THE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
118TH CONGRESS

OPEN PANEL WITH FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICIALS

Wednesday, February 8, 2023

U.S. House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, the Honorable Mike Turner (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Turner, Wenstrup, Stewart, Crawford, Stefanik, Kelly, LaHood, Fitzpatrick, Gallagher, Scott, Crenshaw, Hill, Waltz, Himes, Carson, Krishnamoorthi, Houlahan, Spanberger, Plaskett, Gomez, Bera, Gottheimer, and Crow.

The Chairman. Good morning. The committee will now come to order. Thank you all for joining us today.

Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any time.

Before we start, I want to address some housekeeping matters. First, today's open portion is being broadcast live and streamed on the committee's YouTube channel. It will be conducted entirely on an unclassified basis. All participants are reminded to refrain from discussing classified or other information protected from public disclosure. I now recognize myself for my opening statement.

First off, I want to thank each and every one of these witnesses, which I will introduce in a minute. I know them personally, and I greatly appreciate their contributions to our overall national security dialogue and their unbelievable expertise as they served in important positions.

When I look out, I see titles such as General, Secretary, Director of the CIA, Deputy Director of ODNI, and you look at those titles, and they are impressive, but the individuals that are sitting behind those are much more impressive than the titles. You made them what they were because of your expertise and your contribution.

As I discussed with each of you, we normally open with a worldwide threats hearing that includes the Director of ODNI, the Director of NSA, Director of the FBI, and the Director of the CIA where they give us their guidance and their perspective as to what we should be focusing on in the upcoming year. As a committee, we had a discussion, and we believe that, prior to that, we needed to reach out to those in the national security community who could give us an additional perspective as we begin our planning to work in

concert with the Intelligence Community, and I greatly appreciate your willingness to do that today. Your guidance and expertise is going to be incredibly important.

Now, to introduce our panelists. We have General David Petraeus, who is a former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, and Commander of U.S. Central Command in the surge in Iraq. He currently serves as a partner at KKR, and is the chairman of the KKR Global Institution.

Dr. Heather Wilson is a conformer Member of Congress and member of this committee, and served as the 24th Secretary of the United States Air Force. She is currently the 11th president of the University of Texas at El Paso.

General Retired Phillip Breedlove is the former Commander of U.S. European Command and the 17th Supreme Allied Commander Europe, which I always think is one of the coolest titles in the military: Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

And the Honorable Sue Gordon is the former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. She served nearly 30 years in the IC, including as the Deputy Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and then several executive positions at the CIA.

Thank you, all, for being here. We look forward to your participation today. I know that you are all familiar with this committee and our charge. So we are going to be looking to you to help us with what you think are the most concerning threats to our national security, and is the Intelligence Committee organized and funded appropriately to address these current and future threats, and what can be done to improve cohesion among those involved in

intelligence, and how can congressional oversight of this work be improved? And I also think there may be a few questions about a balloon.

With that, I yield to my ranking member.

[The statement of The Chairman follows:]

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Mr. Himes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to being by thanking the Chairman for holding these hearings and conceiving of these, I guess, this is a panel rather than a hearing. But one of my complaints about the Congress is that we do a whole lot of breadth and not enough depth. This is going to give us an opportunity to really get into the guts of the challenges around our most significant risks.

I was really impressed to see that a lot of the testimony we are going to receive today deals with the complexity. A number of you have said that the threats the United States face are as complicated, as challenging, and as complex as at any point in our history. That in and of itself is interesting. I do want to -- I hate the word, but I am going to approach this a little orthogonally. And what I mean by that is this Congress is doing plenty in terms of thinking about the military and intelligence assets that we put up against the Chinese, the Russian, the Iranian, the North Korean threats. We are doing an awful lot. Just yesterday, we had in Financial Services, a hearing featuring 14 bills on how to limit the economic power of China. I hope we get those things right.

What we are not thinking nearly enough about -- and I am going to beat this drum this afternoon -- is what I think is one of the primary causes or certainly aggravators of conflicts, a conflict which, if we are talking about China or Russia, is almost inconceivable in the devastation it would wreak on the world, the world economy, and that is the threats of mistakes, of misinterpretation and misinformation. Anybody thinking about China I would commend Barbara Tuchman's "The Guns of August" to take a look at how you can get into a catastrophic, near apocalyptic situation through mistake and misinterpretation. We don't talk a lot about this because we are generating the

momentum to counter a threat. When does momentum and countering a threat begin in the eyes of our antagonists to look like aggression that might provoke an unpredictable response?

So, with Russia, do we know the red lines? Do we know when Putin is inclined, what are the territorial and battlefield red lines that lead to the use of a tactical nuclear device or of a dirty bomb? Do we know how and when he becomes isolated and paranoid to a point where the rules change?

With Iran, instability there today, at what point does instability become dangerous? At what point do the Iranians accelerate their attempts to get a nuclear weapon in a way that makes conflict ultimately unavoidable with China? Do we understand the red lines? Do we have the assets to understand leadership intentions? Do we understand the degree of stability inside Beijing?

If the answer to any of these questions is no, it may not matter precisely where the F-35s are located because we could find ourselves in the situation so memorably outlined by Barbara Tuchman in "The Guns of August" and finding ourselves in a catastrophic position. There is a lot here. Intelligence, obviously, is about understanding red lines, about understanding intentions, about understanding and evaluating stability. And I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today on whether we are properly configured to avoid catastrophe that we stumble into.

Thank you. I yield back.

[The statement of Mr. Himes follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you. All of you have testified before Congress before, and you know, and I just wanted to point out to you, a lot of the members have other hearings that they are stepping out to. They will be coming back. Everybody is very eager to come back and to ask you questions.

With that, I want to thank you for submitting your written statements because members had an opportunity in advance to read those so they are not missing out on the discussion. And they will be returning to participate.

With that, I wanted to begin with the opening statements with General Petraeus.

STATEMENTS OF GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS (RET.), PARTNER AT KKR, AND CHAIRMAN OF KKR GLOBAL INSTITUTE; HEATHER WILSON, 11TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO; GENERAL PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER OF U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND 17TH SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE; AND THE HONORABLE SUE M. GORDON, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS (RET.)

General Petraeus. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Himes, Members of this very important committee, thank you for the invitation to offer brief thoughts on the threats facing the United States, the Intelligence Community's posture to assess those threats, and this community's essential responsibilities, noting that the thoughts I provide are my own and not those of any firm or organization of which I am affiliated, and that it is a great pleasure to do so today alongside Dr. Wilson, former Sec. Phil Breedlove, and my longtime colleague in various positions, former PDDNI, Sue Gordon.

I believe that the national security threats currently facing the United States and our Intelligence Community are more numerous and more complex than at any point in our modern history, to include the height of the Cold War. In fact, we now face a phenomenon that is distinct from any our nation has had to manage before: simultaneous multidimensional rivalries with two nuclear

armed global powers, China and Russia, each very different in its own right but each with a major chip on its shoulder about the current world order that has the United States at its center.

Even as the challenges posed by China and Russia have grown in urgency and severity, however, other threats have not receded but, instead, are interacting with great power competition in consequential and often unpredictable ways. These other challenges include two increasingly capable and aggressive regional revisionist powers, North Korea and Iran; the persistence of fanatical Islamist extremist networks that while for the moment degraded in capability have lost none of their desire to destroy us and our way of life; a number of failed and failing states that create tinder for great power and regional rivalries; and also humanitarian crises and transnational threats that respect no borders, including pandemic diseases, organized criminal elements, human migration, and climate change.

As a global power with global interests, the United States cannot ignore any of these problems as tempting as it may be to imagine otherwise. Rather, our country is best imagined as the guy in the circus who has to keep a tent full of plates spinning at the same time, that is to deal with numerous threats simultaneously, albeit with the indispensable help of allies and partners. The China plate clearly is far and away the biggest and most important. The pacing threat, as our national defense strategy properly identifies it. But that is not the only plate that has to be kept spinning. And if we lose control of one or more of the other plates, we should anticipate the likelihood of them crashing into several of the others.

It bears emphasizing in particular that our competition with China is

global and multidimensional. This means that, even as we rightly increase resources for the Indo-Pacific, where the challenge is sharpest and the risk of military conflict the greatest, other parts of the planet, to include the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, are also crucial theaters for various aspects of the Sino-American rivalry that cannot be neglected. We should recognize that Beijing seeks to divide the Euro-Atlantic alliance, pull longstanding U.S. partners in the Middle East into its orbit, establish military footholds in Africa, and secure access to sensitive technologies and natural resources in multiple geographies.

Needless to say, the Intelligence Community has to be resourced to anticipate and understand China's global ambitions and activities, not just its regional ones.

For this reason, I want to recommend strongly that you seek to invest more in the most important asset in the Intelligence Community: its human capital. This is particularly warranted in the nonmilitary agencies, especially the CIA, where, as Representative Spanberger knows, the tasks typically far exceed the available personnel, especially when it comes to our clandestine service officers. And, thus, professional development and training and education are difficult to schedule and complete.

By contrast, as Representative Wenstrup, Stewart, Crawford, Gallagher, Crenshaw, Waltz, Kelly, Garcia, Houlahan, and Crow know from their time in uniform, the U.S. military service has the best -- the military services have the best, most fully resourced professional development systems in government with lengthy initial entry courses and then subsequent further courses every 3 to 5 years in an individual's career, culminating in full academic years at staff and

war colleges for commissioned officers and a similar course for senior noncommissioned officers.

There is also a large personnel account authorized and appropriated for in the military services for those in training and education, and that account encompasses the instructors and trainers in the schoolhouses as well. There is nothing like that in the nonmilitary intelligence agencies, beyond a very impressive initial onboarding and periodic language and special skills training, and I strongly recommend examining how additional resources could be provided to enable greater investment in the exceedingly talented and committed members of the CIA in particular.

Again, the Intelligence Community's human capital greatest is its greatest asset, and I think that when you dig into this issue, you will agree that additional resources should be devoted to the development of it, especially in the CIA

Another area I would encourage you to examine is the overall structure of the community, seeking to identify unnecessary duplication and layering and, thus, ways to achieve efficiencies and savings in personnel that can be applied to address existing shortfalls and emerging needs. I would suggest a particular examination of the substantial growth in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Having discussed the intent behind creation of ODNI and the other intelligence reforms enacted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks with Members of Congress who were part of that effort, it appears that the size of ODNI has expanded considerably beyond what was envisioned.

I recognize fully that ODNI performs very important missions intended to prevent the kind of disconnects and failures that precluded prevention of the 9/11 attacks. It is important to note to this committee that much of the ODNI's

growth is due to statute as well. Regardless, the very substantial number of personnel in that headquarters creates a considerable challenge for the rest of the community from which those personnel tend to be drawn, noting that there are finite numbers of personnel with the expertise, experience, and skills needed, and that it is important to get the balance right between those pulled up to headquarters and those who are actually doing the vital work of gathering intelligence and processing and analyzing it. Having worked with DNI Haines closely in several capacities in the past and holding her in very high regard, I am confident that she would examine this issue and that of the overall IC structure with you in a very constructive manner.

As an additional item in this area and something that is a bit arcane, there likely also is a need to examine and rationalize the respective roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the national mission managers and the national intelligence officers in ODNI, as well as the coherence of the assessments they offer to the National Security Council and the National Intelligence Council, respectfully.

I would offer that the committee should focus as well on some of the most critical enablers helping those in the community as they endeavor to gather, analyze, and share intelligence on the various threats I discussed. Here I would suggest a particular focus on whether additional investments are needed in the areas of open-source intelligence, tradecraft in an era of ubiquitous surveillance, and technologies to enable every aspect of intelligence work, from gathering human, imagery, signals, cyber, open source, and other forms of intelligence to enabling the processing and analysis of that information by those performing such tasks and doing all of this in greater partnership in the private

sector where much of the expertise and capabilities reside. I believe such issues will prove to be very significant for this committee to examine and oversee, and the results of that could be very beneficial to the community and to our country.

I want to bring my remarks to a close, Mr. Chairman, by applauding your intention to be bipartisan in your approach. The reality is that none of the threats we will discuss today is capable defeating the United States, not China, not Russia, not Iran, not al-Qa'ida, not ISIS. The only force that can defeat the United States is the United States itself. It is our adversaries' fondest hope that we allow the disagreements that sometimes divide us to define us. Impassioned debate is, of course, inherent to our system in society, and as each of you appreciate from personal experience, I am sure democracy is a contact sport. Yet I do believe it important to remember that the institutions and values that unite us are stronger than our differences. And I am hopeful that this committee will set a powerful example in this respect.

As I have discussed with you privately, Mr. Chairman, I was privileged to be the Director of the CIA when Congressman Mike Rogers and Dutch Ruppersberger were the chairman and ranking member of the HPSCI. They embodied just such an approach, and it fostered very constructive and productive relationships with IC leaders, even as the members of the committee pursued their oversight responsibilities very vigorously.

Finally, I hope that you will be able to spend time with members of the community's agencies to meet them where they work, to see their facilities, centers of excellence, and capabilities here in the United States, and to spend time with them in our stations and operational deployments overseas as well.

As I know you recognize, the community is comprised of very special Americans, and particularly when times might be challenging in our Nation's Capital, I am confident that visits with them will leave you with energy, enthusiasm, and inspiration, as well as deep appreciation for the extraordinarily important missions they perform around the world and the admirable way in which they seek to perform those missions.

Thank you very much.

[The statement of General Petraeus follows:]

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The Chairman. General Petraeus, thank you, and thank you for mentioning the dedication to bipartisan. This committee actually just began its work yesterday with our organizational meeting. And the Speaker and the minority leader came before this committee, very unusual for them to attend our organizational meeting, and gave us the charge of changing the culture and practice back to bipartisanship. And the ranking member and I also then made that commitment, both to the committee and to both of them personally. So thank you for raising it.

Dr. Heather Wilson.

