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6	THE CHEMICAL FACILITIES ANTI-TERRORISM
7	STANDARDS PROGRAM (CFATS) - A PROGRESS
8	REPORT
9	THURSDAY, JUNE 14, 2018
10	House of Representatives
11	Subcommittee on Environment
12	Committee on Energy and Commerce
13	Washington, D.C.
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17	The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m.,
18	in Room 2123 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Shimkus
19	[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
20	Members present: Representatives Shimkus, McKinley,
21	Harper, Olson, Johnson, Flores, Walberg, Carter, Duncan,
22	Walden (ex officio), Tonko, Ruiz, Peters, Green, DeGette,

23	McNerney, Cardenas, Dingell, Matsui, and Pallone (ex
24	officio).
25	Staff present: Mike Bloomquist, Deputy Staff Director;
26	Samantha Bopp, Staff Assistant; Kelly Collins, Staff
27	Assistant; Jerry Couri, Chief Environmental Advisor; Margaret
28	Tucker Fogarty, Staff Assistant; Jordan Haverly, Policy
29	Coordinator, Environment; Mary Martin, Deputy Chief Counsel,
30	Energy & Environment; Sarah Matthews, Press Secretary; Drew
31	McDowell, Executive Assistant; Peter Spencer, Professional
32	Staff Member, Energy; Austin Stonebraker, Press Assistant;
33	Hamlin Wade, Special Advisor, External Affairs; Everett
34	Winnick, Director of Information Technology; Jean Fruci,
35	Minority Energy and Environment Policy Advisor; Caitlin
36	Haberman, Minority Professional Staff Member; Rick Kessler,
37	Minority Senior Advisor and Staff Director, Energy and
38	Environment; Jourdan Lewis, Minority Staff Assistant;
39	Alexander Ratner, Minority Policy Analyst; Tuley Wright,
40	Minority Energy and Environment Policy Advisor; C.J. Young,
41	Minority Press Secretary; and Catherine Zander, Minority
42	Environment Fellow.

43	Mr. Shimkus. The subcommittee will now come to order.
44	The chair recognizes himself for five minutes for the purpose
45	of an opening statement.
46	Today, the subcommittee will check on the progress of
47	the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards Program, or
48	CFATS, allowing our subcommittee to review the progress of
49	the CFATS program, including overall implementation by the
50	Department of Homeland Security as well as overall
51	achievement of benchmark objectives identified in the past by
52	the Government Accountability Office.
53	This program, which Congress authorized in the fall of
54	2006 was a continuation of congressional efforts since the
55	terror attacks of September 11, 2001, to surgically and
56	directly address gaps in federal law regarding terrorism or
57	other intentional acts against high-risk facilities due to
58	their use or possession of chemicals of concern at levels of
59	concern.
60	The core of this new security-focused law was a
61	process where DHS issued risk-based performance standards
62	that required vulnerability assessments and the site security
63	plans by covered facilities.
64	Most importantly, to avoid overlapping with other

65	federal programs, CFATS was designed to foster collaboration
66	between government and regulated parties.
67	Having finally set up this program, many had great
68	optimism about its possibilities. Unfortunately, the early
69	years of CFATS program implementation were marked
70	with several growing pains, some more hurtful than others.
71	No one knows that more that our witness from the
72	Department of Homeland Security, David Wulf. Very few people
73	have demonstrated the courage, commitment, and longevity with
74	the program that he has. He's kind of the Cal Ripken of
75	CFATS.
76	Based on this subcommittee's hearing in March 2014, we
77	know Mr. Wulf not only set many remedial goals to address
77 78	know Mr. Wulf not only set many remedial goals to address issues he found in the CFATS program, but GAO also found
78	issues he found in the CFATS program, but GAO also found
78 79	issues he found in the CFATS program, but GAO also found areas that needed serious attention.
78 79 80	issues he found in the CFATS program, but GAO also found areas that needed serious attention. GAO provided recommendations to DHS on how to correct
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78 79 80 81 82 83	issues he found in the CFATS program, but GAO also found areas that needed serious attention. GAO provided recommendations to DHS on how to correct these areas. I look forward to hearing about the progress DHS is making here from Mr. Wulf on the first panel, and from Christopher Currie at GAO, who is on the second panel.

community advocacy interests.

Particularly, I am interested in knowing what steps DHS has taken to improve its risk assessment methodology and what that has meant for facility tiering, what DHS has done to become more effective and efficient carrying out the CFATS program, and, finally, what steps has DHS taken to improve CFATS program transparency and communication with regulated facilities, whether it relates to the facility tiering or employee screening.

In my opinion, CFATS has had four uninterrupted years to course correct and these are threshold questions that must be addressed in evaluating whether CFATS is a worthwhile investment for the United States taxpayer.

I know there are some who would like to see the CFATS universe expand to also do EPA's job, or OSHA's job, or FEMA's job, or addressed some other way and we have had lively discussions on the advisability of these changes in the past.

My own thinking has been guided by two thoughts. Are these new requirements advisable as a legally enforceable part of this program, filling a security gap that does not exist or are they merely an additive burden without security

109	benefits, and recognizing the challenges CFATS has faced in
110	the past, CFATS must excel at its present obligations before
111	being given new responsibilities.
112	I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today.
113	We look forward to having your experience, wisdom, and ideas.
114	[The prepared statement of Mr. Shimkus follows:]
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117	Mr. Shimkus. With that, I have a minute left. Anyone
118	seeking time? No one is seeking time so I will yield back
119	and recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr.
120	Tonko from New York, for five minutes.
121	Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our
122	witnesses for your testimony, the Department of Homeland
123	Security's Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, or
124	CFATS program.
125	CFATS is an important part of our nation's
126	counterterrorism efforts to secure high-risk chemical
127	facilities. The program was first created in late 2006
128	through a DHS appropriations bill.
129	In the early years, Congress extended the program
130	through annual appropriations under the passage of a long-
131	term authorization in 2014.
132	Without further congressional action the program will
133	terminate in January of 2019. Under CFATS certain chemical
134	manufacturing, handling, and storage facilities must
135	implement risk-based performance standards for vulnerability
136	assessments and site security plans.
137	Facilities that possess certain chemicals of interest
138	must be screened by DHS. If a facility is deemed a high

139	risk, it will be placed in one of four tiers that will
140	establish standards appropriate to secure the site.
141	As of May 30th of 2018 the CFATS program identifies
142	3,395 facilities as high risk with 159 in tier one and 78 in
143	tier two.
144	While there is complete agreement around the need for a
145	program to keep these chemicals out of the hands of
146	terrorists, even the program's most ardent supporters would
147	admit there have been implementation problems.
148	Over the years, DHS has addressed a number of concerns
149	with the program including some of GAO's recommendations
150	which we will hear about today, I am certain.
151	As Congress considers reauthorization, this is an
152	opportunity to review the program and consider what is
153	working, working well, and how the program could be improved.
154	This includes how we might continue to reduce risks at
155	these sites and ensure that workers, first responders, and
156	local communities have the information they need to stay
157	safe.
158	In my view, we should be working to reauthorize CFATS
159	and, hopefully, improving it. But I would caution against a
160	permanent reauthorization. It is rare for us to discuss this

161	program and a permanent reauthorization may result in even
162	less congressional oversight.
163	We should also keep in mind that CFATS is not the only
164	federal program to regulate chemical facilities. While
165	others are beyond the scope of DHS, I strongly believe
166	Congress should be looking at all aspects of risks at
167	chemical facilities, not just terrorism.
168	Recent incidents should remind us that our concerns must
169	not be limited to security issues alone. We should take a
170	holistic approach to chemical risks which, obviously,
171	includes facility security as well as safety, accounting for
172	the risks to the people working there and living in nearby
173	communities and facilities' resilience.
174	Chemical fires, explosions, and releases can have
175	serious consequences regardless of whether an incident was an
176	accident, a natural disaster or an act of terrorism.
177	For example, EPA's risk management plan program is
178	focused on reducing chemical risk in the event of an
179	accidental release. RMP establishes emergency measures which
180	help local first responders prepare for and respond to a
181	chemical accident.
182	In January of 2017, the Obama administration finalized

183 an RMP amendments rule but in June of last year EPA delayed 184 that rule's implementation, and a few weeks ago EPA proposed 185 a reconsideration of the RMP program, which would essentially 186 roll back nearly all of the safety measures that were adopted 187 in 2017. 188 In addition to safety issues, chemical facilities are 189 also vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters as we 190 have seen during Hurricane Harvey when a power outage and equipment failure led to a significant chemical fire at the 191 192 Arkema facility is Crosby, Texas. 193 The Chemical Safety Board's post-Arkema report 194 recommended the development of comprehensive industry quidance to help companies assess their risk for potential 195 196 extreme weather events. 197 While we all support keeping these facilities secure, I 198 hope we can also address these critical safety and resilience 199 issues, and if there is an opportunity to improve CFATS in a 200 way that close security gaps, reduce risks, better address emerging threats such as cybersecurity and keep first 201 202 responders and workers safer, now is an excellent opportunity 203 to consider those changes to the program. 204 Again, I thank the chair for calling this hearing and

205	thank our witnesses for being here today, and I yield back,
206	Mr. Chair.
207	Mr. Johnson. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman for
208	yielding back.
209	The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
210	committee, Mr. Pallone, for five minutes.
211	Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
212	It's been over five years since this committee held a
213	hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's Chemical
214	Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, or CFATS.
215	Given CFATS' inauspicious history, I believe we should
216	have conducted more regular oversight. Existing CFATS
217	authorization expires on January 2019 so it's important that
218	Congress act to continue this program.
219	At the same time, there are well-documented gaps in the
220	current statute that Congress should address instead of
221	simply rubber stamping an extension of the existing program.
222	I've been an advocate for increased safety and security
223	at our nation's chemical facilities for many years, well
224	before the CFATS program was established in 2006.
225	My home state of New Jersey, which has a high population
226	density, also has a large number of chemical facilities. So

227 the consequences of insufficient security are dire. 228 The program shouldn't have any gaps, and while it took 229 the program five years to approve its first chemical facility security plan, I understand we will hear today that 230 231 improvements have been made. 232 Nevertheless, there are still shortfalls in the program 233 that DHS cannot address without changes to the law. For 234 example, several significant categories of facilities are exempt from the standards, such as public water systems and 235 236 wastewater treatment plants, and they should be added. 237 We should also reject a suggestion from Senate Republicans that we exempt explosive manufacturers from this 238 239 anti-terrorism program. 240 We also cannot have a conversation about chemical 241 facilities without discussing the Trump administration's 242 reckless proposal to dismantle EPA's risk management program, 243 or RMP, improvement rule. 244 This is a common sense update to a nearly 20-year-old risk planning and reduction policy for our nation's chemical 245 246 facilities. The rule would have improved chemical process 247 safety, assisted local emergency authorities and planning for and responding to accidents and improved public awareness of 248

249	chemical hazards at regulated facilities.
250	Unfortunately, the administration's decision to walk
251	away from the RMP improvement rule has widespread and harmful
252	ramifications. Dangerous incidents at chemical facilities
253	across the country are happening too often.
254	Forty-six incidents have occurred at RMP facilities
255	since Administrator Pruitt blocked the RMP improvement rule.
256	Had the rule been in place, those facilities would have been
257	required to prepare for and implement safety improvements to
258	reduce the frequency and severity of those events.
259	The highest profile case occurred in the aftermath of
260	Hurricane Harvey at the Arkema chemical plant in Crosby,
261	Texas. Heavy rains flooded the facility, causing equipment
262	to fail, triggering a chemical fire, and releasing hazardous
263	fumes and smoke into the air.
264	Last month, the Chemical Safety Court released an
265	investigative report on the incident and found that chemical
266	facilities are wholly unprepared for extreme weather events
267	like floods and hurricanes.
268	Improving the resiliency of these facilities will only
269	become more critical as the climate continues to change.
270	More frequent flooding and powerful storms associated with

271	unchecked climate change increase the risk to workers and
272	vulnerable populations in and around these facilities which
273	too often are low-income communities and communities of
274	color.
275	Earlier this year, the New York Times reported that more
276	than 2,500 sites handling toxic chemicals are located in
277	flood-prone areas across the country.
278	It is clear that far more remains to be done to ensure
279	chemical facilities are truly resilient to this growing
280	threat.
281	Mr. Chairman, I also believe we must examine federal
282	chemical safety and security policy holistically. We can't
283	turn a blind eye to the administration's actions to undermine
284	the efficacy of EPA's RMP program.
285	Preventing terrorism at these facilities is important,
286	but accidents and industrial incidents due to extreme weather
287	are far more common and they should also be given due
288	consideration by this committee.
289	We have to ensure the safety and security of workers,
290	first responders, and communities living near our nation's
291	chemical facilities are being prepared on both fronts.
292	And with that, Mr. Chairman I don't think anybody

293	wants my time I'll yield back.
294	Mr. McKinley. [Presiding.] Thank you, and absent the
295	chairman of the full committee, we will now conclude our
296	the members' opening remarks.
297	The chair would like to remind our members that pursuant
298	to the committee rules, all members' opening statements be
299	made part of the record.
300	[The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follows:]
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303	Mr. McKinley. That we thank we wish to thank the
304	all of our witnesses for being here today, taking the time
305	to testify before this subcommittee.
306	Today's witnesses, beginning with the first panel, will
307	have the opportunity to give opening statements followed by a
308	round of questions. You know the drill how this works.
309	Our first witness panel for today's hearing includes Mr.
310	David Wulf, the acting assistant secretary for infrastructure
311	protection with the Department of Homeland Security.
312	Mr. Wulf, we appreciate you being here today and we will
313	begin the program with you and you're recognized for your
314	five minutes to make an opening statement.

315	STATEMENT OF DAVE WULF, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
316	INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
317	SECURITY
318	
319	STATEMENT OF DAVE WULF
320	
321	Mr. Wulf. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I really do
322	appreciate the opportunity to be here and thanks as well to
323	Ranking Member Tonko and other members of this committee.
324	I am excited to be here to provide an update on the
325	progress that the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards,
326	or CFATS program, continues to make in fostering security at
327	high-risk chemical facilities across this nation.
328	When I last testified before this committee in 2013, no
329	question but that the CFATS program was in a very different
330	place, having experienced some significant difficulties in
331	its early years.
332	But we had at that point implemented a comprehensive
333	corrective action plan and had begun making measurable
334	forward progress.
335	At the time, I emphasized the importance of long-term
336	authorization for this critical anti-terrorism program and I

337 am very grateful for the leadership that you all provided --338 that this committee demonstrated in securing the four-year 339 CFATS authorization that was signed into law in December of 340 2014. 341 So as we now find ourselves nearly three and a half 342 years into the authorization period, I am grateful that this 343 committee is, again, taking a lead role in ensuring 344 continuing long-term authorization of CFATS. 345 Now, as I am sure you'll hear me say once or twice today, the stability that has come along with long-term 346 347 authorization has driven unprecedented progress as we have worked with CFATS-covered facilities to make America's high-348 349 risk chemical infrastructure a truly hard target with 350 literally tens of thousands of security measures having been 351 put in place at high-risk chemical facilities across the 352 nation. 353 So the stability afforded by long-term authorization has 354 facilitated our planning and execution of important programmatic improvements while it has also afforded 355 356 regulated industry stakeholders with the certainty they 357 deserved as they planned for and made significant investments

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in CFATS-related security measures.

I am very pleased that you'll be hearing today directly from CFATS industry stakeholders about their direct experience with CFATS. Doug Brown, Jamie Conrad, Steve Roberts, along with a host of industry associations, have been true leaders in promoting a strong culture of chemical security across the nation and I really appreciate their presence and that of the other witnesses here today.

As we are all too aware, the threat of chemical terrorism remains a real and very relevant one. Around the globe, we continue to see bad actors seeking to acquire and using in attacks chemicals of the sort that trigger coverage under CFATS and the threat stream continues to reflect that chemical facilities themselves remain an attractive target for terrorist.

I can tell you with certainty that the work we are doing in concert with our committed stakeholders across the wide variety of industries and facilities that compose the CFATS-covered universe is making a real difference in protecting the nation, and having had the opportunity to work closely with my counterparts in other nations and to co-chair the G-7 Global Partnerships' Chemical Security Working Group, I can absolutely tell you that what we are doing here in the United

381	States through CFATS what you have helped build with your
382	support for long-term authorization is absolutely the envy of
383	the world.
384	With its 18 comprehensive risk-based performance
385	standards and its nonprescriptive flexible approach, CFATS is
386	well suited to enhancing security across the very diverse
387	universe of high-risk chemical facilities.
388	So what have we been doing to make CFATS even stronger
389	as we have enjoyed the stability of long-term authorization
390	over the past three and a half years?
391	Well, we have improved processes and we have seen
392	unprecedented progress in the pace of inspections and in the
393	review and approval of facility site security plans,
394	eliminating a backlog of security plan reviews six years
395	ahead of earlier GAO projections.
396	We have developed and launched an improved risk
397	assessment methodology that effectively accounts for all
398	relevant elements of risk and have reassessed the level of
399	risk associated with nearly 30,000 facilities across the
400	nation.
401	We have implemented the CFATS personnel surety program,
402	affording the highest tiered CFATS-covered facilities the

ability to ensure that individuals with access to those facilities have been vetted for terrorist ties and we have significantly reduced burden across our stakeholder community, having built and launched a streamlined more userfriendly suite of online tools through which facilities submit risk assessment or top-screen surveys and develop their site security plans.

So in addition to facilitating all this progress, long-

term authorization as compared to our former reality of authorization through the annual appropriations process enabled us to continue to recruit and retain top talent and it reduced the possibility of another lapse in authority such as occurred during the October 2013 government shut down.

In addition to the confusion this situation created among our industry stakeholders, the need had arisen for us to take enforcement action to address the national security threat at a CFATS facility during this period of lapse in appropriations. The underlying statutory authority for such enforcement action would have been in doubt.

