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6	DOE MODERNIZATION: LEGISLATION ADDRESSING
7	CYBERSECURITY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
8	Wednesday, March 14, 2018
9	House of Representatives
10	Subcommittee on Energy
11	Committee on Energy and Commerce
12	Washington, D.C.
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16	The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m.,
17	in Room 2322 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton
18	[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
19	Members present: Representatives Upton, Olson, Barton,
20	Shimkus, Latta, Harper, McKinley, Kinzinger, Griffith,
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
21	Johnson, Long, Bucshon, Mullin, Hudson, Walberg, Duncan,

23	Sarbanes, Welch, Tonko, Loebsack, Butterfield, and Pallone
24	(ex officio).
25	Staff present: Mike Bloomquist, Deputy Staff Director;
26	Daniel Butler, Staff Assistant; Kelly Collins, Legislative
27	Clerk, Energy/Environment; Jordan Davis, Director of Policy
28	and External Affairs; Wyatt Ellertson, Professional Staff,
29	Energy/Environment; Margaret Tucker Fogarty, Staff Assistant;
30	Adam Fromm, Director of Outreach and Coalitions; Jordan
31	Haverly, Policy Coordinator, Environment; Ben Lieberman,
32	Senior Counsel, Energy; Mary Martin, Chief Counsel,
33	Energy/Environment; Drew McDowell, Executive Assistant;
34	Brandon Mooney, Deputy Chief Counsel, Energy; Mark Ratner,
35	Policy Coordinator; Annelise Rickert, Counsel, Energy; Dan
36	Schneider, Press Secretary; Peter Spencer, Professional Staff
37	Member, Energy; Jason Stanek, Senior Counsel, Energy; Austin
38	Stonebraker, Press Assistant; Madeline Vey, Policy
39	Coordinator, Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection; Hamlin
40	Wade, Special Advisor, External Affairs; Everett Winnick,
41	Director of Information Technology; Priscilla Barbour,
42	Minority Energy Fellow; Jeff Carroll, Minority Staff
43	Director; Jean Fruci, Minority Energy and Environment Policy
44	Advisor; Tiffany Guarascio, Minority Deputy Staff Director

45	and Chief Health Advisor; Rick Kessler, Minority Senior
46	Advisor and Staff Director, Energy and Environment; John
47	Marshall, Minority Policy Coordinator; Alexander Ratner,
48	Minority Policy Analyst; and C.J. Young, Minority Press
49	Secretary.

50 Good morning. Good morning. So, this DOE 51 modernization hearing is going to focus on the proposed 52 legislation relating to core energy security missions of the 53 Department. 54 This mission is to ensure the supply and delivery of 55 energy that is vital to our economic and national security, 56 our public welfare, and health. 57 For the last two Congresses we have been working to update the Department's authorities and capabilities both to 58 mitigate against and respond to energy supply emergencies, 59 60 especially with respect to critical energy infrastructure and to cybersecurity. 61 62 For example, we directed the Department to modernize its strategic petroleum reserve and response capabilities. 63 64 clarified and enhanced DOE's role as the sector-specific 65 agency for the energy sector, especially for critical 66 electric infrastructure. 67 We moved through the House H.R. 3050 last summer to strengthen DOE's support for state energy emergency offices 68 69 in their cybersecurity efforts and the common theme has been 70 to update DOE's cybersecurity and emergency coordinating 71 functions and provisions of technical assistance to other

72 agencies, states, and asset owners. 73 So in keeping with these modernization efforts, the 74 legislation today continues that work. H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act, introduced by Mr. Walberg and 75 76 Ranking Member Rush, elevates the role in DOE and specifies 77 certain emergency and preparedness functions to ensure full attention to the risks of cybersecurity and other threats to 78 the energy sector. 79 Given the reliance on energy in modern society, ensuring 80 that supply has become of such surpassing importance that we 81 82 have to be able to make sure that the agency has sufficient leadership focus to meet its responsibilities. 83 84 Similarly, H.R. 5175, the Pipeline and LNG Facility Cybersecurity Preparedness Act, which I introduced along with 85 86 Mr. Loebsack would enhance DOE's ability to coordinate the interconnected systems of energy delivery and supply which 87 88 includes ensuring the security of digital systems in pipeline 89 and grid operations. Although several governmental authorities play a role, 90 91 DOE has got to have the adequate visibility across the energy 92 sector to ensure the federal, state, and asset owners are 93 sufficiently prepared and coordinated and to efficiently

94	deploy where needed its world class technological
95	capabilities.
96	This bill certainly aims to assure that it can be done.
97	Both H.R. 5239, the Cyber Sense Act of 2018, and H.R. 5240,
98	the Enhancing Grid Security Through Public-Private
99	Partnership Act, have been introduced by Mr. Latta and Mr.
100	McNerney, two leaders on grid innovation.
101	The Cyber Sense bill, a version of which passed the
102	House as part of H.R. 8 back in 2016, seeks to establish a
103	voluntary DOE program that would permit cybersecure products
104	intended for use in the bulk power system.
105	And the Enhancing Grid Security Act bill seeks to
106	facilitate and encourage public-private partnerships aimed at
107	strengthening the physical and cybersecurity electric
108	utilities, especially mid-size and small utilities which may
109	not have met the resources to identify and address
110	cybersecurity vulnerabilities and system risks.
111	Two panels of witnesses this morning are going to
112	provide their perspective on these bills and discuss what
113	other measures may be helpful to ensure DOE can fulfil its
114	energy security and emergency missions.
115	I want to welcome back Undersecretary of Energy Mark

116	Menezes, who returns from his appearance in January. I look
117	forward to his comments and to talk about his own plans to
118	elevate DOE's leadership in emergency response.
119	He's accompanied by Pat Hoffman, principal deputy
120	assistant secretary in the Office of Electricity, who can
121	provide technical perspective from her experience addressing
122	cybersecurity and energy emergency functions.
123	Our second panel will feature a range of energy security
124	and emergency perspectives. One witness from DOE's Idaho
125	National Lab will help us understand federal capabilities to
126	support cybersecurity in the energy sector.
127	We are going to hear from the state of Indiana's
128	Emergency Response Authority from Dominion Energy on pipeline
129	security from EEI on electric cybersecurity and from the
130	National Electrical Manufacturers Association to talk about
131	cybersecurity of grid components.
132	We welcome you all and with that I would yield to the
133	ranking member of the subcommittee, my friend, Mr. Rush.
134	[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]
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137		[The	Bills	H.R.	5174,	H.R.	5175,	H.R.	5239,	and	H.R.
138	5240	follo	ow; }								
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141	Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
142	holding this important hearing today on legislation
143	addressing cybersecurity and emergency response.
144	Mr. Chairman, I support the four bills before us and I
145	want to specifically and respectfully acknowledge Mr. Walberg
146	of Michigan who worked with my office on the Energy Emergency
147	Leadership Act.
148	This bill will establish a new DOE assistant secretary
149	position with jurisdiction over all energy emergency and
150	security functions related to energy supply, infrastructure,
151	and cybersecurity.
152	Mr. Chairman, while cybersecurity is an important issue,
153	I would be remiss if I did not point out that today at this
154	very same time students have declared this as National Walk-
155	Out Day.
156	And as we speak, Mr. Chairman, students from across the
157	country are leaving their classrooms to honor the lives of
158	the 17 people killed at Stoneman Douglas High School last
159	month and to press policy makers to pass common sense gun
160	control laws.
161	Mr. Chairman, cybersecurity is a serious issue that must
162	be addressed. However, nothing can be more urgent than

163 answering the cries and the pleas emanating from our nation's 164 youth -- students who have had enough of being scared and 165 anxious and frustrated by the lack of leadership coming from 166 both the administration and this Congress on the issue of gun 167 violence. 168 Mr. Chairman, as policy makers, as parents, as 169 grandparents, as adults, and as leaders we are failing our 170 youth by letting politics and influential interest groups 171 come before our most sacred responsibility, and that is 172 protecting our children. 173 Mr. Chairman, every single Democrat on the four Energy 174 and Commerce committees sent a letter to Chairman Walden on 175 March 7th urging him to hold hearings as soon as possible to 176 address gun violence in America. 177 That followed a February 16th letter also signed by all 24 Democrats on the full committee to Chairman Walden and 178 Health Subcommittee Chairman Burgess urging the Republican 179 180 leadership to hold a hearing as soon as possible on federal investment in gun violence prevention research. 181 182 Mr. Chairman, we owe it to our children at the very 183 least to examine this problem in a serious and thoughtful 184 manner and I can assure you that this issue will come up

185	again and again, regardless of the planned topic of
186	discussion until we hold a hearing.
187	With that, I yield the remainder of my time to my friend
188	and colleague from California, Mr. McNerney.
189	Mr. McNerney. Well, I thank the ranking member for
190	yielding and the chairman for holding this hearing.
191	Today, we will examine several legislative proposals
192	concerning our nation's grid security. As co-chairs of the
193	Grid Innovation Caucus, Bob Latta and I are focused on
194	providing a forum that advocates for grid investments and
195	examines the risks and opportunities with our grid.
196	Our work, through the Grid Caucus, has led to the
197	introduction of two bills we will discussing today. H.R.
198	5239, the Cyber Sense Act of 2018 would create a program to
199	identify cybersecure products for the bulk power grid system
200	through testing and verification.
201	The bulk power system is the backbone of American
202	industry and provides all the benefits of reliable electric
203	power to the American people. It's essential that we make
204	this system as secure as possible as cyberattacks pose a
205	serious threat to our electric grid.
206	Any vulnerable components of our grid is a threat to our

207	security and this bill will go a long way to strengthen our
208	system. Mr. Latta and I are also co-leads of H.R. 5240, the
209	Enhancing Grid Security Through Public-Private Partnerships
210	Act.
211	This bill will create a program to enhance the physical
212	and cybersecurity of electric utilities through assessing
213	security vulnerabilities, increase cybersecurity training,
214	and data collection.
215	It will also require the interruption cost estimate
216	calculator, which is used to calculate the return on
217	investment on utility investments, to be updated at least
218	every two years to ensure accurate calculations.
219	These two bipartisan bills, along with the other bills
220	we have before us today, will help put us on the path to
221	better securing our electric utility system.
222	I welcome the panelists and look forward to hearing
223	their insights on the useful of our legislation and how it
224	may be improved.
225	Thank you. I yield back.
226	Mr. Upton. Gentleman's time is expired.
227	The chair will recognize the chairman of the full
228	committee, the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Walden.

229	Chairman Walden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
230	I want to thank my colleague from California for his
231	good work on these issues. This is really important stuff
232	for our country and those of us who have been briefed up on
233	it know the importance of the work that's going on in our
234	agencies and the security issues that are really before us.
235	Today's hearing examines legislation addressing
236	cybersecurity and emergency response. It will help us
237	respond to some of the most urgent challenges the
238	reliability of our nation's energy infrastructure.
239	Because our energy infrastructure drives the entire
240	nation's economy, I've made it a top priority for this
241	committee to focus on emerging threats and proposed solutions
242	to make our infrastructure more resilient.
243	We are looking ahead to make sure we are doing
244	everything we can to protect our electric grid and our oil
245	and natural gas infrastructure as well and improve our
246	ability to respond when the unexpected happens.
247	Because nearly all of our nation's energy infrastructure
248	is privately owned and operated, the federal government needs
249	to work closely with representatives of the energy sector and
250	the companies in the supply chain that manufacture equipment

251	and technologies.
252	In today's highly interconnected world, the threat of
253	cyberattacks is ever present. So we have to be vigilant. We
254	must also be prepared for physical threats whether they be
255	sabotage or natural disasters like the hurricanes we
256	experienced last year.
257	As the sector-specific agency for energy, the Department
258	of Energy has a very important coordinating role to play and
259	this function was on display earlier this year in response to
260	Hurricanes Nate, Maria, Irma, and Harvey.
261	Many of us followed DOE's situation reports on the
262	storms' impacts and the energy industry's recovery and
263	restoration activities.
264	The Department of Energy's emergency responders in the
265	field provided critical subject matter expertise and assisted
266	with waivers and special permits to aid restoration.
267	To prevent a major fuel supply emergency, the Department
268	of Energy's strategic petroleum reserve provided much-needed
269	oil to refiners. The DOE also analyzed electricity supply to
270	determine whether it needed to draw on its Federal Power Act
271	authorities to secure the energy grid.
272	So today's hearing will examine four bipartisan bills

273 designed to improve DOE's energy security and emergency 274 response authorities. I want to thank all our members for 275 working across the aisle on these important issues. 276 I join Chairman Upton in welcoming back Undersecretary 277 of State -- Undersecretary of Energy, I guess, noted in 278 tweets this morning -- Undersecretary of Energy Mark Menezes 279 to our panel. I look forward to your comments on the 280 Department of Energy's security priorities and its views on the legislation. 281 282 I also want to welcome the witnesses appearing on the 283 second panel where we will hear a range of perspectives from 284 state government, the energy industry, and supply chain 285 manufacturers. 286 We are also joined by a witness from DOE's Idaho 287 I was there on Monday. Very much appreciated National Lab. 288 the briefings including the classified ones and so I am very impressed by the work that goes on at INL and our country 289 290 should be very proud of the incredible men and women and the work they do there in every regard. 291 292 I also know that -- saw the unique capabilities to test 293 system wide cybersecurity applications on a full scale 294 electric grid loop.

295	INL is one of 17 DOE national labs tackling the critical
296	scientific challenges of our time and the threats that come
297	our way and I want to thank INL leadership and staff for
298	sharing their research and expertise with the committee.
299	This subcommittee has held dozens of hearings on energy
300	infrastructure and produced several bipartisan bills to
301	improve the resilience and reliability of our nation's energy
302	delivery system and these bills will ultimately make our
303	nation more energy secure, reduce the cost of fuels and
304	electricity for consumers.
305	So at the end of the day, if we focus on what's best for
306	consumers we will continue to make good public policy
307	decisions.
308	With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
309	time and thank our witnesses for their participation.
310	[The prepared statement of Chairman Walden follows:]
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313	Mr. Upton. Gentleman yields back.
314	The chair recognizes the ranking member of the full
315	committee, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pallone.
316	Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
317	Today's hearing revolves around a quartet of bipartisan
318	bills designed to enhance the security of our nation's energy
319	infrastructure. However, before we get to cybersecurity, I'd
320	like to talk for a minute about the security of our nation's
321	children.
322	Today, one month has passed since the tragic shootings
323	at Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School that took the lives
324	of 17 children and educators, and as we sit here students all
325	across the nation have just completed a 17-minute walkout in
326	memory of those killed in that attack as well as to protest
327	this body's refusal to take action on the gun violence
328	epidemic.
329	Students and their families are justifiably frustrated
330	with the inaction here in Washington. They are sick and
331	tired of a president who says one thing in front of the
332	cameras and then works behind the scenes to push the NRA
333	agenda as soon as he thinks the cameras are focused somewhere
334	else.

335	And they are also sick and tired of a Republican
336	leadership in Congress that won't move forward on any common
337	sense legislation, some of which has strong bipartisan
338	support.
339	Americans have legitimate questions about the ever-
340	increasing capacity of guns to kill in large numbers and the
341	ease with which people who are in danger to themselves and
342	others can obtain them in the marketplace and those questions
343	at least deserve to be explored through hearings in this
344	committee.
345	Every Democrat on this committee has asked in two
346	separate letters to the chairman for a series of five
347	hearings on the gun violence epidemic.
348	We have not received a response and no hearings have yet
349	to be scheduled. So I hope that the chairman and my
350	Republican colleagues will finally see the need to schedule
351	the five hearings we requested.
352	We don't expect them to necessarily agree with us or
353	those participating in today's walkout on all the solutions
354	to the gun violence epidemic.
355	However, we do hope that they will finally acknowledge
356	the legitimate need to explore the questions we are asking

357	and for this committee to take action.
358	And now, with regard to cybersecurity, I appreciate the
359	majority taking these small but important bipartisan steps to
360	enhance the Department of Energy's authorities with regard to
361	our nation's energy infrastructure.
362	These four bills build upon the good work done by this
363	committee and the FAST Act under Chairman Upton's leadership.
364	I think it makes sense from both the security and business
365	standpoint to have the department with the best knowledge of
366	the energy industry taking the primary role in coordinating
367	efforts to prevent and respond to cyberattacks on these
368	facilities.
369	In general, I am supportive of each of these bills.
369 370	In general, I am supportive of each of these bills. H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act sponsored by
370	H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act sponsored by
370 371	H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act sponsored by Representative Walberg and Ranking Member Rush, would create
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370371372373	H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act sponsored by Representative Walberg and Ranking Member Rush, would create a new DOE assistant secretary position with jurisdiction over all energy emergency and security functions related to energy
370 371 372 373 374	H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act sponsored by Representative Walberg and Ranking Member Rush, would create a new DOE assistant secretary position with jurisdiction over all energy emergency and security functions related to energy supply, infrastructure and cybersecurity.
370 371 372 373 374 375	H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act sponsored by Representative Walberg and Ranking Member Rush, would create a new DOE assistant secretary position with jurisdiction over all energy emergency and security functions related to energy supply, infrastructure and cybersecurity. H.R. 5175, the Pipeline and LNG Facilities Cybersecurity

379	program to establish policies and procedures that would
380	improve the physical and cybersecurity of natural gas
381	transmission and distribution pipelines, hazardous liquid
382	pipelines and liquefied natural gas facilities.
383	Representative Latta and McNerney's bill, H.R. 5239, the
384	Cyber Sense Act of 2018, is based on McNerney's language
385	included in the last Congress energy bill.
386	It would require the secretary to establish a voluntary
387	program to identify cybersecure products that can be used in
388	bulk power systems.
389	Mr. McNerney and Mr. Latta also introduced H.R. 5240,
390	the Enhancing Grid Security Through Public-Private
391	Partnership Act, which directs the secretary to create and
392	implement a program to enhance the physical and cybersecurity
393	of electric utilities.
394	In addition to these bills, I also wanted to direct the
395	committee's attention to the LIFT America Act, the
396	infrastructure bill that committee Democrats introduced last
397	year.
398	A number of the bill's provisions would enhance the
399	security and resiliency of the grid through new grant
400	programs and by requiring certain projects receiving DOE

401	assistance including the cybersecurity plan written in
402	accordance with guidelines developed by the secretary.
403	And the bill would also establish a strategic
404	transformer reserve program to reduce electric grid
405	vulnerability to physical and cyberattacks, natural
406	disasters, and climate change, and these are provisions that
407	will better assure the security of our energy infrastructure
408	and I hope this committee will consider them as we move
409	forward.
410	And again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for bringing up these
411	bipartisan bills and I yield back.
412	Mr. Upton. Gentleman yields back, and as I indicated,
413	we are joined for our first panel with the Honorable Mark
414	Menezes, the undersecretary of energy.
415	I would just note for those of us that went on the
416	bipartisan trip to look at the hurricane damage in Puerto
417	Rico, on my local radio website this morning I see that the
418	bridge that we saw that was washed out was rededicated
419	yesterday with the governor and it's opened up.
420	It's been six months. It connects 60 families in a town
421	of about 33,000 folks. So I know we were there for an hour
422	or so back in December. So I just thought I'd give that

423	little update.
424	And with that, Mr. Menezes, welcome back again to the
425	committee. We look forward to your testimony. You know the
426	rules. Thank you in advance for your testimony. We will
427	give you five minutes to sum it up and then we will ask
428	questions from that point.
429	So welcome.