STATEMENT OF HEATHER WILSON

Ms. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask that my full statement be included for the record.

The Chairman. Approved.

Ms. Wilson. I really just wanted to highlight four points and then get to the people's questions. The first is that I think probably Russia's attack on the Ukraine has illustrated something very important for this committee, and that is how much intelligence collection has changed through the ubiquity of smart phones and drones and social media, and that rapid integration of massive amounts of data reliably, faster to many more users than ever before is one of the challenges facing the Intelligence Community going forward.

And that challenge I am not sure we have met yet and thinking about what the implications are there for how we develop our intelligence officers and how we develop our systems of collection, targeting, and dissemination and

analysis.

Second, China is the most important strategic competitor that we face, not only militarily but also economically and with respect to technology. As a Nation, we are not educating enough people in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics to meet the threat. And I don't just mean the national security threat. This is different for us. It is different from where we were in the Cold War facing a massive nuclear power of which was economically far inferior to the United States. And we have to think about it in a different way.

The responsibility to do that is not -- doesn't just rest with the Federal Government. It includes State governments and private entities, as well as local entities that educate our children. And in Texas even today, there is a hearing about the Texas budget that includes significant funding for research for Texas universities and a new Texas space commission. So the responsibility is distributed, but the challenge is nationwide.

I would also say with respect to technology, there is no agency in the Intelligence Community that is responsible for scientific and technical intelligence because we really haven't had to think about scientific or technical surprise since the end of the Second World War. And I think we need to think about that. How does this committee steward an enterprise that can avoid scientific and technical surprise?

Third, this committee oversees the space capabilities for the Intelligence Community, and the environment has changed. Our satellites are extremely vulnerable, and we are still the best in the world at space. The United States is unrivalled at space, and our adversaries know it. And they are seeking to develop the capabilities to deny us the use of space during crisis and war. In

some ways, we -- I think we build glass houses before the invention of stones. And we have to think differently and review the strategy for space that thinks about the entire architecture.

So often on this committee people will come up and talk about the iteration, the next step, the next piece of equipment to do the particular mission. This committee must look at the entire architecture and whether it can prevail during all phases of crisis and war in a way that meets the needs of the Nation. That is different, and it is different because the threat has emerged over the last decade.

The fourth comment that I would make before standing for questions is that this committee also has the task of balancing civil liberties with national security. This committee conducted 2 years of oversight from 2006 to 2008 that resulted in the modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and those amendments. That work has generally stood the test of time. And this committee will have to consider its reauthorization this year. And that deserves to be reauthorized, particularly section 702 that has to do with how information is gathered and accessed by the Intelligence Community.

But there is an area that I think deserves oversight. Federal agencies defer to the FBI on counterintelligence information. Now, that is fine if that information has been tested in a court of law or questioned by outside analysts and competitively so. But often it is not. Law enforcement information can become the basis of administrative decisions that affect the lives and livelihoods of Americans with no independent review, no competitive analysis, and no process of appeal. In that area, I think the balance to protect civil liberties must be restored. And I would be happy to expand upon that further in private

session.

I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Ms. Wilson follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Wilson.

General Breedlove.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE (RET.)

General Breedlove. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Himes and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is my great honor to testify before you today. I am grateful for the opportunity to share my insights, and I am proud to be among such prominent and well-respected panelists. And while I am sure the text and tone of our testimonies will overlap, I do not intend to tread on my fellow panelists areas of expertise.

I offer my remarks from the perspective of a former super-user, the U.S. EUCOM Commander and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In my 39-year military career, I had no greater honor or privilege than leading the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians of those two commands. I thank this committee for your continued support of those.

Today the revelations I will share will draw on my experiences as the EUCOM Commander during Russia's two-pronged invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the illegal occupation and subsequent annexation of Crimea, and Moscow's invasion and direct support to the separatist forces Donbas.

I was vocal then and I remain vocal now that we should not be surprised by Russia's actions. We have become too reactive in the European theater, and we must do more to improve the decisionmaking, cohesion, and agility of our key leadership bodies. At the moment, the situation on the ground in Ukraine is extremely volatile and fragile. Ukrainian forces have skillfully pushed back

Russian advances, even conducting their own counter-offenses and retaking Kherson and the surrounding region.

Our NATO allies and non-NATO partners have rallied to Ukraine's side in providing critical weapons and munitions to Kyiv, most recently by the commitments at some point to provide main battle tanks. In reality, President Putin's reinvasion of Ukraine has provided the fuel for the alliances renewed unity and recommitment to cooperative security, crisis management, and collective defense.

However, as the intensifying continues around Bakhmut and Russian forces seem poised to launch or maybe already have launched another full-scale offensive, I cannot overemphasize our need to comprehensively consider Russian actions. At the height of the Cold War, we had a huge pull of Russian analysts in the Intelligence Community writ large who were primarily responsible for keeping an eye on Soviet Russia. By the fall of the wall, as I was serving in Europe, that number come down drastically.

And what I found is, in 2014, in speaking to the Directors of the CIA and DIA, is that number had decreased even further. And I believe that challenges our operational and tactical understanding of Russia leadership and forces. While many of those analysts were repurposed for key assignments on the Middle East and China, and rightfully so, as our soldiers were fighting, the finite group of Russian-focused personnel was too small to quickly and accurately analyze the Kremlin's full range of military actions at the operational and tactical levels.

We need to accept that our attempts at a reset with Moscow have failed. It is imperative that we understand President Putin seems hell-bent on blatantly

changing the rules-based system of European security while maximizing his personal power. Solving this personnel shortage will be critical for protecting our vital interests in Europe. As a great power, we should have the capabilities and adequate personnel to keep an eye on both Russia and China.

President Putin's recent words indicate that Moscow is digging in for a more protracted conflict, with the danger of freezing the conflict as he has done in Georgia, Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, and other areas. This raises the important opportunity to rethink how we view the wider region. We must consider to bolster our allies' air defenses, and we should establish a comprehensive Black Sea strategy with our Ukrainian partners and NATO allies.

Perhaps most concerning, we need to provide a stronger response to the growing military relationship between Russia and Iran. As Moscow imports of Iranian weapons increase, we might consider sending our own similar capabilities to Ukraine. Western weapons and Ukrainian skill in learning to use these systems quickly and effectively have made a world of difference on the battlefield, but the decisionmaking process has become too slow, resulting in severe delays of key weapons and munitions to Ukraine. I believe more can be done to improve how we look at these decisions and how we apportion and allocate scarce resources to inform them. We must also find solutions for serious budget challenges and restraints that limit our ability to be more proactive and agile in responding to the changing global threat environment. Improving the overall decisionmaking process, especially at the highest levels will ensure our efforts are organized and appropriately funded.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, Ranking, and members of this committee, it is

my position that we must do more to find an acceptable lasting solution to our intelligence challenges in this war and Russia's attempt to takeover Ukraine, one that respects Ukraine's state sovereignty and territorial integrity. And by improving our internal processes and cooperating with our NATO allies and non-NATO partners, we can strengthen our shared commitment to security, prosperity, and inclusive peace in Europe and its surrounding neighborhood.

[The statement of General Breedlove follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you.

Ms. Gordon.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SUE M. GORDON

Ms. Gordon. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Himes, Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I am absolutely delighted and honored to be before you to talk about my favorite topic: the intersection of intelligence and national security at an especially consequential moment in history.

My bottom line is upfront: There is absolutely nothing passe about the craft and discipline of intelligence. To know the truth, to see beyond the horizon, and to allow leaders to act before events dictate seems an appropriate mission.

The potential advantage that intelligence affords is no less important today than when it was first imagined. In other words, it is worth your time ensure its strength. Though I have been away a few years, I suspect that the community is better than it has ever been, even as it is not nearly good enough to provide the operational and strategic advantage that we need today. There is work to be done, some that I left undone.

And, third, your oversight is consequential, especially if you see your responsibility is to help drive good outcome, not to solely keep bad things from happening. Now, I look forward to answering any questions you have of me that will help you on your way. I am old, and substantively rangy. But before I do so, let me briefly describe the moment as I see it and present the dominant

challenges and opportunities that the intelligence and national security communities will have to navigate and explore respectively.

We are at another inflection point in national security threats. Over just my career, I saw the Cold War change to a world of proliferation, change to a world of terrorist threats, and now a digital world where threats look like old ones but have little in common with their predecessors. And at each one of those inflection points, we had to reconsider not what intelligence was providing but the manner in which it must. And we are there again.

There are three conditions that characterize this moment, and each will demand response if we are to maintain advantage. And make no mistake, we have advantage worth maintaining. This is a world of ubiquitous technology, where every technology is increasingly available to everyone. What this means is the one that can put it to clever use faster is the one that is going to win. Thus, it is easier for new entrants to make use of technology than it is for those with an installed base, and we have to overcome that.

The Chairman. Sorry. I just wanted to tell you that -- they just turned it off. The lights are malfunctioning. I didn't want you to think you had to hurry and that you were being told to conclude, but they have turned them off now. So disregard the --

Ms. Gordon. I figured the hook was going to come in if you all were really serious.

The Chairman. No. No. We are not signaling that you are being cutoff.

Ms. Gordon. That has happened before.

The Chairman. Continue, please.

Ms. Gordon. So this is also a world of global digital connectiveness, and that changes the aspiration, reach, cost, boundaries, and impact of our adversaries and competitors. Moreover, what it does is it forces economic and national security to be increasingly intertwined. It is that digital connectiveness that changed how allies and partners think about the world in which they are trying to succeed. And this is a world of data abundance that is both bane and boon. We are at once threatened to be overwhelmed and have more opportunity to know more sooner than we ever have.

In aggregate, it is a world where the threats and opportunities disproportionately go to and through information, and the threat surface is not limited to that controlled by the government. So, against this backdrop of change, the Intelligence Community is facing a dizzying array of security challenges that are not different in their intention but different in the way they manifest. And those differences demand that they are addressed differently with new capabilities and new approaches to intelligence.

I will list a few. We have to assess adversaries' approach to and use of capabilities, not just the capabilities themselves. I think we can all agree that, when we over-extrapolate capability, we miss understanding how it is going to be employed, and we both miss in both directions. We have to support new war funding demands. Secretary Wilson mentioned space. I will say cyber. They are both ones the Intelligence Community has to be prepared to support as an active domain with different kinds of wisdom.

We have to provide much more insight into all aspects of foreign information disorder, in part so its pattern and intent might be better known so we can beat our adversaries and competitors to the spot. Secretary Wilson

mentioned technology assessment, identifying the strategic importance and assessing threats and vulnerabilities to those. We can't have lists of things that we either want to protect or think are important.

Those are days when we knew what was important because it was being developed by the government. We have to look at technology, someone must look at those technologies, assess where they can be used, and then look at our adversaries' intention to exploit those.

And we need to become great investors again. There are three things that the United States Government are great at: We are great at having big problems, great at having long time horizons, and we are great at having deep pockets. Let's use them to invest in the technologies that will change our advantage, even while using the capabilities of the commercial sector.

This is a world where you must have data and digital dominance. We have to be able to see the digital environment much more clearly, and we have to use all the data that can help us on our way. We have to share its speed before need and establish partnerships with entities within their own value propositions. Sharing information after a conflict is had is just too slow, whether that partner is the United States military or a private company that is about to be attacked.

We need to integrate commercial capabilities. If we don't learn the lesson of Ukraine and the incredible potential that affords us in terms of helping our partners globally, we will miss this moment.

We have to innovate, and we talk often about the capabilities. I am going to say we need innovation in processes, and not just acquisition but security in how we bring people on board, how we manage risk. When I talk to

cyber companies or companies against cyber threat, I always say: I can guarantee you will face no cyber threat, and that is if you do nothing. The Intelligence Community can protect all its secrets, but that is not the way to advantage. And so having a risk-based approach to security matters.

And, finally, this is a world where transparency can be helpful, as we learned in Ukraine, and we must produce new analytic products that can be given to customers who are not used to the arcanity of our language. This is, again, a brave new world that requires some re-imagination to ensure that intelligence provides the same advantage that it has over our Nation's history. I believe it can be the hero of our story, and it will require your help to allow it to do new things and to ensure that it does so in a manner that is worthy of the trust of the American people.

Thank you so much for inviting me here today to let me, again, be part of this great American process. Happy to help in any way I might. Thank you.

[The statement of Ms. Gordon follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you so much. I appreciate all of our panelists' comments.

I am going to begin with General Petraeus and China. The ranking member and I just came from a Gang of Eight meeting concerning the China balloon. General, you and I were having a little bit of discussion about this before. I mean, what is great about your insight is that you have mission and operational experience; you have institutional experience; you have adversary assessment experience in all uses and in our generation of intelligence.

So you look at this, as we all watch on television, this balloon floating across some of our most sensitive military sites in the Nation, what does this say to us about China? And how -- how should we react in what, not just that the risk is there, but that China has made a calculation?

General Petraeus. Indeed, well, as we were discussing this is what is really most perplexing to me about this whole episode, and it causes you to ask: Is there a process in China -- obviously, the U.S. and other countries conduct sensitive activities, military intelligence, even economic, diplomatic, there is a process. They go to the top. Someone approves it. Is it in line with, what is the risk? What would the effects be if this is detected? And here, you are going to put a balloon across the continental United States that is enormous, clearly identifiable, go right over our sensitive sites and so forth.

Was there a process? Did someone at the very top did give thumbs up to this? In which case, it calls into question those who were interpreting recent initiatives by China and with the United States, the President's meeting on the margins of the Bali G20 Summit, Secretary Yellen's recent meeting with her counterpart, the intended meeting of Secretary Blinken in China where we were

going to produce guardrails and, you know, a foundation for the relationship and so forth.