I know this is not a situation that anyone wants to see repeated. So to finish on a bit more of a positive note, I would, again, like to thank this committee and your top-notch

425	staff for your leadership in the CFATS reauthorization
426	process.
427	We are fond of saying that chemical security is a shared
428	commitment and, not unlike the role of our industry
429	stakeholders who have embraced and helped us to build this
430	program in so many ways and the role of our committed and
431	very talented team at DHS, the role of Congress and of this
432	committee in shaping and authorizing CFATS for the long term
433	has been hugely important and I am looking forward to working
434	further with you as we drive toward reauthorization this
435	year.
436	So thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
437	your questions and to the dialogue here today.
438	[The prepared statement of Mr. Wulf follows:]
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441	Mr. McKinley. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Wulf,
442	and if I could recognize myself for five minutes to begin the
443	question round of questioning.
444	Mr. Wulf, last time you testified before the committee
445	one of the key issues identified by GAO regarding CFATS was
446	Homeland Security's approach to calculating risks and in fact
447	they concluded DHS did not take into consideration all the
448	elements and consequences of threat risk and vulnerability.
449	Your written testimony mentions an enhanced risk
450	assessment and tiered methodology that Homeland Security
451	believes more accurately reflects a facility risk.
452	Has DHS changed its policy to risk analysis?
453	Mr. Wulf. Yes. In fact, Mr. Chairman, we have.
454	So we took very seriously the dialogue we had with this
455	committee took very seriously the recommendations we
456	received from GAO, recognizing that our previous risk-tiering
457	methodology was not as comprehensive as they could have been.
458	It was very focused on the consequences of terrorist
459	attacks and less so on vulnerability and threat.
460	We commissioned a peer review with a committee drawn
461	from across from a panel of experts from across academia,
462	government partners, and industry.

463	We received some excellent recommendations as to ways in
464	which we could enhance our risk-tiering methodology and we
465	set about doing just that.
466	So in the fall of 2016, we did in fact launch a new and
467	improved risk-tiering methodology that accounts for all
468	relevant elements of risk. So consequence, vulnerability,
469	and threat, and we set about retiering the universe of
470	chemical facilities against that new tiering methodology.
471	Mr. McKinley. With this tiering methodology, I am just
472	curious has it been peer reviewed what you've done on that
473	methodology?
474	Mr. Wulf. Yes. It sure has. So after we developed the
475	methodology we drew together another group of experts, again,
476	from across government academia and our industry community to
477	go over the methodology to make recommendations for
478	potential tweaks before we finalized the methodology.
479	And following that, we embarked upon a verification and
480	validation process that was conducted by Sandia National
481	Labs, which advised us that our methodology was in fact
482	sound, was working as intended, and at that point, we
483	launched upon the retiering process.
484	Mr. McKinley. Again, back on the tiers, Mr. Wulf,

485	almost half the group changed tiers onto this new
486	methodology. Fifteen percent apparently left the program and
487	four became newly regulated.
488	And so my question is, is what quality reviews and are
489	there updates occurring to make sure that you are
490	appropriately tiering everybody that should be in the system
491	and, as the engineering room counts up the numbers, your
492	numbers total over 100 percent. So I am curious if there is
493	a discrepancy in your math.
494	Mr. Wulf. That is a that is a good question. So I
495	would say the way to look at the math is, you know, looking
496	at the looking at the number of facilities that had been
497	previously tiered, that group should add up to 100 percent.
498	So of that of that group, about 36 percent of
499	previously tiered high-risk facilities stayed put at the same
500	tier level.
501	About 48 percent, as I think you mentioned, moved across
502	tiers from one tier to another and about 15 percent of that
503	previously tiered population was determined to be no longer
504	high risk, using the new methodology, and fell out of the
505	high-risk category.
506	So those three numbers add up to 99 100 percent when

507 you take into account the decimals. The additional 4 percent 508 is from the population that had previously been not 509 determined to be high risk -- those previously untiered facilities. 510 511 Four percent of those were subsequently determined under the new methodology to be high risk and moved into the risk 512 513 tiers. Mr. McKinley. Just in the time that remains -- the 30 514 some seconds -- what are you doing to -- how do -- how do we 515 have confidence that you're appropriately tiering people, 516 517 risk-tiering companies. So, you know, the risk-tiering methodology is 518 Mr. Wulf. 519 a sound one and is very robust and now takes into account all 520 relevant elements of risk. 521 We have built in -- we have built a system in which 522 human eyes look at tiering for each facility as we move 523 through the process and before a final tiering decision is 524 issued and if anything looks off -- if it appears as though a facility might have submitted information in a way that 525 526 doesn't quite make sense, we are able to reach out directly through our field inspectors, through our compliance case 527 managers directly, to the facility to resolve any 528

529	discrepancies and to ensure that we are in fact issuing the
530	correct tier.
531	Mr. McKinley. Thank you. Thank you for my question.
532	Now, the recognize the ranking member, Mr. Tonko from
533	New York, for five minutes.
534	Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
535	And Mr. Wulf, again, welcome and thank you for your
536	testimony. I commend you on the progress that has been made
537	over the recent years.
538	I believe, however there are ways we can continue to
539	reduce risks and improve the program. I want to reference a
540	few issues that came up when DHS last testified before this
541	committee on the CFATS program.
542	This includes the importance of closing security gaps.
543	Is it true that drinking water and wastewater facilities are
544	statutorily exempt from the CFATS program?
545	Mr. Wulf. Water and wastewater facilities are among the
546	statutory exemptions along with facilities regulated by our
547	friends in the Coast Guard through the NHTSA program and a
548	handful of other exemptions.
549	Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And do you think they were
550	exempted because there are no risks of terrorist attacks on -

551	- at these sites?
552	Mr. Wulf. I was not I was not here when that when
553	that exemption went into effect. Certainly, I think it might
554	be worth studying whether, you know, what gaps may continue
555	to may exist in that arena. I think that might be a
556	might be a sound next step.
557	Mr. Tonko. Okay. And is it true that nuclear
558	facilities are also statutorily exempt from the CFATS
559	program?
560	Mr. Wulf. Facilities regulated by the NRC are exempt.
561	Mr. Tonko. And what about federal facilities that have
562	large amounts of chemicals of interest? Are they exempt?
563	Mr. Wulf. Facilities owned and operated by the
564	Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, both of
565	which have robust standards and audit controls of their own,
566	are exempt as well.
567	Mr. Tonko. Just because a facility is not covered by
568	CFATS does that mean it is not a potential target by
569	terrorists? Should these sites be monitored at all?
570	Mr. Wulf. So, you know, CFATS is designed you know,
571	it's very focused. It is a risk-based program. It is
572	targeted at the highest you know, those facilities that

573	are assessed to be at the highest risk of terrorist attack or
574	exploitation so I think it is a you know, it is an
575	appropriate targeting of our best resources to the facilities
576	that are at the highest risk.
577	That is certainly not to say that other facilities do
578	not present a risk. We have within the Department of
579	Homeland Security a suite of voluntary tools and resources
580	that are available to other chemical facilities through our
581	chemical sector-specific agency.
582	We have protective security advisors who work with
583	facilities on a voluntary basis across the nation every day.
584	So yes, certainly
585	Mr. Tonko. But that's statutorily imposed. So
586	Mr. Wulf. Yes. Those are not a statutory requirement.
587	Mr. Tonko. Okay. Obviously, there are very different
588	security and regulatory regimes at nuclear facilities
589	federal facilities and other sites that have received
590	exemptions.
591	But in the past, DHS has expressed concerns over the
592	gaps created by these exemptions. A number of years ago, DHS
593	testified that the administration's position to support
594	closing security gaps at drinking water and waste water

595	facilities is that still the administration's position?
596	Mr. Wulf. I think I would have to take that I would
597	have to take that back.
598	Mr. Tonko. Okay. And does the administration still
599	support maintaining EPA as the lead agency for drinking water
600	and waste water facility security with the DHS supporting
601	EPA's efforts?
602	Mr. Wulf. I think that is another one we would need to
603	take back.
604	Mr. Tonko. All right. If you can get back to the
605	committee, please.
606	And can you explain how DHS has worked with EPA in
607	recent years to encourage improvements in chemical security
608	at water facilities?
609	Mr. Wulf. So I can speak I can speak more broadly to
610	the work we have done with EPA across the chemical sector.
611	So as you as you probably know, in the wake of the tragic
612	explosion at west Texas, an executive order on improving
613	chemical security safety and security was issued.
614	In implementing that order, we developed a national
615	working group composed of us at DHS along with EPA, OSHA,
616	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and

617	others with a role in assuring chemical facility safety and
618	security.
619	We took steps to ensure that we were sharing information
620	as fully as possibly, comparing notes on inspections,
621	comparing notes on facilities that existed in our relative
622	respective jurisdictions and ensuring that word was getting
623	out as widely as possible about all of the all of the
624	all of the different regulatory and other requirements.
625	Mr. Tonko. Okay. I would simply encourage the
626	committee to consider how we might close some of these
627	security gaps before we debate creating new ones through
628	additional exemptions and I think it's important that we have
629	this holistic approach to cover everyone that might be
630	impacted.
631	With that, I yield back, Mr. Chair.
632	Mr. McKinley. Thank you.
633	And now I recognize my colleague from Mississippi, Mr.
634	Harper, for five minutes.
635	Mr. Harper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
636	Mr. Wulf, thank you for your time being here, and we
637	appreciate it. It's such an important issue and topic for us
638	to continue to look at and we know that we all want to be on

639	the same page, you know, here on where we go, what we look
640	at, and how we try to strengthen this in the future.
641	One of the issues that was identified by the GAO, and
642	also a second witness that will be on the next panel, as a
643	place that needed improvement was compliance, inspections,
644	and enforcement, and I'd like to know what steps DHS has
645	taken to improve in this area.
646	Mr. Wulf. I appreciate I appreciate the question.
647	We have made really unprecedented progress in our conduct of
648	inspections in our review and adjudication of site security
649	plans and have moved as well in as a result have enclosed
650	the backlog of site security plan reviews and adjudications.
651	We have moved now into sort of steady state phase of the
652	program. So, you know, more than 90 percent of the
653	inspections we are now conducting are the for post site
654	security plan approval, compliance inspection, variety of
655	inspections.
656	So we have we have developed standard operating
657	procedures for these inspections and I will say that the
658	inspections that are happening across the country are going
659	well almost across the board.
660	Facilities are taking seriously their obligation to

661	implement their site security plans. They are putting in
662	place planned or new security measures in accordance with
663	agreed upon time lines where issues are being identified or
664	found by inspectors.
665	Nearly always they are being resolved being resolved
666	quickly and in good faith by the facility. You know, we are
667	not hesitant though where needed to use the enforcement
668	authorities with which we have been entrusted.
669	But our overwhelming bias continues to be to work with
670	facilities that are working with us in good faith to come
671	into to come into compliance.
672	Mr. Harper. Mr. Wulf, let's talk about your the
673	inspectors for just a moment. Is there a does DHS have
674	minimum qualification requirements for inspectors so they
675	could demonstrate the knowledge and understanding of the
676	facilities that they encounter and relevant guidance on
677	enforcement requirements.
678	Do you have those do you have the minimum
679	qualifications there and, if yes, will you provide the
680	committee any written items the department has governing
681	inspector qualifications and training?
682	Mr. Wulf. Glad to do that, sir, and absolutely, we have

minimum standards -- a pretty high bar for those standards as well for our inspectors who go through a comprehensive training program when they first come on board at DHS and to whom we provide advanced training throughout their careers on topics -- specific topics such as cybersecurity or personnel surety background check focused program among many others.

You know, there is an exam at the end of the basic

training and it is rigorous. We also focus heavily on onthe-job training and on fostering consistency across our
inspector cadre and the inspections they conduct.

We have put in place relatively recently a group of senior inspectors in each of our 10 regions and their job is to sort of foster training, the development of our inspector cadre and to ensure that we are -- we are working in a consistent way. But absolutely glad to provide you information.

Mr. Harper. And that would be great. And do you -obviously, the goal here is that the inspectors -- that if
you had any inspector come in to any facility that there
would be a consistent review and finding, do you sense that
the training you have in place -- the ongoing training for
those inspectors is going to meet that?

705	Mr. Wulf. Yes, I do. I think, you know, it's never
706	completely perfect. We strive for absolute consistency. We
707	appreciate the feedback we receive from our industry
708	stakeholders, you know, many of whom own and operate
709	companies that have facilities in different parts of the
710	country and, you know, if we hear things are perhaps a little
711	different in one part of the country than the other, we work
712	quickly to address that.
713	You know, in some cases there are reasons for that. It
714	may be that, you know, one of the kind of game changing
715	things we have done as an organization is to begin to take
716	more of a corporate approach to inspections.
717	So we are looking at a number of issues at the corporate
718	headquarters level so if there are policies that apply across
719	facilities it may be that a company's facility that is hit
720	from an inspection standpoint early on in the process it
721	might appear to that facility that it's getting a little more
722	thorough treatment than one that's hit later in the process.
723	But that is likely only because we have
724	Mr. Harper. My time has expired, Mr. Wulf. My time has
725	expired. Thank you so much, and I yield back.
726	Mr. Wulf. Thank you so much.

727	Mr. McKinley. Thank you, and now five minutes yield
728	five minutes to my one of my latest friends, Mr. Peters
729	from California, for five minutes.
730	Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
731	Thank you, Mr. Wulf, for being here today. I want to
732	commend you for the improvements in the CFATS program over
733	the last few years.
734	A longer-term authorization or focus on fixing the known
735	deficiencies in program management have helped to eliminate
736	the site security plan backlog and start the process of
737	compliance inspections.
738	However, a program can only be as good as the statute
739	that authorized it. So I wanted to talk a little bit about
740	how we might improve the statute, if you thought that was
741	useful, starting with effective enforcement.
742	In your testimony, you note that where issues have been
743	identified during inspections they have nearly always been
744	quickly remedied where needed. However, we have utilized our
745	enforcement authorities to incentivize compliance.
746	So can you explain to me, Mr. Wulf, what kind of types
747	of enforcement mechanisms you've been able to use under the
748	program?

749	Mr. Wulf. So yes, I appreciate the I appreciate the
750	question. So the enforcement process within the program I
751	think is in line with the with the flexible
752	nonprescriptive approach to the program and, you know, our
753	general our general orientation to work with facilities to
754	foster compliance.
755	So where issues are identified on inspections, you know,
756	we work with a facility, assuming the facility is working
757	with us in good faith to resolve them.
758	So, occasionally, if, for instance, a planned measure
759	that has been, you know, agreed in the site security plan to
760	be put into place on a on a certain time line has slipped
761	on that time line, it may be that there has been a change in
762	personnel, you know, sort of a lack of understanding of what
763	was in the site security plan.
764	We will, you know, work on, you know, an agreeable quick
765	time frame to get that planned measure in place and
766	frequently those sorts of things are resolved at that point.
767	If we get into the enforcement structure, you know, it
768	is a two-step process. The first step involves the issuance
769	of a essentially, a notice of noncompliance, which gives a
770	facility formally a certain period of time, generally, not

771	too much time to come into compliance and I am pleased to say
772	before a penalty order is issued I am pleased to say that
773	95 percent of the cases that is enough to bring the facility
774	into compliance.
775	Where if if we get to a point where a facility has
776	run through that period we will go ahead and issue a penalty
777	order. We do take into account facility status as a
778	potentially, a small business, a facility's ability to pay in
779	determining the ultimate penalty.
780	That has it's only happened in a small number of
781	cases.
782	Mr. Peters. I was going to ask you, so how many times
783	have you had to use penalties or cease operation orders for
784	facilities that aren't executing their
785	Mr. Wulf. So we have issued penalty orders in three
786	instances at this point.
787	Mr. Peters. Three instances. Okay.
788	And is that so that's the number of times you had to
789	enforce against a noncompliant facility?
790	Mr. Wulf. That's the number of times we have gotten to
791	the point of
792	Mr. Peters. To that point, right.

793	Mr. Wulf a penalty, probably in about 70 occasions
794	begun the process.
795	Mr. Peters. Great. And do you see that the bill that
796	the that act as it's written is does it give you enough
797	authority to do what you have to do? It sounds like that's
798	going fairly well.
799	Mr. Wulf. I believe that we have we have the
800	authority that we need to do what we need to that we need
801	to do to foster security at America's highest-risk chemical
802	facilities.
803	I think it's a good I think it is a it is a
804	regulatory framework that is really well suited to the
805	mission at hand and to the diversity of the of America's
806	chemical infrastructure.
807	Mr. Peters. Great. Just one other topic then the
808	effective and adequate enforcement mechanisms are crucial to
809	preventing noncompliance. We saw the dangers of
810	noncompliance when the West Fertilizer Company in West, Texas
811	exploded.
812	Facilities that don't report their holdings to DHS and
813	are otherwise not identified to the department still pose a
814	risk to workers, first responders, and surrounding

815	communities.
816	What kind of steps have you taken to address the problem
817	of these so-called outlier facilities?
818	Mr. Wulf. Yes. So, certainly, a high priority for us,
819	ensuring that we are getting the word out as widely as
820	possible to facilities about their obligations to report
821	information to us through the through the top-screen.
822	So we work through industry associations. We
823	participate in conferences. We drill down to the state and
824	local level through state industry associations, though
825	recognizing that, you know, not all chemical facilities,
826	companies are members of these associations.
827	We you know, we get creative. We work through
828	Mr. Peters. I am going to run out of
829	Mr. Wulf the state and local law enforcement,
830	preparing lists of facilities and comparing information about
831	
832	Mr. Peters. We are out of time. But I have five
833	seconds for you to tell us if there is anything Congress can
834	improve in this area. Is there anything you would ask us to
835	improve within the law?
836	Mr. Wulf. No. I think I think we have what we need

837	from an outreach standpoint.
838	Mr. Peters. Thank you.
839	Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
840	Mr. McKinley. Thank you, and the chair now recognizes
841	Mr. Johnson from Ohio for five minutes.
842	Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Wulf,
843	thanks for joining us today.
844	I've heard concerns that any changes to Appendix A
845	through guidance including through guidance might not be
846	subject to notice and comment.
847	So would changes to Appendix A by guidance be subject to
848	public notice and comment based on requirements of OMB?
849	Mr. Wulf. So yes, I appreciate the appreciate the
850	question, and Appendix A are a list of chemicals of interest
851	320 or some chemicals is part of our regulation and so,
852	you know, under the Administrative Procedures Act it cannot
853	be adjusted or changed without going through the notice and
854	comment rulemaking process. So as things currently stand,
855	that would be the
856	Mr. Johnson. Even through guidance?
857	Mr. Wulf. Pardon me?
858	Mr. Johnson. Even through guidance.