430	STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK MENEZES, UNDERSECRETARY, U.S.
431	DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
432	
433	Mr. Menezes. Thank you, Chairman Upton, Ranking Member
434	Rush, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
435	Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to
436	participate in this legislative hearing to discuss the
437	strategic priorities addressing the cybersecurity threats
438	facing our national energy infrastructure and the Department
439	of Energy's role in protecting these critical assets and
440	responding to emergencies.
441	Maintaining and improving the resilient energy
442	infrastructure is a top priority of the secretary and a major
443	focus of the department. You referred to the written
444	statement. I have submitted a much more comprehensive
445	written statement so my remarks will be limited to just the
446	highlights.
447	To demonstrate our commitment and focus on this mission,
448	the secretary announced last month that he is establishing
449	the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency
450	Response, to be known as CESER.
451	This organizational challenge change will strengthen

452 the department's role as the sector-specific agency or energy 453 sector cybersecurity supporting our national security 454 responsibilities. The creation of CESER office will accomplish several 455 456 goals -- one, build on the programs that we have today; two, 457 elevate the department's focus on energy infrastructure 458 protection and response; three, enable a more coordinated 459 preparedness and response to cyber and physical threats and natural disasters; and most importantly, four, create a 460 structure and an office with an evolving mission to ensure 461 462 sufficient authorities and resources are in place to address 463 present and future threats. 464 The focus of the office will necessarily include electricity delivery, oil and natural gas infrastructure, and 465 466 all forms of generation. 467 The secretary's desire to create dedicated and focused 468 attention on these responsibilities will provide greater 469 visibility, accountability, and flexibility to better protect our nation's energy infrastructure and support its asset 470 471 owners. 472 As more fully explained in my submitted written testimony, DOE works in collaboration with other agencies and 473

474	private sector organizations including the federal
475	government's designated lead agencies for coordinating the
476	response to significant cyber incidents DHS, the FBI, the
477	National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, as well as
478	DOT, PHMSA, U.S. Coast Guard, and FERC and others through the
479	Energy Government Coordinating Council and other coordinating
480	councils.
481	The FAST Act designated DOE as the sector-specific
482	agency for energy sector cybersecurity. Congress enacted
483	several important new energy security measures in the FAST
484	Act as it relates to cybersecurity.
485	The secretary of energy was provided new authority upon
486	declaration of a grid security emergency by the president to
487	issue emergency orders to protect, restore, or defend the
488	reliability of critical electric infrastructure.
489	This authority allows DOE to respond as needed to
490	threats of cyber and physical attacks on the grid, and
491	although the administration does not have a formal position
492	on any of the legislation under discussion today, we are
493	pleased to continue to work with the committee to provide
494	technical assistance.
495	And this morning, I would like to provide the

496	subcommittee with some high-level priorities of the
497	department in the context of the president's fiscal year 2019
498	budget request and which is the subject matter of today's
499	bills.
500	Overall, investing in energy security and resilience
501	from an all-hazards approach is vital, given the natural and
502	manmade threats facing the nation's energy infrastructure,
503	the energy industry, and the supply chain.
504	The fiscal year 2019 request would provide the
505	department an opportunity to invest in early-stage research,
506	network threat detection, cyber incident response teams, and
507	the testing of supply chain components and systems.
508	Beyond providing guidance and technical support to the
509	energy sector, our Office of Electricity supports R&D
510	designed to develop advanced tools and techniques to provide
511	enhanced cyberprotection for key energy systems.
512	OE cybersecurity for energy delivery systems' R&D
513	program is designed to assist energy sector asset owners by
514	developing cybersecurity solutions for our energy
515	infrastructure.
516	OE co-funds projects with industry, our national labs,
517	and university partners to make advances in cybersecurity

518 These research partnerships are helping to 519 detect, prevent, and mitigate consequences of a cyber 520 incident for our present and future energy systems. 521 It's important to emphasize that DOE plays a critical 522 role in supporting the entire energy sector's efforts to 523 enhance the security and resilience of the nation's critical 524 energy infrastructure. 525 To address today's ever increasing and sophisticated challenges, it is critical for us to be leaders and cultivate 526 527 a culture of resilience. 528 We must constantly develop, educate, and train a robust network of producers, distributors, vendors, public partners, 529 530 regulators, policy makers, and stakeholders acting together to strengthen our ability to prepare, to respond, and 531 532 recover. 533 As part of a comprehensive cyber -- energy cybersecurity 534 resilient strategy, the department supports efforts to 535 enhance visibility and situational awareness of operation networks, increase alignment of cyber preparedness and 536 537 planning across local, state, and federal levels and leverage 538 the expertise of DOE's national labs to drive cybersecurity innovation. 539

540	As always, the department appreciates the opportunity to
541	appear before this committee and discuss cybersecurity and
542	emergency response in the energy sector and we applaud your
543	leadership.
544	We look forward to working with you and your respective
545	staffs and continue to address cyber and physical security
546	challenges, and I look forward to your questions.
547	Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Menezes
548	follows:]
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550	*****************

551 Thank you for your testimony and, as you 552 know, we are talking about several bills this morning. 553 We want to make sure that DOE in fact does have the 554 clear authority in the energy sector to be prepared for 555 emergencies, particularly concerning the distribution of oil 556 and gas and electricity, and we welcome your commitment to 557 work with us and the bill's sponsors, as you indicated in 558 your testimony, to provide the technical assistance to make sure that these proposals provide the tools that the agency 559 560 can use. 561 I want to particularly thank, as Chairman Walden indicated in his opening statement, the willingness to work 562 563 with the Idaho National Lab. 564 I know that he had a very productive day out there earlier this week and I will tell members of the -- our 565 566 subcommittee that we are planning to have a classified briefing with them at some point in the near future so that 567 568 we can -- we can know precisely what we have to be ready for and be able to ask questions in a -- in a classified setting. 569 570 We are looking forward to setting that up in the next couple 571 of weeks. 572 Let me just ask if you can help us identify other areas

573	we might be able to clarify and strengthen your authorities
574	to respond to energy supply emergencies, if we can have that
575	commitment again today, and if you want to share any
576	specifics today or certainly down the road where you can help
577	us make sure that the worst doesn't happen and we will put
578	out thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands, maybe even
579	millions of folks without the ability to hook into the needed
580	energy resources for their daily lives.
581	Mr. Menezes. Thank you for the question, Chairman
582	Upton.
583	Indeed, having a robust communications and coordination
584	system with our industry asset owners is critical to do this.
585	We currently serve on a variety of and coordinator subsector
586	coordinating councils.
587	We work closely with industry. We have regular
588	meetings. We coordinate. We make our labs available to
589	those that need it.
590	We train, we practice, and we prepare. We do all that
591	and, to be sure, we work with our sister agencies through the
592	Energy Government Coordinating Council and work really on a
593	daily basis with, as I mentioned, DHS and the other agencies.
594	All of that we are doing today. When the system is

595 stressed when we have the emergencies in Puerto Rico, the art 596 then is to put all that in place and respond in real time and 597 to work with our sister agencies, and I have testified before 598 that the expectations that the DOE has and the technologies that we have and the abilities to mobilize and to react are 599 600 sometimes exceeded by the authorities and the resources that 601 we have. It would be important -- it is important for the 602 603 department with the bills that you have to be clear on the 604 authorities, you know, that we have and if I could say, too, 605 it would be important to ensure that we have the authority to 606 get the resources that we have when we are working with the 607 other committees to ensure that we have the resources. 608 So we thank you for your leadership on that. But clear 609 direction and the resources -- the authorization to have the resources would be very -- would be very helpful. 610 611 Mr. Upton. So DOE works with the Department of Homeland 612 Security, TSA, and other agencies to ensure the protection of pipelines. But these agencies, as we know, certainly have 613 614 other priorities. 615 It is my understanding that TSA, despite having some 616 50,000 employees, is only able to dedicate some -- a handful

617	of folks, literally, three or four to pipeline security.
618	So the question I might have is are you concerned by
619	that fact, that a lead agency for pipeline safety is so
620	stretched that only a handful of people would be working on
621	pipelines?
622	Mr. Menezes. Well, I can't speak directly to the
623	resources and demands that they have but I can tell you from
624	the experience that we have at DOE, having been over there
625	now almost four months, we are all agencies are
626	constrained to use existing resources to respond to, you
627	know, new and additional obligations, for example, and it is
628	a constant effort to find adequate resources to do things to
629	accomplish our statutory obligations.
630	I will say that with pipelines both DHS and DOT co-
631	chair, you know, that sector-specific pipeline industry. We
632	are involved through the oil and natural gas subsector
633	coordinating council.
634	And so we have we have regular interaction with the
635	agencies that you mentioned and other agencies but also with
636	the industry.
637	So, you know, we are involved in it. But, again, it's
638	always a challenge to find adequate resources within the

639	current budget you know, to do the things that's expected
640	of you.
641	Mr. Upton. Thank you.
642	I yield for questions to the ranking member of the
643	subcommittee, Mr. Rush.
644	Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman.
645	Mr. Undersecretary, to date we have not experienced any
646	large-scale cyberattacks on our energy grid. However, there
647	have been minor incidences, maybe even what we might call
648	probes into the system.
649	In your professional opinion, would you say that we
650	haven't experienced have not experienced any large-scale
651	attacks due to our defenses or is it simply because no entity
652	has as of yet really attempted to launch a full-scale attack?
653	And do we really need to know do we really even know,
654	rather, what their capabilities are of some of these foreign
655	entities or rogue states that may eventually try to do us
656	some harm?
657	Mr. Menezes. Thank you for the question, Ranking Member
658	Rush.
659	Yes, a very important question. We are at probably a
660	historical turning point from what has been going on in the

661	past.
662	I had mentioned the ever increasing level of
663	sophistication and the ever increasing number of threats.
664	What has happened in the past simply is over and every day
665	presents new challenges.
666	Some of the questions you asked, you know, would involve
667	classified material that I can't get in today but it is
668	public that we are facing threats today that we haven't seen
669	in the past.
670	The Internet of Things, all software, all of these are
671	providing opportunities for those that are very creative to
672	try to attack our systems, and it's ongoing. It's daily.
673	It's 24/7. It is around the clock.
674	Interestingly, as we know, that now it is machines that
675	are doing all this and they're using artificial intelligence.
676	So you have machines.
677	Our goal, of course, would be to counter their machines
678	with our machines and our artificial intelligence. But it's
679	an ever-escalating battle.
680	So you're right to ask the question. We don't even know
681	what the future threats are. And this is part of the reason
682	why we are standing up this office. We want this to be

683	highly visible. We want this to be accountable to other
684	agencies, to the Congress, so that you all have a much higher
685	visibility on what DOE is doing.
686	So you asked the right questions. We are concerned
687	about not only current but future threats and having the
688	resources.
689	Pat, did you want to say something?
690	Ms. Hoffman. I just would also like to credit the
691	strong partnership we have with industry and that we are
692	keeping pace with respect to intelligence and classified
693	information sharing, partnership with the ISAC for alerts and
694	getting information out to industry as soon as possible, as
695	well as partnerships and looking at engineering solutions and
696	looking at technology solutions that will help mitigate some
697	of the issues.
698	Mr. Rush. That leads me to another concern, and that's
699	the our nation's workforce preparedness when it comes to
700	cybersecurity. Are we doing all that we can to ensure that
701	we have a highly skilled trained workforce both presently and
702	in the future to address cybersecurity issues?
703	Mr. Menezes. We are doing what we can. I am not sure
704	that we are doing everything that we can but we certainly are

705 elevating education in the realm of preparedness in addition 706 to, you know, response and ultimately recovery. 707 But it's going to be research and development and 708 breakthrough technologies to be able to protect and defend 709 our system and to be able to respond. 710 So we currently have training programs in place where we 711 deal with our -- not only our workforce but also the 712 industry's workforce because they have to have the benefit of everything that we see, we know, and that we are developing 713 714 so that they can train and they can instill a culture of 715 resilience within their organizations. 716 And I can testify firsthand on the past success of the 717 leadership of this committee and working with the ESCC and 718 the industry partners in DOE's role. 719 I can assure you it was important for the electricity 720 sector to have their CEOs participate, and when the CEOs 721 participate they return to the company and they instill a 722 culture of compliance and resilience and that they make many 723 changes and they make sure that the workforce is very 724 educated on these very technical and highly sophisticated 725 programs. 726 So we are committed to ensuring that we have a dedicated

727	and educated workforce.
728	Mr. Rush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
729	Mr. Upton. The chair recognizes the gentleman from
730	Texas, Mr. Barton.
731	Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's always good
732	to see our good friend here in such a position.
733	This is an important hearing that we are having today
734	because it addresses an issue that we really haven't done a
735	very good job of addressing this issue of cybersecurity
736	and emergency response.
737	I am not real sure what cybersecurity is, first of all.
738	So I guess my first question would be does the Department of
739	Energy have a definition of cybersecurity.
740	Mr. Menezes. Well, let me go back to the days that I
741	was on that side of the dais in '05 when we decided to add
742	the word cybersecurity into the mandatory reliability
743	provisions that we put in EPAC of '05.
744	That we thought whether we should define it back
745	then, to be frank about it, and we decided then that it was
746	better to have it as, frankly, broad as it could be because
747	we weren't sure what it would become.
748	And so consequently I am not sure if we have a formal

749	definition. I am looking over at
750	Mr. Barton. So far you have done a very good job of
751	dissimulating and not saying a darn thing so
752	[Laughter.]
753	Mr. Menezes. I know that.
754	Mr. Barton but roles do change.
755	Mr. Menezes. Yes. I don't think we have a formal
756	definition. But
757	Mr. Barton. Well, do we need one.
758	Mr. Menezes I had mentioned that, you know, so
759	cyber again, the Internet of Things and software typically
760	are ways that they seek to gain entry into systems via those
761	mechanisms.
762	Mr. Barton. Mr. Chairman, let's let the record show
763	that I stumped the undersecretary of energy on the first
764	question, but in a polite way, because he and I are friends.
765	Well, would you would you say that cybersecurity
766	deals with the internet intercepting somehow making it
767	difficult for computer systems to operate, hacking into a
768	controlled system or power plants or pipeline controls?
769	Would that be a practical type of cybersecurity attack
770	something like that?

771	Mr. Menezes. Yes, and you mentioned those are threats,
772	right. But there's a security part of that, too. So it
773	would include the communication systems, making sure you have
774	resilient communication systems, control systems that you can
775	monitor and detect and react and take, you know, action.
776	You had mentioned the threat detection and the analysis,
777	and it's not limited to just one sector of the energy
778	industry, for example.
779	So it has to include you have points of potential
780	entry into any systems and we are talking about supply chain
781	today but, you know, we have generation.
782	We have all the distribution. We have transmission. We
782 783	We have all the distribution. We have transmission. We have the, you know, the producers, the vendors. It's all up
783	have the, you know, the producers, the vendors. It's all up
783 784	have the, you know, the producers, the vendors. It's all up and down the, you know, every point.
783 784 785	have the, you know, the producers, the vendors. It's all up and down the, you know, every point. Mr. Barton. Well, let me ask let me ask another
783 784 785 786	have the, you know, the producers, the vendors. It's all up and down the, you know, every point. Mr. Barton. Well, let me ask let me ask another simple question, which you may not want to answer.
783 784 785 786 787	have the, you know, the producers, the vendors. It's all up and down the, you know, every point. Mr. Barton. Well, let me ask let me ask another simple question, which you may not want to answer. Which of our industries are sectors that the Department
783 784 785 786 787	have the, you know, the producers, the vendors. It's all up and down the, you know, every point. Mr. Barton. Well, let me ask let me ask another simple question, which you may not want to answer. Which of our industries are sectors that the Department of Energy has responsibility for would you consider to be
783 784 785 786 787 788 789	have the, you know, the producers, the vendors. It's all up and down the, you know, every point. Mr. Barton. Well, let me ask let me ask another simple question, which you may not want to answer. Which of our industries are sectors that the Department of Energy has responsibility for would you consider to be most vulnerable to a cybersecurity attack?

793	DOE is a member of the National Security Council and as
794	such we have intelligence and counterintelligence and access,
795	you know, to all of our sister agencies and we have eyes on
796	things.
797	When you look at it, those that wish to penetrate our
798	system will try all segments all segments. So in that
799	respect, we are all vulnerable. We are all constantly
800	vulnerable.
801	Mr. Barton. Let me ask my final question. Have to
802	the department's knowledge, have there been any cybersecurity
803	attacks on our energy sector that the Department of Energy is
804	responsible for?
805	Mr. Menezes. Attacks?
806	Mr. Barton. Yes. Have there been attempts to
807	Mr. Menezes. Our systems are constantly being attacked
808	constantly. Not only the DOE system but also the energy
809	system.
810	Mr. Barton. Okay. Well, if you say constantly then
811	that would I would interpret that to mean that we've
812	successfully fended them off, since I am not aware of any
813	breakdowns in our energy infrastructure.
814	Mr. Menezes. Well, there have been some reported

815	breaches, if you will. We are fortunate that we haven't had
816	a major consequence of attacks and thus far we have been
817	successful in identifying.
818	Part of this analysis involves modelling, information
819	sharing, and monitoring. You may collect data and then you
820	will use our experts' abilities to evaluate what we are
821	seeing and then try to figure out what is happening.
822	Mr. Barton. My time has expired. But would the
823	department be willing to have a briefing a bipartisan
824	briefing where we could you could go into some detail
825	about the attempted attacks?
826	Mr. Menezes. Yes, sir.
827	Mr. Barton. Thank you.
828	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
829	Mr. Upton. Gentleman's time has expired.
830	Mr. McNerney.
831	Mr. McNerney. Well, I thank the chairman and, again, I
832	thank the witness.
833	Are you familiar with the two bills that Mr. Latta and I
834	have proposed the Cyber Sense Act and the Enhanced Grid
835	Security Through Public-Private Partnerships Act?
836	Mr. Menezes. Yes, sir.

837	Mr. McNerney. Do you think those bills serve a good
838	purpose?
839	Mr. Menezes. We applaud the we applaud the committee
840	for the leadership, you know, that you have shown and I think
841	has one of them passed already, I believe? I mean, in
842	past Congresses?
843	Mr. McNerney. Right. So
844	Mr. Menezes. And I will say that on the supply chain
845	you have already you have already seen action, right. You
846	have seen action from NERC in proposing critical
847	infrastructure protection standards. So you see it pending
848	at FERC so certainly your past efforts have generated that
849	activity.
850	It's also generated activity here in this administration
851	because in the fiscal year 2019 request we requested
852	additional moneys to do to do what your bill is proposing
853	to do.
854	Mr. McNerney. Do you have any suggestions on improving
855	either one of those two pieces of legislation?
856	Mr. Menezes. Again, my suggestions would be as you
857	choose to send direction over and obligations over to the
858	Department of Energy if you can authorize resources we find

859	that that helps us because otherwise the department typically
860	would be forced to figure out where to get resources, you
861	know, that it's currently using for other
862	Mr. McNerney. But speaking of resources, the fiscal
863	2019 budget looks like a 40 percent cut in the electricity
864	delivery and reliability account, which then is split into
865	two further accounts.
866	So you're saying on the one hand that you need resources
867	and on the other hand the administration is proposing
868	significant cuts in program funding.
869	So how can they reconcile those notions?
870	Mr. Menezes. I think the OE budget cut I believe
871	it's the case where it shows that we are pulling out almost
872	\$96 million and moving it into CESER. So it's creating a new
873	office. But we are still
874	Ms. Hoffman. We see an increase in CESER budget line
875	for the 2019 request to yes, to \$96 million.
876	Mr. McNerney. I saw that, but I mean, I hear that you
877	keep saying we need more resources and yet the some of
878	these line items are being significantly slashed.
879	Mr. Menezes. Well, can I point out a victory that we
880	had that this office had with, you know, the

881	administration?
882	As many of you know, because of the several trips that
883	we've taken to Puerto Rico, for example, on the emergency
884	response, okay, a very critical part I know we've been
885	talking about cybersecurity but if you will allow me to talk
886	about that.
887	Again, when you got when we when we got over there
888	and looked at our resources, it was surprising. It was
889	surprising to me that all the work that DOE was doing on
890	emergency response in this hurricane season, for example, the
891	resources were, I thought, insufficient.
892	We asked the White House and they agreed to double the
893	budget double the budget of the emergency response, of
894	ISER our Infrastructure Security Energy Recovery.
895	Mr. McNerney. So you're saying that in general terms
896	the administration is acting in a way that'll increase your
897	resources. Is that is that what you're saying?
898	Mr. Menezes. In this in this area. In this area.
899	Mr. McNerney. In this area?
900	Mr. Menezes. Yes, and they it's in our fiscal year
901	2019, you know, to set up CESER. It's all in the
902	congressional justification for it. So

903	Mr. McNerney. So, I mean are you
904	Mr. Menezes so we have support in the
905	administration on the topics that we are talking about today.
906	Mr. McNerney. So in a sense, are you robbing Peter to
907	pay Paul for the CESER?
908	Mr. Menezes. No. No, we are not. No, it's you
909	know, we are moving some existing programs over to CESER just
910	to begin to set up the office and so that was not a in
911	fact, that's an increase. That is actually an increase.
912	So, again, together it's going to be \$96 million and
913	that is an uptick of about maybe 16 percent, I think, from
914	what it was in fiscal year 2018.
915	Now, CESER didn't exist I mean, fiscal year 2017. So
916	it's a positive story here.
917	Mr. McNerney. All right. Mr. Chairman, I am going to
918	yield back.
919	Mr. Upton. I would just note that we've got Secretary
920	Perry scheduled to come next month to talk about the budget
921	as well.
922	Mr. Olson.
923	Mr. Olson. I thank the chair. Welcome to our two
924	witnesses.

