

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS  
**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
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WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115  
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June 1, 2018

Ms. Samm Sacks  
Senior Fellow  
Technology Policy Program  
Center for Strategic and International Studies  
1616 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Ms. Sacks:

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology on Wednesday, May 16, 2018, to testify at the hearing entitled "Telecommunications, Global Competitiveness, and National Security."

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record remains open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions for the record, which are attached. To facilitate the printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions with a transmittal letter by the close of business on Friday, June 15, 2018. Your responses should be mailed to Evan Viau, Legislative Clerk, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2125 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515 and e-mailed to [Evan.Viau@mail.house.gov](mailto:Evan.Viau@mail.house.gov).

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the Subcommittee.

Sincerely,



Marsha Blackburn  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology

cc: The Honorable Michael F. Doyle, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Communications and Technology

Attachment

## Attachment—Additional Questions for the Record

### The Honorable Marsha Blackburn

1. China and other competitors have explicitly stated their desire to dominate specific nodes in the supply chain. Given the global nature of the supply chain for information and communication technology, what is our risk?
  - a. If our competitors were to capture critical nodes in the supply chain, either through market share or through technical prowess, what recourse do we have?
2. It seems that the trusted vendor pool is shrinking each year. If this pace continues, we could find ourselves with only one trusted vendor providing communications infrastructure in the U.S. How can government and industry promote competition and longevity for trusted vendors in the market?
3. As you note in your work, China uses a command and control approach to orchestrate their national strategies on the supply chain for information technology, emerging technologies, and R&D. The U.S. does not take such an approach; rather, we rely on market-based mechanisms. Can you elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages of command and control, and how the U.S. can leverage the strengths of its market-based approach?

### The Honorable Mimi Walters

1. DHS, as the Sector Specific Agency for Telecom, is looking into both supply chain risks—including 5G and systemic risks more broadly. The FCC's CSRIC is also looking into supply chain risks related to 5G. The FCC CSRIC Report is due in September, and the DHS effort may conclude some time later before the end of the year. How do we avoid duplicative or potentially conflicting recommendations from all of these parallel efforts?
  - a. Should we vest decision-making at one agency?

### The Honorable Tim Walberg

1. When talking about our domestic manufacturing capability, we're also talking about our ability to identify emerging technologies and bring them to commercialization for both U.S. and global markets.

My colleagues have expressed the need for a national strategy that addresses threats to our telecommunications networks, to competition in the supply chain, and to national security. Can you elaborate on how human capital – having a technically trained

workforce capable of competing on advanced research and development – plays into such a national strategy?

- a. What can Congress do to lead on this piece of the puzzle?

**The Honorable Anna G. Eshoo**

1. During my questioning, I asked if anyone had done an analysis on the trusted supply chain to determine whether it is viable for our country to eliminate our dependence on foreign adversarial companies like Huawei and ZTE. You told me it had not, but you would follow up.
  - a. Have you or anyone begun to conduct such an assessment?
  - b. If not, are you willing to do so?
2. Did you agree with the Department of Commerce's decision to implement a seven-year ban on ZTE?
  - a. If so, should the Department and other U.S. officials investigate whether similar bans are appropriate for other Chinese entities, as Senator Rubio has suggested?
  - b. Should the Administration continue to indulge ZTE and other companies in 'deals' when we know outright that the company has repeatedly undermined our laws?
3. What is the potential for harm to our national security by having foreign adversaries involved in business with U.S. small businesses and start-ups?