THINK TANK EXPERTS

Wednesday, May 15, 2024

U.S. House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room HVC-210 Capitol Visitor Center, the Honorable Michael R. Turner [chairman of the committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Turner, Fitzpatrick, Scott, Carson, Castro, Bera, and Gomez.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Thank you all for joining us today.

Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any time.

Before we start, I want to address a few matters.

First, today's open panel is being broadcast live and streamed on the committee's YouTube channel. It will be conducted entirely on an unclassified basis. All participants are reminded to refrain from discussing classified or other information protected from public disclosure.

I would like to welcome all in attendance and those viewing the broadcast to the fifth open panel held by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the 118th Congress.

I would also like to thank our panelists for their willingness to participate today.

This event is the latest in a series of open panels that the Intelligence Committee has conducted this Congress to inform our agenda and includes four Think Tank experts, including:

Rebeccah Heinrichs, senior fellow and director of the Keystone Defense Initiative at the Hudson Institute.

Ms. Heinrichs currently serves as a commissioner on the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission and also serves on the U.S. Strategic Command Advisory Group and the National Independent Panel on Military Service and Readiness.

Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

He is a commissioner on the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, previously

served in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community during the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, and is also a tenured professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University.

Kari Bingen, director of the Aerospace Security Project and senior fellow of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Ms. Bingen previously served as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and the policy director on the House Armed Services Committee.

Emily Harding, director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Ms. Harding previously served as deputy staff director on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and in positions at the CIA and the National Security Council.

I want to thank you all of you for participating today.

As you know, with the number of conflicts that are currently occurring around the world, your thoughts and contributions today will be most important.

Israel is at war with Hamas, China is considering invading Taiwan, and Vladimir Putin continues his ruthless aggression against Ukraine.

What is the proper role of the Intelligence Community in our Nation's response to these conflicts?

FBI Director Christopher Wray has stated that he believes the United States is at its greatest risk of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11.

What can this committee do to keep the American people safe?

How can our oversight of the Intelligence Community today be enhanced?

And, finally, what advice or lessons learned can these experts provide to our members of the committee today?

Your advice, your recommendations, and your unique perspectives will play a vital role in helping the committee continue its work toward safeguarding Americans from the dangers that are circling our country.

With that, I yield to our ranking member, Mr. Carson.

[The statement of The Chairman follows:]

******** COMMITTEE INSERT ********

Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome to our panel. And thank you for taking the time to be here today and providing unique insights from your time serving across government and private sector roles, including both on the Hill and in the IC.

Since our last think tank open panel over a year ago, the world has not become any less complicated. Russian aggression against Ukraine is unabated, the Middle East has erupted into active conflict, and China relentlessly pursues dominance in East Asia.

In our role as HPSCI, we examine these crises from the vantage of the IC. Today, in this setting, we are hoping your broad national security experiences will help us enhance that picture and show us where any blind spots remain.

One of the core priorities on this committee stretching back years has been to accelerate technology adoption within the IC. We are worried that despite concerted bipartisan efforts to equip the Community with new authorities and tools, the IC is still not where it needs to be.

What would you recommend we consider to advance this strategic imperative?

Thank you for this discussion, and I yield back.

[The statement of Mr. Carson follows:]

******** COMMITTEE INSERT ********

The Chairman. Thank you.

We are going to recognize our participants in this order: Ms. Heinrichs, Mr. Kroenig, Ms. Bingen, Ms. Harding.

We are going to start with Ms. Heinrichs for your opening statement.

STATEMENTS OF MS. REBECCAH HEINRICHS, HUDSON INSTITUTE; DR. MATT KROENIG, ATLANTIC COUNCIL; MS. KARI BINGEN, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; AND MS. EMILY HARDING, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

STATEMENT OF REBECCAH HEINRICHS

Ms. Heinrichs. Thank you.

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share my views on what ought to be the priorities for the IC and for this committee.

The scope of my remarks is limited to the threats posed by China and Russia due to their capacity to carry out the greatest harm.

Each expansionist power is engaged in hostilities in multiple geographic theaters and across domains from the seabed to outer space. And despite U.S. efforts to decrease the role nuclear weapons play in its national defense strategy, China and Russia have increased the role nuclear weapons play in theirs.

Deterring adversaries from going down a path that could lead to nuclear employment must be the top priority for our Nation. It is not one of several equal priorities. It must be the top priority.

And because it is our Nation's priority, it must place a demand on our political leaders to ensure the Intelligence Community is giving urgent and due attention to it and that the United States is allocating optimal resources and personnel to this mission so that decision-makers are given the clearest and most accurate understanding of the

threat.

So I will offer three specific areas of focus.

One, Chinese and Russian decision-making surrounding nuclear weapons planning, acquisitions, and possible use.

The United States risks underestimating the capabilities of its adversaries and, if assumptions within the IC are not interrogated, utterly missing adversaries' intent for their nuclear weapons.

China rejects transparency measures, and its security decisions -- especially in nuclear weapons decisions -- are opaque. It is imperative the IC work to better understand the decisions inside the PRC and the motives that drive its investments in and the posture of its nuclear forces.

To give a snapshot of how fast the PRC is moving in nuclear expansion, observe just two public IC assessments only 3 years apart.

In a 2020 DOD report it said, quote, "Over the next decade, China's nuclear weapons stockpile -- currently estimated to be in the low 200s -- is projected to at least double in size as China expands and modernizes its nuclear forces."

Just 3 years later, the DOD estimated that the PRC possesses more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023. Their assessment from 3 years prior had already been doubled.

Russia is also refusing stability talks with the United States and is no longer complying with the last nuclear arms control treaty, the New START treaty. Understanding Russian leadership's thinking about its nuclear strategy and its possible use in service of its expansionist aims is imperative.

The IC should also reassess the premises of its analytical framework. And if I can flag one area in particular for the committee, it would be to interrogate the IC's

assessment of motivations or primary drivers of various PRC and Russian nuclear acquisition decisions.

The U.S. Strategic Posture Commission, on which Matthew and 10 other professionals and I served, concluded that, quote, "America's defense strategy and strategic posture must change in order to properly defend its vital interests and improve strategic stability with China and Russia," end quote.

One common criticism that we have received from introducing that report is that our report will precipitate a, quote, "arms race." This is a deeply unhelpful label that confuses more than clarifies and could have dangerous effects on dissuading decision-makers from adapting the U.S. forces as needed.

We know from the Cold War, despite the insistence of some, that it is not U.S. efforts to improve the credibility of our strategic deterrent that is the primary motivator of our adversaries' acquisition strategies.

And so we must get back to understanding both China's and Russia's decisions based on their strategic culture and perceptions of what they require for their military and national objectives from their perspectives.

And the second point, China and Russia are collaborating in key sectors with direct military applications. Russian and Chinese officials offer public support for one another's aggression and erroneous territorial claims.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and China's materiel, diplomatic, and economic support for Russia continues to receive the most public attention, and understandably so.

But Russia and China are engaging in aggression on the conflict continuum and increasing the intensity and boldness of it, from cutting gas pipelines on the seabed, to using sonar pulses against our allies and water cannons against U.S. allies operating

lawfully and peacefully in international waters.

The PRC and Russia are choosing to behave confrontationally and dangerously.

And my last point.

Americans should become better informed about the nature of the hostilities, and so the committee might encourage the IC to declassify more, especially regarding events related to what we might consider hybrid warfare but is becoming more intense and regular.

Contesting China and Russia in this hybrid band of the conflict continuum is necessary so that each do not increase the intensity of their aggression and thereby misjudge U.S. and ally resolve.

Thank you.

[The statement of Ms. Heinrichs follows:]

******** COMMITTEE INSERT ********

The Chairman. Dr. Kroenig.

STATEMENT OF MATT KROENIG

Mr. Kroenig. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Carson, esteemed members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you today on worldwide threats.

As vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council, I oversee a 40-person nonpartisan team focused on global strategy, and I am pleased to share with you some of our insights from our work.

Many of us, including myself, are former members of the IC. I am also honored to serve on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. I don't plan to focus on strategic forces in my opening remarks, but happy to discuss that later in the session.

After World War II, the United States and its allies built what has been referred to as a "rules-based international system."

The system hasn't been perfect, but it is the best system ever envisioned for organizing global affairs. The United States and its allies, the American people, are safer, richer, and freer today because of U.S. global leadership enabled by U.S. intelligence.

