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ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
2125 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115
Majority (202) 225-3641
Minority (202) 225-2927

May 19, 2025

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
FROM: Committee Majority Staff
RE: Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Hearing on May 21, 2025

I. INTRODUCTION

The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will hold a hearing on Wednesday, May 21, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. (ET), in 2123 Rayburn House Office Building. The hearing is entitled "Examining Ways to Enhance Our Domestic Critical Mineral Supply Chains."

II. WITNESSES

- **Abigail Hunter**, Executive Director, SAFE Center for Critical Minerals Strategy;
- **Katie Sweeney**, Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer, National Mining Association;
- **Casey Hammond**, Principal, Capitol Pillar LLC;
- **Alexander Herrgott**, President, Permitting Institute; and
- **David Howell**, Director of Strategy, Battery Advocacy for Technology Transformation Coalition (BATT Coalition).

III. BACKGROUND

A. Critical Minerals and Their Importance

Sections 7002(a) and 7002(c) of the Energy Act of 2020 define a critical mineral as "any mineral, element, substance, or material designated as critical by the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), using three criteria."[1] Minerals, elements, substances, and materials are designated critical if the Secretary determines that:

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[1] 30 U.S.C. §1606(a)(3).

1. They "are essential to the economic or national security of the United States;

2. the supply chain of which is vulnerable to disruption (including restrictions associated with foreign political risk, abrupt demand growth, military conflict, violent unrest, anti-competitive or protectionist behaviors, and other risks throughout the supply chain); and

3. [they] serve an essential function in the manufacturing of a product (including energy technology-, defense-, currency-, agriculture-, consumer electronics-, and health care-related applications), the absence of which would have significant consequences for the economic or national security of the United States."[2]

Sections 7002(a) and 7002(c) of the Energy Act of 2020 also specify that the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the USGS, may designate any mineral, element, substance, or material as a critical mineral that another federal agency determines to be strategic and critical to the defense or national security of the U.S.[3] Furthermore, the Energy Act requires the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the USGS, to consult with the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, and Energy, as well as the U.S. Trade Representative in designating critical minerals, and that the list of critical minerals should be updated at least every three years, if not more often.[4] After the Energy Act of 2020 codified the definition of a critical mineral into law, the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of USGS, released a list designating 50 minerals as critical in 2022.[5]

Rare earth elements (REE) are a subset of critical minerals that are not found in a form readily available for extraction. Instead, REEs are distributed throughout a variety of other minerals and can be found in coal and coal by-products.[6] There are 17 REEs, 16 of which are on the USGS's 2022 list of 50 critical minerals.[7]

Critical minerals are used to make items that individuals use every day. For example, critical minerals are found in lightbulbs, televisions, batteries, electric wiring, paint, sunscreen, and makeup (see figure 1), along with smart phones, internet infrastructure, and the computing hardware needed to power advances in artificial intelligence technologies.[8]

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[2] 30 U.S.C. § 1606 (c)(4)(A)(i)-(iii).
[3] 30 U.S.C. §1606(c)(4)(B).
[4] 30 U.S.C. §1606(c)(4)(C); Linda Rowan, *Critical Minerals Resources: National Policy and Critical Minerals List*, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R47982 (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47982.
[5] U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, 2022 Final List of Critical Minerals, Fed. Reg. 87, 37 (Feb. 24, 2022).
[6] Rare Earth Elements – A Subset of Critical Minerals, National Energy Technology Laboratory, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, https://www netl.doe.gov/resource-sustainability/critical-minerals-and-materials/rare-earth-elements (last visited on May 8, 2025).
[7] Report on Rare Earth Elements from Coal and Coal Byproducts, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY (Jan. 2017), https://www.energy.gov/fecm/articles/rare-earth-elements-report-congressre-earth-elements-report-congress; Technology Assessment: Critical Minerals, Status, Challenges, and Policy Options for Recovery from Nontraditional Sources, GAO-25-106395, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (July 2024), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106395.pdf.
[8] Technology Assessment: Critical Minerals, Status, Challenges, and Policy Options for Recovery from Nontraditional Sources, GAO-25-106395, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (July 2024),



