Moscow frequently --
7 on these Russian research projects.

8 So those projects focused on researching
9 online trolling. So trolling is sort of vindictive or
10 nasty sort of bullying-type comments that -- in an
11 online environment, and looking at the underlying
12 psychology of that, and, more generally, behavior on
13 the internet of people, in particular in relation to an
14 area of research called the Dark Triad.

15 Dark Triad are three particular personality
16 traits -- Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and
17 Psychopathy. So his research in Russia was on online
18 trolling and the Dark Triad traits and profiling
19 literally the worst traits in people.

20 So SCL Group was aware of this research and
21 went around and spoke about it to different clients
22 that they had around the world.

1 So I can provide you with, for example, one
2 email to the Minister of National Security of Trinidad
3 talks about the quote "very interesting work" that
4 Aleksandr Kogan is doing for the Russians in relation
5 to profiling of particular targets or the Trinidadian
6 government.

7 As that was -- as -- so as Dr. Kogan was going
8 back and forth to Russia, at the same time we got
9 approached -- and I don't know -- unfortunately, I
10 don't know why we got approached, but we got approached
11 by a company called LUKOIL. So LUKOIL is the second-
12 largest oil company in Russia.

13 We got approached by fairly senior executives
14 at the company. And Aleksandr put together a
15 presentation to them, which I can -- I can pass on to
16 you -- the British committee already has it -- where he
17 talks about rumor campaigns, voter inoculation or
18 attitudinal inoculation, so changing people's minds in
19 a way that they don't quite understand that they're
20 being manipulated, for lack of a better word, and, more
21 generally, undermining confidence in civic
22 institutions, with reference to projects that they had

1 worked on in Africa.

2 Alexander Nix said that the LUKOIL pitch was
3 for a consumer loyalty project in Turkey, but to me I
4 have, you know, no recollection of that. And also, I
5 don't know why he would give a presentation about rumor
6 campaigns and undermining faith in civic institutions
7 in Africa for a consumer loyalty project in Turkey.

8 One of the other things that I can provide to
9 you is emails that reference sending white papers that
10 I had written on the internal capacity of our American
11 data assets and the algorithms and profiling that we
12 were doing and sending that to senior executives at
13 LUKOIL, including a reference to the CEO of LUKOIL.

14 One of the concerns that I have is that LUKOIL
15 has fairly well-known relationships with the FSB, has
16 an information-sharing agreement with the FSB. I know
17 that in Europe it often operates in places that are
18 difficult to get FSB agents in or going around
19 collecting information under the auspices of being a
20 company.

21 The other thing that I should mention is that
22 on the -- on the defense side of the company, SCL does

1 a lot of work in Eastern Europe, in particular in the
2 Baltics. That research and -- or, rather, operations
3 often involve counter-propaganda efforts. So Russian
4 counter-propaganda for NATO clients.

5 And so my other concern is that given that the
6 company was working in Eastern Europe on the military
7 side for NATO clients that we probably would have been
8 some kind of intelligence target, given that we were
9 already operating on their turf, and that Alexander Nix
10 told the company, in no uncertain terms, about the
11 assets that we were building in the United States, what
12 our capacity was, how it could be used, makes reference
13 to rumor campaigns and, you know, disinformation and
14 undermining civic -- confidence in specific
15 institutions, and then informs the company that, in
16 fact, the -- the leader manager of that data harvesting
17 is actually going to Russia.

18 And that -- the concern that I have is not
19 that Cambridge Analytica somehow cut a deal with the
20 Russians and there is a grand conspiracy. The concern
21 that I have is that they made a lot of noise for a long
22 time. It is -- you know, from 2014 to -- you know,

1 essentially from the spring of 2014 to the spring of
2 2015, so almost a year, with LUKOIL, and that if --

3 REP. SPEIER: "They" being?

4 MR. WYLIE: Cambridge Analytica. And that if
5 that information was passed on to any number of
6 agencies in Russia, given that the data that was being
7 acquired through the Facebook harvesting scheme was
8 often not encrypted, that even if it was encrypted
9 could have been acquired through something as simple as
10 a key logger.

11 So key logger is either a device or a piece of
12 software that is uploaded to a computer that then logs
13 what you're typing, which then you can use to get, you
14 know, username, password, all of that.

15 And that given that Dr. Kogan was going back
16 and forth to Russia, as we're making it known to --
17 rather, as Cambridge Analytica is making it known to
18 LUKOIL that these projects are going on, the concern is
19 that it would have been extremely easy to get access to
20 this data. Extremely easy. As simple as a key logger
21 on Dr. Kogan's computer in Russia.

22 As easy as sending -- the data science teams

1 at SCL, when I was there, the majority of them were
2 Eastern European, and they did not do background checks
3 on any of them. Not to say that if you're Eastern
4 European you are somehow, you know, in -- working for
5 -- but that the security practices at the time were
6 incredibly poor.

7 I can give you examples of where the company
8 would be emailing data sets on hundreds of thousands of
9 American citizens in unencrypted emails, which would
10 have been incredibly easy to access.

11 The other sort of --

12 REP. SPEIER: And that would be to a contract
13 that they had with a company where, in the United
14 States or somewhere else?

15 MR. WYLIE: With -- a contract with --

16 REP. SPEIER: A company they had -- you said
17 they would be sending all this --

18 MR. WYLIE: So the Kogan project, so, for
19 example, between Aleksandr Kogan or some of his
20 researchers and Cambridge Analytica. So if we said,
21 "Hey, can I get" --

22 REP. SPEIER: Got it. Okay.

1 MR. WYLIE: -- "a data set," rather than
2 sending it through a secure FTP site, for example, it
3 would just be emailed as just an open, unencrypted
4 file.

5 REP. SPEIER: Professor Kogan was a contractor
6 with SCL or CA or --

7 MR. WYLIE: He operated through a company
8 called Global Science Research. So he, as an
9 individual, wasn't contracted. It was his company,
10 GSR. GSR was made up of Dr. Kogan and then another
11 gentleman, Joseph Chancellor, who now works at
12 Facebook.

13 REP. SPEIER: What's the name?

14 MR. WYLIE: Joseph Chancellor. I can send you
15 -- I can send you the name. So in addition to all of
16 that happening, one of the other things that I just
17 find slightly bizarre about what Cambridge Analytica --
18 some of the research streams that got set up after
19 Bannon took over, the only tested foreign leader in the
20 research that was being done in the United States was
21 on Vladimir Putin.

22 And also, the -- one of the primary focuses of

1 the research in relation to Americans' perspectives on
2 foreign issues was Russian expansion into Eastern
3 Europe and whether Vladimir Putin was justified in
4 taking over parts of Ukraine.

5 REP. SPEIER: Okay.

6 MR. WYLIE: And so I can provide you with, for
7 example, transcripts of focus groups on that. And so
8 the thing -- the thing that I just find --

9 REP. SPEIER: Hold that thought.

10 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

11 REP. SPEIER: We're down to 50 votes. We'll
12 go off the record just for a minute.

13 (Recess taken from 4:34 p.m. until 4:47 p.m.)

14 REP. SCHIFF: Ms. Speier.

15 REP. SPEIER: Where did we leave off?

16 MR. WYLIE: Oh, right. I was talking about --
17 I can't read your writing. I'm sorry. Oh, right.
18 Sorry.

19 So the -- so I'll just back up a little bit.
20 So one of the -- the only foreign leader that was
21 tested --

22 REP. SPEIER: Oh, right.

1 MR. WYLIE: -- in the research that we were
2 doing was Vladimir Putin.

3 REP. SPEIER: And who was requesting that?

4 MR. WYLIE: I -- I don't know who requested
5 it. I know that I didn't, and so I would rather not
6 speculate.

7 REP. SPEIER: But it was also Vladimir Putin
8 and --

9 MR. WYLIE: And --

10 REP. SPEIER: -- people's feelings about the
11 annexation of Crimea?

12 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. So -- so we -- being
13 Cambridge Analytica, in focus groups and in message
14 testing -- and I believe that one of the models that
15 Dr. Kogan provided to Cambridge Analytica actually
16 modeled views on Russia, in terms of foreign relations,
17 because that was one of the message testing --

18 REP. SPEIER: You just said focus groups.
19 Were you doing focus groups --

20 MR. WYLIE: There were --

21 REP. SPEIER: -- in the U.S.?

22 MR. WYLIE: Yes. There was both a qualitative

1 and quantitative stream of research happening in
2 parallel. So --

3 REP. SPEIER: All of that information is now
4 housed within SCL, right?

5 MR. WYLIE: Yes. I can provide you some of
6 the transcripts because I still -- I still have some of
7 the transcripts from the -- from the focus groups, for
8 example, if you'd like that.

9 The focus groups were used -- so qualitative
10 research is not usually generalizable, so -- because
11 your sample size is, you know, 12 people in a room
12 talking. So there's all kinds of things that could
13 affect what -- the output of that.

14 But one of the reasons that focus groups and
15 in-depth interviews were used was essentially to come
16 up with better -- essentially asking people, what is it
17 that I don't know about you that I should know about
18 you? And then coming up with theories or hypotheses
19 from that to then test quantitatively in a way that you
20 can actually validate through control groups and --

21 REP. SPEIER: In your conversations with Mr.
22 Bannon --

1 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

2 REP. SPEIER: -- did he indicate to you any
3 interest in wanting to suppress the vote in the United
4 States on some level?

5 MR. WYLIE: So if by "suppression" you mean
6 discourage particular groups of people or discouraging
7 the likelihood of particular groups of people from
8 voting, is that what you mean by "suppress"?

9 REP. SPEIER: Yes.

10 MR. WYLIE: Then yes. So one of the things
11 that I could provide to you is a memo that references
12 voter disengagements in bold as an objective for some
13 of the American operations.

14 My understanding of that was that that quote
15 "voter disengagement" would be focused on particular
16 groups of people who are more prone to vote Democrat.
17 So it wasn't -- it wasn't general. It was specific to
18 -- to that. So yes.

19 And with respect to your question about Steve
20 Bannon in particular, that was something that came up
21 in conference calls with him.

22 REP. SPEIER: How about efforts to influence

1 voters on race?

2 MR. WYLIE: So one of the things that emerged
3 from some of the research was that there was sort of an
4 undercurrent of certain -- certain types of Americans,
5 typically white men who -- but there were also groups
6 of women, though -- who -- are you familiar with the
7 concept of race realism? No.

8 So race realism is a movement within the alt
9 right, which is the idea that you can call something --
10 you can call someone racist for having prejudicial
11 views towards particular ethnicities or races.

12 But a defense to that -- and so just to be
13 clear, I'm not personally defending it, I'm just -- to
14 explain it -- would be that it's simply being quote
15 "realistic about the realities of race," and that there
16 are certain natural hierarchies to people.

17 And this is something that I know Steve Bannon
18 was -- found interesting, as something that he wanted
19 to explore.

20 REP. SPEIER: So at the time that you were
21 engaged with him, he didn't have a candidate in the
22 U.S. election, or did he?

1 MR. WYLIE: There were -- there were lots of
2 candidates that Robert Mercer or Rebekah Mercer wanted
3 to help or support. But the underlying research was
4 irrespective of the candidate, because the first step
5 to creating the company's assets would be to create
6 insights, models, targeting, message testing, that
7 would be applicable anywhere in the United States for
8 whichever candidates, you know, the Mercers wanted.

9 So, but to answer your question, there were
10 candidates that Robert Mercer wanted from the very
11 beginning to support, or various PACs or various sort
12 of movements and things like that.

13 REP. SPEIER: And did he -- were those
14 articulated to you?

15 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. I can provide you with a
16 list of --

17 REP. SPEIER: Okay. That would be great.

18 MR. WYLIE: -- the -- and, I mean, some of
19 them are currently still in Congress, for example.

20 REP. SPEIER: What is the most important thing
21 you want us to know?

22 MR. WYLIE: I want you to -- so what's --

1 what's really important for me to speak with you as
2 representatives of the United States is that a lot of
3 -- a lot of the wrongdoing that this company has done
4 was in the United States.

5 So, you know, the bulk of the misappropriated
6 Facebook data was on American citizens. The bulk of
7 the research was on American citizens. The -- I want
8 to inform you collectively about -- that this company,
9 and more broadly the backers of this company, so
10 whether it's, you know, the Mercers or Steve Bannon,
11 are willing to manipulate and work the perceptions of
12 American voters, simply to exploit -- exploit that
13 warped view in an election.

14 And the problem that I have with that is that
15 that is fundamentally incongruent with a free election.
16 If you are trying to trick people, for lack -- to
17 really simplify it, trick people into voting for you,
18 by changing what they think is real, that is wrong, and
19 I would like people in the United States to know that.

20 I also think that there may be grounds to
21 investigate the company, not just in the UK but also in
22 the United States, with respect to electoral law

1 infractions and potentially Foreign Corrupt Practices
2 Act and other sort of laws specific to the United
3 States, which I'd like to inform you about.

