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- 7 PUBLIC TRUST AMID RESPIRATORY ILLNESS SEASON
- THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2023 8
- 9 House of Representatives,
- Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 10
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- Committee on Energy and Commerce,
- Washington, D.C. 12
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The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in
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    Room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Morgan
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    Griffith [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
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Present: Representatives Griffith, Burgess, Guthrie,
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    Duncan, Palmer, Lesko, Crenshaw, Armstrong, Rodgers (ex
21
    officio); Castor, DeGette, Schakowsky, Tonko, Ruiz, Peters,
22
    and Pallone (ex officio).
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Also present: Representative Dingell. 24

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Staff Present: Sean Brebbia, Chief Counsel; Lauren 27

Kennedy, Clerk; Tara Hupman, Chief Counsel; Emily King, 28 Member Services Director; Chris Krepich, Press Secretary; 29 Molly Lolli, Counsel; Karli Plucker, Director of Operations 30 (shared staff); Gavin Proffitt, Professional Staff Member; 31 32 Emma Schultheis, Staff Assistant; John Strom, Senior Counsel; Austin Flack, Minority Junior Professional Staff Member; 33 Waverly Gordon, Minority Deputy Staff Director and General 34 35 Counsel; Mary Koenen, Minority GAO Detailee; Will McAuliffe, Minority Chief Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; 36 37 Constance O'Connor, Minority Senior Counsel; Christina Parisi, Minority Professional Staff Member; Harry Samuels, 38 Minority Oversight Counsel; Andrew Souvall, Minority Director 39 of Communications, Outreach, and Member Services; Caroline 40 Wood, Minority Research Analyst; and C.J. Young, Minority 41 Deputy Communications Director. 42

44 \*Mr. Griffith. The Subcommittee on Oversight and
45 Investigations will now come to order.

I now recognize myself for a five-minute openingstatement.

Today's hearing is the first opportunity for Congress to hear testimony from Dr. Mandy Cohen since she was appointed the CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, director in July.

52 Dr. Cohen, congratulations on your appointment. You are 53 taking the reins of the CDC at a critical time in the 54 agency's history, and you have a heavy task ahead. As I said 55 at our June oversight hearing, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed 56 that we did not have the CDC we thought we had. I am looking 57 forward to hearing about how you plan to change that.

58 This hearing is also an opportunity for us to hear firsthand about how the CDC is responding to the ongoing 59 respiratory virus season. I am particularly interested in 60 hearing about how CDC is helping to mitigate the shortage of 61 respiratory syncytial virus, or RSV, immunization for all 62 63 infants. We have already heard reports that RSV cases are rising sharply in certain areas of the country and that some 64 hospitals are in surge mode. 65

66 With unprecedented demand for RSV immunizations this 67 year leading to supply constraints, I hope we will hear what 68 the CDC plans to do to ensure we have a sufficient supply of

69 product for the seasons to come. It is great that we have a 70 safe, effective RSV immunization to protect our children, but 71 it does us little good if we don't do a better job at 72 preventing supply constraints. Questions remain.

How is the CDC planning to rebuild public trust in the agency?

75 Has the CDC learned from the mistakes it made during the 76 COVID-19 pandemic?

77 Is the CDC committed to making the hard and deep reforms 78 needed to avoid repeating those same mistakes?

While I am looking forward to hearing your testimony on these points, I candidly haven't seen much outward evidence yet that the CDC has taken the failings of the COVID-19 pandemic to heart.

Another area I have grave concerns about is the detrimental effect extended school closures have had on our kids' learning. According to a report by the National Assessment of Educational Progress, the average testing scores for U.S. 13-year-olds has hit the lowest level in decades.

According to the New York Times report from earlier this month, school closures led to 50 million children, including my own, being out of the classroom, causing these students to miss an extremely crucial time in their lives since they were forced to attempt to learn from home. And let me assure you,

94 learning from home for school-aged children is not as 95 effective as being in the classroom. In the same report The 96 Times claims this may prove to be the most damaging 97 disruption in the history of American education. The damage 98 wrought by school closures was enormous, and our children 99 will be living with its consequences for decades.

As I have said before, for better or worse, CDC recommendations and guidance carry great weight. They were used to justify not only school closures, but prohibiting nursing home visitations and vaccine mandates that would have resulted in millions of Americans losing their jobs.

In addition, businesses, fitness centers, and worst of all, churches and other places of worship were closed.

Further, the discovery of an illegal biolab in Reedley, 107 California exposed more problems at CDC. CDC's management of 108 the Federal Select Agent program has been subject to 109 criticism in the past for inadequate investigations in 110 response to biosecurity incidents, including investigations 111 from this very subcommittee. Reading the China Select 112 113 Committee's report showed how inadequate CDC's approach to the Select Agent program is. CDC initially refused to even 114 investigate the lab, and only did so once they were contacted 115 by Democratic Representative Jim Costa of California. 116

117 The CDC even refused to test any of the thousands of 118 pathogen samples that may have contained, and could have

119 contained, unknown and dangerous pathogens.

120 The agency also failed to take meaningful action 121 regarding a refrigerator that was labeled "Ebola' ' during 122 their so-called investigation. CDC's response was totally 123 inadequate, and failed to provide any support for the local 124 government, and put the public at risk through indifference. 125 This is not acceptable, and the CDC must do better.

126 As we look to the future it is clear that the CDC needs to do more than just a reset. There needs to be a seismic 127 128 shift. The agency announced in April of 2022 that they were going to undergo a reform by starting to review their 129 processes and structures in place. Since, they have made a 130 handful of changes but more is needed. I know that you have 131 not been there long enough to implement a seismic shift, but 132 133 I hope we can start to see CDC quidance driven by the latest science and robust evidence. 134

In closing, I hope your tenure as director will start that process and reinvigorate this important agency. Thank you.

138 [The prepared statement of Mr. Griffith follows:]

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140 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*COMMITTEE INSERT\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

141

142 \*Mr. Griffith. And I yield back to myself, and now 143 recognize the subcommittee ranking member, Ms. Castor, for 144 her five-minute opening statement.

145 \*Ms. Castor. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good 146 morning, everyone.

Welcome, Dr. Cohen. Thank you for your service as the newest director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The timing of your appearance here today is very important, as we want to ensure that all Americans have all necessary information to protect themselves from respiratory disease as we head into the season of higher infections and illness by -- driven by flu, COVID-19, and RSV.

This subcommittee held a hearing in July on how CDC can improve its effectiveness in performing its core public health missions, but they did so without having anyone from the CDC who could provide a substantive update. So thankfully, we can hear directly from Dr. Cohen today about her priorities to help Americans stay healthy and to prevent and fight disease.

One of the strengths of the CDC is that it works in collaboration with states and local communities. Strong public health partnerships and infrastructure are our best line of defense against disease. Families, communities, businesses, and policymakers like us rely on up-to-date information to understand risks and to devise prevention

167 strategies. Working together, we can improve the lives and 168 health of Americans.

Earlier this week CDC released data showing that life expectancy in America last year increased slightly after a decrease in 2020 and 2021 due to the heavy toll caused by COVID-19, where over 1 million Americans lost their lives. Even with that slight improvement, we are struggling compared to other wealthy countries.

Nevertheless, thanks to the historic emergency 175 176 legislation passed by Democrats in the last Congress and the extraordinary efforts of communities and health professionals 177 across the country and the Biden Administration, we have put 178 the dark days of the pandemic behind us, and we can focus 179 anew on ongoing public health threats like heart disease, 180 cancer, maternal mortality, opioid addiction, suicides, and 181 gun violence. 182

For a country that is grappling with debts and deficits, and for families looking to lower health care costs, it is more important than ever that we ensure that all Americans have access to good nutrition and lifesaving vaccines, and that they don't start smoking cigarettes.

Unfortunately, nearly four years after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, some of my Republican colleagues continue to aggressively undermine cost-saving prevention work and malign scientists performing lifesaving medical research.

The Republican majority has actively opposed strengthening 192 public health, and failed to use the lessons learned to 193 better position America to respond to a future health 194 emergency. Republican budgets in Congress tell the story. 195 196 Instead of working to keep our neighbors safe and avoid higher health care costs, Republicans want to take us 197 198 backwards through harmful cutbacks, shutdowns, and budget 199 showdowns.

200 Meanwhile, Democrats are working to put people over 201 politics to keep our neighbors healthy and well, to prevent 202 unnecessary hospitalizations and deaths, and to be ready for 203 the next Ebola or Zika or coronavirus. You never know what 204 is going to happen.

For example, earlier this summer in Sarasota, Florida, 205 206 just south of me, they experienced a surprising outbreak of malaria, with patients hospitalized. Thank goodness, CDC 207 experts jumped in to aid the community and develop a 208 containment and prevention strategy. See, there hasn't been 209 a malaria outbreak in the United States in 20 years, and that 210 211 is good, because malaria is one of the world's greatest public health problems, and it infects approximately 219 212 million people each year with over 600,000 deaths. 213

So we are grateful for the strong response by CDC, but it is also a great example of the importance of timely information for the public. Access to timely health

217 information became entirely too political during COVID, when 218 some officials in my state and in other places concealed and 219 altered information that the public needed. So I hope we can 220 all work together to improve the availability of accurate and 221 timely health information for the public.

Even in the best of circumstances, CDC has a very difficult job. While some politicians are intent on discrediting CDC or actively spreading misinformation, as the former President Trump did repeatedly in 2020 during the height of the coronavirus pandemic, and as the governor and surgeon general in my state of Florida continue to do so today, gosh, the job gets so much harder.

229 So we can do better. We can come together to support 230 the public, improve the public health, make sure that all 231 Americans, our neighbors, stay healthy and well. So I look 232 forward to hearing from Dr. Cohen today about CDC's efforts 233 to strengthen prevention efforts and keep Americans healthy 234 and safe.

235 [The prepared statement of Ms. Castor follows:]
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237 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*COMMITTEE INSERT\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*Ms. Castor. Thank you, and I yield back my time.

240 \*Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentlelady. I now recognize 241 the chair of the full committee, Mrs. Rodgers, for her five-242 minute opening statement.

\*The Chair. Thank you, Chair Griffith. And I would also like to welcome and congratulate Director Cohen as becoming the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

I believe that we must have a transparent and honest 247 248 conversation about the future of CDC, an agency that was never and needs to be authorized by Congress. Director 249 Cohen, you might be the last appointed CDC director without a 250 Senate confirmation. And your actions and decisions can help 251 return the CDC back to its fundamental mission, or your 252 253 actions could allow the CDC to drift further away and worsen public trust. 254

We want to hear from you today about CDC's preparedness for the current wave of seasonal viruses such as flu, RSV, and COVID-19. And at the same time we want to examine CDC's past decisions and guidance to understand how you are taking lessons learned from COVID-19 and Mpox, and other recent public health threats to improve our current and future public health strategies.

This is a chance to restore transparency and build public trust in our health institutions, and ensure that

264 CDC's issued guidance is clear, practical, and consistently 265 relevant and up to date with the latest science. Sometimes 266 this may include telling the American people what the CDC 267 does and doesn't know.

268 To put this bluntly, your predecessors took bad advice. They acted on bad advice due to political pressure, and 269 misled the American people. The institution you now run 270 influenced schools to remain closed by listening to non-271 scientific stakeholders, namely the teachers unions. And 272 273 because of their guidance to keep schools closed for an extended period, our children, the very future of our 274 country, now suffer generational learning loss and 275 devastating mental health conditions. 276

The gravity of the situation is clear. If we fail to 277 278 restore trust in public health institutions and correct past mistakes, the consequences for our children and our country 279 could be dire. It is in this context of urgency that we must 280 consider the substantial investments made during the 281 pandemic. Congress provided schools with \$190 billion to 282 283 combat COVID, allocating the estimated 20 percent to mitigate learning loss. And despite these efforts, students in grades 284 three through eight are lagging months, if not years, behind 285 in reading and math abilities. Nationwide, our children's 286 academic performance has suffered a historic decline, with 287 reading and math scores plummeting to the lowest levels in 30 288

289 years.

Further, school attendance is down, and students are dealing with a crisis of loneliness. These facts are not merely statistics. They are our children, our nieces and nephews, our neighbor's children. They are the next generation. And right now, this is a stark indication of the broader fallout from actions taken during the COVID-19 response that we are only beginning to uncover.

As we reflect on the events that led us to this point, we must acknowledge the weight of responsibility that comes with being the director of the CDC. The agency's guidance has far-reaching implications, affecting not just public health, but our day-to-day lives and the overall well-being of our children.