Clearly, if this went to the top and it was approved, that was not particularly sincere, and that should give us very great pause, but so should the other alternative, which is that there is no process and that there is not a recognition of how sensitive this could be. And, again, as I mentioned, this should give us very considerable concern because it reflects a lack of appreciation for the kinds of actions that could result in something quite serious that could turn what our National Security Advisor correctly has described as a relationship of severe competition into the kind of conflict that all of us obviously want to see deterred.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Dr. Wilson, I recall being with you when you were the Secretary of the Air Force, calling Members to the Pentagon to give them a briefing concerning the threats of China and space. Now, that we see China utilizing, apparently on a fairly significant scale, as the reports are coming out daily as to the use of these balloons in intelligence collecting, as we look to transitioning from a threat of here is this space threat that China is building out, now that they are building out this low, hard-to-detect craft that also does intelligence collection; how do you see this threat evolving with China?

Ms. Wilson. Well, I expect that our intelligence agencies and the military will be doing technical assessments, not only of what they were seeking to collect but also of the wreckage now that it is being collected. But I actually think that this -- there are some things about this that I find confusing and that I think probably this committee should delve into at a classified level. The

Chinese have over 700 satellites on orbit. Half of them are intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites.

What were they thinking? What where they seeking to collect that they couldn't collect from low-Earth orbit? And like, as General Petraeus said, who approved this, and why? What did they intend, and did they predict correctly what our response would be? Did they understand how we would view this? And, if they didn't understand that, what are the implications of that for their future actions? I think those are really important questions. Did they miscalculate, and why, as to what the American response would be?

From a technical point of view, you know, we will know probably fairly shortly once examine the wreckage what the capability of the systems were and how they might be different from what they have on low-Earth orbit. But with almost 350 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites, it makes me wonder what did they think they could get at 60,000 feet that they are not getting from low-Earth orbit? What was their intent, and who approved it, or are these just programs that sometimes happens in the United States that are completely separate from each other? So I think there are a lot of questions that have less to do with our response and more to do with how did China get itself in this position, and did they miscalculate?

The Chairman. Thank you.

General Breedlove, I appreciate your comments concerning Russia and Ukraine. We definitely have gone from, you know, the Cold War to strategic cooperation to what is now a hot war, and your insights there are very important. I appreciate your calculation, your assessment that, from the intelligence side, we had stopped assessing sufficiently to understand what

Russia might do or their capabilities.

You mentioned the issue of being slow in providing additional weapons systems and our delay. I am also concerned about the public debate that we undertake with our allies about new weapons systems being provided and the concern that would be provocative or an escalation because that public debate, obviously, Russia hears too.

Your -- you have a great deal of experience in looking at Russia and certainly Putin himself. How do you see what we -- looking at what we are doing, what should we be doing differently in determining our military support for Russia and how we conduct diplomacy with our allies?

General Breedlove. Thank you for the question. And, sir, if I could just to the first part of your question, point out that I think even as the -- what we were using to look at Russia came so drastically down. We kept a very strong position on what their nuclear forces were doing, but I do believe we pretty much lost contact with the operational and tactical forces. And that is what gave us so much problem in the first two invasions of Ukraine and also in this third one.

Sir, the public debate in being provocative, I think that we have gotten to a place where we are a bit self-deterred. We always have a "no" answer first, and then, thankfully, in most cases we work our way around to a "yes" answer. But what that does is delay the effect for the Ukrainian forces in theater, and that is what I am talking about, trying to speed this back up.

I don't -- my answer about being provocative is sometimes seen as a bit over the top, but I just look at, Russia has amassed its forces, crossed an internationally recognized border, is invading and occupying a sovereign nation,

brutalizing it. They have weaponized rape. They have weaponized torture. They have weaponized murder. And they have exported, now, we believe almost 15,000 children back to Ukraine.

I typically ask people, when are we going to be provoked with facing this kind of thing? Now, I completely understand the sort or almost childish nature of my response, but we do have to be responsible. But I think that we need to examine that we are possibly too self-deterred in our initial responses.

The Chairman. Ms. Gordon, last question, you were, obviously, involved in policymaking at ODNI, and have a great heritage in that. You mentioned cyber.

Would you please discuss with us for a second the policy process that has been undergoing with offensive cyber? I am very concerned that it is not capabilities that are holding us back; it is consideration of policy itself. How do we balance the issues in our debate on offensive cyber capabilities so that we are at least developing them that can help defend us? Ms. Gordon?

General Petraeus. Thank you, Chairman.

It is a great question. I do think that, over the past 5 years, there has been movement towards streamlining the approval process so that it doesn't require every entity to have approval on every action. I think the best example was going against some of the Russian entities, looking at the 2020 election, and having -- our forces have the ability to take preemptive action without having to go through the whole community's approval before they took action. And I think there is a good history that we were successful in those.

I think two things need to happen now. One is you have to have an outcome in mind. You can't just ask "tell me all the capabilities you have" and

have them thrown out against some problem. You do have to have an outcome in mind. So what is the goal we are pursuing? And then it is against that backdrop that I believe the community has got to have a much clearer, for want of a better term, map of the nodes that are critical to all the capabilities that will matter.

I will chose just one area in Secretary Wilson's capability. In a contested space environment, I would rather keep it out of space and have us use our capabilities to go after the ground network. So you have to imagine that, task that, and then do the work. And I believe that this is an area where some of the information that we have in the private sector can help us do that mapping of that environment.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Ranking Member Himes.

Mr. Himes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to go back to the theme I was teasing out in my opening remarks, which is the potential for miscalculation and misinterpretation. I am haunted by this notion, if you read history, the analogy I would use is that oftentimes there is a whole lot of people putting a whole lot of dynamite into a room, somebody lays the fuse, and it is often a miscalculation that lights that fuse. I didn't mention in my opening remarks a new thing, which I think other generations didn't face, which is the capability to produce deep fakes, artificial intelligence.

We probably got a little taste of that, or we could have gotten a taste of that with respect to the Chinese balloon. Needless to say, all sorts of social media speculation, injudicious speculation on the part of certain Members of

Congress about whether this could be a platform for the delivery of bioweapons, et cetera. It is not inconceivable that deep fakes would, the next time this happens, actually have Xi in flawless English saying that there are bioweapons aboard or a video, otherwise undetectable, the deep fake video that shows something that would really rile the American population.

So, my question, I am going to start with Sue, but, General Petraeus, given one of your positions in the past, I would love to get your take on it too, and if I have more time, I will move over, but what do we need to do better to understand intentions, to understand internal politics in Beijing and in Moscow, to understand the motives, fears, and objectives of the leaders there, in as much as it matters, to understand poplar opinion and pressure? I understand there are very real limits to what we can say in open session, but this strikes me as crucial, so I would just love to hear your take on all of this.

How are we doing, and how could we do better, Ms. Gordon?

Ms. Gordon. So assessment of intention is something that the CIA has been -- its watchword and is the foundation of human intelligence, and although we don't talk about that as much, that is still an area that they ply aggressively. I think we probably underuse data analysis as a surrogate for understanding intention. Looking at massive amounts of data, not just textural data but patterns of exercise, patterns of behavior can reveal intent.

My example is I may intend to go up to Annapolis on a beautiful Saturday to sit on millionaires' alley and watch the boats go back and forth. If you look at the EZPass of mine for the past 5 years, you know that I am going to go to Costco, go to the gas station, fill up my gas can, and mow my lawn. We are underusing the massive amounts of data that can help us with intention.

And then the third thing is we really --

Mr. Himes. Sorry. Let me stop you there. Is that a collection problem or an analysis problem or both?

General Petraeus. Both, right? It -- we really do need to address this issue of a world of openly available data and what they can allow us to do. That is an analysis problem because the methodology by which you do that has some specificity to it.

The third thing I was going to say is we really need to address information disorder and misinformation as you suggest, not just at deep fakes but actually straight up influence. That has got to be a focus, not just for the Intelligence Community but a national focus to work at. Specifically, in Intelligence Community, right now we are flummoxed by deep fakes because they have gotten so good. You could watch a video of me saying almost anything and not know that it is not me. But cross-domain AI, knowing that that can't be said there or then is a way for us to go. So I think there is a lot that can be done with data on all fronts, but this information piece.

And then one last thing -- I am sorry to take so long -- I actually think your point on miscalculation is not just a technical one. But I -- you didn't ask me about the balloon, but what I would have said is that it is a metaphor for our problem with China. They are massively capable, and they show massive moments of lack of judgment. And what that means is we are sitting on a line where any miscalculation can lead to bad effect, and we have got to sort those things out by any means.

Mr. Himes. Thank you.

General Petraeus.

General Petraeus. Yeah. It is actually pretty straightforward, at least to explain it, but very difficult to operationalize it. I mean, basically, what we need to do is steal secrets and recruit sources, and do it in every domain: human intelligence, open-source intelligence, signals, imagery, cyber, et cetera, and enable all of that better than we have been in the past. A --

Mr. Himes. Let me push on that because I want to go one level deeper, and then I will be respectful of my colleagues' time.

General Petraeus. Sure.

Mr. Himes. You were Director of CIA. One of the things that has impressed me is, in this world of digital dust, if you have a phone, we know who you are; they know who are you. If you don't have a phone, they know who are you.

So go one level deeper for me: How do we solve that problem with respect to HUMINT?

General Petraeus. Well, I mean, when it comes to HUMINT -- and now, again, this is an issue that I identified, how do you actually carryout clandestine operations in an area of ubiquitous surveillance? I mean, we have to -- there are ways of doing this; we just have to resource it more. And it is really worth digging into in very closed sessions with the Director of the CIA. I would also ask -- again, Director Burns I think has taken a very good initiative; both in the digital world he has pursued this, and then also with respect to Chinese, establish the Chinese Center of Excellence. Ask him, does he have enough humans in that?

Are they -- and, again, remember I talked about investing in human capital. Do we really have the bench of real experts with native Mandarin

Chinese, if at all possible, or near to that, and then, all of the other capabilities around that for what is, I think, arguably the toughest target in the world, think about trying to operate, again, in China with a normal tradecraft.

You know, when people were running surveillance detection routes at 10 and 12 hours a decade ago, that is before you had a lot of the additional issues of surveillance that have emerged there. So I think you have got to work your way through all of these. Again, it comes back to, again, stealing secrets and recruiting sources in all these areas. And in a very structured and organized way, I think you can actually look at that. And then, when you look at a specific target, such as China, you can ask about each of these and see how that is being integrated and brought together in the China Center of Excellence in the CIA in particular.

Mr. Himes. Thank you. And I yield back.

The Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member.

I am told that the clocks now work even though they didn't work at our spot. I believe you guys have one that is visible to you, and we have one for the members that is now to the left. So I ask for everybody's patience. Sorry about the fact that the system is not working. I will bring your attention to it, is now going to commence, I believe.

Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, all, for being here today. I really appreciate all your testimonies and sharing a lot of your expertise with us in the time that we have today. You know, this committee itself brings a lot of experience as was really mentioned in General Petraeus' opening statement. You know, we have people on this committee that have the

experience of actually developing intelligence and many on this committee that have been on the receiving end, interpreting intelligence and acting upon intelligence. So this is a pretty good mix that we have going into today. And, you know, we are off to a good start on this committee. We are stressing the importance of the bipartisan work that we can do here and how we must do it that way if we are going to be successful.

One of the concerns that I have is not only us coming together as a committee but our relationship with the Intelligence Community. And this is a two-way street, where trust has to be developed, and sometimes it is lacking. You know, we have a responsibility here to represent not only the American people but our colleagues in Congress that don't have access to where we are. And we have to sell, for example, the IAA to our other Members of Congress when they will never see it.

So there has to be a lot of trust. And, you know, our colleagues do see things like the FISA Report from the IG on FISA, and things start to breakdown, and we have problems there. You know, what I have been able to observe in the military and then being here and seeing our agencies, a lot of times in the military we have the UCMJ, where unethical is unlawful. See, in the agencies, it seems that unethical is a little slap on the hand, and "oh, sorry, I shouldn't have done that." So then we couple that with situations where we have been dealing with the IC in this committee, and they tell us they are not going to answer our questions. They are not going to tell us this or that.

Well, who has oversight? So how do we -- how do we go about changing this? Because we might see something now from the IC, and they say they have moderate confidence, and we might say, well, then, we have low

confidence because of this lack of transparency, this lack of cooperation.

So I don't know if we need to set rules of engagement, rules of cooperation, but I would like to direct my question on that and how do we improve this to Dr. Wilson because you have sat here, and you have sat there, and I think that would be helpful if we could hear from you on that.

[11:03 a.m.]

Ms. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman.

There is a responsibility in statute for the administration to keep this committee and your counterpart in the Senate fully and currently informed. Fully and currently informed.

Now, at the same time, as members, you have to engender -- I mean, there is a gap. You have to engender trust in your seriousness as a committee and also as individual members.

It was a very rare time when someone said to the committee or to even individual members, "Well, we are not going to tell you that," because it usually got escalated to the chair and the ranking member, and it became a very serious discussion very quickly.

And this committee has responsibilities that are different from every other committee in the Congress. You are entrusted with oversight of classified matters. And the American people have to trust you to do your job.

That tension between the different branches of government played out in spades in the changes that led up to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act amendments, and it was a pretty tense time. But we got through it, and we are better as a country for it, because this committee did its work.

So I would encourage you to be serious in your work but insist on your responsibilities under the Constitution as a separate branch of government.

Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you for that. I appreciate it.

Yeah, General Petraeus?

General Petraeus. You know, it goes both ways. We worked very, very

hard to meet our responsibilities that we felt -- for example, I met every single month with the Big Four of the House and the Senate and then also, obviously, a lot with the Big Four of the HPSCI and the SSCI. But, beyond that, again, in almost informal sessions, we would do coffees with the SSCI and with the HPSCI, closed sessions, and just have back-and-forth. And it really was, will everyone make themselves available?

And we worked very, very hard, again, to meet the requirement that we would impose for every month to meet individually, by the way, with each of the Big Four and then to meet with the chairmen and the ranking members.