859	Mr. Wulf. That's right.
860	Mr. Johnson. Okay.
861	Mr. Wulf. I think it would be considered significant
862	guidance that would need to go through notice of rulemaking.
863	Mr. Johnson. Okay. Great.
864	Previously, GAO indicated that DHS does not
865	systematically solicit feedback to assess the effectiveness
866	of outreach efforts and does not have a mechanism to measure
867	effectiveness of your outreach activities.
868	Mr. Currie, in his written testimony, indicated that DHS
869	developed a questionnaire to solicit feedback on outreach
870	with industry stakeholders.
871	Would you please walk us through the questionnaire and
872	explain whether it's been effective?
873	Mr. Wulf. Yes. Absolutely. Glad to I am glad to do
874	that.
875	So, you know, we have taken GAO's recommendations
876	seriously. As you mentioned, we have developed that outreach
877	questionnaire. I do believe it is effective. We are in the
878	relative early stages of its deployment.
879	We are using it as we go out to conferences as opposed
880	to going facility by facility during inspections or

881	compliance assistance visits.
882	You know, we ask in this questionnaire those who
883	participate in our engagements to sort of give us some
884	feedback on the content, on the speaker, on the relevance of
885	the information, on the extent to which they expect to be
886	using the information to inform their chemical security risk-
887	based decisions.
888	You know, the challenge sometimes is to get the
889	questionnaire into the hands of the of the people who have
890	actually participated in the event as, you know, we are
891	guests at these conferences. We don't necessarily control
892	the attendance attendee email distribution lists.
893	So we work with organizers of the conference to push it
894	out. To this point, we have received upwards of 60 responses
895	back. Ninety-seven percent of those who responded reported
896	that information was relevant and highly useful.
897	So we are going to continue to look at how we can expand
898	the use of the of the questionnaire. I think it is very
899	much a worthwhile tool.
900	Mr. Johnson. Good. Okay.
901	Well, since the last time the department testified
902	before our committee the Government Accountability Office has

903	made 10 recommendations for improvements to the CFATS
904	program.
905	What progress have you made on those recommendations?
906	Mr. Wulf. I appreciate that, and I appreciate GAO's
907	engagement and, you know, very helpful oversight and
908	recommendations over the course of the year.
909	I am confident that we are among the most thoroughly
910	scrutinized programs in the government and pleased that GAO
911	has recognized our significant forward progress over the
912	over the year and, you know, happy to report that we are
913	making have made a lot of progress in implementing GAO's
914	recommendations.
915	I think those recommendations, broadly speaking, fall
916	into a couple of different bins. One of those focused on our
917	risk assessment process, our tiering methodology.
917 918	risk assessment process, our tiering methodology. You know, we, as I've mentioned in this hearing, made a
918	You know, we, as I've mentioned in this hearing, made a
918 919	You know, we, as I've mentioned in this hearing, made a lot of progress in developing our new risk-tiering
918 919 920	You know, we, as I've mentioned in this hearing, made a lot of progress in developing our new risk-tiering methodology, one that comprehensively accounts for all
918 919 920 921	You know, we, as I've mentioned in this hearing, made a lot of progress in developing our new risk-tiering methodology, one that comprehensively accounts for all relevant elements of risk.

925	I am confident that when GAO issues its next report it
926	will recommend or it will close out the remaining
927	recommendations related to our development of our tiering
928	methodology the conduct of the tiering peer review among
929	other tiering-related issues.
930	The second bin I think concerns, broadly, our internal
931	processes and controls and, you know, we have made a lot of
932	progress on that front, too, executing a 95-point action plan
933	to improve the program, developing standard operating
934	procedures on things like enforcement and on the conduct of
935	inspections, developing metrics to measure the effectiveness
936	of the program and, you know, pleased to report, based upon
937	those metrics, facilities that are within the program have
938	enhanced their security very, very measurably under CFATS.
939	It's a program that is working.
940	Mr. Johnson. Well, great. Well, thank you for your
941	responses. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
942	Mr. McKinley. Thank you.
943	And I now recognize our colleague, Mr. Green from Texas,
944	for five minutes.
945	Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
946	Secretary Wulf, thank you for being here. I have a very

947 urban district in Houston in East Harris County that's home 948 to one of the largest petrochemical complexes in the world so 949 I know how important CFATS is and I'd like to thank you for 950 your work in implementing these safety standards, and I'd 951 heard a lot of good things about the work. 952 I was glad in your earlier testimony or question you 953 acknowledged that CFATS, because it was called anti-terrorism 954 standards, was -- we are more likely to have a natural disaster than we are a terrorist. 955 956 In fact, in my area, I think we could take care of the 957 terrorists pretty quickly. As I say in Texas, we don't have 958 any shortage of small arms. So but Hurricane Harvey that hit 959 our community -- and I know the other issue was the -- that 960 facility out in Crosby, Texas, and that's not my area but 961 East Harris County is. 962 But a lot of our refineries literally were under water 963 in the Houston Ship Channel and that's what my concern is and 964 maybe we need to focus on that, although, admittedly, when we passed the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards 965 966 program we didn't think about natural disasters. 967 But now we need to recognize that because about every 968 seven years in Houston, Texas or southeast Texas we get a

969	tropical storm or a hurricane, and although the last one with
970	Harvey I don't know how we could ever plan for 55 inches of
971	rain in four days.
972	So but can you talk about how subjecting CFATS to a
973	yearly authorization through the appropriations process
974	before 2014 put a burden on the program?
975	Mr. Wulf. Yes, absolutely. Glad to. You know, until
976	we until we attained long-term authorization, we were
977	you know, we were subject to the to the vicissitudes of
978	the appropriations process.
979	So going from year to year or, worse, from continuing
980	resolution to continuing resolution. You know, when the
981	government shut down
982	Mr. Green. I think every federal agency has that
983	problem.
984	Mr. Wulf. Yes. You know, when the when the
985	government shut down in October or November October 2013,
986	you know, our stakeholders didn't know whether CFATS
987	continued in force.
988	You know, we didn't know whether if we needed to take
989	enforcement action to address a national security threat at a
990	CFATS facility, whether the underlying statutory authority

991	was in existence.
992	So long-term authorization in December of 2014 was huge
993	for us. It enabled us to plan for and execute important
994	improvements to the program, some of which I have detailed
995	here today.
996	It provided our industry stakeholders with the certainty
997	that they deserved as they thought through making significant
998	investments in CFATS-focused security measures.
999	So I cannot underscore enough how important continuing
1000	long-term authorization for the program is.
1001	Mr. Green. Do you think we need to put specific
1002	language in there? Because when we have these shut downs
1003	that our committee doesn't have a whole lot to do with since
1004	we are not appropriations.
1005	Mr. Wulf. Yes.
1006	Mr. Green. But, you know, our military still functions.
1007	Our law enforcement functions. Why would we not want our
1008	terrorism safety or even if there is a natural disaster
1009	during a shut down? So do you think we need specific
1010	language to say that?
1011	Mr. Wulf. So I think that the long-term authorization
1012	language I think the language we have in the current

1013	authorization does the trick there.
1014	But I think you have summed up exactly the importance of
1015	longer-term authorization to continue the program
1016	continues in force regardless of what is happening on the
1017	appropriations front.
1018	Mr. Green. Do you currently feel that the facilities
1019	labeled high risk have enough incentive through the program
1020	to reduce that risk and do you see facilities switching tiers
1021	commonly after a high risk designation?
1022	Mr. Wulf. So, you know, as we have gone through the
1023	retiering process using our new risk tiering methodology, we
1024	have seen some shifting across tiers. We have seen some new
1025	facilities come into the program, some previously designated
1026	high-risk facilities move out of the program.
1027	But I do think that kind of organically the CFATS
1028	program promotes the consideration by facilities of you
1029	know, of safer processes, you know, consideration of
1030	different chemicals.
1031	So, you know, there is an incentive for facilities to
1032	lower their level of risk by doing things differently based
1033	on the based on the CFATS program and, you know, over the
1034	course of the program we have seen about 4,000 programs or

1035	4,000 facilities that have changed their processes, changed
1036	their chemical holdings, and dropped out of high-risk status,
1037	which we view as a good thing.
1038	Mr. Green. Well, in a way that's good they are
1039	responding to the threat. Has the industry response been in
1040	revamping of the chemical safety assessment tool, or CSAT?
1041	Do you feel the program is now easy enough to comply
1042	with if you're a small-scale manufacturer?
1043	Mr. Wulf. Yes, I do. I think we made some significant
1044	strides forward with CSAT 2.0, that new online suite of
1045	tools. The amount of time it now takes facilities to work
1046	through the process of submitting a top-screen or a site
1047	security plan has been cut by about 75 percent across the
1048	board.
1049	The tool is much simpler. It's more of a Turbo Tax sort
1050	of model. Duplicative irrelevant questions are no longer
1051	seen by facilities. So greatly simplified and we have had
1052	really tremendous feedback from our from our industry
1053	stakeholders on it.
1054	And, you know, in many respects they helped us to
1055	develop it. They were closest to the pain of working through
1056	the old system. They were able to help us understand ways in

1057	which we could simplify it and make it more user friendly.
1058	Mr. Green. Well, I Mr. Chairman, thank you for your
1059	patience. In my area, we don't have those smaller facilities
1060	that you have.
1061	Mr. Wulf. Yes, I know.
1062	Mr. Green. Chemical plants and refineries who run
1063	250,000 barrels a day. So but I know that we like to go
1064	where the problems are, not just be a paper pusher.
1065	So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1066	Mr. Wulf. Yes. You're in the center of the
1067	petrochemical universe.
1068	Mr. McKinley. Thank you.
1069	And the chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan from South
1070	Carolina for his five minutes.
1071	Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1072	Back in 2014, I was on the Homeland Security Committee
1073	and I worked with them to help reauthorize CFATS for four
1074	consecutive years.
1075	H.R. 4007, Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities
1076	from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014 was under jurisdiction of
1077	both Homeland and Energy and Commerce.
1078	Now we are back to yearly funding extensions and this

1079	creates instability for both DHS and companies operating
1080	under the program.
1081	If Congress were able, Mr. Wulf, to provide multi-year
1082	authorization like we did back in 2014 how can we ensure DHS
1083	will update the program as intended?
1084	Mr. Wulf. So we are very incentivized to try to
1085	continually improve the program. You know, I think a long-
1086	term authorization gives us the stability that we need to
1087	focus on those on those improvements.
1088	We have made a number of them over the course of the
1089	last four years. You know, we are eager to push forward
1090	through the rule making process to engage with our
1091	stakeholders through notice and comment in a number of
1092	different areas
1093	Mr. Duncan. How can we how can we be certain that
1094	you will take the stakeholders' comments into consideration?
1095	Mr. Wulf. I think we have demonstrated over the course
1096	of the last four years that we take very seriously our
1097	stakeholders' comments and that, you know, we seek to involve
1098	them in the in the program.
1099	You know, this whole effort is a shared commitment. It
1100	wouldn't work without the buy-in of our stakeholders. We

1101	have put into place tens of thousands of security measures at
1102	facilities across the country.
1103	So, you know, they know they know in many ways best
1104	ways in which we can improve the program. That's why we have
1105	involved them in the development of the new risk-tiering
1106	methodology.
1107	That's why we have involved them in the development of
1108	the new suite of online tools and their input on those fronts
1109	have been has been invaluable.
1110	Mr. Duncan. I think as long as they know how to comply
1111	and what you're going to expect of them it makes it easy for
1112	them.
1112	Let me shift gears for just a minute. There is a
1113	Let me shift gears for just a minute. There is a
1113 1114	Let me shift gears for just a minute. There is a company in my home county, Austin Powder, and it's a company
111311141115	Let me shift gears for just a minute. There is a company in my home county, Austin Powder, and it's a company facility there in Clinton and previously noted how duplicate
1113 1114 1115 1116	Let me shift gears for just a minute. There is a company in my home county, Austin Powder, and it's a company facility there in Clinton and previously noted how duplicate regulations cost them substantial amounts of money.
1113 1114 1115 1116 1117	Let me shift gears for just a minute. There is a company in my home county, Austin Powder, and it's a company facility there in Clinton and previously noted how duplicate regulations cost them substantial amounts of money. The facility has explosive regulated both by the ATF and
1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118	Let me shift gears for just a minute. There is a company in my home county, Austin Powder, and it's a company facility there in Clinton and previously noted how duplicate regulations cost them substantial amounts of money. The facility has explosive regulated both by the ATF and by DHS under CFATS. The compliance mandated under CFATS does
1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119	Let me shift gears for just a minute. There is a company in my home county, Austin Powder, and it's a company facility there in Clinton and previously noted how duplicate regulations cost them substantial amounts of money. The facility has explosive regulated both by the ATF and by DHS under CFATS. The compliance mandated under CFATS does not measurably improve their facility security. It seems ATF

1123 security gain, what is, in your opinion -- what is your 1124 opinion on exempting those in the explosive industry already 1125 regulated by ATF from the CFATS program? 1126 So we are very, very -- you know, certainly 1127 sympathetic -- sensitive to concerns about duplicative 1128 regulation. I think in the case of explosive materials, you 1129 know, there is regulation in place with ATF. 1130 I think we are talking about a universe of about 30 1131 facilities that are regulated both by CFATS for explosives 1132 only and also by ATF. 1133 You know, I -- ATF and DHS have different programs but I 1134 think they are both -- they are both solid programs. 1135 know, we are open to working with the committee on a path 1136 forward there. 1137 You know, I am not sure I completely agree with the premise that, you know, CFATS doesn't provide any additional 1138 1139 security benefit but there is certainly other -- there are 1140 certainly measures in place at ATF-regulated facility. I've spent a dozen years myself at ATF. You know, a very solid 1141 1142 program there. And so, you know, among the things that I 1143 would not lose too much sleep over exiting the program, 1144 explosives are one of those.

1145	I will note, though, that ATF's program does not address
1146	explosives' precursor chemicals. So, you know, I think many
1147	of those facilities receive benefits still under CFATS with
1148	respect to the regulation of security of explosives'
1149	precursor chemicals for instance, ammonia nitrate.
1150	Mr. Duncan. So do you think the redundancy and overlap
1151	of regulations are okay? I don't hear a whole lot of
1152	jurisdictional prejudice in your answer there.
1153	We are going to look at that. We are going to look and
1154	see, because what we are trying to do is make sure that
1155	businesses aren't faced with multiple compliance burdens when
1156	one agency can handle it, and we run into that too much in
1157	government, I think, where you've got this jurisdictional
1158	overlap and one agency is coveting that and they don't want
1159	to give it up when there maybe be a better agency that can
1160	handle it. And in this case, DHS might be the best agency
1161	and take it away from ATF I don't know that or vice
1162	versa.
1163	Mr. Wulf. Yes. We are happy to happy to work with
1164	you on that.
1165	Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
1166	Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

1167	Mr. McKinley. Thank you. Now I recognize my colleague,
1168	Mr. McNerney from California, for five minutes.
1169	Mr. McNerney. I don't know if I sense a little
1170	reluctance in that acknowledgment, Mr. Chairman.
1171	I thank the panelist. Mr. Wulf, I missed your testimony
1172	and I apologize about that. Now, there are several
1173	categories of threats. I am going to list a few of them.
1174	There is natural disasters. There is physical attacks.
1175	There is industrial accidents and cyber attacks. Do you feel
1176	that cyber attacks are on par with the others in terms of
1177	risk to public safety and health?
1178	Mr. Wulf. I think cyber is a cyber is a very
1179	important threat vector and I think that, you know, no
1180	question but that America has critical infrastructure and
1181	that includes America's chemical infrastructure is in the
1182	cross-hairs of, you know, cyber criminals.
1183	Mr. McNerney. Well, I've learned from the utility
1184	industry that there is some difficulty getting information
1185	sharing across because of security clearance lack of
1186	security clearance within the utility industry mainly because
1187	of the length of time it takes to get a security clearance.
1188	So you think that that is also an issue with the

1189	chemical industry is a lack of security clearance within the
1190	industry prohibiting information sharing that could be
1191	helpful in safety areas?
1192	Mr. Wulf. I think, certainly, getting appropriate folks
1193	across the industry cleared to receive classified threat
1194	information is helpful.
1195	We maintain a program called the private sector
1196	clearance program through which we grant clearances to folks
1197	in the private sector to include those who serve on our
1198	sector coordinating counsels.
1199	So I think, certainly, important and the extent to
1200	the extent we can streamline that process, you know, that's a
1201	good thing.
1202	Mr. McNerney. Would it be helpful for the legislative
1203	branch to get involved in streamlining that process or would
1204	that we cumbersome?
1205	Mr. Wulf. You know, I think we are we are you
1206	know, we are working the issue. It is a high priority for
1207	us. You know, I think it's sort of a process a process
1208	thing, in my view, that, you know, we need to continue to
1209	focus like a laser beam upon and we are certainly committed
1210	to doing that.