It is imperative that we see a commitment to cooperating with Congress. Too many of our inquiries to your predecessor went inadequately answered or wholly ignored, and I think we all agree that being transparent with us and the Americans that we represent is foundational to restoring trust. I know this is your first time testifying before

Congress as director of the CDC, but this hearing is more than a procedural formality. It is a pivotal moment for accountability and reassessment. The insights shared today will not only shed light on past decisions, but will also take a step toward rebuilding trust. This hearing is an

opportunity to share how you will apply lessons learned to the current respiratory illness season, as well as future decisions by the CDC.

Director Cohen, you have an opportunity today to inform the committee and the American people how you plan to lead as director, and we look forward to your testimony and hearing about how you are going to lead the CDC moving forward and restore public trust. Thank you again for being here. [The prepared statement of The Chair follows:]

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324 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*COMMITTEE INSERT\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

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\*The Chair. Chair Griffith, I yield back.

327 \*Mr. Griffith. I thank the lady for yielding back, and 328 now I recognize Mr. Pallone, the ranking member of the full 329 committee, for his five-minute opening statement.

\*Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being here, Dr. Cohen, and I look forward to your testimony today and to working with you on all the important issues that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is tackling.

335 Particularly at this time of year it is critical that we 336 make every effort to extend access to vaccines against seasonal respiratory illnesses to all Americans. With new 337 options and new methods of vaccine delivery, it takes a 338 coordinated effort between the CDC, local health departments, 339 340 and those who are on the ground distributing and administering these vaccines. And right now, COVID-19 341 vaccines are being distributed commercially and not by the 342 government for the first time since the beginning of the 343 pandemic. 344

The RSV vaccine is also now available for the first time for older Americans, and it is critical that we communicate a clear message to Americans about where and how to get vaccinated to protect themselves and their families from respiratory illness.

Now, the CDC has produced a comprehensive campaign to

inform the American public about the availability of COVID-19, influenza, and RSV vaccines. Providing clear guidance based on the best available science is core to CDC's mission, and it is encouraging to see you personally contributing to this campaign, Dr. Cohen.

But Congress has to also do its part. We must ensure 356 that CDC has the resources and authorities needed to best 357 358 serve the American people and protect our health and well-The COVID-19 pandemic exposed systematic shortcomings 359 being. 360 in our public health infrastructure and preparedness that we must address. But instead of coming together to advance the 361 362 Bipartisan Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, or PAHPA, reauthorization that applies the hard lessons learned 363 from the pandemic, our Republican colleagues pushed an 364 365 inadequate and partisan reauthorization through this committee. 366

And I continue to be astonished and disappointed that we 367 still can't agree on the hard lessons learned during the 368 pandemic. The very title of this hearing shows that my 369 370 Republican colleagues have disdain for masks, which was an important and effective tool in reducing the spread of the 371 deadly virus. It is unfortunate. It is unfortunate that a 372 rejection of science seems to have taken hold of House 373 Republicans, and this refusal to learn from the past makes it 374 375 very difficult to find a bipartisan path forward on necessary

376 and important legislation to protect the American people as 377 we go forward.

Over and over again, public health experts have told us 378 that having access to timely data during the pandemic was 379 380 critical to an effective response. Access to updated, streamlined, and coordinated data is essential in order for 381 CDC to provide recommendations, guidance, and public health 382 information to the general public in a way that is useful and 383 timely. And better health information means better guidance 384 385 for the public.

386 Unfortunately, our Republican colleagues refused to 387 include such a provision in their extreme and partisan PAHPA 388 reauthorization bill. Democrats, on the other hand, are 389 committed to future preparedness, and will continue to work 390 towards that goal. We saw what happened during the early 391 days of the pandemic, and we should do whatever we can to 392 avoid relearning those horrible lessons.

And I certainly hope we can have a productive discussion 393 today with Dr. Cohen about her vision and priorities for CDC. 394 395 We understandably spent a lot of time talking about COVID, but there are countless other health issues that CDC is 396 always addressing domestically and globally, such as maternal 397 mortality and morbidity, the opioid epidemic, mental health, 398 rates of sexually-transmitted infections, and shortages in 399 400 our health care workforce. And all of this work depends on

401 good data and a sound public health infrastructure that 402 enables effective communication between CDC and local 403 governments across the country.

We have to be able to spot threats early and evaluate the effectiveness of interventions so that Americans can receive the guidance and the assistance they deserve. But Congress also needs to ensure that CDC has adequate resources to do its work. You only need to look at the House Republicans' extreme appropriations bill to see that they are not serious about strengthening our public health system.

House Republicans want to cut 1.6 billion from CDC's 411 current funding level. This drastic funding cut would 412 seriously undermine CDC's ability to perform its vital 413 mission, and would endanger public health and safety. So it 414 415 once again shows how House Republicans continue to cave to the extreme elements in their party who have no interest in 416 governing, in my opinion. So it is time for Congress to be a 417 partner, not an impediment to making important and necessary 418 reforms that make our nation safer. 419

So I thank you, Dr. Cohen, and I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that we are having this important hearing today. [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]

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424 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*COMMITTEE INSERT\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

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\*Mr. Pallone. Thank you again, I yield back.

427 \*Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentleman for yielding back.
428 This concludes members' opening statements.

Members are reminded that, pursuant to committee rules, all members' written opening statements will be made part of the record. But be sure to provide those opening statements for the record to the clerk promptly.

We want to thank our witnesses for being here today and taking time to testify before the subcommittee. You will have the opportunity to give an opening statement, followed by a round of questions for members.

437 Our witness today is Dr. Mandy Cohen, director of the438 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

We appreciate you taking your time to be here today, and look forward to hearing from you. As you know, if you testify in front of this committee, we generally \_ I guess always, I don't \_ I can't recall a time we didn't \_ we take our evidence under oath. Do you have an objection to testifying under oath today?

445 Seeing that the gentlelady has not objected, we will 446 proceed.

The chair also advises you you are entitled to be advised by counsel, pursuant to House rules. Do you desire to be advised by counsel during testimony today? \*Dr. Cohen. No, sir. 451 \*Mr. Griffith. All right. Seeing that she has not 452 requested to have counsel present, would you please rise and 453 raise your right hand?

454 [Witness sworn.]

Seeing the witness answering in the affirmative, you may now sit down. You are now sworn in and under oath, subject to the penalties set forth in Title 18, Section 1001 of the United States Code.

459 With that, we will now recognize Dr. Cohen for your 460 five-minute opening statement.

462 TESTIMONY OF THE HON. MANDY COHEN, M.D., DIRECTOR, CENTERS463 FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

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\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Chairman Griffith, Ranking
Member Castor, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
It is an honor to appear before you today.

CDC is a critical national security asset, putting data 468 and evidence into action to protect this country's health and 469 safety, and I am privileged to lead this dedicated team. 470 Ι step into this role acknowledging the unprecedented 471 challenges the agency and the country faced during COVID, and 472 that the health threats are going to continue to impact the 473 security and safety of Americans. A CDC is that trusted and 474 has the tools to effectively and quickly respond to the next 475 public health challenges, and it's foundational to combating 476 these threats [sic]. 477

This year's fall and winter respiratory season provides an opportunity to see CDC's core capabilities in action across three domains: first, rapidly detect and respond to health threats; second, provide timely, common-sense, evidence-based solutions to protect and improve health; and third, build towards a broader, integrated, effective system that protects the public's health.

485 So first, to be our national security asset that this 486 country needs to rapidly detect and respond to health threats requires faster and more transparent information, and we are already putting lessons learned into action through our respiratory disease forecasts and a new respiratory season website, and that, for the first time, we are giving a combined view of COVID, flu, and RSV.

CDC is taking action to provide timely, transparent 492 updates to help people make informed decisions on how they 493 will protect themselves and their families against 494 respiratory viruses in their community. You can go to our 495 496 website right now and see that RSV season is in full swing. The flu season is just beginning across most of the country, 497 though accelerating fast. And while we are seeing relatively 498 low levels of COVID, COVID is still the primary cause of new 499 respiratory hospitalizations and deaths, which about with 500 501 about 15,000 hospitalizations and about 1,000 deaths every single week. 502

CDC is also leveraging innovative tools to more quickly 503 detect disease trends. For example, in collaboration with 504 state and local jurisdictions, CDC is utilizing wastewater 505 506 surveillance to rapidly detect spreading disease in communities. Just this week CDC launched an updated 507 wastewater data dashboard providing public health 508 practitioners and the public early insights into the spread 509 of infectious diseases in communities. It is data that can 510 511 be translated into action.

Second, we are also applying lessons learned by 512 providing Americans with clear and timely solutions to 513 protect their health. And there is good news. With the 514 approval of new RSV immunizations for the first time, we now 515 516 have immunizations available for all three major fall and winter respiratory diseases. Immunizations against COVID, 517 flu, and RSV remain the safest and most effective protection 518 519 for avoiding severe illness and death, and I have been traveling around the country talking about the importance of 520 521 vaccination, answering questions, and meeting with our 522 vaccinating partners on the front lines.

Finally, as we build a stronger CDC, it's critical that 523 we build upon and strengthen the infrastructure and systems 524 developed during the pandemic response for a more integrated 525 526 and effective public health system. CDC must have the public health data system that is integrated with health care and 527 our jurisdictional partners. Unfortunately, with the end of 528 the public health emergency, CDC is more limited in our 529 ability to show county-level information for COVID and for 530 531 other infectious diseases like flu and RSV.

Now, CDC is working hard and fast to put in place agreements with our partners to improve access to data at the jurisdictional level and to enable a robust national situational awareness. But even with these agreements in place and the important enhancements we have made to our data

537 capabilities, absent new policy levers and resources from 538 Congress there will continue to be a highly concerning 539 limitation in the information CDC can use to protect health 540 security.

541 Further, CDC recently launched the Bridge Access Program to address gaps in vaccine access. The program provides no-542 cost COVID vaccines to un and under-insured adults for a 543 544 limited time. This program is a temporary fix to longstanding barriers to adult vaccination. Without a 545 546 permanent program, the next time there is a vaccinepreventable outbreak, the country will need to build a system 547 to distribute and administer vaccines to adults who are un 548 and under-insured. 549

550 In closing, CDC is committed to protecting Americans 551 from emerging health threats. And to do this, we must be transparent, provide clear communication, and collaborate 552 across government and with other public and private partners. 553 But even as CDC takes concrete steps to achieve these goals, 554 we know we cannot do it alone. We do need help from Congress 555 556 to support a CDC that has both the resources and the policy levers to be the national security asset we all need. 557

I look forward to working with you on these important goals, and I'm happy to take any questions. Thank you, Chairman.

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562 [The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:]

- 564 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*COMMITTEE INSERT\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*
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Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much for your testimony.
We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of the
hearing, and I will begin the questioning and recognize
myself for five minutes.

570 So we have heard a lot in the opening statements, you 571 know, people going back and forth. But even though we want 572 CDC and our health community to give us the data and the 573 science, that did not always appear to be the case during 574 COVID-19. So that brings up my first question.

575 I have concerns surrounding the potential conflict of interest between the CDC and the CDC Foundation, which 576 accepts millions of dollars annually in private financing 577 578 with minimal reporting requirements or disclosures regarding how these funds are to be spent, or whether there are strings 579 580 attached when those funds come into the Foundation. That results in the concern that private donors may be influencing 581 public health policy at the CDC through the Foundation. 582

583 What assurances can you provide us that there are 584 appropriate checks and balances between the CDC and the CDC 585 Foundation, especially when it comes to transparency?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Chairman. Transparency is very important to me, and I am working hard to make sure that we can collaborate with many partners.

As you likely know, the CDC Foundation is chartered in law. So they exist because Congress asked them to exist.

And they are doing work in alignment with the CDC mission, right, to protect the health of this country, though they do have a separate board, and an independent way of raising dollars, and do act independently from us. So we are trying to accomplish the same mission of protecting health.

\*Mr. Griffith. But I think it is fair to say that you can assure us that you will not allow any donations from individuals to the Foundation to affect your sound decisions in making decisions as the head of the CDC. Yes or no?

600 \*Dr. Cohen. I will continue to make sure that I am
601 making decisions on behalf of the CDC that are in accordance
602 with the data and the evidence

603 \*Mr. Griffith. Perfect.

604 \*Dr. Cohen. from our

605 \*Mr. Griffith. I have got to move on because time is 606 limited, even for the chair of the sub.