The U.S.-led order, however, is under threat, primarily from revisionist autocracies. China is the most capable adversary we have ever faced, but it is increasingly working with other revisionist autocracies -- Russia, Iran, and North Korea -- to displace the U.S.-led order and put in its place a more traditional imperial

system safe for autocracy centered in Beijing and Moscow.

So, in short, I assess we are in a new Cold War. It is not exactly like the old Cold War, just like World War I is not exactly like World War II, but it is a long-term confrontation between the United States and its free world allies against nuclear-armed revisionist autocracies for the future of global order.

Moreover, there is the risk that the new Cold War could turn hot. There are already major wars in Europe and the Middle East. China is increasing military coercion against U.S. allies and partners in Asia, including threatening to take Taiwan. And so there is a real risk that the United States could face simultaneous conflicts.

The Strategic Posture Commission recommended that the United States have a strategy to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russia and China at the same time.

And as I have argued in a new book, the primary purpose of U.S. national security strategy should be to win this new Cold War, not just to manage it. And so therefore, I would recommend today that the primary purpose of the Intelligence Community be to support the U.S. and allied governments as we attempt to win the new Cold War.

So, with that in mind, I would make seven recommendations.

First, the National Intelligence Council is slated to produce a new Global Trends report. These reports often include scenarios about the future of global order.

I would recommend that one of those scenarios depict what U.S. and allied victory in this new Cold War would look like. If we can't envision victory, it is going to be harder to achieve.

As another scenario, they should depict what happens if China and Russia prevail. What does a world dominated by China and Russia look like?

And then they should publicize this information, including testifying before this committee, to convey to policymakers and U.S. and allied capitals and our publics what

the stakes are.

Second, I would recommend that the IC, if it is not doing it already, produce a tracker to measure our adversaries' progress relative to the United States and its allies in key areas of the competition -- economic, technological, military -- to see whether we are maintaining our lead, making progress toward our goal of victory, or are we at risk of losing. As the famed management consultant Peter Drucker said, "If you can't measure it, you can't improve it."

Third, I would recommend that the Intelligence Community produce a National Intelligence Estimate on strategic simultaneity.

What are the risks of simultaneous conflicts?

What are our adversaries' motivations and intentions when it comes to simultaneous attacks on the U.S. alliance system?

What would be the implication for U.S. interests if there is a simultaneous major power conflict?

So, in sum, simultaneity should be a formal priority of the Intelligence Community.

Fourth, intelligence support to deterrence should be a priority, just like it was during the Cold War. IC analysts should take courses in deterrence theory and practice, and they should assess: What is it that our adversaries value most? How can we hold that at risk? How do adversaries calculate the cost and benefit of aggression?

Fifth, the IC should change the way it recruits and trains analysts to meet the intelligence requirements of the new Cold War. Analysts should read more about strategy and history and less tactical reporting about current events.

We need less analysis -- which literally means to break things down -- and more synthesis -- which means to combine parts into a coherent whole -- so that policymakers can see the big picture.

Sixth, the U.S. alliance system is one of its greatest strengths in this new competition. We should continue to work to break down barriers to better share intelligence with our allies.

Seventh, and finally, the United States should pursue a policy of selective derisking from China. We just saw the Biden administration announce new tariffs earlier this week.

But to help them do that, it would be helpful for the Department of Commerce to have its own intelligence capability, and I would recommend that they look to develop their own intelligence office.

So after the end of the Cold War, after 9/11, the IC had to transform itself. This committee played an important role in that process.

Once again, as we enter this new period of strategic competition, I think the IC will have to transform itself again, and, once again, this committee can and should play a key role.

So thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Mr. Kroenig follows:]

******** COMMITTEE INSERT ********

The Chairman. Thank you.

Kari Bingen.

STATEMENT OF KARI BINGEN

Ms. Bingen. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Carson, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to appear here today. It has been a privilege working with this committee and supporting many of you in the past while a staffer on the House Armed Services Committee.

I am grateful for your bipartisan support of the Intelligence Community and especially your support of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. It is also a treat to sit here alongside old friends and colleagues who I greatly admire.

I cannot overemphasize how acute the security challenges are before us and the technology trends occurring around us. We must deter two peer nuclear powers for the first time, confront increasing collaboration across threat actors, and address a simultaneity of crises before us.

Our intelligence apparatus must support all of this -- informing solutions, creating time and space for diplomacy, upholding deterrence -- all while enabling our forces to prepare for conflict.

I offer observations on five aspects of the intelligence enterprise that are vitally important to maintaining U.S. strategic and military advantage, largely through a defense intelligence lens.

First, the operating environment that our forces and ISR assets must operate within is fundamentally different than what we experienced over 20 years in Iraq and

Afghanistan. The Secretary of the Air Force has said, quote, "China is preparing for a war and specifically for a war with the United States," end quote. We will not have air, space, or spectrum superiority.

Constant surveillance, whether by ISR satellites or monitoring in cyberspace, will make it more difficult to maneuver undetected and make other aspects of intelligence -- such as HUMINT and the use of cover -- increasingly harder. Our capabilities, operating concepts, training, and tradecraft must account for this reality.

Second, our adversaries are developing more complex, technically advanced military systems, such as hypersonic missiles, anti-satellite weapons, electronic warfare weapons, and undersea systems. This will place increasing demands on our foundational military intelligence and our scientific and technical intelligence capabilities, which received less emphasis over the last 20 years.

Organizations like the National Space Intelligence Center, National Ground Intelligence Center, and Office of Naval Intelligence are essential to providing the analysis that informs the development of defenses and countermeasures.

Third, while the IC maintains exquisite intelligence capabilities and proficiencies, I would observe that many of the most consequential technological advancements are occurring in the private sector and are being funded by private capital, such as generative AI and advanced compute, for which the U.S. Government cannot match in speed, scale, or investment.

These advances have the potential to revolutionize how the IC collects and analyzes information and how users access data. But they will also expand the threat space, for example, generating disinformation at machine speeds, and challenge our culture and our existing ways of doing business.

A common theme is that much of this is occurring outside of the U.S. Government.

Many of the trends and insights about this techno-economic competition will not be found in highly classified reporting but through greater IC interaction with the private sector on how U.S. competitiveness affects national security.

Fourth, please continue to pay close attention to the security and counterintelligence mission of the IC, including industrial security and personnel vetting. You know this well, but it bears emphasis. Beijing continues to comprehensively target U.S. technologies, intellectual property, supply chains, and critical infrastructure across the government, industry, and academia.

Finally, I would recommend a comprehensive examination of workforce development within the IC. Candidly, this is an area I wish I had paid more attention to when I was at the Pentagon.

An idea for the committee's consideration is whether personnel reforms analogous to those in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 are needed to guide how the IC manages the career paths and the professional development of its workforce.

I see greater opportunity for professional education akin to joint professional military education and a need to broaden the knowledge and experience base foreign intelligence professionals. But the structure and incentives for both individuals and management must be in place.

This December marks the 20th anniversary of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence.

If the last 20 years were characterized by the demands of counterterrorism, the next 20 will be by the unprecedented convergence of military, technical, and economic potential at a speed and scale unlike anything we have faced in the past.

Thank you.

[The statement of Ms. Bingen follows:]

******** COMMITTEE INSERT ********

The Chairman. Yes.

STATEMENT OF EMILY HARDING

Ms. Harding. Thank you so much for having us today.

My colleagues have raised, I think, some apt warnings this morning. I hope to end us on a slightly more positive note.

I was asked to talk about how the IC can use technology to establish a competitive edge against these adversaries. So this briefing will take two parts. First of all, five technologies, and second, four questions.

So, first, the five technologies that should be the top priority for the IC, then the four questions that this committee might consider asking agency seniors to create momentum and accountability on those four technologies.

So, first, what are the five critical technologies to create a competitive edge for the Intelligence Community?

AI/ML. Kari already mentioned this, but it is inconvertible, the IC needs to find a way to use AI effectively and safely. The IC cannot manage the amount of information incoming without it.

When I was a leader in the Intelligence Community, I had analysts spending all night at their desks processing relatively simple information. That pace is simply unsustainable today.

Number two, quantum, and we can divide quantum into quantum computing and quantum sensing. Quantum computing will use powerful decryption to turn today's secrets into an open book. Quantum sensing will allow detection of tiny changes in an

environment from undersea or from outer space.

Speaking of space, the combination of small sats, on-orbit computing, and sophisticated sensors is revolutionizing what we can do from space.

Number four, batteries. This is something I like to harp on a lot, especially for the health and safety of our troops in the field. But small, light, high-performance batteries are invaluable for spy work as well.