4 And then also what is particularly concerning
5 to me is the interactions that I witnessed between the
6 company and LUKOIL, and also the work that Dr. Kogan
7 was doing in Russia, and that given that this company
8 was harvesting a massive amount of very sensitive data
9 on a lot -- you know, tens of millions of Americans,
10 and they were doing it whilst they were telling very
11 senior executives of the second-largest oil company in
12 Russia about it, as the -- the lead researcher who is
13 in charge of that harvesting was going back and forth
14 to Russia.

15 You know, as some of his colleagues -- one of
16 the things that I can provide to you is some of his
17 colleagues were also going to Russia, talking to
18 politicians in Russia about some of the work that the
19 psychometric center was doing. So I am just generally
20 concerned that something -- that this hasn't been
21 investigated, and that it really should be.

22 And given that, you know, this is -- that this

1 is a company that also, you know, has a long history of
2 working with the American military, from an American
3 perspective, you know, is this an appropriate company
4 that your government should be engaging on those kinds
5 of projects? So if that answers your question.

6 REP. SPEIER: Thank you.

7 REP. SCHIFF: We'd be very interested in any
8 documentation you have on the presentations to LUKOIL,
9 on the --

10 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

11 REP. SCHIFF: -- other Kogan employees who
12 were -- also interacted with Russia.

13 MR. WYLIE: So, for example, one of -- one of
14 his colleagues -- and I have the screen cap of it --
15 posted that he was going to meet senior politicians in
16 Russia to talk about the research that they were doing,
17 and he mentions the Prime Minister of Russia as
18 somebody that he was going to give a talk to.

19 REP. SCHIFF: If I could, and then I'll turn
20 to Mr. Swalwell. Have you seen any connections between
21 the work that Cambridge Analytica was doing to analyze
22 American attitudes towards Putin and to the annexation

1 of Ukraine --

2 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

3 REP. SCHIFF: -- and the Trump campaign and
4 LUKOIL? In other words, anything that crosscuts
5 between the Trump campaign, that particular -- the
6 particular interest in that research as well as the
7 interactions with LUKOIL with Russia generally?

8 MR. WYLIE: Not with LUKOIL in particular.
9 More broadly, when you look at a lot of the narratives
10 that the Trump campaign was -- was putting out. These
11 were a lot of the messages and general sort of concepts
12 or imagery that were being tested at Cambridge
13 Analytica. So --

14 REP. SCHIFF: And were those being tested in
15 2014?

16 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. So, for example, drain the
17 swamp, images of walls, you know, the -- you know, my
18 -- one of the -- the wall is really interesting because
19 I don't actually think that their intention is really
20 to build a wall, actually.

21 I think that part of -- so there is -- in
22 post-reunification Germany, there was some research

1 done on something called -- and my German isn't -- I
2 don't speak German, but something to the effect of
3 Mauer im Kopf, which means the wall in the head.

4 So Germans overestimate the distance east to
5 west compared to north to south of the country. So
6 they imagine their country more stretched out than it
7 actually is. And part of that had to do with the
8 imagery of walls, which was, you know, essentially
9 actually only in Berlin. It wasn't the entire country
10 that had a giant concrete wall.

11 But that -- that image created a psychological
12 distancing between the two sides of the country. And
13 that even after that physical wall came down, that
14 mental wall remained and is enduring even to this day.
15 People still imagine the country as wider than it
16 actually is.

17 And that if you are Steve Bannon, and you are
18 looking to close off the United States so that it can
19 quote/unquote "find its purpose again," it is -- that's
20 a direct quote. So if that is one of your objectives,
21 creating this psychological distance thing from, you
22 know, the rest of the world is really important.

1 And so this notion of building a wall isn't
2 necessarily just to actually build a physical wall.
3 It's -- and I don't think it has anything to do with
4 immigration. It's to do with distancing Americans from
5 the rest of the world and creating a very strong,
6 enduring symbol of that.

7 Sorry, that was a bit of a tangent, but --

8 REP. SCHIFF: No, no. That's very
9 interesting.

10 Mr. Swalwell.

11 REP. SWALWELL: Thank you.

12 And, Mr. Wylie, thank you for coming in with
13 us. Can we I guess go back to your last day at SCL or
14 working with Cambridge Analytica. Why did you leave?

15 MR. WYLIE: After Steve Bannon took over, the
16 sort of internal company culture became quite toxic.
17 When I first met Steve Bannon, I actually really liked
18 him. He is very interesting -- he's a very interesting
19 guy to talk to, and you can have conversations like,
20 what is culture, or talk about intersectional feminism
21 and fractured identities in the nature of self, and he
22 will fully engage you in that conversation. So he's a

1 very interesting guy to actually talk to.

2 But when you become his subordinate, you are
3 then treated as such. So the culture of the company,
4 you know, it was -- became very difficult to work in.
5 And then, also, being instructed to -- to apply some of
6 the research that we were doing originally to the
7 United States not only just applied to the United
8 States, but then being introduced to, you know, his
9 associates, who had, in my view, extremely warped
10 political views that I was genuinely uncomfortable
11 with.

12 Sitting, for example, in a meeting with my
13 colleagues, and essentially talking about, you know, to
14 a group that we were introduced to, about essentially
15 how to exacerbate or reactivate homophobia in the
16 United States when many of my colleagues were gay
17 themselves, and it just became clear that this is not
18 something that I can do.

19 I don't -- you know, and I never ended up
20 signing the final contracts and intellectual property
21 agreement that the company wanted me to sign, which
22 would have locked me in to the company, because I just

1 couldn't imagine spending 10 years doing that. I
2 couldn't imagine like my career doing that.

3 REP. SWALWELL: What was the total amount of
4 time you worked there?

5 MR. WYLIE: About a year and a half.

6 REP. SWALWELL: How did you leave? Did you
7 give them a letter? Did you tell someone? How did
8 that play out?

9 MR. WYLIE: I sent an email to Alexander Nix,
10 and I -- I didn't fully go into the reasons why I
11 wanted to leave. I just said, in July 2014, that I'm
12 going to leave. But the agreement that I had was that
13 I would phase out my work until November, which is the
14 -- when the midterm was happening; and then after that
15 point, no more.

16 REP. SWALWELL: Did he respond to you?

17 MR. WYLIE: He was -- in person he did, and he
18 took me to -- to lunch and tried to convince -- so he
19 just -- for Alexander Nix and for Steve Bannon, I think
20 they found it really difficult to understand -- like if
21 we just pay you more, why won't you stay? Why won't --

22 REP. SWALWELL: Did they offer to pay you

1 more?

2 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

3 REP. SWALWELL: Okay.

4 MR. WYLIE: I got offered to pay -- be paid a
5 lot more. And, you know, I just -- I said, "Literally,
6 I can't imagine myself doing this anymore." This is
7 not -- when I -- when I signed up originally, we
8 weren't doing anything with the alt right.

9 We weren't -- I didn't even know who Steve
10 Bannon was, and, you know, the thing that was appealing
11 to me is that I could work on projects that, you know,
12 if it related to counter-extremism, or behavior change
13 in Africa with respect to HIV-prone behaviors, or
14 things like that, to me that was morally acceptable.

15 What they were doing I didn't find acceptable,
16 and I really didn't like that I was playing a
17 foundational role in it. And I essentially understood
18 that I either leave now or I'm going to be locked in,
19 and I just said, "Don't want to" --

20 REP. SWALWELL: Were you ever under a
21 nondisclosure agreement with --

22 MR. WYLIE: Yes. I --

1 REP. SWALWELL: Which company?

2 MR. WYLIE: I have a nondisclosure agreement,
3 a mutual nondisclosure agreement with SCL, and then
4 after I left they then threatened various legal actions
5 and made all kinds of accusations, which were actually
6 just completely untrue, and chased me for months.

7 REP. SWALWELL: When did you sign the
8 nondisclosure agreement with SCL?

9 MR. WYLIE: I signed the nondisclosure
10 agreement with SCL in 2013, and then after receiving
11 legal threats in 2015 after I left, I then signed
12 something called an undertaking of confidentiality,
13 which I believe is signed as a deed. So there is --
14 it's a slightly higher tier of duty of confidence, as
15 it were.

16 REP. SWALWELL: Why did you sign that?

17 MR. WYLIE: Well, they just wouldn't stop
18 sending letters to my lawyers, and then they threatened
19 to take me to court over --

20 REP. SWALWELL: Who is "they"? Who was
21 sending the letters?

22 MR. WYLIE: SCL.

1 REP. SWALWELL: And was it -- were any
2 employees of SCL personally contacting you?

3 MR. WYLIE: Oh, lots. Yeah, everybody was
4 talking to me.

5 REP. SWALWELL: About signing an agreement?

6 MR. WYLIE: Oh, no. About -- not signing the
7 agreement, no. Just about what was happening in the
8 company.

9 REP. SWALWELL: Okay. Who was pressuring you
10 at SCL to sign the agreement?

11 MR. WYLIE: Alexander Nix and Steve Bannon.

12 REP. SWALWELL: And were they doing that in
13 person, on the phone, electronically?

14 MR. WYLIE: All of the above. And it was
15 because -- the problem was that Robert Mercer put in
16 money, and Alexander Nix sort of sold intellectual
17 property to -- or, rather, SCL sold intellectual
18 property to Cambridge Analytica, but they didn't fully
19 finalize or execute agreements with myself about the
20 intellectual property that I was generating.

21 The mutual nondisclosure agreement that I have
22 with the company very clearly states that any

1 intellectual property that I develop I retain, unless I
2 specifically license it to the company. When Bannon
3 found out, he obviously was concerned about that,
4 because their primary concern at the time was that they
5 thought that I might go and take this and go and like
6 work on the Hillary campaign or something and try to
7 replicate.

8 This is -- this is --

9 REP. SWALWELL: Did they tell you that?

10 MR. WYLIE: It came out in conversations
11 between my lawyers and their lawyers that that was one
12 of the concerns that they had. But -- and this is, in
13 part, why they have this narrative that I was a
14 disgruntled employee and that I was trying to set up a
15 rival firm.

16 I never set up a rival firm. I'm the only
17 party in this entire, you know, saga that never
18 commercialized the data. I never sold the data. I
19 didn't set up a rival firm.

20 REP. SWALWELL: Can we go back to the
21 undertaking?

22 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. Sure. Sorry.

1 REP. SWALWELL: Is there anything about that
2 undertaking deed that you signed, or the mutual
3 nondisclosure agreement that you signed --

4 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

5 REP. SWALWELL: -- that is limiting your
6 testimony to us today?

7 MR. WYLIE: No. I am -- my entire
8 conversation with you is breaking in. But in the UK at
9 least, there is a defense to breach of confidence,
10 which is if you are revealing potential criminality or
11 grossly unethical behavior, you have a defense to
12 breach of confidence.

13 REP. SWALWELL: Have you been interviewed by
14 the Special Counsel here in the United States?

15 MR. WYLIE: No, I haven't. Next week I am
16 being interviewed by the FBI, Department of Justice,
17 and the New York Attorney General.

18 REP. SWALWELL: Is that with respect to the
19 Russia investigation?

20 MR. WYLIE: It is with respect to what
21 questions they want to ask me.

22 REP. SWALWELL: I'm sorry. Counsel?

1 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. They haven't -- we haven't
2 -- they don't give you the questions in advance when
3 they interview you. So it --

4 REP. SWALWELL: Do you know if it's -- the FBI
5 interview is from the Special Counsel team, or is that
6 separate?

7 MR. WYLIE: It is being coordinated by the
8 National Crime Agency in the UK. So I have reported
9 various crimes, or at least from my perspective what
10 are possible crimes to investigate, to the NCA, which
11 is the equivalent of the FBI in the UK.

12 The NCA has special relationships with the
13 FBI. They have invited who they as appropriate from
14 the FBI, given what I have handed over to them, to then
15 interview me.

16 REP. SWALWELL: Where will that interview be?

17 MR. WYLIE: It will happen, I believe, on a
18 military base in the UK.

19 REP. SWALWELL: And did you say that it would
20 be a joint interview, or is it separate interviews, New
21 York Attorney General, and then FBI, DOJ?

22 MR. WYLIE: My understanding -- and correct me

1 if I'm wrong, Tamsin -- is that each respective agency
2 or authority will have an opportunity to ask me
3 questions. But the other authorities will be watching
4 the interview also. Is that --

5 MS. ALLEN: We -- I don't know -- I don't
6 think we can give a complete answer to that yet, though
7 we've asked questions about how the interviews are to
8 be structured and we don't yet know completely.

9 REP. SWALWELL: What did you do once you left
10 Cambridge Analytica? What you done since? It sounds
11 like you've gone to school.

12 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. I've done -- so I know this
13 is going to sound ridiculous. So I've done projects in
14 fashion, I have done projects in politics, working as a
15 consultant mostly in data science. So I've done
16 projects, for example, for the Canadian government
17 after Justin Trudeau got elected.

18 REP. SWALWELL: Have you done any work in --
19 that was with a rival of Cambridge Analytica or a rival
20 campaign of a campaign that they were working on?

21 MR. WYLIE: No. I have not -- I am -- so this
22 is -- I find this entire narrative very frustrating

1 because after I -- the reason I left Cambridge
2 Analytica is because I did not want to continue working
3 on Steve Bannon's vision for the alt right.