1211	Mr. McNerney. Well, supposed someone goes into the
1212	industry, say, from the Department of Energy with a pretty
1213	high clearance level a Q clearance or some clearance
1214	top secret clearance. How long would it take them to get the
1215	clearance to get information sharing once they go into
1216	industry?
1217	Mr. Wulf. Yes. I would hope not very long. I might
1218	have to get back to you on exact time lines.
1219	Mr. McNerney. Yes. I have a specific case where it
1220	took someone with a top secret clearance 18 months to get a
1221	secret clearance in industry.
1222	Mr. Wulf. Yes, that's yes, not good.
1223	Mr. McNerney. Okay. Well, I'd like to follow up on
1224	that and hear specifically how that that's going to be
1225	Mr. Wulf. Happy to talk with you more about that
1226	program.
1227	Mr. McNerney. Okay. Do you think that there is on a
1228	different subject, is there resistance to safety regulations
1229	by industry of regulations that actually provide safety to
1230	the public?
1231	Mr. Wulf. So we are you know, although our security-
1232	focused regulation has positive benefits from a safety

1233	standpoint, you know, I don't know if I am in a position to
1234	talk about the extent to which there may or may not be
1235	resistance to EPA's or OSHA's safety-focused regulations.
1236	I would hope not. I think there is a strong culture
1237	across the chemical industry of safety and security. So my
1238	expectation is that, you know, they are meeting requirements
1239	across the board.
1240	Mr. McNerney. Right. I mean, it just takes one bad
1241	player to cause an accident to hurt the whole industry.
1242	Mr. Wulf. Yes. Absolutely.
1243	Mr. McNerney. So I think we both and industry
1244	understand that and are anxious to work with regulatory
1245	bodies such as yours.
1246	Mr. Wulf. Yes.
1247	Mr. McNerney. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield
1248	back. I'll give you a minute.
1249	Mr. McKinley. Thank you.
1250	Now the chair recognizes Mr. Flores from Texas for five
1251	minutes.
1252	Mr. Flores. I thank the chairman and I thank this
1253	subcommittee for holding this important hearing.
1254	On April 18th, 2013 one of the communities in my

1255	district, that being West, Texas experienced a disastrous
1256	explosion that took 15 lives. Twelve of them were first
1257	responders. So this CFATS is important to me and to my
1258	district.
1259	Furthermore, it was really disturbing to learn from the
1260	findings that were released three years later that this
1261	wasn't an industrial accident. It was actually arson.
1262	That said, the citizens of West deserve great credit for
1263	how they've been resilient in rebuilding their community and
1264	the rebound of West today is really remarkable.
1265	As the current authorization for CFATS is set to expire
1266	in January of next year, we must carefully consider how the
1267	program is measured and what improvements should be made or
1268	could be made in the reauthorizing legislation.
1269	I want to thank all of today's witnesses for their
1270	insight in this hearing. And so now I'll move to my question
1271	for Mr. Wulf.
1272	Some people argued that the greater public sharing of
1273	chemical vulnerability information or the CVI, as we call
1274	it is necessary for communities to be better prepared.
1275	So, Mr. Wulf, I have three subquestions under that.
1276	First of all, to whom does Section 2103 currently allow

1277	access to CVI?
1278	Mr. Wulf. So that section of the statute currently
1279	allows access to state and local government officials who
1280	essentially have a need to know that information in
1281	performing their official duties in the first response arena
1282	emergency planning arena.
1283	Mr. Flores. Do you think so the next question would
1284	be do you think it's wise to have CVI publicly disclosed?
1285	Mr. Wulf. I do not. You know, the reason we developed
1286	the chemical terrorism vulnerability information protection
1287	regime was to keep close hold among those who have a need to
1288	know information about high-risk chemical facilities and the
1289	chemical holdings at those sites.
1290	Mr. Flores. Okay. And so that brings us to the next
1291	one. Some people have suggested that local emergency planning
1292	commissions should have access to CVI. Is there a reason to
1293	not provide it to them?
1294	Mr. Wulf. So local emergency planning commissions
1295	perform an important function. But they vary in their in
1296	their composition. So there are certainly folks who are
1297	members of local emergency planning missions who do have a
1298	need to know information about high-risk chemical facilities

1299	and chemical holdings.
1300	So those emergency those first responders, those
1301	emergency planners, we absolutely want to ensure that they
1302	have the information they need to perform their to perform
1303	their official duties.
1304	But we need to balance that with the with the need to
1305	ensure that we are not sharing so broadly that we make it
1306	easy for terrorists and other adversaries to obtain
1307	information to effectively have a roadmap to America's
1308	highest risk facilities.
1309	Mr. Flores. If you have first responders that are CVI
1310	trained, would it be appropriate to share the information
1311	with those first responders?
1312	Mr. Wulf. Absolutely.
1313	Mr. Flores. Okay. Mr. Chairman, this has been helpful
1314	and I thank you.
1315	I yield back the balance of my time.
1316	Mr. McKinley. Thank you very much, and now the chair
1317	recognizes Mr. Cardenas from California for five minutes.
1318	Mr. Cardenas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
1319	appreciate the opportunity to discuss this very, very
1320	important issue that affects all Americans.

1321	Thank you for being here, Mr. Wulf. Earlier this year
1322	at a subcommittee hearing before the House Committee on
1323	Homeland Security, chemical safety advocate Paul Oram
1324	testified that facility owners should be required to develop
1325	and maintain employee input plans.
1326	Mr. Oram commented that, and I quote, "Employees are
1327	often the most vulnerable in the chemical release but also
1328	the most knowledgeable about problems and remedies."
1329	So with that, has DHS encouraged or required facility
1330	owners to consult with employees when developing security
1331	vulnerability assessments?
1332	Mr. Wulf. So I appreciate the question. You know, we
1333	certainly urge companies we urge high-risk facilities to
1334	involve their employees in development of site security plans
1335	and I would say that almost across the board employees are
1336	involved in the development of those plans.
1337	You know, the 2014 long-term authorization act makes
1338	clear that to the extent practicable, facilities should be
1339	involving employee and my expectation and my general
1340	understanding is that facilities are doing just that.
1341	I mean, facility employees are the ones developing
1342	plans.

1343	Mr. Cardenas. So the facilities' owners these plants
1344	voluntarily give that feedback to you? If it's not one of
1345	the checklist things that the department asks, by the way, do
1346	you have an employee input plan on your site?
1347	Mr. Wulf. It is not a checklist thing. We are not
1348	we are not really a checklist program. But we are, you know,
1349	a program that engages very constructively with facilities.
1350	So that is voluntary feedback. That's the experience
1351	Mr. Cardenas. Okay.
1352	Mr. Wulf of our inspectors working with these
1353	facilities.
1354	Mr. Cardenas. So that feedback right now is ad hoc?
1355	It's just as
1356	Mr. Wulf. I don't know if I'd characterize it as ad
1357	hoc, and we're you know, no one there is not a check
1358	box.
1359	Mr. Cardenas. Okay. Well, I'll describe it as ad hoc
1360	if there is not a formal process. Five years ago when we
1361	last the last oversight hearings on the CFATS program then
1362	under Secretary Rand Beers noted on the record that the
1363	department's strategic communications plan may eventually
1364	include, and I quote, "systematic outreach to facilities

1365	including employees at the facilities."
1366	Has systematic outreach become the norm in the CFATS
1367	program?
1368	Mr. Wulf. Yes. I am pleased I am pleased to say
1369	that it has and we have an outreach engagement plan. We
1370	identify areas of priority from year to year and we focus on
1371	ensuring that we are getting the word out to those relevant
1372	communities and that certainly includes to the to the
1373	organized labor relevant organized labor communities.
1374	Mr. Cardenas. Mr. Oram also stated that public
1375	confidence is critical to the success of the CFATS program
1376	and the secrecy is not in the best interest of the
1377	communities.
1378	I couldn't agree more. As a parent, I would not want to
1379	know if I lived down the street from a facility that that
1380	puts my family at risk. I would want to know as much as I
1381	can as much as we believe possible.
1382	Do you agree that this is important to proactively
1383	engage communities living near or next to these facilities?
1384	Mr. Wulf. So I think, again, it's a balance. I think
1385	we need to ensure that those who are charged with protecting
1386	our communities, our first responders, our emergency planners

1387	have the information that they need.
1388	You know, the balance, though, is in ensuring that we
1389	are not making sensitive information so widely available that
1390	it can be accessed by those who would seek to do harm to the
1391	community. So it's a balance.
1392	Mr. Cardenas. So what, if any, specific steps has DHS
1393	taken to improve community outreach and engagement through
1394	the CFATS program?
1395	Mr. Wulf. So, you know, we are as part of our
1396	outreach engagement plan we are out talking to local
1397	emergency planning committees. You know, those can include
1398	members of and frequently do include members of the
1399	community and public officials, first responders, emergency
1400	planners. That is one of the main means by which we are out
1401	across the across the relevant communities.
1402	Mr. Cardenas. Thank you. I can't stress enough how
1403	important it is for employees and local members of the
1404	community to be involved in disaster assessment and
1405	preparedness process.
1406	These individuals are the ones bearing the greatest
1407	risk. They work, live, shop, walk to school, pray, and drive
1408	to jobs near these facilities and they might be at high risk

1409	and they need to know about that. And yet, they are often
1410	left in the dark when it comes to disaster preparedness.
1411	Their voices are critical to the facility and community
1412	safety and I hope that we can work together to improve
1413	engagement efforts under the CFATS.
1414	So I appreciate your time. Thank you very much. I
1415	yield back.
1416	Mr. Wulf. Thank you.
1417	Mr. McKinley. Thank you very much.
1418	The chair recognizes Mr. Walberg from Michigan for five
1419	minutes.
1420	Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
1421	Mr. Wulf, for being here.
1422	In your written testimony you indicate that DHS has
1423	conducted over 3,500 compliance inspections and that, and I
1424	quote your statement, "Nearly across the board results of
1425	these inspections have been positive."
1426	That's good. Could you elaborate a little bit more for
1427	us?
1428	Mr. Wulf. Yes. No, I am glad to.
1429	So we are in sort of steady state compliance inspection
1430	phase. Most of the inspections we are doing across the

1431 country are, you know, post-site security plan approval 1432 inspections. 1433 So we are assessing the extent to which facilities are 1434 doing what they signed up to do in developing their site 1435 security plans, whether they are implementing those plans, whether they are putting in place new security measures along 1436 1437 the time lines agreed to in the plans and I'd say almost 1438 across the board that is absolutely happening. That has been 1439 our experience in conducting these inspections. 1440 Where we have identified issues nearly always we are 1441 able to resolve those with the -- with the facility in pretty 1442 short order. 1443 So, you know, the chemical industry stakeholder community is taking its obligations seriously under CFATS. 1444 1445 Those facilities that have been identified as being at the highest risk of terrorist attack or exploitation that are 1446 1447 covered by CFATS are taking their obligations seriously and 1448 are implementing their plans. 1449 They have put into place literally tens of thousands of 1450 security measures at facilities across the -- across the 1451 country. So, you know, really appreciate their commitment to 1452 the program and their buy-in.

1453	Mr. Walberg. Do you sense and your inspectors sense
1454	that they see you as a partner with them that it's a
1455	benefit and not a burden?
1456	Mr. Wulf. I do. Yes, I do. And I think, you know, the
1457	program is one that lends itself to a little bit of that
1458	partnership approach. Certainly, you know, we are we are
1459	regulators.
1460	But this is a nonprescriptive regulatory framework. So
1461	we are in a position to work with facilities to identify
1462	security measures within a site security plan that work for
1463	that that make sense, given that specific facility's
1464	unique circumstance.
1465	So, you know, really pleased to be able to work with
1466	facilities that way, and we will say also that we prioritize
1467	not just being out there to conduct inspections but to
1468	provide compliance assistance.
1469	So to talk with facilities, to talk with those who own
1470	and operate those facilities about options for meeting the
1471	meeting the spirit of the 18 CFATS risk-based performance
1472	standards.
1473	So, you know, I think it is a it is a really unique
1474	and I want to say uniquely effective program that is well

1475	suited to the diversity of the nation's chemical industry
1476	infrastructure.
1477	Mr. Walberg. I encourage that. We certainly know of
1478	other entities that are involved in regulating and inspecting
1479	at the work site, at the business, that have no there is
1480	no relationship. This seems to be a partner relationship.
1481	Mr. Wulf. Yes.
1482	Mr. Walberg. This is an important
1483	Mr. Wulf. Absolutely, and we rely on our industry
1484	stakeholders very much to help us think through potential
1485	improvements to the program, to develop, you know, new tools
1486	like our new and improved suite of online tools through which
1487	top-screens and site security plans are developed to help us
1488	develop things like our new risk-tiering methodology.
1489	So, you know, in a lot of ways it is a thriving
1490	partnership relationship with our entire stakeholder
1491	community. I am very grateful for that.
1492	Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
1493	Your written testimony notes that where necessary DHS
1494	has utilized our enforcement authorities to incentivize
1495	compliance. Can you elaborate on that? Explain that a
1496	little more?

1497	Mr. Wulf. Yes. I am glad to.
1498	So we have a two-step enforcement process. You know, as
1499	I mentioned, the vast majority of the time we are able to
1500	resolve issues without getting into the enforcement process.
1501	But in about 70 instances over the history of the
1502	program we have begun the we have begun the process. We
1503	have issued a notice of not compliance that, under the law,
1504	gives a facility a specific amount of time to come into
1505	compliance.
1506	I am happy to say that most of time that is sufficient
1507	where other you know, where cooperative work with the
1508	facility has worked to nudge the facility into compliance.
1509	But if that doesn't work we are you know, we will go
1510	ahead and issue a penalty order, and in all cases and it's
1511	only three cases in which we have had to get to the penalty
1512	order you know, that has been the thing that has compelled
1513	compliance.
1514	So we are your know, our overwhelming bias is to work
1515	with facilities and, certainly, the vast majority of
1516	facilities out there are acting, in my experience, in good
1517	faith and are committed to the program and understand
1518	committed to meeting their obligations under CFATS.

1519	But in the small number of instances where that is not
1520	happening, you know, we will go ahead and use those
1521	enforcement authorities.
1522	Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
1523	I yield back.
1524	Mr. McKinley. Thank you very much.
1525	Now the chair recognizes Ms. Matsui from one of the
1526	three possible states of California for the next five
1527	minutes.
1528	Ms. Matsui. I think we are still going to be united
1529	still one state.
1530	Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today we have talked a lot
1531	about the industries and facilities that we calmly associate
1532	with chemicals.
1533	But the CFATS program also covers many types of
1534	facilities that we don't always think of as using high-risk
1535	chemicals like hospitals and universities.
1536	In Sacramento, we have four major hospital systems
1537	including an academic medical center, which represents the
1538	second largest employer in the district.
1539	So I am pleased that DHS has emphasized the importance
1540	of stakeholder involvement, and I've also heard that the

1541	agency and hospitals in California collaborate well.
1542	You've emphasized the CFATS as a nonprescriptive
1543	regulatory framework, which gives flexibility to regulated
1544	facilities.
1545	What are some of the unique challenges that hospitals
1546	face under CFATS and how has DHS worked with hospitals to
1547	tailor security measures to those challenges?
1548	Mr. Wulf. And I appreciate that question. You're
1549	absolutely right. The universe of facilities covered under
1550	CFATS is a very broad one.
1551	So, you know, we prioritize getting out across the
1552	relevant communities and working to address the unique
1553	circumstances of facilities such as hospitals.
1554	So hospitals, you know, college university campuses
1555	can't necessarily be secured in the same way as, you know, a
1556	more traditional chemical manufacturing or chemical
1557	distribution site.
1558	We need to maintain reasonably open access to the site.
1559	You have members of the public coming in and out so, you
1560	know, what we have what we have recommended in cases like
1561	that and in you know, in the in the conduct of our
1562	compliance assistance with those sites is taking kind of an

1563	asset-based approach to security.
1564	So you're not necessarily constructing a perimeter
1565	around the entirety of the hospital but ensuring that where
1566	those sensitive chemicals are being held you have the
1567	requisite security in place. So that tends to be the
1568	approach for facilities such as hospitals.
1569	Ms. Matsui. Okay. Thank you.
1570	I understand the CFATS has improved its risk-based
1571	performance standards and risk calculations based upon actual
1572	threat level and facility vulnerability.
1573	It makes me wonder as climate change is increasing
1574	the frequency and severity of extreme weather if the CFATS
1575	couldn't be used to address weather-related vulnerabilities.
1576	Recently, the Chemical Safety Board released their
1577	investigative report on the Arkema chemical plant fire and
1578	explosion in Crosby, Texas.
1579	The CSB found that the plant was not adequately prepared
1580	for the extreme flooding that occurred during Hurricane
1581	Harvey and that a number of equipment failures occurred as a
1582	result.
1583	The CSB also indicated that other facilities in flood
1584	prone areas face similar problems and made recommendations on

1585	how to address some of these risks.
1586	I think that many of these recommendations are relevant
1587	to CFATS facilities. Do you believe that the damage extreme
1588	weather causes facilities covered by CFATS is a serious
1589	threat to the safety of surrounding communities?
1590	Mr. Wulf. I think, certainly, natural hazards are just
1591	that and, you know, we have certainly seen them impact
1592	chemical facilities.
1593	Ms. Matsui. Okay. Do you think a CFATS security plan
1594	should consider the threat of severe weather and help protect
1595	facility worker and communities? Why or why not?
1596	Mr. Wulf. So I think it's important that CFATS be able
1597	to stay focused on security. It is a security-focused anti-
1598	terrorism program.
1599	But I you know, I will note that there is a lot about
1600	the CFATS program and about security measures that are put
1601	into place or that are required to be put in place at CFATS-
1602	covered facilities that has a positive impact in addressing,
1603	you know, the facilities' resilience in the face of natural
1604	disasters.
1605	So, you know, we require facilities to develop response
1606	plans, to conduct training, to conduct exercise, to conduct

1607	exercises to make contact with their local first responders
1608	and all of those things are equally important in both the
1609	terrorism context, in the deliberate manmade attack context,
1610	as well as in the natural disaster context and we have seen
1611	it play out in instances in which, for instance, a tornado
1612	hit a CFATS-covered facility in Illinois and it was very well
1613	prepared.
1614	Ms. Matsui. So you're really preparing in essence,
1615	to really coordinate these activities more in the sense of
1616	part of the program to review how to do this so, in a sense,
1617	it's part of the program?
1618	Mr. Wulf. I don't believe it makes sense to make it a
1618 1619	Mr. Wulf. I don't believe it makes sense to make it a formal part of the program. I think it's important that we
1619	formal part of the program. I think it's important that we
1619 1620	formal part of the program. I think it's important that we retain our focus on security. But, again, I think their
1619 1620 1621	formal part of the program. I think it's important that we retain our focus on security. But, again, I think their security and safety are very much complementary.
1619 1620 1621 1622	formal part of the program. I think it's important that we retain our focus on security. But, again, I think their security and safety are very much complementary. There are agencies that focus, you know, squarely on the
1619 1620 1621 1622 1623	formal part of the program. I think it's important that we retain our focus on security. But, again, I think their security and safety are very much complementary. There are agencies that focus, you know, squarely on the safety issues on those hazards. We work very closely with
1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624	formal part of the program. I think it's important that we retain our focus on security. But, again, I think their security and safety are very much complementary. There are agencies that focus, you know, squarely on the safety issues on those hazards. We work very closely with the likes of EPA, OSHA, with our friends at FEMA, within the
1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625	formal part of the program. I think it's important that we retain our focus on security. But, again, I think their security and safety are very much complementary. There are agencies that focus, you know, squarely on the safety issues on those hazards. We work very closely with the likes of EPA, OSHA, with our friends at FEMA, within the Department of Homeland Security.