An asset can risk their life installing a sensor in a sensitive area. A battery that lasts is the least we can do to honor that risk.

And then, finally, bio. Put simply, bioengineering is the future. Out of all the technologies on this list, it is the technology most likely to present an enormous collection challenge for the IC.

We have to stay ahead of our adversaries and find ways to provide indications and warning of what they are researching.

So now that I have covered the technologies the IC should focus on the most, let's talk about how to maintain forward momentum on this progress.

Oversight has a critical role to play. Here are four keys questions the committee might ask agency seniors.

Number one, how are you evaluating the risk of these new technologies? Every agency should have a methodology and a process for adjudicating risk and reward. The security verdict cannot be the final say. There must be a person senior enough to accept the risk and say yes.

Number two, how are you taking advantage of an unclassified environment to test technology? How can open source intelligence serve as a testing ground?

The OSINT environment provides an opportunity to test out these new technologies in a relatively low-risk setting. Allowing industry to demonstrate their

capability for AI systems, for example, on the low side will advance both innovation and collaboration.

Plus, creating an innovative hiring model could solve two problems. It could train a new cadre of OSINT talent and also retain diverse candidates through the security screening process. And I am happy to talk more about that in Q&A.

Number three, is there an off-the-shelf solution that can solve 80 percent of the requirements rather than spending time and money to get to 100 percent? What are we really giving up with that 20 percent? Will the mission be harmed with an 80 percent solution?

Quite often, the government will give a description of what it wants, and it is long and detailed and impossible for any industry to meet with off-the-shelf capabilities. They could spend millions of dollars and years trying to get to that 100 percent solution, or the government could reevaluate whether 80 percent will actually get us to mission.

And then, finally, number four, how are you bringing the perspectives of industry into your future planning? Asked differently, who do you have on speed dial?

The IC cannot exist in a bubble. Much of strategic competition will take place in a tech race, and the knowledge needed to anticipate the adversaries' work is hyper-specialized. The IC can't hire one of everything. They need to know who to call.

For more on both of these topics, see our website at CSIS called Tech Recs. It pulls together all of the best recommendations from all the writing that we have done. Because I know you are in markup, I hope that will be a really useful resource for you.

And then also we wrote a paper called "Seven Critical Technologies for Winning the Next War" that goes much more in depth on all of these topics.

But to conclude, we are in a moment of disruptive change. The intersections of these technologies will vastly accelerate the trend lines, and the IC will be racing to collect

indications of adversaries' progress in these fields just as it is attempting to create an intelligence edge by using that tech itself. A smart risk calculation will be key to success.

Thank you.

[The statement of Ms. Harding follows:]

******** COMMITTEE INSERT ********

The Chairman. Thank you.

Well, that is a very good, broad overview of some of the things and issues that we have been discussing as a committee. I want to take the administrative one first.

Kari, you raised the issue of the personnel, structure, management in the IC. This is actually an issue that our committee is taking up for the rest of the year.

Having just come off of 702, one of the issues that we have obviously looked at is: How does the IC function? How is it structured? And are there ways in which it could be enhanced or reorganized? Obviously, our taking a review of this is important as a topic to bring up on a regular basis.

So, with that, I would like to invite each of you, now that we have identified that as a subject matter of the committee, to provide to us some of the thoughts and ideas that you might have as to ways that the IC might be able to be reorganized to enhance performance.

And, Kari, I am going to ask you to embellish a bit. You talk about structure, management, education. Give us some ideas to some of the problems that you see and some of the solutions that might be pursued.

Ms. Bingen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

So when I think about Goldwater-Nichols -- and I know House Armed Services Committee took a stab at that within looking at DOD back in the 2017 timeframe -- a lot of -- a part of Goldwater-Nichols was ensuring that we develop these joint officers that understood different perspectives, whether it was leadership and strategy, policy, operations, acquisition, ensuring that they had professional military education throughout their career, that they were able to take some downtime to think strategically outside their day jobs.

And so as I look at the future of the Intelligence Community and the workforce, I am concerned about attracting and retaining top talent, developing them, and exposing these analysts who sit in SCIFs all day to what is happening outside the SCIF in terms of technology, competitive trends, academia.

So I think there is an opportunity here to be more structured in how do you manage the career path of an intelligence official so that by the time they are in leadership they have seen their intelligence portfolio perhaps from a policy user perspective, from an operator combatant command perspective, from the outside, that they have had an opportunity to do professional education.

Full disclosure, I am now on the National Intelligence University's Board of Visitors, but I see a great role for further education, exposure to the private sector and academia.

But I think it is also going to take some structural changes for how we manage that within the IC in terms of billets, the process, even managers, incentivizing them to give away their folks when they might not get them back.

The Chairman. Excellent.

Mr. Kroenig, you talked about that we may currently be in a Cold War. I was fascinated by the manner in which you described it both from the past and the future.

The Cold War, as you were describing it, isn't a condition of stasis. It wasn't last time. It was a continuation of pressure upon the lines between authoritarianism and democracy. And you characterized it as a Cold War that we need to win and that, to identify it, we have to put together a strategy and describe what the current status is and what our strategies would be to win.

And you indicated -- and you used this very powerful statement -- the future of a global world order, which harkened me to think of the -- last year, I think one of the most

important things that occurred in geopolitical threats is that President Xi went to Russia on the heels of the commencement of the Ukraine conflict and stood next to President Putin, in what we call an open mike, where they were having casual conversation, that caught that conversation.

President Xi said, "We" -- meaning Putin and President Xi -- "are bringing about change that hasn't happened in a hundred years."

Well, we know what that hundred years is. That hundred years is World War I, World War II, and it is the battle between authoritarianism and democracy.

And they see themselves as replaying that and also then winning that, reversing the global world order of democracy and the containment or the diminishing of authoritarian regimes.

Elaborate a little bit more on that, what you see. As we undertake that, we need to win. What is that risk and what would it take to win?

Mr. Kroenig. Great. Well, thank you very much.

So I think your description is absolutely right, that for many decades we had hoped that we could incorporate Russia and China into responsible stakeholders in the U.S.-led system, essentially hoped that they would become kind of big Germanys or Canadas in their regions.

That is obviously not what they want to do. They want to challenge the system. They see it as a threat.

And so one of the things they are trying to do is break our alliance system, and I think they are very clear about that, that they see NATO as a threat in Europe, they see U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific as a threat.

And, second, this is an ideological competition. They want to make a world safe for autocracy. Obviously, with democratic countries spreading to their borders, if

democracy came to Beijing or Moscow, they would be out of a job or killed in the streets.

So they want a more ideological-neutral system. And, ideally, over time, I think that China wants to be at the center of the international system and have a kind of traditional imperial system in its place.

And there are big threats here. One of the ways they might try to do this is through warfare. We already see Putin attacking Ukraine. That could spill across the borders into NATO. China has threatened to attack Taiwan.

And there is this risk of simultaneity. If there is a major Russia-NATO war, does China just sit on the sidelines and eat popcorn, or does it say, "This is our opportunity," and vice-versa?

And so that needs to be, I think, a driving principle of U.S. defense strategy, to be able to deter and, if necessary, defeat both.

Final point. What does victory look like?

I think the problem now is that China in particular, but also working with these other autocracies, does have both the ability and the will to threaten U.S. vital interests.

And so I think victory means getting to a place where they either lack the will or the ability or both to threaten our vital interests.

So I don't think that will be easy. It will probably take a decades-long competition like the first Cold War did.

But working with our allies and partners, if we can get to a place where we can strain China's power so much that, even if it has hostile intent, it can't really threaten our vital interests, or if through the course of this competition Chinese leadership changes its mind and says, "You know what, this was too hard, too difficult, not in Beijing's interest, we are better off taking a different approach," and if we achieved any of those things, I think we could call it victory.

And I would just note that it doesn't require regime change. I think if the Chinese leadership wants to call itself the CCP but it is not threatening our vital interests, that would count as victory.

The Chairman. Ms. Heinrichs, you identified your role and work on the Strategic Posture Commission -- which I thought did an excellent report -- and one of the things that you identified as a conclusion is that our policies must change.

If you look at, I think, the five different significant eras of nuclear weapons development, you have the era, first, of U.S. monopoly, where we are by ourselves and our adversaries are attempting to develop a nuclear capability.

Then you have the era of the arms race, where people were working both towards capabilities and production. And we certainly have the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of even a strategic launch being an area of competition.

Then you have the era of arms control, where we began to negotiate on limits of weapons, limits of capabilities.

And not all of these eras are defined starts and stops. They overlap at periods.