4 I, therefore, cannot be a rival to this
5 company that works for Republicans because I have --
6 and I will be super clear -- I have never worked for a
7 Republican since. I have never worked for a
8 conservative candidate since, and I will not. And so I
9 have not -- I am not setting up a rival -- I don't know
10 where this rival firm is that apparently I have set up
11 and managed.

12 REP. SWALWELL: Can you tell me, how was it
13 that you stayed in contact with employees at Cambridge
14 Analytica? Because it sounds like you had a pretty
15 good window into what was going on all the way up to
16 the Trump data operation, Project Alibi.

17 MR. WYLIE: So it's because I -- the people
18 that I brought on when I was at SCL, and then later
19 when the CA was expanding, were people who I had worked
20 extensively on projects in the past in other contexts.

21 Most of the people who got brought on early on
22 were not conservatives. You know, we had -- you know,

1 not to be flippant about it, but we had a lot of vegans
2 working on the project. We had a lot of gap people
3 work on the project. You know, we -- you know, there
4 weren't -- it wasn't -- it wasn't a conservative team
5 that got set up.

6 And when I left, people would continue talking
7 to me, in part because I had a just really positive --
8 you know, I was friends with some of them -- positive
9 relationship with them, and then also they started
10 getting more and more frustrated with what was
11 happening.

12 I left. A lot of people started leaving after
13 -- after I left.

14 REP. SWALWELL: Have you had any threats made
15 on your life?

16 MR. WYLIE: Not on my life, no.

17 REP. SWALWELL: What kind of -- any physical
18 threats?

19 MR. WYLIE: Not -- not physical.

20 REP. SWALWELL: How about like financial ruin
21 or personal ruin threats?

22 MR. WYLIE: I've had -- I think it would be

1 more appropriate if we spoke about that off record. Is
2 that possible? I've --

3 REP. SWALWELL: Actually, I just want to make
4 sure, Mr. Schiff, if that's all right? He has had
5 threats made, and he doesn't feel comfortable stating
6 them on the record.

7 REP. SCHIFF: That's fine.

8 REP. SWALWELL: Okay. If the stenographer
9 could -- we'll go off the record momentarily.

10 (Recess taken from 5:15 p.m. until 5:17 p.m.)

11 REP. SWALWELL: Were there any Russians
12 working at Cambridge Analytica, or Russian nationals?

13 MR. WYLIE: My understanding is Dr. Kogan was,
14 if not Russian -- I believe he was either Russian or
15 Maldovan. His family is Russian-speaking, and he then
16 naturalized as an American citizen.

17 REP. SWALWELL: While he was working there,
18 did you observe him traveling back and forth from
19 Russia or any --

20 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

21 REP. SWALWELL: -- of the Soviet bloc
22 countries? You did.

1 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. Oh, yeah.

2 REP. SWALWELL: And you did do that.

3 MR. WYLIE: Oh, yeah, yeah. I have email
4 records of that.

5 REP. SWALWELL: Anyone else?

6 MR. WYLIE: There -- I mean, most of the data
7 science team were Eastern European. A lot of them
8 spoke Russian, so it wasn't unusual to -- to hear
9 Russian in the office.

10 At the time, though, that's not -- you know,
11 for me, it's not suspicious that somebody comes from a
12 certain part of the world, or if their colleague also
13 speaks that language, they will speak to them in that
14 language.

15 REP. SWALWELL: Can we go back to the polling
16 or the focus groups --

17 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

18 REP. SWALWELL: -- about how Putin was
19 viewed --

20 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

21 REP. SWALWELL: -- in the United States? Who
22 commissioned that?

1 MR. WYLIE: Cambridge Analytica did.

2 REP. SWALWELL: Was there a client that asked
3 Cambridge Analytica to do that?

4 MR. WYLIE: No. No. We --

5 REP. SWALWELL: Do you know why they wanted to
6 do that?

7 MR. WYLIE: Honestly, no.

8 REP. SWALWELL: Is it possible I guess, just
9 based on how you understood Cambridge Analytica to
10 work, that Mr. Nix or Mr. Kogan or somebody who had a
11 relationship with Russia could have been asked by
12 someone in Russia to do that type of research; is that
13 something that would not have been out of the ordinary?

14 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. Yes. My intuition, and so
15 I'm just going to be super clear, this is not me
16 stating a fact. I'm just stating a suspicion -- is
17 that Dr. Kogan added some of these research areas,
18 because he was quite involved in the actual testing of
19 messages and figuring out ways to test those messages,
20 to test those constructs.

21 And, you know, his -- it was him that actually
22 went out and organized the actual surveys, testing, et

1 cetera. So he had -- he played a very influential role
2 in deciding what kinds of constructs we would look at.

3 But I can't tell you for sure who did it.

4 I can tell you that having gone and asked
5 several former staff members, none of them -- none of
6 the people that I have spoken to commissioned that, or
7 at least told me that they commissioned that area --

8 REP. SWALWELL: Let me ask it this way I
9 guess. Was this something that was out of the
10 ordinary, meaning that your firm was doing, at least
11 ostensibly to you and other employees, research in the
12 United States about how Americans viewed Russia, and
13 there was no known client attached to it?

14 MR. WYLIE: There was that -- that -- as I
15 understand it, at least when I was there, that stream
16 of research was never actually applied to a specific
17 client. It was -- it was just research that was done.

18 REP. SWALWELL: And were there other
19 instances, though, like that where research would be
20 done that didn't have any known application? Or is
21 that sort of an outlier?

22 MR. WYLIE: Not that -- it's an outlier. Not

1 that I can remember because, you know, if you're -- so
2 I don't know how it would be useful to a campaign, an
3 American campaign, to know about people's views on
4 Vladimir Putin. It's not like you're running against
5 Vladimir Putin. It's not like you're -- it's not like
6 a major topical issue is Russian expansionism in
7 Ukraine.

8 So whereas if you are testing other, you know
9 -- your perspective on feminism, for example, that
10 could be used in all kinds of different -- you know,
11 your -- your perspective on gun rights, your
12 perspective on different things, that can be applied.

13 I do not remember any -- at least when I was
14 there, any example of the Russian research being
15 deployed in any way.

16 REP. SCHIFF: On that point, that focus
17 grouping and qualitative and quantitative analysis on
18 the Putin-Ukraine issue --

19 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

20 REP. SCHIFF: -- is that something requested
21 by Bannon specifically, or do you know how that got
22 into the mix?

1 MR. WYLIE: This is something that I have been
2 trying to figure out, because I know that no one on the
3 message testing team commissioned that area of
4 research. So I can -- through a process of
5 elimination, at least -- and I -- I feel like they
6 would be honest to me. So I don't have any reason to
7 think that they would be blind to me.

8 There is sort of two people left. You've
9 either got Steve or you've got Kogan. But I can't -- I
10 can't tell you for sure who would have --

11 REP. SCHIFF: Because this was 2014, right?

12 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

13 REP. SCHIFF: So this is well before the Trump
14 campaign.

15 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

16 REP. SCHIFF: And if this is done by either
17 Bannon or Kogan or Nix --

18 MR. WYLIE: I don't think it would have --
19 well, I don't think it would have been Nix.

20 REP. SCHIFF: Well, the reason I ask is, for
21 the very reason you mention, because it's well before
22 the Trump campaign, yeah --

1 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

2 REP. SCHIFF: -- and Bannon would not have
3 known necessarily that there would be a U.S.
4 Presidential campaign advocating a close relationship
5 with Russia, or mitigating the negative views on Putin
6 and Ukraine, it would make much more sense if it was in
7 connection with a Russian-interested client.

8 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. Something just to say to
9 that is that Steve Bannon has an admiration for sort of
10 strong man-type leadership. So I know that, at least
11 when I was there and he was talking about sort of the
12 kind of leader that he likes, sort of at the time, in
13 my head, I imagined Mussolini, but I could have also
14 very easily imagined Putin. Just it wasn't in my head
15 at the time. But I kind of imagined Mussolini as sort
16 of the Steve Bannon archetype of a very loud but strong
17 kind of leader that he liked.

18 But if I were to -- if I were to -- if I were
19 to -- if I had to bet on who it was, I suspect that
20 because Dr. Kogan was more involved directly in the
21 actual management and commissioning of research, and
22 the actual execution of developing surveys and putting

1 them out and collecting that data, that he may have had
2 a role in that.

3 REP. SCHIFF: And that might have been of
4 interest to the people he was talking to in Russia?

5 MR. WYLIE: It could -- I mean, it could be.
6 This is -- this is, again, partly why -- I mean, I
7 don't have every answer, but partly -- one of the
8 reasons why, you know, I want to speak to you and
9 others is to kind of put that question to the
10 authorities and look at finding an answer to that.

11 REP. SCHIFF: And you've probably seen the
12 indictment that Mueller returned on the 13 Russians
13 that lays out in detail what the Internet Research
14 Agency was doing in terms of their use of social media.

15 From what you have -- what you see in the
16 indictment, and from what you've seen more generally in
17 the open source --

18 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

19 REP. SCHIFF: -- how the Russians deployed,
20 advertising organic content, paid content, does
21 anything about it strike you as suggestive of the use
22 of the modeling that Cambridge Analytica did?

1 MR. WYLIE: The thing that -- and so I'm not
2 an -- like an expert on the -- you know, what the
3 Internet Research Agency was doing, but just generally
4 from what I've seen, the kinds of -- when you look at
5 sort of the style of message or sort of just -- even
6 the general sort of aesthetic of it, how it's slightly
7 bizarre, it feels slightly bizarre, but it's sort of
8 leading -- it's quite divisive. And that, to me, felt
9 -- it felt familiar.

10 But I don't know if the IRA in particular used
11 -- used CA modeling or not, so I can't answer that as a
12 definitive. But what I can say is that if -- if you
13 have an agency, whether it was the IRA or some other
14 agency that had access to this data, it would have been
15 extremely helpful in either developing narratives and
16 understanding what kinds of narratives could become
17 divisive, if that was your goal, or, secondly, where or
18 how to target it.

19 So I can't -- I can't answer that one way or
20 the other, but one of the concerns that I have is that
21 that's a possibility. And I -- I would hope that
22 somebody could go and take that and look into it in

1 some way.

2 REP. SCHIFF: Mr. Swalwell.

3 REP. SWALWELL: You talked to members from
4 Cambridge Analytica throughout, you said, the Trump
5 campaign, and you mentioned earlier that foreign
6 nationals had gone to San Antonio. Do you know what
7 kind of foreign nationals they were?

8 MR. WYLIE: I don't want to -- I don't want to
9 misspeak, so I -- I believe that they were -- what I --
10 how about if I go back and --

11 REP. SWALWELL: Sure.

12 MR. WYLIE: -- I get the photos that I'm
13 referencing, and then I send them to you and you will
14 have the definitive answer on the citizenship and who
15 they were.

16 REP. SWALWELL: Okay. But did anyone ever
17 tell you what the citizenship was?

18 MR. WYLIE: I believe I know, but I just --
19 I'm not 100 percent sure. So I don't want to misspeak.

20 REP. SWALWELL: Okay.

21 MR. WYLIE: But I believe they were Eastern
22 European.

1 REP. SWALWELL: Have you ever been to Russia?

2 MR. WYLIE: Have I -- no, I have never been to
3 Russia. I've been to the Baltics and Eastern Europe,
4 but I have never been to Russia proper.

5 REP. SWALWELL: Did you ever go to the Baltics
6 or Eastern Europe while you were working for Cambridge
7 Analytica?

8 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

9 REP. SWALWELL: Did you ever receive any -- or
10 were you ever subject to any unusual approaches or
11 anything that kind of just seemed unusual? Did someone
12 contact you that struck up conversation and just seemed
13 out of place?

14 MR. WYLIE: I could -- if I answered yes, if I
15 can just explain, that, yes, there were lots of various
16 approaches from people, you know, for example in
17 Lithuania about, you know, wanting to do business or
18 wanting to explore what it was that CA was doing or
19 what I was doing. So, first of all, just to be super
20 clear, I have never actually engaged in business there
21 personally or on behalf of Cambridge Analytica.

22 REP. SWALWELL: You're saying this was by a

1 solicited --

2 MR. WYLIE: But part of -- part of it might
3 just simply be a cultural difference in how people
4 approach things. But, yes, I have been to the Baltic
5 Region, and I have been approached by people who are
6 aware of the work that we were doing and were
7 interested in it.

8 REP. SWALWELL: And when these individuals
9 made these approaches, did you have any reason to
10 believe that -- or had you made them aware of the work
11 you were doing, or were they just completely random
12 approaches and they told --

13 MR. WYLIE: Well, I was --

14 REP. SWALWELL: -- you that there --

15 MR. WYLIE: -- I was visiting -- because
16 several of the other staff members at CA were from
17 Baltic Region or Eastern Europe, my understanding was
18 that they had spoken to people back in their respective
19 home countries about some of the work that we were
20 doing.

21 So whether people know it through just, you
22 know, completely innocent conversation or know it -- in

1 other words, I don't -- I don't know.