925	My first question will be about Hurricane Harvey. I
926	followed your reports on Hurricane Harvey the situation
927	reports very closely as the storm hit and after the storm hit
928	and the impacts on our energy sector the Port of Houston
929	and the petrochemical complex.
930	DOE was a good responder a good partner. Worked hand
931	in hand with Governor Abbott, with the local county judges,
932	my county judge, Bob Hebert, Fort Bend County county judge
933	Matt Sebesta, Brazoria County county judge Ed Emmett,
934	Harris County.
935	He helped to get waivers they needed and the assistant
936	had to ensure the permits and waivers were issued without
937	delay. That's very important.
938	You mentioned, Mr. Menezes, that the budget has been
939	doubled now since lessons learned from Harvey for recovery
940	efforts.
941	What are some lessons learned like that that we could
942	apply in the future, going forward, from Hurricane Harvey?
943	Feel free, both of you, to make comments about that question.
944	Mr. Menezes. Well, I am aware that we did an after
945	activity report, I believe. I might defer to Pat. I think
946	she's in possession of that report.

947	I am not sure if it's finalized or not but certainly we
948	will make it available to all members of the committee.
949	Pat, do you have specific comments on that?
950	Ms. Hoffman. Yes, thank you very much for the question.
951	I think I would applaud industry's effort as well in
952	Hurricane Harvey and Irma and Marie and the strong work that
953	they've done.
954	Some of the lessons learned is as we continue to move
955	forward the industry is on the front line so exchanging
956	coordination of information is critical and absolute for
957	having an effective recovery and restoration process and I
958	think that's where you have seen the success as well as some
959	of the lessons learned.
960	From a department perspective, being able to engage our
961	power marketing administrations, to be continuing to use the
962	strategic petroleum reserve are all important aspects of how
963	the department can help in a restoration process.
964	The waivers and the coordination with industry were
965	always very positive and helpful to support so being
966	proactive in those areas as we continue.
967	As we look forward on cyber, as we think about that,
968	some of the needs and the issues are really being proactive

969	in looking at threat analysis, continuing to support the
970	mutual assistance program, and I think whether it's
971	hurricanes or cybers, really want to be able to engage
972	stronger in the mutual assistance program in support of
973	industry.
974	Mr. Olson. And you all read my mind. Let's now talk
975	about cyber.
976	Attacks happen on America every single day in
977	cyberspace. Bad actors have attacked our power industry.
978	They've attacked refineries, chemical plants, pipelines, all
979	across the spectrum.
980	You mentioned, Mr. Menezes, about AI artificial
981	intelligence. I formed a caucus here in the House to look at
982	those issues and I have a bill out to get us on board with AI
983	because that's our future to prevent some of these attacks.
984	My bill just basically says let's partner up with the
985	private to make sure these attacks don't happen through
986	cyberspace and use AI as a weapon.
987	AI is to empower people. It's not to have machines run
988	our world but it's to empower people with information to make
989	sound decisions when a disaster hits, like a hurricane.
990	And just like you commented about, the bill just

991	basically says let's have a true public-private partnership,
992	support the private sector, make them empower them with
993	the public sector's assistance, make sure we adjust jobs
994	because there's lots of jobs being lost or jobs being
995	created, have facts about jobs. Also bias there's natural
996	bias can be around information that may be biased avoid
997	that, and also privacy big issues.
998	But how can AI help out with the recovery from Harvey
999	and those you're facing?
1000	Mr. Menezes. Well, thank you for that question, Mr.
1001	Olson.
1002	You know, you raise a very important point. AI will be
1003	the future of how strong and resilient we can be because of
1004	the ever sophistication ever-growing sophistication of
1005	these attacks.
1006	With respect to your bill, again, the administration,
1007	you know, doesn't have a formal view of it. But as a general
1008	rule
1009	Mr. Olson. It's good. Trust me.
1010	Mr. Menezes. As a general rule, all the direction and -
1011	- that you can provide to us, particularly in the use of
1012	tools that we can use within industry, former Chairman Barton

1013	had asked about, you know, attacks on the system and we are
1014	here representing the department and to be sure, the
1015	department is, you know, subject to attacks.
1016	It is our industry, however, that typically would be
1017	front line because the bad actors would look for soft
1018	targets. It might not spend a lot of effort in going after
1019	government assets that they think are going to be hard
1020	targets.
1021	So they're developing artificial intelligence to
1022	probably identify those risk levels. Well, industry is going
1023	to be on the front line and so it's very important that we
1024	get a set of tools and resources to be able to work with
1025	industry and to help industry have the resources and the
1026	knowledge and the wherewithal to be able to anticipate,
1027	predict, react, respond, and to make their systems more
1028	secure.
1029	Mr. Olson. Amen. Machines to empower people, not take
1030	over the world. Thank you for your comments. We're working
1031	for this.
1032	I yield back. Thank you, Chairman.
1033	Mr. Upton. Gentleman's time has expired.
1034	Mr. Tonko.

1035	Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to Secretaries
1036	Menezes and Hoffman. Welcome. It's good to have you back
1037	again.
1038	I know DOE is taking its role as the sector-specific
1039	agency for cybersecurity seriously. But I have a few
1040	questions on the reorganization of the Office of Electricity
1041	Delivery and Energy Reliability.
1042	And, for the record, I am not necessarily opposed to the
1043	change but I would like to understand how it might affect DOE
1044	functions as we move into the future.
1045	Last month, Secretary Perry announced the creation of
1046	the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency
1047	Response which, as I understand it, will take existing
1048	programs from the Office of Electricity.
1049	Can you explain the vision for this cybersecurity office
1050	moving forward and do you expect to add new programs or
1051	functions to this office over time?
1052	Mr. Menezes. Thank you for that question. It's a very
1053	good question.
1054	When the secretary arrived over at the department, you
1055	know, and you have your security clearance, right, you get
1056	briefed and your world view changes, and almost immediately

1057 it became very apparent that one of the top priorities will 1058 be resources for cybersecurity and, again, and the physical 1059 security -- and we were in the hurricane seasons as well and so those three things came together very quickly. You know, 1060 1061 just from an experience point of view. 1062 The department, of course, had a history of dealing with 1063 these issues and so we began a process where we evaluated 1064 everything within the department, our stakeholders. 1065 We talked to members of Congress and staff. We talked 1066 to the appropriators. We talked to OMB and the White House to formulate a process to bring the visibility and enhance 1067 1068 the importance of these three topics. Since this is an initial creation -- not a creation but 1069 1070 an establishment -- we had the authority -- you know, the DOE 1071 Org Act has the authority -- has given us the authority to do this -- but it wouldn't surprise you to find out that our 1072 1073 appropriators, you know, had -- and others had some very keen 1074 views on what assets and what could we do to begin the 1075 process. 1076 So I would like to emphasize this is an initial step and so what we did was we identified within the department those 1077 1078 programs -- successful programs to move -- to begin to

1079	process to move them over into a new office. So it was to
1080	simply begin that process.
1081	So we identified those two, the R&D within OE and the
1082	ISER function also within OE. It just happened to be that
1083	they're both in OE.
1084	It doesn't diminish what we continue to expect out of OE
1085	the Office of Electricity and it's just a beginning
1086	point for this new office.
1087	Mr. Tonko. And what will happen to other programs from
1088	the Office of Electricity?
1089	Mr. Menezes. What will happen with what?
1090	Mr. Tonko. Other programs from the Office of
1091	Electricity.
1092	Mr. Menezes. Well, they will continue and we will
1093	you know, in a
1094	Mr. Tonko. In that realm? In that given division?
1095	Mr. Menezes. No, the Office of Electricity will, of
1096	course, help in seeing the transition of them. But the
1097	Office of Electricity has other critical functions too that
1098	they will continue to do and
1099	Mr. Tonko. Does that include the non-cyber R&D portfolio
1100	focussed on grid modernization and storage?

1101	Mr. Menezes. Yes. Yes. They will continue to do that.
1102	The other thing I want to point out is that one thing
1103	that we started at this department is it's a hallmark of this
1104	administration at DOE because of our backgrounds is to engage
1105	in much more of a collaborative effort between all of the
1106	programs.
1107	We are about busting these silos. Now, we are limited
1108	to the actual offices due to revenue streams. But as a
1109	practical matter, we collaborate. We share responsibilities
1110	and you know that we coordinate certainly all of our labs.
1111	So what you're seeing over there is a coordinating
1112	effort and a collaborative effort so that we can make use of
1113	the resources that we currently have to do the things that
1114	were important.
1115	Mr. Tonko. Will there be any split of the Office of
1116	Electricity staff the FTEs, or full time equivalents going
1117	in another direction or will they stay intact as it is now?
1118	Mr. Menezes. Well, we are in the process of identifying
1119	which employees will ultimately report to or be part of the
1120	new office and, you know, there's a series of procedures and
1121	policies that we have to follow in order to do that. But we
1122	are going to be in full compliance with all of the

1123	regulations that we need to do.
1124	Mr. Tonko. Well, it's important, I believe, that
1125	cybersecurity gets proper consideration in resources. I also
1126	believe the work being done by the Office of Electricity on
1127	grid modernization, on micro grids and on storage is also
1128	critical and I hope that these offices will be working
1129	together and not having to compete for resources. I think
1130	that's very important.
1131	Mr. Menezes. You have you have our commitment from
1132	that, sir.
1133	Mr. Tonko. Okay. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chair.
1134	Mr. Upton. Mr. Shimkus.
1135	Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1136	It's great to have to have you good to see you again,
1137	and welcome to the committee.
1138	So I hate acronyms. So CESER is the Office of
1139	Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response
1140	Management, correct?
1141	Mr. Menezes. Yes, sir.
1142	Mr. Shimkus. That's when you use CESER that's what
1143	you're referring to and that's a new organization within the
1144	Department of Energy to address grid resiliency, which can be

1145	defined by either concerns of attacks or cybersecurity or the
1146	like. Is that fair?
1147	Mr. Menezes. That is fair, and it will be headed up by
1148	an assistance secretary.
1149	Mr. Shimkus. And you want to, I think you used a
1150	good terminology you want to bust the silos that occur in
1151	major bureaucracies so we have people talking to each other.
1152	Mr. Menezes. Yes, sir.
1153	Mr. Shimkus. So, so far so good. I think it's needed.
1154	It's something we've talked about for a long time.
1155	So let me address a couple questions, and former
1156	Chairman Barton had raised just the whole cybersecurity
1157	how do you define.
1158	So that's the whole issue of what could be points of
1159	entry. My colleague, Mr. Tonko, mentioned the micro grids,
1160	which kind of are developing in our in our country and
1161	then the question would be cybersecurity of entry through a
1162	data control system that then could make instructions to
1163	transformers, through generation, through the like.
1164	So that's one way there could be disruption. And isn't
1165	that also the reason why we want which we did in the last
1166	Congress, talked about quite a bit I think you mentioned

1167	the fact that we had moved the bill we do want some
1168	communication between our government agencies and the private
1169	sector. Why is that important in this debate?
1170	Mr. Menezes. They're on the front line. I mean, it is
1171	it is their they're, A, providing the service. They
1172	are doing the things that we've come to expect from our
1173	energy infrastructure.
1174	They own and operate the actual facilities, they develop
1175	the software, and they rely on the supply chain, all of which
1176	could be vulnerable. And so as the government, you know,
1177	agency responsible for that, we need to ensure that they do
1178	have the training, they have the know-how.
1179	We share with them information upon which they can, you
1180	know, identify, train, and respond and recover, ultimately.
1181	So they're on that front line, which is not easy. It's a lot
1182	more than
1183	Mr. Shimkus. So, they're seeing some front line attacks
1184	that they can then talk to you and we can address training
1185	and not remediation but counter measures, I guess, would
1186	be.
1187	Are we getting is CESER able to then also talk to our
1188	intel communities for higher level cyber concerns that could

1189	be then passed on to the private sector and say, hey, watch
1190	out for this?
1191	Mr. Menezes. Correct. In fact, you know, we the
1192	information sharing and analytical center, you know, has
1193	developed CRISP, which is the Cybersecurity Risk Information
1194	Sharing Program.
1195	Mr. Shimkus. Thank you.
1196	Mr. Menezes. Yes. Just threw out a couple more
1197	acronyms your way. And the importance of that is that while
1198	the ISAC manages that, it uses information that is shared by
1199	our intelligence-counterintelligence that we receive.
1200	I had mentioned previously as members of the NSC, you
1201	know, we have resources that some agencies do not have and
1202	with special, you know, protections in place for classified
1203	information we share that information to the extent that we
1204	can, and it has been very helpful and useful in identifying
1205	threats that without it we still would not necessarily know
1206	that our system was even attacked.
1207	Mr. Shimkus. You know, let me go quickly. My time is
1208	almost expired. Talking about electromagnetic pulses either
1209	intentional or naturally occurring, the hardening of systems,
1210	the cost, and the communication with the private sector, I

1211	mean, the private sector when we talk about it they just say,
1212	oh, the cost is too much can't do that.
1213	And there is some cost, but I think it is a concern that
1214	I hope that you all and maybe even this CESER subsection of
1215	DOE is talking about.
1216	Mr. Menezes. Well, I would say that a hallmark of any
1217	technology that we develop, any training system, it has to be
1218	cost effective. Clearly, we cannot give them information
1219	that imposes such a burden that
1220	Mr. Shimkus. But are we talking on EMPs both naturally
1221	occurring or bad actors? Is that part of what you're
1222	discussing or
1223	Mr. Menezes. Yes, it's yes. CESER is does have
1224	the energy security part of it so it would include the EMPs
1225	as well and the GMDs, if you want another acronym.
1226	Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. My time has expired.
1227	Mr. Upton. Mr. Loebsack.
1228	Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
1229	important hearing and I do appreciate both of you being here
1230	as well the witnesses. Thank you so much.
1231	I don't think that we can argue with the fact that it's
1232	absolutely critical that we do ensure the safety of our

energy infrastructure and in the 21st century we all know that a very critical emerging threat that's been talked about today is cyberattacks and we've got to just work as hard as we can to make sure that we protect, you know, that energy infrastructure.

I am very proud to work with Chairman Upton. We actually can do some things on a bipartisan basis in this committee and I think we've done a lot, but to make sure that we get adopted eventually and implemented H.R. 5175, the Pipeline and LNG Facilities Cybersecurity Preparedness Act. So I want to thank the chair for working with me on that, and vice versa. It's great.

I do think it's absolutely critical that we make progress to ensure the cybersecurity and safety of our natural gas and LNG facilities and I believe that this bill is a step in the right direction.

Physical threats to pipelines and energy infrastructure do remain a significant threat, as everyone on this committee knows and you folks know. But today -- these days our pipeline system is increasingly technologically sophisticated as we get new pipelines put in place and that does, I think, probably increase our vulnerability in some ways to

1255	cybersecurity attacks. And for the life of me, since I speak
1256	a little Spanish and even more Portuguese, I cannot figure
1257	out yet how to pronounce your name why it's only two
1258	syllables.
1259	Mr. Menezes. It's Americanized Portuguese.
1260	Mr. Loebsack. Yes, I am aware of that.
1261	Mr. Menezes. You were right on that. And so we've
1262	apparently had the middle E become silent. So it's Menezes.
1263	Mr. Loebsack. Thank you for explaining that. Menezes.
1264	Thank you so much. Thanks for being here today.
1265	As we mentioned, DOE has to play a critical role in
1266	ensuring the safety and security of this infrastructure can
1267	you elaborate a little more about the level of vulnerability
1268	of our pipeline system to cyberattacks?
1269	I mean, you have spoken about that some this morning
1270	already but can you elaborate even more, within the context
1271	of an open hearing, at any rate.
1272	Mr. Menezes. Right, and so I will keep it general.
1273	Perhaps the vulnerability on the pipelines exist because
1274	it's a transportation system, you know, at its sense and it -
1275	- probably the control mechanisms, the communication systems,
1276	and the operations systems, they may not be as fully

1277	integrated, say, as a fully operating electricity, you know,
1278	company in all sectors, for example, in the and so as a
1279	consequence it may be the assumption that because they're
1280	more simplified, if you will, you might not have to develop
1281	technologies to make them as resilient as any other point of
1282	entry.
1283	So as they are improving their efficiencies they are
1284	bringing in new softwares, you know, and new devices and,
1285	again, the result is you see the flow of product.
1286	But as they become more sophisticated, we need to ensure
1287	that what they put in has the resiliency programmed in at the
1288	front end
1289	Mr. Loebsack. Right.
1290	
	Mr. Menezes so that it's resilient, and that's
1291	Mr. Menezes so that it's resilient, and that's going to be the key. So
1291 1292	
1292	going to be the key. So
1292	going to be the key. So Mr. Loebsack. Because I was kind of shocked actually at
1292 1293	going to be the key. So Mr. Loebsack. Because I was kind of shocked actually at an earlier hearing when I found out that there isn't a lot of
1292 1293 1294	going to be the key. So Mr. Loebsack. Because I was kind of shocked actually at an earlier hearing when I found out that there isn't a lot of federal involvement, you know, when it comes to pipelines in
1292 1293 1294 1295	going to be the key. So Mr. Loebsack. Because I was kind of shocked actually at an earlier hearing when I found out that there isn't a lot of federal involvement, you know, when it comes to pipelines in the first place.

things are put in properly and that they are secure. Mr. Menezes. Yes. We are doing what we can in our	
role, you know, for the oil and natural gas subsector	
1303 coordinating council and we do have regularly you know,	
1304 meetings we have monthly meetings with the group and we	÷
have quarterly meetings as well with the larger group, you	l
1306 know, that is co-led by DOT and DHS and we do bring in all	-
1307 those other agencies. So we are we have a structure	
within the existing authorities to try to address that.	
1309 Mr. Loebsack. Yes.	
1310 Mr. Menezes. There's a lot of information sharing ar	ıd
it's important. You have got to be at the meetings. You	
have got to you have got to be willing to participate.	
And they are, by the way. I mean, they are.	
Mr. Loebsack. And just very quickly my time is	
running short. Thank you very much. I want to make sure	
that, you know, that you folks are prepared as a departmen	ıt
in the event that this legislation is passed, be able to p	ut
1318 this into effect.	
I do have one other question. Maybe you could respon	ıd
in writing to me if that's possible. We have a lot of	