Figure 1: Everyday Examples of Critical Minerals.[9]

Beyond everyday needs and conveniences, critical minerals underlie our most crucial industries—such as defense, which relies on REEs for our warfighting and defense technologies, and energy, which uses critical minerals in essential components of our grid and electrical networks (see figure 2).[10]

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106395.pdf; AI and Digital Technologies, SFA OXFORD, https://www.sfa-oxford.com/knowledge-and-insights/critical-minerals-in-low-carbon-and-future-technologies/critical-minerals-in-artificial-intelligence/ (last accessed May 18, 2025).

[9] *Id.*

[10] Gracelin Baskaran and Duncan Wood (Eds)., Critical Minerals and the Future of the U.S. Economy, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Feb. 2025).



Figure 2: Critical Minerals in Advanced Technologies.[11]

Below (see figure 3) is a chart that details the 2022 U.S. Critical Minerals list, the key industries in which each critical mineral is used (including aerospace, defense, energy, telecommunications and electronics, and transportation), what percentage of that critical mineral was sourced from a foreign entity in 2022, and the primary country from which that critical mineral was imported between 2018 and 2022.

[11] Critical Minerals: Building on Federal Efforts to Advance Recovery and Substitution Could Help Address Supply Risks, GAO-22-104824, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (June 2022), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104824.pdf.

Mineral	Percentage from foreign sources[a]	Key Industries: Aerospace	Defense	Energy	Telecommunications and electronics	Transportation (non-aerospace)	Primary Import Source (2018–2021)[b]
Arsenic	100%		●	○	○		China: 57%
Cesium	100%	●	●	○	○		N/A
Fluorspar	100%			○	○		Mexico: 66%
Gallium	100%	●	●	○	○		China: 35%
Graphite	100%	●	●	○	○	○	China: 35%
Indium	100%	●	●	○	○		Republic of Korea: 35%
Manganese	100%	●	●	○		○	Gabon: 67%
Niobium	100%	●	●	○			Brazil: 66%
Rubidium	100%	●	●	○	○		N/A
Tantalum	100%	●	●	○	○		China: 24%
Bismuth	96%		●	○	○		China: 65%
Rare Earth Elements (Cerium, Dysprosium, Erbium, Europium, Gadolinium, Holmium, Lanthanum, Lutetium, Neodymium, Praseodymium, Samarium, Scandium, Terbium, Thulium, Ytterbium, Yttrium)	>95%	●	●	○	○	○	China: 74%
Titanium	>95%	●	●	○			Japan: 89%
Antimony	83%		●	○	○	○	China: 63%
Chromium	83%	●	●	○			South Africa: 37%
Tin	77%		●		○		Peru: 25% (refined Tin)
Cobalt	76%	●	●	○	○	○	Norway: 22%
Zinc	76%		●	○			Canada: 66%
Barite	>75%			○			China: 38%
Tellurium	>75%		●	○	○		Canada: 52%
Platinum	66%	●		○	○	○	South Africa: 24%
Nickel	56%	●	●	○			Canada: 45%
Aluminum	54%	●	●	○		○	Canada: 50%
Vanadium	54%	●	●	○			Canada: 31%
Germanium	>50%	●	●	○	○		China: 54%
Magnesium Metal	>50%	●	●	○	○	○	Canada: 21%
Tungsten	>50%	●	●	○	○		China: 29%
Zirconium	<50%	●	●	○			China: 89% (Zirconium unwrought, including powder)
Palladium	26%	●		○	○	○	Russia: 34%
Lithium	>25%	●	●	○	○	○	Argentina: 51%
Beryllium	<20%	●	●	○	○		Kazakhstan: 43%
Hafnium	Data N/A	●	●	○			Germany: 36%
Iridium	Data N/A	●		○	○	○	
Rhodium	Data N/A	●		○	○	○	
Ruthenium	Data N/A	●		○	○	○	

Source: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), *Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023* (Reston, Virginia: 2023). | GAO-24-106395

Figure 3: The 2022 U.S. list of Critical Minerals, Percentage of the U.S. Supply Imported in 2022, Industries in Which Each is Used, and Primary Import Source.[12]

B. Critical Minerals Supply Chains

The supply chain for critical minerals generally includes identification and extraction; processing and refining; manufacturing; use; and end of life, reuse, or recycle (see figure 4).[13]

[12] Technology Assessment: Critical Minerals, Status, Challenges, and Policy Options for Recovery from Nontraditional Sources, GAO-25-106395, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (July 2024), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106395.pdf.