So Dr. Cohen, since you have become the CDC director, 607 the level of cooperation from the CDC in response to this 608 committee's oversight has been a little bit disappointing. 609 610 CDC specifically has not responded to certain letters. Instead, we have received letters signed by HHS Assistant 611 612 Secretary for Legislation. Even these responses did not respond to all of our questions or provide a single document. 613 614 Instead, the responses recounted publicly-available 615 information.

Under your leadership, as you get your legs \_ your sea legs under you, I hope that CDC will work with us to do our role as oversight. Will you commit to working with us and having the CDC cooperate with our oversight for the betterment of the nation, yes or no?

621 \*Dr. Cohen. Chairman, I look forward to working with 622 you. I think it is really important, as I said in my opening 623 statement, that we work closely with Congress, and I look 624 forward to working with you personally.

I built relationships across the aisle in North Carolina, and I look forward to doing that here in this new role.

628 \*Mr. Griffith. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.

With the current surge in respiratory disease in China, this subcommittee sent a letter to you just yesterday \_ so we don't expect an answer yet \_ but just yesterday regarding this mysterious uptick in cases. Our hope is that \_ you know, and if you need us to help, we will, but we are hoping that you can put some pressure in an attempt to try to get China to not mislead the world as they did with COVID-19.

What steps is your agency taking, is CDC taking to ensure that you can gather all the complete and accurate data regarding this mysterious uptick in respiratory illnesses in China?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Chairman. On that,

641 obviously, it is really important that CDC continues to do 642 our global work and do this scientific diplomacy.

What we know as of right now, today, of what is 643 happening in China, they are having an increase in some of 644 645 their respiratory illness. They are seeing it in the northern part of their country. They are seeing an uptick in 646 their pediatric population. What we do know as of, again, as 647 of today, is we do not believe this is a new or novel 648 pathogen. We believe this is all existing meaning COVID, 649 650 flu, RSV, mycoplasma and but they are seeing an upsurgance. You know, we do have an office, CDC does, in China. And 651 our officials have been in touch with our counterparts to 652 make sure that we're understanding the situation there, that, 653 you know, they were sharing back with us, again, not a novel 654 pathogen 655

\*Mr. Griffith. And you will keep us informed?
\*Dr. Cohen. We will.

658 \*Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that.

659 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you.

Mr. Griffith. According to conversations the Select Committee on China had with local officials of Reedley, California, the CDC refused to take phone calls from city and county officials about that biolab. Why wouldn't the CDC prioritize a call on a serious and potentially deadly issue? \*Dr. Cohen. Chairman, we take very seriously working

with our state and local partners. We work very closely and collaboratively. And I know in this case, when we were again, we did not lead the investigation, but when we were invited to join and investigate related to select agents at that lab, we did so. We went on site for two-and-a-half days and completed that investigation.

672 \*Mr. Griffith. Well, what can you tell me about this673 Ebola refrigerator?

\*Dr. Cohen. So we did a two-and-a-half day

investigation. We took 300 photos, looked at everything.

Our team did not see anything that said "Ebola' ' anywhere.

677 \*Mr. Griffith. Okay.

\*Dr. Cohen. When we heard, after the fact, that someone said it was labeled "Ebola,' we immediately followed up and said, "Do you have a picture? Is there any evidence?' They could not produce that. So I think that was an erroneous inclusion in that report.

683 \*Mr. Griffith. Okay.

\*Dr. Cohen. We do not believe that there was any select
agents on premises at that lab.

686 \*Mr. Griffith. Yes. It is a dangerous world. Be 687 careful out there.

I yield back and now recognize Ms. Castor for her five minutes of questions.

690 \*Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Cohen, thank you for your testimony and the important updates on what CDC is doing to educate the public on influenza, COVID-19, and RSV during this season.

Having all three vaccines available represents great progress in protection against these viruses, and it provided me an opportunity to check in with health providers at home. And they are quite enthused about having all of these tools at their disposal, especially the new vaccine for RSV for infants and pregnant women.

And I cannot agree with you more about the importance of ensuring CDC has consistent access to timely public health data. When a public health threat arises anywhere in the country, communities cannot mount an effective response if they don't know what is happening on the ground. Quick action in a health emergency saves lives.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress authorized and 706 CDC worked to efficiently collect and analyze data from 707 states and localities. But as we learned, spending a lot of 708 time on these processes during a pandemic was a distraction 709 710 from the missions that -- where we could have been preventing the spread and treating the sick. So that is why I was 711 heartened to see a positive example of a quick and effective 712 CDC response recently in Sarasota on malaria. 713

Can you -- can you walk us through what -- how that worked, and the importance of data gathering, and then what

you all were able to do on containment and prevention?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Ranking Member Castor.
This was, you know \_ working on the first domestically
acquired malaria in 20 years that our country has seen was, I
think, an example of how local, state, and Federal officials
work really well together.

And I think a good news story in that when we were we 722 723 identified, again, those first few cases of domestically acquired malaria that we hadn't seen in 20 years, the local 724 725 leaders were very much on top of it, but were able to reach back to state, and then to us at CDC to ask for assistance. 726 We were able to provide technical assistance related to how 727 to control the mosquitoes, how to think about treatment for 728 the individuals. We gave out guidance to the local 729 730 communities, as well as the health care providers in that agency to make sure that they were looking for additional 731 cases. We provided some back-up laboratory capability for 732 the area, and we also made sure to look at all of the 733 mosquitoes in the area to make sure we weren't seeing further 734 735 malaria in those mosquitoes.

So a partnership here again, local, state, and Federal together, and the good news story is we did not see any continuation of malaria. It's really important to stop it quickly. It was really important to have the data to put out evidence-based guidance very quickly, and to take action,

right, to make sure we were spraying for mosquitoes, again, making sure we were taking protective measures. And I think a good news story of saying that's public health at work.

Now, public health sometimes, when it is a success, it can be often invisible. Right? I bet most folks in Florida don't even know that public health was working for them. But it was, and I am very proud of the team's effort \_ again, state, local, and Federal together.

\*Ms. Castor. And I bet a lot of members here weren't even aware of it. And thankfully, no one lost their life. And think about it. In a tourism-based economy, if something -- if a public health threat gets out of control or takes off, then it really hurts. It hurts a lot of people.

The -- talk a little bit about RSV. You know, we are used to hearing about flu, and get your flu shot every year. People are all too familiar with COVID. But RSV, why is it more prevalent now, and why is it so important for pregnant women and infants to get the vaccination?

\*Dr. Cohen. Yes. So RSV is another virus, a respiratory virus that circulates in the winter season. It really impacts our older adults, our seniors, and our young babies.

Babies, usually by the age, you know, two or three years, have been exposed to RSV already. We know that because of the pandemic we did stay home for a period of

time, and so there was a cohort of kids that did not get exposed to RSV. And then when the \_ we were all having lovely Thanksgivings and Christmases again we did see higher rates of circulation. And because children hadn't been exposed to that before, then they were newly infected with RSV. And we know young babies have little lungs and little bronchioles, and sometimes get more sick from RSV.

773 The good news for this season, which we haven't ever before had, is a vaccine for our older adults over 60 and an 774 775 immunization for our infants. It is a long-acting monoclonal, which means we are giving antibodies directly to 776 babies to protect them from RSV. So we are in a different 777 place, but we know that there is a limited supply of that 778 immunization for our babies, so still need for parents to 779 780 take precautions.

And for our pregnant moms, we also have a vaccine between \_ for pregnant moms between 32 and 36 weeks pregnant, where they can get vaccinated, build up antibodies, and pass those along to their babies to be protected, as well.

785 \*Ms. Castor. Excellent. Thank you.

786 I yield back my time.

787 \*Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentlelady.

In regard to mosquitoes, the Aedes aegypti modified mosquito by Oxitec, which I think is a great control, not your jurisdiction, but NIH and FDA are working on that.

Dr. Burgess, I look forward to hearing your five minutesof questioning.

\*Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Chairman. I don't share your optimism about the FDA and the Oxitec mosquito, but that is a separate discussion.

Director Cohen, thank you for being here today. Obviously, your first time before this committee in your role as CDC director, but it is not your first time before this committee. Your role in CMS in previous congresses. Thanks for talking with us at the Doctors Caucus.

801 We all share the goal of rebuilding the faith and trust in the CDC, because I think most of us recognize we need a 802 well-functioning and respected CDC in order to protect the 803 American people. And you have shared some of your vision 804 805 with us about how we travel that road, but one thing missing is the to the degree that there has been self-reflection 806 and decisions made as far as governance and how things work 807 internally at the CDC, are you free to speak on that? 808 809 \*Dr. Cohen. About the internal work of the CDC? 810 Absolutely.

\*Mr. Burgess. Well, and what you have done internally to change \_ to modify the culture, improve the culture. \*Dr. Cohen. Yes. So this was work \_ I want to give credit \_ that started before I came on board as CDC director. They definitely have changed the structure of the agency to

816 make sure it is more operationally focused, so it is more 817 ready to respond. We have created programs like the CDC 818 Ready program, where we are training and keeping warm ready-819 responders who are trained and ready to be deployed if we 820 would see any emergency.

But I think now what we are really focusing on is making sure that we can turn data into action quickly, and making sure that we are working as one team. At CDC there is a lot of fantastic experts, but often siloed in their disease states.

826 \*Mr. Burgess. Sure. Let me just ask you, because we are working on the reauthorization of the Pandemic All-827 Hazards Preparedness Act, have you done an after-action 828 report strictly vis a vis the CDC, what happened, what went 829 830 right, what needed improvement that you could share with us? I have asked Dr. Califf this same question. He has 831 promised to do so, but has not produced. Do you have such a 832 833 document?

\*Dr. Cohen. Yeah. So before my tenure there was an extensive review on how CDC should be reorganized. That was put together as part of the \_ what was labeled as the Moving Forward Plan. So we would be happy to share with your team more details on that.

839 \*Mr. Burgess. But just as far as the details of what 840 could we have done better, do we have access to that?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, I think there has been many ways in 841 which we've been thinking about lessons learned, particularly 842 whether we think about the communication space or the lab 843 safety space and quality space, those are all lessons learned 844 845 we're already baking into our work. And I hope you're already seeing us communicate differently, both more timely 846 telling folks what we know when we know it, and also what we 847 848 don't know. I heard that in some opening statements.

So I think we are both communicating differently, I think we have many new procedures related to lab quality to make sure we don't ever see the mistakes on the lab side that we saw before, and we are making sure our workforce is ready to respond.

But I will say there are still ways in which we need to continue to work with Congress to make sure CDC is funded to be that national security asset that we need for this country. So there are resources and authorities, again, that we look forward to working with you on.

\*Mr. Burgess. Well, it always sounds odd coming from a political figure arguing that someone should express humility when talking about something that they are really not sure what is going to happen. We know it is important, we know it is dangerous, but we don't always know what is going to happen next, or we changed our minds with new data that came in. And that is what was really missing at the helm of the

CDC during the height of the pandemic. Again, it seems odd for Members of Congress to be lecturing people about humility, because it is a quality that we are not known for. [Laughter.]

870 \*Mr. Burgess. Just also on the Prestige Biotech that the chairman asked about, have we developed a lessons learned 871 in how to prevent this from happening, or is there going to 872 873 be an effort created for surveillance of outside labs? \*Dr. Cohen. So look, we know we are in unprecedented 874 875 times with more health threats. And whether those threats come from a lab, from an animal, from a weapon, we need to be 876 ready. And that is exactly why CDC needs to be well 877 resourced and funded, to make sure we are detecting those 878 threats, and that we are ready to deploy and respond. 879

\*Mr. Burgess. Yes, but it is not the first time this has happened. We had this thing here with Dr. Friedman many, many years ago. So it is something that requires some scrutiny.

Let me just ask you, I have got the life expectancy increases produced by the Center for Disease Control. It talks about the increases in life expectancy would have been greater if not for the offsetting increases in mortality due to influenza, pneumonia, perinatal conditions. Can you expound upon the perinatal conditions that have contributed to that?

\*Dr. Cohen. You know, sir, I don't know that I could,
but I would be happy for our team to

\*Mr. Burgess. If you will share that with us, that is important to me, and I would like to see the follow-up on that.

\*Dr. Cohen. Absolutely. Will do.

\*Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

\*Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentleman for yielding back.
I now recognize the gentlelady from Colorado, Ms. DeGette,
for her five minutes of questioning.

901 \*Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 902 holding this hearing.

Most members of this committee know every year about this time I always say we should have a hearing on flu preparedness. But like everything else in our lives now, it has become much more complex because now we have three things we are trying to prepare for. So, Dr. Cohen, we are happy to have you where you are because we know you are taking this seriously.