1321	existing pipelines now that may not be as subject to
1322	cybersecurity threats.
1323	I don't know the answer to that, and maybe you could
1324	distinguish in writing for me those that are already in the
1325	ground, already exist, versus the newer ones which might be
1326	more vulnerable, given the technology, and I would really
1327	appreciate an answer to that question, perhaps in writing if
1328	that works for you.
1329	Mr. Menezes. We'll be happy to get back with you on
1330	that.
1331	Mr. Loebsack. Thank you so much.
1332	Mr. Menezes. Thank you.
1333	Mr. Loebsack. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I
1334	yield back.
1335	Mr. Upton. Mr. Latta.
1336	Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
1337	holding today's hearing. This is very, very important when
1338	we are talking about cybersecurity and also the emergency
1339	response.
1340	But before I do, and I know he's stepped out right now,
1341	but I just want to recognize Mr. McNerney from California
1342	who's been working with me and all the hard work that he's

1343	done on the issues, especially with grid security.
1344	Mr. Under Secretary and Ms. Hoffman, thank you very much
1345	for being with us today because, again, this is a very, very
1346	important topic that we are dealing with today.
1347	But if I could start with in your testimony you noted
1348	that securing the electric sector supply chain is critical to
1349	the security and resilience of the electrical grid and
1350	products must be tested for known vulnerabilities in order to
1351	assess risk and develop mitigations.
1352	Would you explain the consequences of having a device or
1353	a component in the electric system that poses a cybersecurity
1354	vulnerability and, you know, are there more importantly,
1355	do we have the adequate measures right now in place to
1356	protect that supply chain?
1357	Mr. Menezes. Great question, and thank you very much
1358	for it.
1359	Our supply chains probably would be our most vulnerable
1360	areas and by supply chain it could be any component part, you
1361	know, that any of our energy partners, you know, would rely
1362	on.
1363	That could make our entire system vulnerable. If point
1364	of entry could be on a what you think is a routine

1365 software program, perhaps to do accounting, you know, for a 1366 supplier of valves, for example. 1367 So the importance has been noted in a couple of 1368 NERC has already proposed CIPs -- the critical 1369 infrastructure protection standards -- which is pending at 1370 FERC to address this very supply chain issue with respect to, 1371 you know, the agencies that's responsible for developing our mandatory reliability provisions for the electricity grid and 1372 1373 this administration in fiscal year 2019 has requested 1374 additional money so that we, with our labs and our experts, 1375 can similarly test these products for -- you know, for their 1376 vulnerabilities and we can mitigate those vulnerabilities. 1377 So we can make the whole system stronger by really addressing those most vulnerable, if you will. 1378 1379 Also in your testimony you referenced the Mr. Latta. budget proposal to invest in testing supply chain components 1380 1381 and systems and under the Cyber Sense bill seeks to authorize 1382 a related program focused on identifying and promoting cybersecure products using the bulk power system. 1383 1384 Again, would you elaborate on the work that the DOE is 1385 doing to test the supply chain components and systems and 1386 also in a follow-up of that, how does the quality control for

1387	supply chains help in ensuring that cybersecurity?
1388	Mr. Menezes. I will allow Pat has more experience
1389	directly on this.
1390	Ms. Hoffman. So through the Electric Sector
1391	Coordinating Council and our discussions with industry, the
1392	supply chain need has been highlighted as extreme importance
1393	and so I appreciate the committee's efforts in this area.
1394	What we are looking at is actually partnering with
1395	industry to test and do a pilot program to test several
1396	components that are critical in the industry to do a deep
1397	dive testing of the components and subcomponents.
1398	What the industry would like to understand is all the
1399	vulnerabilities so they can assess their risk and the risks
1400	that they are facing.
1401	So part of what the NERC standards also emphasize is the
1402	disclosure of vulnerabilities and the continued testing.
1403	One of the things that we want to emphasize is as we are
1404	looking at testing of components there may be a new
1405	vulnerability or a new threat vector that's discovered
1406	tomorrow. So what should be institutionalized is a process
1407	for continual improvement in cybersecurity.
1408	As we've talked about the definition of cybersecurity

1409	being secure, information technology, secure firmware
1410	software, the information side of the industry, we really
1411	need to continually test product, continually improve
1412	products, just like we would do from a manufacturing point of
1413	view.
1414	So that philosophy of continual improvement is
1415	absolutely critical and testing with the national
1416	laboratories can help identify some of the vulnerabilities
1417	and continue to advance the improvement of products.
1418	Mr. Latta. When you're testing the products and getting
1419	that how do you get that information out to the industry?
1420	Because just like this past Friday I spoke at one of my
1421	electric co-ops in my district I have the largest number
1422	of co-ops in the state of Ohio and not too far in the past
1423	from that I also spoke at another one.
1424	But how do you get that information out, especially with
1425	these products, to make sure that they know that they're, A,
1426	available and, B, that they're tested and they ought to be
1427	utilized once they're approved?
1428	Ms. Hoffman. So the goal is to get the information out
1429	through the supply chain community and I am sure the next
1430	panel will talk about that and details of having that

1431	disclosure and that collaborative relationship with the
1432	industry with the mitigations and the solutions.
1433	But the other area is through our national laboratories
1434	and through, say, the ISAC program to continue to really
1435	identify some of the vulnerabilities but get it out to
1436	industry and all the components and all the and all the
1437	sectors in the industry.
1438	Mr. Latta. Yes. Well, thank you very much, and I yield
1439	back.
1440	Mr. Upton. Okay. I would recognize Mr. Kinzinger. No,
1441	I am sorry Mr. McKinley.
1442	Mr. McKinley. Well, I wasn't expecting that. Thank
1443	you, Mr. Chairman.
1444	Mr. Menezes or Secretary Menezes, a couple questions
1445	quickly, if I could.
1446	Almost three years ago, to today three years ago we
1447	had Tom Siebel he's the CEO of C3 Energy testify before
1448	us about cybersecurity and the grid, and he made a very
1449	revealing comment.
1450	He said that there were just a group of engineers
1451	just a small group of engineers would be able to shut down
1452	the grid on the East Coast in four days, and that would shut

1453	it would shut down the grid between Boston and New York.
1454	Did you did you did you ever see his testimony or
1455	respond back to him on that?
1456	Mr. Menezes. I did not see it.
1457	Mr. McKinley. It just the fact that a lot of things
1458	have happened and I appreciate your remarks your answers
1459	back to Barton where you said that we are constantly under
1460	attack.
1461	And maybe it's worked but I am saying there are groups
1462	saying the engineers can do this. They can still get past
1463	your system if they want to do that.
1464	So the other thing, and just maybe it was coincidence in
1465	2015 Ukraine was faced with a cyberattack. The Russians
1466	apparently are the ones that contributed to that.
1467	What have we learned from that? Did we interact with
1468	the Ukraine and find out how that was shut down so we could
1469	prevent that from happening here?
1470	Mr. Menezes. Since that occurred before I arrived, I
1471	will just
1472	Mr. McKinley. Just quickly, because I've got a series
1473	of more questions. Have we yes or no, have we worked
1474	interacted with them?

1475	Ms. Hoffman. The answer is yes. We participated we
1476	worked closely with them. We actually gained some knowledge
1477	of the attack. We have had training sessions with industry
1478	and analyzing so lots of
1479	Mr. McKinley. Okay. But we've learned we've learned
1480	something from it.
1481	But then let me go also now go back even further in
1482	history. Back in 2007 there was an Aurora generator test
1483	that was maybe controversial. Are you familiar with it,
1484	Secretary?
1485	Ms. Hoffman. Yes, I am very familiar with it.
1486	Mr. McKinley. Okay, you are. Okay. What have we
1487	because they are it was they were able to display that
1488	just by entering 21 codes they could blow up a generator and
1489	thereby set in motion a blackout in the United States.
1490	What have we done to prevent those 21 codes from being
1491	introduced?
1492	Ms. Hoffman. So we worked with industry in analysing
1493	that the Aurora attack and looking at the focus on relays
1494	and the vulnerabilities in that. The industry has looked at
1495	mitigation solutions. We've done information sharing with
1496	industry.

1497	So it's been an active engagement with the industry.
1498	Mr. McKinley. Have we taken have they taken action,
1499	implemented things to prevent that from happening with that?
1500	Ms. Hoffman. The industry has implemented and has taken
1501	action per some of the requests from NERC in doing that.
1502	Mr. McKinley. Okay. The third question or second
1503	question has to do with vulnerability because you talk about
1504	emergency, and we have a report here from New England saying
1505	that they're not going to have enough gas if there's an
1506	emergency situation that's coming up and they say that
1507	because during the cold weather they're having to divert
1508	those that gas to homes and so there's not going to be gas
1509	for power plants.
1510	We've experienced that in West Virginia. We had a black
1511	start plant that had to shut down during the Polar Vortex and
1512	just this last winter was told that they were on day to day -
1513	- they may have to shut down as well.
1514	So I am wondering about in an emergency how are we going
1515	to make sure that we have gas available for our power
1516	generation, let alone cyberattack? Is there a solution to
1517	that?
1518	Mr. Menezes. Well, we need more infrastructure, to be

1519	sure, both what you referenced. The New England ISO,
1520	together with NERC, has identified areas in the country where
1521	we rely heavily on natural gas for our power generation to
1522	ensure our resilient and the reliability of our grid.
1523	It's in those constrained areas where it's important
1524	that we try to increase the infrastructure so that we can
1525	have adequate supply.
1526	That has been the hallmark of this administration so
1527	that we have, you know, a sufficient diversity of fuels
1528	including natural gas.
1529	Mr. McKinley. If I could, Mr. Secretary, but we are
1530	relying on Russia for bringing in LNG to New England and just
1531	and this is now they've unloaded their second tanker on
1532	this.
1533	So if we are going to be energy dominant, how are we
1534	energy dominant if in an emergency if we are going to rely on
1535	a foreign government to provide us a natural resource to be
1536	able to provide electricity in New England?
1537	Mr. Menezes. Well, good question. Well, the president,
1538	you know, has announced his efforts to for the
1539	infrastructure bill and contained therein or recommendations
1540	on how we can help to, you know, site and build, construct,

1541	and permit these in this case, natural gas pipelines, you
1542	know, to address the issue that you raised.
1543	Mr. McKinley. Right.
1544	Mr. Menezes. It's not limited to that but it is a
1545	component part of that. So it's also a function of working
1546	with the states because, you know, under federalism the
1547	states have a big role to play as to any interstate gas
1548	pipelines
1549	Mr. McKinley. I understand. I don't want a heavy hand
1550	
1551	Mr. Menezes. There's so much we can do.
1552	Mr. McKinley. I don't want the heavy hand of the
1553	federal government stepping in. But there is a concern.
1554	Just in closing quickly, could you tell me what keeps
1555	you up at night? What is your biggest worry, biggest
1556	concern, from your position?
1557	Mr. Menezes. Well, in the cybersecurity, clearly. I
1558	mean, this is your worldview changes as you get a security
1559	clearance and you get briefed in on what's happening.
1560	I mean, I think you all have been read into a lot of
1561	this stuff. But yes, that causes me to stay awake and,
1562	frankly, as we have seen what are becoming, you know, common

1563	winter events when our system is stressed it seems as though,
1564	you know, we may be faced with an inadequate supply of what
1565	used to be baseload.
1566	So the closure premature closing of what
1567	historically, you know, has been whether it's nuclear or
1568	clean coal, these facilities are going offline.
1569	We are becoming more reliant on natural gas, which is
1570	not a bad thing. But it does have to get through pipelines
1571	and we've seen in the cyclone bomb, if you will, on the East
1572	Coast we see natural gas actually having price spikes, which
1573	forces the operators to go to nuclear, coal, and, believe it
1574	or not, oil. So those are the things that keep me up at
1575	night.
1576	Mr. McKinley. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield
1577	back.
1578	Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
1579	for being here.
1580	I know we all recognize the very serious threat we face
1581	with cyberattacks. It can be especially difficult as the
1582	threats we face are constantly evolving and can vary
1583	significantly.
1584	Individual bad actors are constantly attempting to

1585	obtain data bank routing numbers or medical records from
1586	everyday Americans while state actors, for example, North
1587	Korea's attack on Sony Pictures or China's break of the OPM
1588	files, represent a very different kind of threat. And for a
1589	lot of these nonstate actors, a very low barrier of entry.
1590	In the energy sector, we have to prepare for any level
1591	of attack, given the innerconnectedness of the grid. Even a
1592	relatively small scale attack on a single asset could have
1593	serious consequences.
1594	I will ask both of you, just whatever you can do with
1595	this. If you can elaborate on how the work the DOE does,
1596	like R&D, industry information sharing, and physical
1597	hardening of assets to combat cyberattacks, is flexible and
1598	able to evolve as the threats change.
1599	You might have addressed this to some extent.
1600	Ms. Hoffman. Sure. I appreciate the question. We've
1601	been actively engaged with industry and we know that the core
1602	components of a strong cybersecurity program really looks at
1603	building capabilities.
1604	And so our goal is to help industry build as much
1605	capabilities as possible so our R&D program is focussed on
1606	supporting that capability development.

So from an information sharing program, let's look at a continuous monitoring or an ability for intrusion detection. It's a capability that the industry needs to have and a support that we've been providing through the risk information sharing program that we've developed with industry.

Other activities is really trying to get ahead of the game and looking at threat analytics but engineering some cyber solutions to prevent and mitigate some of the events that are occurring or the events that could cause damage to the equipment.

One of the things that we want to do is look at continued sharing of programs but also incident response and I think that is the next phase of which we must advance in is supporting the development of incident response capabilities so those tools and capabilities to identify where actors are on the system but also to prevent them from continuing to progress from a cyberattack point of view.

So our R&D program, we also have two strong university programs, one with the University of Illinois and one with the University of Arkansas, to develop the next generation solutions as well as partnerships with the national

1629	laboratories, looking at a moving target type activity to
1630	think about how could we make the system more dynamic.
1631	Mr. Kinzinger. And to drill down a little bit, it was
1632	mentioned, sir, in your testimony that the cyberattack on
1633	Ukraine, which the CIA attributes to Russian military
1634	hackers, we've experienced a number of attacks by state
1635	actors here.
1636	Does DOE plan for these kinds of coordinated attacks
1637	differently and what systems are in place to ensure that the
1638	DOE is receiving the most pertinent and up to date threat
1639	information from our intelligence agencies?
1640	Mr. Menezes. Right. I mean, as Pat Hoffman had
1641	testified earlier, the lessons that we learned with respect
1642	to the Ukraine.
1643	But I would like to point out that we work with NERC on
1644	the GridEx exercises where we have these kinds of situations
1645	and we bring industry in, government in, all the stakeholders
1646	in, and they participate in a real live situation, if you
1647	will, that brings to bear the most sophisticated approaches
1648	that we have seen to date.
1649	So it's been ongoing. It had been a success story by
1650	all measures. We gain a lot from that. The industry gains a

1651	lot from that. I can I can vouch from industry that you
1652	take those lessons learned and you implement them.
1653	And they could be as simple as revealing, for example,
1654	that you might need satellite phones, for example, because
1655	when you lose your power you need to be able to communicate
1656	and you need to have enough satellite phones.
1657	So it can be something as simple as that to something
1658	much more sophisticated to developing, you know, a more
1659	resilient software program, for example.
1660	Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
1661	And DOE has a long history of promoting a strong energy
1662	workforce and I think we all recognize the need for well-
1663	trained cybersecurity professionals in both the private and
1664	public sector.
1665	As part of the new announced Office of Cybersecurity,
1666	Energy Security, and Emergency Response, does DOE plan to
1667	engage in cybersecurity workforce development? For whoever
1668	wants to answer that.
1669	Mr. Menezes. Right, and that to repeat what we had
1670	previously said, the short answer is yes. We currently have
1671	in place training programs throughout the process, whether it
1672	be at the front end on, you know, on preparedness.

1673	We make sure that you have training, to anticipate,
1674	identify, you know, the new threat vectors, how to respond
1675	you know, how do you recover.
1676	And, of course, the what's most important is to have
1677	the innovative R&D in place. So while driven primarily by
1678	our labs together with industry it's important that we train
1679	the workforce, and the workforce is not just in the
1680	departments, you know, or the governments.
1681	It's in the industries themselves and it's not limited
1682	to just the big player in the industries but it's all the
1683	participants which we have in place right now to cover, you
1684	know, the large utilities of all sizes whether you're a muni
1685	or a co-op.
1686	So we are trying to develop and implement and train and
1687	maintain and enhance these programs.
1688	Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you all, and thanks for your
1689	service to the country.
1690	I yield back.
1691	Mr. Upton. Mr. Griffith.
1692	Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
1693	thank you, Mr. Undersecretary, for being here. I appreciate
1694	all your work on emergency response and Puerto Rico, and I

1695	know you're passionate about trying to make everything safer.
1696	I am going to shift gears a little bit. My colleagues
1697	have asked some great questions on what we already have and I
1698	appreciate that, and my colleague on the other side of the
1699	aisle, Congressman Loebsack, touched on this earlier and
1700	asked you all to get back with him on whether the new
1701	pipelines with more technologies are more vulnerable than
1702	older ones already in the ground.
1703	I would hope that you would include me in whatever
1704	response you give him because I am interested in that.
1705	And we have a new pipeline that's being built in my
1706	district and a lot of my constituents are concerned about all
1707	kinds of issues.
1708	And so I would also ask, and not expecting you to have
1709	an answer today, but also ask that you take a look at what
1710	can we do as far as making sure that the new pipelines have
1711	technology in them that lets us know if there's an earthquake
1712	in the area, a collapse somewhere.
1713	The faster that people know about it the faster we can
1714	respond. Folks are very concerned about, you know, possible
1715	breaches.
1716	I've mentioned natural disasters but it could also be

bad actors from outside. And also I think maybe we need to look and would like your help in figuring out if we need to draft legislation that would get DOE in on the front end, as Mr. Loebsack pointed out, because, you know, I am not sure that FERC is looking at, okay, how can we make this pipeline less vulnerable -- should we move it away from the more occupied area of a particular -- let's say we have a farm. Should we move it away from where the house and the barn are and -- to an area that's less likely both to be attacked by bad actors or to create a problem should there be some kind of an issue. Likewise on that same vein -- I am going to give you a second here but I just want to get it all out before I forget something -- it would also seem to me that DOE would want to know who had extra capacity and a new pipeline with the right kind of technology could tell you instantly whether or not they had the ability to take on more natural gas at a particular moment should there be a failure in some other area so that we can get that natural gas to where it needs to go by rerouting it possibly.

my district, one going through Bob Goodlatte's and other

And we've got two coming through Virginia, one through

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1739	districts.
1740	While we are laying this pipe is the time to put in any
1741	new innovations and new thoughts into that, and I am just
1742	hoping that DOE has some thoughts and plans.
1743	And I will give you an opportunity to respond to that
1744	now but also ask that you get back to me on all those
1745	thoughts that are important to me intellectually but also
1746	important to the constituents in my district that they
1747	want to feel a little bit safer about this pipeline coming
1748	through their back yard.
1749	Mr. Menezes. Well, thank you for the series of
1750	questions and the commentary. Of course, we you know, we
1751	agree with the issues that you have identified. If I can
1752	just take a quick crack at it, if you will, Pat, and then I
1753	will defer to you.
1754	But, first of all, with respect to developing the
1755	technology on the on the resiliency side of it, first of
1756	all, you hit on a key point.
1757	As you know, our system is becoming more and more open.
1758	We are actually excited about all the possibilities of
1759	getting more inputs on either side of the meter. Individuals
1760	will to be able to gain input.