[13] Critical Minerals: Building on Federal Efforts to Advance Recovery and Substitution Could Help Address Supply Risks, GAO-22-104824, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (June 2022), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-



Figure 4: Example Critical Minerals Supply Chain.[14]

Each piece of the critical minerals supply chain relies on the piece before and after, and no piece can stand alone. For example, the supply chain cannot exist if the feedstock is not mined. Additionally, the raw material that is mined is just a pile of dirt if it is not processed and refined into the purified or final material.

Risks to this supply chain can be multi-faceted. For example, according to the National Research Council, supply chain risks may be: (1) geologic—based on where resources exist in nature; (2) technical—potential issues with the resource being extracted and/or processed; (3) environmental and social—concerns over environmental or social effects of extraction or processing in a location; (4) political—government actions, legislation, or policies that have an effect on the availability of resources; and (5) economic—whether the extraction or processing is financially feasible or worthwhile.[15]

C. Domestic Critical Mineral Capabilities and Foreign Reliance

1. China's Growing Dominance of the REE Supply Chain

From the late 1960s through the early 1980s, the U.S. was the leading producer and refiner of REEs, producing an average of 15,000 metric tons of REE per year (see figure 5 below).[16] This was about three times more than the rest of the world was producing at this time.[17]

104824.pdf; Linda Rowan, *Critical Minerals Resources: National Policy and Critical Minerals List*, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R47982 (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47982.

[14] Critical Minerals: Building on Federal Efforts to Advance Recovery and Substitution Could Help Address Supply Risks, GAO-22-104824, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (June 2022), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104824.pdf.

[15] National Research Council (NRC), Minerals, Critical Minerals, and the U.S. Economy, 2008; Linda Rowan, *Critical Minerals Resources: National Policy and Critical Minerals List*, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R47982 (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47982.

[16] Linda Rowan, *Critical Minerals Resources: National Policy and Critical Minerals List*, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R47982 (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47982; Sulgiye Park, Cameron Tracy, and Rodney Ewing, *Reimagining US rare earth production: Domestic failures and the decline of US rare earth production dominance – Lessons learned and recommendations*, 85 Part A RESOURCES, 1 (Aug. 2023).

[17] Sulgiye Park, Cameron Tracy, and Rodney Ewing, Reimagining US rare earth production: Domestic failures and the decline of US rare earth production dominance – Lessons learned and recommendations, *Resources Policy* Vol 85, Part A (Aug. 2023).



Figure 5: Metric Tons of Mine Production Containing Rare Earth Oxides by Country Over Time.[18]

By the late 1990s, the U.S. REE industry dissolved, including much of the mining and production infrastructure and the underlying capital.[19] According to the Mine Safety and Health Administration, there was a peak of 1,321 metal mines—both underground and surface mines—and 394 processing plants in 1981.[20] As of 2024, there are 232 metal mines in the U.S. and 42 processing plants for metals.[21] There is only one REE mine in the U.S. and its raw materials are sent to China for processing.[22] Cheap labor costs and limited to non-existent environmental regulations in China combined with mounting domestic permitting and environmental regulations made U.S. production, processing, and refining of REEs no longer financially feasible. [23]

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[18] Linda Rowan, *Critical Minerals Resources: National Policy and Critical Minerals List*, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R47982 (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47982 (*Mine production* refers to the extraction of a mineral resource and is most often quantified in the weight of material mined in metric tons over a specified period. A metric ton is a unit of weight equivalent to 1,000 kilograms (about 2,204.6 pounds). REO = rare earth oxide.).