And then you have the era, which I think was a mistake, is the era of U.S. unilateral constraint, where we both restrained our development and our research and our seeking the ability to have capabilities because there was an inherent policy within the Department of Defense, and I think even in the Intelligence Community and in policymakers in administrations, that we would be provocative if we undertook development of certain types of weapons, even research or capabilities.

You see that in the area of hypersonics, where now we have now lost our edge, where we were ahead, where we could have continued.

And then you have the era -- which, again, these are concurrent -- the era of our adversaries' nuclear expansion. While we are under -- are pursuing U.S. unilateral

constraint, you have our adversaries. You indicated China is doubling its nuclear weapons.

You have Russia pursuing the exotics. Its number of new weapon systems and capabilities that no one has ever seen before. Skyfall, the nuclear-powered cruise missile that orbits the Earth. You have Poseidon, their unmanned underwater nuclear weapon that is supposed to surface and then take out an American city. You have their hypersonics, which are already fielded. You have now disclosed by the administration the nuclear-capable anti-satellite weapon that is intended to be in orbit.

You also then have North Korea and their expansion. They have not just sought to be a nuclear weapon state. They are continuing to expand their production, their capabilities, both in missiles and in the number of warheads that they are producing.

And then you have Iran that is continuing to pursue enrichment and perfection of delivery vehicles.

You have said that our policies must change. How?

Ms. Heinrichs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

During this period of time that you mentioned where the United States really focused on arms control, on disarmament, and self-restrictions -- unilateral restrictions -- we really believed that -- and you can see this across Republican and Democratic administrations -- that Russia was no longer the same kind of adversary that the Soviets were during the Cold War. And that fundamental assumption about the assessment of the threat was in part what motivated U.S. policymakers to shift our emphasis.

And then, at the time, China was considered a lesser-included case, meaning it didn't have the nuclear weapons capabilities at significant scale for the United States to consider it a threat or to posture our nuclear forces differently than the way that we

have.

We really just focused on providing basic deterrence requirements for the Russians and then focused on these arms control and disarmament objectives.

But at the same time, essentially, our adversaries did not agree with the United States on what was considered strategic stability.

And the Russians in particular, to use an example, focused their nuclear weapons development in particular on, as you mentioned, the exotics, but also maintaining a robust theater-range nuclear weapons force, which of course is outside any arms control treaty.

The New START treaty does not cover those. Despite the U.S. wanting to, the Russians refused to include those theater-based nuclear weapons.

And then when you look at the Chinese, during the -- when the United States was still constrained by the INF Treaty -- which of course prohibited the intermediate nuclear range -- intermediate conventional and nuclear strike systems, ground-based strike systems -- the Chinese actually invested significantly. Over 90 percent of their forces would have violated the INF Treaty.

So that is a particular kind of category of conventional and potentially nuclear systems that the Chinese have developed.

And so my assessment is that the United States must now adapt to what our adversaries have invested in and potentially can hold at risk U.S. forces and U.S. allies abroad in the regional context.

And so the United States must field nuclear deterrent capabilities in a credible way that can put weapons on targets closer into where the Chinese and the Russians are in order to raise the nuclear threshold and deter our adversaries from thinking that they might be able to employ a nuclear weapon in theater.

And the idea here would be that they are seeking -- to Matt's perspective in mentioning the importance of U.S. allies and how the United States -- the U.S.-led order really relies on the U.S. system of alliances -- well, our adversaries' theory of victory over the United States is to break those alliances.

And one way they may seek to do that is to launch a low-yield, limited-scoped nuclear strike in theater to paralyze the United States to not come to the aid of our allies for fear of escalation.

And so to convince our adversaries that that would not be successful and they should not seek to do that, my recommendation is that the United States needs to significantly adapt -- this is just one way to adapt -- our nuclear posture so that we are able to credibly convince our adversaries that they would not succeed in that way.

The Chairman. Excellent. That certainly is a very difficult threat for our current nuclear posture positions, our policies, and our responses.

In most recent weeks, DOD's Dr. Plumb came before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee and disclosed publicly for the first time that the anti-satellite Russian system that this committee has been concerned about and has been calling for declassification of the information is a nuclear-capable satellite, anti-satellite system, and it itself is a satellite, that it would be deployed in orbit.

And he indicated if it was deployed in low Earth orbit, it would take out all of the satellites that are in that orbit and that it would likely render the low Earth orbit area unusable for perhaps longer than a year.

I would like to get each of your thoughts on this. The committee has taken a pretty forward view of pushing the administration to respond to this issue, to declassify it, to try to deter Russia from deploying such a system. We believe that the administration has been slow to do so and that we are sleepwalking our way into a Cuban Missile Crisis

in space.

I would love to get each of your thoughts on this threat and what the possible responses may be.

Let's begin with you, Ms. Heinrichs.

Ms. Heinrichs. Mr. Chairman, if the Russians were to deploy the kind of weapon system you described, it would be a potential violation of the Outer Space Treaty, which is fitting with the pattern of the Russians' systemic violations of treaties, from the INF Treaty, to the Open Skies Treaty, and now then they are not complying with the New START treaty.

It would be a highly provocative, very dangerous, and threatening problem for the United States for which the United States has no answer.

The Chairman. Mr. Kroenig.

Mr. Kroenig. Well, I sometimes hear people say we shouldn't weaponize space, and I think it is too late for that, and this is just the latest example.

We have to ask why. Why would Russia want to put a nuclear weapon in space? And I can think of at least two objectives.

One, of course, would be to go after our space assets. In the event of a crisis or a war, the U.S. military, of course, depends on assets in space, but so does our commercial economy. And so that could be devastating if they take out U.S. satellite constellations in space.

Another possibility could be that it is part of a nuclear warfighting strategy. We know that the Russians put nuclear warheads on their air defenses and on their missile defense interceptors.

You don't have to be as accurate if you are trying to shoot down an incoming missile if you have a nuclear warhead on your interceptor.

And so having a nuclear weapon in space could also serve that purpose. If, God forbid, there were a major nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia, maybe Russia launches a major nuclear first strike on the United States, we would try to retaliate with our ICBMs, they could potentially use nuclear weapons in space as a missile defense system to destroy our incoming missiles.

So I think this is very threatening, very threatening indeed.

The Chairman. Mr. Kroenig, you have raised a very important point. This should not be looked at as just an anti-satellite, but even a missile defense system. And I think the Department of Defense needs to undertake all analysis as to what the effects might be.

Ms. Bingen.

Ms. Bingen. And sadly, Mr. Chairman, to your point earlier about all the different exotic and nuclear modernization activities Russia has underway, in some respects it shouldn't surprise us that space is also in scope as well.

I look at this as a class of weapon in and above any of the other types of counterspace weapons that we have seen, and we are seeing a lot out of both Russia, but particularly China right now.

If it is a nuclear weapon, I will say, detonated somewhere in low Earth orbit, it could be several, it could be one, this is an indiscriminate weapon that would affect not just military capability but commercial, scientific capability of now over 90 nations that operate in space.

I would say we have done this before. I mean, us and the Soviets, we did it. We did it in 1962. Now, it was a nuclear warhead launched atop a missile detonated at 250 kilometers, and it wiped out a good third of satellites. There weren't many in 1962. But it was catastrophic.

And it also created EMP, electronic magnetic pulse, that radiated energy through the Earth, fried electronic grids, aircraft electronics. And you think now just how high-tech we are. It could also have an impact on Earth. So I want to emphasize that as well.

There is still a lot of information and detail we don't have, so it is tough to articulate the specific effects, but I did find it interesting, Assistant Secretary of State Stewart said at a CSIS event a couple of weeks ago that what Russia is doing with this satellite weapon is it is in an -- it is or it would be -- and that wasn't clear -- in an unusual orbit, in a higher radiation, low Earth orbit.

With my former aerospace hat, engineering hat on, I mean, a higher LEO orbit where there is higher radiation is somewhere between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers. That is the first part of the Van Allen belt. You pump that up, and you could create pretty significant effects across all of low Earth orbit.

What can be done? I think the international pressure is incredibly important; sharing intelligence with our allies and partners and others in the community; continuing to accelerate resilient proliferated architectures not just at low Earth orbit but other orbits; creating greater connectivity, whether it is within government systems, with commercial, with allies in other domains with airborne systems.

But also I think we need to take a hard look at radiation hardening. We are not going to be able to radiation harden everything. It has a cost. But for some of those really key, like, nuclear command-and-control systems, those are requirements we are going to have to keep in place going forward.