1761	We are we are increasing the flexibility of our grid
1762	for a variety of good reasons make it more resilient, more
1763	reliable. However, every time we make it smarter it's a new
1764	entry it's a potentially new entry.
1765	So in my conversations with the lab directors, for
1766	example, whom we meet with regularly on this, as they're
1767	developing ways to make things more efficient or greater
1768	access, more individuals who can get electrons you know,
1769	produce whatever they want when they want it, as an example,
1770	I make sure that my message to them is as you develop that
1771	new technology, please, at the front end, design it in such a
1772	way that it is resilient and it is secure. And so that
1773	message is out and they are they are doing that. So
1774	that's on that question.
1775	With respect to the question on the extra capacity to
1776	take on more natural gas, I will say that we work with our
1777	other partners. I mean, we work with FERC. We work with
1778	NERC.
1779	We are aware of the interoperability issues there. We
1780	are also aware of other potential issues that might give
1781	rise, when you're talking about sharing market information
1782	and that kind of thing. So those things have to be looked at

1783	and considered carefully.
1784	But the short answer is yes, to the extent that as we
1785	are making these improvements and we are spending these
1786	resources and we are developing these programs and we are
1787	improving technologies, I think you can look at it
1788	holistically, if I can use that word, to describe what you
1789	were discussing.
1790	And with that, I will pass it to Pat if she wishes to
1791	say something.
1792	Ms. Hoffman. Just really quick, adding the resiliency
1793	looks at looking at four and minus one contingency or
1794	single point of failures.
1795	I think also another point that I would like to bring up
1796	is you're absolutely right, having the ability to increase
1797	the amount of sensors in the system to be able to predict and
1798	get ahead of the game as we look at failures as a critical
1799	component that we think is an important part of our program
1800	in improving resilience.
1801	Mr. Griffith. I appreciate it, and I yield back, Mr.
1802	Chairman.
1803	Mr. Upton. Mr. Johnson.
1804	Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to

1805	thank both of you for being here today. Such a such an
1806	important topic, cybersecurity, particularly as it relates to
1807	energy and our energy infrastructure.
1808	I dare say that most people don't really think about the
1809	implications of cybersecurity when it comes to infrastructure
1810	and the importance of it.
1811	So when looking at emerging cybersecurity risk and
1812	particularly threats of the highest consequence to energy
1813	infrastructure, it seems critical to me that DOE have full
1814	visibility on the greatest infrastructure risks and
1815	consequences.
1816	Do you believe, Mr. Undersecretary, at this point that
1817	DOE has sufficient visibility to day on what those risks and
1818	vulnerabilities are?
1819	Mr. Menezes. Well, we are doing we have currently
1820	we have sufficient visibility but it is the future that we
1821	need to anticipate. And so today's hearing is about how it
1822	is that these increasing threats will require us to have
1823	greater visibility in the resources which is why we've set up
1824	this office that we affectionately refer to as CESER.
1825	Mr. Johnson. Yes.
1826	Mr. Menezes. So it is we are looking we are doing

1827	okay today, as several members have identified. It seems as
1828	though while we have the constant threats we've been able to,
1829	you know, avoid a major catastrophe.
1830	But we want to make sure that going forward we have the
1831	visibility and the resources. I think Ms. Hoffman would like
1832	to say something.
1833	Mr. Johnson. Sure.
1834	Ms. Hoffman. I think it's important to continue to
1835	support the information sharing between industry and the
1836	Department of Energy in understanding the number of events
1837	that are going out.
1838	The critical need, as the undersecretary has talked
1839	about, is moving forward that we want to get ahead, we
1840	want to see what the next generation threats are.
1841	And so that close public-private partnership and
1842	information sharing and the flexibility and the freedom for
1843	the industry to voluntarily share information with the
1844	department is absolutely important.
1845	Mr. Johnson. Okay. I am encouraged by that answer
1846	because I've long held the belief and I still do that this is
1847	not this is not an issue that has an ending to it.
1848	I mean, this is not a race that we are going to run and

1849	cross the finish line. As soon as we figure out how to keep
1850	the bad guys from getting into our networks, especially in
1851	the digital world where everything is connected, as soon as
1852	we figure that out, we've got another problem right on the
1853	tail end of that.
1854	So I appreciate that there's a forward look and an
1855	understanding that that's the case. So what measures can you
1856	take to increase visibility of security threats today?
1857	Now, you mentioned some of them. You have created this
1858	office. Can you give us some examples of what some of the
1859	future look areas are?
1860	Mr. Menezes. I will take the you know, the larger
1861	view and I will defer then to Ms. Hoffman on the specifics.
1862	But the creation of the CESER or the establishment of
1863	the CESER program is just an initial step and we are taking
1864	existing programs and putting it in.
1865	Our vision, though, is much greater and so we want to
1866	work with this committee and other members of Congress you
1867	know, the White House, our other agencies to actually put
1868	in place other programs, projects, and the resources to
1869	anticipate the increasing threat.
1870	And so that's the big picture and that's why it's

1871	important, we think, to set this up and have it under an
1872	assistant secretary.
1873	Mr. Johnson. Okay.
1874	Ms. Hoffman. So I would just add three things. It's
1875	really active threat investigations, so going after and
1876	looking at future threats and tactics and techniques that a
1877	bad actor would utilize against the system. So it's really
1878	being proactive, moving forward.
1879	It's continuing to support the threat analysis programs
1880	such as the CRISP program where we are actively looking at
1881	indicators and looking at sharing of information, whether
1882	it's an indicator that's discovered by industry or by the
1883	federal government and allowing that to be shared with
1884	industry as quickly as possible.
1885	And then it's really getting to the point that we can
1886	get to machine-to-machine sharing and we can get proactive
1887	whether it's with our official intelligence, whether it's
1888	with other capabilities.
1889	But it's very I would say going from the current
1890	understanding mode to more of a proactive mode are the areas
1891	that we want to move forward on.
1892	Mr. Johnson. You know, one of the things that when I

1893	when I was on active duty in the Air Force even as far
1894	back as the as the mid-'90s as the world began to be
1895	interconnected and we started talking about things like
1896	network-centric warfare and the digital age and what that
1897	meant to national security, risk management and risk
1898	assessment was began to be pushed down in the Department
1899	of Defense as part of our overall culture. So it's one thing
1900	to have our leaders talking about it.
1901	I know I am over my time. Can you give us 30 seconds on
1902	what you're doing to make risk assessment and risk management
1903	where cybersecurity is part of the culture in DOE?
1904	Ms. Hoffman. Just really quick we have a risk
1905	management tool that we've provided and work with industry
1906	on. We have a cyber capabilities maturity model, which is
1907	also a risk assessment tool.
1908	The industry is looking at the NIST risk assessment
1909	capabilities. So that is being filtered down. But it is a
1910	continual process that we want to show in advance. And so
1911	there are tools and best practices that the legislation has
1912	recognized and it's very important a success in industry
1913	for advancing those capabilities.
1914	Mr. Johnson. Okay. Well, thank you very much.

1915	Mr. Chairman, thanks for the indulgence and I yield
1916	back.
1917	Mr. Upton. Mr. Long.
1918	Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Menezes,
1919	when you opened this morning you mentioned I believe that the
1920	cyber threat from the bad actors, sometimes it boils down to
1921	their artificial intelligence attacking our systems and our
1922	defense is our artificial intelligence trying to prevent
1923	their artificial can you speak to that for just 30 seconds
1924	and kind of I mean, that's a
1925	Mr. Menezes. I will let
1926	Mr. Long can of very severe worms, I think.
1927	Mr. Menezes. I will let Ms. Hoffman answer that one.
1928	Ms. Hoffman. So when so when we talk about
1929	cybersecurity, it's really looking at information,
1930	technology, and control system technology.
1931	But a lot of it is layering computer protections against
1932	computer attacks and computer protections, and so you keep
1933	layering on, you know, different information technology
1934	solutions to thwart information-based attacks on the system.
1935	So it becomes an information and a controlled system but
1936	a capability of an actor to use that information technology

1937	against the industry and so it becomes a very broad attack
1938	surface.
1939	And so what we need to do is think about what is the
1940	right information technology placement in industry that
1941	provides the capability industry requires but doesn't provide
1942	that broader attack surface.
1943	Mr. Long. Kind of reminds me of a friend of mine 40
1944	years ago that had a restaurant and he said that he laid
1945	awake half the night trying to figure out how to keep his
1946	employees from stealing from him.
1947	But the problem was that his employees laid awake the
1948	other half of the night trying to circumvent his new system.
1949	So, Mr. Menezes, as we live in an increasingly digitized
1950	world with the ever-growing threat of cybersecurity attacks,
1951	I think it would be important for the Department of Energy to
1952	identify the greatest security risk in order to mitigate
1953	potential damage.
1954	How does the Department of Energy prioritize any
1955	security risk and how are you working with private energy
1956	asset owners to plan for the possibility of cyberattacks?
1957	Mr. Menezes. Well, our priorities are typically a
1958	result of what we are seeing and what we are anticipating.

1959	So it's in real time because information that we gathered
1960	both you and Congressman Johnson mentioned the digitalization
1961	of our systems and, indeed, we are producing not only more
1962	data but more access points as all of our systems become more
1963	digitized.
1964	So when we prioritize those things that we are
1965	addressing, it is obviously we have to address those
1966	threats that we know as those threats are evolving. I mean,
1967	that's the first thing.
1968	We have to continue everything we've done in the past
1969	because they can always revert to prior technology, so we
1970	can't ignore that. We build on we build on what we know
1971	and then we try to anticipate where we think the next threats
1972	are coming from.
1973	So we have to we have to make sure that we can
1974	respond to what we know and we have to be able to identify
1975	those threats.
1976	As I mentioned earlier, we have a lot of hits on our
1977	systems. They could appear random. Because of our modelling
1978	techniques it could be that we are we are witnessing ways
1979	new ways that they are trying to figure out ways to gain
1980	access to the system.

1981	So we need to make sure that we have that priority in
1982	place so we can almost see into the future, if you will, to
1983	make our current system resilient to those to those
1984	threats.
1985	Mr. Long. Okay. And you also talk a lot in your
1986	testimony about the Department of Energy working with the
1987	Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and
1988	the FBI on energy sector cybersecurity.
1989	As the sector-specific agency for cybersecurity in the
1990	energy sector, what is the Department of Energy's role during
1991	a potential cyberattack on the energy infrastructure?
1992	Mr. Menezes. I will defer to Pat.
1993	Ms. Hoffman. So in the event of a cyberattack, I mean,
1994	first of all, we coordinate very closely with industry in
1995	looking at what is the event what is happening on the
1996	system.
1997	We coordinate the primary function through the National
1998	Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center the
1999	NCCIC at DHS, which is the focal point for cyber coordination
2000	in the federal government. So we will work with them. We
2001	will work with the FBI as well.
2002	We will look at the capabilities that industry has for

2003	dealing with this attack, trying to understand what is the
2004	cause the root cause of the attack but then also work with
2005	industry on providing mitigation measures and any support
2006	that's needed.
2007	We would utilize NERC and the ISAC for getting
2008	information out to the rest of industry from a prevention and
2009	preparedness point of view and that capability is very strong
2010	and used, is aware across the all the sectors of the
2011	industry to pay attention.
2012	Mr. Long. Okay. Thank you.
2013	I have run out of time so, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
2014	Mr. Upton. Mr. Walberg.
2015	Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
2016	highlighting my legislation, H.R. 5174, as part of this
2017	hearing, and I appreciate the panel being here, Mr. Menezes
2018	and Ms. Hoffman, and your attention to these concerns.
2019	Back when the Department of Energy was organized as a
2020	Cabinet agency back when I was in graduate school in 1977,
2021	the largest energy security concern was fuel supply
2022	disruptions, not electricity disruptions or cybersecurity, as
2023	we are talking about now.
2024	As you would expect, the department's Organization Act

2025	reflected those concerns. Times have changed and we should
2026	be thinking differently now about energy security and
2027	emergency preparedness. So I am glad we are doing that here
2028	today.
2029	Mr. Menezes, the secretary's efforts to elevate the
2030	agency's leadership on emergency and cybersecurity functions
2031	are commendable. But I would like to see DOE leadership
2032	continue under future administrations. It can't be catch as
2033	catch can. We need that continuity.
2034	Do you think it would help to codify DOE's assistant
2035	secretary functions into DOE Organization Act?
2036	Mr. Menezes. Well, thank you for that question,
2037	Congressman, and let me take a minute to express our
2038	appreciation for working with the committee and its efforts
2039	to review our DOE structure and its authorizing statutes.
2040	Your staff and members other members have been very -
2041	- work in a very collaborative way to try to identify ways to
2042	as we seek to realign and modernize the department that
2043	you seek to modernize the enabling statutes.
2044	So we support the effort. We appreciate the
2045	collaboration and exchange of information and we continue to
2046	look forward with you as you move legislation through the

2047	process.
2048	Mr. Walberg. In H.R. 5174, we specify functions to
2049	include emergency planning coordination response. Can you
2050	talk about your work to elevate these functions in the new
2051	office?
2052	Mr. Menezes. Right. Well, and the secretary announced
2053	the setting up of CESER. That's going to be that is a
2054	clear demonstration of his commitment and his organizational
2055	vision for the department, to highlight it, to increase the
2056	visibility, to coordinate efforts, and to be a source of
2057	additional guidance from Congress, the White House, and other
2058	agencies.
2059	So he's committed to that and he's showing it in a very
2060	real and measurable way.
2061	So that's what we are proposing and that's what we are
2062	doing. And then we look forward to working with you, the
2063	appropriators, others, you know, to ensure that it has the
2064	adequate resources it needs to accomplish the goals that we
2065	hope it accomplishes.
2066	Mr. Walberg. Ms. Hoffman.
2067	Ms. Hoffman. I would just like to add to what the
2068	undersecretary said that any sort of event that occurs the

2069	effective response really is built off of information sharing
2070	and coordination.
2071	So in the preparedness when we are conducting exercises,
2072	when we are sharing classified threat briefings, when we are
2073	coordinating with the intelligence community, it's all
2074	critical components of how we support preparedness and so
2075	that we are actively coordinating ahead of any event that may
2076	occur and that will be allow the federal government and
2077	industry to be very efficient in making sure that we
2078	understand the cause the root causes but also the
2079	opportunities for mitigations and restoration.
2080	Mr. Walberg. Good. So, clearly, you will work with us
2081	to identify any gaps with of authority or ambiguities
2082	maybe I should have left that word out in the system so we
2083	can make sure it continues to work.
2084	Mr. Menezes. Yes, sir.
2085	Mr. Walberg. Let me ask one more question, Mr. Menezes.
2086	Do you believe that elevating cybersecurity functions to a
2087	Senate-confirmed assistant secretary level will help
2088	intergovernmental and interagency communication as well as
2089	multidirectional information sharing with DOE's ability to
2090	appropriately and quickly address cyber-related emergencies?

2091	Mr. Menezes. I do. The key point the key part about
2092	being a Senate-confirmed appointee is the accountability that
2093	you have to maintain with the two branches of government.
2094	You're in the executive branch and you're confirmed by
2095	the Senate, and so it forces you to work with Congress and to
2096	fully explain yourself to the executive branch.
2097	Secondly, it increases the visibility and the
2098	accountability. So as of today, we come up here regularly to
2099	testify and so it's a way that we can ensure that we have
2100	we are doing what we said we were going to do and we are
2101	doing what you think that we told you that we were going to
2102	do, and you can give us instructions as to, you know, how we
2103	can better do what we need to do.
2104	Mr. Walberg. Thank you, and you can review the acronyms
2105	too, as you come up.
2106	I yield back.
2107	Mr. Upton. Mr. Duncan.
2108	Mr. Duncan. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You saved the
2109	best for last, I guess. Maybe.
2110	There's been a lot of talk today about electromagnetic
2111	pulse and grid hardening. You know, solar flares, coronal
2112	mass ejections, CMEs, resulting geomagnetic storm effects are

2113 real.

So EMPs could be manmade and be a natural event, and we sort of discount the natural event but just did a little research -- 1989 we had a huge CME event that knocked out power to 6 million people in northeastern Canada, and we just missed another one this year in 2017 where a huge solar flare happened and the Earth just was not in its path, thank goodness, and thank God we weren't.

But we are not immune to that happening in the future. So too many times when we talk about EMPs, people look at us like we have on a tinfoil hat -- that we are talking about some rogue state possibly launching a nuclear weapon in to the atmosphere above the Earth and creating an EMP and knocking out our power grid. That's a real possibility too when rogue states have nuclear weapons.

So whether it's a natural EMP or whether it's manmade, we've got to be prepared for it and one thing that I talk about a lot in this committee is my alma mater, Clemson University, and they partner with Savannah River site -- the Savannah River National Laboratory, rather -- DOE, regional utilities, and stakeholders to develop the nation's largest grid emulator, the 20 MVA Duke Energy e-grid and are working

2135	on the next phase, a high-voltage transmission scale user
2136	facility that can be used to test large-power transformers
2137	and other critical transmission assets to develop protection
2138	schemes from cyber and EMP attacks both cyber and EMP
2139	attacks.
2140	It's a prime example of enhancing grid security through
2141	public-private partnerships, which is the title of one of the
2142	bills we are reviewing today.
2143	So I encourage DOE to continue looking for these
2144	opportunities, especially since the new Office of
2145	Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response. I
2146	guess you're going to pronounce that as CESER. Everything in
2147	government has an acronym, right?
2148	Can you further discuss what CESER's plans to harden the
2149	grid and protect the EMPs are? Either one.
2150	Ms. Hoffman. So thank you for the question.
2151	As you are well aware, the department takes an all-
2152	hazard approach. So we are looking at a multitude of threats
2153	that face the electric grid and the energy industry.
2154	The national laboratories have important testing
2155	capabilities. You mentioned one of them. There are several
2156	capabilities that we are utilizing from an EMP perspective.

2157	We have partnership with the we have partnered with the
2158	industry in looking at an EMP strategy.
2159	We have also worked with EPRI as they're looking at
2160	their mitigation and testing plan. We are looking at what
2161	the department can do to support EMP testing. As you
2162	know, it's a very expensive process to do EMP testing.
2163	Mr. Duncan. You mentioned the cost but were you
2164	familiar with what Clemson is doing, before today?
2165	Ms. Hoffman. Yes, I am familiar with Clemson several
2166	other activities in the labs.
2167	Mr. Duncan. Have you visited the research facility in
2168	Charleston, South Carolina, or has anybody from DOE done
2169	that?
2170	Ms. Hoffman. I don't know if visited that facility but
2171	I've visited the
2172	Mr. Duncan. Can I invite you on behalf of my alma mater
2173	to visit the drivetrain and test facility in Charleston,
2174	South Carolina?
2175	Ms. Hoffman. Yes, sir.
2176	Mr. Duncan. Both of you?
2177	Mr. Menezes. Yes, sir.
2178	Mr. Duncan. Okay.

