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NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF  
THE RISE OF AUTHORITARIANISM

Tuesday, February 26, 2019

U.S. House of Representatives,  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,  
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 210, Cannon House Office Building, the Honorable Adam Schiff (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Schiff, Himes, Sewell, Carson, Speier, Quigley, Swalwell, Castro, Heck, Welch, Maloney, Demings, Nunes, Conaway, Turner, Wenstrup, Stewart, Crawford, Stefanik, Hurd, and Ratcliff.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Before we begin, I want to remind all of our members that we are in open session, and as such, we will discuss unclassified matters only. Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any time.

I want to welcome our members and this panel of esteemed witnesses to the committee's first open hearing of the new Congress. When the Berlin Wall fell in late 1989, followed 2 years later by the demise of the Soviet Union, it seemed that the enlightenment ideals that animated the birth of the Nation, democracy, equality, and Jefferson's unalienable rights had finally triumphed. As the academic, Francis Fukuyama, put it then, we had reached the end of history and liberal democracy represented an end to ideology and presaged a new era of political harmony.

As humanity's bloodiest century drew to a close, a century that had seen two cataclysmic wars and titanic ideological struggles between Fascism and democracy, between Soviet communism and capitalism, between colonialism and self-determination, the optimism of the 1990s was understandable.

For much of the decade following the Soviet collapse it seemed that triumphalists would be proven right and the worldwide march of liberty and democracy would be permanent. Even Russia took cautious steps down the democratic path and many in the United States and elsewhere held out hope that China would also marry its newly dynamic economy to governance more accountable to the Chinese people.

Today is clear that trust in the inevitability of democratic ascendance was, if not misplaced, certainly premature. And a new war of ideologies has emerged pitting liberal democracy against autocracy. Not the old autocracy of monarchal Europe, but a rebranding that distorts and subverts the institutions that are the foundation of the

West's success. Strong legislatures, independent judiciaries, a free press, and dynamic civil societies.

Whether measured by a numerical scorecard as the democracy advocacy organization Freedom House has done annually in its freedom of the world reports, or by observing recent political developments in countries such as Turkey, the Philippines, Hungary, Poland, Brazil, Egypt, and yes, Russia and China, democracy is on the retreat and authoritarianism is filling the void.

The 21st century autocrat asserts himself as a legitimate alternative to perceive shortcomings in democracy and representative government. In the era of rapid technological advancement, incoming inequality, the hollowing out of the middle class, and unease with the pace of cultural change, the modern despot promises easy answers and provides convenient scapegoats.

The trappings of democracy sometimes remain in place, often with elections that are neither free nor fair, or pliant legislature that rubber-stamps the authoritarians' edicts. Ruling authority is increasingly centralized and national interests become synonymous with the autocrats's personal interests. Independent institutions or critics are targeted as obstacles to progress or enemies of the Nation, and are marginalized whether by purge, arrest, or delegitimization.

In some cases these autocrats rise to the top of representative government through legitimate electoral processes or other political mechanics functioning as intended, only to chip away at democratic institutions and norms once in office. Such centralization of power has bred a newfound assertiveness, which has manifest itself across the world's stage. Russia has successfully exploited the openness of our political dialogue, a defining element of American democracy to exacerbate divisions along racial and societal lines during the 2016 election.

Last year, the director of national intelligence and other government agencies announced before the 2018 midterms that Russia and other foreign actors were persisting in covert political influence activities, including through the dissemination of false information and propaganda. Beijing has wielded economic might to bend the political global environment towards more favorable terms for itself through its belt and road initiative, and the export advanced telecommunications and network equipment.

This projection of power comes with the not too subtle expectation that recipients pay careful heed to Beijing's strategic interests. It also provided those countries with the technical means to control and monitor the internet and other communication technologies domestically and stifle online dissent or access to independent sources of information. Not to mention the capacity to monitor the movement of its citizens through CCTV, that rivals anything that George Orwell might have imagined.

With today's hearing, I hope we can compliment previous hearings into China's military expansion and its strategies for future technological superiority to understand how Beijing uses both those avenues for advancing its authoritarian agenda. And if China hopes to create a network of dependent countries, or worse, so-called authoritarian capitalist imitators that are enthralled to Beijing's largess when they built the high tech surveillance states of their own, that is the threatening trend that the U.S. through its Intelligence Community needs to comprehensively understand.

Our committee has taken a global purview and rising authoritarianism is a global threat. Director of National Intelligence Coats in his prepared testimony before our Senate counterparts last month pointed to an alignment between Chinese and Russian interests not seen since the 1950s. Interests that are inherently antagonistic toward the sanctity of human rights, democratic processes, and individual liberties.

As Americans, we are justly proud that modern democracy was born here, but we

have become dangerously complacent in recent years. Our voter participation rates are woefully low. Civics education, once a staple for generations of American students has withered away, and too many of us are disengaged from the political process. Democracy and liberty may be our birthright, but no people is immune to the siren song of those who promise to solve our problems for us.

We must also preserve and reenforce America's place as the global champion of the democracy, and ensure that our values guide our interests, not the other way around. Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis' resignation letter warned about China and Russia's desire, quote, "to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model," unquote. And admonished the Nation not to shirk its unique responsibility.

While the U.S. remains the indispensable Nation in the free world, he wrote, we cannot protect our interests or serve that role effectively without maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those allies as well.

Just over a week ago I traveled to Europe to participate in Munich security conference and to meet with NATO officials and European leaders in Brussels as part of a codel led by Speaker Pelosi. I know Mr. Turner participated in those meetings as well. In both places and in every meeting our Nation's closest friends and partners expressed their concern that we were retreating from the position that we have occupied for three-quarters of a century, as a leader of the global coalition of democracies and the head of a unique and durable transatlantic partnership.

NATO was born 70 years ago to present the united front against Soviet expansionism. As we confront the new challenge of 21st century of authoritarianism, it remains just as relevant today.

With that, I recognize the ranking member for any opening statement he wishes to make.

[The statement of The Chairman follows:]

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Mr. Nunes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today we will hear from a panel of national security implications of authoritarianism. We welcome the recognition from committee Democrats that Russia and China pose primary strategic threats to the United States. A point committee Republicans have made -- been emphasizing and making for many years. In the 114th and 115th Congresses, this committee examined these threats, along with those from other malign actors seeking to harm our country, and I welcome the opportunity for the committee to do so.

Nonetheless, I am concerned this hearing is not an appropriate forum to undertake a broad survey of authoritarian regimes. This would be more appropriate for the Committee on Foreign Affairs rather than the Intelligence Committee. The Intelligence Committee is the sole committee in the entire House charged with overseeing the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government.

Furthermore, I hope this hearing will not become a venue for making spurious comparisons between authoritarian governments and democracies. Though these false analogies may be useful for partisan political purposes, they diminish and trivialize the degree of suffering, repression, and violence that people endure under actual authoritarian regimes.

Soon President Trump will submit his fiscal year 2020 budget to Congress, and the committee will be charged with setting the funding authorizations for the most sensitive intelligence programs of our government. In preparation for the budget release, we urgently need to hold classified oversight briefing. I hope that we will be having more of those intelligence-related briefings as we are among a small handful of House Members who have the appropriate accesses and responsibility to conduct such oversight.

I hope this committee quick returns to our core responsibilities, and I yield back the balance of my time.

[The statement of Mr. Nunes follows:]

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The Chairman. I thank the ranking member. And without objection, these opening statements will be made a part of the record.

I am honored to welcome the distinguished panel of witnesses here with us today to discuss the different facets of autocracy's advance and democracy's retreat in the world.

First, is Former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. Any attempt at a full introduction would fall woefully short of capturing the full scope of credentials and wisdom Secretary Albright brings to today's subject. So I will only briefly note that she dealt firsthand with autocrats and liberal Democrats alike while serving as our top diplomat during the Clinton administration's second term. She is the chair of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and her most recent book is aptly titled *Fascism, A Warning*. We thank Secretary Albright for her prior public service to the Nation and look forward to her testimony today.

Next, Former Danish Prime Minister and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. After 5 years of distinguished service as the alliance's top international civil servant from 2009 until 2014, Secretary General Rasmussen has since gone on to found the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of democracy and free markets across the globe. He is the organizer and host of the annual Copenhagen Democracy Summit, and the chair of the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity. Thank you for joining us today, secretary general.

Next, we have Dr. Teng Biao, an esteemed human rights lawyer and civil rights activist who left China in 2012. Experienced Beijing's harsh treatment of dissidence firsthand, and has written about what he has termed Xi Jinping's new totalitarianism. His personal story and scholarship speak to a possible dystopian future, if the world fails

to stand up to Beijing's authoritarian capitalist model for the suppression of human rights and civil liberties, and the stifling of dissent or criticism within China's borders or outside of them. We appreciate your appearing before the committee today, Doctor.

And, finally, Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a senior fellow and director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for the American Security. Prior to that, Dr. Kendall-Taylor was a deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, and also a CIA analyst with a focus on the political dynamics of autocracies and democratic decline.

We don't say thank you enough to our hard working intelligence community professionals, but we are grateful for your time and service to our country, and are glad to have you join us here today.

Each of your statements will be made a part of the record in its entirety. And I would now welcome your opening statements, Madam Secretary, you may begin.

**STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, CHAIR; ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN, FORMER NATO SECRETARY, GENERAL AND PRIME MINISTER OF DENMARK, THE ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES FOUNDATION, FOUNDER, AND TRANSATLANTIC COMMISSION ON ELECTION INTEGRITY, CHAIR; DR. TENG BIAO, HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVIST; AND ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY**

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT**

Ms. Albright. Thank you very much, Chairman Schiff, Congressman Nunes, members of the committee. I very much appreciate being here today.

I want to begin by saying that as a regular consumer of intelligence during my years in government and as a member of the CIA's external advisory board from 2009 to 2017, I have the highest respect for America's intelligence professionals and for this committee's role in overseeing their work. In fact, one thing I truly do miss about being in government is having that daily access to the intelligence.

I also want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for making the resurgence of authoritarianism a focus of the committee so early in your tenure. And as my comments today will make clear, I believe the assault on democratic values around the world poses a direct threat to the national security interests of the United States.

Understanding the forces driving this trend and helping the U.S. Government respond must be a key priority of America's Intelligence Community and of this

committee. I have been involved in the struggle between democracy and dictatorship every day as the chairman of the National Democratic Institute, and I have spent a lot of time thinking about what has happened in the 30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and what we can do to get back on the right path.

The Italian Fascist leader, Benito Mussolini, observed that in seeking to accumulate power, it is wise to do so in the manner of one plucking a chicken, one feather at a time. Looking around the world today there are a lot of feathers being plucked. Warning signs abound across the globe, the discrediting of mainstream politicians, the emergence of leaders who seek to divide rather than unite, the pursuit of political victory at all costs, and the invocation of national greatness by people who identify greatness only with themselves.

Most often, the signposts that should alert us are disguised, the altered constitution that passes for reform, the attacks on a free press justified by security, the invocation of national emergencies, the dehumanization of others, or the hollowing-out of a democratic political system so that all is erased but the label.

History teaches us that authoritarianism and the tendencies that lead to it are subject to imitation.

Surveying the world today, we see apprentice autocrats copying repressive tactics that had their tryouts in Venezuela or Russia. We also see more and more countries employing squads of opinion-shapers to flood online sites and social media networks, where one can spread lies just as easily as truth.

So undemocratic practices are on the rise in, among other places, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, and the Philippines, each a treaty ally of the United States.

Radical nationalist movements, some violent, some not, are achieving notoriety as they draw media attention, make parliamentary inroads, and push the boundaries of

public discussion towards bigotry and hate.

Many of these parties receive support from Russia, a country led by a former KGB operative who has invaded Ukraine, undermined foreign democracies, exported corruption, and stands accused of conducting political assassinations.

Under President Xi, China has become another leading global champion of authoritarianism, actively using its economic might to shape the world in its image, while pioneering new methods for monitoring and controlling its population which some have dubbed techno-authoritarianism.

This committee needs to be clear-eyed about the role that Moscow and Beijing are playing in the global retreat of freedom. Their tactics are distinct, but they are each interesting heavily and effectively in covertly undermining democratic norms and institutions, and they are both using their own considerable intelligence and technological capabilities to weaponize information.

Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and their ilk want to turn autocracy into the driving force of this no-longer-new century. They may call it by a different a name, using oxymorons such as authoritarian capitalism or illiberal democracy, but we should not be naive about the troubling trends.

Because we are all affected, directly or indirectly, by political repression and by the human cruelty that rides alongside it. And make no mistake, America's security needs are influenced greatly by whether democracy or authoritarianism prevails around the world.

For as long as I have been around, I have heard some people argue that the path to stability and order is to empower a single strong man or group. The truth is exactly the opposite. The Taliban did not bring real stability to Afghanistan, nor Gaddafi to Libya, nor Assad to Syria, nor Chavez to Venezuela.