1629	I yield back.
1630	Mr. McKinley. Thank you. And now the chair recognizes
1631	the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from
1632	Oregon, Mr. Walden, five minutes.
1633	The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
1634	thanks to you for holding this hearing and, Mr. Wulf, thank
1635	you for being here. We appreciate your guidance.
1636	I just have a couple of questions. You've been with the
1637	program a long time I won't say a very long time a long
1638	time, and, frankly, many people credit your leadership
1639	your leadership and your committed staff with the gains the
1640	program has made in recent years.
1641	So, you know, we go through this with different agencies
1642	and, frankly, depending on who's in charge doesn't seem to
1643	matter sometimes which who's in the White House.
1644	So this isn't a partisan issue because we have seen it
1645	in other agencies. But having seen how a less committed
1646	senior political leadership can wreak havoc on a program, how
1647	do we know these reforms are permanent?
1648	Mr. Wulf. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
1649	appreciate very much the kind words. We have a great team in
1650	place within our program and great buy-in and commitment

1651	across our industry stakeholder community. So it's very much
1652	very much a team effort.
1653	I can tell you that, you know, our new senior political
1654	leadership with the change of administration is very, very
1655	committed to the future of CFATS.
1656	It remains a priority within this with this
1657	administration, very focused on ensuring that we are able to
1658	maintain positive momentum that we have the resources we need
1659	to do just that.
1660	So, you know, we remain focused like a laser beam. We
1661	have nothing I've seen nothing but support from the
1662	from the upper reaches of the department and the
1663	administration.
1664	The Chairman. Right. And some of the witnesses on the
1665	second panel in their testimony their testimony today on
1666	CFATS have made that they say that CFATS has made
1667	serious improvements in problems it was facing four years
1668	ago.
1669	What do you attribute the progress of CFATS program over
1670	the course of the last four years?
1671	Mr. Wulf. I appreciate that question.
1672	I think, first and foremost, I attribute the progress we

1673 have been able to make to the -- to the environment of 1674 stability that has been fostered by long-term authorization 1675 on which this committee showed so much leadership in 2014. So that gave us the stability that we needed to plan for 1676 1677 and execute many of the improvements I've detailed here It afforded our industry stakeholders the certainty 1678 they deserved as they were thinking through making 1679 1680 significant investments in CFATS-focused security measures. 1681 I would say also I would credit a lot of the progress to 1682 the spirit of openness and transparency which we have strived 1683 to operate over the past -- over the past four years. 1684 So, you know, we have a very strong relationship with 1685 our industry stakeholders. We take their feedback very seriously. We involve them in efforts to improve the --1686 1687 improve the program. We very much value their input. 1688 And, thirdly, I would just -- I would point maybe to a 1689 willingness to change processes -- to, you know, not stick 1690 with, you know, with the status quo to do game changing 1691 things like take a corporate approach to inspection activity, to take a fresh look at our suite of online tools and see 1692 1693 what we can do about making them more user friendly, more 1694 streamlined, and more useful in the development of top-screen

1695	risk assessment surveys and site security plans.
1696	So all of the above but, you know, at its core, you
1697	know, the stability of that long-term authorization has been
1698	absolutely key.
1699	The Chairman. Well, and as chairman of the full
1700	committee, you have my assurance that we are going to move
1701	expeditiously to reauthorize this work.
1702	Mr. Wulf. We appreciate that.
1703	The Chairman. We know of its critical importance. You
1704	keep this up, you may get cloned and your staff too because
1705	not every program and agency achieves these kinds of results.
1706	So we do appreciate your leadership and that of your
1707	team and you look forward to working with you so we meet our
1708	deadlines here and get this reauthorized.
1709	So with that, Mr. Chairman, I'd yield back.
1710	Mr. McKinley. Thank you very much.
1711	The chair recognizes Ms. DeGette from Colorado for five
1712	minutes.
1713	Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1714	Thank you for coming today, Mr. Wulf. Right outside of
1715	my right on the border of my district is the Suncour oil
1716	refinery.

1717	There are 53,000 people that live within a three-mile
1718	radius of that refinery and that includes over 5,000 children
1719	under five years old who are particularly susceptible to air
1720	toxins.
1721	The neighborhood that's the closest to the refinery,
1722	Elyria-Swansea, has a population that's over 80 percent
1723	Latino with over 25 percent of the residents living with
1724	incomes below the poverty line, and as you know, these
1725	characteristics are pretty common for neighborhoods that are
1726	nearby industrial facilities.
1727	So I wanted to ask you would you agree that while
1728	security is important for all chemical facilities, additional
1729	considerations like mitigation are necessary when you're
1730	dealing with urban facilities with large populations next
1731	right nearby. Security is not the only issue that these
1732	institutions or that these refineries and others are facing.
1733	Mr. Wulf. Well, sure. Yes. Absolutely.
1734	Ms. DeGette. And one thing that happened over at
1735	Suncour we have had problems with interruptions from the
1736	external power supply and, as you know, even brief
1737	disruptions to the power supply can cause harmful chemical
1738	emissions.

1739	In October 2016, the Suncour refinery suffered an
1740	accidental power failure that led to release of a yellow
1741	cloud of smoke, which closed the highway and caused 14 local
1742	schools to go into lockdown.
1743	And then they had a second power outage in March 2017
1744	which released more than 500 pounds of sulfur dioxide gas and
1745	a hundred pounds of hydrogen sulfide gas.
1746	So my question is I know, you look a little puzzled
1747	because but I am wanting to know is power supply security
1748	a consideration when the Department of Homeland Security
1749	considers site security plans submitted by high-risk
1750	facilities?
1751	Mr. Wulf. So, yes, the power supply is certainly
1752	something that
1753	Ms. DeGette. Is one of the things?
1754	Mr. Wulf something to be considered and also
1755	considering what contingencies are in place it is certainly
1756	important from a security perspective when the power goes
1757	out.
1758	Ms. DeGette. Okay. Does DHS have specific
1759	recommendations for providing a secure power supply under
1760	CFATS?

1761	Mr. Wulf. I will get back to you on that, certainly.
1762	Ms. DeGette. Thank you. Okay. Now, DHS is not allowed
1763	to disapprove of the site security plan because it lacks
1764	specific security measures. Is that right?
1765	Mr. Wulf. That is that is correct. It's a
1766	nonprescriptive program so we work with facilities to assess
1767	what makes sense and meets the intent of the relevant risk-
1768	based performance standards.
1769	Ms. DeGette. So would you consider a facility secure if
1770	it suffered a significant chemical release due to a brief
1771	power outage or would that show that the facility might be
1772	susceptible to deliberate disruption? Would you look at
1773	that?
1774	Mr. Wulf. It would be something we would look at,
1775	certainly.
1776	Ms. DeGette. Now, the CFATS program is intended to
1777	protect chemical facilities from terrorist attacks. Is that
1778	right?
1779	Mr. Wulf. That is correct, to protect against terrorist
1780	attack or exploitation. The majority of the facilities we
1781	have in the program that have been designated at high risk
1782	are designated as such owing to the threat of theft or

1783	diversion of chemicals
1784	Ms. DeGette. Okay.
1785	Mr. Wulf and taking their being taken offsite
1786	and deployed.
1787	Ms. DeGette. Off site. So the Suncour refinery
1788	incidents I talked about before caused by accidental power
1789	outages they would be included in the scope of the program
1790	though, right?
1791	Power outages that are causing chemical releases.
1792	Mr. Wulf. Yes. I mean, the power situation and
1793	resilience in the face of power you know, ensuring that
1794	the security systems are resilience is important.
1795	Ms. DeGette. Now, what about emissions caused by
1796	negligence, natural disasters, or other types of actions?
1797	That would not be included?
1798	Mr. Wulf. That is not within our purview. But, you
1799	know, as I've mentioned here, many of the measures that we
1800	require to be put in place through CFATS such as the conduct
1801	of training, exercise the development of response plans that
1802	are applicable
1803	Ms. DeGette. They would they would
1804	Mr. Wulf in both the natural disaster context or,

1805	you know, manmade attacks.
1806	Ms. DeGette. They would have that potential spillover
1807	effect, right?
1808	Mr. Wulf. Right. A complementary a
1809	complementary
1810	Ms. DeGette. Yes. But, Mr. Chairman, the reason why I
1811	bring this up is because I think it's security is really
1812	important to me but there is so many other issues.
1813	I would hope that we can also come to bipartisan
1814	agreement on how we address these toxic releases, because in
1815	my district and many other districts in the country, there
1816	people are living right next to these plants and even if it's
1817	not a terrorist attack or a natural disaster, they are at
1818	risk of contamination every day.
1819	So I would hope that would be another issue that we
1820	could work on in this committee.
1821	Thank you, and I yield back.
1822	Mr. McKinley. Thank you very much, and I hope we can
1823	continue that dialogue on that.
1824	Now the chair recognizes from Texas Mr. Olson for five
1825	minutes.
1826	Mr. Olson. I thank the chair, and welcome, Mr. Wulf.

1827	As you know, I am a congressman from Texas 22. I like
1828	to call that the suburbs of the energy capital of the entire
1829	world, the massive petrochemical complex along the Port of
1830	Houston and Houston ship channel.
1831	Mr. Wulf. Absolutely.
1832	Mr. Olson. As you know, there are lots of nasty
1833	chemicals on our highways and our railroads. In fact, this
1834	last month, Houston had the anniversary but remembered that -
1835	- see, was it in 1976 had a tanker turn over a truck with
1836	ammonia.
1837	Six people died. Over 60 were hospitalized. That was
1838	right by Interstate 610 U.S. 59, right by the Galleria.
1839	I know that's not CFATS, but my point is those chemicals
1840	are all over our roads, and that's just ammonia going through
1841	going by traffic.
1842	It's been talked about, some of the issues with the
1843	Crosby fire during Hurricane Harvey. I want to talk about
1844	cyber attacks, because the bad guys now are adjusting to
1845	attack us through cyberspace.
1846	What happened at Crosby was a failure of the backup
1847	system. They had backup power but they didn't test enough.
1848	They fired up for maybe a minute or two hey, it's working.

1849	It had to work.
1850	It didn't. And as you know, the chemical once you
1851	lost control of the process it was going to come through and
1852	have an emission.
1853	And so terrorists could easily hack into there and open
1854	up those things, do exactly what they did what nature did.
1855	So how is CFATS adapting to terror attacks through
1856	cyberspace?
1857	Mr. Wulf. Yes, you're absolutely right. Cyber attacks
1858	very significant threat vector. You know, chemical
1859	facilities, you know, vary in the level to which cyber
1860	systems are integrated with their industrial control systems,
1861	with their process systems, and, for that matter, with their
1862	security systems.
1863	But there certainly exists a decent population of
1864	facilities where those systems are very much integrated and
1865	so one of our risk-based performance standards and I think
1866	this was in place before you know, before any folks were
1867	thinking about cybersecurity one of the 18 risk-based
1868	performance standards under CFATS focuses specifically on
1869	cybersecurity.
1870	Mr. Olson. All right. Good.

1871	Mr. Wulf. So we have trained a large number of our
1872	inspectors to work with facilities that have the fuller
1873	integration of cyber systems with their industrial control
1874	systems.
1875	We have cyber experts on our staff at headquarters who
1876	review those facility site security plans and provide
1877	guidance to the inspectors in the in the field.
1878	You know, we ask facilities to put in place sound
1879	cybersecurity practices or other site security things a
1880	very important part of our program.
1881	Mr. Olson. Thank you. That is music to my ears.
1882	More of a softball question for you. As you noted,
1883	CFATS was authorized a little over one decade ago. Looking
1884	back, could you talk about the single biggest lesson learned
1885	that you've had the first years of the program? What's one
1886	thing you've learned over those first couple years?
1887	Mr. Wulf. So I think the most important thing is that,
1888	you know, it takes a community to secure America's chemical
1889	infrastructure that it's not something we can do alone and
1890	it's not something we can do without the feedback of our
1891	of our industry stakeholders.
1892	So, you know, the importance of transparency, the

1893	importance of openness, the importance of a you know, a
1894	community wide approach.
1895	A shared commitment to chemical security is absolutely
1896	key and I think as a result we have seen a great deal of buy-
1897	in and a great deal of commitment across our community of
1898	owners and operators of high-risk chemical facilities.
1899	Mr. Olson. Thank you. That brings up the next question
1900	and that is domestic community. How about international
1901	community?
1902	I mean, as you note in your opening statement, the
1903	threats we have seen in our homeland have spiked up following
1904	attacks terrorist attacks overseas.
1905	NATO and our allies in Europe are dealing with these
1906	attacks every single day as are allies all across the world.
1907	Can you discuss how our CFATS program compares with their
1908	programs and are we exchanging data with NATO, with other
1909	countries? Are they exchanging with us? Are we working
1910	together to address this problem?
1911	Mr. Wulf. That's a great question, and we are
1912	prioritizing international outreach. So I actually have the
1913	privilege of chairing a G-7 global partnership working group
1914	on chemical security.

1915 We are -- we are engaging with our European Union 1916 partners and a number of other nations to sort of share best 1917 practices, to compare notes on chemical security. 1918 I will tell you that, you know, what we are doing here 1919 is in many, many ways the envy of the -- of the world --1920 significantly more comprehensive. 1921 You know, they -- there is a large threat out there. 1922 You know, we have been relatively privileged not to have, you 1923 know, as many chemical-focused attacks. But no question, you 1924 know, adversaries around the world continue to seek out and 1925 to use in attacks chemicals of exactly the sort that trigger 1926 coverage under CFATS. 1927 So, you know, we need to remain vigilant. There are 1928 other approaches to securing certain chemicals, in 1929 particular, IED precursor chemicals. In Europe, that seemed to be making some headway. I think we want to learn from our 1930 1931 colleagues over there what is working as we think through 1932 potentially new approaches at the -- at the point of sale to 1933 high threat IED precursor chemicals, whether, you know, of a 1934 voluntary or a regulatory nature and that's probably another hearing for another day. But we learn a lot from our 1935 1936 international colleagues and I think they learn a lot from

1937	us.
1938	Mr. Olson. I thank you. So my time is expired.
1939	A final closing comment you always have a standing
1940	invitation to come to Houston, Texas, see all that stuff with
1941	your own eyes. Also, enjoy the best barbecue at the Swinging
1942	Door in Fort Bend County and also the best Mexican breakfast
1943	at Bob's Taco Station in Rosenberg, Texas.
1944	Mr. Wulf. Okay. What was the first one? I want to
1945	make
1946	Mr. McKinley. Okay.
1947	Mr. Olson. The Swinging Door Swinging Door. That's
1948	in Richmond. Bob's Taco Station is in Rosenberg.
1949	Mr. Wulf. All right. We are down there quite a bit so
1950	I will
1951	Mr. Olson. Yield back.
1952	[Laughter.]
1953	Mr. McKinley. Thank you.
1954	Mr. Olson. Thank you, Chairman.
1955	Mr. McKinley. The chair now recognizes the very patient
1956	member from Georgia, Mr. Carter, for his five minutes.
1957	Mr. Carter. Well, it's certainly going to be hard to
1958	follow that but I'll do my best.

1959	Thank you, Mr. Wulf, for being here. I appreciate it.
1960	I want to echo the comments of the chair of the full
1961	committee. Just from listening to you, it appears that you
1962	have a firm grasp of this and have a handle on it and I
1963	appreciate that. That's good to know.
1964	I wanted to ask you, it appears that improvements have
1965	been made in the program as it's gone along, and from what I
1966	understand in some of my reading that since the
1967	implementation of CFATS the GAO makes a number of
1968	recommendations that appear to have improved the program, and
1969	I just wanted to ask you specifically about two things
1970	vulnerability and economic consequences. Those two things
1971	are of concern to me and I just wanted to ask have you
1972	have you changed your overview of these two things,
1973	particularly of economic consequences? Or the management of
1974	the program have you tried to address this at all?
1975	Because I believe that GAO had noted that that was one
1976	thing that was not taken into consideration enough and that
1977	was the economic consequences.
1978	Mr. Wulf. That's exactly right. So GAO made a number
1979	of recommendations related to tiering and, you know, we have
1980	taken them all very much to heart in developing our new and

1981	improved risk tiering methodology which does take a more
1982	comprehensive a significantly more comprehensive approach
1983	to addressing all relevant elements of risk to include
1984	consequence, vulnerability as well, looking at the sort of
1985	inherent vulnerabilities associated with facilities on a
1986	facility by facility basis things like, you know, how
1987	chemicals are stored, the types of containers, among many
1988	other things, and threat.
1989	With respect to economic consequences, we have studied
1990	this very hard in response to the in response to the
1991	recommendation and I think just makes sense to have done that
1992	done that anyway.
1993	You know, our ultimate conclusion was that the
1994	threshold, which is actually a classified threshold for
1995	significant economic consequences to the nation from an
1996	attack on a specific chemical facility is a pretty high one.
1997	And so, you know, it was it was based on a review of
1998	the facilities in our program. They were not facilities that
1999	you know, on which an attack would move the needle from a
2000	risk tiering perspective with respect to economic
2001	consequences.