2 REP. SWALWELL: Going back to Mr. Bannon and
3 the -- as you described it, discouragement of voters or
4 voting, you said you heard it on conference calls, what
5 exactly do you remember him saying as it related to
6 discouraging voter participation?

7 MR. WYLIE: Finding -- finding ways -- so my
8 recollection of it was that Steve Bannon was
9 particularly focused more -- just generally on African
10 American in terms of voter disengagement.

11 So my recollection of those calls was that he
12 -- he wanted to understand not just how to motivate his
13 base or his supporters, but how to demotivate his
14 opponents and discourage them from participating in an
15 election, because, in his mind, that's the most -- like
16 that's a key piece of winning. You push your people
17 up. You push them down. It makes it easier to win.

18 REP. SWALWELL: Was Mr. Bannon ever involved
19 in developing tests or models for this type of --

20 MR. WYLIE: He's not a technical --

21 REP. SWALWELL: -- engagement?

22 MR. WYLIE: He's not a technical person. He

1 has a good general understanding of technology, but he
2 is not a developer. So he didn't directly model or
3 handle data, but he was aware of what we were doing for
4 sure. And because he and Rebecca Mercer were the ones
5 who authorized spending. Anytime the company wanted to
6 start a new project or a new research stream, they had
7 to authorize it so that there was appropriate funds to
8 spend on it.

9 REP. SWALWELL: Who is Robert Murtfield?

10 MR. WYLIE: Robert Murtfield was an associate
11 of a barrister, a lawyer in the UK named John Jones.
12 John Jones was Julian Assange's lawyer.

13 After -- John Jones had some kind of
14 psychological breakdown, after the Hillary Clinton
15 emails were released, he then walked in front of a
16 train and killed himself. And his assistant, I -- yes,
17 his assistant was Robert Murtfield, who then -- or his
18 clerk. Sorry. I've been corrected, his clerk, which
19 is technically different from his assistant, then was
20 hired by Cambridge Analytica and now -- and still works
21 for Cambridge Analytica.

22 REP. SWALWELL: Did you know -- do you know

1 Mr. Murtfield?

2 MR. WYLIE: I don't -- I don't know him
3 personally, no.

4 REP. SWALWELL: Did you ever communicate with
5 him?

6 MR. WYLIE: I believe I've met him, but I -- I
7 didn't have any -- I knew who he was and -- but I
8 didn't have any like direct working relationship with
9 him.

10 REP. SWALWELL: To your knowledge, did Julian
11 Assange have any relationship with Cambridge Analytica,
12 or do you suspect, based on some of the circumstantial
13 evidence you've pieced together, that Mr. Assange had a
14 relationship with Cambridge Analytica?

15 MR. WYLIE: So this is where working with the
16 British inquiry would be very helpful. There are tapes
17 from various Cambridge Analytica employees talking
18 about the relationship with Julian Assange, that that
19 relationship happened -- was -- that that relationship
20 happened over a year before the American election
21 started, well over a year before the American election.

22 So it wasn't just the email in June, or

1 whatever the official -- and I've also seen emails that
2 John -- before he died, that John Jones was -- because
3 John Jones also, in addition to being Julian Assange's
4 lawyer, also did work for Cambridge Analytica in
5 various ways.

6 He wrote -- I think he even went and lobbied
7 in the United States for some of their clients, I
8 believe, or wrote articles and things like that. And
9 so I have seen, although I don't possess, but I know
10 where they are, emails that allude to WikiLeaks.

11 REP. SWALWELL: And so just based on what
12 you've laid out for us, you know of Russians working
13 for Cambridge Analytica who traveled to Russia. You
14 know of individuals working for Cambridge Analytica who
15 traveled to Russia. You know of Cambridge Analytica
16 doing work on how Russia is viewed in the United
17 States. And you know that individuals at Cambridge
18 Analytica, a year before the hacking of Democratic
19 emails, were in contact with Julian Assange. Is that
20 all accurate?

21 MR. WYLIE: Yes. And in addition to that, I
22 also know that Cambridge Analytica was advertising the

1 projects that they were working on in the United States
2 to LUKOIL and the senior executives at LUKOIL.

3 REP. SWALWELL: Were you aware of, once you
4 left Cambridge Analytica, but in your continuous
5 contacts with friends there, of any effort to obtain
6 Hillary Clinton's quote/unquote "deleted emails"?

7 MR. WYLIE: Yes. So some of the tape
8 recordings reference that. Something else to just
9 point out is that the firm SCL has a history of making
10 use of hacked material. So, for example, in Nigeria,
11 the company utilized medical records and private emails
12 of the current president of Nigeria in trying to create
13 Kompromat.

14 The person who organized that project in
15 Nigeria, Brittney Kaiser, also had a very significant
16 relationship with John Jones before he did. As I
17 believe he was supervising her -- her master's degree,
18 or something like that, and then she then went on and
19 worked at his firm before she went to Cambridge
20 Analytica.

21 REP. SWALWELL: So what were you hearing from
22 colleagues of yours at Cambridge Analytica? What

1 personal knowledge do you have of discussions about
2 obtaining Hillary Clinton's deleted emails?

3 MR. WYLIE: I don't have personal knowledge
4 because I never discussed access using hacked material
5 in the United States, or anywhere, actually, for that
6 matter. That's a line that I wouldn't -- that's
7 illegal, that's a crime.

8 But I have seen email documentation, tape
9 recordings, and also have spoken to various employees
10 who also, you know, reference relationships with
11 WikiLeaks and, in particular, acquiring Kompromat in
12 the same way that they would attempt to obtain
13 Kompromat in an African country.

14 REP. SWALWELL: Who were they trying to obtain
15 Kompromat on?

16 MR. WYLIE: The Democrats. So Hillary
17 Clinton, in particular.

18 REP. SWALWELL: And is this publicly available
19 information, or is this something that you are --

20 MR. WYLIE: Some is and some isn't. Some is
21 in the possession of the inquiry in Britain. It's --

22 REP. SWALWELL: And who are the individuals

1 seeking the deleted emails? Are these Cambridge
2 Analytica employees?

3 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. Alexander Nix and I -- and
4 then I believe Nigel Oakes. Nigel Oakes, for example,
5 is on tape talking about it.

6 REP. SWALWELL: Now, have you seen the
7 publicly released email where I believe Mr. Nix is
8 talking with an individual about a conversation or an
9 approach he had made to Julian Assange?

10 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

11 REP. SCHIFF: Rebekah Mercer.

12 REP. SWALWELL: Yeah. Rebekah Mercer. Are
13 you saying that, aside from this, there were other
14 efforts that you're aware of to obtain --

15 MR. WYLIE: That's my understanding. So I
16 think if you -- I can -- if you don't already have a
17 relationship with Damian Collins, who is the chair of
18 the DCMS Committee at the UK Parliament, I am happy to
19 -- I know him very well, so I can introduce you,
20 because this is something that they are looking at.
21 And then I can also speak to others who have
22 documentation around this area.

1 REP. SWALWELL: I'll yield back to you, Mr.
2 Chairman.

3 REP. SCHIFF: Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
4 Swalwell.

5 Just to follow up on that, in the public email
6 or public reported email, Rebecca Mercer suggests that
7 Cambridge Analytica reach out to Julian Assange and try
8 to basically house the -- and archive the emails. And
9 Nix, I think, reportedly responds that he tried that.

10 So you're aware of emails and tape recordings
11 that indicate that it was more than Nix simply asking
12 his assistant to reach out and being rebuffed?

13 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

14 REP. SCHIFF: Do you know whether Cambridge
15 Analytica had any success in getting information for
16 WikiLeaks?

17 MR. WYLIE: That I don't -- I'm not definitive
18 on. What I can help you get access to is various
19 pieces of evidence that -- that show a wider
20 relationship with -- or association with Julian Assange
21 and WikiLeaks that go back much further than just that
22 brief moment that -- or at least the narrative that it

1 was only just an email or just a random cold call to
2 WikiLeaks.

3 REP. SCHIFF: So when Mr. Nix purportedly
4 asked his assistant to reach out to Julian Assange, it
5 wouldn't have been a cold call. There were
6 relationships there.

7 MR. WYLIE: Can I tell you why that doesn't
8 make sense?

9 REP. SCHIFF: Yeah.

10 MR. WYLIE: So Brittney Kaiser, who after the
11 stories came out she left the company but was there
12 until a couple of weeks ago -- she was the business
13 development director -- she had worked for John Jones,
14 so Julian Assange's lawyer. And so in addition to
15 Robert Murtfield coming on, she also came on.

16 And the reason why I think that it doesn't
17 make sense to just cold call is that she would have had
18 very easy access to WikiLeaks and to Julian Assange
19 because she worked for his now-deceased lawyer, who had
20 a relatively close relationship with Julian Assange.

21 And so for me to go -- and it doesn't make
22 sense that he would just cold call when he had a very -

1 - when he would have had a much warmer reception using
2 a network.

3 REP. SCHIFF: So the Julian Assange lawyer
4 left WikiLeaks and came to work at Cambridge Analytica.

5 MR. WYLIE: He was working -- he didn't leave
6 WikiLeaks. He was also working for Cambridge Analytica
7 and --

8 REP. SCHIFF: The same --

9 MR. WYLIE: -- and then he committed suicide.

10 REP. SCHIFF: So the same lawyer worked for
11 both Julian Assange and Cambridge Analytica.

12 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

13 MS. ALLEN: Is it helpful to explain the split
14 profession, the barrister -- the role of a barrister as
15 opposed to what he was doing --

16 MR. WYLIE: If you think it's relevant.

17 MS. ALLEN: Well, I'm not sure that it is, but
18 the -- as a barrister --

19 REP. SCHIFF: Well, they were both clients of
20 the lawyer.

21 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

22 REP. SCHIFF: So the lawyer wasn't in-house

1 with WikiLeaks or in-house with Cambridge Analytica.

2 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

3 REP. SCHIFF: He had both of these clients.

4 MR. WYLIE: Yes. Barristers are always --
5 barristers are never employed. They are always
6 independent. It's just --

7 REP. SCHIFF: Oh, I see.

8 MR. WYLIE: -- a function -- it's just how the
9 -- there's two types of lawyers in the UK. There's
10 solicitors --

11 REP. SCHIFF: And the barristers --

12 MR. WYLIE: -- who can be employed, and
13 barristers are -- do you want -- you're the lawyer.
14 You can explain it.

15 REP. SCHIFF: No, I think I understand.

16 MS. ALLEN: Yes. So this is how the client
17 relationship -- the main -- the primary client
18 relationship, and they then instruct the barrister.

19 John Jones was a barrister. So there would have been a
20 lawyer who had instructed John Jones, unless he was
21 working outside his normal chambers to give informal
22 advice.

1 REP. SCHIFF: So they were two different
2 clients of the same barrister as --

3 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

4 REP. SCHIFF: -- who ended up taking his life.
5 And that barrister's clerk also --

6 MR. WYLIE: Robert Murtfield, who --

7 MS. ALLEN: And as a clerk, the clerk is
8 attached to the chambers, which is the place which
9 houses a group of barristers. It's not a -- it's not a
10 law firm as such. It's a group of self-employed
11 people, and they have a -- gather together onto the
12 banner of a chambers, and the chambers employs the
13 clerk. So the clerk would have --

14 MR. WYLIE: But he was the clerk that worked
15 for --

16 MS. ALLEN: Yeah. And they're assigned some
17 barristers, but he would have worked for others as
18 well.

19 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. And so he -- so to put it
20 in just simple terms, we have a lawyer who was working
21 for WikiLeaks and working for Cambridge Analytica.
22 When he died, his clerk, assistant, person, then went

1 over to Cambridge Analytica and -- and then also
2 Brittney Kaiser, who wasn't a direct employee of his,
3 but she was supervised by him for her academic research
4 and then she went on and worked at the same chambers,
5 which is kind of like a law firm.

6 She then also went to Cambridge Analytica, and
7 she was the one who, for example, introduced the
8 Cambridge Analytica to a firm in Nigeria or a foreign
9 firm that accessed somehow the private medical records
10 of the now-president of Nigeria.

11 She was the one who organized that
12 relationship and that project, which likely involved
13 hacking. So she is probably somebody that you might be
14 interested in speaking to.

15 REP. SCHIFF: And tell me her name again.

16 MR. WYLIE: Brittney Kaiser.

17 REP. SCHIFF: So Brittany Kaiser --

18 MR. WYLIE: She is an American citizen.

19 REP. SCHIFF: -- worked at one project for
20 Cambridge Analytica in which they had records for use
21 in a political campaign in Nigeria. Is that --

22 MR. WYLIE: So projects that involved -- I'm

1 just conscious of that this might be published on
2 record and it doesn't have privilege. So
3 misappropriated private or personal information of
4 opposition politicians in Nigeria and several Caribbean
5 countries where she was involved in managing the
6 relationships of the contractors who, through various
7 means, were able to acquire that information.

8 REP. SCHIFF: So that was part of her
9 responsibility at Cambridge Analytica, or was it --

10 MR. WYLIE: I don't know if it was a formal
11 job -- I don't think she would have put it on her
12 LinkedIn, that that's something that was her formal job
13 role. But it is something that she was involved in,
14 and there are several instances of her involving in
15 that kind of work.