Dictators can create the illusion of order for a period of time, but almost inevitably, by blocking the path to peaceful change they make violent, disruptive change more easily. So it is no coincidence that the hotspots most likely to harbor terrorists, generate waves of refugees and produce illegal drugs, are in areas of the world that are nondemocratic.

It is true that democratic transition can produce disorder in the short term, but it is best democracy can produce the kind of stability that lasts. And so for all of these reasons, the health of democracy is clearly vital to America's interest.

In my travels abroad, I hear the same questions all the time. If America has a leader who says the press always lies, how can Vladimir Putin be faulted for making the same claim? And I am very concerned about being a laughing stock to leaders such as in Hungary.

And if our political system becomes so dysfunctional that we cannot even keep the government open, how do we convince leaders in other countries that democratic paths are worth following?

I will never forget meeting with parliamentarians in Egypt and talking to them about the need to compromise in order to govern effectively. And one of them looked at me, and said, yeah, you mean like you guys.

So, Mr. Chairman, there are many elements involved in countering the threat of authoritarianism, but I want to emphasize today that our work has to start at home, and in that effort both parties in Congress can and must take the lead. You are the bedrock of our democracy and a co-equal branch of government established by Article I of our Constitution.

In recent years, we have all become familiar with the slogan, if you see something, say something. I have decided to add a third element. See something, say something,

and do something. And in that spirit, I would urge you to do the following things.

First, defend the Constitution by protecting the free press and reinforcing the principle that no one is above the law.

Second, set an example for other democracies by governing effectively, fighting corruption, and combating foreign influence in our elections and on our political system more broadly.

Third, support programs that strengthen other democracies.

I am very proud of the work that the National Democratic Institute does in partnership with the International Republican Institute, and we would very much appreciate the support of Congress.

Another effort I am involved in is with Secretary General Rasmussen in a New Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Security, and Prosperity, which we launched at the Munich Security Conference with a goal of rallying the democratic world on behalf of our common values.

Even as we promote democratic values, media, and civic institutions, we also have to better understand and counter the growing influence of our authoritarian competitors. The United States has to develop and execute a comprehensive strategy to counter Russia and China's antidemocratic campaigns. And this will mean ensuring that our intelligence community is organized and equipped with the necessary resources and expertise to meet this challenge, and it means cooperating more closely with our democratic allies.

It also means investing in diplomacy and development to check authoritarian influence, and undertake a concerted effort to fight kleptocracy and money laundering, which helps abusive rulers to hold on to power. Finally, it means having a real discussion with technology platforms about how to guard against information operations and protect democratic discourse.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, you will play a critical role in defending democracy and countering the rise of authoritarianism globally. I think this is a very proper discussion for this committee to have, and I am grateful to have a chance to be here with you.

[The statement of Ms. Albright follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you, madam secretary. Secretary General Rasmussen.

## **STATEMENT OF ANDERS ROGH RASMUSSEN**

Mr. Rasmussen. Chairman Schiff, esteemed members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to offer my thoughts for this hearing on Autocracy's Advance and Democracy's Decline.

I have dedicated my political life to promoting freedom and democracy, and to advocating the benevolent force of a U.S.-led Western alliance. An alliance that united to defeat the tyrannies of Nazism and Communism. However, tyranny is once again awaking from its slumber.

Last year my foundation, the Alliance of Democracies, produced the single biggest international survey of attitudes towards democracy. It found that people in autocracies are more satisfied with their governments than those living in democracies. It is high time for the world's democracies to come together and fight back against autocracy.

If the free world fails to unite against the autocratic challenge, the personal and economic liberties that we often take for granted today will slowly but surely decline in the coming years.

After the fall of communism, many people, including myself, were hoping to see China and Russia become part of the free world. We must now conclude that the opposite has happened. China and Russia have descended back into autocracy and become openly hostile geopolitical rivals of the world's democracies.

Autocracies like Russia and China are systematically seeking to undermine our

political systems. They exploit and abuse economic relationships, building elaborate debt traps, and energy dependencies. They use covert influence to disturb our politics and undermine trust and confidence in our democratic institutions.

China has taken an increasingly authoritarian turn under Xi Jinping, bullying its smaller neighbors in the South China Sea, bypassing international law, and building its global economic footprint without reciprocity. The economic giants of China are synonymous with the state, challenging free trade.

I witnessed the authoritarian turn in Russia under Putin. Russia does not only invade its neighbors and poison its suspected adversaries, it also seeks to poison our democracies and media. Over the past 2 years, foreign interference has been detected in at least 10 elections and referendums on both sides of the Atlantic. This is a playbook that was developed by Russia.

In Europe, according to a report by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia is responsible for 80 -- eight, zero percent of disinformation activities. Just last week, Microsoft detected efforts to phish servers of European think tanks, mirroring a similar effort detected last year in the United States. And make no mistake, invading Crimea, meddling in our elections, poisoning a spy on the streets of England, hacking or attacking our servers, these are part of Russia's hybrid warfare.

So what do we do to counter this authoritarian surge? First, we need to strengthen the spine of our democratic supremacy. We should create an overwhelmingly powerful and credible democratic alliance in order to counterbalance the rising and assertive autocracies. We need to preserve and strengthen NATO, and we need to build stronger relationships between the traditional transatlantic alliance and the rest of the world's democracies, including major powers such as Japan and India.

We need to strengthen the world's free societies to counter the advancing

autocracies. As my contribution, I created the Alliance of Democracies, a nonprofit dedicated to the advancement of democracy and free markets across the globe.

I am hosting the Copenhagen Democracy Summit on June 28 this year. The Summit provides a high-level strategic forum to those who share broad commitment to democracy to discuss the most pressing issues of our time. And I hope to see Members of Congress and this committee to join us to reaffirm our trust in global democracy.

Second, we must counter foreign meddling in our elections and democratic institutions. At the Alliance of Democracies, our flagship initiative is the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity, a bipartisan initiative. I am joined in it by Michael Chertoff and Joe Biden and other high-level profiles.

It is our mission to raise public awareness of the potential threats coming from foreign powers and to develop new technologies to prevent the next generation of disinformation such as deep fake audio and video.

We recently launched a five-point election pledge calling on EU candidates and political parties not to actively or passively support efforts to meddle in elections such as fabricating, using and spreading false or fabricated documents, video and audio.

And, third, we need determined American global leadership. Whether you like it or not, America is the indispensable Nation for the democratic world order. If the United States retrenches, it leaves a vacuum filled by the bad guys. And then the United States will be faced with a stronger foes, weaker friends, and a more insecure world.

But, of course, America should not carry the burden alone. The other democracies have an equally important duty in the defense of the free world. As one of America's greatest friends, and a genuine admirer of your country, and by the way, also grandfather to American grandchildren, let me stress this, the United States benefits from the multilateral world order it built after World War II.

So, in conclusion, we must present a united front against the autocracies. The authoritarian advance is a common threat to the United States and Europe. We must develop a robust response. The world's democracies must present a united front against the autocracies who are themselves united in their efforts to undermine us.

Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Rasmussen follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary General. Dr. Teng, please begin.

#### **STATEMENT OF DR. TENG BIAO**

Mr. Teng. Thank you very much for inviting me to speak here. Thirty years ago, our democracies in the world condemned the Tiananmen massacre, sanctioned Chinese dictators, and supported Tiananmen activists. Soon after that, however, Western leaders could not wait to welcome Chinese butchers and dictators with their red carpet, eager hugs and state banquets. Only 17 days after the Tiananmen massacre, President George H.W. Bush sent a secret letter to Deng Xiaoping and then dispatched a secret envoy to meet with Deng later.

U.S. Government granted China a most-favored-nation status, the link of human rights to trade. China was allowed to join the WTO. Then China was given the opportunity to host the Olympic Games, the World Expo, and APEC. China has repeatedly been voted in as a member of the UN Human Rights Council. Tiananmen massacre shocked the world, but there is another shock, the Relative Strength Comparison between China and the West has been a terrifying turnaround since 1989.

The rise of China is the rise of Chinese Government, not the Chinese people. People living in China do not have access to Google, Facebook, or Twitter, nor do they have the right to protect their houses. They do not have religious freedom or right to vote. Political prisoners have died in custody, including the Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo. Torture is rampant. More than 4,000 Falun Gong practitioners have been tortured to death during detention. A million Uighurs and ethnic -- now 2 million. Two million Uighurs and ethnic minorities have been detained in concentration camps.

Because of my human rights work, I was disbarred, banned from teaching, kidnapped by secret police and severely tortured. My home was ransacked and my NGO was shut down. China's high-tech totalitarianism has begun to take shape. CCP utilizes its leading technology of AI to tighten its control of society.

Great Firewall, social media, e-commerce, and the modern telecommunication make it easier for CCP to keep people under surveillance. The internet has been used by CCP as an effective tool for censorship and brainwashing. Facial recognition, voiceprint recognition, gait recognition, DNA collection, and so on, all have strengthened the existing systematic control.

By 2022, every Chinese will own two surveillance cameras. What we have seen in China is an unprecedented high-tech totalitarianism, an advanced version of 1984. Moreover, China has become more and more aggressive on the international stage. One belt one road, Confucius Institutes, South China Sea aggression, cyber attacks, meddling in elections in Taiwan and Australia, exporting its political motive, et cetera.

Cao Shunli was one of my clients. When she was on her way to Geneva to participate in China's UPR, she was stopped at the Beijing airport, and detained, severely tortured, and died in custody. Activists and dissidents living in the United States cannot stay out of CCP's control. Their family members back in China are intimidated, arrested, or detained.

ABA rescinded a proposal to publish that book, telling me that publishing your book will upset the Chinese government. My scheduled talk was canceled by an Ivy League university. After I came to the United States, my wife and child were prevented from leaving China as a part of collective punishment.

My wife was fired by her company. I have been harassed by frivolous lawsuits by a billionaire who worked for China's Ministry of State Security. I received death threats

from Twitter users.

In Mexico, India, Canada, Paris, New York, Atlanta, and San Francisco, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, and Chinese dissidents have been harassed and physically attacked. Gui Minhai, a publisher with a Swedish passport, was kidnapped in Thailand by Chinese secret police.

The CCP does not represent the interests of the Chinese people. Its first priority is to prolong its one-party rule. So it needs to make the world safe for the CCP. It tries to control the overseas Chinese communities. And Chinese Government has eliminated almost all independent Chinese language media outlets in the United States. It is more so in Europe, Asia, Africa, and elsewhere.

CCP has always been an important supporter of every dictatorial regime. With the help of resident appeasement policy, money, and technology, CCP has established a powerful and brutal totalitarianism. I gave the case of Cisco, Nortel Networks, Microsoft, Intel, McKinsey, Yahoo, and Google, their roles.

China is also demanding a rewriting of international norms, attempting to create a new international order in which rule of law is manipulated, human dignity is debased, democracy is abused, and justice is denied. The West should have learned a lesson, human rights are not to be sacrificed for economic or political gains. Over the years, the CCP has violated human rights and suppressed freedom beyond its borders. The free world needs to re-examine their policy towards China before it is too late.

Now a few policy recommendations. Tear down the Great Firewall. Link human rights and the information freedom to trade with China. Ban Huawei, ZTE, and other Chinese companies that threaten United States national security. Scrutinize the Confucius Institute, CSSA, and Chinese Scholars and Students Association, and other Chinese Government-related or sponsored organizations. Block the products and the

services from China that were involved in human rights violation.

Demand all Chinese state-run media outlets to register as foreign agents. Enforce the Global Magnitsky Act more effectively and widely. Boycott Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics, or initiate to strip Beijing of hosting rights, if China continues its concentration camps in Xinjiang, and continues its persecution of Tibetans, Christians, and Falun Gong practitioners.

Disapprove the permanent residence application of Chinese officials. Scrutinize the donation to U.S. universities, think tanks, and nonprofit organizations. Make sure that donation does not influence an independence of research and academic freedom. Support the human rights defenders and the prisoners of conscience in China. Lead reform of UN system, especially the Human Rights Council.

Finally, unite the democratic allies to take coordinated actions against the CCP's interference and infiltration. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Teng follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Teng. And now, Dr. Kendall-Taylor.

#### **STATEMENT OF ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR**

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Nunes, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here. I served for almost a decade in the U.S. Intelligence Community. During this time I helped shape the IEC's efforts to understand the forces fueling authoritarianism and the way that these regimes maintain their grip on power.

During my time in the IEC, and through my academic work, I have come to view the rise of authoritarianism as one of the most significant threats to U.S. national security and to the American way of life. Today's threats to democracy are real, but democracy's decline is not inevitable. Democracies have proven remarkably resilient over time, they have faced challenges, and they have found ways to overcome them. That is the task before us.