2003 now but we have the resources. We have the knowledge from 2004 the study to include it as needed if we get to a point where 2005 economic consequences are, potentially, significant enough 2006 from one attack on a single facility. 2007 Mr. Carter. Let me ask you just a couple of simple 2008 questions, if you will. How do you determine who is to comply? Is that incumbent upon the business itself or do you 2009 2010 determine that or what? 2011 Mr. Wulf. Yes. So the way the process works is that 2012 facilities that have holdings of one or more of our 320 2013 chemicals of interest that are in the regulation identify --2014 sort of self-identify if they have those chemical holdings at 2015 or above the specified threshold or at or above the specified 2016 concentration. 2017 They submit to us what we call a top-screen, so basic information about the facility, about the chemical holdings, 2018 2019 and we run that through our risk tiering methodology and make 2020 a determination as to whether the facility, based on the 2021 totality of the circumstances of its facility, of its 2022 chemical holdings, of its location as relevant -- whether it's in an urban or rural area, whether that facility is at 2023 2024 high risk of terrorist attack or exploitation, and if it is -

2025	- and about 10 percent of the facilities that submit this
2026	paperwork to us ultimately are determined to be high risk
2027	if a facility is issued that determination we then issue it a
2028	risk tier.
2029	So it's placed in one of our four risk tiers and then
2030	embarks upon the process of collaborating with us as it
2031	develops a site security plan that's ultimately approved and
2032	then entering into the regular cycle of compliance
2033	Mr. Carter. So it is incumbent upon the business to
2034	initiate it?
2035	Mr. Wulf. It is.
2036	Mr. Carter. Okay.
2037	Mr. Wulf. But we prioritize getting the word out about
2038	those reporting obligations because the community of those
2039	who hold chemicals is very diverse.
2040	Mr. Carter. I see. Right.
2041	Mr. Wulf. So it's not only the traditional chemical
2042	manufacturers.
2043	Mr. Carter. Well, very quickly, because I want to get
2044	this in. I have two major seaports in my district.
2045	That seems like that's that would be a bugaboo to try
2046	to really have an overview of that

2047	Mr. Wulf. Yes. No, that's
2048	Mr. Carter of everything that's going through
2049	those ports.
2050	Mr. Wulf. Yes. There is a lot of chemical
2051	infrastructure on the water at the at the ports. Our
2052	friends at the Coast Guard have the responsibility actually -
2053	_
2054	Mr. Carter. Okay.
2055	Mr. Wulf for managing that. So facilities that
2056	are regulated by the Coast Guard are specifically exempted
2057	from CFATS.
2058	Mr. Carter. Right.
2059	Mr. Wulf. So we work very closely with the Coast Guard.
2060	Mr. Carter. Good. Thank you very much.
2061	Mr. Wulf. Absolutely.
2062	Mr. Carter. And I yield back.
2063	Mr. McKinley. Thank you very much.
2064	Now, if I could, you've been you've been going here
2065	almost two-plus hours on this thing. But let me just
2066	conclude with one question, if I could the privilege of
2067	the chair.
2068	I want to clarify your answer to Congressman Johnson

2069	about the listing of items on Appendix 1, because I've spoken
2070	to several chemical manufacturers in our district and they
2071	claim that the on Appendix 1 is this designation of high
2072	priority chemicals you understand that.
2073	They claim the existing statute is silent over whether
2074	or not the response whether it's subject to notice in
2075	rulemaking versus the sole discretion of DHS.
2076	I thought you said that it had to go through notice in
2077	rulemaking. I just want for the record for the record you
2078	saying it does go under
2079	Mr. Wulf. Yes. So it is yes. It is it is part
2080	of our regulation and so I have a crack team of lawyers who
2081	tell me that as a result of its status in the regulation it
2082	is subject to notice and comment rulemaking pursuant to the
2083	administrative procedures.
2084	Mr. McKinley. So these manufacturers maybe are just
2085	mistaken where they think it's silent?
2086	Mr. Wulf. Yes. It may not be explicitly addressed in
2087	the in the statute but there are other you know, other
2088	legal frameworks that apply to it.
2089	Mr. McKinley. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you.
2090	Mr. Wulf. Absolutely.

2091	Mr. McKinley. Seeing that there are no further members
2092	wishing to participate and ask questions, I'd like to thank
2093	our witness again for being here today.
2094	And with that, we will end the first panel.
2095	Mr. Wulf. Thank you so much.
2096	[Pause.]
2097	Mr. McKinley. So if we could, we call up the second
2098	panel now and your placards.
2099	[Pause.]
2100	Okay. We want to thank our witnesses for being here
2101	today, as we went through the first many of you just went
2102	through the first panel and so we begin the second panel so -
2103	- and your taking the time to testify before this
2104	subcommittee.
2105	Today's witnesses will have the opportunity to give
2106	opening statements followed by a round of questions from the
2107	members that are present.
2108	Our second panel today for today's hearing includes
2109	Chris Currie, director of the Emergency Management National
2110	Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection, Homeland
2111	Security, and the Justice Team in the U.S. Government
2112	Accountability Office; Mr. Brown, president and CEO of Brown

2113	Chemical Company; we also have Mike Wilson, national director
2114	for occupational and environmental health in BlueGreen
2115	Alliance; Mr. Roberts, principal of Chemical Security Group,
2116	LLC; and Mr. Conrad James Conrad, the principal of Conrad
2117	Law and Policy Council on behalf of the Society of Chemical
2118	Manufacturers and Affiliates; and lastly, Yvette Arellano
2119	did I pronounce that properly Arellano the policy
2120	research and grassroots advocate of the Texas Environmental
2121	Justice and Advocacy Services.
2122	So we appreciate you. The committee subcommittee
2123	appreciates all of you for being here today and the patience
2124	of working with us on this, and we will begin the panel
2125	discussion with Mr. Currie for his opening statement of five
2126	minutes.

2127	STATEMENTS OF CHRIS P. CURRIE, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY
2128	MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, AND CRITICAL
2129	INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE
2130	TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; DOUG BROWN,
2131	PRESIDENT AND COO, BROWN CHEMICAL COMPANY; DR. MIKE WILSON,
2132	NATIONAL DIRECTOR, OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH,
2133	BLUEGREEN ALLIANCE; STEVE ROBERTS, PRINCIPAL, CHEMICAL
2134	SECURITY GROUP, LLC; JAMES CONRAD, PRINCIPAL, CONRAD LAW AND
2135	POLICY COUNSEL, ON BEHALF OF SOCIETY OF CHEMICAL
2136	MANUFACTURERS AND AFFILIATES; YVETTE ARELLANO, POLICY
2137	RESEARCH AND GRASSROOTS ADVOCATE, TEXAS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
2138	ADVOCACY SERVICES
2139	
2140	STATEMENT OF CHRIS P. CURRIE
2141	
2142	Mr. Currie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
2143	Tonko, other members of the committee that are here.
2144	I think this hearing is really well-timed. CFATS is
2145	over 10 years old. We have spent almost a billion dollars of
2146	taxpayer money implementing it, getting it up and running,
2147	and industry has spent its own dollars doing the same thing.
2148	GAO has been assessing this program for almost a decade,

2149	and I want to be clear that, you know, we have no position on
2147	and I want to be crear that, you know, we have no position on
2150	reauthorization. That's a decision for Congress.
2151	Our jobs, as always, is to help you make those decisions
2152	with information on how well programs like this are working.
2153	In that regard, it's no secret that this program has had
2154	challenges.
2155	Today, after numerous GAO recommendations and heavy
2156	oversight by Congress, CFATS has addressed many of the
2157	management challenges it faced early on. I think DHS
2158	deserves a lot of credit for that. I think Congress deserves
2159	a lot of credit for the oversight.
2160	I'd like to summarize just some of our past work and
2161	where DHS is in addressing the recommendations. First, just
2162	identifying facilities originally that could have been
2163	subject to this regulation was daunting and a huge challenge.
2164	In 2014, we identified, through our own work, chemical
2165	facilities that were not required were not reporting
2166	ammonium nitrate holdings, for example, to DHS as they were
2167	required to do.
2168	We recommended the DHS work with EPA, other agencies,
2169	and states to better share their separate data sources to
2170	close this gap. Since then, DHS implemented this

2171	recommendation and identified 1,000 additional facilities
2172	that should have complied with CFATS.
2173	Assessing facility risk levels, as was discussed a lot
2174	on the first panel, and improving site security plans has
2175	also been a complicated process.
2176	Specifically, we recommended that DHS improve its
2177	process for assessing facility risk, or tiering, as was
2178	mentioned, and have this process peer reviewed, and DHS has
2179	taken steps to address these issues as well.
2180	DHS also eliminated the backlog for reviewing and
2181	approving facility site plans, which at one point we
2182	estimated to be seven to nine years long.
2183	More recently, DHS overhauled and streamlined its tools
2184	for gathering information from facilities and assessing the
2185	risk and, according to most industry officials and facilities
2186	we have talked to so far, the new tool is much easier to use
2187	and understand.
2188	As of June 2008, DHS told us they've processed hearing
2189	results for all but 226 facilities nationwide. Compliance
2190	inspections are also a critical piece of the program. These
2191	inspections ensure that facilities are implementing and
2192	maintaining the security measures in their plans.

2193	In our 2015 report, at that time DHS had only done 83 of
2194	these inspections. They recently told us the number is now
2195	up to over 3,500, and this is promising, but DHS still hasn't
2196	fully implemented our recommendation to establish a final
2197	procedure for conducting these inspections.
2198	They have one in draft that they are using and they tell
2199	us they expect to finalize that later this year. However,
2200	just fixing past problems is not enough to declare victory.
2201	Now it's an important time, I think, to shift our mind set
2202	from establishing the functional components of a regulatory
2203	program to questions about what do we expect from CFATS in
2204	the future.
2205	Many of these will be addressed in the manage we also to
2200	Many of these will be addressed in the report we plan to
2206	issue next month. First, it's critical that the CFATS
2206	issue next month. First, it's critical that the CFATS
2206 2207	issue next month. First, it's critical that the CFATS program be able to measure over time how risk and
2206 2207 2208	issue next month. First, it's critical that the CFATS program be able to measure over time how risk and vulnerability are actually being reduced and not just focus
2206 2207 2208 2209	issue next month. First, it's critical that the CFATS program be able to measure over time how risk and vulnerability are actually being reduced and not just focus on outputs like inspection numbers.
2206 2207 2208 2209 2210	issue next month. First, it's critical that the CFATS program be able to measure over time how risk and vulnerability are actually being reduced and not just focus on outputs like inspection numbers. In the past, we have found weakness in how the program
2206 2207 2208 2209 2210 2211	issue next month. First, it's critical that the CFATS program be able to measure over time how risk and vulnerability are actually being reduced and not just focus on outputs like inspection numbers. In the past, we have found weakness in how the program measures performance and we continue to assess their progress

2215	considered. Also, the program is in a unique position to
2216	help the industry by communicating these threats and best
2217	practices.
2218	Further, a balance must be struck between sharing
2219	information and protecting security. For example, recently
2220	deadly incidents show how important it is that first
2221	responders know what they are responding to at these
2222	facilities and how to address it.
2223	We are assessing these and other issues in our ongoing
2224	work and, as I mentioned, we expect a report out on those
2225	specific things next month.
2226	This concludes my statement and I look forward to the
2227	discussion.
2228	[The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:]
2229	
2230	**************************************

2231	Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Mr. Currie.
2232	And now the chair recognizes Mr. Brown for his five
2233	minutes.

2234	STATEMENT OF DOUG BROWN
2235	
2236	Mr. Brown. Good morning, Vice Chairman McKinley, and
2237	Ranking Member Tonko, and members of the subcommittee.
2238	My name is Doug Brown and I am president and CEO of
2239	Brown Chemical, a chemical distributor based in Oakland, New
2240	Jersey. I am also the current chairman of the National
2241	Association of Chemical Distributors NACD.
2242	I thank you for holding this important hearing today on
2243	the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program and I
2244	am pleased to provide testimony.
2245	Brown Chemical was founded in 1936. It is a fourth
2246	generation family-owned and operated business with 14
2247	employees. We operate facilities in Oakland and Patterson,
2248	New Jersey.
2249	Brown Chemical direct sells, distributes, or packages
2250	over 350 products to approximately 400 customers in 41
2251	states. We've been practising NACD's responsible
2252	distribution since its inception in 1991 when it became
2253	mandatory for all association members.
2254	This comprehensive program addresses environmental,
2255	health, safety, and security risks. Members companies are

2256	third-party verified to ensure the highest quality of
2257	performance in these areas.
2258	While security has always been an inherent element of
2259	responsible distribution, after the September 11 terrorist
2260	attacks NACD specifically added security elements to the
2261	program and the association continues to enhance these
2262	requirements.
2263	In 2013, NACD added a specific security code to
2264	responsible distribution and consolidated many prior
2265	requirements and improved others.
2266	Brown Chemical supports a long-term reauthorization of
2267	CFATS. I believe the CFATS program has made the chemical
2268	industry in our nation more secure.
2269	Since the program's establishment in 2007, the industry
2270	has invested significant capital and training resources for
2271	its enhanced security measures at our facilities.
2272	While these investments did not help grow my business,
2273	they nonetheless ensured the security of my company, our
2274	employees, and the community.
2275	It is undeniable there were growing pains in the first
2276	few years of CFATS. The Department of Homeland Security has
2277	worked hard to address these issues and has made substantial

2278 improvements to run the program more efficiently. 2279 One reason for the success of the CFATS program is the 2280 fact that DHS has taken the time to truly learn about the 2281 diversity of the chemical industry and work with companies on 2282 security measures that meet the CFATS risk-based performance 2283 standards. DHS has taken a collaborative common sense approach in 2284 2285 implementing the program while providing flexibility to each unique chemical facility in doing so. 2286 2287 The clear objective of the CFATS program is to help 2288 facilities be more secure while not taking a punitive 2289 DHS has excelled in outreach to the industry in 2290 three key ways: by publishing numerous fact sheets and 2291 lessons learned documents, by interacting with facility 2292 owners and operators during the chemical sector security 2293 summits and other industry meetings, and always making 2294 inspectors and headquarters personnel available to talk 2295 through issues and answer questions. The 2014 reauthorization of the CFATS program, which, 2296 2297 for the first time provided CFATS a multi-year authorization, 2298 further enhanced security efforts by providing regulatory certainty to both industry and DHS. 2299

2300 This stability allowed DHS to increase efficiencies in 2301 the program while streamlining the information submission 2302 process for regulated facilities. 2303 I believe the CFATS program is strong and needs minimal 2304 change. One priority I can recommend is to require that any 2305 changes to the Appendix A chemicals of interest list remain 2306 subject to notice and comment rulemaking. Changes to the COI list could have major impacts on my 2307 2308 business operations and security investments. Changes may be needed upon discovery of new threat information. But it is 2309 2310 important for regulated companies like mine to be able to provide information to DHS and explain the impacts of any 2311 2312 proposed changes. 2313 I also support the creation of a program under which DHS 2314 would recognize companies that meet certain criteria such as 2315 participation and an environmental health, safety, and 2316 security program like responsible distribution. 2317 By acknowledging responsible distributors through measures like less frequent inspections, DHS would then be 2318 2319 able to prioritize resources on the noncompliant outliers that may pose a greater security risk. 2320 2321 Brown Chemical supports the CFATS program and looks

2322	forward to working with the subcommittee on legislation to
2323	reauthorize this important regulation. A multi-year
2324	reauthorization of CFATS will provide the certainty needed to
2325	enhance the security of my chemical facilities and our
2326	nation.
2327	On behalf of Brown Chemical, I appreciate this
2328	opportunity to present our views on this important issue and
2329	I look forward to your questions.
2330	[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]
2331	
2332	*********INSERT 5******

2333	Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
2334	And then next on the panel, Mr. Wilson with BlueGreen
2335	Alliance your opening statement, please.

2336	STATEMENT OF DR. MIKE WILSON
2337	
2338	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
2339	Tonko, and distinguished members.
2340	My name is Michael Wilson. I am the national director
2341	for occupational and environmental health at the BlueGreen
2342	Alliance.
2343	On behalf of our organization, our national labor and
2344	environmental partners, and the millions of members and
2345	supporters they represent, I want to thank you for convening
2346	the hearing today and for your interest in chemical safety
2347	and security.
2348	I am familiar with the risks of industrial hazards
2349	because I had the privilege of working for 13 years as a
2350	professional firefighter, paramedic, and EMT, during which
2351	time I responded to about 10,000 emergency calls.
2352	I worked in a city with heavy industry centered around
2353	agriculture, so there were many facilities that used chlorine
2354	and ammonia and other agricultural chemicals.
2355	Responding to an incident at one of these facilities
2356	meant grappling with a lot of uncertainty because the
2357	facilities weren't required to invite us in and involve us in

planning or training for an emergency. 2358 2359 In general, I would say they relied on us if they had an 2360 emergency but they were reluctant to help us improve the 2361 safety and effectiveness of our response. Without a doubt, 2362 emergency response is a necessary aspect of chemical safety 2363 and security. 2364 But it's an indicator of a failure. It's a measure of last resort where thoughtful planning and prevention have 2365 2366 broken down. 2367 EPA reported this year that most serious chemical 2368 accidents are preventable if the necessary precautions and 2369 actions are taken and yet serious industrial chemical 2370 accidents continue to occur every two and a half days across 2371 our nation. Last year, EPA estimated that about 177 million 2372 Americans live close enough to an industrial facility to be 2373 2374 affected by a chemical accident and that these risks fall 2375 disproportionately on low-income and minority communities. CFATS responds to this problem by requiring companies to 2376 2377 surround dangerous chemicals with security measures and yet, 2378 as many experts have noted, these measures require continual 2379 updating to thwart the efforts of a motivated actor.

2380	Perhaps it is in response to this challenge with
2381	security measures that thousands of facilities seem to be
2382	shifting to prevention strategies.
2383	DHS noted last year that companies reported taking
2384	action to prevent risks on about 250 dangerous chemicals by
2385	replacing those chemicals with safer ones, reducing the
2386	quantities held on site, or switching to less concentrated
2387	formulations.
2388	If DHS is confident in the veracity of these claims,
2389	these actions do more than manage risks. They actually
2390	reduce the risk footprint, and in this way they provide
2391	protection not only from an intentional attack but also from
2392	an extreme weather event, earthquake, power outage, or
2393	mechanical failure risks that we've heard from several
2394	members today.
2395	On the other hand, there are about 3,400 facilities that
2396	have remained in the CFATS high-risk tier and which pose a
2397	substantial risk to workers and communities.
2398	Changes to the CFATS program are needed to reward the
2399	leaders and move the laggards up. CFATS could be
2400	strengthened with updated requirements in four areas: one,
2401	risk management; two, risk prevention; three, meaningful

2402	participation by rank and file worker representatives; and
2403	four, emergency response.
2404	The state of California, the third largest refining
2405	state in the country, adopted these approaches last year in a
2406	sweeping new refinery safety regulation, which was motivated
2407	by a large flammable vapor explosion at the Richmond Chevron
2408	refinery.
2409	That incident created a 100 square meter vapor cloud
2410	that ignited and endangered the lives of 19 workers and
2411	caused some 15,000 people down wind of the plant to seek
2412	medical attention.
2413	California's comprehensive new regulation is informed by
2414	the industry's own best engineering and management practices
2415	developed over the last 20 years and largely shifts from a
2416	risk management to risk prevention framework.
2417	While California is improving the safety of refineries
2418	in communities, however, U.S. EPA is proposing to
2419	substantially weaken the federal chemical disaster rule by
2420	rolling back most of its key provisions, including all 10 of
2421	its prevention requirements.
2422	These changes will endanger the lives of my former co-
2423	workers in the U.S. Fire Service. They will endanger workers

2424	and millions of community members and their families who live
2425	around our nation's chemical facilities. The chemical
2426	disaster rule should be retained in its original form, not
2427	weakened or delayed, as the administration has proposed.
2428	We can and must prevent chemical accidents. I urge you
2429	to use the reauthorization of CFATS as an opportunity to
2430	strengthen the program. The results would be fewer
2431	explosions, fewer injuries and deaths, and a far more
2432	resilient industrial infrastructure.
2433	In closing, I would like to thank you again for this
2434	hearing and for granting me the opportunity to appear, and I
2435	will be happy to answer any questions.
2436	Thank you.
2437	[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
2438	
2439	**************************************

2440	Mr. Harper. [Presiding.] Thank you, Dr. Wilson.
2441	The chair will now recognize Mr. Roberts for the
2442	purposes of an opening statement. You're recognized for five
2443	minutes.