16 REP. SCHIFF: And she was working for the
17 clerk for the barrister who had --

18 MR. WYLIE: She was working for the chambers
19 of the barrister. She was working with the barrister
20 who was -- who represented Julian Assange at the
21 chambers, and then also he supervised her master's
22 degree.

1 REP. SCHIFF: Okay. And then she leaves that
2 chambers to go to work at --

3 MR. WYLIE: For Cambridge Analytica.

4 REP. SCHIFF: Okay. Okay. So you have
5 someone with experience in using misappropriated
6 materials through Cambridge Analytica to influence an
7 election, who has a relationship with people who have a
8 relationship with Julian Assange.

9 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

10 REP. SCHIFF: And there are documents,
11 recordings about an approach to try to obtain those
12 materials from Julian Assange, but you don't know
13 whether they were actually acquired or used by
14 Cambridge Analytica.

15 MR. WYLIE: That's the one thing that I can't
16 confirm to you.

17 REP. SCHIFF: Okay. Do you know whether --
18 and we would love to speak to our counterpart in
19 Britain. Do you know whether they have evidence of
20 that?

21 MR. WYLIE: So they have a lot of the
22 recordings that I'm referring to. I actually helped

1 them get the recordings, so I wasn't in possession, but
2 I facilitated them acquiring them. And then I also
3 know the individuals who have some of the emails and
4 documents in relation to that.

5 I also know that there are several journalists
6 who have some material who may, in some way, be willing
7 to show them.

8 REP. SCHIFF: And you mentioned that Nigel
9 Oakes was involved in this effort. What was his role
10 at SCL? I know he was one of the original --

11 MR. WYLIE: He is -- yeah, he goes way back in
12 the firm. So he is one of the shareholders, directors.
13 He is -- there are recordings of him talking about
14 WikiLeaks. So he knows about the situation.

15 REP. SCHIFF: And he is still an investor in
16 2016?

17 MR. WYLIE: He is, I believe, currently still
18 a major shareholder in SCL, not Cambridge Analytica
19 proper, but in SCL Group.

20 REP. SCHIFF: Did you ever come across Roger
21 Stone while you were at Cambridge Analytica or learn of
22 any interaction that he had with any of the principals

1 there?

2 MR. WYLIE: No, not while -- no.

3 REP. SCHIFF: Okay. I have some other
4 questions, but I'm going to go to Mr. Castro.

5 REP. CASTRO: Sure. Thank you for your
6 testimony today. You're American?

7 MR. WYLIE: I'm Canadian, actually.

8 REP. CASTRO: Oh, Canadian.

9 MR. WYLIE: But I have residency in the UK.
10 I've lived in the UK since 2010.

11 REP. CASTRO: Okay. Do you know whether any
12 other Americans were involved with Cambridge Analytica
13 in the activities that you've been describing here in
14 this interview?

15 MR. WYLIE: So Brittney Kaiser is an American
16 citizen. She lives in New York.

17 REP. CASTRO: And what was her role again?

18 MR. WYLIE: She was director of business
19 development, I believe was her title.

20 REP. CASTRO: Is she the one that had a role
21 in Nigeria and the Caribbean nation?

22 MR. WYLIE: And Caribbean, yeah. And also,

1 she is the one that worked with John Jones, the Assange
2 lawyer.

3 Other Americans who were involved -- Steve
4 Bannon.

5 REP. SCHIFF: Mike Flynn was as well.

6 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

7 REP. SCHIFF: Can you tell us about his
8 involvement?

9 MR. WYLIE: I don't know that much about what
10 exactly he was doing, but I know that he was an
11 advisor, and one of the roles that he had was to go and
12 solicit clients. I know that after Trump got elected,
13 the firm made a very concerted effort to make it known
14 that they had these connections with the Trump
15 administration, that they got Trump elected, and they
16 were looking to, you know, solicit clients through --
17 because of that.

18 I know that Alexander Nix, after Trump got
19 elected, made a concerted effort to try to meet as many
20 people as he could. I know that he had a meeting with
21 the foreign commonwealth office, for example, in the
22 UK.

1 I believe he met with Boris Johnson, so he --
2 so he and the firm went around essentially advertising
3 this relationship, and I think with the view of trying
4 to profit off of it. My understanding of what Michael
5 Flynn's role was was: a) as an advisor to the firm,
6 but b) to use his network of contacts and then also
7 this sort of Trump brand to solicit clients for the
8 company.

9 REP. CASTRO: And do you know, who did the
10 company share data with? Were there data partners
11 groups that you all were swapping data with at all or
12 coordinating with?

13 MR. WYLIE: So in terms of acquiring data,
14 there were several partner companies. Just -- some of
15 them were just very ordinary, so not that interesting,
16 but I know that they used Experian data, another
17 company called Info Group. All of this is sort of very
18 standard. Some of your own companies might use Info
19 Group data.

20 I know that after Brittney Kaiser came onto
21 the company, they started exploring relationships with
22 the Ergen family, so Chase Ergen, who my understanding

1 is that they -- that this family is, if not
2 shareholders, exert some sort of significant influence
3 over Dish Network in the United States.

4 REP. CASTRO: Do you know what kind of
5 information or data was being shared with them or --

6 MR. WYLIE: I don't know in particular. I
7 know that this was something that they were quite
8 interested in. I know that the company's relationship
9 with a lot of the various companies in, for example,
10 Mexico, like Pig.gi, which is a data harvesting app --

11 REP. CASTRO: What is it called?

12 MR. WYLIE: Pig.gi, P-i-g dot g-i. Or
13 Mowasat, which is also in Mexico.

14 REP. CASTRO: How do you spell that one?

15 MR. WYLIE: M-o-w-a-s-a-t. Both of those
16 companies, the Ergens are involved in. The Ergens were
17 also involved in, I believe, Nigeria and several other
18 countries. The various sort of projects -- my
19 understanding is that the projects that they were doing
20 -- that they are doing in Mexico are sort of research
21 and development projects with different means of data
22 harvesting, where oversight is not necessarily robust,

1 to see what they can do and what they can get away
2 with, to then export that to other parts of the world
3 that they -- that they operate in.

4 Perhaps what I can do is I can give you -- I
5 can come back to you guys and give you just a complete
6 list of every company or organization or individual
7 that I'm aware of where they had some sort of data
8 transaction.

9 REP. CASTRO: That would be helpful.

10 MR. WYLIE: If that -- if that's helpful.

11 REP. CASTRO: That would be great.

12 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

13 REP. CASTRO: Yeah. Thank you. What about
14 with any -- any Russians or anyone in Russia?

15 MR. WYLIE: So I'm not sure if you were here
16 when I was speaking about Russia before. So I'll just
17 maybe --

18 REP. CASTRO: If you've covered it, then
19 that's fine.

20 MR. WYLIE: Okay. Just very quickly, Dr.
21 Kogan was working in Russia at the time. His research
22 at St. Petersburg University was on online trolling and

1 something called Dark Triad Traits, which is
2 Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and Psychopathy.

3 He was doing that at the same time that he was
4 managing the Facebook harvesting project, and in
5 addition to that happening, which, by the way, SCL was
6 advertising to other clients that it had the
7 applications of this Russian work.

8 It was also interfacing with LUKOIL, so
9 advertising. I can perhaps, if it's --

10 REP. SCHIFF: We'll go back to --

11 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

12 REP. CASTRO: We covered Brad Parscale also?

13 REP. SCHIFF: We didn't really get into Brad
14 Parscale.

15 REP. CASTRO: What was the relationship, if
16 any, or your interfacing with Brad Parscale?

17 MR. WYLIE: I didn't -- that was after I had
18 left, so I didn't --

19 REP. CASTRO: So did you hear anything about
20 it, or it was coming, it was on the horizon, or
21 anything?

22 MR. WYLIE: No, not with respect to him. No.

1 REP. CASTRO: Okay.

2 REP. SCHIFF: So I have kind of a lightning
3 round, a number of questions.

4 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

5 REP. SCHIFF: So there will be no particular
6 order.

7 MR. WYLIE: Okay.

8 REP. SCHIFF: We had an interview with Mr.
9 Nix. If he testified that Cambridge Analytica received
10 no data through Facebook, would that be an inaccurate
11 or misleading statement?

12 MR. WYLIE: So he also said that to the
13 British Parliament. And as I said at the British
14 Parliament, I will say the exact same thing to you.
15 Facebook data -- the company's foundational models were
16 based on Facebook data.

17 I think it's incredibly misleading to say that
18 no Facebook data was used to develop the algorithms or
19 the targeting or the -- or to conduct the message
20 testing of the company.

21 The firm -- and I can provide you with these
22 documents. It has Alexander's signature on it. The

1 firm engaged Dr. Kogan specifically because his
2 application harvested Facebook data, and specifically
3 because it harvested not only the Facebook data of the
4 user but also their friend network. That is in
5 contracts. That is in project documentation. The
6 contracts have Alexander's signature on it.

7 So I don't understand why he would tell you
8 that they didn't use Facebook data.

9 REP. SCHIFF: Is that what they teach you at
10 Eton?

11 MR. WYLIE: I --

12 REP. SCHIFF: That's a rhetorical question.

13 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

14 REP. SCHIFF: You mentioned that one of the
15 things that we should be considered about is potential
16 violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. What
17 were you referring to there?

18 MR. WYLIE: Yes. So one -- so I am -- I am --
19 so can I -- sorry. Can I ask a question? So --

20 REP. SCHIFF: Yes.

21 MR. WYLIE: -- if I speak about certain
22 things, I -- so I understand that this will be made

1 public at some point.

2 REP. SCHIFF: Yes. And I want to -- I was
3 going to wait until the end of the interview to ask
4 you. The Judiciary Committee that you interviewed with
5 yesterday released a summary of key parts of your
6 testimony.

7 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

8 REP. SCHIFF: Including some excerpts. I
9 don't know if they discussed that with you in advance
10 or not.

11 MR. WYLIE: I don't believe they -- they
12 didn't discuss the excerpts. I knew that they were
13 going to publish. I treated it as entirely on the
14 record.

15 REP. SCHIFF: Okay. So --

16 MR. WYLIE: So we didn't go nearly as in-depth
17 on certain topics.

18 REP. SCHIFF: What I thought we would do when
19 we finish is normally our interviews are in closed
20 session.

21 MR. WYLIE: Right.

22 REP. SCHIFF: Subject to our releasing the

1 transcript at a point when we decide to release it.

2 MR. WYLIE: Okay.

3 REP. SCHIFF: Now, as the majority is not
4 participating, we are not operating under the normal
5 rubric.

6 MR. WYLIE: Right.

7 REP. SCHIFF: So we have more flexibility than
8 we would otherwise.

9 MR. WYLIE: Right.

10 REP. SCHIFF: I don't want to release
11 something that is going to create an issue for you.

12 MR. WYLIE: Sure. Sure.

13 REP. SCHIFF: Without there being a good for
14 it, without giving you a heads-up, and anything along
15 those lines.

16 There were a couple of things that I wanted to
17 ask you about at the end whether you had any
18 reservation with our discussing publicly generally what
19 you had said without releasing the transcript. I mean,
20 I think --

21 MR. WYLIE: Okay.

22 REP. SCHIFF: -- I think, for example, it will

1 be of great interest to people that there were more
2 connections to WikiLeaks than is publicly known.

3 MR. WYLIE: Right.

4 REP. SCHIFF: But I would want to ask you
5 about a couple of different areas and whether you are
6 comfortable with our sharing at least a
7 characterization, if not exact comments that you made.

8 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

9 REP. SCHIFF: But on this particular topic
10 that I asked about FCPA, if there is something that
11 concerns you, then, obviously, that will be something
12 we will discuss after the interview.

13 And down the road, if we're at a point of
14 releasing the transcripts of interviews, we would want
15 to work with you and try to address any concerns you
16 have of timing, over any redactions that we need to
17 make.

18 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

19 REP. SCHIFF: And that type of thing.

20 MR. WYLIE: Sure. So if we could have that
21 conversation perhaps off record for --

22 REP. SCHIFF: Yeah.

1 MR. WYLIE: -- for now, and then --

2 REP. SCHIFF: Sure.

3 MR. WYLIE: -- simply because -- for two
4 reasons.

5 REP. SCHIFF: Can we go off the record?

6 (Recess taken from 6:04 p.m. to 6:39 p.m.)

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

1 E V E N I N G S E S S I O N

2 (6:39 p.m.)

3 REP. SCHIFF: If you could make your answers
4 very short to these.

5 MR. WYLIE: I will try to be succinct.

6 REP. SCHIFF: If there are areas where I need
7 to know more, I will then ask follow-up.

8 MR. WYLIE: Okay.

9 REP. SCHIFF: Tell me, Michael Kosinski, he
10 worked with Kogan or --

11 MR. WYLIE: He worked with Kogan initially.
12 He helped prepare some of the planning and he did some
13 of the preparatory work for the data harvesting
14 project.

15 He did not continue on that particular data
16 harvesting project -- I'm referencing the Facebook
17 project -- because he demanded half a million dollars
18 and 50 percent royalties, whereas Kogan said that he
19 wanted to do it for this academic institution and,
20 therefore, would do it at cost.