To meet this challenge and forge an effective set of strategies, however, we must recognize that political dynamics are changing. In my remarks, I will briefly address three fundamental changes that are reshaping the contest between democracy and authoritarianism.

First, the way that democracies are breaking down is changing. Historically, coups have been the biggest threat to democracy. Since the end of the Cold War, however, democracy has increasingly been dismantled by leaders coming to power in relatively free and fair elections, but that subsequently erodes democracy from within.

If current trends persist, this populous-fueled backsliding will be the most

common way that democracies fail. The second factor shaping the competition between democracy and authoritarianism is the rise of highly personalized authoritarianism regimes. The key point here is that autocracy is evolving and adapting. 21st century autocrats are not the same as their Cold War predecessors. Today's autocracies have become more resilient and a more formidable challenge to democracy.

One important change in autocracies today is the rise of personalist regimes. Or those autocracies where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single individual, such as Putin, Erdogan, CC, and Kim Jong-un. The data show that personalist autocracies have increased notably since the end of the Cold War. This is concerning because a body of research shows that personalist leaderships tend to produce the worst outcomes of any regime type. They pursue the most risky and aggressive foreign policies. They are the most likely to invest in their nuclear weapons. The most likely to fight wars against democracies. And the most likely to initiate interstate conflict.

They tend to be the most volatile and unpredictable partners, the most corrupt, and the least likely to democratize. A sustained rise of personalist autocracies will create challenges for U.S. foreign policy.

Finally, there are tectonic shifts taking place in the international system stemming from China's rise. Research shows that the structure of the international system affects the number of democracies in the world. When a single democracy dominates the international system, as the United States has in the post-Cold War era, the number of democracies in the world rises. But when autocracies gain influence, the pendulum swings in other direction and the number of autocracies rise.

Along with changes in the structure of the system, autocracies like China, and especially Russia, have grown more assertive on the global stage. Russia and China have long thought to counter democracy promotion, and to export their tactics for maintaining

control. And while their efforts are not new, they have changed in scope and intensity.

Since 2014, Russia, in particular, has gone on the offensive with its efforts to undermine western democracies. In short, China's rise, especially if accompanied by deepening relations with Moscow will create conditions more conducive to autocracy. So what can be done? I outlined several recommendations in my written statement, but I will briefly highlight three.

First, Congress must act early. The further democratic back-sliding progresses, the more difficult it is to halt or -- reverse or halt.

Second, Congress should increase democracy support and sustain it in strategically important democracies. Research suggests that the most effective way to support durable democracy is through the creation and maintenance of constraints on the executive, judiciaries, media, and political parties.

And, finally, and perhaps most important, Congress must invest in maintaining America's competitive edge. Politics follows geopolitics, and the maintenance of America's power and influence will be critical for the maintenance of democracy across the globe. This means supporting the strength and resilience of democracy at home, and equipping the United States to compete with other autocracies like China abroad.

In closing, the good news is that democracy remains the most prevalent form of government in the world. But if current trends persist, we may witness a disconcerting reversal. If democracies do not respond to contemporary challenges, autocracies may soon become the international norm. The world's democracies must be proactive and cannot afford complacency. Thank you.

[The statement of Ms. Kendall-Taylor follows:]

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The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Kendall-Taylor. We will now proceed with questions, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes.

Madam secretary, if we look at Hungary as a test case, how did the transformation take place in Hungary, and what should that tell us about what we need to look out for in other countries, and how we might take early action to arrest democratic back-sliding?

Ms. Albright. Thank you very much for asking that. I have spent a lot of time looking at Hungary. In fact, I was there in the 1980s when Viktor Orban was everybody's favorite dissident and had started Fidesz, the young people's party. I do think that part of the causes there is that there have been dissatisfaction with Hungary's economy, in a number of ways. Some questioning about whether there was corruption in the ruling party, but mainly you have a leader who is very clever.

And as Dr. Kendall-Taylor said, people that are elected, that is that part that has made the difference because he was going to change the system. He wanted to make sure that there was some response to the people's needs. What he did, however, was all of a sudden to see himself as the savior of Hungary's nationalism. And Hungary is a country that had a lot of sense that they had been robbed after World War I with the Trianon Treaty.

And I did a survey of all of Europe in 1991, and one of the questions that we asked after the fall of the Soviet Union was: Do you think a piece of your country is in the neighboring country? And I will never forget, the Hungarians -- 80 percent Hungarians thought that a piece of their country was in the neighboring country.

So what Viktor Orban has been doing is working off of that anger and dissatisfaction to put himself in power and then invent this crazy term, illiberal democracy, which means majority rule without any minority rights. He, by the way, has

attacked George Soros who funded him for his education, and has done everything -- he is the ultimate demagogue.

But I think what happened was that there was dissatisfaction after the end of the Cold War, there were economic -- lack of care for many of the people, corruption, and a chance for a demagogic leader to in fact turn himself into an authoritarian and link up with, believe it or not, with the Russians, who in fact support this concept of illiberal democracy.

The Chairman. Thank you, madam secretary.

Dr. Kendall-Taylor, the Intel Community typically focuses on hard targets, the rise of China, Russia's invasion of Ukraine. How much awareness, how much of a priority does the Intel Community put on ideological threats like the rise of authoritarianism. Is there a sufficient focus, do you think, in recognition of the danger?

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I think there is a recognition, and certainly that recognition has grown over recent years, as we have seen the number of democracies, including in Europe, begin to backslide. So looking at Turkey, Hungary, Poland. And I think there is recognition and a lot of good work being done in the Intelligence Community to try out to try to identify the indicators, as you suggested, of what this process looks like so that the Intelligence Community can warn policymakers in advance so that policymakers can intervene early.

And I think the playbook looks something like this. First, they come to power with public support claiming mandates for their efforts to dismantle democracy. They attack the media, looking to discredit it and increase their control over it. They undermine judicial independence. They erode civil society and ultimately they change the rules of the game in ways that makes it hard to remove these leaders from power.

So from the perspective of the Intelligence Community, there is a lot of good work

to be done, I think, to develop these frameworks, understand the intentions of these governments so that we are positioned to provide the Congress with the warning that they need to intervene early, which as I mention in my remarks is key to halting and reversing that process.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary General, the case of Turkey. What do you do when a NATO ally becomes increasingly authoritarian? Were there missed opportunities to try to arrest that trend? How would you recommend we deal with Turkey now?

Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you very much. I think that is a crucial question. I am very much concerned about the domestic political developments in Turkey, the lack of respect for human rights, restrictions on free speech, et cetera. So we should be very much concerned about the development, and in addition to the political issues, Turkey is also considering purchasing Russian military equipment.

First, on the military equipment side, obviously, Russian military equipment would never be adaptable or compatible with NATO military equipment. So if they pursue that course, they will have to separate that from NATO systems, and coactively that might marginalize Turkey from a security point of view.

How should we react to that? Should we kick out Turkey of NATO? Should we freeze our relations with Turkey? My conclusion is quite the opposite. I think we should step up our critical dialogue with Ankara. I think we owe it to the half of the Turkish people who voted against the constitutional amendment proposed by President Erdogan.

Out of a thing from a strategic point of view, we need Turkey as a western-oriented, reform-oriented nation. If we try to cut off our links with Turkey, basically Turkey will turn eastwards.

So my conclusion is, we should intensify our dialogue with the government in Ankara, tell them about our concerns, keep our discussions within the NATO council, as we have done during -- over the years. So I am concerned, but I think this is the only way forward.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary General.

Ranking Member Nunes.

Mr. Nunes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to just quickly get on the record the status of four authoritarian regimes from my perspective. And I will just start from the left side there with Dr. Teng.

Do you consider Russia, China, Venezuela, and Iran, those four, are they all, in your measure, the way that you measure authoritarian regimes, are they all authoritarianism regimes, those four?

Mr. Teng. Thank you. Not China. China is not an authoritarian regime. Since 1949, Chinese communist party established totalitarianism. And up to Mao's death in 1976, many -- I think most of western scholars now see China as authoritarian, but it is not. It is still a totalitarian. It is a sophisticated totalitarianism. It is a high-tech knowledge in totalitarianism. And there are a lot of theoretical discussions, but there is one mostly important difference between authoritarianism state and totalitarianism, that is the control of private fear, so the suppressing of culture, education, religion, that -- yeah so --

Mr. Nunes. So all four then are either authoritarian or totalitarian in your definition?

Mr. Teng. Yeah.

Mr. Nunes. Okay. Mr. Secretary General, those four regimes, are they -- do you consider them all authoritarian regimes or totalitarian, Dr. Teng?

Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, I don't see any difference.

Mr. Nunes. Madam secretary?

Ms. Albright. I consider them that way, all of them.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. Concur.

Mr. Nunes. All right. With that, I yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Himes.

Mr. Himes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all of you for testifying today on this very important topic. I am an optimist, so I have been resisting those who say that we are in an analogous period to the early 1930s. But I am haunted by the fact that I suspect some people in the early 1930s imagine that Germany and Italy, as the sort of the flowers of enlightened liberalism at the time couldn't possibly go the way that subsequently they did.

So I want to use my question really to ask generally whether I am overly optimistic, or whether there is a meaningful probability that the rise of authoritarianism really takes a very dark turn, specifically -- and because I have limited time, let me start with Dr. Kendall-Taylor. But I will ask Secretary Albright to comment as well.

You both have given us lists of things that we should do to try to thwart the rise of authoritarianism. Dr. Kendall-Taylor, I want to start with you, because you said something intriguing but extremely general, which is you said, Congress should act early, but you didn't tell us what that means.

So let me ask you to quickly clarify that. And then let me ask both you and Secretary Albright, one concept has not come up, which I think is essential to this discussion, which is immigration and migration.

As you look around the world, authoritarian regimes, certainly in western Europe, always have a strong anti-immigrant component to that authoritarianism, and of course it

has warped to the politics of this young Congress and probably contributed meaningfully to Brexit in the UK.

So I wonder if you can you give us some practical advice on how we should think about the whole topic of migration and immigration?

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. On your first point about the importance of early intervention. So these things are incredibly hard to navigate the flow, kind of the gradual dismantling of democracy from within. Because in many cases these leaders have popular support. In many cases, they are doing these illiberal and anti-democratic measures using legal means. And so it becomes very difficult for the United States I think to understand when to intervene.

And so my suggestion is based on this idea of looking at this from a comparative perspective. So as I laid out when I addressed the chairman's questions about what the indicators are.

So the U.S. Intelligence Community and subject matter experts should be able to establish a framework of democratic back-sliding, what it looks like. Because when we can understand the indicators, what may not look problematic, and early indicator in one particular country, it becomes more evident when we can look across cases and see that actually that is an early step in this far greater process.

So I think the key is for the Intelligence Community and subject matter experts to lay out what these indicators are, and then it would equip Congress I think to at least to intervene early in terms of putting pressure on these governments, and then clearly articulating at some point what the costs are of further anti-democratic measures.

Mr. Himes. So I have only got 2 minutes. I am really interested to hear each of you for a minute, I guess, on the subject of migration and immigration, as a practical matter how we should think about it and what we should do about it?

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[10:59 a.m.]

Mr. Himes. Secretary Albright?

Ms. Albright. Well, I am prejudiced. I am an immigrant. I came here when I was 11 years old, having escaped two totalitarian regimes, first the fascists in 1939 and then the Communists in 1948 in my native Czechoslovakia.

I do think that one of issues in terms of some definitions of authoritarianism is identification with one group at the expense of another and turning that other group into a bunch of scapegoats. And I think that I am very troubled by what our immigration policy is.

By the way, I am an optimist who worries a lot. And that is what I am worrying about, and the feather plucking. By the way, you shouldn't say those two words together too quickly.

But I think that basically what has to happen is -- an example of something that should not be going on is turning immigrants into an emergency. I think we need to have comprehensive immigration reform. I think every country has a right to define whom they want to let in, but there has to be -- this is, I think, where Congress needs to act in terms of having some kind of comprehensive immigration reform.

And the fact that the numbers now are going down so badly in terms of whom we let in I think is bad. And I do think we are scapegoating immigrants. And partially that is something that was going on also in Europe.

Mr. Himes. And let me just ask you -- I wasn't so much asking about the U.S., but in Western Europe, where Secretary Clinton, for example, suggested that they needed to

get their migration problem under control. What advice would you give us with respect to Western Europe?

Ms. Albright. Well, I do think -- by the way, I have been involved in a whole task force on trying to deal with immigration.

They were very disorganized at the beginning. The EU needs to do better. There does need to be a variety of rules there. I salute Chancellor Merkel for what she did, but I do think there was not any way of dealing in terms of how the camps work or where people go.

But I do think the European Union also has to figure out some kind of a fair system and recognize they need immigrants in some places, but there does need to be some better organization. And I can send you actually something on all the details that have come out about that, because it was badly organized and unprepared for.

Mr. Himes. Thank you.

Thank you. My time has expired.