The Chairman. Well, this is an excellent discussion because already two of you, Mr. Kroenig and Ms. Bingen, have both commented on ways that have not been in the public discussion before.

Mr. Kroenig, your description of it as a missile defense system.

And, Ms. Bingen, your statement that this could affect electronics in an EMP fashion on the ground is actually contrary to what the administration has been saying, saying that there is no risk whatsoever to the ground.

And I think that we don't really have all the answers, and we need to study these. It is one of the things that we are going to be pushing the Department of Defense on, on what would the effects be, what are the modeling. And from that, hopefully, it could inform us as to what the risks are.

Ms. Harding.

Ms. Harding. Thank you.

I completely agree with what Kari said. I think I would add, though, that there is a strong commercial angle here that has been unrepresented. Kari's use of the word "indiscriminate," I think, is apt. It would obliterate commercial just as much as it would government.

And I think it is an opportunity to really test just how much the partnership without limits between Russia and China is actually a partnership without limits. China has probably just as much to lose from loss of LEO as we do. And pushing the commercial angle for China and for businesses around the world, I think, could be a really strong point for us.

The Chairman. Ms. Harding, that is a very good point.

Another aspect of this weapon is, if it is placed in space, it is not just the issue of its detonation, it is its presence. Because from day one that it is there the commercial world is going to have to assume that space may not be available the next day.

And so from that, the enormous investment that is going to have to occur just to be able to protect our ability on the civil side, on the commercial side, and the military

side, to utilize space or some form of communication outside of the area that may be affected, would be enormous.

Ms. Heinrichs, you had a comment you wanted to add?

Ms. Heinrichs. Yeah. Mr. Chairman, you just began to make the point that I wanted to just underscore, which is that, even if the assessment is that it is implausible that the Russians may detonate such a weapon, it has an enormous coercive effect. And so its very existence, should it put this weapon in space, should be intolerable to the United States.

The Chairman. Right, because the entire world is hostage day one.

Mr. Carson.

Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman.

This question is for all the panelists.

I would like to get your thoughts on the advancements of biotech, AI, and space technology. And what can you tell us about the capabilities of the PRC and Russia in these emerging spaces? And what are the challenges in addressing the cascading risks to U.S. national security?

Also, I would like to welcome your thoughts on addressing the workforce shortages in these areas and what actions should we take to increase really the diversity of the workforce and expand access to training and career opportunities for spaces like HBCUs and other institutions.

Ms. Harding. So I suppose I will start there. Thank you for the question.

You have hit on three things that I think are going to be really important, especially working together.

If you look at the combination of bio and AI, or look at the combination of AI and space, you have vast acceleration in the potential capabilities that we and our adversaries

could have.

If you look at the PRC's advancement in these areas, I am particularly concerned about what they are doing in the bio space. They have proven themselves repeatedly to be less responsible, let's say, than other actors when it comes to experimenting with potential bio compounds, bio advancements.

Things like CRISPR-9 have made it just far too easy to manipulate genetic code. And that, combined with AI, can allow for new compounds in vast numbers that I think that China could really use to expand their own bio programs.

When it comes to China and AI, one sort of mystery in the Chinese approach to collecting intelligence in the last 5 to 10 years has been just how much stuff they have taken. The vast sucking sound of the huge amounts of information being pulled out of the U.S. by the PRC is kind of astonishing.

There is some kind of statistic about how they probably have information on every man, woman, and child living inside the U.S. What are you going to do with it?

AI can help solve that problem. They can use their particular AI attempts to filter through all that data, find the signal in the noise.

On top of that, as we have seen just recently, in order to train these AI systems effectively you need a huge amount of data, and it needs to be diverse data. China is not exactly known for its diversity. The U.S. is.

So if you have massive amounts of U.S. data, then you can train your AI system to recognize a whole variety of potential medical syndromes, faces, colors, anything that you could possibly need.

Russia, I suspect, is further advanced on bio but less advanced on AI. We really have seen China push forward in that space far more than the Russians have.

And then we just had a conversation about Russia in space. They have been

leaders in this area always and will continue to be.

I still have faith that the U.S. can win in all of these races. Our ability to innovate, our ability to unleash our talent onto pretty much any problem and come up with a solution has always inspired me.

And that leads me to your second question about the workforce shortage.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, the IC can't hire one of everything. They just can't.

And the kind of information that we are dealing with today in the tech space is so detailed, so esoteric, that trying to find the right person who can look at a piece of collection coming out of China and recognize not only what technology they are talking about but the implications of that technology is very difficult.

So what the IC needs to have is a very robust Rolodex. These are not going to be people that you necessarily have on staff the whole time. Instead, what you are going to know is this person and this university is doing this kind of research. And that is exactly who we need to pick up the phone and call when we see something that looks kind of strange coming out of China in the bio space.

They need to be very good at 1-day read-ins. You put a piece of paper down in front of somebody and you say, "You are going to help me with this question, and then tomorrow you are going to forget everything that I just asked you." And this is something that is a standard practice, but I think they are going to have to get much better at it.

And then when it comes to the diversity of the hiring pipeline, the thing that I mentioned in my opening statement, one theory as to why the IC has had a really hard time trying to recruit diverse talent is that not everybody can wait around for a year for a security clearance.

Not everybody can, like, piece together part-time jobs and then make ends meet while they are waiting for a security clearance to come through that may never come through.

So find a way to have those people have employment while they are waiting for their security clearance to come. And I think the open source space is a huge opportunity for that.

If you create a pipeline -- an on-ramp, if you will -- where somebody who has a conditional offer of employment can start work on open source intelligence, they can get trained on some data science techniques, they can get trained on analysis techniques, and then the minute that security clearance comes through they graduate with all those skills onto the classified side.

And if their security clearance doesn't come through, good to know. We wish you well in your future endeavors.

Ms. Bingen. Congressman, I very much appreciate the question.

So if I can build off biotech, and not being a biotech expert, but what I have observed is exactly what Emily said, is it is this convergence of technologies. So I converge synthetic biology and advanced compute.

What does that mean?

We used to be at a point where the machines could read DNA at machine speeds. We are now quickly getting to a point where the machines cannot only read DNA but write DNA at machine speeds, and, to me, that is staggering.

For good, health issues and whatnot around the world, but also used for bad and for threats. So that was one thing I would mention on biotech.

On space -- and I would love to leave you with our CSIS Space Threat Assessment. We just published it last month. It is a nonclassified look at the world for space threats.

And I want to particularly emphasize China and what they are doing.

A couple dimensions.

One, China on the commercial front. In the United States, one Starlink constellation of 12,000 satellites isn't good enough for China. China is in the process, and they will be launching more starting this year, of building two Starlink-equivalent communication broadband architectures in space. Guo Wang and G60 Starlink they are calling it.

On the ISR front, China is moving at stunning pace and putting ISR satellites up on orbit. The director of the Space Force's intelligence group has basically said, hey, the last couple of years, the U.S. focused on communication satellites, China has focused on extending surveillance to space with ISR satellites.

They are also getting to a point now where they are working through how they close their kill chains. We talk about closing our kill chains here. They are working on the same thing there and doing it much faster.

They are also putting up ISR satellites in ways that we in the United States maybe wouldn't do. So last year alone they launched two ISR satellites into geosynchronous orbits, so 36,000 kilometers away from Earth one to do radar, one to do imagery.

You know, I talk to U.S. folks, like, we wouldn't put a satellite up in geo to do that. But they are doing it. And you know what? It may be good enough. The resolutions, if the reporting is accurate, are good enough to maybe pick out a ship or a car across the vast Indo-Pacific. So they are doing things differently.

And then, lastly, I would say on the counterspace weapons front, I used to say -- China is doing a lot of R&D, and then they launched a direct descent anti-satellite test in 2007.

They are still doing a heck of a lot of R&D, but they are fielding capabilities,

everything from reversible jamming and spoofing -- which we are actually seeing them do spoofing -- all the way up to some of those more kinetic capabilities and starting to think through, "How do we counter the U.S.?" as they build out these proliferated constellations.

No orbit is out of reach anymore for what the Chinese are doing in terms of threatening space capabilities.

The Chairman. Mr. Scott.

Mr. Kroenig. I would like to make several points.

First --

The Chairman. I am sorry. I didn't realize you were still going. Go ahead.

Mr. Kroenig. Oh, sorry. Sorry. Okay.

The Chairman. Please, Mr. Kroenig.

Mr. Kroenig. Oh, yeah. I would like to make several points.