21 REP. SCHIFF: Did Kosinski have any
22 relationship with any Russian institutions?

1 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, and also to be clear, he was
2 the deputy. Kogan -- sorry -- Kosinski was the Deputy
3 Director at the time of the Cambridge Psychometric
4 Center. So he also had his own applications that did
5 the equivalent type of harvesting. So he had the
6 identical capacity that Kogan had.

7 He had already amassed a very large data set,
8 mostly on Americans. That originally was harvested for
9 academic use. One of the things that I can provide you
10 is a screen shot of Kosinski saying that -- it's him
11 boarding a plane, and he says -- he makes reference to
12 the fact he's going to Russia, meeting with senior
13 politicians, including the Prime Minister of Russia,
14 where he was going to present some of the work that he
15 was doing, which was identical to what Kogan was doing.

16 Because originally, they were working
17 together, and --

18 REP. SCHIFF: And do you know whether he had
19 formed any relationship with the Russians?

20 MR. WYLIE: I don't know in terms of any
21 employment or any sort of that kind of relationship. I
22 know that he did presentations in Russia to politicians

1 about this work.

2 REP. SCHIFF: Do you know whether he shared
3 his data?

4 MR. WYLIE: I don't know if he -- I don't know
5 if he shared data, but I do know that he did
6 presentations on that data where that data may have
7 been used.

8 REP. SCHIFF: And how voluminous was the data
9 compared to what Kogan got?

10 MR. WYLIE: My understanding was it was in the
11 millions, was my understanding, but the point that I'd
12 make is he had the same capacity to harvest data. So
13 I'm not sure if he went and harvested more data or if -
14 - but the data set that he had, he had already built
15 algorithms, providing algorithms with, and had already
16 validated those algorithms. Indeed, some of his
17 research that was published presented that.

18 Some of it may be of interest to you. Some of
19 that research was funded by DARPA. So I'm not sure. I
20 can't answer that question, you know, directly.

21 REP. SCHIFF: Well, in those papers, he would
22 not have presented the algorithms.

1 MR. WYLIE: No, no, no. He just would have
2 presented results.

3 REP. SCHIFF: I see. Anything else about
4 Kosinski we should know?

5 MR. WYLIE: Not -- not -- no, I don't think
6 there's anything in particular.

7 REP. SCHIFF: There's a New York Times article
8 that said two former company insiders, I assume
9 referring to Cambridge Analytica, said LUKOIL was
10 interested in data targeting American voters. Do you
11 know who the other of these two insiders refers to?

12 MR. WYLIE: I have an idea, but I can't say
13 definitively one way or the other, but there were
14 several. There were -- I wasn't the only one who was
15 aware of the LUKOIL project.

16 REP. SCHIFF: Okay.

17 MR. WYLIE: Although I was the one that had
18 the actual documentation on it.

19 REP. SCHIFF: What role, if any, did Dr. Kogan
20 in LUKOIL?

21 MR. WYLIE: I don't think that Kogan actually
22 met with LUKOIL, but I do know that Alexander made it

1 known to LUKOIL --

2 REP. SCHIFF: That Kogan was --

3 MR. WYLIE: -- that Kogan was one of -- that
4 we had a Russian in Russia who was working on it, and
5 you're a Russian company, and this is something that
6 you would like.

7 And so I don't know if Kogan actually met with
8 LUKOIL, but I do know that Alexander Nix mentions and
9 referred to.

10 REP. SCHIFF: What do you know about John
11 Bolton's PAC?

12 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, John Bolton's PAC was a
13 client. They were one of the first clients of
14 Cambridge Analytica actually. They used -- the project
15 that they funded made use of models that were built
16 with the Facebook data.

17 My understanding of the project was that John
18 Bolton wanted to explore ways of, for lack of a better
19 term, increasing sort of militaristic views in
20 Americans; that they had their sort of hypothesis or
21 theory, was that Americans are becoming too weak on a
22 sort of military intervention, and that they wanted to

1 explore ways of making people more supportive of robust
2 military intervention around the world.

3 REP. SCHIFF: And did the Bolton PAC retain
4 Cambridge Analytica? Were they a paying customer?

5 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, yeah, and I can actually
6 provide you with -- I believe I can provide you with
7 the contracting and the project specification.

8 REP. SCHIFF: And there were specific races
9 that Bolton's PAC targeted that --

10 MR. WYLIE: I believe there was a combination
11 of states and districts of interest, but also more
12 generally research on this sort of strength, this sort
13 of militarism. How can we just generally make
14 Americans more militaristic?

15 REP. SCHIFF: Okay. What was Palantir's
16 relationship to Cambridge Analytica?

17 MR. WYLIE: So one of the -- so before I
18 joined the company, and by "the company," I mean SCL
19 Group, Sophie Schmidt works for SCL Group. Sophie
20 Schmidt is the daughter of Eric Schmidt, the Chairman
21 of either Google or Alphabet.

22 She encouraged Alexander Nix to get in touch

1 with Palantir. I believe that she facilitated the
2 first introductions to Palantir.

3 When I joined, one of the first emails that I
4 got was asking about my views on Palantir and whether
5 we should engage. One of the first meetings I had with
6 Alexander Nix, he wanted to know what we should -- that
7 he had met people at Palantir, and he wanted to pursue
8 a relationship with them.

9 I told him, I said, "Well, that might make
10 sense for some of the, you know, military or counter-
11 extremism projects that, you know, that the company
12 works on, but they didn't" -- I literally, and I think
13 I even put this in an email -- that they didn't make
14 sense for a campaign, any political projects.

15 Nonetheless he pursued that relationship. He
16 had several meetings at Palantir. I got invited to
17 meetings at Palantir in their European office. So
18 that's based in London, in Soho.

19 So after Cambridge Analytica got set up, so in
20 the spring of 2014, Palantir staff started showing up
21 in the office. One staff member in particular came in
22 very regularly. I was told that they were helping

1 advise on some difficult -- I don't recall the
2 specifics of it, but some kind of difficult problem
3 that the data science team was experiencing with
4 algorithms or some kind of complex algorithmic
5 structure that they were looking at, and that also the
6 staff members were just generally interested, in
7 particular, as to what kinds of projects were we
8 working on and to see what could be done with the data
9 that we were acquiring, including the Facebook data.

10 So I have emails from some of these staff
11 members talking about Facebook data acquisition, ideas
12 for modeling it, ideas for acquiring it.

13 One of the things that I found slightly
14 disconcerting about that, which is why it sticks in my
15 head, was that we were all instructed that when we were
16 dealing with anybody from Palantir on the staff list,
17 they had pseudonyms. So they had fake names, and that
18 there was at least one time where I saw a staff member
19 being paid in cash. I'm not sure exactly what that
20 was.

21 It was slightly unusual as to why they kept
22 coming in. Palantir says that they were doing it in a

1 personal capacity. The only thing that I would say
2 that is unusual about that is that it was during
3 business hours, and it was regular. So it wasn't like
4 somebody coming in for an hour in the evening or on the
5 weekend just to give some casual advice. Like there
6 were regular intervals of meetings and actual work that
7 was being done.

8 But I don't know exactly what happened with
9 that or what kind of data might have been taken, if
10 there was any data taken, but I know that there was one
11 Palantir staff member in particular who had access to
12 the Facebook data and was quite interested in it.

13 But I can't say exactly --

14 REP. SCHIFF: So it wasn't clear why they were
15 there or what they were doing, and they had these
16 pseudonyms?

17 MR. WYLIE: Yes. So some of the emails I have
18 are from the personal accounts, personal email
19 accounts, of staff members, and then some of the emails
20 I have come from pseudonyms, but some of the emails
21 they signed off on their actual name and forgot that
22 they were using a pseudonym.

1 It might be that they were there in a personal
2 capacity, and that -- I don't know -- Palantir just has
3 very loose requirements as to coming into the office
4 and taking personal days regularly, but the thing that
5 I would say is that if you're doing something in a
6 personal capacity during the week and actually doing
7 some fairly complex work, it doesn't seem like a
8 personal project.

9 REP. SCHIFF: But any guess as to what the
10 deal was? Was this an effort to avoid foreign
11 nationals working on a British campaign or any reason?

12 I mean, is there any rational expression for
13 why all of the skullduggery?

14 MR. WYLIE: So I don't -- I shouldn't
15 speculate. I don't think I should speculate. So I'll
16 tell you sort of what I observed and what I know.

17 REP. SCHIFF: Okay.

18 MR. WYLIE: Without speculating.

19 REP. SCHIFF: What's your thought in terms of
20 how much Facebook knew about what was being done with
21 its data in real time?

22 MR. WYLIE: So Facebook has said that they

1 didn't know what was going on, but I remember at least
2 one instance where there was a delay in the next
3 tranche of data being acquired by Kogan and remember
4 talking to Kogan and just asking him what the delay was
5 about.

6 And he said something about he was having some
7 problem with the app, that Facebook either temporarily
8 shut it down or throttled the amounts of data he was
9 being to pull per minute from the app, but that he had
10 a conversation with somebody at Facebook. I think it
11 was like an engineer at Facebook, and that then they
12 sort of turned the permissions back on or did something
13 that --

14 REP. SCHIFF: That would indicate though that
15 they were concerned about the volume of data being
16 acquired, but any indication that they knew that the
17 data was not being used for academic purposes, that, in
18 fact, it was being used by a commercial entity?

19 MR. WYLIE: That I don't know specifically,
20 but one of the other things that I should point out is
21 that Kogan's business partner, Joseph Chancellor, then
22 went and worked at Facebook. He still works at

1 Facebook.

2 And I believe they actually went and presented
3 the project to Facebook or learning from the project or
4 something. I think there was something that they went
5 to Facebook and actually presented something about the
6 projects.

7 This is something that I remember. I don't
8 know the exact details of it, but my recollection is
9 that they were relatively open or at least that
10 Facebook knew that there was this data that was being
11 acquired.

12 I don't know if Facebook knew specifically
13 whether it was commercialized or not. They told me
14 that they weren't aware that it was commercialized;
15 that Facebook told me that they were told by Kogan that
16 it was for academic purposes.

17 REP. SCHIFF: In Brittney Kaiser's testimony
18 before Parliament, she suggested that there were
19 additional Facebook-linked questionnaires and data sets
20 used by Cambridge Analytica.

21 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

22 REP. SCHIFF: And that the quantity of data

1 might be far greater.

2 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

3 REP. SCHIFF: Is that a reference to
4 Kosinski's work and the data he was acquiring or what
5 do you think it refers to?

6 MR. WYLIE: No. So the purpose of Kogan was
7 -- so if you recall, after the money was deposited into
8 Cambridge Analytica, Steve Bannon then set this
9 deadline for September or around September to finish
10 data acquisition models, message testing, everything.
11 So that there was some time in between that and the
12 midterms that they could then play with it on some
13 campaigns.

14 So the original purpose of Kogan was sort of
15 this stopgap measure, which was we need to get lots of
16 data really quickly because Steve Bannon is demanding
17 it, and this scales really quickly.

18 But there was a decision made at the company
19 that essentially it's not smart business practice to --
20 if data is the foundation of your company, it's not
21 good business practice to rely on an external vendor
22 solely to provide you that, and that internal capacity

1 should be built to create data acquisition in a sense.

2 So while Kogan was doing his harvesting
3 project, there were staff members at Cambridge
4 Analytica who were then exploring what kinds of apps or
5 browser extensions or various widgets or things to put
6 on people's computers that could replicate some of the
7 functionality that Kogan had, but it would be in-house
8 so they wouldn't have to rely on him. Even when I was
9 there, that was a project.

10 So what Brittney Kaiser is referring to is the
11 finished product of that exercise.

12 REP. SCHIFF: And do we know how much data
13 that was able to scrape?

14 MR. WYLIE: I don't know for certain, but if
15 they used applications that were developed outside of
16 Facebook, I mean, theoretically they could get tens of
17 millions of records that way.

18 REP. SCHIFF: Did you ever see any connection
19 between Cambridge Analytica and Paul Manafort?

20 MR. WYLIE: Yes and no. So I know that Mark
21 Block -- so Mark Block -- are you familiar with Mark
22 Block?

1 Okay. So Mark Block was one of the people who
2 originally introduced Alexander Nix to Steve Bannon.
3 So he used to work for Americans for Prosperity. He
4 was quite senior in that. Then he went to go and work
5 with the Mercers and Steve Bannon.

6 He joined Cambridge Analytica after it got set
7 up, and one of his roles was to essentially just sort
8 of culturally validate this foreign firm with his
9 contacts in his particular wing of the Republican
10 Party.

11 So he didn't necessarily do anything in
12 particular aside from go and meet people and say,
13 "These guys are great and they're on our side, and you
14 know, I'm just like you. They're just like us."

15 But I know that he has or at least had a
16 relationship with Paul Manafort, and I believe that he
17 had meetings with Paul Manafort around the time that
18 Alexander Nix was also having meetings with Cory
19 Lewandowski.