The Chairman. Mr. Conaway.

Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, everybody, for your testimony this morning.

Secretary General, since you gave a shout-out to your grandchildren, I met with your daughter-in-law yesterday. A very pleasant, productive meeting with Kristina.

Dr. Teng, thank you for all you have suffered. Thank you for continuing to speak out with the risks of having happen to you what has happened to other folks who dare to speak against the Chinese.

Anybody who wants to go first. Can democracies and autocracies, totalitarian systems, peacefully coexist in a world? Is it not inevitable that we get into a fight with somebody? Or can we figure out a way to coexist and let thugs do what the thugs do

the best?

Madam Secretary?

Ms. Albright. Well, I think it is very hard to coexist, especially since the thugs are trying to invade our space. And I think the number of you that have talked about the fact that the U.S. is an indispensable nation is something that I fully believe. It is just there is nothing about the word "indispensable" that says "alone." We need partners, and those partners and we have to act together.

And the Secretary General spoke about the asymmetrical way that the thugs are operating now, in terms of undermining our process generally through weaponizing information. And I do think that we cannot live with that, when they are, in fact, trying to separate us from our friends and allies.

Mr. Conaway. So we have got China ignoring the rule of law generally, but specifically the South China Sea. They are long players. Xi Jinping, I suspect, will be the emperor there for a long, long time. Our leadership comes and goes, elected leadership comes and goes.

So they into the South China Sea, they create islands, under the auspices of helping our fisherman and rescuing folks. And Xi Jinping actually stood in the Rose Garden and said they were not going to arm those islands. I think public reporting indicates that is exactly what they have done, is arm those islands.

They lost in the tribunal and basically ignored the world, and we have ignored them, and now they have now gone further and further.

So how do we effectively stand up to an autocracy like China that is as strong as they are and make that work?

Mr. Rasmussen. I would say that one example could be to stand up for freedom of navigation when it comes to the Azov Sea between Ukraine and Russia. If it we

cannot protect the freedom of navigation in the Azov Sea, how can we ensure that we can maintain freedom of navigation in the South China Sea?

So it is very much about pursuing the same principles, whether you are speaking about Europe or China.

Mr. Conaway. So, Dr. Teng, we look through the rest of the world through -- I do -- through the lens that has 240 years of democracy. It is genetically wired into us to be free people and to demand freedom.

Do the Chinese people have within them the tools or the drive to cause an autocracy to collapse? In other words, to stand against? The growing middle class, will they put up with, as an example, the social credit scheme that Xi Jinping is putting in place, the kind of absolute control of them? Will they at some point in time be willing to stand up against that?

Mr. Teng. So I started my human rights work in 2002. At that time the Chinese people and the lawyers, bloggers, writers, and journalists, human rights defenders, and NGOs, used the space of the internet and legal channels and education. So we did have some space to promote human rights and rule of law in China and more and more Chinese activists joined our human rights movement.

And the Communist Party also knew the threat from civil society. And so, since Xi Jinping took his power in late 2012, he did make a big change. So he suppressed every force of civil society -- lawyers, internet, universities, Uighur, Tibet, and underground churches.

So if the Chinese people could enjoy the limited space like in the 1990s and early 2000s, more and more Chinese people will stand up against the regime from a different angle. But now what Xi Jinping has been doing for the past 6 years makes it more and more difficult.

Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. I am out of time.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Ms. Sewell.

Ms. Sewell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank all of our witnesses for being here today.

You know, it is quite alarming, every one of you have said in so many words that these autocrats have really come into power by undermining democratic institutions and the confidence that we have within those institutions.

I am particularly interested in the threat of foreign influence in other electoral system. I am a daughter of Selma. Today I am going to be introducing the Voting Rights Advancement Act, which would seek to restore the full protections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

We witnessed Russia meddling in our elections, I think all of our agencies have said that, intelligence agencies have said that.

I would really be interested in your thoughts, Dr. Kendall-Taylor, on how we deal with this existential threat, what suggestions you would have in terms of tools in our tool box that we could thwart those advances, because what we are seeing is these autocratic nations become actors themselves.

And to coin or to borrow the phrase of Secretary Albright, I, too, am an optimist, but I worry a lot about our electoral system and the fact that we have not done enough to really get at the cybersecurity threat that is there.

So your thoughts on the tools that we could employ.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I think your question is such an important one, because, as we talked about, there was certainly evidence of Russia interfering in the 2016 election. The Intelligence Community warned about the continuing threat to the midterm

elections, and it is important to recognize that those threats persist today.

But I think there are two important points. One is we shouldn't overstate the effectiveness of Russia's malign actions. Russia is not 10 feet tall and there are real questions about the effectiveness of their efforts to meddle in the U.S. and about their ability to kind of change public attitudes.

The second important point is we don't want to let Russian malign action distract from the hard work that we have to do at home. Russia is most effective when they are picking on and exploiting existing fissures, disenchantment, discontent within our own population, and the growing polarization that we have in our society.

So it is really important that we do the hard work at home to restore our own democracy because it is those divisions that they are looking to exploit. So doing that really helps get, I think, at the root cause of what Russia is doing.

But it is incredibly important also to address the actions that Russia is doing, and that will require, to use a cliched term, kind of a whole-of-government approach. Those policies will be far reaching and comprehensive.

So we do need to address vulnerabilities in the electoral system, including campaign finance, the financial sector, cyber infrastructure. There are things we could do to address transparency in the financial sector and in real estate to root out money laundering in our own system. We do need to focus on protecting cyber infrastructure and other critical infrastructure. And certainly more needs to be done to protect the information environment.

Ms. Sewell. And I would suggest, as you said, we should start early.

Secretary Albright, if you would comment on your thoughts about what we should do about this real threat that I think will come growing, especially since a lot of these actors are foreign sovereigns that are the actors perpetrating this against our --

Ms. Albright. Well, I do think that it is something that we need to pay attention to immediately, because there is an attempt to undermine our democracy. We need to sort out a lot of the things that Dr. Kendall-Taylor said.

But I think we need to understand it is both things. There are problems that the United States has with some of the voter suppression and a number of issues that outside forces are taking advantage of. And so we need to make sure that we are not providing a petri dish for them to be able to play around in.

But there are threats from abroad, there is no question, through the media, et cetera. But I think we have to begin now, and I am very glad you are on to this.

Ms. Sewell. My other question was really about what we can do to bolster our Intelligence Community's support, not just for the collection and dissemination of information, but also in undergirding and supporting democratic institutions abroad.

Any thoughts on how we can best utilize, we, as members of the Intelligence Committee, in our oversight capacity, aside from giving them more resources, can help do that?

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I think more effort can be put in from the IC in building their partnerships with liaison services. As we kind of become clear eyed about what Russia and China are doing and kind of operating in this increasingly gray space, Chinese efforts to acquire dual use technologies, I think the IC can do a better job in working and building up a network of cooperation to help look into these situations.

And the second thing I would say is a lot of the things that we are talking about in terms of threats to democracy happen out in the open. And so for the Intelligence Community to continue to attract talent from social scientists and to do a better job, I think, in engaging with experts outside of the Intelligence Community.

For example, I think the IC was slow to acknowledge and identify the democratic

decline that was happening in Turkey. They were behind, I think, where the academic community was.

And so in encouraging in a safe and kind of calculated way their efforts to engage more closely with outside experts, I think, is another key part of this.

Ms. Sewell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. Turner. Thank you.

Dr. Kendall-Taylor, Dr. Teng, thank you for being here.

Secretary General Rasmussen, Secretary Albright, thank you for being here.

Thank you for your continued efforts to serve our country, and our world is safer because both of you in your great service have continued your efforts to help build democracy.

Secretary Albright, we were having a conversation just post-Munich Security Conference where our allies are now suffering internal domestic problems. As we have looked to U.S. leadership and authoritarian regimes, we have France burning with yellow vests, we have Germany, Merkel's government is unstable, we have England preoccupied with Brexit.

Recognizing that we are not the Foreign Affairs Committee, as Mr. Nunes said, I want to turn to a question about Russia and give both of you, Secretary General Rasmussen and Secretary Albright, an intel question.

You know, it is just recently that we all now agree that Russia is an adversary. And we all recall that when Obama openly mocked his opponent in 2012 for saying Russia was an adversary and that that was so 1990s, that has changed. We are now all in agreement.

In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea. In 2015, Russia went into

Syria. In 2017, there was an attempted assassination in Montenegro as they were ascending into NATO. We had the chemical weapons attack that occurred in Ukraine. And all that in the context of the invasion of Georgia under President Bush.

You look on the nuclear side, you have Russia openly in their Zapad exercises using a nuclear weapon component. You have Putin saying he is ready for another Cuban missile crisis with the modernization of the nuclear weapons. We have their nuclear doctrine where they said they will use nuclear weapons to deescalate. And we have their hybrid warfare in all of our countries.

The Trump administration has done a lot. Expanding the F-35. Belgium has just joined us. They have armed Ukraine after Poroshenko came in front of a joint session of Congress and said: I can't fight a war with blankets. We are now doing NATO training.

NATO has increased funding. Stoltenberg just said that since 2016 European allies and Canada have spent a cumulative 40 billion U.S. dollars more on defense. And based on the latest reports, this will rise to \$100 billion by next year, doubling, as a result of the Trump administration's prodding.

The Trump administration doubled the European Reassurance Initiative. We have troops in Poland, marines in Norway. We still have the Obama administration sanctions that remain in place, and some of them have been increased by Trump.

What I am concerned about is information sharing, since this is the Intel Committee. As you know, Secretary Albright, there was significant angst among Congress that we were not sharing INF Treaty violations from Russia closely enough with our allies. Many times when we are aware of what they are doing we don't give them the information that they need. The RAND study was one of the first public statements of showing what Russia capability was within the area.

So I would like both of you, if you would, to talk for a moment about the gap.

Isn't it dangerous? Don't we have an obligation to share with our allies the intel that shows what Russia's capability is?

I will start with you, Secretary General.

Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, indeed, we should do that. And I can testify to the fact that the Russian violations of the INF Treaty were only reluctantly shared with NATO allies. But it is clear, and it was clear to many of us, that Russia violated the INF Treaty.

In that respect, I think the U.S. has done the right thing to indicate the willingness to withdraw from the INF Treaty, hoping that would lead to new negotiations on a more robust and updated and more robust treaty.

Actually, within NATO we have improved intel sharing during recent years. A special unit has been developed within NATO. But still some allies are more reluctant to share intelligence with others. And I would very much like to see a more intensified sharing of intelligence within NATO. That is one of the ways to strengthen NATO.

Mr. Turner. Secretary Albright?

Ms. Albright. I do believe that it is very important to begin to treat our allies as allies. There are any number of ways that we can and should cooperate, and I definitely think on the intelligence sharing that it requires a certain amount of trust, and that has kind of dissipated. That worries me a lot in terms of how we operate with our allies.

I also think that we underestimated where Russia was going. I think we thought when the Cold War is over, we thought we had won it.

And when I was talking about this survey that we took, we also did focus groups in 1991. And I will never forget this man in a focus group outside of Moscow who stood up said: "I am so embarrassed. We used to be a superpower and now we are Bangladesh with missiles."

Putin has identified -- again, the way Orban has -- with anger to make himself

great again. And I think that we have forgotten that we are dealing with a KGB agent, and he knows how to do this, and he is undermining what we are doing. I think he has played a weak hand very well. And I personally owe an apology to now Senator Romney because I think that we underestimated what was going on in Russia.

And I was on the CIA External Advisory Board. There was no question that less money was being put into Russian language and assessing what was going on in Russia. I mean, it is interesting.

And the thing also, there is an awful lot of open source information now which also has to be handled by the Intelligence Community, and I hope that you all kind of push on that.

But we underestimated Russia and Putin has put them back on the scene.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. One thing I will just quickly add is I think we just live in a world where the burden of truth is incredibly high and that is something that the Russians take advantage of. And so where it is possible for the Intelligence Community to lean forward and share intelligence, I think that helps a great deal.

Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. If I could, for just a moment, could I recognize Sandy Vershbow, who was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO and also served in the State Department. I think he is one of most brilliant experts and certainly works on a bipartisan basis. We certainly are glad to have him today.

Thank you.

Ms. Albright. I will second that.

Mr. Rasmussen. So would I.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Turner.

Mr. Heck.

Mr. Heck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, a lot of people would characterize the end of the Cold War as of late a hot peace. I actually think we are in Cold War II, a new Cold War. I think a lot of the people for whom I work, my bosses, kind of get that, especially as it relates to Russia and China. I mean, they know that Russia interfered in our election and they know that China has got a fairly deeply embedded practice of stealing intellectual property and the like.

But here is my question. It is not clear to me that my bosses get why it should be important to them that there are emerging autocracies in Southeast Asia or the sub-Saharan or name your Baltic states, smaller, more remote areas.