2179	Let me shift gears real quick. President Trump has
2180	talked about a huge infrastructure package and we are talking
2181	about within Congress and I guess TNI is working on this
2182	package.
2183	When people think about infrastructure they think about
2184	roads, bridges, water, sewer, airports, port deepening, et
2185	cetera.
2186	But grid hardening and our transmission of power
2187	supplies, so talking about I think Morgan Griffith talked
2188	about natural gas pipelines and other things. But are
2189	elements within DOE, discussing with the White House and
2190	members of Congress, specifically probably TNI Committee
2191	transportation and infrastructure plans to include grid
2192	hardening and cybersecurity as part of the infrastructure
2193	package or elements within the DOE having those
2194	conversations?
2195	Mr. Menezes. Well, thank you for the question and
2196	pointing out the importance of the issue and the
2197	opportunities to work with everyone who's working on the
2198	infrastructure bill and who will be working on the
2199	infrastructure bill.
2200	To be sure, you know, a resilient strong operating

2201	energy system relies on infrastructure and so those component
2202	parts should be part of an infrastructure bill to the extent
2203	that it's necessary.
2204	The secretary, in fact, is testifying today in the
2205	Senate in the other body, excuse me.
2206	Mr. Duncan. On this subject?
2207	Mr. Menezes. Excuse me on the other body on the
2208	infrastructure on the president's infrastructure bill.
2209	And so
2210	Mr. Duncan. So let me just because my time is
2211	running out
2212	Mr. Menezes. So energy is a
2213	Mr. Duncan is this a priority for the White House
2214	with regard to an infrastructure package grid hardening
2215	and cyber security as part of the infrastructure package and
2216	should it be?
2217	Mr. Menezes. I know that energy components are a part.
2218	I am not sure if they if the phrase hardening would be in
2219	
2220	Mr. Duncan. Let me encourage you to go back to
2221	Secretary Perry and go back to your bosses and others in the
2222	White House you have conversations with and let's make this a

2223	priority in the upcoming infrastructure package.
2224	But I can tell you it's going to be a priority of a
2225	number of people here in Congress.
2226	Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. With that, I yield back.
2227	Mr. Walberg. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman.
2228	Seeing that there are no further members wishing to
2229	Mr. Rush. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
2230	Mr. Walberg. Mr. Rush.
2231	Mr. Rush. Before we adjourn, I want to ask unanimous
2232	consent to allow me to ask the Secretary a couple of
2233	questions.
2234	Mr. Walberg. Without objection.
2235	Mr. Rush. Mr. Secretary, I understand that the
2236	Secretary will be appearing before the committee in the near
2237	future to discuss the Department's fiscal year 2019 budget
2238	request.
2239	The Department routinely provides detailed budget
2240	justification to Congress. But a number of the detailed buy-
2241	ins of the fiscal year 2019 request are not available. Does
2242	the Department plan to release Volumes II, III, V, and VI
2243	prior to the Secretary's appearance before the committee?
2244	Mr. Menezes. We plan to release it when it's complete.

2245	Yes, sir.
2246	Mr. Rush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
2247	Mr. Walberg. I thank the gentleman.
2248	Again, seeing that there are no further members wishing
2249	to ask questions, I would like to thank the panel for being
2250	with us today and providing us the answers and probably
2251	further questions that we'll have down the road.
2252	Mr. Menezes. Happy to answer any questions for the
2253	record. Thank you.
2254	Mr. Walberg. Thank you, sir.
2255	We'll change panels here now, and move on with the
2256	continuation of the hearing.
2257	[Pause.]
2258	We appreciate the quick changeover here and we want to
2259	thank all of our witnesses for being here today and taking
2260	the time to testify before our subcommittee.
2261	Today's witnesses will have the opportunity to give
2262	opening statements followed by a round of questions from
2263	members.
2264	Our second witness panel for today's hearing includes
2265	Tristan Vance, director chief energy officer, Indiana
2266	Office of Energy Development welcome; Zachary Tudor,

2267	associate laboratory director for National and Homeland
2268	Security Idaho National Laboratory welcome; Mark Engel,
2269	senior enterprise security advisor, Dominion Energy
2270	welcome to you; Kyle Pitsor, vice president, government
2271	relations, National Electrical Manufacturers Association
2272	welcome you; and Scott Aaronson, vice president, security and
2273	preparedness, Edison Electric Institute. Welcome.
2274	We appreciate you all being here today. We'll begin
2275	the panel with Mr. Tristan Vance, and you are now recognized
2276	for five minutes to give an opening statement and I am sure
2277	you're well aware of the lighting format.
2278	Welcome. We recognize you.

2279	STATEMENTS OF TRISTAN VANCE, DIRECTOR, CHIEF ENERGY OFFICER,
2280	INDIANA OFFICE OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT; ZACHARY TUDOR,
2281	ASSOCIATE LABORATORY DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL AND HOMELAND
2282	SECURITY, IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY; MARK ENGELS, SENIOR
2283	ENTERPRISE SECURITY ADVISOR, DOMINION ENERGY; KYLE PITSOR,
2284	VICE PRESIDENT, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, NATIONAL ELECTRICAL
2285	MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION; SCOTT AARONSON, VICE PRESIDENT,
2286	SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE
2287	
2288	STATEMENT OF MR. VANCE
2289	Mr. Vance. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
2290	Member Rush, and members of the subcommittee.
2291	I am Tristan Vance, the director of the Indiana Office
2292	of Energy Development. I also serve as the chief energy
2293	officer for the state of Indiana and I am testifying on
2294	behalf of the National Association of State Energy Officials
2295	NASEO.
2296	Our testimony is in support of H.R. 5174, the Energy
2297	Emergency Leadership Act, H.R. 5175, Pipeline and LNG
2298	Facilities cybersecurity Preparedness Act, H.R. 5239, the
2299	Cyber Sense Act, and H.R. 5240, the Enhancing Grid Security
2300	Through Public-Private Partnership Act.

2301	We appreciate the subcommittee's actions on energy
2302	emergency preparedness as demonstrated by the passage of H.R.
2303	3050, which reauthorized appropriations for the U.S. State
2304	Energy Program SEP and strengthened its emergency and
2305	cybersecurity provisions.
2306	Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rush, Full Committee
2307	Chairman Walden, Ranking Member Pallone, and the original
2308	sponsored of the SEP legislation and sponsors of the Dear
2309	Colleague letter calling for \$70 million for the SEP program,
2310	Mr. Tonko and Mr. McKinley, you all deserve special praise
2311	for your leadership.
2312	My state energy director colleagues from across the
2313	country visited Washington, D.C. in February and strongly
2314	encouraged many of your Senate colleagues to act on H.R.
2315	3050.
2316	First, NASEO would like to note the U.S. Department of
2317	Energy's exceptional response to last year's hurricanes. The
2318	support for energy the support for energy emergency
2319	response from DOE combined with SEP resources, collaboration
2320	among states, tribal, and local governments and industry
2321	worked to save lives and lessen economic losses.
2322	In particular, the electric and petroleum industries'

2323	efforts to restore services were exceptional. Secretary
2324	Perry's call for the cybersecurity, Energy Security, and
2325	Emergency Response Office, or CESER, would further improve
2326	both states' and the nation's ability to respond to and
2327	mitigate the risks of energy supply disruption from all
2328	hazards.
2329	NASEO's 2017 bipartisan recommendation to the Trump
2330	administration called for such action. In my capacity as a
2331	NASEO board member, I co-chaired the NASEO transition task
2332	force which developed this important recommendation.
2333	We believe such action will save lives and protect the
2334	economy of communities in every region of the country.
2335	The Energy Emergency Leadership Act will elevate this
2336	core DOE function and we strongly support the bill. I also
2337	want to stress the importance of CESER having a well-defined
2338	state energy security program and robust program management
2339	resources.
2340	A strong DOE state energy emergency partnership such as
2341	the one that exists today in the DOE Office of Infrastructure
2342	Security and Energy Restoration is critical to respond to
2343	emergencies effectively.
2344	Joint state-federal coordination and data sharing is the

2345	heart of emergency response. In Indiana, for example, the
2346	propane crisis in 2014 needed a rapid response and
2347	government's ability to connect stakeholders from three
2348	sources in order to keep Hoosiers safe and protect our local
2349	economy from potentially devastating poultry industry losses.
2350	While our nation has not faced a cybersecurity event
2351	with significant energy supply impacts, we should adopt the
2352	lessons learned from recent natural disasters for our cyber
2353	preparedness.
2354	We share the subcommittee's concerns and the threat
2355	cybersecurity presents to the energy system electricity,
2356	natural gas, and petroleum.
2357	A cyberattack to the energy system during a natural
2358	disaster is a horrific scenario. However, we must address
2359	such possibilities.
2360	For example, the DOE-NASEO-NARUC Liberty Eclipse
2361	emergency exercise in 2016 focused on a combined cyber and
2362	natural disaster event.
2363	These low-cost regional exercises are essential. We
2364	also strongly support H.R. 5239 and H.R. 5240 and believe
2365	states can leverage these activities. They build upon the
2366	work of utilities, DOE, and the states.

2367	For example, in Indiana we created the Indiana Executive
2368	Council on Cybersecurity to lead a public-private partnership
2369	and have created a state-led exercise series focused on SCADA
2370	systems for electric and water utilities.
2371	Equally important is mitigating energy system risks.
2372	For example, states using public-private partnerships such as
2373	the energy such as energy savings performance contracting
2374	to upgrade energy systems at mission critical facilities and
2375	we are working with DOE's Clean Cities program to add natural
2376	gas, propane, and electric vehicles in first responder fleets
2377	to enhance resiliency.
2378	NASEO believes the four bills discussed today are a
2379	significant step forward on an urgent nonpartisan national
2380	security issue. We greatly appreciate the subcommittee's
2381	continued leadership on these issues.
2382	Thank you.
2383	[The prepared statement of Mr. Vance follows:]
2384	
2385	********INSERT******

2386	Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
2387	I recognize Mr. Tudor for your five minutes of
2388	testimony.

2389	STATEMENT OF MR. TUDOR
2390	
2391	Mr. Tudor. Thank you, Chairman Upton, Ranking Member
2392	Rush, Mr. Walberg, and distinguished members of the committee
2393	for holding this hearing and inviting Idaho National
2394	Laboratory's testimony on the energy sector's cybersecurity
2395	and emergency response. I request that my written testimony
2396	be made part of the record.
2397	In my role at Idaho National Laboratory, also known as
2398	INL, I lead an organization that conducts research for the
2399	cyber and physical protection of critical infrastructure with
2400	an emphasis on the energy sector.
2401	INL has capabilities that will support the Department of
2402	Energy's Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and
2403	Emergency Response, or CESER, in achieving the new leadership
2404	role for critical infrastructure protection, consistent with
2405	the authorities directed in the FAST Act for assuring the
2406	energy sector's capabilities and coordination for cyber and
2407	physical protection of emergency response.
2408	Persistent, capable, well-resourced, and highly
2409	motivated cyber adversaries are a threat to our nation's
2410	energy sector. These adversaries continue to develop the

2411 skills, capabilities, and opportunities for potential 2412 compromise of the nation's energy infrastructure. 2413 The potential consequences of a sophisticated cyberattack create an imperative that federal agencies, labs, 2414 2415 and industries collaborate to build capabilities and develop 2416 innovations that reduce the unacceptable risks associated with a cyberattack. 2417 2418 DOE, INL, and our other national laboratory partners are 2419 providing leadership and resources to assure that the nation 2420 has detective capabilities to reduce these risks. 2421 These capabilities include a broad array of science and engineering programs, extensive teams of multidisciplinary 2422 2423 national laboratory researches, unique user facilities and 2424 test beds for experimentation at scale, and a breadth of 2425 collaborative relationships with industry, universities, and 2426 federal agencies. 2427 With regard to reducing cyber risks, INL's Cybercore 2428 Integration Center, known as Cybercore, performs research, development, testing, and evaluation of technologies and 2429 2430 information products to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber 2431 vulnerabilities and intrusions. 2432 When shared through public-private partnerships, these

2433 solutions create barriers to attack, mitigate the 2434 consequences of an attack, and enable rapid restoration of 2435 energy sector operations. Specific examples of technology advancement that are 2436 2437 reducing risks include, with DOE and other agencies, INL 2438 supported the recovery and information sharing in response to 2439 the cyberattack on Ukraine's electric grid. After our post-2440 event analysis, INL developed and is conducting unique cyber 2441 strike workshops for U.S. asset owners and operators to learn 2442 how to protect against similar attacks. 2443 INL developed and completed a pilot study of our 2444 consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering methodology, or 2445 CCE, with Florida Power and Light. 2446 CCE leverages an organization's knowledge and 2447 experiences to engineer out the potential and highest -- for 2448 the highest consequence cyber events. Briefings of the 2449 study's results were shared with the Section 9 electric 2450 utility partners, congressional staffers, and government 2451 leaders. A second pilot is currently underway. 2452 INL also is advising the National Security Council on 2453 implementing the methodology with a larger set of 2454 participants.

2455 INL is one of several national laboratories providing 2456 technical information and strategic planning guidance to 2457 assist CESER develop -- leadership to develop infrastructures, capabilities and processes for reducing 2458 2459 cyber and physical risk. 2460 This includes providing principles to establish a 2461 research portfolio that delivers impactful solutions and response to cyber and all hazard threats, standards for 2462 2463 security-informed design to engineer in cyber physical protections for future grid infrastructure and next 2464 2465 generation energy systems, quidance on best practices for 2466 coordinating incident response with DHS and other federal and 2467 private organizations. 2468 Some examples of INL's current partnerships that are 2469 reducing cyber risks are research collaboration with the 2470 electric industry partners at the California Energy Systems 2471 for the 21st Century Program and Lawrence Livermore National 2472 Laboratory is leading to new capabilities for machine-to-2473 machine automated threat response. 2474 DOE's pilot program, cybersecurity for the operational 2475 technology environment, is providing a forum for situational 2476 awareness for cyber risks among industry partners and

2477	stakeholders.
2478	Examples I described demonstrate that DOE and INL are
2479	making significant progress in reducing the risks to our
2480	energy sector. However, with the increasing capabilities of
2481	our adversaries and the increasing complexity of our energy
2482	system technologies we will not completely eliminate all
2483	risks.
2484	Hence, INL will continue to prioritize initiatives that
2485	emphasize the advancement of protection and response
2486	capabilities that reduces risks. We do this with the
2487	understanding that the U.S. will continue to identify new
2488	requirements for technology and innovation, expect solutions
2489	through expansive organizational leadership, coordination,
2490	and integration, and prioritize funding and focus for
2491	research.
2492	I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
2493	[The prepared statement of Mr. Tudor follows:]
2494	
2495	********INSERT******

2496 Mr. Walberg. Thank you.

2497 Mr. Engels, you're recognized.

2498 STATEMENT OF MR. ENGELS 2499 2500 Mr. Engels. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rush, and 2501 members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 2502 testify. 2503 My name is Mark Engels and I am a senior enterprise security advisor at Dominion Energy. Dominion Energy is one 2504 2505 of the largest producers and transporters of energy with a portfolio of approximately 26,200 megawatts of electricity 2506 generation, 6,600 miles of electric and transmission and 2507 2508 distribution lines, 15,000 miles of natural gas pipeline, and 2509 the Cove Point liquefied natural gas facility in Maryland. 2510 We operate one of the largest natural gas storage 2511 systems in the U.S. with one trillion cubic feet of capacity 2512 and serve more than 6 million utility and retail customers. 2513 I've been with Dominion Energy almost 40 years and with 2514 a focus on cybersecurity for 19 of those years. 2515 representative from Dominion Energy, I appreciate the 2516 opportunity to provide comments and input to this committee 2517 and applaud the committee's focus to advance public-private 2518 partnership between the Department of Energy and the oil and 2519 natural gas sector.

2520	For Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, both the
2521	Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security in
2522	coordination with the Department of Transportation function
2523	as the sector-specific agencies for natural gas pipelines and
2524	LNG.
2525	The fact that pipelines have two SSAs comprised of three
2526	different federal agencies cannot be understated, especially
2527	when it comes to interagency coordination in advance of,
2528	during, and post-incident operations.
2529	The key to this coordination is maintaining a productive
2530	relationships between the energy government coordination
2531	councils' two co-chairs DOE and DHS and the oil and
2532	natural gas sector coordinating council.
2533	The ONG SEC is comprised of owners and operators from
2534	20-plus industry trade associations representing all aspects
2535	of the oil and natural gas sector.
2536	I encourage DOE and TSA, who has regulatory authority
2537	for pipeline security, to develop a memo of understanding
2538	that outlines roles and responsibilities for dealing with
2539	cyber and physical security of natural gas pipelines and LNG.
2540	TSA already has an MOU with the Department of
2541	Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety

2542	Administration, or PHMSA, which has responsibility for
2543	pipeline safety.
2544	The recent announcement of DOE's new Office of
2545	Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response should
2546	continue to improve the coordination for pipeline, cyber, and
2547	physical security.
2548	The language in H.R. 5175 Section 22 could introduce
2549	complexity and confusion when it comes to DOE's involvements
2550	with states. Individual pipeline companies, Dominion Energy
2551	included, already have longstanding relationships with state
2552	emergency response organizations, public utility commissions,
2553	and law enforcement for all hazard events.
2554	H.R. 5175 directs DOE to focus on advanced cybersecurity
2555	applications, pilot demonstrations, develop workforce
2556	curricula, and provide mechanisms to help the energy sector
2557	evaluate, prioritize, and improve physical and cybersecurity
2558	capabilities.
2559	Dominion Energy has worked with DOE and several national
2560	labs on a number of efforts that align with the proposed
2561	legislation.
2562	They include being a peer reviewer for the Department of
2563	Energy's Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems Program,

2564	participation into workforce and training efforts, Cyber
2565	Strike a hands-on workshop communicating lessons learned
2566	associated with the Ukraine grid attacks and Attack, an
2567	approached developed by INL to aggregate and evaluate cyber
2568	risk-related information.
2569	Dominion Energy is a member of both the downstream
2570	natural gas and electricity information sharing and analysis
2571	centers, both who have benefited both of which have
2572	benefited from intelligence provided by DOE's Cybersecurity
2573	Risk Information Sharing Program, or CRISP.
2574	Dominion's Dominion Energy and other national and
2575	other natural gas pipeline companies have worked very closely
2576	with TSA and DOE on cyber and physical security to build a
2577	partnership based on trust and respect.
2578	The proposed legislation should make sure that roles and
2579	responsibilities are clearly defined and understandable by
2580	pipeline operators who ultimately have to face the growing
2581	threat every day.
2582	Thank you again for the opportunity to provide comments
2583	and I will be glad to answer any of your questions.
2584	[The prepared statement of Mr. Engels follows:]
2585	

2586 *********INSERT******

2587 Mr. Walberg. Thank you.

2588 Mr. Pitsor.

2589	STATEMENT OF MR. PITSOR
2590	
2591	Mr. Pitsor. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
2592	Member Rush, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
2593	opportunity to testify on such an important topic today, the
2594	physical and cybersecurity of our nation's electric system.
2595	My name is Kyle Pitsor, vice president of government
2596	relations for National Electrical Manufacturers Association,
2597	representing about 350 manufacturers of electrical equipment
2598	and medical imaging technologies.
2599	NEMA and our member manufacturers have made
2600	cybersecurity a top priority. As the manufacturers of
2601	essential grid equipment, NEMA companies are a key line of
2602	defence against both physical and cyberattacks in the
2603	electricity transmission and distribution system.
2604	We understand that a secure product supply chain is
2605	inherent to a secure grid and cybersecurity aspects should be
2606	built into, not bolted onto manufacturers' products whenever
2607	possible.
2608	Manufacturers also understand that managing
2609	cybersecurity supply chain risk requires a collaborative
2610	effort and open lines of communication among electrical

2611 utility companies, federal and state and local governments, 2612 and suppliers of the full spectrum of grid systems and 2613 components, both hardware and software. 2614 I would like to mention briefly some of the industry 2615 wide efforts NEMA and its members have pursued to establish 2616 best practices for supply chain and manufacturer 2617 cybersecurity hygiene and then make a few comments on the 2618 Cyber Sense Act and the Enhancing Grid Security Through 2619 Public-Private Partnership Act. 2620 In 2005, the electrical industry took a step towards 2621 improving supply chains' security of manufacturers' products 2622 by publishing a technical best practices document that laid 2623 out the steps for securing supply chains. 2624 NEMA published a white paper on cybersecurity, supply 2625 chain best practices for manufacturers that addresses supply 2626 chain integrity through four phases of a product's life cycle 2627 -- the manufacturing, delivery, operation, and end of life of 2628 a product. This month in March, NEMA members have approved a new 2629 2630 technical document detailing industry best practice cyber 2631 hygiene principles for electrical manufacturers to implement 2632 in their manufacturing and engineering processes.