[19] Sulgiye Park, Cameron Tracy, and Rodney Ewing, *Reimagining US rare earth production: Domestic failures and the decline of US rare earth production dominance – Lessons learned and recommendations*, 85 Part A RESOURCES, 1 (Aug. 2023).

[20] Mine Safety & Health Administration's Number of Coal and Nonfuel Mineral Operations, 1979-2024, NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION, https://nma.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/msha_number_operations_by_sector_2024.pdf.

[21] *Id.*

[22] Alan Ohnsman, *The Only U.S. Rare Earth Mine May Win Big From Trump's China Tariffs*, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2025), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanohnsman/2025/04/21/the-only-us-rare-earth-mine-may-win-big-from-trumps-china-tariffs/.

[23] Marc Schmid, *Rare Earths in the Trade Dispute Between the US and China: A Déjà vu,* 54 INTERECONOMICS, 6 (2019), https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2019/number/6/article/rare-earths-in-the-trade-dispute-between-the-us-and-china-a-deja-vu html; Rick Mills, How the US lost the plot on rare earths, MINING.COM (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.mining.com/web/us-lost-plot-rare-earths/.

In 2023, the U.S. imported more than half of its supply for 29 of the 50 minerals listed on the USGS 2022 Final List of Critical Minerals and has been exclusively reliant on imports from foreign nations for 12 of these minerals.[24] We are, therefore, at least 50 percent reliant on other nations for 82 percent of the 50 USGS critical minerals.

As the U.S. focus on domestic production, processing, and refining dwindled, countries like China dramatically ramped up their capabilities. For example, between 1985 and 1995, China's annual REE mining production increased from 21 to 60 percent of the global share, beginning China's current dominance in the supply chain.[25] In 2023, the U.S. mined 43,000 metric tons of REEs, but this was less than 20 percent of China's output the same year.[26] China also invested in processing and refining facilities while increasing its mining capacity. Currently, China controls about 70 percent of the production of REEs and up to 90 percent of REE processing in the world—whether those facilities are in China or China state-owned mines, processing plants, or refineries in other countries.[27] In 2023, China was the leading source for 29 of the 50 USGS identified critical minerals.[28]

In December 2024, China banned exports of three REEs—antimony, gallium, and germanium—to the U.S., and in early April 2025, China put seven categories of medium and heavy REEs—ones vital to the U.S.' national security and economy—on an export control list, requiring special export licenses to export these REEs.[29] The export control on heavy REEs, such as terbium, which is used in key defense systems including submarines, is particularly concerning as China controls 100 percent of the heavy REE processing in the world following the refinery in Vietnam shut down in 2023 over a tax dispute.[30] This means that even though various countries have critical mineral and REE production capacity, most of the raw materials still end up being shipped to China for processing and refining. Moreover, China also has a hand in the recycling process for critical minerals—such as the recycling of electric vehicle batteries

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[24] Rare Earths: Mineral Commodity Survey, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-rare-earths.pdf.
[25] Does China Pose a Threat to Global Rare Earth Supply Chains?, CHINA POWER PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-rare-earths/ (last visited May 15, 2025).
[26] Rare Earths: Mineral Commodity Survey, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-rare-earths.pdf.
[27] Sulgiye Park, Cameron Tracy, and Rodney Ewing, *Reimagining US rare earth production: Domestic failures and the decline of US rare earth production dominance – Lessons learned and recommendations*, 85 Part A RESOURCES, 1 (Aug. 2023).
[28] Critical Minerals Resources: The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Role in Research and Analysis, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R48005 (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48005.
[29] Amy Lv and Tony Munroe, *China Bans Export of Critical Minerals to US as Trade Tensions Escalate*, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2024), https://www reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-bans-exports-gallium-germanium-antimony-us-2024-12-03/; Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz, *The Consequences of China's New Rare Earths Export Restrictions*, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/consequences-chinas-new-rare-earths-export-restrictions.
[30] Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz, *The Consequences of China's New Rare Earths Export Restrictions*, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/consequences-chinas-new-rare-earths-export-restrictions; *Department of Defense Awards $4.22 Million to Increase Production of Terbium and Other Rare Earth Elements,* U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Sept. 9, 2024), https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3898948/department-of-defense-awards-422-million-to-increase-production-of-terbium-and/.

to recover critical minerals like lithium.[31] This further increases China's dominance in critical mineral supply chains.