We also brought the Intelligence Big Four out to the Agency on a pretty regular basis, and we tried to, in each case, introduce them to some new element of the Agency that they might not have seen before. For example, during my particular time, it was really important that they see the Counterterrorism Center -- they had not seen it, of all things -- introduce them to the Open Source Center. There was one senior person that actually didn't realize we had an Open Source Center.

And so we would have a couple of structured engagements like that out there at Langley or some other location and then sit down and have dinner together. And it was all very efficient, and, you know, everybody would be out of there by 8:00 p.m.

But if you all can make that possible, I think that is very, very helpful. It is all about, obviously, open communication. And, again, we felt a huge responsibility to answer every question that was asked of us.

Dr. Wenstrup. That is great advice from both of you. I appreciate it. We need to form those relationships. And I think it was another General who

once said, we can only move with the speed of trust.

So thank you, and yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Carson.

Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman.

I know I don't speak for myself when I say our hearts go out to the victims of the horrific earthquake that just occurred in Turkey.

You know, this tragedy just compounds a humanitarian crisis that has been ongoing for over a decade in this region. What potential security impact could this have, given Turkey's position on NATO's southern flank?

General Breedlove. Sir, thanks for the question.

You are right; this has been building for some time. And the Turkish border has become very porous to movement of not only those who deserve the help of the world but those who intend harm for the world. And that throughput of refugees from Turkey into the rest of Europe has been a highway now for some time, and it is worrisome even more today, sir, I would offer.

And I will close with this: that because our relationship with the leadership of Turkey is becoming ever more challenged, I think our cooperation on those issues is going down somewhat. And I think that is something that, at the level of the agencies and at the level of your committee and others, we could use some oversight and help.

Mr. Carson. Thank you.

General Petraeus. I think we are going to have to have a degree of strategic patience with the situation and the relationship with Turkey. And I think we actually are demonstrating that, frankly.

This is a hugely frustrating situation. It is very fraught. There are

numerous crosscutting currents. When you look at the relationships between Turkey and Syria, then the Syrian Kurds, who were supporting in northeastern Syria, who allegedly are close to the PKK, Turkish Kurd terrorists -- we think they are under control; that is not shared -- the relationship between Turkey and Russia and Turkey and Ukraine, all of these, and then Turkey within NATO and its crucial geostrategic and geopolitical situation and location, we have to get through this.

And I think we have to be careful not to let short-term frustration result in long-term dislocation of the relationship. That would be very, very damaging.

And then, of course, you have the issue where Turkey is holding up the pending membership of Sweden and Finland, which want to join NATO as well.

So there are lots of areas for frustration -- the purchase of the S-300, S-400 that Turkey did that obviated the possibility of the F-35 and so forth. We have to work our way through this, though. And it is going to require a degree of strategic patience, I think.

Mr. Carson. I yield back, Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Chairman.

A little awkward when you haven't been able to join you with your opening comments, and I apologize for that. And I think as the chairman and I think all of you understand as well, you kind of split your time. So I apologize if I follow up on some questions that you feel like you adequately answered before.

Before I get to that, thank you all for being here and for your service. I know every one of you; we all do. We know your reputations. We know the

service that you have provided, and I consider some of you close friends. So thank you for being with us.

I don't want to spend a lot of time on it, but I do think I want to come back to the larger strategic questions regarding the balloon incident of the last week or so. And one of the things that I think we maybe don't discuss enough is -- or understand well enough is what China's intentions were in doing this and the timing of doing it.

And I would ask you all, first, if you -- and I know you don't know this; none of us do -- but what is your estimation of whether, say, even President Xi was aware of this and the timing of this? Because it wasn't a coincidence that it happened the week that we expected to send Secretary Blinken there.

And it is very unlikely, I think, that they thought this balloon would not be observed. At 60,000 feet, it was almost certain, as it traversed the entire Nation. If it had gone across a small portion of the U.S., maybe not, but probably going to be observed, and they knew that.

Do you think that this was a statement, a political statement, regarding the Secretary's visit? And, if so, how should we read that?

And, again, I am asking you to speculate, but if you have an informed opinion on it, I would appreciate it.

And I don't know where to begin. I will just leave it to you who might have a view on this.

General Breedlove. I will take the first swing.

I would like to go back to the miscalculation piece. I completely agree and respect the other things offered about the balloon so far. I would add to that list of concerns that miscalculation is often a result of the enemy

conditioning us.

We saw Russia condition us before 2014. We have seen Russia conditioning us before this most recent invasion. And is this a part of conditioning by the Chinese to engender miscalculation, overreaction, or to test?

And I would just add that.

Mr. Stewart. And I think that is a great point, in the sense that we see them doing the same thing with their excursions in Taiwanese airspace, for example, again and again in a very aggressive manner that is designed for that purpose, I think.

Anyone else?

General?

General Petraeus. Well, this was so blatant, though. And I mentioned earlier that, again, the big question is, was there an approval process? Did it get to the top? If it got to the top and there was really the intention to float this right over the continental United States, it calls into question what the intention is for the relationship, given the pending visit of Secretary Blinken, which they seemingly had wanted to do.

Again, there seemed to be an effort on the part of President Xi. He did away with Zero COVID. He has reduced some of the intrusion in the tech space and the Chinese economy. They were softening a bit of the wolf warrior diplomacy, lightening up on some of the other issues that have really backfired, in my view, have been counterproductive for them. And you have this visit upcoming and, of course, President Xi planning to visit here in October or November.

So all of these different -- pointing in one direction. And then you have,

was there a decision to do this, which completely blows all of that up, or was there not a process, which should give us enormous pause as well?

You know, again, as you noted, though, it is just hugely perplexing. No one really knows right now.

And, again, it comes back to why we need to have more understanding of what goes on inside a very, very difficult place to explore, and that is, of course, what is going on in the closest inner circle of the Politburo Standing Committee and particularly those right around President Xi.

Mr. Stewart. Well, I do think this is perhaps the most important question we can try to answer. And I don't want to belabor it. Two more points, if I could.

Number one is, if this wasn't made at President Xi's level or his cabinet around him, someone is certainly getting fired over this, because it has turned into an enormous issue for both sides. And I can't imagine that poor guy standing up and saying, "Yeah, whoops, I maybe should have told you."

But, also, as my colleague Dr. Wenstrup points out, I mean, I think they may be testing the American people and our reaction to this as well. I think that that has been, I think, helpful for them to see or interesting for them to see how the American people reacted.

Ms. Gordon, if I could -- yes, ma'am.

Ms. Gordon. I will just add to those two points.

One, I think their intention is clear. They are developing increasing capabilities to survey and be able to penetrate the sovereign territory, whether that is in the South China Sea or Taiwan or here. That is their intention. So that is clear.

This seems like an unusual event and makes little sense in having to do it. But don't be distracted by the event away from the intention of what they are developing.

I do think it provides for them a fantastic ops test, especially in aggre- -- if it turns out that there were others, as they understand how we do it, and especially if you imagine that this is a precursor to something that you would not put over the United States but, rather, over a contested area that did not have the ability to do something about it.

So just also focus on the intention of their overall program and to incur our work -- our --

Mr. Stewart. Well, my time has expired. I will just conclude with this. I mean, if I were the decision-maker, I would make it very clear that we will destroy any balloon before it enters our sovereign airspace again.

And if any of you object to that or would disagree, please let me know, but I think that should be our policy from here forward.

Chairman, I am sorry. I yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Krishnamoorthi.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of these witnesses. Your exemplary record of public service is really amazing and incredible.

I want to direct my attention -- direct my first question to Dr. Wilson.

I understand you are the president of the University of Texas, El Paso.

You know, back in 2009, a Turkish graduate of the California Institute of Technology and MIT, a man named Erdal Arikan, published a paper about fast data transfers, to make it more possible to speed 4G to something better than

4G.

He looked for academic funding, and he also looked for a visa and he looked for a way to stay in the United States, and he didn't get it. He went back to Turkey, and guess who recruited him? The Chinese Communist Party. He is the father of 5G in the People's Republic of China because we turned him away.

How important is it to upgrade our immigration system and take our immigration system to the next level to compete with the Chinese Communist Party?

Ms. Wilson. Congressman, I think it is very important. And I would say there are two parts to this.

First, we want the best and brightest to continue to want to come to this country and build this country.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And they want to come.

Ms. Wilson. Second, we also need to make sure that the pathway is there for the kids who were born here to also get those advanced degrees.

And so it is both. And I see it as a university president, although a very high percentage of graduate students at UTEP are actually from the United States of America, a disproportionate number for a top-tier research institution.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. I think what we are seeing over and over again -- our employers tell us this; of course universities tell us this: We are training the next generation of scientists, whether they are in the private sector or at universities, to go off back to their home country or to the People's Republic of China to compete against us. And now we are playing a very dangerous game, as you know, from a technological standpoint.

Second question: By a raise of hands, does anybody have TikTok on their phone?

Neither do I.

TikTok has as its parent company ByteDance. And ByteDance is a Chinese company that must abide by the 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires that all user data be accessible to the CCP and that, if it gets disclosed to them, it not be disclosed to anyone else.

Sue, you are nodding your head. I think you know about this law. How important is it for the CCP and the different companies that obviously are based in China for its purposes of espionage abroad?

Ms. Gordon. I was talking about intention of China. It is clear that China intends to collect as much data as it can and to apply its massive compute power and its data analytics to be able to have practice with it far in advance of when we have the opportunity to practice for many reasons.

Anything that goes across a Chinese system can be compelled to go back. So, when I talked earlier about why --

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. My guess is they don't have a FISA system over there.

Ms. Gordon. They do not.

Listen, if you asked me, I love the rule of law. I love privacy. Our system wins every day and twice on Sunday. But we have to recognize what is happening.

And when I said earlier that one of the reasons why we have to talk about technology vulnerability, it is because the decisions that led to the proliferation of some of these technologies is because the private sector did not realize what

they were doing with some of the choices they made about who they let invest, where they offshored their technology, and how they integrated it.

So getting the Intelligence Community, the national security community to be much more explicit about which technologies are strategically significant and which are vulnerable I think will help us get ahead of this in the future.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you.

General Petraeus, what does victory in Ukraine look like for the people of Ukraine? And can you give us a timeframe on when victory would be ideally -- well, when do you think victory will be achieved?

General Petraeus. You are asking me to answer the question that I asked in the hearing of my embedded journalist during the fight to Baghdad, "Tell me how this ends," which was rhetorical.

For the people of Ukraine, victory is Ukraine whole and free. For them, it is the entire country free of Russia. And that includes the Donbas and Crimea, which were occupied, of course, in 2014, not just what has been seized since 24 February of last year.

I believe that how this ends is a negotiated resolution that happens only when Russia, when President Putin recognizes that the war in Ukraine is unsustainable on the battlefield, keeping in mind that Russia has already lost now maybe as many as nine times the soldiers in a year that it lost in nearly a decade in Afghanistan, which was unsustainable for the USSR.

So number one is unsustainable on the battlefield.

And we need to do everything we can -- and I am with General Breedlove on this -- to enable the Ukrainians to hasten the day when Russia realizes it is unsustainable, and also unsustainable on the home front because of the

financial, economic, and personal sanctions and export controls.

And we need to continue to tighten those as well, every way that we can, to hasten the day when Putin recognizes that the damage that these are doing to the economy -- which has probably set back at least a generation.

Now, sadly, because Russia is sent from central casting as a country to withstand sanctions, being a top three oil, gas, and coal producer and with a lot of strategic minerals and so forth, it is more difficult to bring them to their knees economically or at least bring them to the point where they recognize that they need to get out of this war. That is on the Russian side.

And then on the Ukrainian side, they will recognize, obviously, we have to stop this endless destruction of our civilian infrastructure -- electricity, transmission, water systems, and so forth. And Ukraine will desperately need a Marshall-like plan to help reconstruct this terribly damaged infrastructure and economy and an iron-clad security guarantee. And that needs to be either NATO membership or, if it is not possible, once again, because of perhaps Turkey or Hungary or something, then it needs to be a U.S.-led, ironclad security guarantee.

Because without that guarantee, the reconstruction program won't be successful. What made the Marshall Plan succeed was not the $120 billion in today's currency support to the Western European countries in the wake of World War II; it was our security umbrella for them.

Now, what I can't tell you is when will those conditions obtain. What I will tell you, again, together with Phil Breedlove, is, we should be doing everything we can to enable that to happen as quickly as we can, both on the battlefield and with respect to the Russian home front.

And we should recognize that Vladimir Putin has established red line after red line and blown through all of those. Yes, we should be concerned about needless provocation or escalation, but I think that we can be over-concerned about that, and that we have been on a number of occasions, while noting that $29 billion of arms, ammunition, and other assistance is extraordinary and we have led the world magnificently in providing that and in the financial, economic, and personal sanctions and export controls.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Crawford.

Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the members of the panel. This is an impressive panel anywhere you go, so thank you for being here.

General Petraeus, I have heard you say this on a couple occasions during your testimony, and that is that recruit sources steal secrets. Recruit sources steal secrets. And I think it is safe to say and fair to say that the undergirding of everything that is done in the IC is really based on human capital.

And so my concern is, one, do we think we are becoming over-reliant on technology?

And, number two, how do we address -- and I think you are uniquely qualified among the panelists to address this because you have served at the highest commands in the military and also been the director of an important component of our Intelligence Community, that being the CIA.

How do we address the career path of people in the IC with respect to career development, ongoing career development, what we see in the military and the enlisted ranks? We have PLDC, BNOC, ANOC, Sergeant Majors

Academy. We see in the officer ranks all the different colleges and the degrees they can acquire. How do we mirror that in the IC and make the proper investments for career tracks for human capital?

General Petraeus. The way we mirror that is, we provide a personnel account. It is authorized and appropriated for at the CIA, which is the agency that is most affected because it is the only completely civilian agency within the community.

In fact, even the other agencies that have large numbers of civilians -- NGA -- she was the deputy -- NSA -- even they are hooked in to the greater DOD.