So help me talk with them, talk with the body shop owner in Lakewood, Washington, or the caseworker over in Olympia, Washington, about why that should matter to them, why the rise of autocracies in those kinds of places matters to America and to America's national security interests.

Ms. Albright. I think it is always difficult to try to put domestic and foreign policy together. But I do think that every day more and more it is evident that our national interests are threatened when terrible things happen abroad, whether they are these autocracies pushing against us as we have been talking about in terms of hybrid kind of warfare, but also what happens if, in fact, there are fragile states that then again become the places where terrorists really do come at.

I was also part of a USIP study and something that was in many ways funded by Senator Lindsey Graham in order to try to find out why extremism comes in fragile states. And I think that then, if you don't fight it abroad, they come home to America.

And I think the problem that I have always in explaining this is that I don't want us to operate on the basis of fear. Democracies need to operate on the basis of hope. But I do think that we need to explain that these things are not that far away and that

given the kind of world we live in, the globalization and the spread of technology, these are things that affect all of us.

And the people that you work for -- we all work for -- are ones that fully understand that our national interests can't be kind of -- we are not an island nation and that we have to be involved much more. And I do think that those of us who are foreign policy types need to travel around America more and talk to people and explain why what happens in some country they have never heard of or they can't locate, why it really is important ultimately because it does affect U.S. national interests.

Mr. Heck. So I would also like your help in having a framework for an approach to dealing with countries with whom we have had strategic alliances, and in some regards have been friends, but have these autocratic impulses manifesting and growing. You can pick your country. Turkey seems to me to be an obvious example of somebody that had been an important strategic partner and ally to us in many ways, but now these autocratic trends are in full motion.

How should we think about how we deal with the countries that do have strategic value and partnership value to us, but who are not doing the right thing over here? How do we approach that? How do we think about it? What should be the framework?

Ms. Albright. Well, first of all, I do think that we are living in a completely different era, where a lot of the institutions that most of us grew up with aren't functioning very well, and we need to think about how it should work, and I think the comment about working more with some academic institutions and trying to kind of sort out a new thinking for this era.

But I do think the following thing, having been in this position: You often do not agree on every single thing that an X country is doing, whether an ally or just a nonaligned

state. And I think it is important for us to go and explain -- I used to say, I have come a long way so I must be frank -- and basically talk about what we think the problems are, and at the same time, try to find areas where we can work together.

I do not believe that it is smart to cut off relations with a country. I think it is important for our diplomat -- we actually need diplomats, which means why we need to fund the State Department, that really are able to try to sort out what the problems are in order to have frank discussions.

I have spent a lot of time in Turkey and I really do think it is important to talk to them, recognize what the problems are.

I also think what the Secretary General said about Turkey and NATO is something that needs to be explored more -- I really thought your answer on that was brilliant -- because I think we can't cut them off, we don't want to kick them out of NATO.

But there are other countries where we have to keep talking to them. I think it is a mistake when we don't have diplomatic relations with a country, where we see it as a gift. It is not a gift, it is the way that countries and leaders communicate with each other.

Mr. Heck. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you very much.

Thank you all for being here. I have to say that I appreciate all of your insights. And I would hope that all of America could hear all of your insights, because I don't think the average American is really aware of what we are facing in this world today and the behaviors of our adversaries. So your expertise has been very valuable today.

And, Dr. Teng, I think that you bring forward, as this is the Intelligence Committee, I think that you bring forward a lot of intelligence because of your experience being from China and what you share.

When I was a kid my mom used to say: You better eat all your supper, because there are poor kids in China that aren't being fed. Well, I think that has changed today. We still have sympathy for the Chinese people that have to live under the rule that they live under, but things have changed.

And as Mr. Turner pointed out, things have changed in Russia and our approach to Russia. And thank you, Secretary Albright, for your comments on that.

I do have a question for you, Dr. Teng. Did I hear you say that you were scheduled to speak at an Ivy League school and you got canceled?

Mr. Teng. Yeah.

Dr. Wenstrup. Did they tell you why you were canceled?

Mr. Teng. Yes. So actually I was scheduled to talk with the [unintelligible] together. And then a leader of that university called me. And then I went to his office. He told me: You have to cancel this talk because our president, the university president, is meeting with Chinese president.

And so that is the reason. And he also mentions their programs in China.

Dr. Wenstrup. Well, that of course concerns me, when your free speech is being denied there in that particular situation.

But today we see our adversaries, we see within our own country Russia today having a presence here. This is very concerning. We talk about the influence of elections through social media and also the disruption of the American people, trying to divide the American people through social media by our adversaries.

I love free speech, I love free press, but I also love the value of honesty and I love

the value of trust. And we do have a problem with that, you know, your testimonies are eye opening to many Americans, but when you hear people being silenced at colleges. And we worry about foreign influence in our media and trust.

And I was with our editorial board in Cincinnati, Ohio, and one of the questions they asked me was, where do you tell people to go for their news? And I said, well, you tell me. I said, because I used to as a kid, I would read letters to the editor. And if they were opining, that was one thing, but if they listed a fact and it wasn't right the editor wrote what the actual fact was. That doesn't happen today.

And I said, you wrote a story recently about how we have increased security since the shooting at the baseball field. And it was a fine article, except for a couple of things. One of the things you wrote in there: To date Wenstrup has no reported incidents of threats. And I said, you didn't ask me. I don't report them to you. We have had Secret Service go to two people's homes. I report them to them, Capitol Police, local law enforcement. Why would you write that?

And the title of their article was "Why Wenstrup Doesn't Do Parades Anymore," and I had just done two 8 days earlier. I was grand marshal at one of them on Memorial Day.

So this trust in press is all over. And I want to address this to you, Secretary Albright, because you mentioned the press in your statement. And I certainly think that we have the obligation to be pointing out when the press is wrong.

How do we deal with all these different areas of press, Dr. Teng being silenced, the social media aspect from our adversaries, and this, our domestic press, writing false stories?

Ms. Albright. I do think that democracy depends on a free press and they being able to cover what they want to and need to. I do think that there are problems now,

exactly the kind you mentioned with the Russian TV and a number of different other ways of getting into our system.

I think it is very hard at this point. I think that a reader or a listener or viewer is being asked to do something very hard, which is to do kind of comparative. What you do in research is look at a lot of different sources and try to figure out.

I do believe there is such a thing as truth, but I think that one does have to -- it is much harder these days to get at it.

I do think also, however, to call the press the enemy of the people is a mistake in a democracy. And what we need to do is to figure out how to get people to look at different kind of sources. And some of the press really do have fact checker things.

But I think it is hard. There is no question about it. And I think we need to understand that a free press is the basis of a democracy.

Dr. Wenstrup. There is no doubt about that and I agree with you 100 percent on that. But it is frustrating and I am sure you have dealt with it in your career as well.

Ms. Albright. Yes.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Maloney.

Mr. Maloney. Well, thank you all for being here.

I wanted to draw your attention just to the specifics of intelligence in the subjects we are talking about. So I think you will find broad-based agreement on the committee around the dangers in the rise of authoritarian regimes.

What should the proper role of the United States Intelligence Community be? For example, I just came back from Germany where a lot of people are concerned about the rise of the AfD party and those extremist elements.

Some of the most troubling episodes in the history of our Intelligence Community

has been when we used our intelligence assets against regimes that displeased us for one reason or another. Sometimes those regimes were democratically elected. We are talking now about the rise of authoritarianism increasingly through democratically elected individuals.

It seems to me it raises a hornet's nest of difficult questions about what the proper role, for example, of covert activities against foreign extremist elements or cooperating with intelligence services among our allies against political parties in their own countries.

I would love to get your thoughts on what the proper role of our intelligence activities should be with respect to the rise of authoritarian regimes.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I think it is critical, first and foremost, that we don't seek to replicate the activities that the Russians use against us. That is first and foremost.

And I have touched on this somewhat in my other comments. It is obviously critical that the IC remain equipped to do what it does best, which is go after the hard targets and understand the intentions, the capabilities, and the vulnerabilities of these countries.

But as we talked about, a lot of these processes are happening out in the opening, the democratic erosion, the slow dismantling of democracy.

And so I think two key areas there are efforts by the IC to work more closely with intelligence services in our partner countries to build that network and that community and to increase the capacity of the services in those countries.

Certainly one of most important things we can do to combat authoritarianism is to build the resiliency of democracies at home and in Europe. That is a key deterrent to Russia. So working with the partner services there.

We talked a little bit about the role of sharing intelligence and how important that

can be. But also just enhancing the capacity of those services. There are a lot of exchanges and things that the IC can do to help build the capacity of intelligence services in Eastern Europe, in the Baltics, and other places.

But I also think it is incredibly important that the Intelligence Committee continue to lean forward in working with academic experts and other subject matter experts outside of the Intelligence Community. Again, a lot of these things happen out in the open. And so if we can build these frameworks.

One of the things that is so hard, I think, about the democratic backsliding is that if you are an analyst following one country, say Turkey, you see early signs, but it is easy to explain them away. Oftentimes they can look democratic, for example, targeting corruption and going after corrupt official.

It is easy to explain some of that away, but if we have this larger perspective and we understand what the indicators are, then we can lean forward and be proactive earlier in the process.

So from my perspective those kind of are some recommendations, I think, that would help the IC be positioned to deal with the challenges that we are facing today.

Mr. Maloney. I would like to invite the others to comment. But I would also love to hear one more word on your listing of energy dependence and creating energy dependence as part of the strategy of authoritarians. And if you want to say a word about Nord Stream 2, I would be interested in your thoughts on that.

But I would love to get your thoughts, Secretary Albright or Secretary General Rasmussen, on the issue of the proper role of the Intelligence Community in combating authoritarianism.

Ms. Albright. I think one cannot operate without an Intelligence Community. And I was very proud to serve on the External Advisory Board and learned an awful lot

there, and also having been a major consumer of intelligence.

I do think that one of your responsibilities is to really look at how the various pieces of it work these days with the DNI and various issues.

One of the, I have to say, interesting things when you are a consumer of intelligence is seeing the divergence in some of the analysis. And I think that it is important to continue to be able to do that in a free and fair Intelligence Community that needs to be supported.

I do think we need to work with other countries much more. I also have to say that I would not give up covert activity. I mean, there is a place to do it and a place not to. But we are not in the middle of the Cold War, and I think that is one of the issues that needs to be discussed.

And one of the things that needs to be discussed is generally -- and I teach at Georgetown, I teach a course on decisionmaking, and it is a little hard to figure out exactly how it operates these days. And I do think that the integration of the various parts of the national security community need to be brought together.

And on Nord Stream, let me say, I do think it would be unfortunate, given what is going on in terms of what the Russians are doing, is for -- and this is easy enough for me to say from the outside -- I don't think the Europeans should become more dependent on Russian energy.

Mr. Rasmussen. Two things. First, on intelligence, I am not going to intervene in discussions on how the U.S. should organize its intelligence services.

But I would say, as former Secretary General of NATO, I appreciated very much the special intelligence I received from your government. And I can tell you, based on that, I fully trust the intelligence services of the U.S. And I think that is one thing the U.S. could do, to provide leaders of international organizations with the kind of

intelligence that I received.

Now, on Nord Stream 2, there is no need to build Nord Stream 2. I am against Nord Stream 2. I would advise against it. I hope it can be stopped. But I think the United States can play a crucial role in that.

As you know, the German Government is strongly in favor of building Nord Stream 2. I think Nord Stream 2 is not a commercial product. It is a duplicative product aimed at maintaining European dependence in imported Russian gas and also to deprive Ukraine and other eastern partners from transit fees.

So it should be stopped. Recently, the European Union has decided that all EU directives should apply to Nord Stream 2, which, among other things, means unbundling. That would make the product less attractive for the Russians, but it won't stop it.

Denmark has to give its permission to let the pipeline go through Danish territorial waters. The Danish Government could say no, but in that case Nord Stream 2 would just move the pipeline into national waters. Again, that would make the product less attractive, but it won't stop it.

The only power in Europe that can stop the product is the German Government. But the U.S. could assist in that by imposing sanctions or threaten to do that on European companies cooperating with Nord Stream 2 investors. And seen from my perspective, the U.S. should consider that.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart. I thank the chairman and witnesses. Truly just a very, very informative, very insightful hearing.

And it is fun. I have got all sorts of notes. And it is fun because I can keep them and go share them with people rather than shred them, right, or never be able to look at

them again.

And I am going to take your opening statements and go share some of those with my staff and with other people, because I do think you raise some very important points and do it uniquely. And I want you to know that I agree and appreciate with almost everything that you have said with maybe a very few, very small exceptions.

A personal anecdote, if I could. You don't know this about me, I am a writer, I have written many books. One of the books I wrote was called "The Miracle of Freedom." And freedom is a miracle. And it is extraordinarily fragile. And in this book we talk about America's special responsibility to lead.