D. Recent Executive Actions

During his first term, President Trump issued several Executive Orders (EO) related to critical minerals. These EOs defined critical minerals, required the publishing of a list of critical minerals by the Secretary of Interior, and declared the growing threat of the U.S. reliance on China and other foreign adversaries for critical minerals a national emergency.[32] In 2017, President Trump issued EO 13817 which provided a definition of a critical mineral and directed the Secretary of Interior, in coordination with other relevant executive departments and agencies, to publish a list of critical minerals.[33]

Following this order, the Secretary of Interior published a list of 35 critical minerals in the Federal Register in May of the following year.[34] Recognizing the growing threat of the U.S. reliance on China and other foreign adversaries for critical minerals, in 2020 President Trump declared this threat a national emergency via EO 13953.[35] This EO directed the Secretary of Interior to adjust the listing criteria for critical minerals based on an amended definition and to update the list regularly.[36] The definition of a critical mineral, criteria for listing, and the requirement to update the list regularly was codified in the Energy Act of 2020.[37] This Act also directed the USGS to assess domestic critical mineral resources and conduct supply chain analysis to forecast production, consumption, and recycling patterns for critical minerals.[38]

President Biden also took executive action related to critical minerals. In February 2021, he issued EO 14017 which directed the federal government to conduct a 100-day review of supply chains for four critical products—semiconductors, large capacity batteries, critical minerals and materials, and pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients.[39] This review yielded more than 70 recommendations to promote resilience of these supply chains.[40] In 2021, the National Science and Technology Council Critical Minerals Subcommittee was codified to coordinate Federal science and technology efforts to ensure secure and reliable supplies of critical minerals to the U.S.[41]

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[31] *Battery recycling breakthrough achieves 99.99% lithium recovery*, BATTERY NEWS (Mar. 14, 2025), https://batteriesnews.com/battery-recycling-breakthrough-achieves-99-99-lithium-recovery/.
[32] Exec. Order No. 13817, 82 Fed. Reg. 60835-60837 (Dec. 26, 2017); Department of the Interior (DOI), "Final List of Critical Minerals 2018," 83 Fed. Reg. 23295-23296 (May 18, 2018); Exec. Order No. 13953, 85 Fed. Reg. 62539 (Sept. 30, 2020).
[33] Exec. Order No. 13817, 82 Fed. Reg. 60835 (Dec. 26, 2017).
[34] Department of the Interior (DOI), "Final List of Critical Minerals 2018," 83 Fed. Reg. 23295 (May 18, 2018).
[35] Exec. Order 13953, 85 Fed. Reg. 62539 (Sept. 30, 2020).
[36] *Id.*
[37] 30 U.S.C. §1606(a)(3).
[38] Critical Mineral Resources: The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Role in Research and Analysis R48005, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48005.
[39] Exec. Order No. 14017, 86 Fed. Reg. 11849, (Feb. 24, 2021).
[40] Two Years of Building Stronger Supply Chains and A More Resilient Economy, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 2023), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Supply-Chain-Report-Card.pdf.
[41] Linda Rowan, *Critical Minerals Resources: National Policy and Critical Minerals List*, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R47982 (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47982.