2633	The document raises a manufacturer's level of
2634	cybersecurity sophistication by following seven fundamental
2635	principles that are outlined in my statement.
2636	With the above-mentioned two industry developed and
2637	cybersecurity best practices documents in mind, I will make a
2638	few comments about two of the bills under consideration
2639	today.
2640	First of all, with respect to the Cyber Sense Act, NEMA
2641	member manufacturers support voluntary cyber evaluation of
2642	products used in the transmission, distribution, storage, and
2643	end use of electricity.
2644	However, the specific requirements of any such program
2645	need to be carefully designed in close collaboration with
2646	manufacturers and other stakeholder groups and developed via
2647	an open and transparent process.
2648	We recommend that any cybersecurity evaluation program
2649	abide by a set of principles that we've outlined in our
2650	written statement.
2651	With respect to the Enhancing Grid Security Through
2652	Public-Private Partnership Act, NEMA supports the concepts
2653	included in the draft legislation.
2654	With respect to Section 2, NEMA agrees that voluntary

2655 technical assistance efforts should be available to provide 2656 electric utilities with information and resources to 2657 effectively prepare for and combat both physical and cybersecurity threats. 2658 2659 We also agree that this technical assistance should be 2660 provided in close collaboration with state governments and 2661 public utility regulatory commissions as well as with 2662 equipment manufacturers. 2663 Including manufacturers in the training and technical 2664 assistance efforts will ensure that products are installed 2665 and maintained as intended to limit the risk of cyberattack 2666 resulting from the proper -- possible misuse of a product. 2667 NEMA also supports the recommendations included in 2668 Sections 3 and 4 of the legislation. One additional outage 2669 index that we recommend be included in Section 4(b) of the 2670 draft legislation is the Momentary Average Interruption 2671 Frequency Index. Momentary outages cost U.S. electricity consumers over 2672 2673 \$60 billion in 2014 and account for more than half of all 2674 power outages. Inclusion of this index, we believe, will 2675 improve the interrupter cost estimate information produced by

the Department of Energy.

2676

2677	In conclusion, NEMA and member company manufacturers
2678	recognize that cybersecurity risks are constantly evolving
2679	and changing and requires a shared responsibility by all
2680	stakeholders.
2681	NEMA looks forward to working with you as a resource to
2682	this committee as you continue your work to address
2683	cybersecurity concerns in the energy sector.
2684	Thank you, and I look forward to any questions.
2685	[The prepared statement of Mr. Pitsor follows:]
2686	
2687	********INSERT******

2688 Mr. Walberg. Thank you. 2689 I now recognize Mr. Aaronson.

2690	STATEMENT OF MR. AARONSON
2691	
2692	Mr. Aaronson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
2693	Rush, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the
2694	opportunity to testify here today.
2695	For EEI's member companies, which includes all of the
2696	nation's investor-owned electric companies, securing the
2697	energy grid is a top priority. I appreciate your invitation
2698	to discuss this important topic on their behalf.
2699	The electric power industry, which includes investor-
2700	owned electric companies, public power utilities, and
2701	electric cooperatives, supports more than 7 million American
2702	jobs and contributes \$880 billion annually to U.S. gross
2703	domestic product about 5 percent of the total.
2704	That 5 percent is truly the first 5 percent, responsible
2705	for generating and delivering the energy that powers our
2706	economy and our way of life.
2707	Our members own and operate some of the nation's most
2708	critical infrastructure and they take that responsibility
2709	seriously. EEI's member companies prepare for all hazards
2710	physical and cyber events, naturally occurring or manmade
2711	threats, and severe weather of every kind.

2712	To address multiple threats, our companies take what's
2713	known as a defense in-depth approach with several layers of
2714	security. I would like to highlight three main areas of
2715	focus standards, partnerships, and response and recovery.
2716	First, standards through a process created by
2717	Congress the electric power sector is subject to mandatory
2718	enforceable critical infrastructure protection, or CIP,
2719	regulatory standards for cyber and physical security.
2720	Through these standards, the bulk power system enjoys a
2721	baseline level of security. Standards are important, but
2722	with intelligent adversaries operating in a dynamic threat
2723	environment, regulations alone are insufficient and must be
2724	supplemented.
2725	That brings me to the second area of focus, which is
2726	partnerships, which you have heard a lot about today. You
2727	heard it from DOE and you will hear it from this entire panel
2728	security is a shared responsibility.
2729	None of us can do this alone. To be successful in this
2730	environment, industry and government must partner, and as you
2731	heard earlier, we are.
2732	I am here this morning in my role as EEI's vice
2733	president for security and preparedness but I am also

2734	privileged to be a member of the secretariat for the
2735	Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council.
2736	The ESCC is comprised of CEOs of 22 electric companies
2737	and nine major industry trade associations representing the
2738	full scope of electric generation, transmission, and
2739	distribution in the United States and Canada.
2740	Through partnerships like the ESCC, government and
2741	industry leverage one another's strengths. This partnership
2742	manifests itself in many ways including deployment of
2743	government technologies, like CRISP, which you have heard
2744	about, multidirectional information sharing, drills and
2745	exercises, and facilitating cross-sector coordination.
2746	What makes the ESCC effective is CEO leadership across
2747	all segments of the industry. This structure provides
2748	resources, sets priorities, drives accountability.
2749	Furthermore, CEOs serve as a draw to other senior
2750	counterparts in industry sectors and in government. The
2751	unity of effort driven by industry working with government
2752	has produced significant tangible results.
2753	Finally, the third area of focus is response and
2754	recovery. The electric power sector is proud of its record
2755	on reliability but outages do occur.

2756	The past year has made one thing abundantly clear we
2757	can't protect everything from everything all of the time and
2758	investments help companies restore power and be prepared.
2759	Our industry invests more than \$120 billion each year to
2760	make the energy grid stronger, smarter, cleaner, more
2761	dynamic, and more secure.
2762	In addition, the industry's culture of mutual assistance
2763	unleashes a world-class workforce amidst the toughest
2764	conditions to restore power safely and effectively.
2765	Today, we have supplemented that traditional response in
2766	recovery with a 21st century edition cyber mutual
2767	assistance. So far, more than 140 entities are participating
2768	in the program, covering more than 80 percent of U.S.
2769	electricity customers.
2770	That brings me to the bills before the subcommittee
2771	today. We appreciate both Congress and the Trump
2772	administration's support of the electric power sector.
2773	Just as EEI's member companies evolve to meet new
2774	threats, our government partners continuously improve their
2775	posture through these new initiatives.
2776	For example, we applaud DOE Secretary Perry and his team
2777	for establishing DOE's new Office of Cybersecurity, Energy

2778	Security, and Emergency Response, or CESER.
2779	Legislation passed by this committee codified DOE's role
2780	as the sector-specific agency thank you and we believe
2781	the elevation of CESER will deepen the relationship between
2782	our industry and DOE on issues of cybersecurity and energy
2783	grid response initiatives.
2784	In his testimony, Secretary Menezes mentioned DOE's
2785	establishment of the supply chain testing facility. We are
2786	interested in the details of that program. The subcommittee
2787	is also aware that through the NERC/FERC process as mandatory
2788	supply chain standard will be implemented soon.
2789	The committee should consider those efforts when
2790	adopting legislation related to supply chains.
2791	Finally, I would like to mention a report included in
2792	the Enhancing Grid Security Through Public-Private
2793	Partnerships Act looking at distribution, cyber, and physical
2794	security.
2795	EEI supports this report because it could address
2796	several emerging questions that many in the industry also are
2797	asking.
2798	What considerations should be made to protect a
2799	distribution system that is outside of mandatory NERC CIP

2800	standards?
2801	How can we secure newer technology that is largely
2802	consumer grade but may increase the energy grid's attack
2803	surface?
2804	A collaborative risk-based approach to security at the
2805	distribution level is essential. This report should drive
2806	that approach and consider the many different entities in the
2807	distribution grid, electric companies, and others.
2808	Again, I appreciate you holding this hearing. I look
2809	forward to answering any of your questions.
2810	[The prepared statement of Mr. Aaronson follows:]
2811	
2812	********INSERT******

2813	Mr. Walberg. Thank you. Thanks to the panel for your
2814	very efficient use of the five minutes time. Maybe it would
2815	be an example to myself and my colleagues.
2816	Now privileged to represent the neighbor to the south
2817	who guards my border, Mr. Latta.
2818	Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
2819	I appreciate our panel for being here. And again, this is a
2820	really important hearing that we are having today because it
2821	affects us all.
2822	Mr. Pitsor, if I could start with my questions with you,
2823	if I may, please. In your testimony you state that you
2824	support a voluntary cybersecurity evaluation of products used
2825	in bulk power systems such as the program described in H.R.
2826	5239 Cyber Sense.
2827	One point you raise is that once products are sold
2828	manufactures often don't know where or how these components
2829	are used, installed, or operated.
2830	You suggest that asset owners should maintain a system
2831	of tracking products. Would you explain in detail why it is
2832	important to track these products?
2833	Mr. Pitsor. As we look as we look at evaluation of
2834	cybersecurity threats of different components and how they're

2835	assembled in the manufacturers, once they have sold a
2836	product, they're assembled in the field. They're not
2837	necessarily aware of who purchased them and how they were
2838	assembled.
2839	And so the tracking concept here is to have a database
2840	and that could be shared so would be more familiar with where
2841	products have been placed, how they've been assembled, how
2842	they've been installed, how they've been commissioned.
2843	So that if patching is necessary due to a cyber-related
2844	event or testing for that product, we would then be able to
2845	contact the asset user as to what patches should be installed
2846	and how they should be installed.
2847	Mr. Latta. Let me follow up, when you're talking about
2848	the especially with the with the database because in
2849	Section 2(b)(2) of the Cyber Sense bill establishes a
2850	cybersecurity vulnerability reporting process and related
2851	database for products tested and identified as cybersecure
2852	under this program.
2853	Would this help address the need for a system for
2854	tracking those products by having that, as you just
2855	mentioned?
2856	Mr. Pitsor. I think a database would be very helpful in

2857	terms of addressing that need, yes.
2858	Mr. Latta. Thank you.
2859	Mr. Aaronson, if I could ask you, and I think you
2860	mentioned about in your testimony about when you were out
2861	with co-ops, and I know I just was at two of my co-ops. I
2862	represent the largest number of co-ops in the district in
2863	the state of Ohio.
2864	But if I could ask this question as the new
2865	technologies are becoming increasingly interconnected within
2866	our electric grid, new vulnerabilities are emerging across
2867	the system including at the distribution level.
2868	Currently, the physical or cybersecurity of the bulk
2869	power system or the interstate is addressed through the
2870	Critical Infrastructure Protection Standards issued by NERC.
2871	But the distribution system intrastate is outside the
2872	jurisdiction of the mandatory NERC standards and the question
2873	is are there implications for this perceived gap in oversight
2874	and protection of the cybersecurity of the distribution
2875	portion of the nation's electrical grid.
2876	Mr. Aaronson. So a couple of things to respond to
2877	there. As I mentioned in my testimony, we operate one big
2878	machine, right, with thousands of owners and operators from

2879 really large investor-owned electric companies that EEI 2880 represents to co-ops and municipal systems of varying sizes. 2881 And so as you know, the ESCC incorporates all of those and we 2882 work very closely. 2883 I know both APPA and NRECA provided written testimony or 2884 written statement for the record. So I would refer to that. 2885 With respect to gaps, and I call them perceived gaps, 2886 just because distribution level components are not subject to 2887 the federal CIP standards does not mean that there is not 2888 security happening at that level. 2889 That said, we do think that anything we can do with respect to components that make up that part of the grid --2890 2891 the intrastate -- the distribution level, is going to be an 2892 important approach to continue to advance security for all of 2893 us. 2894 The other thing I would say about distribution security is we need to prioritize. You know, in security we defend --2895 2896 you protect diamonds like diamonds and pencils like pencils, 2897 and to be sure, there are diamonds at the distribution level 2898 that we need to be aware of. There are components that are 2899 crown jewels at the distribution level that we need to be

securing.

2900

2901	And so approaches like Cyber Sense may allow us to do
2902	that and some of the things that Secretary Menezes and
2903	Assistant Secretary Hoffman were discussing with respect to
2904	really looking closely at those components and drilling down
2905	on the most critical, because if you have a hundred
2906	priorities you have no priorities but really finding those
2907	most critical components and beating the heck out of them so
2908	that we can understand if there are any vulnerabilities in
2909	them, again, will make us all more secure.
2910	Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My
2911	time is about to expire and I yield back.
2912	Mr. Walberg. I thank the gentleman.
2913	Now I am privileged to recognize the ranking member, the
2914	gentleman from Illinois in fact, the district I was
2915	privileged to be born in I quickly add long before you
2916	represented the district, Mr. Rush.
2917	[Laughter.]
2918	Mr. Rush. Mr. Chairman, it's still the best district in
2919	the nation.
2920	Mr. Vance, in your written testimony you noted that DOE
2921	held a cybersecurity contest which brought together students
2922	competing to address the challenges of protecting

2923	infrastructure and firms that might employ the same students
2924	after they graduate.
2925	Do you think that on both the public and private sector
2926	that we are doing enough to ensure that we have a skilled
2927	workforce capable of meeting the challenges we will
2928	inevitably face in regards to cybersecurity?
2929	And I will invite any of the members of the panel to
2930	weigh in on some of these issues.
2931	Mr. Vance. I think what we've been doing in Indiana is
2932	specifically trying to bring together the public and private
2933	sides together to analyse what some of the weaknesses are,
2934	what we are good at, what we are not good at, and as Mr.
2935	Aaronson from EEI spoke about just a second ago, I think we
2936	need to prioritize and figure out where those diamonds are
2937	and where those pencils are.
2938	It's one thing for me and my colleagues in the private -
2939	- I am sorry, the public sector to sit in a room and try to
2940	figure out what we need to focus on. We are going to miss a
2941	lot of things.
2942	What we need to do is sit down with the private sector
2943	and work through a collaborative process to identify where
2944	our weaknesses are and how to strengthen those.

2945	So the bills being discussed today, I think, are four
2946	steps in the right direction to help strengthen those
2947	partnerships.
2948	Mr. Rush. Anybody else want to chime in?
2949	Mr. Tudor. Mr. Rush, thank you for the question.
2950	I agree that public-private partnerships are key to
2951	moving these forward and these four pieces of legislation are
2952	definitely, you know, great steps towards that.
2953	At the Idaho National Lab, you know, we know that the
2954	partnerships are the strongest part of our operation, whether
2955	it's with vendors, asset owners, you know, with other
2956	government agencies and that's the way that we will be able
2957	to develop the structures to keep our cyber resilience in our
2958	energy systems.
2959	Mr. Rush. And does anyone have any suggestions on how
2960	the Congress could help you to ensure that we have enough
2961	skilled workforce other than what's information in these four
2962	bills?
2963	Mr. Vance. I will add, real quick, just to give a
2964	little bit more perspective on what we are doing in Indiana.
2965	Our approach with our cybersecurity council has been to bring
2966	together all the potential industries involved in

2301	cybersecurity.
2968	So right now, I've got about 250 or so members of that
2969	council spanning about 20 different industries with industry
2970	subgroups that then things can bubble up through those
2971	subgroups into the full committee that to address in a
2972	cross-sector manner.
2973	So I will give you an example. One of the committees is
2974	focused on personal identifiable information because that's
2975	something that's not unique to any one specific industry and
2976	it really needs to be a topic in and of itself.
2977	But it can't just be its own council or committee. It
2978	has to be part of a bigger picture because it ties back to
2979	energy, water, finance all these other things.
2980	So what we've been trying to do in Indiana is to build a
2981	large council that integrates all these different aspects so
2982	it can be addressed in a very in a cross-sector manner
2983	across different industries.
2984	Mr. Aaronson. Mr. Rush, I would add, you know, I know
2985	you're very committed to workforce development in particular
2986	with respect to cyber and I think one of the things that
2987	you're hearing both from the previous panel and all of us is
2988	this is a shared responsibility.

2967

cybersecurity.

2989	It's a whole of community issue. I referenced in my
2990	verbal testimony the cyber mutual assistance program. To us,
2991	that is a force multiplier. That is when a company is in
2992	is being attacked their counterparts come from around the
2993	country and around the nation and around North America,
2994	frankly, to support them.
2995	And so I think that's great for the electricity sector
2996	and we are very proud of that. But to be able to work with
2997	the National Guard, to be able to work with other sectors, to
2998	be able to prioritize restoration when cyber incidents maybe
2999	are impacting more than one sector.
3000	We need to look at this again far more holistically.
3001	And then from a workforce perspective, you know, we are very
3002	proud of the development that we do within our sector through
3003	things like the CEWD. It's the Energy Workforce Development
3004	Committee for Energy and Workforce Development is a great
3005	example of how we can find those gaps that we have in our
3006	workforce and work through education, work through public-
3007	private partnerships to improve our staffing in our most
3008	critical needs.
3009	Mr. Rush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
3010	Mr. Walberg. I thank the gentleman.

3011	I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
3012	Griffith.
3013	Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
3014	Mr. Tudor, I am going to come to you first but I am
3015	going to take what's more or less a point of personal
3016	privilege and just say that I saw you sitting throughout that
3017	first panel and all those questions on that second row there
3018	with a couple of young people who are very well behaved. Are
3019	they connected with you?
3020	Mr. Tudor. Yes, sir. That's my son, Miles, and my
3021	niece, Sydney. They're getting a civics lesson today.
3022	Mr. Griffith. Well, not the most riveting of hearings
3023	but one that's very important and they have done a great job
3024	and I thought they were you could tell they were doing
3025	some stuff back there and I thought they were like my kids,
3026	playing on an electronic device.
3027	But, apparently, they have a numbers game that they're
3028	working on that's all done with their hands and they've been
3029	very quiet and very well behaved. So you're you and your
3030	family are to be commended for having such well-behaved
3031	children.
3032	That being said, let's get down to business. You made

3033	reference to the consequence-driven cyber-informed
3034	engineering CCE methodology.
3035	You say this is more about getting ahead of the problems
3036	of vulnerabilities and threats rather than chasing them. Can
3037	you describe what role this approach may have in
3038	strengthening cybersecurity and critical infrastructure?
3039	Mr. Tudor. Yes. Thank you for that question, sir.
3040	So consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering, or
3041	CCE, kind of identifies the problem that we are constantly
3042	seeing new vulnerabilities, new threats every day. So an
3043	organization does a risk assessment on a Monday and by
3044	Wednesday when new vulnerabilities are discovered, many of
3045	the activities described in that risk assessment may be moot.
3046	But if we go back and look at the key consequences of
3047	any organization and we take an electric utility at this, you
3048	know, if keeping the lights on is their mission but maybe
3049	there's several key components that if they were lost may
3050	prevent that mission from being carried out.
3051	You know, looking at the engineering methods of those
3052	consequences, looking at the way an adversary might go about
3053	attacking those infrastructures, using a threat-based
3054	methodology and at INL we do a lot of work considering the

3055	threat first and we use that mind set when we look at our
3056	different mitigations, and then developing mitigations with
3057	the asset owner who is a key component of this.
3058	So if we can engineer out those severe consequences,
3059	irregardless of the threat or the current risk or a current -
3060	- or a new vulnerability then we believe that that has a
3061	chance of maintaining that resiliency over a longer period
3062	rather than just addressing new vulnerabilities as they show
3063	up.
3064	Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that, and there's a pilot
3065	program but it's had very limited deployment. Are you
3066	confident this methodology is an effective approach and, if
3067	so, what are you trying to examine before deciding whether
3068	this program should be expanded?
3069	Mr. Tudor. Yes, thank you again.
3070	We have conducted one pilot. We are on a second, and I
3071	think that as we've been briefing this across Congress, the
3072	National Security Council, and others, we've been very
3073	encouraged that people do believe that this type of
3074	methodology will be able to go forward.
3075	So we are working with the DOE and others to develop
3076	some ways to do CCES scale. In our next few pilot

3077	engagements we'll be bringing more partners along to provide
3078	training for them and they can go out and provide training
3079	for others. So we hope to be able to scale out this
3080	methodology in the next several years.
3081	Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that.
3082	Mr. Engels, you have got a pipeline a new pipeline
3083	coming near my district, although not through my district,
3084	and I asked before about some, for lack of a better term,
3085	smart pipe technology.
3086	I know you're not expecting that question today and so
3087	if you could just get me an answer later as to what you all
3088	might be doing in regards to letting us know if there's some
3089	kind of a break in the line quicker using some smart
3090	technology.
3091	Mr. Engels. I will be glad to follow up with you on
3092	that.
3093	Mr. Griffith. And likewise, I have a friend who's got a
3094	farm where there's going to be a pump station and whatever
3095	you all could do to reassure folks that they're being placed
3096	in the safest location and likewise if there's any smart
3097	technology in there I would appreciate having that
3098	information.