2444	STATEMENT OF STEVE ROBERTS
2445	
2446	Mr. Roberts. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman,
2447	Ranking Member Tonko, and other distinguished members of the
2448	subcommittee.
2449	As a security consultant and lawyer, I've been fortunate
2450	to participate and work in the CFATS program from the very
2451	beginning since 2007, more than 11 years ago now, and have
2452	seen during that time and have participated in countless
2453	dozens of refineries, chemical plants, paint and coating
2454	manufacturers, agricultural facilities, aerospace and defense
2455	a range of CFATS facilities that Mr. Wulf spoke about
2456	earlier in this testimony.
2457	Against this backdrop, I am pleased to offer the
2458	following comments for the committee's consideration: first,
2459	reauthorize CFATS for multiple years; second, further enhance
2460	the transparency of the risk tiering process; third, update
2461	the CFATS rulemaking process; and fourth, ensure that there
2462	is greater consistency among inspectors and the inspection
2463	process.
2464	First, reauthorize CFATS. When the first standalone
2465	CFATS legislation was introduced four years ago, we find

2466 ourselves back now at the same time, as that legislation 2467 nears the end of its life. 2468 I can certainly say that industry needs the certainty of CFATS and reauthorization of CFATS to continue to make its 2469 2470 investments in the program and continue to implement the 2471 program. 2472 I think DHS also needs the certainty of CFATS to ensure its long-term viability of programmatic changes. 2473 2474 Second, with respect to transparency and risk 2475 determination process, which we've heard about quite a bit 2476 today, ISCD has certainly improved the transparency of its 2477 risk process. 2478 They have done many things to help the regulated community understand why they may be tiered or not tiered, 2479 2480 and includes things like webinars, fact sheets, and the like. 2481 Most significantly -- and I think it goes -- and the 2482 agency should get a lot of credit -- you are willing to call 2483 up the agency and have a so-called technical consultation, essentially asking why am I tiered -- is there something that 2484 2485 I could do -- is there something I need to know -- is there something that's correct or perhaps incorrect in this 2486 2487 process.

2488	And while often that doesn't change the needle, unless
2489	there was some kind of error omission, the mere process of
2490	being able to have that conversation with the agency is very
2491	helpful and welcome.
2492	That sort of dialogue was not allowed was not
2493	permitted was not welcome many years ago at the beginning
2494	of the CFATS program and I think the current leadership has a
2495	lot to do with that and should be recognized.
2496	That's not to suggest that I or the facilities for which
2497	I work always agree with the process. In fact, many times,
2498	especially with respect to the most recent CSAT 2.0
2499	resteering process, companies have said to me, why am I
2500	tiered can I appeal that tiering decision and the
2501	answer is no. The regulation does not provide for any kind
2502	of appeal mechanism.
2503	In fact, allowing a straight appeal would probably
2504	swallow the regulation. DHS would spend all of its time on
2505	appeals and not being able to articulate and move forward
2506	with the program. So I don't think a straight appeal would
2507	be appropriate.
2508	But some further something more formal than a
2509	technical consultation but less something less than a

formal appeal would certainly help facilities to understand is there something they can do, especially on the consequence side of the house, for release sites -- for sites that have release flammable or toxic inhalation hazard materials -- to bring that risk down, re-file a top-screen, and perhaps get a different result. Right now, we are not able to effectively do that beyond the technical consultation. Third, the rulemaking process -- as we've noted today, CFATS has been around for now 11 years. The regulations have not changed one word in that 11-year period, and whether it be Appendix A or other key aspects of the rule, in order to change that rule, to update it, to align it to certain things, that process would need to go through the rulemaking process. DHS started that process in the fall of 2014 -- the summer of 2014 through an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. But that process has now stalled. If we take a look at the current rulemaking agenda for the Department of Homeland Security just published recently, we now see CFATS

I would urge the committee to suggest, to require that rulemaking occur so we can update the program necessarily in

has been moved to the list of long-term actions.

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very material ways that need to occur for both, in my view, industry and for DHS.

Fourth, as we've heard a little bit and including from Mr. Currie, ISCD should opt to make authorization inspections — compliance inspections more consistent, more uniform — ensure that the same level of knowledge, of rigor, of completeness of those processes.

ISCD has done a lot towards that and I certainly think - and have worked with many of these inspectors -- they are
professional, they are courteous, they are very easy going
many times and friendly.

However, that does not always translate into the same process from site to site, from region to region, even within the same region. That inconsistency sometimes and lack of --differences in knowledge, understanding the actual tools that DHS uses, the CSAT process, the different approaches to how an inspection actually occurs -- the level of detail or lack thereof -- is a ongoing source of frustration for many businesses, many companies, especially those that operate facilities from region to region and very clearly see and question why we see so many differences boots on the ground among the inspection team.

2554	DHS has recognized that. We hear from them that they
2555	are going to take steps and are taking steps, as the GAO has
2556	also recognized, to improve and enhance that process, going
2557	forward.
2558	But I think more is needed. I think further training is
2559	needed minimum standards and better consistency
2560	horizontally between the regions and vertically between
2561	headquarters and the regions themselves.
2562	So with that, I appreciate the opportunity to testify,
2563	holding this important hearing, and be pleased to answer any
2564	questions you may have.
2565	[The prepared statement of Mr. Roberts follows:]
2566	
2567	*********INSERT 7******

2568	Mr. Harper. Thank you, Mr. Roberts. We appreciate
2569	that.
2570	And Mr. Conrad, we'll now recognize you for five minutes
2571	for the purposes of an opening statement.
2572	Thank you.
2573	Mr. Conrad, could you pull that microphone around in
2574	front of you a little bit? Thank you.

2575	STATEMENT OF JAMES CONRAD
2576	
2577	Mr. Conrad. The button. There we go.
2578	For over a decade, I have been counsel to the Society
2579	for Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates, the only U.S
2580	based trade association dedicated solely to the specialty and
2581	fine chemical industry.
2582	For the previous 14 years, I was an in-house lawyer at
2583	the American Chemistry Council and so I've been working on
2584	chemical facility security since before 9/11 and I've been
2585	continuously involved in the CFATS process since it was first
2586	enacted in 2006.
2586 2587	enacted in 2006. I've also chaired the ABA's administrative law and
2587	I've also chaired the ABA's administrative law and
2587 2588	I've also chaired the ABA's administrative law and regulatory practice section. I am pleased to be able to
258725882589	I've also chaired the ABA's administrative law and regulatory practice section. I am pleased to be able to provide today with SOCMA's perspective on CFATS.
2587 2588 2589 2590	I've also chaired the ABA's administrative law and regulatory practice section. I am pleased to be able to provide today with SOCMA's perspective on CFATS. CFATS protects high-risk chemical facilities and their
2587 2588 2589 2590 2591	I've also chaired the ABA's administrative law and regulatory practice section. I am pleased to be able to provide today with SOCMA's perspective on CFATS. CFATS protects high-risk chemical facilities and their surrounding communities by ensuring that security measures
2587 2588 2589 2590 2591 2592	I've also chaired the ABA's administrative law and regulatory practice section. I am pleased to be able to provide today with SOCMA's perspective on CFATS. CFATS protects high-risk chemical facilities and their surrounding communities by ensuring that security measures are in place to reduce the risk of successful terrorist acts.
2587 2588 2589 2590 2591 2592 2593	I've also chaired the ABA's administrative law and regulatory practice section. I am pleased to be able to provide today with SOCMA's perspective on CFATS. CFATS protects high-risk chemical facilities and their surrounding communities by ensuring that security measures are in place to reduce the risk of successful terrorist acts. More than have of SOCMA's 115 manufacturing members are

2597	A one-year reauthorization, however, is not desirable
2598	because regulatory certainty is crucial to business planning.
2599	Complying with CFATS is expensive and time consuming,
2600	especially for small businesses. SOCMA's members want the
2601	program to be consistent and predictable, and a multi-year
2602	reauthorization would give them that assurance.
2603	Through the years, the CFATS program has undergone
2604	dramatic changes. The early years were a significant
2605	challenge for everyone, but the program has vastly improved
2606	under the direction of Deputy Assistant Secretary Wulf, whose
2607	earlier accomplishments gave Congress the confidence to
2608	reauthorize CFATS for four years in 2014.
2609	SOCMA believes that the program's continued progress is
2610	directly attributable to Mr. Wulf's leadership and justifies
2611	another reauthorization for a comparable period of years.
2612	The most significant recent improvement in CFATS is
2613	Version 2.0 of the Chemical Security Assessment Tool, or
2614	CSAT. The original CSAT process was clunky and difficult to
2615	use, took significant amounts of time and resources to
2616	complete.
2617	The number-one recommendation of SOCMA's CFATS comments
2618	in 2014 was that DHS fix it, and DHS has now done that

2619	dramatically, and our members uniformly report that it's much
2620	easier to use and far less resource intensive while still
2621	giving DHS the information it needs.
2622	This improvement is extremely important for SOCMA
2623	members, 70 percent of which are small businesses. Most of
2624	these businesses cannot afford to have dedicated regulatory
2625	compliance staff nor can they hire afford to hire
2626	consultants to do the job for them.
2627	While I've thus far applauded DHS's efforts, SOCMA does
2628	have some concerns. It first relates to how DHS tiers or
2629	assigns risk levels to facilities based on their CSAT
2630	submissions.
2631	When Congress reauthorized CFATS, it instructed DHS to,
2632	quote, "share with the owner or operator of a covered
2633	chemical facility any information that the owner or operator
2634	needs to comply with this section."
2635	Congress could revise this language to create a clearer
2636	obligation for DHS to share with the facility the exact
2637	reason for its tier assignment. That would help them
2638	understand how they could lower their risk tiers.
2639	The second concern is the personnel surety program.
2640	Currently, PSP only applies to tier one and two facilities,

2641	but DHS is considering applying it to tiers three and four.
2642	SOCMA believes this is premature. These facilities, by
2643	definition, pose lower risks and the PSP program continues to
2644	impose burdens in terms of time and delay.
2645	SOCMA believes DHS should work with the Department of
2646	Justice and the FBI to rigorously assess both what risks are
2647	avoided and what costs are imposed by the process, and we
2648	think such a multi-agency review is necessary before we
2649	expand it further.
2650	We also believe CFATS should recognize voluntary
2651	industry programs that enhance the safety and security of
2652	hazardous chemicals and thus complement what the CFATS
2653	program does.
2654	The leading chemical industry trade associations have
2655	organized and implementing demanding stewardship initiatives
2656	such as SOCMA's ChemStewards to manage and improve
2657	environmental health, safety, and security performance a
2658	public-private partnership that leveraged these industry
2659	stewardship programs like ChemStewards to benefit both
2660	chemical facilities and the public.
2661	And then last, I will emphasize a point that's been made
2662	before about the continuing importance to use rulemaking in

2663	amending Appendix A, and I will agree with Director Wulf.
2664	Currently, the Administrative Procedure Act requires
2665	Appendix A to be changed through rulemaking because it's
2666	already part of the rule, and so that will continue to be the
2667	case, unless that were to be changed by this by new
2668	legislation, which we would not support because it's
2669	important for facilities to be able to get the information to
2670	the DHS that it needs to understand them.
2671	The bottom line is that CFATS is working and working far
2672	more successfully and efficiently than a lot of other
2673	regulatory programs.
2674	CFATS inspectors generally interact well with facilities
2675	and the agency has an effective compliance assistance
2676	program. Facilities are more secure and the public is safer
2677	today because of this program.
2678	Congress should reauthorize it to maintain that
2679	progress.
2680	Thank you.
2681	[The prepared statement of Mr. Conrad follows:]
2682	
2683	*********INSERT 8******

2684	Mr. Harper. Thank you, Mr. Conrad.
2685	The chair will now recognize Ms. Arellano for five
2686	minutes for the purposes of an opening statement.
2687	Welcome.

2689	
Ms. Arellano. Thank you, Chairs and Ranking Members,	of
the Energy and Commerce Committee and Subcommittee on the	
2692 Environment.	
2693 Thank you for this opportunity to speak on the propose	ed.
rule to roll back and eliminate critical protections for my	7
2695 community in Houston Texas that are part of EPA's 2017	
2696 chemical disaster rule.	
I am disappointed that the EPA and its rulemaking has	
2698 chosen to only hold one hearing in Washington, D.C., making	J
2699 it difficult for voices like those in my community to be	
2700 heard.	
2701 But I am relieved that I can bring my experience to the	nis
hearing. My name is Yvette Arellano. I am here on behalf	of
2703 Texas Environmental Justice Advocacy Services.	
We are a nonprofit working to educate and mobilize our	-
2705 community in southeast Houston, including Manchester and the	ıe
2706 surrounding neighborhoods, which have high concentrations of	f
2707 chemical facilities.	
The EPA is required to regulate effectively under the	
2709 risk management plan and CFATS. This exposes our communities	_es

2710 which include significant communities of color and low-income 2711 families to more toxic air, pollution, and disproportionate 2712 harm from chemical disasters. 2713 As illustrated too well from Hurricane Harvey, too often 2714 we experience a toxic flood on top of the threats we already 2715 face from hurricanes and heavy rains. That comes on top of disparate health and safety impacts we already face around 2716 the year because EPA refuses to do its job to protect us from 2717 2718 the frequent toxic releases and pollution these facilities send across the fence line into our communities. 2719 2720 At Hartman Park, which is right across the street from 2721 the Valero refinery, communities painted a mural reflecting 2722 that nearly every child that plays in the park is in the shadow of a nearby chemical facility -- a far cry from what 2723 2724 people at this hearing see out of their window in Capitol 2725 Hill and D.C. 2726 Communities in Manchester never know which incident 2727 requires evacuation or sheltering in place. We hear the sirens go off. I heard the sirens go off, or alarms go off, 2728 2729 for a vote and that sent my stress levels high. People live in constant fear of releases or incidences 2730 while their children are playing outside. 2731 In hurricane

2732 seasons, it's bad enough that families have to prepare for 2733 their lights to go out and ensuring that they have enough 2734 food and water. 2735 No one should have to shelter in place due to a 2736 hurricane as toxic chemicals flood their homes, wondering 2737 what to do if facilities down the street will have a catastrophic explosion, chemical fire, chemical release, as 2738 2739 what happened in our community and neighborhoods during 2740 Harvey. People deserve the right to know the information 2741 necessary to make informed decisions for them and their 2742 families. 2743 The chemical disaster rule contains important safequards 2744 that would help communities like mine and across the country 2745 with common sense provisions, most importantly, for our 2746 already over exposed communities. 2747 We need this fully effective right now and we need to 2748 require facilities to take action to prevent fires, 2749 explosions, and disasters including by ensuring they actually 2750 look for safer ways to operate before a disaster starts. 2751 also would have increased the availability of basic information we need to know, like chemical safety data sheets 2752 2753 and emergency response contacts so communities can try to

2754 find ways to protect ourselves if a serious incident happens. 2755 Community members should get the information from each incident they're exposed to without delay and it's essential 2756 2757 for facilities to do real incident investigation reports that 2758 they cannot ignore in planning to prevent future problems. 2759 I want to highlight that the rule finalized in early 2760 2019 and came afterward by the EPA and after over a hundred groups working with TEJAS called for action, starting in 2761 2762 2011, as disasters were happening across the country and people in Washington, D.C. didn't seem to pay attention. 2763 2764 It also provided for a better coordination through sharing information first responders need and assuring 2765 2766 practice notification and exercises happen to prepare without 2767 delay. 2768 EPA cannot justify repealing all of the prevention and weakening other important requirements and it has refused to 2769 2770 face the fact that it's taking away protections meant to save 2771 lives and prevent harm, especially to communities like ours, right across the fence line from chemical facilities. 2772 2773 These rollbacks don't come without community costs as 2774 fires, toxic releases across the country on this administration's watch, especially Arkema -- the Arkema 2775

2776 explosion in Crosby after Hurricane Harvey, demonstrated. 2777 A lack of information puts the surrounding community and 2778 first responders in jeopardy. First responders on the scene had to be evacuated and received medical treatment for 2779 2780 inhaling dangerous chemicals from the blast. 2781 Community members are still dealing with the aftermath 2782 of chemical debris which is visible on their lawns and cars. The Valero refinery and other nearby facilities released a 2783 spike of benzene and other toxic chemicals. But most of 2784 2785 these were missed because EPA and states turned off or moved 2786 most of the air monitors. 2787 I urge this committee to consider the impacts on your 2788 neighbors, on our neighbors, our families, without critical protections like those in the chemical disaster rule and ask 2789 2790 you to call on President Trump and the administration and 2791 Administrator Pruitt to drop the hazardous plan that the EPA 2792 is considering which would revoke lifesaving protections for 2793 communities across the country, preventing children and vulnerable communities from chemical disasters. 2794 2795 The way EPA originally found was necessary should not be 2796 a partisan issue and we call on Congress and EPA to protect 2797 communities, not chemical companies.