So you have nothing -- as I mentioned earlier and Representative Spanberger knows very well, there is very good on-boarding, there are periodic schools, but oftentimes the clandestine service officers don't even get to finish their language training, much less actually go to the equivalent of, as you have correctly noted with your background -- and I highlighted the number of military members here who know how extensive the professional development courses are in the military for commissioned, noncommissioned, and warrant officers. There is nothing like it in the CIA.

And the way that it is enabled in the military needs to be mirrored in the CIA -- that is, to give them a personnel account that allows for a certain number of their officers to be in school, professional development courses, and so forth, and for those individuals from the Agency that have to be part of the schoolhouse, to run that as well. It is really quite simple.

I do believe we have to be very careful not to be over-reliant on technology. Human capital still is the most important asset of the overall

Intelligence Community, but especially, again, that of the CIA, while noting that we need to enable that human capital in every way we possibly can, especially given the challenges --

Mr. Crawford. Let me interject here.

General Petraeus. -- of an era of ubiquitous surveillance and much more open-source information.

Mr. Crawford. On the subject of protecting that human capital, we have seen in the military a very aggressive, if not adequate, address of sexual assault in the military. And my concern is, in the IC and particularly in the CIA, that there is not an adequate address of this.

And I think the clandestine nature of it makes it maybe a little more difficult, but no less concerning, that we provide the proper counseling and, quite frankly, even across the spectrum of, you know, PTSD that military has suffered.

What are we doing to provide the services necessary for individuals within the IC to receive the kind of counseling they need to be retained in the IC, to continue on their career path, without being stigmatized?

And that applies to sexual assault as well, because it is a hard thing even in the military to jeopardize potentially your career --

General Petraeus. Yep.

Mr. Crawford. -- and I would think that is even doubly hard in the clandestine nature of the IC.

And your comments on that?

General Petraeus. Sure. Let me start, and then let me tag-team with my former deputy director for support.

Mr. Crawford. Absolutely.

General Petraeus. I felt, when I transitioned from the military to the CIA, that actually the CIA was way ahead of the U.S. military when it came to all of these aspects that you are discussing. There is an affinity group for everybody. They have long since gotten rid of, you know, Don't Ask, Don't Tell or any of that stuff. None of that was there. Way ahead.

That said, I am not saying that everything was adequate. And given, again, the clandestine nature of some of the activities, it is certainly possible that there were inadequacies.

Beyond that, you do touch on something that is very important. We have asked a great deal, particularly of a small subset, those within the special activities, those that are actually carrying out the covert action in particular, without getting into more detail. There is actually a foundation that exists to provide what the Agency can't provide, because of resources, called the Third Option Foundation. I am a member of its board. And we do try to see to the needs of such individuals and of their family members, which is above and beyond what the organization can actually provide.

And I do think this is worth looking into, especially, again, with respect to the CIA, which has borne the brunt of two decades of the global war on terror.

But, Sue.

Ms. Gordon. Yeah. If you will allow, just three quick comments. I totally support General Petraeus on that.

You know, one of the things for the CIA, mission is so dominant in its culture that I think, over time, that leads people to be too focused on this and not

attentive to these things. I think mental health, sexual harassment, making sure the resources are there -- there has been movement over the years -- you can't do enough on this one.

Because, culturally, its history is not in warfighting, and it is incredibly mission-driven, and that can leave people to hold to themselves what they really need to share and get support with. So I would agree with that push.

When it comes to technology, technology without humans -- technology just isn't a magic button, but it is a technical world. And there does need to be investment in leadership, particularly to understand the risks associated with technology so that it can do decision-making with it as a partner.

And then I think the last thing that I would say is, look at continuing security clearance opportunities to let people move in and out over the course of their career. Because part of their development is not a straight-line progression within the closed environment, but let them go out and work in policy, let them work in industry without having to lose the time with their clearance.

So I think you are on the right track, Congressman.

Mr. Crawford. Thank you. I appreciate that. And I am going to continue to pursue that, because I think it is important.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Ms. Houlahan.

Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.

And I would also like to associate myself with the remarks of my colleague with regard to a real interest in security clearance processes and being able to have people come in and out of their positions and jobs.

But I actually am going to focus my time on a couple of other issues.

Dr. Wilson, I don't know if you remember, but March of 2019, you were one of the very first people to welcome me to the Hill. I had a terrific breakfast with you and Representative Sherrill and Representative Luria. And it was a remarkable time, because every last person we had breakfast with was a woman. Many, many, many stars were represented in that room, and it was a real feeling that we had made some enormous progress. So, grateful to have the chance to talk to you now.

You in your testimony said, quote/unquote, "No agency is responsible for scientific and technical intelligence collection."

And, Ms. Gordon, you also said something to the effect of, someone must be looking at technology and looking at ways that it can be exploited. And it sounds like we have a gap, you know, a very clear gap.

So, two questions.

I can name things like deep fakes and 23andMe and TikTok and all of those kinds of things, but could you, each and every one, give an example that is able to be given in an open forum of what keeps you up at night that is something that is in this space?

And would you be able, Dr. Wilson and Ms. Gordon, to talk about what the solution set is, therefore? Is it another agency, or is there something else that you would propose as a solution?

Ms. Wilson. Congresswoman, let me start, and then I will defer to Sue.

So let me give you an example of what I think part of the problem is.

In particularly military intelligence but also more generally, we have experts who look at, what is the next incremental change that there might be in a

radar system or in an ICBM or an aircraft or something? But what we are not doing is scanning the horizon across all scientific and technical domains and then going deep if we see something of interest.

As to where it should reside, I mean, there are some areas where they do some scientific and technical intelligence analysis, but I actually think it probably needs to be structured differently. We don't need all of -- we don't need to claim that we have experts on everything, because if you divide scientific and technical expertise down to its granular finest from an academic point of view, there are about 100,000 subcategories. What you need are the systems to do the early scan and then pull together the Nation's experts to do a deep dive in that area.

So the path-breaking innovation and incremental innovation are very different things. And if we are always looking at, "What do we think they are going to do to increment on this?" we will miss the path-breaking innovation. And that is what I am worried about. And I think we have to worry about it now more than ever.

As to where it sits, it doesn't really matter to me. If we do this well, it will be able to draw on the expertise in the defense industrial base, in the academic space, from the military, from the civilian analytical community, and swarm problems and then disperse again.

Ms. Gordon. It is such a good question, and thank you for asking it.

Secretary Wilson says it really well; there are plenty of places that do S&T intelligence. You know, the CIA has done it for a long time. There is a national intelligence officer.

I think where the gap that I see is, it tends to be an absolutist view of what

our foreign adversaries and competitors are doing, rather than putting that in action with the things that we are trying to do. Right? It is almost an artifact of intelligence trying to maintain its independence, that it essentially wants to assess it for what it is.

And I think this is an interesting moment across the board where we can't be afraid of looking at intelligence in terms of being relevant to the policies we are making even though it is not colored by it. And technology is one of those. We have to know what we are trying to achieve when you take those areas.

I think there are lots of solutions to it, as Secretary Wilson mentioned. Open-source data can really help. Focus on it. This does not have to be classified work. It can be in combination. And, again, I think moving people back and forth in terms of use and assessment is the way that you are really going to get at it.

Ms. Houlahan. No, I appreciate that. I would love to follow up with you both.

I only have 20 seconds, and my remaining questions have to do with: All of you all mentioned workforce issues and making sure that we have a better workforce that is more qualified.

One idea that has been brought up and I have been championing is a cyber and digital service academy. I would love to follow up with you guys, since I know I don't have any time, on that and also the Cybersecurity Workforce Expansion Act as well.

If it is all right, I will submit those questions to you guys and would like to follow up with you as well.

[The information follows:]

******** COMMITTEE INSERT ********

Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, and I yield back.

General Petraeus. Big thumbs-up for those.

The Chairman. As the members and our panel know, the clock wasn't working when this first began, so it has put us back in time. I am going to have to ask if we could stick with the 5-minute limit. And I am going to ask the panelists to assist the members in trying to get their answers within that time period so we can get to everyone.

Trent Kelly.

Mr. Kelly. This shouldn't count against my time, because I think you are targeting me. No.

Secretary Wilson, this is kind of for you, because you have been on both sides of -- you have been both in administrations and you have also been in the House of Representatives on this committee.

And one of the things that is most frustrating to me right now is the FBI -- and it kind of deals across this, but, like, right now, there are current things that our Senate and House Oversight need to know, but DOJ is saying, "Well, it is a current, ongoing investigation."

That is an internal memo -- that is not a statute, that is not a law -- that is an internal memo which prevents us from getting that.

Personally, it matters to me. I was on the receiving end of an assassination attempt at the baseball shooting in 2017. And the FBI still has that categorized as "under investigation" even though the assassin is dead.

So what do we need to do in the House of Representatives, Secretary -- and I want to use just 2-1/2 minutes. What do we need to do to make sure that DOJ -- listen, we are not spying, but there are things that we

need to know. And we are a very select group of people on the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, that when we have a need to know, it is not that they don't want us to know, it is that we have a need to know.

And how do we broach that, Secretary?

Ms. Wilson. Very good question and a difficult one. But my advice to you would be to focus on the rules and the process, as opposed to the specific case, and get the processes right, get the tension between the branches or oversight right.

And as I mentioned -- I am not sure whether you were here in my opening statement, but I actually am concerned about FBI law enforcement information that is passed to other agencies.

And agencies have a lot of power, and it is not just, you know, where you stand in line at TSA at the airport. It is whether you have a security clearance, whether you can work for a company that does contracting for the Federal Government -- a whole lot of things that they can affect your life and your livelihood.

And I don't think, from my perspective, that there is adequate oversight and review of pre-prosecution law-enforcement-gathered data. And I think this is the committee that needs to do that.

Mr. Kelly. And, you know, perception is reality. And right now we have a huge perception problem with the American public, that they don't trust agencies to be doing the right thing. And we have to work on that. And that is a joint problem -- that is, they also don't trust the House of Representatives or anything else. So we have to work on that.

General Petraeus or Director or whatever I should call you -- you have so

many titles -- but I want to talk a little bit about, in the military, we lost a lot of time in fighting an insurgency type of war, and we lost our focus on near-peer competition.

We also -- the reason we are the greatest military in the world is because of the jointness in our ability to fight Air Force, Marines, Navy, Coast Guard, all those pieces and parts.

How good is the IC in refocusing on the peer competition? How do we need to restructure? What do we need to do?

And are they as good at jointness, the NSA working with the IC, working with DOD, and all those three-letter agencies working together?

General Petraeus. I think the equivalent of jointness, actually, in the Intelligence Community outside the United States is exceptional, because everyone works for the station chief, who is also the DNI rep, and you have unity of command, if you will, purpose, effort, and so forth.

The challenge, traditionally -- and, actually, even pre-9/11, I was overseas, deployed, and doing -- I had both a U.S. hat that was essentially clandestine, if you will, and we all worked really well together. Obviously, back in the States, pre-9/11, that level of coordination was not adequate. Obviously, we failed to detect and prevent the 9/11 attacks. The intelligence reforms have sought to remedy that. I think they have done a good job.

By the way, I am one who believes in the intelligence reform, although, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I think we have to look at the unnecessary duplication and layering that has been created in the expansion of certain headquarters. And that is where I think you need to focus. I think, overseas, again, the jointness is quite exemplary.

And I also think that the community writ large, especially the CIA -- and, again, that is who is heading these overseas stations and to whom everyone works, including, by the way, the FBI if they are doing any kind of overseas activity, just in the same way that CIA stations, we all know they exist in the United States -- they report through or coordinate with the FBI special agent in charge of a particular municipality or region when it comes to certain functions as well.

I think the transition is ongoing. I think Director Burns, in particular, has made a number of very good changes. But I think it is worth having him in to explain what it is that he is doing in particular and then, you know, judge whether or not there are some areas in which he might need more resources to enable further such of those activities.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Ms. Plaskett.

Ms. Plaskett. Thank you very much.

It is a pleasure to be here and to receive this information from you all.

I have a number of questions, so I am going to try and move rather quickly.

Dr. Wilson, you talked -- and I thought it was fascinating -- about the complexity of the challenges related to information and the volume of information that is out there, particularly because of social media.

I was wondering if you, as well as Ms. Gordon, could discuss how AI could be utilized to support the culling and disaggregating this kind of information so they could be brought to the top and utilized for intelligence purposes. And do we have enough funding and support for that?

Ms. Wilson. It is a fantastic question, and I think it is a particularly timely one. I am sure some of you, over Christmas, played with ChatGPT.

But think about that today -- and then there was an article out about the other companies that are going to be competing in that space earlier this week in The Wall Street Journal. But play with that today, and think, a year from now, it will be 10, 20, 100 times more powerful.

How can we use that tool to enable a deeper understanding, while also recognizing that it can make mistakes? How do we protect from the mistakes it might make? How do we allow our analysts and put into our systems ways to, instead of giving you a whole sheet of possible answers, to start to get deeper into what the possible answers might be?

So it is another tool. It is like when you first -- you are too young, but I was in college when they came out with the TI-53 calculator. You know, it was a new tool. This is a new tool. How do we integrate it, train with it, use it to our advantage? Because our adversaries certainly will be.

Before turning it over to Sue, there is one other piece, which is, how do we think about how our adversaries will use this, and how we can create doubt in their minds that they might not completely understand. And so there are huge challenges here.

Sue.

Ms. Gordon. Just two quick things, because you said you had a lot of questions.

Number one, for the national security community, for lots of reasons, investing in AI assurance to make sure that it can be trusted, that we understand it, is disproportionately important for free and open societies. So that is a really

good area.

And the second thing, I think it holds great potential in the information disorder front in order to identify -- I am not talking content -- true from false in terms of, is it legitimately produced or is it the product of some illegitimate source? I think that is a next thing that can really be useful.