My publisher in New York, who I had worked with for many years, did not want to publish this book. And the reason they said so is because they said no one cares about this subject. And I went to another publisher and it did very well, it was a national bestseller for a long time, because it turns out that people do care about this subject. And we have to care about this subject, and Americans still do.

Secretary Albright, I am going to talk, if you don't mind, just very quickly, and I want to tread very lightly on this. I want you to know that I have looked to you for many years with admiration. And I think you have been a very sturdy voice for a long, long time.

And I would just make one comment. In your written statement, and you have also voiced this and you have come back to it a couple of times, and it is to follow up on what Brad said, my colleague to my left. You said first defend the Constitution by protecting the free press. I absolutely agree with that. It is fundamental to our freedom.

But I wish you would add a comment such as, "But it is important in defending democracy for our press to maintain long-held standards of professional responsibility in

being accurate and in being honest in their reporting," because I think that is equally destructive to democracy.

If the press is no longer trusted because the press has been inaccurate far too many times, that is as bad as losing freedom of the press. I think it is a fair point that may be worth sharing as well.

And you are free to respond to that, or if you would rather not, that is fine. That is just a suggestion.

Ms. Albright. I actually think it is a very important point. And I do think that in some ways there has been too much complicity because of ratings or something. And I do think that the press has a responsibility.

And if I could, about your issue of freedom and democracy in America, my father, as I said, was a Czechoslovak diplomat. He then defected and asked for political asylum, which he got, and he started teaching at the University of Denver. And he said: There is nothing better than being a professor in a free country.

One of the things he said -- and I was the perfect daughter, I still am -- is to say that he was concerned about the fact that Americans took their democracy for granted too much.

Mr. Stewart. Yeah.

Ms. Albright. That we don't understand how easy it is to lose. And Czechoslovakia was actually a democratic country between the two wars.

Mr. Stewart. And that is such a great point, and I will maybe conclude this part with that, and that is, I make the point in the book and other times that people assume that what we have now will always be, and it is not true.

Ms. Albright. No.

Mr. Stewart. Secretary General Rasmussen, if I could come to you very quickly.

I was a pilot and I loved flying with our NATO partners. And we really appreciated their effort.

But here is the truth. When we put a combat package together, a practice exercise, we knew their aircraft were slower, they didn't have the secure communications, they didn't have the overall situational awareness. We had to be very careful in the targets we assigned them because they had limited capability to penetrate and the accurate weapons to hit those targets. We appreciated their contribution, but it wasn't as much as we hoped.

I remember traveling as a Congressman to Europe and making a point with our European allies and our NATO friends: We need you to contribute, as you have committed to do, your 2 percent of the GDP. Which has been on the table for years and years, but has been by and large ignored by almost every one of our partners.

And I am wondering, how important do you think it is -- or has it been -- to increase our persistence with our NATO allies in their commitment to that 2 percent? And do you think it will make a difference in what we share is a common goal, and that is countering Russian's influence in Europe and throughout the world? And you have 26 seconds.

Mr. Rasmussen. Yeah, first of all, speaking about books, in 2016 I published a book called "The Will to Lead," in which I passionately argue for determined American global leadership. I hope it will be read by more people than it has been the case unto now, though it is been selling quite good.

Mr. Stewart. I will go buy a copy this afternoon.

Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you.

On NATO, yes, it is of vital importance that NATO allies step up to their commitments. And this is the reason why at my last summit as NATO Secretary General,

in 2014, we decided that within the next decade all allies will live up to the 2 percent commitment.

And we are on the right track. At that time only three did so. By the end of this year, I would estimate, eight will do so.

And all allies are on the right track. Since 2014, the Europeans have invested 50 billion U.S. dollars more on defense per year. And that is quite a lot. It is the right direction, there is more to do.

And in addition to that, at least 20 percent of the investment should go to research, development, and new technology.

So it is of utmost importance. But I would add to this, in all fairness, in Afghanistan you saw European allies step up to the plate and contribute in a very valuable way. In my country we suffered a lot of fatalities. Actually, compared to the size of my country, we suffered a number of fatalities equivalent to what the U.S. did.

Of course you also have to be very careful in the way you criticize European allies. It is not only about money, it is also about commitment, and we committed.

Mr. Stewart. In your phrase, in all fairness, I agree with you, you are exactly right, which is why in starting my conversation I said we are grateful for the partnership and we are grateful for their alliance and their contribution. And I didn't mean to diminish it in my way and I hope you didn't take it as such.

But as a partner we need to be able to rely and to be honest with one another, and I think that is what we have done here today. So thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Carson.

Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman.

This question is for the entire panel. I would like to know your thoughts on terrorism as a tool of authoritarian regimes.

There are some suggestions that Russia has used false flag operations that use terrorist tactics to stoke fear, translating in essentially a boost of support for folks like Vladimir Putin.

What is your take on these claims and whether or not regimes have gone this far? And what role does the fear of terrorism and interior violence play in the accumulation of power by autocrats?

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I can start.

I think when you look around the globe it is quite clear that most authoritarian leaders use terrorism as a means to justify their efforts to crack down on civil society. If you look at the language in a lot of NGO laws, restrictive NGO laws around the globe, oftentimes leaders are justifying those decisions on grounds of terrorism and efforts to cut back on foreign financing.

Broadly speaking, it is a useful tactic for dictators when they can instill fear and use threats of instability. Again, they can use that to justify their efforts to crack down on leaders.

In many cases, including in the Middle East, events like the Arab Spring and instability in the region I think has also led some citizens to increasingly prioritize stability over some of their rights. So people are more willing to trade those rights for the guarantees of leaders who are promising stability.

And the last thing I will say is there is also some very interesting political psychology literature that talks about when people feel threatened from social conditions and from external adversaries it increases their own personal desire to see strong, decisive leadership that can keep those forces at bay. And so it is a very effective tactic

and it is one of the driving factors, I think, of the increases on restrictions in political and civil liberties that we are seeing across the globe.

Ms. Albright. I do think that one of the definitions of an authoritarian leader is to identify himself, as I said earlier, with one group against another and to exacerbate those divisions. And then once the divisions are exacerbated, then it is easy enough to find somebody who wants to fight and become a terrorist in pursuit of that division.

So I do think that they are used in different ways. But it is a combination of the situation that has created the divisions in the first place, and then exacerbated, and then viewed as a tool of those who want to attack the minority or those who disagree with them.

Mr. Carson. Yes, sir?

Mr. Teng. First, the Chinese Government secretly and indirectly supports some terrorism groups.

Second, what the Chinese Government is doing in Xinjiang and the persecution of Falun Gong, Tibetans, and dissidents, it is like a terrorism group. So it is kind of a state terrorism.

And, ridiculously, the Chinese Government is labeling what they have done in Xinjiang counterterrorism. So it is a state terrorism, but they use the name of counterterrorism.

Mr. Carson. And lastly, whether in a diplomatic or intelligence relationship, how should the U.S. collaborate with a nondemocratic state or even a security service in a manner that essentially preserves our democracy?

Mr. Rasmussen. Yeah, that is a very good question.

As a point of departure, I think you should always be in particular critical about activities among your own partners and allies. That is what I call the critical dialogue

with other governments. I think that is very important.

And then of course at the end of day you also have to pursue a pragmatic approach, you have to choose your partners carefully, and in certain cases also cooperate with nondemocracies in an attempt to ensure your own security.

Of course to the extreme you showed that during the Second World War. The U.S. cooperated with the Soviet Union, and did so, I think, we appreciate the outcome. And at the end of the day, that is often the case, that you have to choose.

But if you consider a country your partner and ally, I think you should not shy away from criticizing. For instance, if that partner kills journalists on foreign soil.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. One quick thing to add, too, I think is just a broader point about the importance of lines of communication between the United States and some of its adversaries.

So in the case of Russia, for example, the connections between the United States today and Russia are lower than they were during the Cold War, and that is one of the factors that significantly raises the risk of an inadvertent escalation. And so maintaining open lines of communication will be critical for avoiding conflict with Russia moving forward.

Mr. Carson. Thank you all.

Chairman, I yield back.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Crawford.

Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here. It has been a very impressive discourse thus far.

And one of the, I guess you might call it a disadvantage, I might consider it an advantage, of being this far down the dais is all the questions are already answered and

asked. So I want to take a little bit of a different direction here.

One of the things that has been in the news quite a bit here lately is what is going on in Venezuela. And so without getting into the specifics about Maduro, one of the things that caught my attention was obviously that Maduro has blocked food aid. And so that kind of tees up this question I have about a couple of things.

One, we talked about energy and how that is manipulated in many cases, how authoritarians manipulate that in a variety of ways, but food security and how that plays an important role with regard to how authoritarians might leverage food security to effect a political outcome. Can you talk about that briefly? Because I have a couple of other questions that sort of fit in with that.

I can start with you, Dr. Kendall-Taylor.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I haven't spent much time looking at how kind of authoritarian regimes might weaponize food security. So my only point on the Venezuela issue is for me it underscores the importance of allies and partners and democratic allies and partners.

The fact that we were able to kind of mobilize a coalition of other governments who were willing to take a stand with the United States I think is incredibly important. We don't want to be in these situations standing alone. We would run the risk of being isolated.

And so having those close relationships, I think, in cases like this, it really underscores the importance of those relationships.

Mr. Crawford. So I serve on the Ag Committee. I would be remiss if I didn't address this issue. And I serve an agricultural constituency and that tends to be one of the topics of conversation.

But a little further, how do you punish an authoritarian regime without punishing

the people over whom that authoritarian rules? How do we do that?

Ms. Albright. I talked about my course, and I say foreign policy is just trying to get some country to do what you want, that is all it is.

So what are the tools? And my course is called The National Security Toolbox. And yesterday I taught about the tool of sanctions, and that is a tool which actually we are using on Venezuela. I think we need to actually press even more.

The question has always been is how you do comprehensive sanctions which hurt everybody, versus smarter targeted sanctions that hurt those that are putting that policy into place. And I think we need to do more targeted sanctions, multilaterally, on Venezuela. Some of that is going through already with this Lima Group. But I don't think we can just let this go.

The other part is we talked about this declaration of principles. And one of them is the right of assistance and to kind of try to help countries where we have some responsibility in terms of, while recognizing their rights, that the international community does have some reason to help.

One of the issues that has come up on the food, though, is that some people think it is a mistake to use it as a hostage in this. So this is a very complicated issue, how to not hurt the people, how to make sure that there is multilateral action on it, and that the tool of use at the moment, I think, is sanctions and diplomacy.

Mr. Crawford. Let me ask you, under what circumstances should diplomatic relations with an authoritarian regime be curtailed, limited, or completely severed? And can you give me some examples?

Ms. Albright. Well, I will tell you again, I think one of our problems is when we don't have representation in a country. And one of the issues until a couple of years ago was the highest level American official to go to North Korea. We have no embassy

there. We don't know a lot of what is going on. We have no embassy in Iran. And for a long time, you know, we had no idea what is going.

So I think that we have to think about when we cut off relations that we in some ways are cutting off our eyes and ears in terms of being able to find out what is going on in a security.

Mr. Crawford. Thank you.

Secretary General, do you have a comment?

Mr. Rasmussen. On the latter, I fully agree. I think it is a great mistake not to have diplomatic relations with a country, even, I would say, the worst regime. You need to use your eyes and your ears and see what is going on in that country. So I fully agree.

On sanctions, well, if you don't want a military conflict, I think sanctions is the only instrument you have. In that respect, I think targeted sanctions against individuals may be very, very efficient. We see that as regards Russia, that the targeted sanctions against individuals in Putin's inner circle have been very, very efficient.

I don't think you can introduce general sanctions without hurting the people. We saw that in the sanctions against Iraq. Clearly, the Iraqi people suffered from those sanctions. Eventually a military action was initiated and the sanctions stopped, to the benefit of the Iraqi people.

So there is a trade-off here. As far as Venezuela is concerned, I think all options should still be on the table and then let's see. I hope pressure can be built up so that the conflict can be stopped in due time.

Mr. Crawford. Thank you.

My time has expired. I yield back.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mrs. Demings.

Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to all of our witnesses. You have given us much to think about today, you and my colleagues.

Look, we are here to protect our democracy and support democratic forms of government around the world. I believe that when the United States fails to lead that the whole world is out of order and off balance.

So, Madam Secretary, I am going to start with you. You said earlier that we underestimated Russia in the past. You also said that Russia had a weak hand but we kind of gave them the space to play it. Do you believe that we still underestimate Russia?

Ms. Albright. I think that we are underestimating Russia because one of the things that is going on, Putin is just a flat-out dictator.

And there was a very interesting story yesterday about all of the out-of-work KGB agents that are now part of the government. They were talking about the deep state in Russia and I am willing to believe that.

I used to be a Soviet expert, and I kind of look at my library, and I think archeology, no. They are trying to rebuild a system and they are using this asymmetrical tool.