In the four months of President's Trump's second term, he has issued at least nine EOs related to critical minerals.[42] On his first day in office, President Trump declared a National Energy Emergency, emphasizing that the U.S.'s identification, production, and refining of critical minerals is inadequate to meet domestic needs.[43] In February 2025, President Trump also established the National Energy Dominance Council (EDC) via EO to advise the President on how best to exercise his authority to increase American energy production and utilize these resources to advance national priorities, including improving processes related to critical minerals.[44]

Many of President Trump's subsequent EOs related to critical minerals focus on identifying undue burdens that reduce incentives to invest in U.S. critical mineral industries or hinder the ability of companies to operate domestically. For example, EO 14154, among other things, directs the heads of all agencies to review existing regulations, orders, guidance, and other policies to identify agency actions that impose an undue burden on the identification, development, or use of domestic energy resources, including critical minerals, and implement action plans to remove these unnecessary incumbrances.[45]

This EO also includes requirements for prioritization of ongoing geologic mapping by the USGS, consideration of U.S. needs for supplying and maintaining the National Defense Stockpile, and assurance that critical mineral projects receive consideration for federal support.[46] EO 14260, signed in April 2025, seeks to identify state and local laws, regulations, and policies that are causing an undue burden on companies in the energy sector—including critical mineral companies—to ease barriers for domestic investment and production.[47]

Several EOs also labeled minerals as critical that are not present on the USGS list of 50 critical minerals. For example, in March 2025, President Trump signed EO 14241, which, among other things, named uranium, copper, potash, and gold as critical minerals.[48]

E. Prior Committee Activity

In the 118th Congress, the Environment Subcommittee (formerly the Subcommittee on Environment, Manufacturing, and Critical Minerals) held two hearings on critical minerals. In April 2023, the Environment Subcommittee reviewed the risks associated with the increased need for critical mineral inputs, particularly from China, for use in renewable or green

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[42] Exec. Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. 8433 (Jan. 20, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353 (Jan. 20, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14241, 90 Fed. Reg. 13673 (Mar. 20, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14213, 90 Fed. Reg. (Feb. 14, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14220, 90 Fed. Reg. 11001 (Feb. 25, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14241, 90 Fed. Reg. 13673 (Mar. 20, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14260, 90 Fed. Reg. 15513 (Apr. 8, 2025); Exec. No. Order 14261, 90 Fed. Reg. 15517 (Apr. 8, 2025); Exec. No. Order 14272, 90 Fed. Reg. 16437 (Apr. 15, 2025).
[43] Exec. Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. 8433 (Jan. 20, 2025).
[44] Exec. Order No. 14213, 90 Fed. Reg. 9945 (Feb. 14, 2025).
[45] Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353 (Jan. 20, 2025).
[46] *Id.*
[47] Executive Order 14260, 90 Fed. Reg. 15513 (Apr. 8, 2025).
[48] Exec. Order No. 14241, 90 Fed. Reg. 13673 (Mar. 20, 2025).

technologies.[49] In June 2024, the Environment Subcommittee held a hearing that examined the landscape of concerns with Chinese monopolization of the critical materials supply chains and the consequences of energy and resource policy decisions downstream of the critical minerals and materials market.[50]

The Environment Subcommittee also wrote two letters to then-Secretary of Energy Granholm inquiring, among other things, about actions the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) took to address China's export restrictions on graphite, gallium, and germanium and what actions DOE would take in response to the Chinese government's announcement in July of 2024 that rare earth metals were the property of the government of China.[51]

IV. KEY QUESTIONS

The hearing may include discussion around the following key questions:

- What is the status of critical minerals production, processing, and refining in the U.S.?
- How do we decouple and derisk the U.S. from China and foreign adversaries and shore up domestic supply chains?
- What are some of the challenges or hindrances in developing or operating critical mineral industries in the U.S.?
- What opportunities lie in the expansion and development of critical mineral industries in the U.S.?

V. STAFF CONTACTS

If you have any questions regarding this hearing, please contact Majority Committee staff at (202) 225-3641.

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[49] *Exposing the Environmental, Human Rights, and National Security Risks of the Biden Administration's Rush to Green Policies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Manufacturing, and Critical Minerals of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce*, 118th Cong. (2023).
[50] *Securing America's Critical Materials Supply Chains and Economic Leadership: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Manufacturing, and Critical Minerals of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce*, 118th Cong. (2024).
[51] Letter from Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Chair, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to Jennifer Granholm, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't, of Energy (Nov. 21, 2023); Letter from Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Chair, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to Jennifer Granholm, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't, of Energy (July 30, 2024).