Thank you.

Ms. Plaskett. Thank you.

General Petraeus, you discuss as possible challenges that are facing the Intelligence Community -- one of those is an interest that I have a very deep interest in, is failed and failing states.

I think that, in particular, in areas of Africa as well as in the Caribbean, as we look at Haiti, we are seeing failed states being created.

And I'm wondering as to the United States engagement or what type of engagement you think we should have in those failed states.

General Petraeus. Well, you know, the big idea here, ideally, is that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and if you can prevent situations from getting worse.

The same is true, frankly, with how we have to continue to keep an eye on extremist elements. Again, if you take your eye off them, you are going to have a much bigger problem. They will reconstitute, as was the case with the Islamic State in Iraq after the departure of our combat forces. And the Prime Minister -- it was his decisions that really unhinged a situation that was actually pretty good.

So it is all about, I think, trying to prevent this from getting worse, at the very least; if you can and the conditions are possible, usually involving decent

political leadership and rule of law and so forth, what you are trying to support, can you actually improve the situation?

I might add that a country at which you might want to look is actually much closer to home than even those. It is Mexico, where the rule of law is very seriously challenged by what can only be described now as, in many respects, you know, these are criminal empires.

Ms. Plaskett. Uh-huh.

General Petraeus. And you actually need a counterinsurgency, but the insurgents are not ideological or extremists; they are criminal in nature. And they are gradually eroding the rule of law in our southern neighbor, which is a critical partner in the North American economy under the U.S.-Canada-Mexico Agreement.

Ms. Plaskett. Thank you.

And I know I am running out of time, but, Mr. Breedlove, at some other point, maybe you could talk about -- you discussed budgetary constraints, and General Petraeus talked about unnecessary duplication and layering which hinder us from efficiencies and savings in personnel, and how that duplication in one area maybe can be shifted to other areas in which those budgetary constraints have allowed us not to have those personnel.

But thank you very much for the opportunity to question these outstanding witnesses.

The Chairman. Thank you so much.

Mr. LaHood.

Mr. LaHood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all of you for your service and your valuable testimony

here today.

Dr. Wilson, I want to just touch on one point related to China. You mentioned in your opening statement the economic relationship between the U.S. and China.

We just stood up the new Select Committee on China. I am proud to be selected as a part of that, along with Mr. Gallagher and Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And it provides a great opportunity for us to highlight the malign activities of the CCP but also come up with economic solutions and proposals.

One of the biggest issues with China is the U.S. companies that are embedded in China. You know, I think about the BRT, the Business Roundtable, and the Chamber of Commerce, and, you know, go down the list of the iconic American companies that have been in China for 40 years. But many of them make excuses for the CCP every single day. They justify their relationship there.

And as we look at how do we deal with that relationship between, you know, these companies and businesses that continue to make concessions for the CCP -- you know, whether it is when we talk about the autonomy of Taiwan or the democracy in Taiwan, "Well, don't talk about that." They don't want to have a conversation about that. If we talk about Xinjiang and the violations there and the forced labor camps, again, that is not something they want to deal with, you know. And it is the double standard, really, of, you know, you look at the violation of religious liberties, privacy rights, the surveillance state that China is, but many of these companies turn a blind eye to that.

So, as we look at the Select Committee on China and how we deal with the economic relationship, this is not the -- this is not what Russia was 40 years

ago, because of the economic relationship. I am wondering if you have suggestions on that.

Ms. Wilson. That is actually a good set of questions.

But, you know, one of the questions when China began to develop as an economic power was whether it could develop economically and still remain repressive politically. And I think there was tremendous hope, and certainly, you know, we all remember when they opened the Summer Olympics and the tremendous hope for a possible openness.

I hope that this period under Xi passes away and that China changes its course. But while we are where we are, we have to hold multiple ideas in our head simultaneously, which is that we have to hold them accountable for their human rights abuses; we have to recognize that they are targeting our companies, stealing intellectual property, have a massive intelligence-collection enterprise against both public and private entities in the United States; and that they also are a huge -- their economy is now -- while not per capita, certainly their economy is now roughly equal to that of the United States of America.

So we cannot ignore that fact. We have to continue to pursue our interests in economics as well as national security over time. And, you know, that is going to be difficult to do, to navigate that. But, in the long term, I think that will be the best for the United States.

Mr. LaHood. I want to switch topics, and either General Breedlove or General Petraeus.

On Ukraine, you know, we all know that the invasion of Ukraine, you know, was the violation of the sovereignty and was unjustified and illegal. But it seems like China is so fixated on sovereignty -- sovereignty for Xinjiang,

sovereignty for Taiwan, sovereignty for Hong Kong -- and it seems like a complete double standard and hypocrisy that everywhere they talk about sovereignty but yet, when the invasion happens, they talk about their unbreakable bond with Putin, right, and for a year straight they have stood by Putin in this.

And I am wondering, has that hurt them diplomatically? It doesn't seem to me to do that. But how do we allow them to continue to get away with this argument on sovereignty when it is a blatant double standard?

General Breedlove. Well, it is a great question, and it is something that I think needs to be aired more publicly. We don't have a public debate about this, which then engenders people holding them to task. So I think that is an important part of this.

And what we, I think, have seen as far as Russia and China is actually China distancing them just a little. They don't want to get too close to what Russia is doing in Ukraine, especially as Russia talks more and more about nukes.

General Petraeus. I would just add that the "partnership without limits" that was declared on the eve of the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Winter Olympics actually has turned out to have distinct limits and that the relationship between China and Russia has become even more transactional than it already was, that this has actually put President Xi, I think, in quite an uncomfortable position, where China has to abstain from voting.

I mean, how can you not criticize Russia for carrying out an invasion of a sovereign country and doing it in such a brutal manner? And they have twice abstained from votes in the U.N. General Assembly, condemning the invasion

and then condemning the annexation of parts of Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

I think another measure, though, that is worth exploring is, how much are we doing in terms of secondary sanctions? Because there is some assistance to Russia that I think is violating some of the sanctions, it is helping Russia evade these sanctions that I highlighted as so important earlier, which have brought down the Russia economy but only by about 3.5 percent last year, and it may actually grow slightly this year, according to the IMF, maybe 0.5 percent, which for a country under sanctions should be disappointing to those who are leading the effort to impose those sanctions.

So I think exploring what might be done in terms of secondary sanctions, to highlight that we are watching and holding to account, would be very useful.

Mr. LaHood. Thank you.

The Chairman. Ms. Spanberger.

Ms. Spanberger. Hello, everyone. Thank you so much for being with us.

And, General Petraeus, it is a pleasure to see you. I served in the CIA under your leadership. So I am going to start my question with you, if I may.

You had spoken, in your opening testimony and then specifically answering Mr. Crawford's questions, some of the issues related to training, related to the bench that we are building out across intel agencies. And I have a -- kind of a couple elements of a question. Right?

So, when building a bench, there is the ability to recruit people immediately, recruiting young people directly out of college, also recruiting people mid-career. And you spoke to the lengthy training at the front end.

And I am curious for your thoughts on how we could get that balance correct, to make sure that there are people who are building up their expertise within the Agency -- and, certainly, Ms. Gordon, if you have comments on this, I would love to hear it as well -- but also recruiting people who have an expertise in a skill set from outside agencies that can be brought forth.

So that is the first element of my question, which ties into the second one, related to training. You mentioned the 10- to 12-hour SDR. I know that when I was serving overseas I barely found time to go to the dentist, let alone go back home to headquarters for training. The OPSTEMPO is such, if you are on a 2- to 3-year tour, a week away is a week that you are not recruiting somebody, that you are not developing someone, that you are not out on the circuit doing all the things that you need to do.

And so I am curious if you have suggestions for -- you talked about the money aspect, but -- how to bring that into a cultural piece where it has the same culture like we have seen in the military, where it is expected and part of the job.

And I will turn it over to you for initial comments.

General Petraeus. Well, thanks. These are terrific questions.

And I should note, just first of all, I have actually discussed these with Director Burns very recently. I was just out there 3 weeks ago and had a long conversation with him. I also met separately with his chief learning officer. He has established that. And that is a very important element of this.

And perhaps you can continue to sound the drum for this, given your own personal experience, which we all recognize and appreciate. And I was privileged to be the Director when you were one of the CIA's officers.

I think, first of all -- and Director Burns is trying to do this -- expedite the approval of initial entry. As you know, it takes far too long to approve someone. And you have these brilliant people that graduate, and they expected to sit for 12 to 18 months in the past --

Ms. Spanberger. Mine was 3-1/2 years.

General Petraeus. I mean, this is just -- a couple of times as Director, I finally said, this person is, you know, a graduate of Princeton, summa cum laude, speaks, again, this language, served in the military; what more do you want?

And so, now, he is working this. He has already driven it down, I believe, to below 8 months, maybe even 6 months. But it would be worth, I think, some oversight in asking him what it is that he could use.

Ms. Spanberger. Uh-huh.

General Petraeus. When it comes to building those within, this is very, very simple. It is for the Congress to approve a personnel account and authorize the resources for that, that is separate and above from the operational force, if you will, just in the way that the, say, U.S. Army, I think, literally has something like 70,000 or 80,000 people at any given time -- I don't know what the Air Force had; it is a little bit smaller service. But, again, we are talking tens of thousands of people who are authorized to be in school at any given time, plus those who actually run the schoolhouse, who are in uniform as well. So that is about a personnel account.

And, again, I think the chief learning officer -- who I actually know pretty well, spent some previous time together -- I think, can help you with this.

The mid-career is crucial. I am really excited that you mentioned this.

Because the Agency actually does have the ability to do this.

Ms. Spanberger. Uh-huh.

General Petraeus. We had someone, for example, when I was the Director, I sat down with him at the "eat with the Director" events that I used to have to try to get to know people, and I asked him where he worked in the Agency. He said he refused to have an office in the Agency. I said, what is your job title? He said, I didn't want one of those either. I asked, what are you doing? He said, I volunteered to help you with tradecraft in an era of ubiquitous surveillance. I have built three companies in the Valley, sold them. I am good to go. I have rented my own office over in Crystal City or something, I have a little team, and we are working on that.

You have the flexibility to do that. We need to do more of it.

And, actually, again, another one of the -- the chief data, I think it is, officer, with whom I met recently as well, was brought in from Silicon Valley to take on some of these challenges.

So, if the leadership is willing to exercise the flexibility that it has, I think it is very capable of doing that.

And, again, encouraging, though, and especially providing the authority and the authorizations for the personnel account is crucial.

Ms. Spanberger. I think that is interesting. And when we have more time, I would love to follow up on the idea of officers leaving for leave without pay --

General Petraeus. Yep.

Ms. Spanberger. -- and actually going to spend a number of years in the private sector before perhaps returning back.

But I am out of time, so, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Fitzpatrick.

Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here.

I am going to propose the same question to you that I will the agency heads when they appear before us.

General Petraeus, you and I speak the same language when it comes to the true threat facing America and the world. As much external threats and pressure as we face from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the like, the greatest threat is internal division, undermining of democracy here in the United States. A lot of us define what that true threat is very, very differently.

As it pertains to this committee, drilling down on it, I believe the biggest threat to our country, to exactly what you point to, is the politicization of our Intelligence Community and their agencies.

I spent 14 years in the Bureau. I never saw it. If I ever did, I would have called it out. In my oversight role in Congress, I have seen that it does in fact, has happened, does exist, both in the Bureau and the Agency. Granted, it is the exception and not the rule, but it is there.

And just like our local communities are made less safe when the communities lose faith in the police departments that protect them, so, too, our Nation is less safe when the American public loses faith and confidence in the Intelligence Community that is designed to protect them.

I don't know how to go about fixing this problem, but I know it is a severe problem and it is a major threat and a major problem, when people that are

entrusted with the most significant responsibilities in the world, to protect all of us and keep us safe, act in a manner that is unbecoming by allowing their political biases to play a role in their decision-making.

And we are all human beings. Everybody in these agencies are registered voters. They have their beliefs. But I feel like in the past there was more of an ability to check that at the door and put your public-service hat on and call balls and strikes objectively, and we seem to be losing that incrementally across all of our agencies.

How do we go about addressing that and fixing it?

[12:03 p.m.]

General Petraeus. You know, I actually stopped voting and registering to vote when I was promoted to two stars. I didn't think all that much of it at the time, but it turned out to be pretty significant because I ended up working for both very senior positions for two major appointments for a Republican and two under a Democrat. And, again, it at least allowed me to say, look, I don't even vote much less register or associate. And I still don't, by the way. I think -- I am not advocating that for everyone, but I think at least the mindset that informed that should inform folks.

At the end of the day, there has to be when in the -- particularly in the senior Members, there has to be a nonpolitical approach. I am not saying bipartisan. I am saying nonpartisan. It has to be -- truth to power has to be on what you insist on hearing, and the agency directors need to try to lead and inspire the workforce to adopt a similar approach, noting that, again, as you said, people -- certainly, we fight for the right to vote and to do that.

And above all, another caution, of course, is that there has to be a real sensitivity to any effort to try to lead the workforce to a particular analytical conclusion because that can end up in a very dangerous situation.

But I would ask, actually, again someone who spent three decades to offer her thoughts here.

Ms. Gordon. I agree with everything you said. I think the greatest threat to America is that we will stop believing in ourselves, and we have to address that. I, like you, had I ever seen it during my tenure, I would have addressed it. I think there are a couple things that can be done.

Number one is the leadership has to understand the responsibility they carry, not the person that appointed them but the responsibility of their job. Do they understand what the job of the directors of intelligence agencies are to do exactly what you said? So encouraging that. And then, second, as I am going to couple it a little bit with Congresswoman Spanberger's comments, I think we really need to invest in the leadership within our agencies. These are really fraught times where big questions are put before them, yes and no, which way or not. That is a heavy load. Investing in their development is, I think, another piece to do it, sir.