I also am very worried about the increased militarization and the INF Treaty issue that we already talked about a bit and their modernization of their nuclear forces and their now new partnership with China.

So I think we do need to figure out what is going on. And I hope that the agency now has, in fact, kind of revved up its Russia-speaking aspects. And I think that we need to know that there is a leader over there that knows how to play propaganda and everything pretty well.

RPTR FORADORI

EDTR HUMKE

[12:00 p.m.]

Mrs. Demings. Thank you.

Doctor?

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I think that there have been kind of a turning of ship as we talked about for -- in the wake of 9/11, the agency was heavily focused on counterterrorism and some of the Russia capabilities and capacities and collection assets atrophied. And, you know, in the wake of Crimea, that has changed. And I think the Intelligence Community is very clear-eyed about what President Putin is doing and what his goals and intentions are.

And so I think there has been a significant realignment and a serious effort to up those capacities. But I do think it is also important that we don't overestimate what the Russians can do. We talked a little bit about, thanks to Putin's efforts, you know, he has breathed new life into NATO. And so our partners are taking NATO much more seriously. Our allies are very clear about what Putin is doing in Europe and they are taking measures to respond accordingly.

But there are a couple of areas I think that we do need to be mindful of. Number one is the relationship between Russia and China. In the DNI's annual threat assessment they raised the risk of growing relations between Russia and China, and I think that would be an incredibly serious challenge for foreign policy. But when we look at Russia, demographics -- their demographics are declining, the economy is declining. And certainly they can cause a lot of trouble in the meantime that we need to contain. But I have heard someone say, if Russia is a typhoon or a hurricane, China is climate change.

And that is where we need to be kind of focused.

Mrs. Demings. Thank you. Go ahead.

Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, just to add to this. Yes, we underestimated Russia. No doubt about the fact we were taken by surprise when he attacked Ukraine and took Crimea. I don't think we underestimate Russia any longer. We should learn from the past. Recently, I looked in my notes from the NATO Summit in 2008, Bucharest.

At that summit Putin was furious and he made statements about Crimea that we didn't take seriously at that time. If we had done that, we could have foreseen what happened in February-March 2014. So, yes, we underestimated Russia, but we don't do it any longer.

Mrs. Demings. Thank you. Dr. Teng, there has been some concern about China exporting safe city technology to more vulnerable fragile democratic countries. What are your thoughts about that and how concerned should we be?

Mr. Teng. Yes. China is exporting some of these technologies to other countries in South America, African countries like that, and also trying to export the so-called China model to other countries. So it is very effective and powerful in exporting its narrative.

So we should, as I have mentioned, Chinese Government is successfully eliminating almost every independent Chinese language media in the United States, Europe, and other continents, so that is something we can do. So to block these efforts that the Chinese Government is trying to silence the Chinese language media and to brainwash the Chinese communities and also the western audience.

Mrs. Demings. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Ms. Stefanik.

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Albright, I had the opportunity to meet with you and former national security advisor Steve Hadley at the Munich Security Conference to discuss your unveiling of the new Declaration of Principles, Security, and Prosperity, with the goals of rallying democracies around the globe on behalf of our shared values. I believe that this initiative is of global importance.

And my question to you today is, how do we respond to this concept of sharp power that has been effectively utilized by both China and Russia in terms of their use of information warfare that undermines these democratic values that we hold so dear.

How should the U.S. take a more forward-leaning assertive approach in the information operations space to counter that use of sharp power from our adversaries.

Ms. Albright. Thank you for commending the Declaration of Principles because, frankly, when some of us started we were kind of skeptical about how could we go back to something that had worked at the end of World War II. And I had said that we can't take those principles for granted, and that we have to renew our vows to really understand that the western system and the whole international system is based on a variety of these principles, which I won't go through. But thank you very much for saying that.

I do think that we have underestimated the sharp power aspect, and mainly things that have been changed in terms of just the way social media is used, but also cyber and a variety of different tools that the Russians are using. And I think that we need to educate ourselves more about what is going on.

I am very proud of the work that the National Democratic Institute is doing in terms of looking at disinformation and how it is played. And I think we can't just kind of

close our eyes to the variety of ways that are taking place in terms of kinds of things that we have not paid attention to. Artificial intelligence, for instance. I don't know whether you want to talk about smart cities and sharp power, but there are any number of different ways, it is possible for those who want to undermine democracy to intrude it in upon us in ways that we are not used to. And I do think that there has to be more work done by the intelligence agencies, but also by our private sector on this.

One of the things that I think is important and hard to do is the cooperation of the public and private sector and this is one area where I think that is very important.

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, madam secretary. I wanted to follow-up and ask Dr. Kendall-Taylor, in your opening statement you talked about the importance of prioritizing strategically important democracies. And I particularly think when it comes to countering this use of sharp power, that is an important space that we need to be engaged in and more assertive.

Can you comment specifically on the information operations piece and the countering disinformation for strategically important democracies as we are in this engaged battle with China and Russia who are seeking to make in-roads in those countries?

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I think there are certainly a couple of countries we would want to look at to prioritize, Hungary and Poland are clearly at the top of that list. I think it is incredibly important that working with the Europeans and keeping kind of the western democratic core strong will be very important.

But since this is also the Intelligence Committee, the Intelligence Community also does a lot of good work in identifying countries most at risk for democratic back-sliding, and countries kind of on the precipice or most ripe for democratic transitions.

The political instability task force works with outside experts and does a lot of

excellent modeling that could help identify some of the countries we would want to focus on. So number one would be going after some of the low hanging fruit. What are the countries, and we could look at modeling to understand that, that are at the most -- at most risk of back-sliding? What are the countries most ripe for democratization? So that would be one place to start.

And then the second thing I would say is looking at those countries that are important in regions, either by size or with their connections with neighbors, and going after some of those lynchpin countries and making sure democracy is resilient in those places are looking to transfer to democracy is also another effective approach.

And one other thing, the last point that I will make. It is incredibly important that we sustain our relationship with those strategically important democracies. So we talked about not taking democracy for granted, and there is also some excellent research that shows that while the risk of democratic decline in a country does go down significantly, approximately 20 years after the onset of democracy, we do see that democracies consolidate.

But the interesting finding is that the reason that countries are at less risk of back-sliding is because their risk of coups goes down, and this process of the slow gradual back-sliding that I talked about never goes down. And so if we can identify these countries and make sure that we remain engaged, and not just because we see free and fair elections or other indicators in democracy, that the United States withdraws, that doesn't work anymore.

And so when we identify these countries, it is very important to sustain the engagement because that risk of back-sliding is something that I think will be with us for awhile.

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. My time is expired.

The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Castro.

Mr. Castro. Thank you, chairman.

I read a quote from an African leader recently who said that China is the money and Russia is the muscle. How do you see the partnership of China and Russia, and perhaps other nations, playing out throughout the world in the coming years? And are they becoming more and more of a package deal?

Mr. Rasmussen. Clearly, Russia and China share views on the animosity of democracies. They share the opposition to an American global leadership. So they share a lot of ideological interests no doubt. However, we shouldn't forget that friends in Central Asia, they are also competitors.

China is building what is called the new silk road, which will go through Central Asia to Europe. They want to get hold of any of the resources in Central Asia, and all that is in contradiction with Mr. Putin's ambition to create a Eurasian union, which should be a parallel to the European Union.

So behind an ideological common interest, you will also see deep strategic contradictions between Russia and China. So I think the democratic world could use that split between the two countries. If we unite in this alliance of democracies, this global alliance of democracies that I think we need.

Mr. Castro. Okay.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. If I may just make a comment. I think I see it slightly differently in the sense that as the Intelligence Community warned about the growing relationship between Russia and China, I think those two countries, their views of how the world should be ordered and their values are aligning now to a greater extent than we have seen in a long time.

And I think where we thought that there would be competition in some key

regions like Central Asia and the Balkans, we have not yet seen it. And I, along with a colleague of mine, a former deputy NIO for China, published a piece in Foreign Affairs a couple of months ago that talk about how Russia and China undermine democracy. And the quote from the African leader I think has it spot on.

We talked about increasing synergy between Russia and China. So although they go about their business in very different ways and we don't yet see signs of very close coordination, what they are actually doing is a force multiplier for one another. So particularly in Europe, I think this is most relevant, the Russians come in with their corrupt networks and disinformation and other tools that basically undermine or erode some actors' commitment to democracy, but it is the Chinese who sweep in with the cash that gives these leaders the capacity to pull away from the West.

And so I think, you know, I think again, one of the biggest challenges for U.S. foreign policy moving forward may very well be the relationship between Russia and China because we are seeing increasing signs of synergy and possibly moving towards closer coordination.

Mr. Castro. I also have a question. We have talked about cybersecurity, the growing threats -- the growing cyber threats. How do you judge our cooperation between the United States and NATO, for example, the United States and other allies with respect to mutual cyber defense?

Mr. Rasmussen. This is a very important area for increased cooperation in the coming years. In 2014, NATO declared that cybersecurity is now part of the collective security, which means that a cyber attack against one NATO ally may initiate invocation of Article V. So NATO would respond to such a cyber attack, and that is a very, very important step forward.

In parallel with that, NATO has strengthened its ability to act in a very concrete

way deploying rapid reaction forces within the cyber space, et cetera. So it is a very important area, and it is an area where we will see further progress in the cooperation between NATO allies in the coming years.

Mr. Castro. Thank you.

I yield back, chairman.

The Chairman. Ms. Speier.

Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your presentations this morning. I am of the belief that we as a country ring our hands a lot and take action so slowly that the response is oftentimes woefully inadequate. I would like to go over some red flags, and have any of you respond to them.

Was the lifting of sanctions on Deripaska through Rusal a mistake? Anyone want to comment?

Ms. Albright. I think, yes. I think that it is -- I go back to how the tools are used and his relationship to a number of other issues, I think kind of gave him a freer hand.

Ms. Speier. Dr. Teng, you reference that media outlets from China should be registered as foreign agents. We have done that as it relates to RT on some level, either on social media outlets, at least 1 or 2 of them, I believe. But I would be interested in knowing more about the foreign agent aspect because I tend to agree with you.

Mr. Teng. Yeah, so almost all media in China are controlled by the Chinese communist party. And so it is even worse that in the United States and foreign countries, the Xinhua news agency, there is CGTN, the name of CCTV, or the People's Daily, so these -- the top work in the media. They not only are part of propaganda, but serve as espionage.

So they collect the information of Chinese people, American politics like that. So it is necessary and urgent to demount these state on media to --

Ms. Speier. Let me ask you about the Confucius Institutes. How many are there in the United States?

Mr. Teng. There were 110, but for the past 2 years, 11 or 12 have been shut down, or the university, the host universities terminated the contract with Confucius Institute. But there are 500 or so Confucius classrooms. So in high school it is like that. So I think we should scrutinize these. I really think we should prohibit Confucius Institute and classrooms.

Ms. Speier. Secretary General Rasmussen, we have just returned from the security conference, and I was stunned by how much angst there still is about NATO. And we visited NATO as well. How scarred is our relationship with NATO?

Mr. Rasmussen. Well, NATO is nothing without American leadership, let's face it. So, of course, within NATO allies we have seen a lot of concerns about U.S. policies on NATO. But I would say, on the ground, if you are watching what is really happening, NATO has been strengthened in recent years due to more deployment of U.S. troops in Eastern Europe and also deployment of other -- troops from other NATO allies.

So we have strengthened our defense in Eastern Europe. And the fact that we have increased defense investment has also made NATO a strong ally from a military point of view. However, it has weakened NATO from a political point of view because doubts have been raised about the American commitment to Article V. Article V is really the cornerstone of NATO.

Ms. Speier. All right. I am trying to eek out one more question. The belt and road initiative, Secretary Albright, could you speak to how that is being used perniciously?

Ms. Albright. I have been saying that the Chinese must be getting very fat because the belt is getting larger and larger. They are moving into all kinds of areas.

In Africa, they have had something to do with what has been going on in

Venezuela. They are using it as a tool to really penetrate into a number of societies, and then also kind of doing what is called the debt trap, is getting the countries that they deal with to all of a sudden be stuck trying to figure out how to deal with what they have gotten. And I think that they are in fact using it as a policy tool, and something that we need to be concerned about.

And, just generally, I think we are not paying enough attention to China's role. We have stepped back and they are filling the vacuum. There is just no question about it. And that issue about typhoon, et cetera, about the Russians and the Chinese being climate change, they are the ones that in many ways are making the rules up for what is going on. And the longer the United States stays out of action internationally, there will be institutions that develop without us. We are AWOL, we cannot be AWOL.

Ms. Speier. Thank you.

I yield back.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Welch.

Mr. Welch. On this question, you mentioned, madam secretary, covert activity, and I am trying to understand where and what circumstances you would see that as being useful and effective because there is obviously cyber activity or covert activity that could be used to disable perhaps weapon system development.