2798	Communities across the country remain in harm's way and
2799	especially this is especially scary as we drive around
2800	Houston with billboards saying hurricane season has begun
2801	be prepared.
2802	[The prepared statement of Ms. Arellano follows:]
2803	
2804	**************************************

2805	Mr. Harper. Your time has expired. I apologize.
2806	We'll give you opportunity during the questioning.
2807	Thank you very much.
2808	It's now time for the members to ask questions. I want
2809	to thank each of you for your appearance here and for your
2810	insight and the experience that you bring.
2811	And Mr. Roberts, I would like to ask you a question
2812	first. We've from GAO that one of the challenges faced by
2813	DHS with the implementation of CFATS is compliance
2814	enforcement.
2815	Your written testimony points out that there's
2816	inconsistency with inspections and enforcement from region to
2817	region. Can you elaborate some on that and perhaps give us
2818	some suggestions on how to correct that?
2819	Mr. Roberts. Certainly. So there is let me
2820	emphasize again the inspectors are, with almost without fail,
2821	are extremely helpful.
2822	They're friendly, professional, but there continues to
2823	be a lack of, it seems, consistent knowledge in various areas
2824	of the program, including the specific way the regulation
2825	itself may work the confusion oftentimes between what
2826	regulation is and implementing guidance.

2827	As we know, CFATS is a risk-based performance standard.
2828	That means that DHS can't prescribe the particularly security
2829	measure a facility must implement or may not or does not
2830	need to implement for plan approval, and we've had many
2831	instances over the years, especially as DHS has upticked,
2832	obviously, it's compliance inspections in the last few years
2833	where the specific manner and nature of those inspections
2834	simply is not the same region to region and even within the
2835	same region.
2836	Some of that may go back to training. Some of it may go
2837	back to the prior biases or lack thereof of the inspector who
2838	may come from a prior federal background.
2839	Some of that goes to, on a positive side, with
2840	familiarity of an inspector with the site so they may not
2841	feel the need to continue to go very deeply sometimes.
2842	But the way a particular inspector assesses things seems
2843	to lack any real consistency from site to site, region to
2844	region.
2845	Mr. Harper. And I appreciate the way you have
2846	elaborated on that. So is this a is this a training issue
2847	that we are talking about or is it just something that,
2848	because of the different experiences, we can't correct?

Mr. Roberts. No, I think it absolutely is a couple of things. One is training -- training around the actual rule -- training around the CSAT portal -- how it works.

We've had instances where inspectors would ask a facility to do something in their top-screen that is not possible because the top-screen doesn't allow that type of data to be inputted. So that just shows me that that particular inspector may not understand how the top-screen itself works.

Certainly, training of the regulation -- the top-screen tool, the CSAT suite of tools that Mr. Wulf mentioned -- certainly, the guidance -- difference between guidance and regulation, and I think, as DHS has indicated, as GAO has indicated, as DHS has said in other occasions, they are putting together some more specific directives, some more specific guidance material for their inspectors.

I think this is one area where actually a checklist would be helpful in terms of understanding what an inspection should do, what we should look for, the level and detail an inspection should occur, site to site, region to region, regardless of the particular nuances of the facility. There are some basic things that should occur every time.

2871	Mr. Harper. Thanks, Mr. Roberts.
2872	Mr. Conrad, if I may ask you I know we've had some
2873	that would argue that information from CFATS-regulated
2874	facilities is not available to people who should know it.
2875	What would be your response to that?
2876	Mr. Conrad. I would say that if that's true it's
2877	because the systems we have in place to make that happen
2878	aren't working. There is a statute, the EPCRA the
2879	Environmental the Emergency Planning and Community Right
2880	to Know Act that originated in this committee whose sole
2881	focus is to make sure that state and local emergency planning
2882	bodies and fire departments are provided with all the
2883	information that they need to plan for emergencies of
2884	whatever sort natural as well as security related and
2885	to be able to respond to them, and the statute is just
2886	couldn't be clearer that, for example, those facilities shall
2887	promptly provide information necessary for developing and
2888	implementing the emergency plan.
2889	So it's not qualified, and it requires submission of
2890	lists of safety data sheets or the safety data sheets
2891	themselves, inventories of chemicals, or, upon request, the
2892	maximum and average amounts of a chemical on the site, where

2893 it's stored, how it's stored, and that information, in turn, 2894 can be made available to the public. 2895 And specifically with respect to fire departments, it says that the owner or operator with the facility shall allow 2896 2897 the fire department to conduct an on-site inspection of the facility and shall provide to the fire department specific 2898 2899 location information on hazardous chemicals at the facility. 2900 So we think the statute is sound. It may well be 2901 appropriate for this committee to conduct oversight on why it 2902 is the LEPAS perform less -- more or less well in certain 2903 But it certainly -- the CFATS program doesn't 2904 restrict any of that. 2905 To the contrary, the statute that you all passed four 2906 years ago expressly preserves all those sorts of information 2907 disclosure statutes from any effect by a result of the CFATS 2908 program. 2909 In fact, the guidance -- this is the CVI guidance from 2910 DHS from the Bush administration, no less, state -- note, 2911 state, local, and tribal officials including first responders 2912 must have access to any information that is necessary to plan for and respond to an emergency event at a chemical facility. 2913 2914 It's equally important that this information is

2915	available in a form that is readily accessible and easily
2916	disseminated. In most cases, a facility can provide this
2917	information that contains all necessary operational and
2918	facility-specific information and excludes CVI.
2919	But then, as Mr. Wulf said, there's a way for sharing
2920	CVI, too. So the systems that the legal system, I think,
2921	is sound. It's just a question of whether it's really
2922	working well.
2923	Mr. Harper. Thank you very much, Mr. Conrad.
2924	The chair will now recognize the gentleman from New
2925	York, Mr. Tonko, the ranking member of the subcommittee.
2926	Mr. Tonko.
2927	Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
2928	I believe we must acknowledge that the CFATS program is
2929	not comprehensive and that security gaps do indeed exist.
2930	Director Currie, can you give us a sense of the quality
2931	of information given to first responders near CFATS
2932	facilities?
2933	Mr. Currie. Yes, sir.
2934	So actually in our ongoing review that we'll issue a
2935	report on next month we are looking at that very issue and it
2936	relates to what Mr. Conrad is saying.

2937	He's right that there's never been an assessment of the
2938	process itself under CFATS for how well they're coordinating
2939	with the local emergency planning committees and what they're
2940	providing.
2941	That's exactly what we are looking at. We are digging
2942	into that process to figure out how they're coordinating with
2943	those committees and what information specifically those
2944	committees and first responders are actually getting.
2945	And so, you know, we'll report on that next month.
2946	Mr. Tonko. You will share that with this committee?
2947	Mr. Currie. Yes, sir.
2948	Mr. Tonko. The subcommittee, please.
2948 2949	Mr. Tonko. The subcommittee, please. Have they always had all the information in preparation
2949	Have they always had all the information in preparation
2949 2950	Have they always had all the information in preparation necessary to respond to incidents at these facilities?
294929502951	Have they always had all the information in preparation necessary to respond to incidents at these facilities? Mr. Currie. Well, I think one of the things we are
2949295029512952	Have they always had all the information in preparation necessary to respond to incidents at these facilities? Mr. Currie. Well, I think one of the things we are looking at, as we've talked about today, you know, the CFATS
29492950295129522953	Have they always had all the information in preparation necessary to respond to incidents at these facilities? Mr. Currie. Well, I think one of the things we are looking at, as we've talked about today, you know, the CFATS program has only been around 10 years and some of these other
294929502951295229532954	Have they always had all the information in preparation necessary to respond to incidents at these facilities? Mr. Currie. Well, I think one of the things we are looking at, as we've talked about today, you know, the CFATS program has only been around 10 years and some of these other programs have been around much longer.
2949 2950 2951 2952 2953 2954 2955	Have they always had all the information in preparation necessary to respond to incidents at these facilities? Mr. Currie. Well, I think one of the things we are looking at, as we've talked about today, you know, the CFATS program has only been around 10 years and some of these other programs have been around much longer. So, you know, in the early stages of the program that

Nobody's really looked at it, and so that's why we are

2333	time. Nobody 5 leally looked at it, and 50 that 5 why we are
2960	taking a look at it.
2961	It's an extremely important issue. I mean, these are
2962	life and death situations and it's important they have the
2963	information they need to respond.
2964	Mr. Tonko. Thank you. If first responders do not have
2965	all the necessary information, it makes those security gaps
2966	even worse.
2967	Dr. Wilson, what is your sense on some of the security
2968	gaps in the CFATS program? Do you have any thoughts on the
2969	exemptions that exist in the program?
2970	Mr. Wilson. Sure. I think with regard to exemptions,
2971	we heard earlier around waste water waste treatment
2972	nuclear and maritime, and I think it's worth assessing
2973	whether and to what extent security is an element of the
2974	safety programs in those in those sectors.
2975	And the reason I say that is that in practice, I think
2976	there's a cultural and operational divide between safety
2977	engineering and security provisions and yet security and
2978	engineering are interrelated.
2979	So good engineering design drives down both safety and
2980	security risks but security is often missing from engineering

2959

time.

2981	practice.
2982	So last month, the American Institute of Chemical
2983	Engineers sorry had its conference with a keynote
2984	address by the FBI, and the reason for that appearance by FBI
2985	was to encourage engineers to include security in their scope
2986	of practice rather than relegating it, in a way, to
2987	traditional barriers, monitoring, and response approaches.
2988	And so I think it would be worth evaluating if these
2989	exempted sectors are meeting the CFATS 18 performance
2990	standards and if they're effectively integrating security
2991	into engineering practice.
2992	Mr. Tonko. So, from that, I can assume that first
2993	responders often that they may not know exactly what is at
2994	a facility before having to respond to the incident?
2995	Mr. Wilson. It's a I would say it's a perennial
2996	problem. Despite the requirements of the Emergency Planning
2997	Community Right to Know Act, there are gaps in information,
2998	in particular in transmitting information to first
2999	responders.
3000	One of the problems with the local emergency planning
3001	committee structure is that the members of those committees
3002	are serving voluntarily and yet there is a lot asked of those

3003	members.
3004	I served as the state's representative the state
3005	Department of Industrial Relations representative to our
3006	state emergency response committee in California and saw
3007	firsthand the difficulty that those members of the local
3008	committees the challenges that they carried in trying to
3009	implement the requirements of a EPCRA and transmitting
3010	information effectively and so forth.
3011	Mr. Tonko. I have concerns with EPA's recent decisions
3012	around the RMP rule. Can you discuss some of the provisions
3013	that were delayed and what would be rolled back from the
3014	latest RMP proposal?
3015	Mr. Wilson. There are 10 provisions having to do with
3016	incident prevention that are being proposed for removal from
3017	the program, and we could go through and catalog each of
3018	those.
3019	They, I think, are the I think are the most
3020	fundamental and most sort of protective aspects of the RMP
3021	that have been that have been proposed.
3022	And as I said earlier, one of the reasons I am very
3023	concerned about that is because of the fact that prevention
3024	elements provide protection against multiple threats, and

3025	we've heard from many members today about not only the threat
3026	of an intentional attack against a facility but the very real
3027	threat of a natural disaster, of an earthquake as we are
3028	in California of a mechanical failure, and we heard of
3029	power outage and so forth.
3030	And so prevention elements or prevention requirements
3031	drive down that risk footprint in the face of all of those
3032	threats. Those are proposed to be thoroughly removed under
3033	the RMP proposal that we are hearing from the administration.
3034	Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Dr. Wilson.
3035	With that, I yield back.
3036	Mr. Harper. The gentleman yields back.
3037	The chair will now recognize the gentleman from Texas,
3038	Mr. Green, for five minutes.
3039	Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
3040	our panel for being here today.
3041	As I said earlier in our first witness, CFATS was
3042	created because of what happened in West Texas. But as we
3043	found out that and I think the last thing I heard that
3044	that was arson and still being investigated but our real
3045	challenge is from natural disasters, like you just said
3046	earthquakes in California, hurricanes and tropical storms in

3047	the Gulf of Mexico. That's what I would like to focus more
3048	on and see how we can correct it.
3049	The I have a district in East Harris County, and Ms.
3050	Arellano is very correct Manchester has a chemical plant
3051	on the west side, a thank farm on the north side before the
3052	Houston ship channel, and a refinery to the east side, and on
3053	the south they're covered by railroad tracks.
3054	And that's where Houston literally started back in the
3055	1830s and 1840s. The Manchester area was actually called
3056	Harrisburg before there was a city of Houston.
3057	And so we see a lot of these challenges in urban areas
3058	where industry is literally right next door to people who
3059	have lived there and it's in Manchester for 50 years. I know
3060	two generations at least in that community.
3061	One of the concerns I had was that during our Hurricane
3062	Harvey and I guess I should understand that when it was
3063	coming in, our air monitors were shut down.
3064	I've been told that I have probably the most air
3065	monitored district in the country because we have EPA. We
3066	have the city of Houston there they have jurisdiction. We
3067	have the county of Harris with a pollution control agency
3068	and, of course, the state of Texas, and it's not just the air

3069 monitors but the other issue is that most of the rising water 3070 was literally on the bottom of those plants and refineries 3071 and chemical plants because of the 55 inches of rain in four 3072 days -- how can you do it? The other problem, though -- and I hope the industry is 3073 3074 listening because we've talked about it -- is that we have 3075 huge tanks that hold product, either crude oil or refined 3076 product, and the way they're filled up is that they have 3077 floating roofs. 3078 The problem is when you get that much water on that 3079 roof, those rooves actually turn and you end up -- whatever the emissions come from that, but it also can overflow 3080 3081 because of the heavy rain. 3082 So we've got a lot of challenges in our area and to keep 3083 working with it, but we used to have community groups, and I hardly hear about them anymore -- Manchester, Pasadena, Bay 3084 3085 Town -- the community groups, and I would go to those 3086 meetings sometimes and the industry would come in and sit down with their neighbors along the fence line, and I am not 3087 3088 so sure those are still going. Is that -- is that still active in other parts of the country and maybe not in our 3089

area?

3090

3091	Mr. Wilson. Is that is that question to me?
3092	Mr. Green. Yes.
3093	Mr. Wilson. I am not aware of those kinds of meetings
3094	taking place and but I, you know, absolutely, you know,
3095	agree with your characterization of the problem.
3096	One of the things that California has done in its
3097	refinery safety regulations has required companies to look at
3098	inherently safer technologies wherever feasible and it has
3099	also required, and I think in the example that you have just
3100	given, risk management strategies that require redundancy and
3101	independence of safeguards to prevent a cascade of failures
3102	so, for example, in the event of a power failure, losing
3103	safeguards, one after the other.
3104	And, you know, of course, you know, California is the
3105	third largest refining state and is, you know, producing jet
3106	fuel and gasoline. It's inherently hazardous, and so we felt
3107	it was important to be very clear about the importance of
3108	introducing and requiring, actually, independence and
3109	Mr. Green. Let me I only have 26 seconds.
3110	Mr. Wilson. Sorry.
3111	Mr. Green. And I agree, because even with the Arkema
3112	problem wasn't in our district but the redundancies

3113	weren't there. In fact, our Harris County district attorney
3114	has launched an investigation into that plant and see why it
3115	didn't.
3116	Ms. Arellano, in your testimony, you talked a lot about
3117	how communities like ours in Houston face additional
3118	challenges during natural disasters due to their proximity to
3119	these plants.
3120	What recommendations would you do for industry to
3121	improve their relationship with community groups and civic
3122	clubs, because I know I visit Manchester civic club as
3123	often as I can and, typically, one of our refinery staff is
3124	there to answer questions.
3125	What would what are some of the suggestions TEJAS
3126	would tell us that we could do and inform people in the
3127	neighborhood but also, you know, just how we can do this
3128	better?
3129	Because those refineries and chemical plants are
3130	probably not going to move because they've been there for 50
3131	years.
3132	Ms. Arellano. These industry partners, they do come out
3133	to the civic associations. But they talk about scholarships.
3134	They talk about fire, indoor air pollutants. They'll hand

3135	out fire detectors.
3136	But they won't talk about the latest expansion. They
3137	won't talk about a permit notice they had out like the one
3138	they have out that would increase hydrogen cyanide from 52
3139	tons to 512 tons.
3140	They'll go ahead and they'll speak about a backpack
3141	giveaway event but not give any real information. So I would
3142	say having true and real information going between industry
3143	partners and neighboring communities is vital to this
3144	process.
3145	The other thing that I would like people to consider is
3146	a cumulative analysis of the TCQ is supposed to have some
3147	sort of cumulative analysis program.
3148	It's important for us to know exactly the impacts of all
3149	the neighbors. Just like you said, there is Contanda
3150	Chemical, it's 87 CO carbon storage tanks with a capacity of
3151	a thousand to 74,000 barrels of chemical product.
3152	At Valero Refining, it has 164,000 barrels per calendar
3153	day of refining, and then the sulfuric acid plant that's Eco
3154	Services, original Rhodia.
3155	So it's important for us to know the impacts of all of
3156	these aggregated together. RMP facilities have, you know,

3157 these radiuses. 3158 But we are not accounting for the toxic impacts on the 3159 communities, and adding all that information, to not say that 3160 four facilities are exposing the community to 10 cancer-3161 causing substances but instead saying this community is exposed to 40, and taking into account that all of them have 3162 3163 safety hazards and all of them have chemical releases, they 3164 all are exposed to fires and incidences whether it is --3165 people keep talking about these terrorist attacks but the 3166 communities are exposed to daily toxics. 3167 They're exposed -- they're more frequently exposed to fires from chemical releases and fugitive emissions than they 3168 3169 are a terror attack. 3170 So I would hope that this committee considers these 3171 everyday problems with community members in the decision to 3172 keep going forward and give people the opportunity to make 3173 their own decisions -- safe ones for them and their families. 3174 Mr. Harper. The gentleman's time has expired. 3175 Seeing that there are no further members wishing to ask 3176 questions, I want to thank each of you for being here today and for the knowledge and information that you have shared 3177 with us. It's very, very helpful. 3178

3179	Before we conclude, I would like to ask for unanimous
3180	consent to submit the following document for the record a
3181	letter from the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
3182	Coalition.
3183	Without objection, so ordered.
3184	[The information follows:]
3185	
3186	**************************************

3187	Mr. Harper. And pursuant to committee rules, I remind
3188	members that they have 10 business days to submit additional
3189	questions for the record, and should you get any of those
3190	questions I would ask that you submit your responses within
3191	10 days 10 business days from the receipt of such
3192	questions.
3193	Without objection, the subcommittee is adjourned.
3194	[Whereupon, at 12:44 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]