20 But I don't believe that Mark Block still
21 works for Cambridge Analytica, but I know that he had
22 some relationship with Paul Manafort because I actually

1 knew who Paul Manafort was and who Roger Stone was
2 before they kind of became public figures after sort of
3 the Trump campaign, and it was because they -- I've
4 never met them, but their names would pop up on
5 occasion.

6 REP. SCHIFF: Did Steve Bannon ever talk about
7 WikiLeaks or Julian Assange?

8 MR. WYLIE: Not to my recollection. To me
9 personally.

10 REP. SCHIFF: Yeah.

11 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

12 REP. SCHIFF: Did you ever hear of him
13 discussing that with anyone else?

14 MR. WYLIE: Not to my recollection, but he may
15 be referenced on some of these tapes that Damian
16 Collins has, but I don't -- I'm not sure on that.

17 REP. SCHIFF: I think you testified before the
18 Parliament about the ProtonMail accounts that Mr. Nix
19 utilized or others.

20 MR. WYLIE: Un-huh.

21 REP. SCHIFF: Did you ever have any reason to
22 believe that that was used to hide the various work

1 being done at Cambridge Analytica?

2 MR. WYLIE: So I'll just start by qualifying
3 my response, which is that there are many legitimate
4 reasons why you may use ProtonMail or self-destructing
5 emails. In particular, if you are operating in a
6 country where you are being surveilled, which is a lot
7 of countries that SCL works in, or where evidence not
8 necessarily on your side, but on the client's side may
9 be discoverable and that would put them in jeopardy.

10 That's not a reason why you would use it, but
11 there were instances where I think that Alexander may
12 have had relationships with people or conducted
13 business dealings or authorized something that could
14 have been unlawful and, therefore, it would have --
15 that using technologies like that may have been useful.

16 REP. SCHIFF: Any specific occasions though
17 where you know it was used for that purpose?

18 MR. WYLIE: If I'm -- I'm on record accusing
19 somebody of a crime. Is that --

20 (Counsel conferred with the witness.)

21 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, so if it's okay with you, I
22 perhaps can provide you with some of the documentation

1 on some of the things that I have sent to the
2 authorities.

3 REP. SCHIFF: Yes.

4 MR. WYLIE: Because there are certain things
5 that may be potentially unlawful, but haven't been yet
6 -- haven't actually gone to court yet. So for me to
7 say that they are unlawful potentially is --

8 REP. SCHIFF: Well, let me ask it this way
9 then. Are you aware of use of Proton accounts to hide
10 things that were unethical and potentially unlawful?

11 MR. WYLIE: I'm aware of people at Cambridge
12 Analytica or SCL Group using technologies like
13 ProtonMail or simply going and deleting things that may
14 have been potential evidence that would have been
15 relevant to an investigation.

16 REP. SCHIFF: Would you rather provide that to
17 us in documentary form?

18 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

19 REP. SCHIFF: Okay. My staff may have a few
20 more questions for you, but is there anything I haven't
21 asked you about that you think that I should be aware
22 of?

1 MR. WYLIE: (Pause.) Sorry. I'm just -- I'm
2 just kind of going through our conversation just to
3 make sure.

4 REP. SCHIFF: Yes, sure.

5 MR. WYLIE: Not off the top of my head, but I
6 know five minutes after I leave there's going to be
7 something that I --

8 REP. SCHIFF: We'll follow up with you on the
9 documents that you've offered to help with as well.

10 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

11 REP. SCHIFF: So let me ask you this. I think
12 in terms of all of this is of great interest to us, and
13 very, very helpful. Really grateful.

14 I think what is probably of most immediate
15 interest, apart from the things that we won't talk
16 about, are the fact that there were a number of
17 connections between Cambridge Analytica and WikiLeaks.

18 MR. WYLIE: Un-huh.

19 REP. SCHIFF: And the other is some of the
20 detail on LUKOIL.

21 MR. WYLIE: Okay.

22 REP. SCHIFF: And the fact that LUKOIL was

1 showing an interest in these data sets involving U.S.
2 voters, and that LUKOIL operates sometimes as an
3 extension of Russian intelligence in places where the
4 Russian government can't operate, and the fact that
5 there were a number of people, including Dr. Kogan, who
6 were making frequent trips to Russia and were promoting
7 the work they were doing in terms of data analytics and
8 the type of modeling that Cambridge Analytica was using
9 in the United States.

10 I think those two areas would be of great
11 interest.

12 MR. WYLIE: Okay.

13 REP. SCHIFF: Do you have any reservations
14 about my saying that we discussed this and --

15 MR. WYLIE: No. I think one of the things
16 that I'd love to facilitate is connecting you with
17 Damian Collins and the investigation, the parliamentary
18 investigation that's happening because they have
19 certain documents or recordings or things that I think
20 might be interesting to you.

21 And also, given that a lot of the people
22 involved in this are actually in the U.K., he might be

1 in a position if he is made aware or I know of
2 something, he might be in a position to compel some of
3 that evidence and then pass it to you. So --

4 MS. ALLEN: He might be a source here
5 potentially.

6 MR. WYLIE: Yes. I'm already doing it with
7 the Canadian Parliament because of Aggregate IQ, which
8 is the Canadian entity that was set up, which received
9 40 percent of all pro-Brexit spending.

10 But because they've been hiding from or not
11 necessarily hiding; because they've been not
12 forthcoming with information to the British
13 authorities, I connected the British committee and the
14 Canadian committee. The Canadian committee went and
15 compelled the evidence that the British committee
16 wanted.

17 REP. SCHIFF: Super.

18 MR. WYLIE: So potentially that could be --

19 REP. SCHIFF: That would be very helpful.

20 Thank you.

21 And just, you know, so I'm clear, those two
22 areas in terms of your testimony, you're okay with our

1 making public either in summary form or in transcript
2 form?

3 MR. WYLIE: If you're publishing transcripts,
4 would it be all right with you if we just have a chat
5 about what those transcripts look like?

6 REP. SCHIFF: Certainly.

7 MR. WYLIE: Summary is totally fine,
8 absolutely.

9 REP. SCHIFF: Yes.

10 MR. WYLIE: Just to make sure that everything
11 -- I want to make sure that things that are published
12 are absolutely solidly correct, and so if I realize
13 that I -- I don't think I have. I haven't intended to,
14 but I just want to make sure --

15 REP. SCHIFF: Sure.

16 MR. WYLIE: -- given the potential import. I
17 just want to make sure that everything is --

18 REP. SCHIFF: We would be happy to.

19 MR. WYLIE: -- as accurate as possible.

20 REP. SCHIFF: We would be happy to.

21 MR. WYLIE: Okay.

22 REP. SCHIFF: Thank you very much.

1 I'm going to leave you with my staff.

2 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

3 REP. SCHIFF: I think they only have a small
4 number of questions to go over. So we're almost at the
5 end of the road.

6 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

7 REP. SCHIFF: But thank you so much for
8 speaking out and agreeing to sit down with us, and this
9 has been enormously helpful.

10 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

11 REP. SCHIFF: I really appreciate you doing
12 it.

13 MR. WYLIE: Well, it's my pleasure. It's why
14 I came. I want as many authorities or legislators to
15 start looking at it, and if there's information that's
16 helpful, I want to provide it.

17 REP. SCHIFF: Thank you.

18 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

19 (A brief recess was taken.)

20 ■■■■■ I'm really looking forward to
21 connecting with your folks in the U.K. --

22 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

1 ██████████ -- that are doing the
2 investigation.

3 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

4 ██████████ I appreciate how long you've been
5 here today, and --

6 MR. WYLIE: Oh, no worries.

7 ██████████ I know you've had a long couple of
8 days here, but we just have a few questions.

9 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, sure.

10 ██████████ And then you can go on your way.

11 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

12 ██████████ I'm curious if any of your other
13 colleagues from SCL or Cambridge Analytica have also
14 come forward as a whistleblower as you have, other than
15 Brittany Kaiser, I believe.

16 MR. WYLIE: There are numerous people who have
17 provided either myself or journalists or the
18 parliamentary inquiry with information, documents, or
19 testimony. Most of those people have done it off the
20 record.

21 Even after I've come out, they still are
22 extremely wary of this company, but there are many

1 people who have information and have provided it either
2 to myself or to others.

3 Just a point on Brittney Kaiser. I take
4 slight issue with the term "whistleblower." This is
5 just my personal perspective. She worked at the
6 company until very recently and only came forward after
7 it was apparent that that relationship was no longer
8 fruitful.

9 When you actually look carefully at her
10 testimony to the British Parliament, she actually is
11 very particular in only revealing information about
12 what other people have done and, in particular, only
13 revealing information or focusing that information not
14 only what other people have done, but people outside of
15 the company.

16 The other piece of information that I would
17 provide to you, just to add context to Brittney
18 Kaiser's testimony, is that I was told, and I actually
19 have this screen "shotted" from the investigation's
20 editor of Chanel 4 News, so who commissioned the
21 undercover.

22 They interviewed Brittney Kaiser right after

1 her testimony, and they saw that Alexander Nix was
2 texting her, and one of those texts was at the end of
3 her testimony and said, "Good job. Well done."

4 So just to add some context to that, the other
5 thing I would also add context to is that her sudden
6 switch from working for Cambridge Analytica to becoming
7 a data privacy advocate in the span of a week I find
8 interesting, and the other --

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Can I ask: did you hire her?

10 MR. WYLIE: No. She came on -- it was
11 Alexander Nix who decided to bring her on.

12 I mean, she used to work in Libya. A lot of
13 her connections are Libyans, and she's done all kinds
14 of interesting projects around the world, which I'll
15 let you look at.

16 One of the other things that I would just
17 point out also is that these various cryptocurrency
18 companies that she's now promoting actually will
19 benefit from the legislative -- financially benefit
20 from the legislative changes that she's proposing. So
21 she is proposing changes to Facebook and then also
22 privacy policies in the United States that would

1 actually create a data market that her cryptocurrency
2 companies would financially profit from.

3 So I just -- sorry. I don't mean to go on a
4 long rant about it. I just -- the other thing that I'd
5 point out is that she hasn't actually been cooperative
6 with the British authorities who have consistently
7 requested information, and she continues to not provide
8 information to British authorities.

9 She took an opportunity to go to the
10 parliamentary inquiry because it was televised, and
11 less than 24 hours later, she launched her new
12 cryptocurrency. She flew to London, did the testimony,
13 flew back to Manhattan, and then launched her
14 cryptocurrency the next day.

15 So just -- I'm just providing you with some
16 context as to, you know, Brittney Kaiser because she
17 continuously presents herself as a whistleblower, and I
18 really take issue.

19 The process that I went through was months and
20 months and months of work, including first going to the
21 authorities, making sure they had plenty of time to
22 investigate the matter; doing a lot of the boring,

1 long, technical stuff that involves reporting stuff to
2 the authorities, working with regulators that she
3 refuses to do.

4 And she just -- anyway, sorry. I am going to
5 stop myself.

6 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The work you've done with Channel
7 4 and that whole undercover story is phenomenal.

8 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. I helped them set up the
9 whole thing. So even coming up with that issue, Sri
10 Lanka, because --

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] It was brilliant.

12 MR. WYLIE: -- because they -- we had to pick
13 a country, and so they have eight offices in India or
14 rather eight sort of partner offices in India. So they
15 do work in India.

16 But Sri Lanka, the politics of Sri Lanka are
17 so convoluted that it's actually really hard to like --
18 it's convoluted enough that a quick Google search
19 before a meeting, you can't parse out is this a set-up
20 or not, but it's close enough to their Indian partners
21 that they could actually deliver the work relatively
22 easily.

1 So we eventually even figured out what company
2 and how to approach it and all of that. Like it was
3 bizarre. We had like these strategy planning meetings,
4 and yeah. Anyway, sorry.

5 ██████████ Shifting gears just a little bit

6 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, yeah.

7 ██████████ -- a Columbia University

8 technology expert --

9 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

10 ██████████ -- last fall wrote an article on

11 the Website Medium about an intern at Cambridge

12 Analytica who reportedly left source code on GitHub.

13 MR. WYLIE: Un-huh.

14 ██████████ Are you familiar with that

15 article?

16 MR. WYLIE: I am, yeah, and I'm not sure if

17 you've seen that that's happened several times. So

18 UpGuard, which is a data security firm, also revealed

19 several misconfigurations on GitLab where some of this

20 happened, I think, two or three weeks ago, where some

21 of the source code for Ripon, which was one of the

22 technology platforms that was developed to deploy some

1 of the data, was also revealed in GitLab.

2 Sorry. I just --

3 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The intern who reportedly --

4 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] -- this was a gentleman named
6 Michael Phillip.

7 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Did you happen to know him?

9 MR. WYLIE: I didn't, no. I'm not sure if he
10 was there when I was there or not, but I didn't
11 actually engage with the interns that much. So, no, I
12 didn't have a relationship with him.

13 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] And were you familiar with the
14 data that was left on GitHub?

15 MR. WYLIE: I'm not familiar. I know that
16 there was some kind of information that was left, but I
17 don't recall which.

18 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Okay. I was just curious if you
19 knew him and knew about that data.