The United States has been the world's technology leader since the time of Thomas Edison, and that has brought us enormous geopolitical, economic, and military advantages. So we should aim to maintain that innovation edge.

China, of course, wants to claim it for itself. It has this strategy that used to be called Made in China 2025 to claim the commanding heights of emerging technology.

And that would be a problem. According to some reports, China may already have the lead in certain areas: hypersonics, certain applications of artificial intelligence, quantum computing. And so this is concerning.

And so a recommendation to the Intelligence Community would be to make sure that they are tracking their progress in these areas, and then maybe having a high-level kind of summary of this that would even go in the Presidential Daily Brief of kind of: Where are we in the new tech arms race? Where does the United States have the lead?

Where does China have the lead?

And then, also, if you look historically, it wasn't just having the technology that has mattered, but when it relates to military affairs, the operational concepts. How do you put all these technologies together in a way that has a decisive effect on the battlefield?

The classic historical example is World War I. Tanks and aircraft existed, but countries didn't really know how to use them. It wasn't until Nazi Germany figured out how to put them together in combined arms operations that they really had a devastating effect.

So I think that is something we should be tracking as well. What are the operational concepts our adversaries are thinking about for employing these new technologies?

I agree with Emily that I think, at the end of the day, the United States has the better innovation model. I am confident.

But one thing, one area where I think the adversaries do have an advantage is a lack of moral scruples, and they will be willing to do things that we won't. And I think we already see that with the way China is using AI for surveillance.

I think when it comes to biological applications, China may e more willing to consider biological weapons that we would consider beyond the pale.

And then final point on this. We debate whether we should have artificial intelligence in our military command and control, even on our nuclear command and control.

In a way, we have the luxury to debate this. But, actually, a country like North Korea that may worry about a decapitating strike against Kim Jong-un may actually have more of an incentive to automate its military forces' nuclear retaliation than we do.

So it may not be up to us to decide. Kim Jong-un or others may move in this

direction whether we want to or not.

[11:08 a.m.]

Ms. Heinrichs. Thank you for the question.

I am going to just tackle the workforce portion of your questions. And that is that when you think about kind of the post-Cold War order, some of the things that Members of Congress have been grappling with, one, that we have an atrophied defense industrial base because we simply didn't -- I mean, some of the reasons good, it made a lot of sense, some of the reasons, of course, bad, and especially in hindsight, that we can no longer produce the necessary weapons at scale that we need in order to deter, and then, if deterrence fails, to win a major conflict.

And so we are getting at that now, and the U.S. support for Ukraine is helping the United States move faster at rebooting the defense industrial base.

But another implication of this period of time where the United States was not focusing on great power competition and we were instead focused on the rogue state threat and then also the global war on terror is that we really had a brain drain.

We no longer have the kinds of analysts that we would like to have in the IC specifically focused on the Russia and Chinese threats in the way their regimes are thinking about how they may employ their militaries for their specific aims that they perceive.

And that one of the things that I have perceived as I engage in my various capacities in studying this issue is there tends to be an American default to a more benign motive that our adversaries may have, or the tendency to fall into the trap of this mirror imaging, that they wouldn't do certain things because the United States wouldn't do certain things.

And it is irrational, and I would suggest that we really do need to increase our

workforce specifically in the area of experts in China and Russia and then focusing on how their regimes are thinking about the potential use of nuclear weapons.

And then I would just say, in 2020 the Biden administration really worked to get a joint statement with China and Russia that said that a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought, and this really harkens back to the statement made by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev making the same point.

And I am worried that if you look at the kinds of capabilities that both Russia and China are investing in, in the way Russia, in particular, is using them in nuclear sabre-rattling to deter the United States and NATO from helping Ukraine to a greater degree, that China and Russia may not necessarily agree with that statement that they signed on to.

So to the extent that the United States can grow our Intelligence Community workforce, specifically to focus on those portfolios and to be collaborating with one another to synthesize that analysis, and then also using that in the defense -- STRATCOM is the one I am thinking of in particular -- so that we can have a more accurate, better understanding of how our adversaries are thinking about this, I think that would be a very fruitful thing for the United States to do.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Now Mr. Scott.

Mr. Scott. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I want to talk about something a little more simple, and that is information. And if you look at the United States, I think the biggest loss that we have had recently is being kicked out of Niger and Niger selecting Russia as a partner over the United States of America.

This isn't new in that part of the world. You have got Mali, you have got Burkina

Faso. I honestly thought that with Wagner moving under the Russian flag, that we might see advances in that part of the world for the United States, and it has actually gone the other way.

So you are familiar with -- and they were published -- the mass graves in Mali probably where French ISR picks up and shares it with the local government. But before the government could do anything with it, Wagner had taken the pictures and said the French did it.

And the end result of Wagner doing this is that the French were removed from the country instead of the people that actually carried out the execution of the country's citizens.

I say that to get to the question of speed in declassification. Declassification of Russia's pending assault on Ukraine, I think, was one of the better decisions of the Biden administration. I certainly supported him in that decision. I think that the world being prepared for that invasion actually was of benefit to both Ukraine and the world from an economic standpoint.

But I would like you to each speak to the issue of declassification, the speed of declassification, and how we get the world to understand that this is the truth, because the decisions are not being made based on the truth.

And so we can just go down the -- Ms. Heinrichs, start with you, I guess. But declassification, the speed of declassification.

Ms. Heinrichs. Congressman, I think it is a critically important issue.

The American people, I think, need to have confidence, first of all, in the institution of the IC. And so I guess my first thought would be that it is critically important -- I know this committee has done a really commendable job under the leadership of the chairman and the ranking member on ensuring that this committee

stays nonpartisan, nonpolitical. And that is a great step in the right direction, I think, to preserve the institution of the IC so that the American people can then believe whenever they have assessments that are made public.

So I think that is number one.

Number two, I think it is very important that the knowledge base of the American people must go up to understand the nature of the threat in what Russia is doing, what China is doing, beyond the more -- the ones that get the bigger headlines around the first island chain in the case of China, and then just Ukraine in the case of Russia, that this really is a -- that they are behaving in such ways that are counter to the interests of the American people across geographic areas and military domains.

So to the extent that this committee can continue to press whenever something is classified that it would be very helpful for the American people to be aware of what our adversaries are doing, I would encourage that.

Mr. Kroenig. The first thing I would say is that Russian disinformation and misinformation is a real challenge, and I think it is one that it is difficult for us to deal with as an open society. It is easier for them to influence our information space than the reverse.

So on balance, I think we have more advantages in this competition, but I think this is a relative disadvantage, and so it makes sense that Russia is trying to exploit it.

Second, I think this use of intelligence to pre-bunk Russian activities before they happened was really innovative. Ultimately, it wasn't enough to deter Russia, but I think it was helpful when it came to building a coalition after the fact to counter Russia and support Ukraine. So I think this is something we should do in the future.

Of course, the counterveiling factor is, we don't want to compromise sources and methods as we do that. My understanding is that there is a robust system in place to

make sure that when we have done the pre-bunk, we are not doing that, but we need to make sure that we are balancing those interests.

Additionally, I had heard from allies who said that they didn't believe us at first when we came to them and said that Russia is about to invade. And so I do think that because of some of our --

Mr. Scott. I will tell you specifically, I was in -- I was at NATO the day Russia moved in. And the questions, very pointed -- not questions but comments -- were, "Look how good your intel was in Afghanistan," sarcastically towards us, and that created a problem. The way we handled the Afghanistan withdrawal created problems there.

I am out of time, chair. I don't know if -- I mean --

The Chairman. We will grant you some additional time if you want to finish, Mr. Kroenig.

Mr. Kroenig. I was just going to -- so I do think we have some work to do to rebuild trust with allies, and I think it will just take time and more examples of successful sharing like this.

I did want to comment briefly. You asked about Russia gaining influence in Africa, and of course there is the concern of both Russia and China gaining influence in the Global South, why aren't they on our side when comes to things like Ukraine.

And so I think this would also be an area that the lntelligence Community could dive into. What is it that is causing Brazil, South Africa, India to be on the fence? And what would it take for them to change and join our side?

Mr. Scott. One final question -- one statement, if I may. And I appreciate your patience to let me go over time.

I feel that increasingly -- and this is a nonpartisan committee -- I feel that increasingly I get a policy position, not an intelligence assessment, from the people that

are briefing us today, especially when we are in country, especially in Africa.

Thank you all for being here.

The Chairman. I will just note for the record that our participants were largely shaking their heads in the affirmative.

Do you want to make a comment on that?