Back in February we had a hearing in this subcommittee with some health officials from CDC, NIH, and FDA about the government's COVID-19 response which, as you heard today, we keep talking about over and over again, but which we really need to move forward to try to be prepared to respond better the next time instead of just whining about it.

At that hearing, your predecessor, Dr. Walensky, urged this committee to provide CDC with new statutory authorities so that it could fulfill its public mission.

919 \*Voice. Ain't going to happen.

Ms. DeGette. And some of those priorities were
priorities you discussed in your testimony today.

922 You need to turn off your mike, thanks.

So some of these priorities are ones that you provided in your testimony today, and we were talking about it nine months ago. So I am kind of disappointed that we haven't made more progress as a Congress in giving CDC more data authorities, because that is what we really need to be able to identify the issue and then -- and then to alert the public.

So you can't respond to a crisis if you can't measure that crisis, or if you are seeing it in the rearview mirror. And CDC doesn't have the authority to do that without Congress. So, you know, there is this effort to transform the agency that started, again, with your predecessor, CDC Moving Forward. And I know you are trying to move this forward and modernize the data and communication

937 infrastructure.

Can you give us an update as to your efforts and let us know what you still need so we can work in a bipartisan way to give it to you? 941 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you, Representative DeGette. Yes, 942 our data infrastructure is critical to making sure that CDC 943 is the national security asset that we need, and a lot of 944 work has been done, and I think there is a lot of success 945 stories.

You know, at the beginning of the pandemic we transmitted information, you know, electronically, and only about 200 hospitals were able to transmit that data electronically to that \_ now we are close to 30,000.

Right? So we are making significant progress.

950

You know, as a state official from North Carolina, that data was incredibly important to us and, again, we wanted both that information to be at the state level and the national level, because I know that our borders were really important. I needed to know what was happening in South Carolina in order \_ because Charlotte is right on the border there, right?

958 So having information and visibility across borders is really important. And so we need to make sure that we have a 959 960 national picture of what is going on. And that is the importance of these data authorities. And we are working 961 closely with our states to do what we can, and make sure that 962 we can put all the authorities in place. But we but having 963 964 that infrastructure and the authorities and, importantly, the resources are 965

966 \*Ms. DeGette. What authorities do you need us to give 967 you still?

968 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, so I want to touch on resources 969 because I will say in the \_

970 \*Ms. DeGette. Okay.

971 \*Dr. Cohen. In our current budget and the way it looks 972 in the House, they zeroed out investments in data 973 infrastructure that is just not going to be compatible with a 974 successful CDC.

975 But there is also authorities that allow for us to collect data in a way from both our health care partners 976 and our state and local partners in a way that allows us to 977 978 have that visibility. So we are also happy to work with your teams on how to structure that. We are always talking about 979 980 data in this case that is de-identified. We are very focused on making sure we are protecting privacy as we make sure to 981 collect this data. But it is really important. 982

\*Ms. DeGette. So if you and your team can get back to 983 us specifically with the legislative language -- first of 984 985 all, I agree with you about the resources. If we are going to sit here and collectively say we need to do a better job 986 987 if there is a new pandemic, we can't zero out your budget for data collection. That is insane. And I don't think that 988 989 will happen in the end. But in terms of the legal 990 authorities that you need, if your team can work with us on

991 specific legislative language, then we will try to work in a 992 bipartisan way to make that happen.

993 And I yield back.

994 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you.

995 \*Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentlelady for yielding 996 back, and now recognize Mr. Guthrie for his five minutes of 997 questions.

998 \*Mr. Guthrie. Thanks.

999 Thanks, Dr. Cohen, for being here, and thanks for 1000 hosting me in Atlanta and getting to meet your good team. 1001 And I will tell you, there are a lot of hard-working 1002 Americans in your building trying to make sure we are 1003 protected and safe, and we appreciate that. I enjoyed my 1004 time there.

And as you know, as we discussed \_ and it gets to \_ you know, I wouldn't say that I am whining about COVID. I know my good friend from Colorado \_ and she is my dear friend. But we have lessons learned. We lost some faith in a lot of institutions \_ I am going to talk about WHO and some others \_ and I believe you are working to try to do that, and I think we have to work together to try to do that.

But it is just instances that happen. And there is one, it is one of the letters that we had sent to you from the leadership of E&C about the COVID tracker data. I think there were 72,000 deaths that were removed from the CDC COVID 1016 tracker website. I think you said it was the \_ not you
1017 personally, but it was a glitch.

1018 There was also CDC's National Vital Statistics System 1019 showed less COVID-19 deaths in kids than was previously 1020 reported. And so would you explain? I know those are two 1021 separate situations. Explain those, and then what you have 1022 done.

Because what your group showed me what they wanted to 1023 do with the data. And I believe they, the people sitting in 1024 1025 that room, were wanting to use it to give good information for them to protect the American people. The question we 1026 have when we talked about it and other things is how can we 1027 ensure data is being made private. And when you see some of 1028 these mistakes and lack of transparency, it is hard to make 1029 that case, and I think you want to make it. 1030

1031 And so would you talk about those specific instances, 1032 and then what you have done to fix them?

1033 \*Dr. Cohen. Yes. Well thank you, Representative1034 Guthrie, and I really appreciated the visit down.

You know, making sure that we have timely and accurate information is critically important. And this, I think, when we look at our mortality data or our death data, this is a success story over the course of the pandemic. At the beginning of the pandemic, the way we were able to report death data was quarterly. It wasn't quick, it wasn't in real

1041 time. But we know the pandemic was moving so quickly that we 1042 had to report more quickly, and so we used a different 1043 mechanism to report death data through case surveillance 1044 data.

1045 Essentially, the state and local folks were collecting that data and would give it to the CDC. We caveated at the 1046 1047 time to say this was preliminary. The gold standard, which was not as timely at the time we were still reporting, but 1048 again, it was slower. We made a lot of improvements again, 1049 1050 thank you to Congress for those resources where now we can almost get real time in that gold standard data, and that is 1051 1052 what we are using. And we were able to sunset those case 1053 surveillance data that you were referring to. So we are now in a better place related to our timeliness and accuracy of 1054 the mortality. 1055

And look, we are still looking at 1.1 million adults that have lost their lives to the 1,700 kids that have lost their lives to COVID, so we do have to use all the tools at our disposal to make sure we are protecting folks.

Mr. Guthrie. Okay, thanks. And you talked earlier about the \_ I was going to ask you about what is going on in China now. And you \_ your assessment, from what you know, is that it is not a novel virus.

1064\*Dr. Cohen. Correct, not a novel virus. Again, we have1065been in close touch with our counterparts in China, and that

information has been corroborated with other counterparts across the U.S. Government, but also with our European Union partners, as well. So we feel confident that that information has been corroborated.

1070 \*Mr. Guthrie. Because one of the institutions that I feel really fell was that World Health Organization. 1071 Thev seem to defend this is my assessment of it defensive of 1072 China when this whole COVID broke out, when there was they 1073 were doing the indefensible, not sharing information so the 1074 1075 rest of the world could react to it. And they have requested specific data from China for the for this current outbreak, 1076 and specifically in recent trends in circulation of known 1077 1078 pathogens and so forth.

1079 Is China responding to the World Health Organization? I 1080 know you have people in China that are dealing with their 1081 Chinese colleagues. Do you think the World Health 1082 Organization is responding in a way that it should? 1083 And do you think China is working with them to 1084 forward

1085 \*Dr. Cohen. My

1086 \*Mr. Guthrie. From what you can corroborate.

\*Dr. Cohen. Yeah, I don't know firsthand about the WHO and China interactions. Our information is direct from our teams who are in our China office with our counterparts. But my understanding from WHO is that China has been sharing

1091 information related to this. And so, again, another way to 1092 corroborate.

Mr. Guthrie. Okay, thanks. You know, also, the World Health Organization asked China for information in December of 2022.

So I guess, just to summarize I am about out of time 1096 I know we have our own personnel in China for the CDC, and 1097 you feel confident that they have China is being 1098 transparent with them for the information that you have? 1099 1100 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, I think, you know, scientific diplomacy is incredibly important in that part of the world. 1101 We do have a small office, and we are trying to work on 1102 1103 things that are mutually agreeable. But I am sure we would love to do more work, and I would be happy to talk more 1104 about 1105

Mr. Guthrie. If it was coming straight from scientists, you are probably different than \_ I know they have to work through their government, as well.

But thank you for your work, and I appreciate it, and I yield back.

Mr. Griffith. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Pallone, for his five minutes of questions.

1114 \*Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1115 Dr. Cohen, thank you again for being here to talk to us

about the CDC's important work, particularly at this time of year when respiratory illnesses are on the top of everyone's mind.

As people are scheduling vaccines to ward against seasonal respiratory illnesses of flu, COVID-19, RSV for themselves and their families, I wanted to know what CDC is seeing in its data about rates of infections,

hospitalizations, and deaths. So is CDC seeing a sharper rise in rates of infection or hospitalizations for one of these viruses compared to the others?

1126 And what does CDC project through winter in terms of 1127 cases, if you will?

1128 \*Dr. Cohen. Yes. Well, thank you, Representative 1129 Pallone.

1130 So for the first time this season, you can actually see 1131 a consolidated view of COVID, flu, and RSV together on our 1132 website now. So you can see the relative impact.

I would say that we are in full swing of RSV season. We are seeing a lot of RSV, particularly in the southern part of the country. So we are near peak is what I would say for RSV.

1137 With that, we are also at the beginning of flu season. 1138 So we are not having an early flu. We are actually having a 1139 pretty \_ what I would say \_ typical flu season. We do expect 1140 to see a lot more flu cases over the course of December and January, so please do make sure that you are getting your updated flu shot, and check what is happening in your communities.

But that being said, even though those are both going up 1144 1145 and we are at the peak of RSV, COVID is still the respiratory virus that is putting the most number of folks in the 1146 hospital and taking their lives. So it is about 15,000 1147 people in the hospital for COVID, and about 1,000 people 1148 dying per week across the country related to COVID. 1149 We are seeing an uptick in COVID. Remember, we had a late summer 1150 wave of COVID. We came down from that. We are going back up 1151 again, which we expect, again, after a lot of travel and 1152 gathering at Thanksgiving. 1153

But to remind folks it's never too late to get that updated COVID vaccine, and as well as making sure that we are getting access to testing and treatment. Really important, because we have treatment for these diseases, to get tested. You know what you have. That treatment, in addition, could save your life.

Mr. Pallone. Now, what about the monitoring of vaccine uptakes across the country for the three: for flu, COVID-19, and RSV? What -- what are you -- trends are you seeing about the vaccine uptake?

1164\*Dr. Cohen. Yeah. So now that we are outside the1165official public health emergency \_ this is one of the issues

we were discussing related to lack of visibility with our data \_ so we don't have the same level of data visibility that we had when the Federal Government was purchasing and distributing all the vaccines.

1170 What we have now is an imperfect tool to know how folks 1171 are or aren't getting vaccinated. We use a survey. It is a 1172 survey we have used for decades, so it is a validated survey. 1173 But we essentially ask folks, did you get an updated COVID 1174 vaccine? And from that survey data we see about 16 percent 1175 of Americans have gotten the updated COVID vaccine, and that 1176 is not enough. I will say that right now.

I have been doing as much as I possibly can to be going around the country, again, meeting with folks, answering questions, explaining the importance of vaccination, but it is not enough, and I look forward to continuing to work with Congress and other partners to make sure that we can help folks know what tools are out there, and have them use them to protect themselves.

Mr. Pallone. Well, that gets into the communications issue. So I had two questions about that, and then we will probably be out of time.

1187 What kind of strategies is CDC employing to facilitate 1188 communications of your recommendations to the public and to 1189 health care workers?

1190 And how would a modernized data infrastructure or

increased authorities to access more timely health data enhance your ability to make public communication more effective?

\*Dr. Cohen. So first, we are really concentrating our communications efforts with health care providers. We know doctors and nurses are some of the most trusted and most important folks who can talk to people about their vaccinations.

One of the top reasons people don't get vaccinated is because their doctor or their nurse practitioner just didn't bring it up. So we are really focusing our effort in a time where there are limited funds on making sure that our health care providers have all the information they need.

As I said, I am going around the country to answer 1204 questions. We are working through trusted providers, but we 1205 have more work to do. And yes, would real-time data help us 1206 to direct our resources? Absolutely. I will just say, as 1207 when I led through the COVID crisis in North Carolina, we 1208 used data day to day to decide should we deploy teams here, 1209 1210 should we increase, you know, media in a certain part of the state because we are seeing lower things? So that real-time 1211 data is really important to allow us to make sure that we are 1212 tailoring our operational work. 1213

1214 \*Mr. Pallone. Well, thank you so much.