20 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

21 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] There were some questions that
22 arose about whether that was possibly left purposefully

1 for others to access or if potentially Russians could
2 have

3 MR. WYLIE: Yes. Something to -- one of the
4 things that I remember being told about was -- and it
5 never occurred to me that you would do -- and this is
6 why I remember it, because I was just like, "Oh, that's
7 quite clever" -- was that if you do -- so, for example,
8 if you have a PAC that's supporting a particular or
9 that's not -- because a PAC can't technically support a
10 candidate. No, sometimes they can.

11 Anyway, if they want footage of a candidate
12 but can't film it directly, that you post it on like
13 YouTube, for example, and call it something very
14 random, and then they just happen to find it, and then
15 they can use it.

16 And so I remember something to the effect of
17 like not with respect to data, but with respect to like
18 content and various things to avoid actually
19 transferring something, to just sort of leave it
20 somewhere and then somebody can find it.

21 With respect to leaving data around for people
22 to find, that wasn't something that I was aware of, and

1 frankly, if I knew about it, I would have stopped it
2 because at least in U.K. that's potentially unlawful
3 under the Data Protection Act.

4 [REDACTED] Can I ask on this point? Because
5 I know in Parliament I think you had said that, and you
6 were very clear on this, you don't have any evidence of
7 actual collusion between Mr. Nix or Kogan and Russian
8 interfering in the election.

9 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

10 [REDACTED] But your concern is that because
11 of perhaps insecurity, things aren't protected, Mr.
12 Kogan is going back and forth; Dr. Kogan is going back
13 and forth.

14 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

15 [REDACTED] The Russians maybe knew what he
16 was doing and maybe sought opportunity to do something
17 about it.

18 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

19 [REDACTED] Just sort of baseline level, how
20 technically savvy does one have to be? Say you, you
21 know, hacked or steal the algorithms that you were
22 talking about that CA developed.

1 MR. WYLIE: Un-huh.

2 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] How technically savvy do you have
3 to be to actually deploy those if your intention was to
4 interfere or weaponize it in some way, you know,
5 baseline level?

6 MR. WYLIE: Sure.

7 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] You know, perhaps a nation-state
8 actor has these capabilities, but I'm just curious.
9 Like what do you if you come across this data?

10 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] And, you know, acquire it
12 illegally, putting aside like leaving it in the open.

13 MR. WYLIE: So I think there's a difference
14 between the data and the algorithm.

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I hear you on that.

16 MR. WYLIE: And also the actual acquisition.

17 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Sure.

18 MR. WYLIE: Because the security practices --
19 let me give you an example of how poor the security
20 practices were.

21 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] That would be very helpful.

22 MR. WYLIE: I got emails, unencrypted emails,

1 all of the access credentials for the shared servers
2 for the entire company. The passwords, which I can
3 send you, so it's not this exact password, but it was
4 something to the effect of SCL --

5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] One, two, three, four.

6 MR. WYLIE: -- 2014.

7 Brute force attack, it would have taken --
8 which you don't need to be -- to do a brute force
9 attack, it's like, I mean, you don't have to be very
10 technical. You have to be slightly technical, but
11 that's not a complicated way of hacking.

12 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Sure.

13 MR. WYLIE: It's like baby hacking.

14 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Sure.

15 MR. WYLIE: If you have just a combination of
16 letters and numbers and it's that long and also even a
17 dictionary attack, you'd start with dictionary attack.

18 The first thing you do is start with like common names
19 and the year or 123. That probably would take a couple
20 of minutes, and you would have then had access to the
21 servers.

22 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Right.

1 MR. WYLIE: And also that was emailed to me,
2 unencrypted, just all of it just right there.

3 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Just sort of basically lax of
4 security.

5 MR. WYLIE: Yes.

6 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The access possibilities are
7 there.

8 MR. WYLIE: Atrocious.

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Okay. That's step one.

10 MR. WYLIE: So first, in terms of the security
11 practices were so poor that you wouldn't even have to
12 be a very good hacker to do it. You probably could
13 Google how to hack something and probably figure it out
14 if you kind of know that code.

15 So that's the first point.

16 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Right.

17 MR. WYLIE: The second point is then there's
18 two things that you could possibly acquire. You could
19 acquire data. So that would be either, for example,
20 the electoral register, consumer data or Facebook data.

21 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Right.

22 MR. WYLIE: If you just simply acquired the

1 Facebook data and you acquired the electoral register
2 and you acquired commercial data, you could just use
3 that to create a custom universe in Facebook if you
4 wanted to.

5 [REDACTED] Right.

6 MR. WYLIE: Like that wouldn't be hard to do.

7 You would just like make a list, and you could do it
8 in a very rudimentary way. I want to target like white
9 men over 40 who are registered as a Republican. Upload
10 this custom list, right?

11 [REDACTED] Right.

12 MR. WYLIE: Like so you wouldn't need to be
13 very technically savvy.

14 On the other hand, if you were to pull
15 algorithms, that's where you're getting into like you
16 need to know -- that's where it would be more
17 complicated because you have to actually understand
18 like machine learning and what it is that you're
19 looking at.

20 [REDACTED] Right.

21 MR. WYLIE: And how things -- all the inputs
22 and the rationale of all the code. So that would be

1 more technically complex.

2 But at the same time, if you just get somebody
3 who -- I mean, it's not hard to find somebody who like
4 understands statistics.

5 [REDACTED] Right.

6 MR. WYLIE: You know, and code.

7 [REDACTED] Right.

8 MR. WYLIE: You know, data finds, you know,
9 and so my concern is that because the data was, you
10 know, not that secure and that even if it wasn't an
11 offensive hack, if a hack happened, you know, you could
12 have key logged Kogan's computer in Russia. You know,
13 you initially need a USB, --

14 [REDACTED] Sure, sure.

15 MR. WYLIE: -- stick it in, leave it for 30
16 seconds, and then pull it out, and you key logged it,
17 right?

18 [REDACTED] Understood.

19 MR. WYLIE: So in terms of deploying the
20 algorithms, that would be more complicated, but like,
21 again, imagine you have access to 87 million records,
22 the bulk of which are American citizens, and you're

1 Russia or any kind of foreign user. Like if you have
2 that asset and you also have the intention of misusing
3 it --

4 [REDACTED] Opportunity, intention, and
5 capability.

6 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. You know, you have ready
7 access to.

8 [REDACTED] Right.

9 MR. WYLIE: And also I don't know. Are you
10 familiar with the Garrison Law doctrine?

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 MR. WYLIE: Right. So when you actually look
13 at how Russian military policy, and this is partly why
14 DARPA and DSTL and various military research agencies
15 were shifting gears into non-kinetic warfare or
16 asymmetric warfare, you know, not -- because you've got
17 kinetic warfare is blowing stuff up, and then non-
18 kinetic, which is like cyber information.

19 Because Russia and several other countries and
20 also ISIS and various other -- because the thing about
21 non-kinetic warfare is that it's so much cheaper, and
22 the dirty secret about Russia is that it's super poor.

1 Their GDP is like Australia, but they have a --

2 █████ █████ Right.

3 MR. WYLIE: -- nuclear arsenal that they can't
4 afford to maintain.

5 █████ █████ Right.

6 MR. WYLIE: And so if you look at the expense
7 that it is, you know, how expensive it is to, you know,
8 buy a series of missiles or a nuclear weapon, right,
9 and then, you know, Eastern European data scientists
10 aren't that expensive.

11 █████ █████ Right. That all makes sense, and
12 I get that just goes to sort of to decide whether
13 Cambridge was willingly trying to help someone but just
14 by what you already know, already the opportunity was
15 there. That's something someone could have maliciously

16 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

17 █████ █████ -- done something and done
18 something with it.

19 I think I've only got one other question
20 actually.

21 █████ █████ Go ahead.

22 █████ █████ And hopefully it's quick. Talked

1 on that.

2 Oh, so I don't know if you saw that, but
3 Alexander Nix spoke at a Lisbon Web Summit late last
4 year, and the Wall Street Journal reported that Nix
5 apparently said that he found it, frankly, absurd that
6 Russia interfered in the election.

7 Any insight as to why Mr. Nix would have that
8 specific an opinion that the fact that Russians
9 interfering in the U.S. election is an absurd concept?

10 I realize that you can't get into his head, of
11 course, but it just seems --

12 MR. WYLIE: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] It caught our attention. So
14 inasmuch as you have a thought on it, I think that's
15 just curious.

16 MR. WYLIE: I don't have any particular -- I
17 probably shouldn't spec --

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 MR. WYLIE: I shouldn't speculate on his
20 motives for saying that other than just saying that
21 that is the line of his particular clientele, and so it
22 makes sense that he would say that.

1 Because if he says, "Yeah, Russians interfered
2 with my and helped my client, who I still want to work
3 with," that probably would be --

4 ██████████ Thanks.

5 ██████████ Mr. Wylie, you may know that Dr.
6 Kogan testified yesterday.

7 MR. WYLIE: Yes. I haven't actually seen his
8 testimony yet, although I had the tidbits of
9 highlights, yes.

10 ██████████ As you might imagine, he disputes
11 some of your claims.

12 MR. WYLIE: Un-huh.

13 ██████████ Did you set up a company when you
14 left SCL?

15 MR. WYLIE: Not when I left. When I was at
16 Cambridge Analytica, I set up a company because the
17 majority of people -- while Cambridge Analytica was
18 being set up, the majority of people were engaged as
19 consultants rather than employees because, again, they
20 were still working out how to actually set up the
21 company.

22 And also, in the U.K., I don't know that it's

1 the thing here, but in the U.K., you have to pay
2 additional taxes per employee. So it was cheaper.

3 So I wasn't the only person at CIA who had a
4 consulting company.

5 [REDACTED] Sure. When you left SCL, did you
6 engage in any type of transaction with Dr. Kogan, any
7 type of data sharing arrangement?

8 MR. WYLIE: Yeah. So I had access, and I've
9 been super clear on this. I had access to data or,
10 rather, I had access to a portion of the data.

11 I also agreed with Kogan that I would also
12 help him acquire new data sets, and I'll be super clear
13 on this, to help his institute. He told me, and I have
14 this well documented in writing, that he was going to
15 be setting up an academic institute.

16 I thought that this was a very good idea, and
17 several professors at Cambridge were very excited about
18 the notion of having a very large data set where you
19 could explore social construct in a quantitative way,
20 and that it would have been sort of the first sort of
21 test case for a new field of or an emerging field of
22 research in computational sociology or computational

1 psychology.

2 He did not tell me, and I then found out, that
3 he went back after I had left to meet with Alexander
4 Nix where he proposed a commercial contract, and he was
5 going to -- because he told me that he was intending on
6 finalizing or completing his relationship with
7 Cambridge Analytica, and that he was then going to set
8 up this institute, which I was actually very excited
9 about.

10 And when I found out that he went back and
11 didn't tell me about it to Alexander Nix and pitched a
12 commercial project with the data, I told him to go
13 away.

14 [REDACTED] That's actually very helpful.
15 That helps me fill in the picture.

16 MR. WYLIE: And can I just be super clear on
17 something? I am the only person that was involved in
18 any way with this Facebook data set who has never sold
19 the data. Okay? Cambridge Analytica has been involved
20 in using that data or derivatives of that data for
21 client projects. Dr. Kogan has been involved in
22 selling that data or derivatives of that data.

1 I am the only person who had access to that
2 data who has never sold it, just to be super clear on
3 that. Because there is this narrative that Cambridge
4 Analytica has how set up a Website on how I'm not a
5 whistleblower.

6 [REDACTED] You know, I believe you.

7 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

8 [REDACTED] And I just want to give you an
9 opportunity.

10 MR. WYLIE: Oh, no, no, no, that's fine.

11 [REDACTED] To resolve that.

12 MR. WYLIE: Yeah, that's fine. It's just I
13 find it very -- the thing that I find frustrating is
14 that like I have gone out of my way to accept my share
15 of responsibility in this project. I don't deny I had
16 access to the data. I played a -- and I deeply regret
17 it, which is why I'm talking about it -- you know,
18 played a fundamental role in facilitating that project
19 and, more generally, setting up Cambridge Analytica.

20 And, you know, I'm disappointed that, you
21 know, Aleksandr Kogan tried to obfuscate his
22 responsibility of Facebook, tried to obfuscate the

1 responsibility of Cambridge Analytica. Everyone is
2 starting to just blame everyone else, and it would just
3 be so much simpler if he just said, "Yes, I did
4 something stupid. I screwed up." And I just find it
5 frustrating.

6 [REDACTED] Well, hopefully some of these
7 committees will get to the bottom of these activities.

8 MR. WYLIE: Yeah.

9 [REDACTED] But again, on behalf of the
10 Ranking Member, we appreciate your patience.

11 [REDACTED] And Speaker Pelosi for --

12 [REDACTED] And Speaker Pelosi. So that
13 completes --

14 MR. WYLIE: Because I felt really cool to like
15 meet Nancy Pelosi, and she's just sitting there. It
16 was, "oh, my God, you're great. Love you."

17 (Laughter.)

18 [REDACTED] We can go off the record.

19 (Whereupon, at 7:37 p.m., the interview was
20 completed.)

21 * * * * *

22