Ms. Heinrichs. If I can, Congressman.

I share your concern. And I would just say, especially on the particular issue of the Afghanistan withdrawal, that that really wasn't primarily an intelligence failure.

It was a failure to respond to the intelligence in a way that would have brought better outcomes for the United States and our allies.

And so the way that we get ahead of that problem, when our allies are skeptical, is to fess up to political and strategy decisions, to make the point that this was not an intelligence failure.

Mr. Scott. I agree, and General McKenzie has made it very public what his advice to our President was.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Dr. Bera, we will also be lenient on your time.

Dr. Bera. Great. Thank you.

The Chairman. I appreciate your patience.

Dr. Bera. Thank you.

I actually agree with everything that Mr. Scott just talked about in terms of declassifying information, getting that. They are working with our think tank partners to educate not just the U.S. population, but also those who are in Congress.

The reason why I don't like using the Cold War analogy is because I actually think in the Cold War we had a long-term, decades-long strategy against an adversary in the

Soviet Union that really didn't deviate based on who was in the White House or who was in the majority in Congress.

It might have moved a little bit this way or that way, but it was a long-term strategy with leaders in Congress, as well as the folks that were elected to the White House.

I think we do a disservice if we don't try to understand the politics of the United States as it exists today. It never would have occurred to me when we delayed a Ukraine aid vote in September to get a continuing resolution passed.

In my mind, it was like, okay, we will just bring this up as a stand-alone in a couple weeks, and we will have a large bipartisan vote, won't be a problem. Took us at least 6 months to get that to the floor.

That isn't a condemnation of Republicans or Democrats. That is an understanding that something significantly has changed within the United States Congress.

I saw it in the immediate aftermath of October 7th and the heinous acts that took place there. We are seeing politics play out in the American public on college campuses, et cetera, which then affect politics in Congress.

And these are incredibly complicated issues, so I do think, again, to my think tank colleagues, again, using the Cold War analogy is too simplistic, because that was a bipolar world of the United States and its allies, but largely the United States leading a coalition against the Soviet Union.

In the aftermath of the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine, understanding our politics, much of my message when I am talking to our European NATO counterparts is the United States isn't going anywhere, but Europe has to be eyes wide open that they will have to take primary responsibility for European security at a time where we are also

trying to contain a war in the Middle East.

That responsibility falls on us to make sure we don't have a widespread regional conflict. Again, we have partners there, but it still primarily is falling on us.

And we are trying to prevent a war in Asia. Again, that is primarily falling on us.

We do see allies trying to step up. I applaud Prime Minister Kishida, at his own political risk, to get Japan to 2 percent of GDP. Incredibly important.

I applaud President Yoon in Korea to start looking beyond the Korean Peninsula and not being so insular focused on peninsular politics, but leaning into the trilateral, at his own political risk, but that trilateral partnership is incredibly important in stabilizing East Asian politics.

I applaud the Filipinos for coming back into the fold to create the trilateral with Japan and the United States.

Korea is incredibly important. AUKUS is incredibly important, important for us to be very successful.

But these are very different strategies than the Cold War. So I think if we use the Cold War analogy, it becomes bipolar, and this has to be a multipolar, multi-alliance type of strategy.

We never really linked a transatlantic strategy with an Indo-Pacific strategy, and I think it is in our interest as the United States -- again, with like-minded, like-value partners -- to start thinking about what that looks like.

AUKUS does that a little bit. We have to have an Indian Ocean strategy because we were slow to the game in the first island chain, the second island chain.

We see what is happening in the Indian Ocean. The PRC is being very strategic in what they are doing, where they are engaging. And we have got to make sure we have that Indian Ocean strategy that, again, ties with our South China Sea strategy and our

Pacific Island strategy.

So all of these are incredibly important.

I haven't asked you guys a question yet, but I am just sharing. My main non-IC committee is Foreign Affairs, so I spend a lot of time thinking about this from that perspective.

If I think about what the risks are, particularly as we try to avoid a conflict in China, I think there are a couple. I touched on one. I don't think most of my colleagues spend enough time in the SCIF.

And I will say that from the perspective as a new member on the Intelligence Committee. I did spend a lot of time in HFAC, a lot of time thinking about geopolitical strategy and threats and what that looked like. I didn't really understand it until I was on the Intelligence Committee.

And I would just say, that comes out of this long challenge of renewing FISA 702. If more of my colleagues spent time in the SCIF, I think they would understand why it is an important tool to keep America and the world safe.

And I think we just have to figure out what that looks like. And some of that is what Mr. Scott said in terms of declassifying information, getting information out there.

So that is something that I worry about and think about, because if we, as the Representatives of the American people in the House, don't fully grasp that, then we are going to have a hard time articulating it.

And one of you mentioned that the public and the world has to have confidence in the Intelligence Committee. I certainly have that confidence now having spent a year and a half having back-and-forth conversations.

I think it starts with making sure our colleagues in Congress understand the threats but also understand the opportunities. Because I am optimistic. It is not a

given what the next 75 years look like.

So I would just challenge the think tank world because you do have a different podium, a different mechanism to communicate with our colleagues to see how we can actually work together to educate and get that information out there.

Mr. Scott touched on the misinformation and disinformation space. The whole conversation around TikTok is really interesting because, again, I think October 7th was an "eyes wide open" moment -- or should have been -- for most of us to understand how -- I never would have expected a population to go out there and have pro-Palestine, in some cases pro-Hamas protests, but they did. And I think we have got to understand that.

So I guess my question, and maybe to each of the panelists, would be, how can we work together, one, to better educate our colleagues, understanding the threat and why it is important for us not to have a Democratic or a Republican strategy, but if China is playing the long game, we have to play an equally long game that can't change every 2 or 4 years based on who is in the majority or who is in the White House. It has got to be a long-term strategy.

Ms. Heinrichs. Congressman, thank you for your remarks and for your question.

And I would just say that one of the things that China -- China seeks to supplant the United States as the preeminent global power and, to a sense, prove that its form of government is superior to ours, and in part because of the messy things that you just laid out so eloquently, about how hard it is to get an open society that is so divided to have a common understanding of what our shared -- of what our national threats are and what the country needs to do.

But the good news is, really because of the hard work of some of the national security heavyweights in the Congress, this committee, House Armed Services

Committee, the Appropriations Committees, et cetera, really did a lot of hard work of educating Members and their minds were open and they did change their minds, and we got to a place where we could have a bipartisan support for the national security supplemental, which I thought was really important.

So I would just encourage you that there is just going to be more of that, I think, in the years to come.

The reason I think that the Cold War does provide, if not a perfect overlay of what we are dealing with now, it is helpful in that it is going to be cross-administrations, it is going to require bipartisan collaboration to do this. And that is simply -- there is simply no other way out of this.

To the point on allies, I agree with you that the United States has these global threats, but this is why the United States must not just say that our allies are a great asset, we must use them.

And so even as the United States delegates and helps encourage our allies to take more of the burden in particular areas of various theaters in which we have shared adversaries seeking to disrupt and to threaten, that the United States will remain the coalescing force.

And I am convinced of that after spending lots of time with our allies. They are willing to do more. The Baltic countries are willing to do more. Poland is willing to do more. We have new great allies in NATO. The Finns are ready and able to do more, to shoulder more of the burden.

And so I would just commend to you that the United States must have a grand strategy and must truly utilize the benefit that we have of our alliances.

And then in adapt, a lot of what we are doing, some of our force posture, I think, will -- we talked a little bit about that with our nuclear posture. But conventional forces,

the kinds of weapon systems our allies want, that the United States has been slow to provide for, I think, unnecessary and unfounded fears of escalation and provocation, I think those are dated, and we must adapt them.

And we are to the point now where -- that our allies must be stronger on NATO's now eastern front, the Central and Eastern Europe.

And it is the same way in Asia. The Australians want to do more. The United States -- AUKUS, you mentioned AUKUS, but pillar two is that technology-sharing. The United States has been very slow to share, and we must adapt.

And so there is great opportunity there. Japan, I mean, we could be co-producing -- I talked about the missile discrepancy that the United States has in the Indo-Pacific because for years we were under the INF Treaty.

We should be co-producing, in my view, particular weapon systems with the Japanese, or deploying them closer in theater with some of our Asian allies.

So there is lots more we can do, but the United States must become more comfortable with sharing information, intelligence, and collaborating with our allies and coming up with a coherent grand strategy, which I would submit the United States has not yet done.