But on this question of the rise of authoritarianism, it seems fundamentally that it would be political engagement. And I wondering if you could just elaborate on that?

Ms. Albright. I am not suggesting it in terms of the authoritarianism. I just know that it is a tool of the Intelligence Community if done properly with findings and things. And what I am mostly troubled by is the lack of understanding at the moment of how the U.S. decisionmaking process is working, in terms of those decisions be being

made, and a number of aspects of how that works also with the use of drones and a number of different parts, which you all really do deal with.

And I think Title 50 and a number of different issues that I think need to be studied.

Mr. Welch. Go ahead.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I think that it is probably easier to have these kind of discussions in a closed hearing rather than an open one.

Mr. Welch. Okay. And the question of the rise of authoritarianism, there has been in many countries, it obviously coincides with a significant disruption in the economic order of western democracies. And some commentators really compare it to the rise of industrialization and the collapse of the agrarian economy. So you have these new tools of communication where they are not credible edited communicators. Traditional news is overwhelmed by social media.

Secondly, you have the rise of enormous profit, but the collapse of incomes on a lot of people who are not part of the new economy. And many commentators say that is a major reason for Brexit, the insecurity that was created with the immigrants and also with wage stagnation.

We focus on diplomacy and engagement, but how much of our response has to be developing institutions internally, not just in our country but other countries, where that economic surplus is shared more broadly rather than less?

I will start with you and then you --

Ms. Albright. I do think that, as I said earlier, we are in a different era and the different era does have to do with -- to go way back, the break down of the social contract.

Mr. Welch. Right.

Ms. Albright. People gave up their individual rights to be protected by a state, and both have responsibilities. And what has happened is that the state are not worrying enough about exactly the kinds of questions you are talking about, economic -- I don't believe in an authoritarian state or socialism, but I do believe that the state has responsibilities, but so do the individuals in terms of voting and being a part of the system. And so I think we have a very large issue in terms of where our societies are going.

The thing that I have talked about is that there are really two megatrends. One is globalization, which mostly we have benefited from, but its downside is that it is faceless, and so people want their identities. And so there are, you know, people want to know their ethic, linguistic, et cetera. What is -- patriotic is one thing, nationalism is very dangerous. And hyper-nationalism is what we are seeing as these autocratic leaders take advantage of that.

And then technology, which in fact has contributed to people being able to do much more also, and the Kenyan women farmer that can use her mobile phone, but they have also disaggregated voices.

And so all of a sudden you have people brought by social media to Tahrir Square in Cairo, but they are so disaggregated they couldn't form a political party. And what happened, the Muslim brotherhood that was organized won. So any number of aspects that we are not dealing with, and it is kind of like a new industrial revolution, and we did not pay enough attention to it in terms of what it would do to discombobulate, frankly, the societies.

Mr. Welch. Thank you.

Mr. Rasmussen. I think, first of all, leaders in democratic countries should address people's general grievances, and that is not only about a fair distribution of the

gains from globalization, but it is also about identity politics. I think that many people fear that open borders and globalization will undermine their way of life, their religion, their traditions, et cetera, et cetera.

Let me focus on Europe. I think the European Union, I fully agree should improve its regulation of immigration, for instance. We need immigrants, but people do not like illegal immigrants. So we should create a common and strengthened external border control, and in exchange, abolish all the internal borders and reestablish a free flowing internal and well-functioning internal market.

And, in addition to that, we should also reform our welfare system. Say to people from Africa and other places, you are welcome if you want to work, but you are not welcome to take into our welfare systems until you have contributed to our countries in 4, 5, or 7 years.

If political leaders really address those issues sufficiently, then you will stop population, nationalism, and all the other issues that are exploited by Russia and other autocratic regimes.

Mr. Welch. Thank you. I yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Quigley.

Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I feel like one of the few things separating between you and lunch, so I want to thank you for being here. Madam secretary and others, Poland. I am from Chicago, the largest Polish population outside of Warsaw, but of great interest is the status of democracy in Poland, as played out at least in one example through the judiciary.

Obviously, after the actions by the government, really in my mind, the attack on the judiciary the EU sued and the so-called quote "purge" did not go into effect. But many in the support of the law and justice party argued that the move was necessary to,

quote, decommunize the judiciary. Extraordinary times. Your thoughts on this and what conditions allowed this, and what are the consequences of where Poland is heading?

Ms. Albright. I am very concerned about Poland, and I am going there next week, actually, to give a speech in honor of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was my professor, as well as my boss at the National Security Council. I do think that the Peace and Justice Party happens to -- it is the wrong name for them -- and basically they are not paying attention to having an independent judiciary, but in fact are undermining various aspects by using the issue of, quote, decommunizing them.

And I think that the EU was right to raise the problem. I do think also that there are some of these nationality problems that we were talking about there in Poland. And I think that we need to speak out about it in terms of the number of ways. What I do find interesting is that recently there have been more protests against what is going on in Warsaw and that Peace and Justice Party.

So it is my sense that democracy is resilient and that there are ways that we need to support what is going on in Poland to get back to kind of an era where they were an example of how a former communist country can lead the way.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. The only thing I would add -- I agree with what the secretary said, but it is the playbook that we see across much of Europe and the factors driving it there, are much the same as the factors that drove it in Hungary and Turkey. It is the economic insecurity and rising inequality. It is the declining importance of political parties. People no longer see the mainstream political parties as working for them, and so they are pushed out to the extremes. And it is the values and identity change.

And so it is the factors are largely the same even though it is taking root in very different historical and cultural context. And the playbook looks much the same. Again, it is the media, the judiciary, civil society, and then trying to change the rules of the

game in ways that will make it hard to get law and justice out of office.

I think the silver lining here, too, is that just as autocrats have adapted their techniques for coming to power, so too are the democracies now learning to respond. And I think Poland is a good example of where the European Union was willing to get involved earlier than it did in Hungary. And I think that there was some intervention and some pressure from the United States that came earlier in the process there than it did in Hungary.

And like the secretary said, we see protests and there is push-back from the people. And so it is a little bit of this cat and the mouse game. The autocrats are adapting in the way that they are coming to power, and the democracies will have to figure out how to adapt and evolve to meet those challenges. But I think that we are seeing some push-back.

Mr. Rasmussen. If I may, as a European activist, I agree we should speak up against any back-sliding, in democracy including violation of principles of rule of law, et cetera. However, we should also think carefully about how we react, and we should not forget that in many Eastern European countries people argue in the following way, they said, we did not get rid of communism, just to replace Moscow with Brussels.

Before we got dictate from Moscow, we don't want to replace that with dictates from Brussels. So we have to carefully consider how we speak up. I agree we should speak up. We should do what we can to ensure freedom, rule of law, free speech, et cetera, et cetera, but it shouldn't maybe be European institutions.

Mr. Welch. Thank you.

I yield back.

The Chairman. Mr. Krishnamoorthi.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you very much for coming in today. It is a very

distinguished group, and I am honored to be able to ask you a couple questions here. I am very concerned about Russia's political interference and information warfare with its NATO allies, and the impact it has on our democracy. That is why earlier this month I introduced the Bipartisan Kremlin Act with my Republican colleague on this committee, Chris Stewart of Utah.

In short, this legislation would require to Director of the National Intelligence to submit an assessment to our committee and our counterpart in the Senate, which outlines Russian leadership intentions in pursuing military actions against members of NATO. I guess what I wanted to ask each of you is a very simple question, which is, if you had to choose a tool in our tool kit, what would you choose in the way of a way of countering Russian influence that either worked in the past or that you feel needs to be developed now and that is within our reach.

I would just be curious about, you know, best practices or something that perhaps we forgot to use now that we have done before. Obviously, hopefully in a peaceful fashion.

And I would like to start with Dr. Kendall-Taylor.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor. I think it is a little bit about going back to basics. And I think the most important tool that we have at our disposal when countering Russia is our allies. So reinvesting in those relationships, making sure that the United States remains committed to NATO, and that there is coherence and cohesiveness between the United States and Europe.

I think what we have seen is a coherent, cohesive response between the United States and Europe is by far the most effective deterrent against Putin. Where he sees divisions and fissures in that relationship is where he seeks to exploit it.

So I think it is going back and reinvesting and making sure that the alliance is

strong. And I also think it is an incredibly -- it is a two for one because I think that is also an incredibly important tool for confronting China as well. So for me it is the allies.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you.

Secretary.

Ms. Albright. I think that we forget that NATO is not just a military alliance, it is a political alliance of democracies. And I think we need to stress that. Not only am I going to Poland, but I am going to the Czech Republic, and they are the ones that are celebrating their anniversary of having been joined with NATO.

The Czechs treat me as some combination of a queen and an irritating older sister. I am going to give an older sister speech when I get there, is to really say that the democracy part of this is very important. And that partially they have to deal with issues of corruption, which is one of the questions that then divides people --

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. I am from Chicago, I don't know what you are talking about.

Ms. Albright. But I also think that one of the things we need to do specifically is pay more attention to Ukraine, because it is not a part of NATO. It is the part of the issue that has raised so many questions. They are about to have an election. And I think that they are in many ways a symbol of some of the things that have been going on.

So I think we need to pay immediate more attention to Ukraine.

Mr. Rasmussen. I fully agree. Actually, I think Ukraine could be considered what we call Ground Zero, when it comes to Russian meddling in elections. This is the reason why the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity has deployed a special task force to monitor the Ukrainian election and to suggest concrete steps to prevent Russia from meddling in the elections.

We will have President elections on the 31 of March and a second round in April, and we will have parliamentary elections in October. So Ukraine plays a very important

role. I think, in general, we could serve emerging and new democracies by demonstrating a good example. In a very concrete way, the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity has engaged with high-tech firms to develop new technologies to detect deep fake videos and audios and prevent that from disturbing our democratic processes.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Very good.

Dr. Teng?

Mr. Teng. The Magnitsky Act was from Russia originally and now it is global Magnitsky Act. I think it is a very useful tool to enforce this global Magnitsky Act broadly, more broadly. And we should also encourage our allies to adopt the similar Magnitsky Act.

And it is very useful and important not to provide a safe haven for this corrupt money of the corrupt officials from China and Russia.

Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. I thank you. I just have one last question, if I could, for Dr. Teng. When we started the hearing, the secretary general gave us a rather sober statistic that people living in autocratic societies were in fact more pleased with their governance than those living in democratic societies. If that remains the case, then democracy is in deep trouble.

What do Chinese citizens know about the state of their freedom or lack of freedom? How successful has the Chinese state been in suppressing information? And are Chinese citizens content to have their liberty limited as long as their economic well-being is increasing?

Mr. Teng. Of course, China -- internet was introduced into China in 1994, and then because of this social media internet technology, it is more difficult for the

communist party to control information on internet. But the government -- Chinese Government is quite effective on information censorship. And, you know, the information freedom is really a threat to the one party rule.

So it is kind of two -- we activists and dissidents used the internet as a weapon to develop our civil society, but the communist party is effective in control and censor the internet, and also the social media. They dictate -- all this high-tech technology is used by the communist party to tighten its control of society. So the first suggestion I gave you is tear down the Great Firewall.

The Chairman. And what is your assessment of whether the majority of Chinese citizens are willing to accept the trade-off of having less freedom because the economy -- their economic circumstances have improved so dramatically?

Mr. Teng. Yeah. Yeah, it is true that the majority of Chinese people became richer, and they have hope that they will earn more money for the next year or in the near future. But I think more and more Chinese people realize the importance of freedom and democracy because even the billionaires, they could be put into prison suddenly.

And if they lose their connection with the government or a certain government official. And so on their hands, the Chinese Government brainwashes the people, and many people don't know -- don't have any idea of freedom or democracy.

But, on the other hand, more and more Chinese people really want freedom and democracy. They don't want kind of trade-off. They don't want to live in fear. So even though [unintelligible], the standing member of Politburo, the top leaders are not safe. They can be arrested or disappeared at any time.

The Chairman. I want to thank you all for your testimony and for your work and helping to inform us on this very important issue. To me, it seems like this is being

driven by two revolutions taking place at the same time. A revolution in the global economy in which millions of people are losing their jobs, through no fault of their own, something every bit as disruptive as the industrial revolution, but also a revolution going on in communication.

That may be every bit as significant as the invention of the printing press. And that both of these are happening at the same time introduces a tremendous amount of instability and an environment rife for those who will take advantage of it.

So your testimony is very important. We will intend to continue our emphasis on this in this committee. Mr. Secretary General, I look forward to seeing you in June, and I hope my colleagues will join me. And I want to thank you, once again.

Without objection, members are hereby granted up to 3 legislative days to submit written questions to be answered by any of our hearing witnesses in writing. Those questions and answers will be made a part of the formal hearing record.

With that, again, I thank our wonderful and distinguished panel, and the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]