Mr. Fitzpatrick. But we, on the way in to these agencies, certainly at the Bureau, we screen for all kinds of things. We screen for drug abuse. We screen for foreign contacts.

Is there a way to screen for this, to catch this stuff on the way in?

General Petraeus. You know, speaking from a military basis, there actually is because the military grappled with this. When I was a brigade commander in the 82nd Airborne Division, we a had the problem there was some extremist element, domestic extremism, that was inside the ranks, and one of these guys took a weapon and shot up an entire formation of a sister brigade, killing a number of paratroopers. And then we did -- you know, of all things, there were tattoos that sort of indicated, and there was a tattoo check, and lo and behold, we identified there was a serious problem. And Fort Bragg has experienced this a couple of different times.

So, again, I think it is about -- what are the indicators of this, how can you then identify those, how do you screen for them, and I mean, you have got to be upfront about it and open and transparent about it as well because it is a very

serious threat.

Mr. Fitzpatrick. Yeah. I have a lot more to share on that, but I am out of time. So I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Bera.

Dr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to try to get two questions in. First one for Dr. Wilson: You know, in the United States, the President lays out a memorandum on how we make decisions on national security. There is a National Security Council. There is a Principals Committee. There is a Deputies Committee, an Interagency Committee. Looking at the balloon crisis right now and looking at how decisionmaking is made in China, it is very concerning.

Is there anything we can do. It is not just in our interest; it is in the Chinese interest?

And then the second thing that certainly concerns me is, can you imagine if we didn't have lines of communication with the Soviet Union in October of 1962? And I am very worried that we don't have those lines. You hear Secretary Austin -- it is not a peer-to-peer line of communication. If you could just comment on that.

And is there anything we can do -- again, it is in the Chinese interest to have these lines of communication as well -- to influence this?

Ms. Wilson. Congressman, first, I do think that military-to-military communication lines and engagements is actually in the long-term best interest of the United States and may in the long term help to avoid miscalculation.

With respect to the U.S. decisionmaking processes, this committee really, I think, has the opportunity to dig deeply into the intent of China, what they

expected, who made the decisions, what is the technical assessment from the collection that we did on the balloon, as well as on the debris. And I think it is less focused on -- every President and every administration will be slightly different in its decisionmaking processes. I think this committee can make a tremendous contribution in looking at what were the Chinese thinking and why.

Dr. Bera. Great. Let me ask a question of General Petraeus, because you eluded to this, as well, in my work on the Foreign Affairs Committee as chair of Asia and the Pacific. We did introduce legislation to look at expanding the workforce that understands Chinese culture, understands Chinese language because it did serve us well during the Cold War. We created a generation of experts on the Soviet Union, and we are playing the long game here with China.

So, with the chair of the select committee here, I think that is something that we ought to invest in and look at. And then, I guess the real question is you have also eluded to expertise that exists in the military, folks that are there. How do we make it really easy for those folks as they are exiting the military to transition into whether it is State Department, diplomacy, other areas, and you know, build up that capacity as well, and then also in academia as well, which we hadn't in the Cold War?

General Petraeus. Well, again, this might actually be something that Chairman Gallagher will take up as well. I mean, it is literally about how do you build the expertise that we need for a comprehensive approach to the fierce competition, again, severe competition that has been used to describe the relationship here.

Within the military, there are actually a number of initiatives in recent years that actually do enable the services to develop people. It is much easier

to go to graduate school now than it was in my day. I was an anomaly, and I was told I was committing professional suicide when I went to graduate school instead of the ranger regiment. So it is much -- I think there are a number of advances actually in the military. I would like to see them more in the main civilian agency and the Intelligence Community, the CIA, as I have highlighted several times.

And then, in terms of going back and forth in government, of course, it just has to be attractive. And, in terms of the Foreign Service, I think there has been quite a hemorrhaging of talent from the Foreign Service in recent years. It is for your Foreign Affairs Committee to address what is it that Congress can do to enable the Department of State to ensure that it is not losing talent and that it is capable of attracting the best and brightest to its ranks as Foreign Service officers.

Dr. Bera. That is certainly something that we did lose a lot of exceptional mid-career talents, you know, over the past few years.

How do we bring those folks back? How do we bring them back where they have lost some tenure and so forth, that recognize that? And, you know, that is something that I do think hinders us.

General Petraeus. I think, empower the Secretary of State to take actions that incentivize people to do that.

Dr. Bera. With that, Mr. Chairman, I will go ahead and yield back.

Mr. Gallagher. [Presiding.] Chairman Turner has stepped out, but he has given me the authority to recognize myself for 5 minutes.

General Petraeus, I once worked for an army officer who told me that the key task of a strategic leader is to get the big ideas right and communicate those

big ideas relentlessly, through the organization and externally.

As I read your testimony, a few big ideas come out. One seems to be that humans are the center of gravity in the IC. You have talked, I think, persuasively about sort of adopting some of the best practices from the military and applying it to the IC.

I wonder, however, do you think the military does a good job of developing deep regional expertise, particularly as it pertains to China? For example, you know, as I assume General Breedlove would agree, if you are of a certain generation in the military during the old Cold War, you probably knew a ton about the Soviet Union in a way that I am just not sure exists in the present day with respect to the Chinese Communist Party.

General Petraeus. I think we are shooting behind the target. I think we didn't build that bench sufficiently in advance. We were preoccupied, to be sure. I think we are racing now to catch up and also racing to also find where are the old Soviet and Russian experts that we can put our hands on as well.

I mean, when it comes to that, I believe there are some career management issues that are challenging in the military as well. And that is that many of our foreign area officers, which is where much of this expertise resides, have to choose between that and the operational path. I think that was a mistake. We did get much better foreign area officers, but they can't ever continue -- it is very rare that a foreign area officer is promoted, for example, to brigadier general, much less to two stars.

And yet, we need those individuals on the staffs of say USEUCOM and CENTCOM and the others, but they are not there because they are not in the pool. They couldn't make that tiny very little cut when it goes to flag rank

because they didn't command. And I would like to see us modify it so that some of the foreign area officers can do what General Abizaid did, for example, which is still command a battalion brigade division all the way on up to Central Command, instead of being shunted off into a career path that only allows him to be attaches and foreign military sales individuals like that.

So there is a lot about that. For what it is worth, the same is true of the strategist program, which you have to choose between strategy and operational. I always thought that you actually wanted some commanders who actually knew something about strategy, and why you would only make them your special assistant instead of the person actually at the top was beyond me.

Mr. Gallagher. Well, I am glad that pesky Ph.D. from Princeton didn't kill your career, General.

General Petraeus. Well-spoken by a fellow Princeton graduate. Thank you.

Mr. Gallagher. I would ask General Breedlove and then Dr. Wilson to comment on the same question, and perhaps comment also on what countries besides China itself might be ones that we want to prioritize as we develop deep regional expertise in the IC.

General Breedlove. I just want to echo what General Petraeus has said. The way that we sort of by process of un-selection don't recognize the talents that we need in our foreign area experience is -- really needs to be changed. We have tried this before in our Air Force. We tried to create a path that was going to fix this problem, and it just doesn't. It is about culture and the way that boards look at people who are going to command and be promoted. Until we change that culture, it is just probably not going to work.

Sir, I apologize, but I don't want to be a broken record, but we used to have a lot of experience on Russia. Now, we don't. So I would add Russia back to that list. We -- bare essentials was a program started by the previous two that worked with me, and they were trying to bring back talent, but Russia would be on my list.

Mr. Gallagher. Right.

Dr. Wilson?

Ms. Wilson. Congressman, certainly North Korea, Iran, Russia, China, but I would also add to what has been said here, deep regional understanding, deep understanding, is undervalued sometimes. We think that analytical skill is fungible. That if you are an analyst on Latin America and we need to surge to cover Eastern Europe, that we will just reassign. To some extent, you can, but you miss that deep experience. And that is true in the military as well as the IC more generally.

We did in the Air Force increase the number of Ph.D. slots available and start to treat them differently with respect to promotion with a specialized desk that is supposed to manage Ph.D.' s because they are so valuable and then separate out promotion tracks into seven different buckets, and I hope over time, that helps keeps that --

Mr. Gallagher. And I am out of time. But I do think the Reserve process has effectively grabbed some remarkable experts. In the Air Force, there is Oriana Mastro. Obviously, Vance Serchuk in the Navy. So that is also an opportunity -- I don't know what the model would be for the IC.

But, thank you. I am out of time.

The Chairman. [Presiding.] Mr. Scott.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you think for being here. Ms. Plaskett and a couple of others have mentioned the failed states around the world or near-failed states. I would like to talk a little bit about paramilitary organizations. I was in the Lake Chad Basin area, close to Mali. French ISR picked up a mass grave where the Wagner Group had killed a bunch of people. And by the time the French had put it out, Wagner had turned it around and convinced the leadership of the country that it was the French that did it. And then the end result of that is that countries like the French who are actually trying to provide assistance to the country are pushed out, and they are left with the people who actually killed their citizens.

How much are we missing with regard to what these paramilitary and private military companies and criminal empires are doing and the role that they play in destabilizing the world?

General Petraeus. This is a growing threat actually. And Wagner is perhaps -- I mean, they are the most exemplary, if you will, of the challenges that this poses. They have been -- obviously, they are a central feature of the offensive going on in Bakhmut right now, in southeastern Ukraine. They have been in Syria. They have been all over Africa. They are now being requested by a number of the autocrats in countries in Africa because they will do what the autocrats want, which is mostly to keep them in power, and they can pay them with illicit gains from exported minerals and so forth.

We have found it difficult to respond to that because of course -- actually rightly, we adhere to the rule of law. We often won't work with groups -- the Leahy Amendment and so forth prohibit us from working with certain

organizations when it comes to the U.S. military, though, we have, again, very, very good Special Forces who are established for this, as you know. And, within the Army, there is also the essentially advise-and-assist brigades that it has created that I think are very useful as well. And you get into the information domain, which is another battlefield. So that is an element of this that you have to use to address it.

But I was actually going to list paramilitary groups as a subset of the threats, and my statement got a bit long, and I am glad that you raised it. There are covert action alternatives that we do have available, but, again, there is just a finite number of individuals that can actually carry out these kind of activities. It is much, much smaller I think than people realize or people that go to the movies and see these in action there.

Mr. Scott. I think, if I may, General, I think one of the things we have to address is how fast we respond when we see it. And I think we are going to have to push those authorities down.

General Petraeus. Yup. Yup. This is like a political campaign actually. In the -- during the surge in Iraq, one of the admonitions that was part of my counterinsurgency guidance was for public affairs, and it was: Be first with the truth. Beat the bad guys to the CNN Baghdad bureau office with the truth as we know it, not spin, not lipstick on pigs or anything else, the truth, because you want to get the headline rather than the sub-headline.

Mr. Scott. If I can, General Breedlove, one of the things -- and I know we rarely give the other party much credit. I think our Intelligence Community, and I give -- did a wonderful job with the intelligence on Ukraine. I think the President did right to declassify that information so that the world

was ready for the invasion as best they could be, at least expected it.

Could you speak to the value of declassifying information when we have the confidence level we have and the importance of that to the world?

General Breedlove. I think it is incredibly important, Congressman. I think you have heard me say before that our country has never really been in the information war in the way that China and Russia are. And I thought that what the President did was truly a strike in the right direction. He entered the information war with truth, and it made an impact. It didn't change significantly, but it did change Russia's approach.

Mr. Scott. If I may, Ms. Gordon, you mentioned that China's intention is clear. It has been clear to most of us on this panel. Those of you who work in the Intelligence Community.

Dr. Wilson, I know you are very much aware of it.

It seems that corporate America has simply ignored the intentions they have known.

Is it time to declassify more of what we know that China is doing to America so that corporate America can no longer pretend it isn't happening?

Ms. Gordon. Yes. Yes. They are national security decisionmakers. We need to help them be able to see it, and not with fragmentary information but information that is enough for them to understand intention in their actions.

Mr. Scott. Thank you.

The Chairman. I am going to have to, again, apologize to our panelists and members. As a result of the clock not having worked, it affected our pace. General Breedlove is going to have to leave us.

General Breedlove, thank you so much for participating in this panel, and

we appreciate the rest of our panelists' flexibility that they are able to remain with us.

Mr. Gomez.

Mr. Gomez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to just -- appreciate everything that -- all your service to our country.

Mr. -- the Ranking Member had a question regarding our relationship with China, the potential for misinterpreting some of their actions or a miscalculation on their part or our part.

And in an era of advanced data, right -- we have a lot of data, we can still misinterpret that data. You know, somebody sending the email to one person to another, one person reads it one way, "Oh, no big deal, they are asking for this"; another person is insulted by that same email. And that is people with complete information, what was shared on that screen.

How do we prevent that misinterpretation, that miscalculation? How do we take into account the cultural differences and understandings between China and the United States?

And I kind of -- I am thinking about this in relation to the Cuban Missile Crisis, that there was a drastic miscalculation by the Soviet Union on what our response would be when it came to placing missiles on the island of Cuba. And, after that, what was established? The hotline. I hope we don't get to a point where we have to do it in that way, where there is such a near catastrophe that -- because we all misinterpreted and -- just miscalculated each other's responses.

What can the Intelligence Community do? What can Congress do?

And what can the executive do to make sure that doesn't happen? It is an open question for everybody.

Ms. Gordon. I will start, and my mates will fix it. On this issue of misinterpreting information, that is fundamentally the craft of intelligence, right, is to take what is uncertain and try and put it in a framework that allows people to deal with it with certainty. At its best, that is what it is. At its worst, it makes mistakes.

When General Petraeus talks about training and education and investing in humans, it is to make sure that that piece is done well. When we talk about competitive analysis, not just one center that has a voice, but it is to try and beat out bias that, even with every piece of training you have, can creep in. When I talk about data, it is easier to find the truth when you look at it from more angles, the more sources you have, the more -- so that is where data can come in and help us.