1215 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1216 \*Mrs. Lesko. [Presiding] I would like to recognize the 1217 chairwoman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, Cathy 1218 McMorris Rodgers, for five minutes of questioning.

1219 \*The Chair. Much of your written testimony focused on 1220 CDC's response to the expected trifecta of respiratory 1221 diseases this season \_ influenza, RSV, and COVID-19 \_ as well 1222 as your goal to rebuild trust. I hope CDC will learn the 1223 right lessons from COVID.

I am growing increasingly concerned about what we are 1224 1225 hearing from China. The recent spike in respiratory diseases and clusters of pneumonia reported among children, images of 1226 hospitals and schools being overwhelmed with sick children, 1227 and it brings us back, sadly, to the early days of COVID-19. 1228 The lack of reliable information coming out of China is a 1229 troubling parallel to 2020. I, along with our Oversight 1230 Chair Griffith and Health Subcommittee Chair Guthrie, sent a 1231 letter yesterday to CDC asking about what, if any, 1232 interaction the CDC has had with their Chinese counterparts 1233 regarding this outbreak. And I appreciate the emails that 1234 1235 CDC sent last night.

I do want to urge you to respond to the letter completely and in a timely fashion, and understand we just sent it yesterday. While I look forward to your response, I would like to know today whether the Government of China is has been transparent, forthcoming. Have you spoken with

1241 your public health counterparts there?

Do you have confidence in their accuracy and completeness of the information that they are sharing? And do you have confidence in the independence of the World Health Organization and its ability to accurately share information out of China? \*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Chairman Rodgers.

First I just want to reiterate that the based on the 1248 information we have now, we believe there is no new or novel 1249 1250 pathogen, that these are related to existing pathogens COVID, flu, RSV, myco pneumonia and making sure that we are 1251 using our China CDC office. So we do have staff from CDC in 1252 touch with Chinese officials, our counterparts, and they have 1253 been in direct communication. They have shared the Chinese 1254 officials have shared with us that, again, no novel 1255

1256 pathogens, that what they are seeing is this.

And we were able to corroborate that information across other sources from our European Union partners and others to make sure that we were getting a complete picture.

1260 \*The Chair. That is so important, because I have been 1261 concerned about CDC depending too much on official 1262 announcements from the Government of China or the World 1263 Health Organization that has proven to be ineffective. 1264 I also think it is safe to say that the pandemic broke

1265 CDC's guidance drafting process. And leaving aside the

disgrace of CDC's collusion with teachers unions on the school reopening guidance, and the fact that CDC still won't tell this committee what outside groups it consults with when drafting guidance documents, throughout the pandemic the CDC struggled to produce timely, accurate guidance, and had to regularly revise guidance documents within days of issuing them. The process is clearly broken.

Do you believe doing something similar to what the FDA does, which is to use a clear, transparent process for how recommendations are crafted, disseminated, and applied should be implemented at CDC?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, so first I want to say that we want to make sure that we are getting feedback. And I have already talked to our team about how we need to make sure that we are marrying evidence-based solutions with what works on the ground.

As a state official, I want to make sure that the guidance that we are providing from CDC works for our states. Stakeholder engagement is a core component of what we need to do.

1286 Right now we have guidance that is posted on our website 1287 for public feedback for all to do. But there are certain 1288 circumstances where we need to work quickly. Actually, the 1289 example of malaria that we responded to in Florida required 1290 us to move very rapidly and put out guidance for those 1291 communities in a rapid way.

1292 \*The Chair. Okay.

1293 \*Dr. Cohen. So there

\*The Chair. Thank you, thank you. I have one more 1294 1295 question I want to get to here, because I do believe that this is fundamental, that we need good guidance practices. 1296 1297 The FDA did this over 25 years ago. I have a bill that would require CDC to enact good guidance practices, and it 1298 even includes a provision allowing the Secretary to waive 1299 1300 those practices in an emergency. So unfortunately, the CDC is opposing this bill. So we have seen how CDC guidance can 1301 affect millions of American everyday lives. The FDA already 1302 1303 uses a similar approach. Why shouldn't the CDC? \*Dr. Cohen. Well, I don't think there is a one-size-1304 fits-all for the kind of guidance that CDC offers. 1305 Sometimes, like this example for malaria, it wasn't an 1306 1307 emergency, but we did need to move quickly to prevent the emergency. Other times, when we have the time like we have 1308 right now, we have some guidance up on our website for 1309 1310 feedback.

I hear the intent of what you want, which is to make sure we are hearing feedback both from Congress and other stakeholders. It is very important to me, as well. So we want to bake that in. I don't think there, like I said, there is a one-size-fits-all for that process, but I hear you 1316 on the intent, and very much hope we are already showing you 1317 that we are fulfilling that.

1318 \*The Chair. Well, I want to work with you on this. I 1319 believe good guidance is really important, and it would go a 1320 long way toward building trust that has been broken.

1321 So I yield back.

1322 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you.

1323 \*Mrs. Lesko. And now I recognize Mr. Tonko for five1324 minutes of questioning.

1325 \*Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Seasonal RSV typically causes mild, cold-like symptoms, but in some cases the virus can cause serious illness and hospitalization. Infants and young children are at a particularly high risk of serious illness from RSV infection, as we heard here today. This is the first year there is an RSV vaccine for the youngest children, which is an incredible advancement.

1333 So, Dr. Cohen, what do parents need to know about the 1334 current RSV season, and what steps can they take to keep 1335 their kids healthy?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, first we want parents to know that their \_ our youngest can be impacted by RSV, but there is a new immunization. So also, if you are a pregnant mom, to know if you are between 32 and 36 weeks there is a new vaccine for you that allows you to pass on your antibodies to 1341 the baby and protect your baby, as well.

1342 So new tools that are out there, but remember to make 1343 sure you are in touch with your pediatrician about getting 1344 access to them.

Mr. Tonko. Thank you. In my district I know that parents have heard CDC's message to get their children vaccinated. They are attempting to respond, and there is high demand. Unfortunately, parents in my district are having trouble finding the vaccine due to shortages, which I know CDC is aware of.

I also am hearing from many constituents about access 1351 issues for COVID-19 vaccines for children under three years 1352 old. For example, an individual I will name just as Heather 1353 from Delmar, New York contacted me and shared that she had 1354 been trying to find a vaccine for her two-year-old child, but 1355 that there were no such options available. The closest 1356 location that would offer the vaccine to children under three 1357 was nearly two hours away in Hartford, Connecticut. 1358

I am also hearing about access issues for the RSV immunization for children and pregnant individuals. A mother from Albany, New York shared that her toddler has asthma and is considered at a more severe risk for infection complications, yet the immunization is not availably local --

1364 available locally for her soon -- for her son.

1365 In response to these calls from constituents, I reached

1366	out to two of our colleagues here in Congress who are both
1367	pediatricians, Congresswoman Schrier and Congresswoman
1368	Caraveo. They shared my concern for the health and
1369	well-being of many of our youngest and most vulnerable
1370	constituents. With that in mind, this week we joined
1371	together to send a letter to CDC on pediatric vaccine access.
1372	And Madam Chair, I ask that we enter this letter into
1373	the record, please.
1374	*Mrs. Lesko. Without objection.
1375	[The information follows:]
1376	
1377	********COMMITTEE INSERT********

1379 \*Mr. Tonko. Thank you, and I look forward to a complete 1380 response to this letter.

But in the meantime, I have a few questions for you specifically in regard to the RSV vaccine. Dr. Cohen, how is CDC working with FDA and manufacturers to respond to this supposed shortage of pediatric RSV vaccines?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Representative Tonko. We have been working very closely with manufacturers. I personally have been on the phone maybe dozens of times with the teams to work to accelerate the supply.

The good news is we actually were able to have about 1389 70,000 additional doses accelerated. We do expect additional 1390 doses in the January timeframe, but there were manufacturing 1391 delays here. And so what CDC has done, in addition to 1392 working with the manufacturers, is to put out guidance to 1393 make sure we are using the supply that we do have, and we 1394 have many hundreds of thousands of doses, but that we do use 1395 1396 those doses for the highest-risk children, and making sure that, for example, those who are under the age of six months 1397 1398 are even at higher risk, and make sure that they are getting prioritized for these doses. 1399

1400 \*Mr. Tonko. Well, I appreciate that. And it is so 1401 important that you are taking it so seriously.

1402 In addition to what you have just indicated, is there 1403 anything that Congress should be doing now to help alleviate

1404 current and future pediatric RSV vaccine shortages?

1405 \*Dr. Cohen. I appreciate that question. I would 1406 probably need to get back to you

1407 \*Mr. Tonko. Okay.

\*Dr. Cohen. \_ on what would be most helpful. We are working through that right now, and, you know, as I shared earlier, the RSV immunization is a long-acting monoclonal. It is a different production cycle than a traditional vaccine. It takes longer.

There are decisions needed right now to make sure even next season that we are in an adequate place that we are working with the manufacturers on. So let me take that back to the team, and see if there are other things we need to deploy here.

\*Mr. Tonko. I appreciate that. The work that CDC does 1418 every year to educate Americans and help them prepare for 1419 1420 seasonal viruses like RSV is indispensable. It is encouraging to see such strong demand for a new vaccine, and 1421 I look forward to working together to make certain that you 1422 1423 have the resources you need to continue CDC's important work. 1424 We appreciate the public information efforts, they are incredibly important. 1425

And with that, Madam Chair, I thank you and yield back. Mrs. Lesko. And now I would like to recognize the gentleman from North South Carolina. Sorry, Representative 1429 Duncan.

1430 \*Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Today's hearing, Director Cohen, is fundamentally about understanding your priorities as director, and how you are going to lead CDC.

Dr. Cohen, as secretary of North Carolina's department 1434 of health and human services during the COVID-19 pandemic, 1435 you mandated that students in K through eighth grade wear a 1436 mask regardless of their vaccination status, and threatened 1437 to sue school districts that refused to comply. You imposed 1438 the school mask mandate after Governor Cooper, whose 1439 administration you worked for, vetoed a bill that would have 1440 1441 required in-person schooling.

You have also spoken publicly that you made decisions on 1442 whether to allow fans to attend football games or whether to 1443 lift mask mandates based on feelings and what your friends at 1444 other state public health agencies were doing. None of this 1445 1446 suggests that you will push for the much-needed changes at CDC, or help the agency break from its insular culture. 1447 1448 I would like to ask you if you have any regrets about the school closures, the mask mandates, or any other 1449 restrictive measures you imposed in North Carolina. 1450 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Representative Denton 1451 1452 [sic].

1453 You know, I am very proud of the work that we did in

North Carolina. I feel like we did that in a way that was 1454 1455 very inclusive. We listened. I had great partners on both sides of the aisle in North Carolina as we did that work. 1456 You know, you have to put yourself back in 2020, when we 1457 1458 had very little information, we barely had any tests, we had very little PPE, we certainly didn't have vaccines or 1459 1460 treatment. There were very few tools at our disposal to protect folks. 1461

1462 \*Mr. Duncan. Would you impose those type restrictions
1463 today?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, the good news is we are in a new place, so \_ right? And I am looking forward to turning this new chapter with CDC as we look forward. I want to make sure we are learning the lessons from the pandemic about transparency, and about creating those infrastructures that we need to make sure that we can detect and respond to diseases.

But I want to make sure that we are in a place where we don't have to get into that place again, right? So we are a\_

1474 \*Mr. Duncan. We trust the science, and not the feelings 1475 and the opinions. A lot of it was subjective, you know, the 1476 six-foot social distancing and all this.

1477 But anyway, moving on, we had a hearing at CDC \_ on CDC 1478 reform back in June, just after the COVID-19 public health

emergency declaration was finally terminated. Some of the major takeaways I had from that hearing is that CDC is much too academic, too insular, and does too much.

To be fair to you and the CDC, a lot of these failings 1482 1483 have their roots here in Congress. CDC has never been authorized as a coherent agency. We in Congress have never 1484 1485 told the CDC definitively what it is supposed to do and what it isn't supposed to do. This has led to a mission creep and 1486 a CDC that is an agency of all trades, but master of none. 1487 So I think the lack of underlying authorization is the 1488 root of a lot of CDC's problems. We in Congress need to 1489 revisit CDC's authorities and impose authorities to impose 1490 mask mandates and vaccine mandates. Some of these statutes 1491 date back decades, and were originally given to the surgeon 1492 general, who is now just sort of a glorified spokesman for 1493 These authorities are totally out of date, and 1494 the nation. prior to COVID-19 were thankfully seldom utilized and never 1495 at the scale we just experienced. 1496

Mr. Duncan. Dr. Cohen, it is a tragedy that CDC pushed vaccine, mask, and distancing mandates on the constituents of the 3rd district of South Carolina and all across the nation that closed small businesses, schools, and places of worship. And it is worth noting that these same restrictions were not applied to protest and riots that we saw all across the country.