Mr. Kroenig. So I agree with you on the importance of maintaining a bipartisan, nonpartisan, long-term strategy. This isn't going to be solved within 2 or 4 years. It is going to be, I think, a long-term confrontation. And so making sure that we have that nonpartisan strategy is important.

I agree with your points about the domestic politics. And I think this is an area where we in the think tank community, and I think your committee, could help, where we could do better and you could help, which is making the case better to the American people about what is at stake.

Ukraine isn't about helping Ukraine. It is not about defending democracy. Taiwan is not about semiconductors.

I think it is fundamentally about what kind of world do we want to live in. Do we want to live in a world led by the United States and our democratic allies that has brought peace, prosperity, and freedom to the American people for 80 years, or do we want to live in a world dominated by hostile dictators? Because I do think that those are the stakes.

Ms. Bingen. If I can also add, and this has been a great discussion, and I share a lot of the points, sir, that you made and my panelists here.

To your point on the Cold War analogy being simplistic, I absolutely agree. When I think about the Soviet threat, it was largely a military and a political threat.

When I look at China and just the simultaneity of challenges, it is military, political, economic, technical, information, all of those things.

And when I look at the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and then the broader Intelligence Community, we were good at -- we are good at counting things -- ships, tanks, aircraft.

When you start to move into this information space that Mr. Scott talked about and you have talked about, when you talk about the technology, you talk about the strategic importance of a port somewhere in the world not being operated by a Chinese commercial company but by an entity that shares a lot of our same values and practices, getting, I will say, even the Department of Defense to think that way is incredibly challenging.

So I am very encouraged that you are pushing on those kinds of things, thinking more broader than just, I will say, ship counting.

On the congressional role, we would love to partner more with you to make sure,

as Matt said, we are hitting on exactly those right issues.

We do a lot of great nonclassified work that we are always happy to put out. But we want to make sure that we are also impactful and relevant. So the more that we can be tied in with what you are doing, I think, the better.

I would also commend this committee and under the chairman's leadership of your outside-the-SCIF series. I think it is so important for you to get out, partnered, Republican and Democrat, talking about these issues that transcend party dynamics. And I really commend you on that work.

I also, for my time up on the Hill here, what inspired me was a lot of your codels, your bipartisan codels, where you are out talking to foreign leaders, to our diplomats and military officials, where you left D.C., and it was substantive conversations. It was showing -- just showing the flag, showing your engagement, and you taking that back and legislating on it.

And to me, that is a really bright spot of those bipartisan codels, to get out and continue to message and engage with our allies and partners -- and even to some degree our adversaries as well -- being united in your messaging.

Ms. Harding. Yeah, I want to second what Kari said about the codels. Those are often the most beneficial, both for building camaraderie and also for really learning what is going on out in the field.

I am really glad that you are talking about building trust in the IC and about helping the American people understand what the IC does, because that is, in fact, the mission of my program at CSIS.

The Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program, otherwise known as INT, is supposed to be telling the American people exactly what the Intelligence Community does and how it can do its job best.

I am very passionate about this after more than a decade working in the IC. I was one of those people who was using 702 collection to write those PDBs and understanding just how powerful it can really be. I pushed very hard for additional declassifications and got the "yeah, we are working on it" a great many times, and hopefully that will be revisited before the next round.

I am hoping this year actually to do a series of events at CSIS featuring IC leaders to talk about trust in the IC and why the American people should really trust the IC and what they do.

These are Americans, who are very patriotic, sitting behind their desks, working extraordinarily long hours, and all they really want to do is protect America against its adversaries and help it succeed. And I think the American people really need to understand that.

On the point of alliances, you cannot emphasize enough how intelligence work is critical when it comes to maintaining those alliances and how those alliances make intelligence work possible.

Even when relationships are tense at the State Department or tense at the Defense Department, the intelligence partnerships remain very strong because we know how valuable they are. And those can often be the key to rebuilding those tense relationships over time.

There are some places that the U.S. can't go and our allies and partners can. And a lot of that we are seeing in this connection between the European theater and the Pacific theater.

You don't have to listen to academics tell you that this is an important connection. All you have to do is look at how European leaders are going to the Pacific and talking about countering China, and how Pacific leaders are going to Europe and talking about

countering Russia and the broader message that that sends.

I was in Estonia on a recent trip, and I sat down with their cyber leaders to talk about Russia and how Russia attempts to penetrate European networks. We had a long and interesting conversation about that, and then they paused and they said, "But I really want to talk about China."

And that was really interesting to me, that the Estonians, who have been on the front lines of the Russian cyber activity for decades now, were more concerned about China than they were about Russia.

So clearly all of these issues are connected, and having a strong IC, with a strong web of alliances around the world, is how we are going to get there and win.

The Chairman. First off, thank you each for the research that you do, the advocacy that you do, that each of your think tanks collectively do to inform the debate and the discussion that we have here in Congress and throughout our policymaking in government.

I would like to give you the opportunity if you have any closing comments, any additional thoughts or questions that we have not asked you that ou wanted to contribute today. Any closing thoughts?

Yes. Ms. Heinrichs.

Ms. Heinrichs. I had one last point that I just want to put out there for your consideration, is to reassess and focus on -- and I am sure you are already -- your staff is already busy doing this -- but the degree to which Chinese and Russian nationals continue to operate inside U.S. research labs.

This is an issue that kind of ebbs and flows in the attention that this gets in the American media.

But our laboratories and nuclear enterprise must be secure and utterly free of

exploitation. Threats to our national laboratories and across the nuclear enterprise can come from both external adversaries or from the insider threat.

The GAO has offered some recommendations for how to protect against that latter type of threat, and to my knowledge, those have not been fully implemented.

So I would just encourage the committee to continue to watch that, to ensure that our adversaries are not exploiting the research, technology, analysis of the United States and then taking it back and then using it to their advantage, to our great detriment.

The Chairman. That is a very important point.

Any other comments?

Yes.

Mr. Kroenig. Just to, I think, summarize the key point of my opening statement, is I do think the world is at an inflection point. I think President Biden is right about that.

The challenges the United States faces are very different, in many ways more severe than we have ever faced. And so I think the lntelligence Community does need to transform from its long-term focus on terrorism and counterinsurgency over the past 20 years or so to a dedicated focus on strategic competition.

They are making a lot of progress, but I think there is still a lot of work that needs to be done, and this committee will play a helpful role in getting us there.

So thank you again for the opportunity to be here, and we look forward to continuing to work with you.

The Chairman. Excellent.

Ms. Bingen.

Ms. Bingen. I just cannot emphasize enough how different the operating environment is going to be vis-à-vis China and Russia than it has been the last 20 years in

counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Please, challenge assumptions, encourage the IC, the DOD to red team themselves prior to undertaking operations. These are muscles that we haven't exercised in a while, and the environment, particularly with the influx of technology and surveillance, it is different. So I just can't emphasize that enough.

Second is just the urgency with which action is required. You have senior leaders coming up and talking about 2027. I don't know one way or another, but, regardless, that is just around the corner.

We are very likely going to be in a position where we may have to fight and continue to collect and analyze intelligence with a toolkit that largely exists today, because those next-generation systems aren't going to be online.

That really does put a premium on integrating what we have today, not just across the government but with the commercial sector, who have phenomenal capabilities to bring to bear, as well as our allies and partners.

And then lastly -- and we have talked about this a little bit -- is really infusing in the Intelligence Community think hard about strategic deterrence. And I credit Deputy Secretary Hicks with saying this.

But how do we get Xi to wake up every day and think, "Not today, I don't want to take on the United States and our allies today"? That requires an incredible amount of intelligence and strategic thinking to get to that point.

The Chairman. Actually, that was a great comment on -- that intelligence is actually to impact the outcome. It is not just for us to casually be an observer. And I appreciate that.

Ms. Harding.

Ms. Harding. Completely agree, sir.

I would just like to double down on the idea that the landscape for intelligence has completely changed.

With ubiquitous technical surveillance, with the difficulties of running any kind of HUMINT operation at all, with what I suspect is soon going to be AI-enabled cyber operations, trying to have that cat-and-mouse game of the collection, and the defeat of collection, is only going to accelerate.

So we are going to have this super high-end, exquisite collection capability, but then we also absolutely have to get OSINT right. Randy Nixon and his folks at the Open Source Enterprise are doing some really interesting work.

I think trying to figure out, from Congress' perspective, what the American people are going to be comfortable with when it comes to the lntelligence Community collecting publicly available information and using it, and then from there giving the IC very clear instructions on what they can do with that information, is going to be critically important, and we have to get that piece of it right.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you.

And with that, we will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]