As far as the misinterpretation, we have talked about military channels. There are intelligence liaison channels that try and have that conversation that is below the surface of policy to make sure that you are never losing connections, that you always have that opportunity.

And then the last is I think to just see -- to see clearly what is, to not judge it as whether it is good or bad but to try and understand what it is, is the best way to get there. But this is hard in a fast world because these disciplines right now are disproportionately manual on disproportionately small datasets, and we have to move that along. Great question.

General Petraeus. I think it is establishing communications with a potential adversary where you can, having developed an understanding of the

adversary, which includes cultural appreciation, if you will, and ideally you actually have procedures and guardrails, which is what Secretary Blinken was seeking to advance in the visit that had to be canceled or rescheduled.

Keep in mind, for example, when we had a near confrontation -- we had a confrontation with the Wagner Group elements in northeastern Syria -- we had communications established with the Russians, and we used those communications. They were very forewarned before we attacked that element that was coming at us. Now, it didn't prevent them from continuing, but it ensured that they understood what it was we were doing and why we had done it. They had literally crossed a certain physical line, and when that was crossed, we were going to take action, and we did. So, again, I think it is those elements that are crucial to this kind of issue.

Ms. Wilson. Congressman, the only thing I would add is the difficulty of speed. Speed of decisionmaking is very different than it was for the Cuban Missile Crisis. It makes it harder for decisionmakers. One of the things that means, though, is you need to get those connections often at a lower and more tactical nonpolicy level.

I was forward -- as the Secretary, I visited one of our command centers in Iraq -- when the air picture there included the United States and allied forces from multiple countries supporting indigenous forces on the ground, fighting ISIS in Syria, that was being supported by the Russians, and the Russians were in the same air space. We had an open line with a couple of young airmen who were native Russians who had emigrated to the United States and were in the United States Air Force to try to make sure -- and in that space -- so we had the Russians watching us who were watching somebody else on the ground, and the

Russians didn't know it. And there was also an F22 watching the Russians who were watching us watching the ground, so extremely complicated, fast moving, and there is no -- there is no substitute for that direct communication, when needed, to ensure that there is no miscalculation.

Mr. Gomez. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Gomez, your time has expired.

Mr. Gomez. Give me something to think about, but thank you for answering.

Dr. Wilson, I want to take you up on that offer from your opening statement to have more conversations about -- thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Crenshaw.

Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here. This is quite the esteemed set of witnesses, and it has been very exciting to hear from you.

General, it is great to see you again.

I wanted to comment openly and wonder aloud about the CIA personnel development problem. That wasn't something I wasn't aware of before, and perhaps the committee might consider as a first step simply facilitating CIA personnel having access to the very large resources that DOD already does. The DOD would love that because as those of us, sort of, we were in that world, the Intelligence Community on the DOD side, we would love more engagement with the CIA since they are in charge. It is quite helpful.

General Petraeus. It actually has the access. It can send people to staff

colleges, war colleges -- all the rest of this. The problem is it doesn't have the time. The tasks always are greater than the number of personnel available, and there is not a personnel allocation allowing this to happen. That is the problem.

Mr. Crenshaw. I see.

I do want to move onto -- I am going to list these questions rather quickly, and then hope that you all can answer them. So, moving south of our border, how does the Intelligence Community view the Mexican cartel fentanyl issue? Is it viewed as a national security threat? Is it viewed as a drug issue? Is it viewed as a law enforcement issue? Who is the lead on this?

Number two, do you view China's role in providing the basic components of fentanyl as a deliberate intent by them, or is it more of a convenient opportunity to degrade us in our society?

Number three, does the IC commit adequate resources to Latin America and especially with respect to countering China's influence in Latin America?

General, I will start with you.

General Petraeus. I think the regard would be a national security threat, and you have the coordination of the response to that really is the chief of mission. Now, obviously, you have got DOJ. You have DEA. You have other departments and agencies in the government. The challenge, I think, there has been the erosion of the trust and coordination and cooperation between the Mexican Government, frankly, and our U.S. organizations.

When I was privileged to be the Director, as Sue will recall, we had a very close relationship. We were provided enormous assistance. Each time there is a new President, they go through new process, if you will, and they are surprised at how much of this was going on. This particular President in

Mexico is so hard populist, that there is not that kind of relationship. And so there have been a number of public stories, in fact, about how the most important relationship eroded because of a variety of factors within Mexico, not from our part.

China's role, I think, is probably both deliberate and convenient, equal parts of that most likely.

And Latin America, no, I think this is the economy of force theater that has always been the economy of force. And that is not adequate. But, again, there are limited resources you have to prioritize, and it always ends up being the last of the geographic regions, even though it is the one closest to us and the source, if you will, of many of the real illegal immigration problems that we have, either from certain countries in that region or actually now coming through South America, through the Darien and up through Central America into Mexico and the border.

Ms. Wilson. Congressman, let me just, there is a joint task force that is set up to support tracking transnational cartels. There is also an intelligence fusion center that is intended to try to support that. Both of those are at Fort Bliss or in El Paso. If you would like to come out, I will buy the enchiladas.

General Petraeus. Another one actually down in Key West.

Mr. Crenshaw. Sounds good. Thank you.

Dr. Gordon, if you would like to add?

Ms. Gordon. No, they said it very well. I will say the Intelligence Community, particularly the CIA, has had a long storied history in terms of counternarcotics -- countering narcotics. I think it is more effective potentially now because we have better relationships with domestic agencies than we did in

the early days when we tried to do it only with our authorities. And I think General Petraeus said very well that we have some of our best officers and best relationships in South America, but it is resource limited compared to others.

Mr. Crenshaw. And my last question, if I could fit it in really fast, the Department of Defense has a vast amount of the Intelligence Community resources.

Does it have the proper authorities to really collect on the cartels the way we need to?

General Petraeus. I think it does because, of course, you can use title 50 as well as title 10, as you know. And a lot of what goes on in certain activities can be actually under that headline. So it is led by the, if you will, CIA, CIA covert action authorities, but it can still be conducted.

Ms. Gordon. Yeah. Counterterrorism taught us a lot about sharing authorities as well.

Mr. Crenshaw. It does have to be in conjunction with the CIA when that happens.

General Petraeus. Yes. And, of course, keep in mind, of course, if it is overseas, it is -- the CIA is the lead organization for that kind of activity.

Mr. Crenshaw. Excellent. Thank you.

I yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Hill.

Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to serve on this panel. I want to thank our panelists today for your outstanding testimony and service to the country.

And, Dr. Wilson, it is good to see you. We shared our affection for

George Bush 41 on the White House staff together, and a real affection for a former Air Force General Brent Scowcroft. So it is good to see you today.

I am an economist. I am a banker. I am not a war fighter per se. But my experience tells me and both my government service and my work here in Congress for the past 8 years that, if you want to get bad guys, you cut the money off. So I hope I bring that perspective to this panel. And cutting off the money means you have a really impressive economic forecasting and international assessment capability of people's economics, their sources of funds, where those funds go for, and where they go to. And, of course, we know that through the massive use of sanctions in the last 15 years.

Now I am reminded of a great guy when I was a young, Senate staffer, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who used to rail on the floor of the Senate about the CIA, quote, repeatedly getting it wrong about major political economic questions. For example, he said the IC systematically has misinformed successive Presidents over the size and growth of the Soviet economy. That was a big theme for, you know, 40 years.

So this idea, I want to pose it to you. How are we doing on assessing China's economic statistics? I am told, in the private sector, you know, not so good, but, General Petraeus, you have been in uniform at the CIA and now global business at KKR, and all three of you, I think, bring a great perspective on this. So tell me about how we do in the IC of forecasting economics because, if it is -- if we are wrong, we spend more money than we need to spend here in ramping up a defense organization that we may not need.

So let me yield to you, sir, for you first thought.

General Petraeus. Well, I actually think we are doing better than when it

came to the challenges of trying to define what was going on in the Soviet Union, which was obviously not just a closed economy in many respects or central economy but was also very difficult to pierce. You will remember Churchill who described, you know, what is it, a mystery within an enigma within something else. And I think that was true of that time.

I think it is very difficult to hide some of the data that is freely available nowadays when you look at China. And, in fact, it is use of that data that has enabled not just the CIA. I would actually look outside at the economic analysis firms that do this very, very well, that can look at the number of whatever it may be, indicators, and say, see, that is not really GDP -- indicative of GDP growth of what they say it is. It is probably a percentage, 2 percentage less than that.

So I think there is so much more information out there now, that if you can harness that, analyze that, you can come to much better conclusions about, say, the Chinese economy than you can, I think, we were able to do about the Soviet economy.

Mr. Hill. Thank you.

Ms. Gordon?

Ms. Gordon. Yeah. One, I think you are hitting on the skill set that is the court of the realm. I think we are better than we were. I think we are better than we were when the Trump administration started. I think there was an advantage to having a businessman who came in demanding and questioning the work that we did in economic analysis. And we got better. During his tenure, we invested more in resources.

I think the point about the data that are available makes us have even

greater potential to get good at this.

As the Intelligence Community learns that it does not have to be limited to that intelligence which it collects and curates, this will come. So I think that there is this recognition that this is an area where we were disproportionately political-military analysis, and now we see this. I would say, is there something you can do? What I noticed was the Intelligence Community typically went to the National Security Council, and the Economic Council was a different meeting with much less tethers. Bringing those two closer together, if you can help enable that, I think will help further this.

Mr. Hill. Very helpful.

Dr. Wilson, you also talked about open-source -- all three of you talked about more open-source analysis, so your thoughts?

Ms. Wilson. I also think that some of the better analysis on this is actually done open-source in private companies that are looking to support business in and from China, and that that is a great place to leverage what is going on outside of government.

Mr. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The Chairman. Thank you.

We are going to conclude with Mr. Waltz.

Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to be with you all.

I am going to start with you, General Petraeus. You know, the definition, or at least definitionally of a Cold War as I have looked across a number of pieces of literature and doctrine, is an adversary that is using all elements of national power, diplomatic, informational, military, economic, to supplant another. By my definition, that is exactly what the CCP is doing.

So, from your perspective, has the CCP, has the PRC entered into a Cold War with the United States?

General Petraeus. I hesitate because the term I think is challenging because the context is so very different. Certainly there are activities that are very similar to those that took place during the Cold War between the USSR and the U.S., the East and the West, if you will.

But the context in which this relationship is being carried out -- again, China and the U.S. and the West -- is so extraordinarily different. I mean, they are one of our top three trading partners. And so I just -- I am cautious about just saying this is another Cold War, and it evokes all of the actions that we used to take. We had no economic interchange of any meaningful --

Mr. Waltz. Right. Some would argue that that actually makes it a much more dangerous Cold War --

General Petraeus. Well, it is much more complex because they are dependent on us. We are dependent on them. Supply chains, all the rest of this. There are enormous vulnerabilities on both sides, and so we cannot, I don't think, for example, de-couple from China. That is just not practical. We can selectively and should, and we are selectively restricting certain exports. I mean, the IP, the fabs, and the chips for -- the superchips and so forth.

Mr. Waltz. Sure.

General Petraeus. A whole variety of areas. And, again, to come back, what the investment community needs is specificity. What can you do, and what can't you do? But we can't completely de-couple. That would just be --

Mr. Waltz. But for the sake of time, I think there are a number of many powerful entities in Wall Street, in the investment community, in the sports

industry, in Hollywood, in academia that don't like that term. You could say coupled. That is the polite way. I would say, they are making -- everyone is making a ton of money -- which is an adversary which we have never faced, but when we have the leadership of that entity with which we are now dependent openly talking about defeating capitalism, defeating liberal democracy, and replacing it with their vision of the world that they then seek to export globally, I think actually the term "Cold War" could generate a lot of positive responses in terms of wake-up call that I think we need across the government and American society.

In that vein, what do you think the PRC and the CCP fears the most? Do you think they fear some additional capability or deterrent? Or is it internal, and they fear their own people? And if it is the latter -- you know, during the Cold War, we supported dissidents. We supported authors and civil society. I mean, these people were household names, these Russians who bravely were standing up in solidarity and so forth.

But we don't seem to have that approach, either in the military or even in the Intelligence Community. It seems to really scare a lot of people, or you have those other factors that are pulling us away. Should we have more of an irregular warfare and perhaps a human rights focused approach to have the CCP looking internally rather than externally?

General Petraeus. First of all, I think it is very appropriate for this committee to get into what it is that actually is being done. I wouldn't assume that we aren't doing a fair amount of this kind of activity.

But to get to the question, and I would actually put it with respect to Russia as well. I think what Russia fears most is an example of what right

looks like in Ukraine. It fears a vibrant, economically successful, democracy next door, which would show the citizens of the Russian Federation what they could have if they could jettison the kleptocratic regime that has been running Russia for over two decades now.

Mr. Waltz. I completely agree.

General Petraeus. I think the same is true with respect to --

Mr. Waltz. I think what they feared was Hong Kong, and they fear that model, right? And Taiwan.

General Petraeus. And us. And, of course, they are seeking to sow division, seeking to exacerbate differences, and all the rest of that.

Mr. Waltz. Right. Just last remaining question, and I will just take it as follow on: Under the 2017 National Intel Law where everyone, every business, every Chinese citizen is mandated to collect what they are told to collect, does that essentially turn the 400,000 students that are here, the Confucius Institutes, business people, technology, trade, anyone, I mean, essentially into a collector -- and that is not racist or xenophobic. That is amazing, wonderful Chinese people and culture, but they don't have a choice in terms of what they are told, if told, to collect, and if you could just address that?

Ms. Gordon. That is true, if compelled. I think the issue of humans, individuals, particularly those over here, is not as straightforward a question as TikTok and Huawei.

Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for going over my time. I yield.

The Chairman. Thank you very much to our panelists. I greatly appreciate -- you are the quick-off for our committee. And this is going to be

very important to us as we focus on the upcoming year. Thank you for being here.

General Petraeus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]