We owe it to the American people to provide coherent direction to CDC. Congress owes that to CDC, as well. Set clear boundaries on your authority.

And as I close I would encourage my colleagues to read the report I am going to request be entered into the record by the Heritage Foundation. It provides what I think is a realistic roadmap that we can \_ that can set us on a course to fix the failures and over-reach we saw during COVID-19.

Mr. Chairman \_ Madam Chairman, I would ask to enter that into the record, and thank you for your leadership and for holding this hearing.

Dr. Cohen, Director Cohen, I wish you luck at CDC as you face these challenges. We are not here to thwart your efforts. We want to define your mission and help you to keep America safe, but do it in a very pragmatic, common-sense, science-based way.

1520 And with that, I yield back.

1521 \*Mrs. Lesko. Without objection, we will put \_ place 1522 that in the record.

1523 [The information follows:]

1524

1525 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*COMMITTEE INSERT\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

1527 \*Mrs. Lesko. And now I call on Mr. Ruiz for five1528 minutes of questioning.

Mr. Ruiz. Thank you, Dr. Cohen, for being here and for taking on the incredibly important role of -- as CDC director. I serve as ranking member of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, and I believe that the value of looking back at the government's response to the pandemic is to be more prepared going forward.

1535 So Dr. Cohen, what are the most important lessons to 1536 take away for CDC and the public health system from the 1537 pandemic, and how are you applying those lessons?

And I know you have talked a lot about it, so if you -so let me ask it in a different way. If you were to choose one thing that could make the biggest difference, what would be on top of that list?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Representative Ruiz. It is always hard to choose just one, because, look, this is \*Mr. Ruiz. Of course.

\*Dr. Cohen. \_ a hard amount of work. And I certainly
bring a lot of lessons learned from North Carolina.

Maybe I will focus on operational excellence. I think it is really important to pair the science and the evidence and the data with execution, meaning the ability for us to deliver for the American people a response effort, or a vaccine distribution that is effective. And so making sure 1552 that we have systems that work.

1553 Certainly, we have talked a lot about data, but having systems that coordinate between Federal, state, and local and 1554 that we have that the infrastructure to make sure that we 1555 1556 are delivering for the American people. So I see CDC already moving in that direction. And what I mean by that, we are 1557 1558 not just putting out recommendations related to vaccines. We are putting programs in place that allow people to get 1559 vaccinated. 1560

For example, the Bridge program, this is a program stood up, first time, very incredible, heavy lift for CDC to stand up this program so quickly, but is offering free vaccines for the un and under-insured across this country. And so that is the kind of work we need to pair with the good data to say that these vaccines are safe and effective. We also have to break down barriers of cost and access at the same time.

Mr. Ruiz. And so, as you begin your tenure at CDC, what should our priorities be in Congress to improve the nation's readiness for a future health emergency?

1571 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you for that. I think a1572 partnership with Congress is so important.

We have talked a lot about the \_ needing the resources and authority to be the national security asset that we need. But I will also say it is really important that we align to share good information about tools folks can use to protect

1577 themselves.

We know that folks want to leave COVID in the rearview mirror, but it is still here with us, and it is important to have a shared voice saying, hey, use these tools that are safe and effective. I am certainly going around the country doing that. I would love to have more voices join that chorus.

But again, the communication is important, but we need those resources and authorities that allow us to do our job well.

Mr. Ruiz. And some of our Republican colleagues have raised concerns about CDC's Federal Select Agent Program and CDC's inspection of a facility in Reedley, California. Can you explain the role of the Federal Select Agent Program in biosafety?

And is there anything you would like to clarify on the 1592 1593 CDC's response to reports about the Reedley facility? \*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Representative Ruiz. You 1594 know, the report that was put together on this did have a 1595 1596 number of inaccuracies, and I do want to make sure we are clarifying that the investigation was run by state and local 1597 officials in California. It was run by FDA, FBI. 1598 CDC was brought in, to your point, around select agents. 1599 We were 1600 asked to join on site to investigate could there be select agents on site. 1601

Our team was there for two-and-a-half days in an extensive review, took hundreds of pictures. We looked at invoices, we looked at freezers, and what was actually very notable was the absence of equipment that you would normally see if there were select agents. So whether it was protective equipment or safety hoods, or what have you, none of that existed at this lab.

And after that extensive review, you know, our team did conclude that there were no select agents on that property and then, again, turned the investigation back over to the FBI and others who were in charge.

Mr. Ruiz. Thank you. You know, we face challenges in rural and underserved communities in getting public health information to them. What are some of the most persistent obstacles the CDC faces in getting public health information to hard-to-reach communities, and what strategies does the CDC employ to try to overcome these obstacles?

1619 \*Dr. Cohen. So we \_ it is very important that we are 1620 reaching every community. I believe no matter what zip code 1621 you live in, you should have the opportunity for health. 1622 I think our most important tool here is partnership and 1623 trusted partners. So there are trusted partners that we work 1624 closely with who already are known by their community,

1625 trusted by their community. And again, we are focused a lot 1626 also on making sure our health providers have the information 1627 and tools. We know that they are trusted doctors and nurses,

1628 and those are folks that we want to make sure we are

1629 partnering with.

1630 \*Mr. Ruiz. Thank you.

1631 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you.

1632 \*Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, and now I call on myself for 1633 five minutes of questions.

1634 Thank you, Director, for coming to testify, and thank 1635 you for meeting with me in my office the other day.

1636 In addition to this committee, I also serve on the 1637 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic.

The CDC is, obviously, important to the health and safety of Americans. And unfortunately, I think all of us know that the confusing and inconsistent recommendations coming from the CDC during the COVID pandemic have really damaged Americans' trust in the CDC, and we want to rebuild that.

1644 Vaccine and mask mandates implemented by the Biden Administration and states have caused long-lasting distrust 1645 1646 in the "Trust us, the government knows best what is for you' [sic] mentality. I have been told that while you served as 1647 the secretary of the North Carolina department of health and 1648 human services, you were a staunch proponent of vaccine 1649 1650 mandates, extending school closures, and business lockdowns 1651 and closures.

Is what I have been told accurate? And if so, how do we know you won't support government mandates at the Federal level?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Representative Lesko. And you know, I appreciate that we are looking forward. We want to turn that new chapter. I think there are a lot of lessons learned from the pandemic. We have been talking about them today.

And you have to remember at different moments in time we 1660 1661 needed different solutions. And the good news is we are in a different place, and we can look forward as we go to make 1662 sure that we are building the national security asset that we 1663 need. And so we are want to use tools that protect folks' 1664 health. Vaccines are a very important tool to protect folks' 1665 health. It is why I have been traveling around the country 1666 sharing that, but I am trying to take those lessons learned 1667 and apply them, and move us forward. 1668

Mrs. Lesko. Well, hopefully you will take those lessons if another pandemic breaks out while you are still the director, because I oppose government mandates. I myself took the vaccinations, but I don't think it should be forced on people.

And with that in mind, do you think that the government mandating vaccine mandates, it actually did the opposite effect, it made people more hesitant to take them?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, I think vaccines are a critical tool 1677 1678 to keeping folks healthy and safe. And it is not just the COVID vaccine, it is flu, it is all of the vaccines that have 1679 kept children and people safe for many, many decades. 1680 1681 I think they are continue to be really important tools, and I look forward to working with Congress to make 1682 1683 sure that we can get good information to folks so that they can make the choices for themselves to use tools to protect 1684 themselves. 1685

\*Mrs. Lesko. Well, I can tell you from personal experience, talking to many constituents, the mandates actually had the opposite effect on people. Less people want to take vaccines. I think it is a better approach to encourage people to take vaccines, not to force it on them from the government, because then people just will distrust it. Not all people, but a lot of people.

My other question is, do you believe that wearing cloth masks or the surgical masks \_ I am not talking about the N95 masks \_ the surgical masks prevented people from getting COVID?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thanks for that question. We know that masks work. They do work. The surgical masks work to make sure that you are protecting you, the individual, from circulating viruses. So they do work.

1701 And again, at different points in time they were some of

our only tools that we had before we had reliable tests or treatment or vaccines. But they are still a tool that we can use. But don't forget washing hands, ventilation. We learned a lot during the pandemic. We need to use all those tools.

\*Mrs. Lesko. So you believe that some of those cloth masks that people had, where the openings in the cloth is bigger than the molecules of the COVID vaccine, actually prevented people from getting COVID?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, so surgical masks are certainly better, N95s, you know, even better than that. But cloth masks still provided some barrier to folks. But that is not you know, when CDC makes its recommendations about what kind of mask to wear, we say wear a well-fitting, appropriate mask, yes.

Mrs. Lesko. I hope that the government balances the benefits versus, for instance, in school children, having all school children mandated to wear masks when perhaps those masks \_ benefit did not outweigh the negatives of children not being able to see lips moving, or expressions, and that type of thing.

1723 Thank you.

\*Dr. Cohen. Well thank you.

1725 \*Mrs. Lesko. Go ahead.

\*Dr. Cohen. Oh, I was going to say that is where, you

1727 know, we relied on the American Academy of Pediatrics related 1728 to safety of masks for kids. And they continue to say that 1729 that continues to be a tool that we can use to make sure 1730 folks are protecting themselves.

1731 \*Mrs. Lesko. Thank you. And now I call on 1732 Representative Schakowsky for five minutes of questioning. 1733 [Pause.]

1734 \*Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I am so happy to welcome you, Dr. Cohen, at your first 1735 1736 hearing right now. And I want to wish you the best of luck. And I want also say that I am so grateful that you have 1737 hit the ground running. I know that you have been all around 1738 1739 the country, that you have been encouraging people to get vaccinated, and that you have been fighting vaccine 1740 misinformation. I know that you were in my city of Chicago. 1741 I appreciate that very much. 1742

I have focused on older Americans and their health care 1743 needs throughout my career, and I am concerned about what is 1744 happening right now in nursing homes and in assisted living 1745 1746 places, where we see, according to the -- according to your agency, that, in fact, that the numbers of seniors who are 1747 being right now being vaccinated is quite low. And in fact, 1748 there was a study that found that only 20 percent of the 1749 1750 people in nursing homes right now have gotten the vaccines 1751 that they need.

Before I turn to you, I just want to say that we also rely on staff, and the CDC does require staff to understand more about vaccines, about being vaccinated and to pass that on. But we are concerned that some of the staff are not encouraging people to get the vaccines. Could you reply to that?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, first, thank you, Representative Schakowsky. We too share your focus on seniors and making sure that they are vaccinated. We continue to see in our data that those over 65 are at the highest risk of hospitalization and death from COVID, flu, and RSV. So it is important that folks are getting access to these tools.

I want you to know that we have been very focused on engaging the long-term care community and leaders. We had a summit at the White House bringing folks together to understand barriers, and we continue to have weekly calls with folks to say, "How can we help and overcome any challenges?'

And I have spent my time as I have traveled around the country to visit some nursing homes, a particular few that have really high rates of vaccination, to understand what are those best practices that we can share around the country. I was in a nursing home outside of the Philadelphia area, Statesman Nursing Home, where they really used their love of the football Eagles to be to help them with their

1777 vaccination efforts, right? They made it a little fun 1778 because, look, we understand that folks are a bit fatigued 1779 from vaccines. And so by thinking about creative ways to get 1780 folks vaccinated \_ and I appreciate you bringing up the 1781 staff, because it is important for the staff themselves to 1782 get vaccinated.

So we need to be working not just to get, of course, the our vulnerable seniors, but also those who are working closely with them. So we have been working closely to make sure we are thinking about both communities to get vaccinated.

Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you so much for that. In the remaining time I wondered if you could tell us, looking forward, what your priorities might be. I am not just talking about the issues that you want to confront, but perhaps also the management of the -- of the CDC.

1793 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you for that opportunity to1794 talk about the future.

You know, I shared that we really need to make sure, again, that we are identifying and responding to health threats, that we are making sure that we are giving evidencebased, but common-sense solutions for folks to protect themselves. But I want to spend a little time on how we create a system that brings health delivery and public health closer together. I think silos were not our friend during the pandemic, and I am working hard to make sure that we are bringing CDC and public health, state, and local closer to our health delivery system.

