

Attachment 1—Additional Questions for the Record

The Honorable Neal Dunn

1. A July 2019 Inspector General’s report found that the Department of Defense continues to buy tens of millions of dollars in Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) technologies with known cybersecurity risks such as Lenovo computers, Lexmark printers, and GoPro cameras. What is the U.S. government doing to close loopholes that Lenovo and other IT firms in which the Chinese government has an ownership stake can exploit to sell its equipment to the U.S. military and other federal government departments and agencies?
2. Although the State Department, Department of Defense, and several intelligence agencies have banned the purchase of computers and printers from companies in which the Chinese government has an ownership stake, these procurement guidelines are not standard. What steps in the Administration taking to close these widespread critical cybersecurity vulnerabilities across the federal government?
3. The computing division of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) was added to the U.S. government’s Entity List in December 2022. Why does the U.S. government continue to allow federal departments and agencies to purchase computers from other firms that CAS owns? Why should a known security threat like Lenovo, in which CAS has a significant ownership stake that it tries to hide through subsidiary entities, be allowed to sell equipment to the U.S. federal government?
4. Which allies and partners should the US be working with to help diversify supply chains away from China?
5. You have commented in the past about the potential for creating a network of trusted trading partners. You propose that to do so, we must lower trade barriers to help create a resilient and reliable allied supply chain. Can you discuss this issue and why it has merit?

Responses from Marc Jarsulic

Responses to these five questions, in the order presented:

1. This question could best be answered by appropriate U.S. government agencies.
2. This question could best be answered by appropriate U.S. government agencies.
3. This question could best be answered by appropriate U.S. government agencies.
4. This question could best be answered by appropriate U.S. government agencies.
5. Trade policies should put the interests of U.S. workers front and center. An outline of this approach can be found in “Trump’s Trade Deal and the Road Not Taken”, available

at <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trumps-trade-deal-road-not-taken/>. That paper explains that a worker-centered trade policy would include several elements, among them strong, detailed standards and meaningful enforcement for meaningful labor and the environment rules; trade-related tools to address the threat of climate change; and greater ability for U.S. businesses and farmers to distinguish their products, whether for consumer right-to-know, climate-labeling, or other purposes, from import competition. In addition, such a trade regime would avoid the inclusion of harmful elements, such as allowing companies to override needed domestic regulation through investor-state dispute mechanisms, or the inclusion of limitations to effective competition policy.