3099	Mr. Engels. I understand. We'll make sure we follow
3100	up.
3101	Mr. Griffith. Thank you. All right.
3102	Mr. Aaronson, you mentioned in your written testimony
3103	that approximately 75 percent of U.S. customers are served by
3104	a company that participates in cybersecurity risk information
3105	sharing program.
3106	Do you have any insight what's going on with the other
3107	25 percent?
3108	Mr. Aaronson. So CRISP is a wonderful technology and
3109	the beauty of it is it was something that was actually
3110	developed by National Labs. It was piloted for a few years
3111	by a small subset of companies did some proof of concept,
3112	and that was then.
3113	We'll call it commercialized, although maybe that's not
3114	a fair characterization because it is still a public-private
3115	partnership with the Department of Energy, the North American
3116	Electrical Reliability Corporation through their information-
3117	sharing analysis center I am trying to not use acronyms
3118	and then the companies that deploy it.
3119	What we are looking to do and what the ISAC is planning
3120	to do now is to expand the program. So started with five

3121	pilots. It has expanded to more than that, to the 75 percent
3122	of customers being represented by a company that has deployed
3123	CRISP.
3124	The other thing you should note is that information,
3125	while it is gleaned from the companies that have deployed the
3126	sensors that make up CRISP, the information that is gleaned
3127	is actually socialized to the entire electric utility sector.
3128	So while there are sensors on 75 percent of companies,
3129	we are going to get a much broader cross-section in the
3130	coming years.
3131	Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that. Thank you for the
3132	answer.
3133	I thank all of you for being here today, and I yield
3134	back.
3135	Mr. Walberg. I thank the gentleman and I recognize the
3136	gentleman from California, Mr. McNerney.
3137	Mr. McNerney. I want to thank the chairman and I thank
3138	the witnesses. Good testimony and informative.
3139	Mr. Aaronson, in your testimony you pointed out that the
3140	EEI members do work to prepare for hazards and cyber or
3141	natural events.
3142	What are your members doing to prepare for climate

3143	change events? Is that is that is there a standard or
3144	is there some sort of work that needs to be done that's being
3145	done?
3146	Mr. Aaronson. So, again, I think we look at this as all
3147	hazards, and whether it is an act of war or an act of God,
3148	whether it is a natural disaster, whether it's an earthquake,
3149	whether it's the wildfires that I know that your district has
3150	been impacted by, we are looking at ways we can be more
3151	resilient, and a lot of what we do kind of crosses, again,
3152	acts of war and acts of God and is more about consequence
3153	management.
3154	Why the lights were, you know, turned off why there
3155	was a power outage becomes a little less relevant and how
3156	quickly can we get them restored.
3157	And so a lot of our focus is on that response and
3158	recovery and resilience component of preparation for all
3159	manner of hazards.
3160	Mr. McNerney. Okay. Thank you.
3161	Mr. Pitsor, I appreciate your comments on the enhancing
3162	grid security through public-private partnerships. You
3163	mentioned that you wanted to see a Momentary Average
3164	Interruption Frequency Index included in the ICE calculation.

3165	How would that improve the calculation? How would that
3166	improve the results?
3167	Mr. Pitsor. Well, the MAIFI index represents some
3168	nearly 50 percent of all the momentary outages that occur in
3169	the U.S. and these are momentary outages that are usually
3170	five minutes or less.
3171	We think that the overall interrupter calculation, if
3172	it's missing those 50 percent of the outages, it's not
3173	capturing fully the economic costs that are associated by
3174	these smaller momentary outages.
3175	For instance, electric motors trip off, computers don't
3176	have backup power trip off. There are costs associated with
3177	that that could be should be captured in the overall
3178	estimator.
3179	Mr. McNerney. Okay. You mentioned the Cyber Sense Act.
3180	How would your members respond to nonvoluntary requirements
3181	for including cybersecurity in their products?
3182	Mr. Pitsor. We are very supportive of the evaluation
3183	testing of electrical equipment. I think the key is going to
3184	be what type of equipment we are speaking of the scope of
3185	the testing, what protocols we are testing against, who's
3186	paying for that testing, and the follow-on work that will be

3187	done to address vulnerabilities that are found in terms of
3188	patching, recommissioning, the continuous process that goes
3189	on in addressing cyber
3190	Mr. McNerney. I mean, it seems that your members would
3191	want to have a set of standards they could they could link
3192	their products.
3193	Mr. Pitsor. Exactly. Working on supply side standards
3194	that I mentioned, a new cyber security index standard and
3195	then looking at how we test different products and different
3196	configurations against different vulnerabilities. We segment
3197	those products because some products, as has been recognized,
3198	are behind layers of security. So the testing of those maybe
3199	are less than those that have outward-facing connection to
3200	the internet. There's different levels of testing that would
3201	be required for those products.
3202	Mr. McNerney. Do you have concerns about cuts that are
3203	being proposed in the fiscal 2019 budget's impact on
3204	cybersecurity or security in general? I guess Mr. Aaronson
3205	would be the right person to ask that question of.
3206	Mr. Aaronson. So we appreciate what the Department of
3207	Energy has done with respect to CESER and elevating some of
3208	these issues. We've worked really closely in particular with

3209	the Office of Electricity and their Infrastructure Security
3210	Energy Restoration Office, which will ultimately matriculate
3211	over the CESER.
3212	This last historic hurricane season and the nor'easters
3213	the last several weeks, and with that response from Puerto
3214	Rico so between that, our partnerships with the labs and
3215	our partnerships with the sector coordinating council we have
3216	really appreciated the ability to work closely with this
3217	administration and the previous administration. This has
3218	been a priority for Department of Energy for several years
3219	now.
3220	Mr. McNerney. So you don't see any sort of a drawback
3221	with the cuts that are being proposed?
3222	Mr. Aaronson. You know, at this point, I think the
3223	priorities that we care about most have not been impacted in
3224	our day-to-day interactions with the department.
3225	Mr. McNerney. Thank you. I yield back.
3226	Mr. Walberg. I thank the gentleman.
3227	Now I recognize the good doctor and gentleman from
3228	Indiana, Mr. Bucshon.
3229	Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
3230	Mr. Vance, good to have you here from Indiana.

3231	Mr. Vance. Thank you.
3232	Mr. Bucshon. You're welcome. As you know this is a
3233	question for you as you know, electric cooperatives serve
3234	more than 1.3 million customers in the state of Indiana,
3235	primarily those in rural parts of the state, which is
3236	southwest Indiana, the Wabash Valley that I represent.
3237	An additional 300,000 individuals are served by
3238	municipal electric utilities. Both cooperative and municipal
3239	utilities are generally much smaller than their investor-
3240	owned counterparts.
3241	What are some of the specific challenges that you see
3242	these smaller utilities face in terms of defending their
3243	assets against cybersecurity threats?
3244	Mr. Vance. I think the challenge is that a co-op or a
3245	municipal utility face are very similar to what an investor-
3246	owned utility face because they have the same issues in that
3247	every time that you move toward a networked piece of
3248	equipment you're exposing yourself to potential cybersecurity
3249	attacks.
3250	So in Indiana we've been very aware of including our co-
3251	ops and our municipal utilities in our conversations on
3252	energy security and cybersecurity. They sit on our

3253	cybersecurity council established by the governor.
3254	I think one of the important things we are trying to do
3255	in Indiana as we continue exercises is to build those
3256	relationships so that we know we have those personal
3257	connections and when an energy emergency hits we cannot spend
3258	hours searching through a binder of 300 pages trying to
3259	figure out what to do.
3260	I think to some extent the movie "Ghostbusters" summed
3261	it up well when it said, "Who are you going to call?" You
3262	have to know who you're going to call in those situations.
3263	We can't spend hours trying to figure it out.
3264	So we've been including our munis and co-ops in our
3265	conversations.
3266	Mr. Bucshon. Are there financial challenges to making
3267	sure that your networks and everything are secure that the
3268	state helps with or anything?
3269	Mr. Vance. There's always finding constraints when it
3270	comes to infrastructure. But to the best of my knowledge, I
3271	have not I am not aware of any specific constraints with
3272	munis and co-ops. But we can get back to you on an answer to
3273	that.
3274	Mr. Bucshon. Okay. One of the bills we are discussing,

3275	and somebody mentioned this a little while ago, Enhancing
3276	Grid Security Through Public-Private Partnership Act
3277	specifically requires the secretary of energy to take
3278	different sizes of and regions served by electric utilities
3279	into account when administering cybersecurity programs.
3280	Based on your experience in Indiana, what might this
3281	look like?
3282	Mr. Vance. I think that would be something that we'd be
3283	very interested to work with DOE on. What that would look
3284	like I am not entirely sure, off the top of my head.
3285	Mr. Bucshon. Anybody have any comments on any of this
3286	stuff? No?
3287	Good. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
3288	Mr. Walberg. I thank the gentleman.
3289	Seeing no one else on the panel, I recognize myself for
3290	five minutes. Thanks to the panel for being here.
3291	Mr. Aaronson and Mr. Vance, I asked some questions to
3292	our DOE panel earlier and I would appreciate hearing your
3293	answers to them as well.
3294	I appreciate the secretary's efforts to elevate the
3295	agency's leadership on emergency and cybersecurity functions
3296	and I believe they are commendable.

3297	But I would like to see DOE leadership continue under
3298	future administrations, as I mentioned. Do you think it
3299	would be would help to codify DOE's assistant secretary
3300	functions in the DOE organization chart?
3301	Either one Mr. Vance or Mr. Aaronson.
3302	Mr. Vance. From our perspective, I would have to
3303	discuss with my other members of NASEO before I could make a
3304	statement one way or the other.
3305	But I would defer to DOE on that.
3306	Mr. Walberg. Okay. Mr. Aaronson.
3307	Mr. Aaronson. I would just simply say I see no problem
3308	with that. I think it could be useful, and to Mr. McNerney's
3309	question also, I think anything that provides accountability,
3310	that elevates something not just within the organization but
3311	then visibility as a Senate-confirmed position and across the
3312	various verticals within the department that acknowledges
3313	these intersector relationships between electric, gas, and
3314	other generating capabilities, and then I think anything that
3315	can get more resources.
3316	I don't want to be dismissive of your question, Mr.
3317	McNerney. I think anything that you know, more resources
3318	so we can do some of these partnerships more, better, faster,

3319	and focus on all of the things that are happening in this
3320	in with respect to security in the sector is going to be
3321	valuable. So I think codifying it, elevating it, funding it,
3322	supporting it are all good outcomes.
3323	Mr. Walberg. Okay. Let me ask, do you believe that
3324	elevating the cybersecurity functions to the Senate-confirmed
3325	assistant secretary level is a positive? Is it necessary?
3326	Mr. Aaronson. You know, I will leave that to policy
3327	makers on that, sir. I think I think it's a positive
3328	development though, certainly.
3329	Mr. Walberg. Okay.
3330	Mr. Aaronson, one of the bills we are discussing today
3331	is the Enhancing Grid Security Through Public-Private
3332	Partnership Act, which directs DOE to provide cybersecurity
3333	training and technical assistance for electric utilities that
3334	have fewer available resources due to size or region.
3335	The legislation builds upon the existing public-private
3336	partnership between DOE, the electrical cooperatives, and
3337	public utilities power utilities.
3338	Could you explain for us the challenges facing certain
3339	electric utilities in improving the cybersecurity of their
3340	assets?

3341	Mr. Aaronson. Sure. So, again, I would point everybody
3342	to the statement by the American Public Power Association and
3343	the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association with whom
3344	I serve as secretaries on the sector coordinating council
3345	with.
3346	So one of the benefits of the sector coordinating
3347	council is that we do all come together with common cause,
3348	whether they are large investor-owns, smaller investor-owns,
3349	cooperatives, municipals, Canadians, independent power
3350	generators, the nuclear sector, gas, and on and on and on.
3351	So we work really well together on these issues, again,
3352	of sort of mutual concern with respect to protection of our
3353	infrastructure.
3354	With respect to challenges among the smaller entities,
3355	there are workforce challenges. There are the ability to
3356	ingest intelligence.
3357	There is the ability to implement some of the good
3358	information that is coming out of the government and some of
3359	the mitigation measures that are recommended. And so
3360	anything that we can do as a community again, whole of
3361	community so that it is a rising tide that lifts all boats
3362	ultimately helps all of the infrastructure that we own and

3363	operate together.
3364	So we are very supportive of that particular provision
3365	for our co-op and municipal brothers and sisters but also for
3366	some of other smaller entities that are going to need help
3367	implementing the things you all recommend.
3368	Mr. Walberg. So this Section 2 of H.R. 5240, the
3369	Enhancing Grid Security Through Public-Private Partnerships
3370	Act, does that strengthen and further these existing public-
3371	private partnerships?
3372	Mr. Aaronson. I think it does.
3373	Mr. Walberg. Okay.
3374	Thank you. The gentleman from New York is here, my
3375	friend, and we recognize you for five minutes for
3376	questioning.
3377	Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our
3378	witnesses for being here this afternoon.
3379	Mr. Aaronson, the utility industry has a long tradition
3380	and culture of mutual assistance. When a disaster strikes,
3381	everyone responds, and I know there are still crews from New
3382	York working in Puerto Rico.
3383	The industry has a good idea of how to deal with supply
3384	disruptions and restorations after a natural disaster. But

3385	cyber is still uncharted territory. When the industry comes
3386	together to think about the future of mutual assistance, does
3387	that include how you might respond to a cyber incident?
3388	Mr. Aaronson. Very much so.
3389	So the one of the things that we have done as a
3390	sector and actually I will give a little bit of a time
3391	line because in think it's instructive.
3392	So you will recall the end of 2015 we had both GridEx
3393	III, which is a biannual exercise that NERC puts on, and then
3394	just a month later there was the attack in Ukraine that had
3395	impact on their distribution system.
3396	The CEOs of the sector coordinating council got together
3397	for a meeting in January of 2016 and asked the question, do
3398	we have the surge capacity to deal with either the imagined
3399	threats in the GridEx scenario or the real ones that were
3400	perceived from the Ukraine scenario.
3401	And the answer was sort of, which is never a good answer
3402	for chief executives. And so they told us as the sector
3403	coordinating council support staff to go put something
3404	together.
3405	We put together something known as cyber mutual
3406	assistance, and so from that time just a little over two

3407	years ago we scoped what cyber mutual assistance would look
3408	like.
3409	We developed a legal structure around it. We developed
3410	a play book. We exercised it. We've utilized it, and now
3411	142 companies representing nearly 80 percent of all customers
3412	in North America have a company that is a member of the cyber
3413	mutual assistance program.
3414	So we will be look, it's in its very nascent stages.
3415	Traditional mutual assistance has been around for more than
3416	80 years. But it is a platform that we can begin to surge
3417	and support each other in the eventuality of a cyberattack.
3418	Mr. Tonko. And in that collaboration, are there any
3419	differences that you would cite that they could distinctly
3420	make a distinction from, you know, the regular emergency
3421	planning and response efforts?
3422	Mr. Aaronson. It is in some ways very similar in that
3423	the goal is to restore power and one of the things I tell
3424	people is the best way to not have cyber vulnerabilities is
3425	to not have cyber infrastructure.
3426	So another thing that we are pursuing is to actually be
3427	able to operate in a degraded state manually, which is
3428	something Ukrainians were able to do and, again, which we

3429	have some capacity to do but, you know, are going to develop
3430	even more so.
3431	With respect to the differences between traditional and
3432	cyber mutual assistance, the first one is the obvious one.
3433	You're not going to have bucket trucks of, you know, cyber
3434	linemen driving down the highway to the affected area.
3435	But there is the capacity to support each other
3436	remotely. There are things that can be done to develop both
3437	information sharing in the event of these attacks and the
3438	sharing of equipment and the bringing in of noncompromised
3439	equipment to support the company that may have had equipment
3440	compromised.
3441	Last is with storms you see them coming and they are
3442	regional. And so companies from all over North America will
3443	descend, and did certainly this last year, on the affected
3444	region.
3445	Cyber doesn't know boundaries like that and so that is a
3446	consideration for how do you respond do I want to send my
3447	people into a company that's been impacted when I may be
3448	next, and that is something that the cyber mutual assistance
3449	program is contemplating and addressing.
3450	Mr. Tonko. Okay. Thank you very much.

3451	And Mr. Vance, a common theme we are hearing today is
3452	how partnerships those between utilities and between
3453	different levels of government are critical to ensuring
3454	that our electric system is reliable, resilient, and prepared
3455	for the worst.
3456	Can you give us a sense of the level of cyber expertise
3457	at the state and local levels?
3458	Mr. Vance. We have a number of folks at our Office of
3459	Technology who are the co-coordinators of our cybersecurity
3460	council who are spending their time on cybersecurity in
3461	coordination with our Department of Homeland Security, our
3462	Utility Regulatory Commission, and a number of folks across
3463	state government.
3464	So we do have some folks who are focused specifically on
3465	the cyber issues. This is a relatively recent thing. I
3466	think it started in 2016 but it's something we are trying to
3467	get up to speed on as soon as we possibly can.
3468	Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And your testimony mentioned the
3469	importance of a robust state energy security program. What
3470	kind of services and resources can DOE provide to our given
3471	states?
3472	Mr. Vance. I think that's something that can be defined

3473	as we explore this more. But the first things off the top of
3474	my head are more training and exercise.
3475	A lot of this planning and exercise activities for
3476	example, the exercise we did in Rhode Island that mapped a
3477	cyberattack on top of a natural disaster is something that
3478	was a very useful exercise, bringing people together and go
3479	through these issues and also put a face to who some of these
3480	people were at utilities, at DOE, at the states.
3481	So I think more exercise and opportunities to plan
3482	regionally are really helpful as well.
3483	Mr. Tonko. Thank you very much.
3484	And seeing that I have no time remaining, I yield back,
3485	Mr. Chair.
3486	Mr. Walberg. I thank the gentleman.
3487	Seeing there are no further members wishing to ask
3488	questions, I would like to thank all of our witnesses again
3489	for being here today and for the insights you shared with us
3490	and considering our questions.
3491	Before we conclude, I would like to ask for unanimous
3492	consent to submit the following documents for the record:
3493	number one, a statement from the American Public Power
3494	Association and the National Rural Electric Cooperative

3495	Association; a cybersecurity update letter from the American
3496	Public Power Association; a letter to Department of Energy
3497	Secretary Perry; a response letter from the Department of
3498	Energy Secretary Perry; a statement from Siemens Energy.
3499	[The information follows:]
3500	
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3502	Mr. Walberg. And pursuant to committee rules, I remind
3503	members that they have 10 business days to submit additional
3504	questions for the record and I ask that witnesses submit
3505	their response within 10 business days upon receipt of the
3506	questions.
3507	Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
3508	[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]