1806 Now, we I want to make sure I don't lose the opportunity to talk about the importance of the public health 1807 1808 workforce and needing people to be experts and do this work as we go forward, so making sure that we are training the 1809 next generation of experts in public health. But that does 1810 require us to continue to work with Congress to make sure we 1811 have the right authorities to bring in the talent that we 1812 1813 need as we go forward.

1814 So a lot of work ahead to build an integrated way in 1815 which we are bringing health delivery and public health 1816 closer together, that we tie that together with data and 1817 other mechanisms, but we need the people who are the experts 1818 to make sure we're we can carry out our mission.

1819 \*Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you so much, and I yield back.
1820 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you.

1821 \*Mrs. Lesko. Thank you.

1822 And Dr. Bucshon, just so that you know, our rules say 1823 that Mr. Peters has to go first.

1824 [Laughter.]

1825 \*Mrs. Lesko. So I call on Representative Peters for1826 five minutes of questioning.

1827

1849

\*Mr. Peters. I love going in front of Larry.

1828 [Laughter.]

Thank you, Dr. Cohen. I have to say we 1829 \*Mr. Peters. had a really great conversation the other day, and I was 1830 1831 excited about, you know, I think I was frustrated with a lot of people about CDC's communication. And I am very indulgent 1832 because I know that, gosh, we didn't know anything, we didn't 1833 have any tools. And I thought that throughout the whole 1834 process, looking back, it would have been useful to share 1835 1836 more of the uncertainty along with people as we went along. I think they would have appreciated that. 1837

And I think you just made a mistake in this testimony in that I wanted a clear answer to a question, "Do cloth masks work," and you gave me an answer, as a lawyer, that I had a hard time understanding. And I think it is a fair question. And I guess I wish that you had just said, "Don't use cloth masks, use the surgical masks." Don't we have enough information to ask -- to answer the question like that?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, so I want to make sure that we are saying that cloth masks are a barrier, meaning that they do work in some \_ but do surgical masks work better? Absolutely, right? Would I wear a cloth mask? No, I

1850 \*Mr. Peters. It is still pretty complicated. My 1851 district is, I think, the 10th best educated congressional

wouldn't, I would wear a surgical mask.

district in the country. My neighbor would say, "Should I wear a cloth mask?" I don't know from your answer of what I should tell them. What I would say is, you know -- I don't know -- I don't know what to tell them. So I guess I am a little bit frustrated with the still-a-little-bit unclear response from you about a simple question.

But let me ask about complicated thing, which is data. What would you tell my neighbor about the importance of having good data at the Federal level to help us inform how to prevent something like this from happening again, or how to -- how to address it as it happens?

1863\*Dr. Cohen. Sure. But I want to be clear. Wear a1864surgical mask. So wearing a well-fitting surgical mask.

So \_\_but on the data side, it is really important to have a national picture of what is going on. I think we have made a ton of progress in that way. I mentioned, actually, a new data visualization around our wastewater data. I think that is going to give us some really interesting look at some early signals about what is happening in communities all across the country.

And the reason we need a national picture, I mentioned, you know, I led the COVID response for North Carolina. Charlotte, one of our biggest cities, is on the border with South Carolina. It was really important for me, as a public health official, to understand what was happening in South

1877 Carolina to understand what would happen in Charlotte.

\*Mr. Peters. Back that up a couple of steps. Why is that important? You say it is important. I think I agree with you. Why don't you explain why? Why is it important for you to have information like -- and what information did you need to have to make a response?

1883 \*Dr. Cohen. Yes. So having that information allows us1884 to deploy different

1885 \*Mr. Peters. What information?

1886 \*Dr. Cohen. I am sorry?

1887 \*Mr. Peters. What information?

\*Dr. Cohen. It depends on what we are talking about, whether it was how many people are vaccinated in an area, how many tests were we seeing people get access to. If I could see certain neighborhoods that weren't getting as much testing or as much vaccination, I could deploy at the state level different kinds of teams.

We also had information, you know, at the height of the pandemic where ventilator use was. And, you know, that was an important point related to South Carolina, because there were multiple times where North Carolina had to share some of our ventilators with South Carolina. So knowing where our ventilators were, and how we could be sharing resources was really critical.

1901 \*Mr. Peters. So I have been long wondering what we

1902 could do in Congress to support better data at the national 1903 level. I know the Administration has taken on a data 1904 modernization initiative. I think that is great. It needs 1905 to be funded. What is -- what is left to be done in that 1906 initiative?

1907 And what do you need from Congress in addition to 1908 funding?

1909 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you for that. The funding is critical, and we want to make sure we are moving forward. 1910 1911 But in terms of authorities, we have really scoped out something that I think allows us to do even a pilot is a 1912 step forward here. So we have some concrete language, and I 1913 1914 am happy to have our team share with you what we have been working on, particularly with some of our Senate partners, 1915 about how we can think about data authority that allows for 1916 collection of data beyond COVID, to make sure that we are 1917 1918 getting the information we need to respond quickly, to your 1919 point, to deploy different kinds of tools based on what we see in the data. 1920

1921 \*Mr. Peters. Do you have legislative ideas for us that 1922 we --

1923 \*Dr. Cohen. Absolutely.

\*Mr. Peters. Okay. I would love for you to share that
with us. I think we all want to make this work better.
I want to say again, look, we started this, we were

really vulnerable as a country. We didn't have even PPE. 1927 We didn't have a lot of science. I think one of the ironies of 1928 this whole discussion is that one of the great, great 1929 achievements of the Trump Administration was the warp speed 1930 1931 creation of a vaccine really fast. They don't want to talk about it now, because they are sort of anti-vaccine. It puts 1932 1933 them in a tough spot. But I would like to know what lessons, positive lessons, we can learn from that to make sure that we 1934 get these -- that we are ready the next time. 1935

And I hope that you will be very forthcoming about the funding needs that you have, which will be smaller at the front end than they are in the middle. We lost a lot of -we spent a lot of resources dealing with this. I think that was the right thing to do in the circumstances. But let's make sure we are not caught unprepared next time and have to do that again.

1943 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you.

1944 \*Mr. Peters. I yield back.

1945 \*Mrs. Lesko. Now I recognize Dr. Bucshon for five 1946 minutes of questions.

1947 \*Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, and thank you, Director Cohen, 1948 for being here today. And thanks for recently coming to the 1949 GOP Doctors Caucus. I very much appreciate it.

1950 Your job isn't an easy one. You knew that coming here, 1951 though, right? Yet you have taken on the challenge, and I

1952 have a great deal of respect for that.

1953 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you.

Mr. Bucshon. I want to quickly follow up on what Mr. Peters said about data. The key is making it clear to the American people this is de-identified, non-person-specific data.

1958 \*Dr. Cohen. Okay.

Mr. Bucshon. That is the challenge I have in rural America. People just don't trust the Feds on this. And we have to make sure that we do that. And I agree that we need better data.

As I have discussed with your predecessor, Dr. Walensky, as a physician myself, political influence must be removed from the decision-making at the CDC. And I have mentioned that to you at Doc Caucus. This has happened recently under both Republican and Democratic administrations.

We are all aware that a substantial percentage of the public has lost trust in the CDC, and we can agree or disagree on how exactly that happened or what the implications may be. But I believe all of us looking forward can agree that something needs to change if the agency is going to be effective at combating the spread of communicable diseases, as was its original mission.

1975 Let me remind everyone the CDC was established in 1946 1976 as the Communicable Disease Center, the CDC. It was born out

1977 of the goal of preventing malaria and typhus in southeastern 1978 states. The CDC has been the preeminent organization in the 1979 world on these issues for decades, and still is, in my view, 1980 even with the challenges created by what I consider 1981 overbearing political influence.

With that statement, I want to talk about specific communication and how we communicate and convince the American people that we are making progress here. On the communications side, do you have specific actions you have taken or do you plan to take to get to the American people what the CDC is doing and why?

1988 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Dr. Bucshon, for that.
1989 And yes, I hope you are already seeing the CDC communicate
1990 differently.

First, we have overhauled our website where people do come, and there is more to come with that as we continue to consolidate the information so it is more usable, people can access it more quickly.

But we are also communicating in different mechanisms. So for example, when there was a new variant that we saw in August, we immediately put something out to say, "Here's what we are seeing, here's what we know, and here's what we don't know,' and I think that was brought up earlier. So we are trying to rapidly communicate, and we're trying to use different mechanisms to communicate.

2002 So we're trying to make sure that we are meeting folks 2003 where they are getting their information. They are not 2004 coming to our website necessarily for information. We have 2005 to go to where folks are, whether that is using social media 2006 or others. So you are seeing me post a lot more videos. So 2007 we recognize that some folks want to watch a short video to 2008 understand a complex topic.

2009 \*Mr. Bucshon. Sure.

\*Dr. Cohen. So I think there is a lot of ways in which we are changing up how we are communicating, but we are still going to make sure that we are focused on bringing the best evidence and data to that, but

2014 \*Mr. Bucshon. Sure.

2015 \*Dr. Cohen. \_ make sure that it is simple and timely, 2016 as well as work on the ground for real people.

\*Mr. Bucshon. Yes, because, as you know, as political people like ourselves, communications is key. And that has changed dramatically over the last 10 years, right? And if we are behind at an agency, you just don't reach most of the people. You have to be on social media. You have to do, to your point, go to where you can reach people.

I have adult children. None of them watch the regular news. None of them. They get alerts on their phone, whether that is on Snapchat, whether that is on Instagram, X, all of those. And I am hopeful that we can do that. 2027 Who do you seek guidance on to help you do this? I 2028 mean, who is helping? Is it \_ you know, I mean, I would 2029 argue that maybe it should be Madison Avenue.

2030 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, first, you can already follow me on 2031 Insta.

2032 [Laughter.]

2033 \*Dr. Cohen. But we have brought in, you know,

additional folks to make sure that we are modernizing how we are thinking about communication. And so I think we still have work to do, but yes, important.

2037 \*Mr. Bucshon. Do you have an internal \_ does the CDC 2038 have a robust, internal communications and public relations 2039 department specifically to address this?

\*Dr. Cohen. Yes, sir. We have a communications department. We have \_ it is under new leadership. I think they are doing good work, but we are not all the way there. We have more work to do.

2044 \*Mr. Bucshon. Okay, I appreciate that. And you are 2045 aware of the CSIS report on \_

2046 \*Dr. Cohen. Oh, yeah, the

2047 \*Mr. Bucshon. You know, the

2048 \*Dr. Cohen. CSIS, yeah.

2049 \*Mr. Bucshon. This report.

2050 \*Dr. Cohen. Yes, sir.

2051 \*Mr. Bucshon. Yes, there is a lot of good things in

2052 there. It was a bipartisan commission.

2053 \*Dr. Cohen. Yeah.

Mr. Bucshon. I know that Dr. Walensky and I talked about that. We actually had a meeting over at CSIS here in town.

2057 \*Dr. Cohen. Mm-hmm, I

Mr. Bucshon. Dr. Walensky was there. There is a lot of good ideas in there, bipartisan. I would just encourage you to use this as a resource with \_ along with your internal Moving Forward program. Thank you.

2062 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you.

2063 \*Mrs. Lesko. Now I recognize Representative Dingell for 2064 five minutes of questioning.

2065 \*Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Madam Chair.

It is good to see you here, and thank you for coming in 2066 and testifying on this important topic. As you know, the 2067 coronavirus pandemic did upend our nation, and it strained 2068 2069 our health care system, stunted our economy, disrupted children's learning, and no community was left untouched. 2070 It 2071 was the worst public health crisis we have experienced in a 2072 century. And you have come into the CDC at a time of turmoil, unrest, et cetera. 2073

And even as we continue emerging from the pandemic, COVID-19 is still with us. I say to everybody, we may be done with COVID-19, but it is not done with us, and we 2077 continue to see infections. It has fundamentally changed our 2078 nation, and we are still dealing with many of the 2079 consequences.

Today one of the problems we still have is we continue to witness significant distrust of our public health institutions like the CDC, unfortunately. So one of the questions I keep asking myself, how can we expect Americans to make the best decisions to protect themselves and their loved ones if they don't have confidence in our leading public health institutions?

2087 So I was going to ask some of the same questions my colleague just did on some of the communication issues. I 2088 know you are making this a priority, and I am going to 2089 reinforce and maybe do a few more for the record, that that 2090 -- it becomes really, really important because one of the 2091 things that I am very concerned about, we are hearing an 2092 uptake in respiratory cases. People aren't getting any of 2093 2094 their -- there is a distrust of all shots, of all -- not only the COVID-19 vaccine, but the flu and the RSV. 2095

2096 Why is it so important for people to get the latest 2097 COVID-19 vaccine and these other immunizations, as well? 2098 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Representative Dingell. 2099 You know, I have been traveling around the country sharing 2100 with folks about why to get the updated COVID vaccine. 2101 Really, three reasons. One, the virus has changed. So in the same way that the flu virus changes year over year, we have seen the COVID virus change. And you want to make sure that the protection you have is matched to the way the virus has changed.

Second, whether you have had COVID before or you have been vaccinated before, that protection decreases over time. And you want to make sure you are boosted up to the highest level of protection you can going into a time when we know we will see more COVID circulating.

2111 And third is about reducing the risk of long COVID. We 2112 are still seeing one in seven adults have extended symptoms, 2113 even from a mild case of COVID. No one wants to be sick for 2114 a short time, certainly not for a long time.

And so for those reasons we are encouraging folks to get the updated vaccine. It is why, you know, when we look at the data, there is not an age group that doesn't have some increased risk from the COVID virus. Certainly, our seniors are at the highest risk, so those who are over 65 are at the highest risk of hospitalization and death. But our vaccines can prevent them.

And I know we have been focused a lot on vaccines, but I just want to mention treatment again. We do have treatment for COVID and for flu, but you have to know you have it, which means you need to get tested. We are offering free COVID tests at COVIDtest.gov. We want folks to make sure

they are ordering those tests so that they can get treatment. \*Mrs. Dingell. So let me ask you a quick question on -there is a lot of misinformation out there, and a lot of people are still afraid to get all of these different immunizations. Getting back to the communication issue, how are you combating misinformation?

2133 \*Dr. Cohen. Yes. So in order to combat misinformation, one, you just have to get a lot of the good information out 2134 there, and that means we have to partner with folks who are 2135 2136 trusted. So whether that is doctors and nurses and that is where we have been focusing a lot of our efforts, is to make 2137 sure our doctors and nurses and other health care 2138 professionals have what they need but also whether it is 2139 the faith community or others to help get good information 2140 out and I include Congress in that, as well, to help us get 2141 good information out to communities to make sure that they 2142 hear the good information, the accurate information, so they 2143 can make choices for themselves. 2144

\*Mrs. Dingell. So you are almost out of time. I might do some questions for the record. But since we only have a few -- less than a minute, is there anything else you want to add about the work you are doing?

\*Dr. Cohen. Just that I think the CDC is on the right path, but we have more work to do, and I recognize that we do need help from Congress to make sure that we are well

2152 resourced and have the authorities related to data and 2153 workforce.

We talked earlier about the importance of making sure that we have a vaccines for adults program, as well. We have a vaccines for children's program, but do not have something similar for under or uninsured adults. So all of those things I look forward to working with Congress on.

2159 \*Mrs. Dingell. Thank you.

2160 \*Dr. Cohen. Thank you.

2161 \*Mrs. Dingell. I yield back, Madam Chair.

\*Mrs. Lesko. Well, Director, you are so popular that more people have showed up to ask you questions. So now I recognize Representative Palmer for five minutes of

2165 questioning.

2166 \*Mr. Palmer. I thank the gentlelady.

Director Cohen, can you name three things that you would do differently from the former director of the CDC?

\*Dr. Cohen. Thank you so much for that question. As I was sharing earlier, I led the COVID response for North Carolina, and I think the lessons that I bring from that are three of them.

One, a focus on transparency. I think transparency is really important to build trust. I think sharing what you know when you know it, and also what you don't know. I hope you see that already under my tenure and how we are 2177 communicating differently. So that is one.

Second is a focus on operational excellence. We can't just recommend a vaccine. We have to make sure that we are making access possible for folks. We need to marry the evidence with the operations. We are an operation response agency, as well. So that is number two.

2183 And then the third is about relationships. It is really 2184 important that we are working as one team. We have to build 2185 relationships before a crisis hits so that when we get into 2186 those crises we can make sure to use those. Sometimes public 2187 health finds themselves siloed away from the traditional 2188 health care system. I think it is really important that we 2189 bring health care and public health closer together.

\*Mr. Palmer. Well, if the CDC had a sales department, that \_ those would all be fine. I am talking more about actual policy. And specifically, would you have shut down the schools? Would you have closed the schools? Is that what you did in North Carolina?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, sir, yes. Back in 2020, all the schools across the entire country were shut down, including North Carolina. But I did work across the aisle with the \*Mr. Palmer. Would you shut them down \_ had you been in charge, would you have shut down the schools if this were to happen again? If we had another major respiratory outbreak, would you shut down the schools?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, the good news is we are in a different place than we were before. We both have different tools and different mechanisms to respond. So I can't really address a hypothetical, but I do think we have learned a lot about how to approach things.

2207 \*Mr. Palmer. Did it harm our students by shutting down 2208 the schools?

2209 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, look, we always knew in-person 2210 instruction was incredibly beneficial, not just for \_

Mr. Palmer. You would be great in the sales department, but I am trying to get to policy. And that is one of the key things that troubles us about the CDC is that we have to address policy. You know, there is a saying that if you are explaining, you are losing. So we need to get down to policy. We need to talk about the things that went wrong, and what we need to do.

2218 Masking, you know, you keep \_ the CDC insisted on 2219 masking kids as young as two years old, and made the argument 2220 that there was no disagreement. I think the word is 2221 equipoise. I have a study here that clearly shows that there 2222 was widespread disagreement in Europe, even here, yet the CDC 2223 insisted on masking kids as young as two years old. What 2224 would be your position on that?

2225 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, I would say it is good that we are in 2226 a different place and we are able to turn a chapter forward. 2227 We have a lot of different tools to protect our children now, 2228 vaccines and treatment. Masks continue to be one tool 2229 amongst many that we can use to protect ourselves.

2230 \*Mr. Palmer. So you would continue to require masking 2231 for two-year-old kids?

2232 \*Dr. Cohen. So again, we are in a very different place, 2233 and

\*Mr. Palmer. I know that. But I am asking you. This is a policy question. There have been no randomized controlled trials on masking. And I can't help but think that the CDC didn't want the randomized controlled trials because it didn't fit the narrative, didn't fit the position they wanted to take.

And there is a lot of people I mean, a lot of people 2240 that felt like this was more about power than it was 2241 medicine. And if you are going to continue to try to do a 2242 2243 sales job, you want to continue to try to explain positions, it is going to be difficult to get us on board with the CDC 2244 because people don't trust you anymore. And there has been 2245 2246 enormous damage done to science and medicine by the policy of the CDC and the National Institutes for Health and others, 2247 Dr. Fauci being the lead candidate for disinformation. 2248

2249 So you can continue to come in and do a sales job. You 2250 can try to explain. But if there aren't significant policy 2251 changes, I think it is going to be very difficult going

2252 forward.

I yield back.

2254 \*Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, and now I call on
2255 Representative Crenshaw for five minutes of questioning.

2256 \*Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Thank you, Dr. Cohen, for being here. I echo what my 2257 friend, Mr. Palmer, said. If the CDC wants its credibility 2258 back, you have got to have a mea culpa moment. You are in 2259 the perfect position to do it, because you had nothing to do 2260 2261 with their decisions at the time. So there is no reason to defend it. The data is the data. The data is very clear 2262 2263 now. You can blame it on hindsight. You can blame it on, 2264 you know, we didn't know as much as we know now at the time. You can do all sorts of things, but you can tell the truth, 2265 and then the public will start trusting the CDC again. You 2266 can say it is okay to say that it didn't make any sense to 2267 shut down schools. The data shows that now. It didn't make 2268 2269 any sense to do major lockdowns. The data shows that now. It doesn't make sense to mask kids. Data shows that now. 2270 2271 You could it is okay to say it, and the public will reward you for it. 2272

Because it is pretty dangerous, thinking about the future, when maybe we do have a disease that spreads through America that has a 50 percent kill rate of eight-year-olds. Then you had better mask up. Then you had better really 2277 start thinking about things. But you know what? They are 2278 not going to trust you, because you refuse to even say that 2279 you were wrong. And you weren't even wrong, so you might as 2280 well just say that others were wrong. That is just some 2281 advice unsolicited.

You know, I have major questions. I can read a long list of agencies that kind of seem to do the same thing BARDA, ASPR, CDC. There is, like, a defense-bio something, NIH. There is a lot of overlap here. I mean, what is the difference between ASPR and CDC?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Representative Crenshaw. So CDC does provide the scientific evidence and technical expertise particularly related to infectious disease and other health threats.

ASPR provides emergency response. So I would say to any kind of threat, a hurricane to an infectious disease threat. So they can bring in resources, whether it is people or stockpile resources.

But it is really CDC and that technical expertise that decides, well, where do you deploy it, how, for what purpose? So it is a partnership. You can't have one without the other. And we do work very, very closely together to make sure that we are coordinated.

2300 \*Mr. Crenshaw. It seems like a lot of overlap. And you2301 know, there is a ton of academic research that happens at

2302 CDC. And I think we have real questions. The CDC has never 2303 been authorized. That is another fun fact. But that 2304 academic research also happens at NIH. You know, it is very 2305 duplicative. How do we justify that?

\*Dr. Cohen. So I do think that they are separate types of portfolios. NIH is doing evidence generation. The kind of work that CDC is doing is detection. Are we detecting threats and then responding to them and understanding what best practices work to make sure that we are keeping folks healthy?

2312 So that is the work that we are focused on in CDC and in 2313 public health. Again, NIH, incredibly important research 2314 portfolio.

Mr. Crenshaw. Yes, and I appreciate your intent to more \_ to create a more operational CDC. But, you know, because it is not there right now, you know, we have really no bio detection system. I know you want more of it. I know we talked about wastewater in our previous conversations, and that is all good. I like that a lot.

But I do have more questions. I know Mr. Griffith asked about this, but there was a hidden biolab out in California, Reedley, California. Local officials discovered the Chinese national was running an illegal biolab with 1,000 transgenic mice modified to be similar to humans infected with nasty stuff like dengue, COVID, HIV, malaria, tuberculosis. I 2327 won't get into a ton of details here.

I think the main problem here is why did it take so long to actually respond to that lab, and for the CDC to go test it?

The American public believes in their minds, like, this is exactly what the CDC is for. Locals can't deal with it. The state is \_ the human \_ health and human services of California is asking CDC to do it. What was the timeline from that ask to actual response?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you so much. I was able to share some information earlier that there were a number of inaccuracies in the report that was put together from this.

Again, state and local authorities are, as you were saying, are in charge, as well as FBI, FDA. CDC's role was to come in and do an investigation related to select agents. When we were invited and asked to do that, we did respond. We sent a team. They were there for two-and-a-half days, did an extensive review. What we found was no select \_ no evidence of select agents.

And really, what was compelling as I reviewed that information, was it wasn't that they didn't have any equipment that would have allowed folks to work with select agents. So not only did we see the freezers and the paperwork \_

2351 \*Mr. Crenshaw. How long did it take from the request

for CDC to actually come? Because I thought it took, like, a congressperson from California to get the CDC there.

2354 \*Dr. Cohen. My understanding is that when we were 2355 asked, we deployed.

Mr. Crenshaw. Okay. Select agents. Very specific. I am under the understanding that if a vial of something is not labeled, that you don't test it.

\*Dr. Cohen. So we do have limited authority in some of this space. But what we did was go on premises, again, do a two-and-a-half-day investigation. We did not see any evidence of select agents at this lab.

Mr. Crenshaw. You are using words very carefully, and I am out of time. But you need to tell us what law that is that \_ so if it says Gatorade on it, and you are like, I mean, it could be Ebola, it could be \_ it says Gatorade, don't test it, the law says don't test it. I have a hard time believing the law says that.

2369 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, so I

2370 \*Mr. Crenshaw. But I am out of time. But if the 2371 chairwoman will let me keep going, I will be happy to let you 2372 answer.

Mr. Griffith. [Presiding] Well, and I wish I could, but that would not be appropriate behavior by the chair. Mr. Crenshaw. It was a woman a second ago. [Laughter.] \*Mr. Griffith. But the gentleman wants to, you know, bring up issues of the old false flag in naval combat, just because it flew an American flag didn't necessarily mean it was an American ship, and I understand that.

I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Dunn, for five minutes of questioning.

2383 \*Mr. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Cohen, I appreciate you being here today. In addition to being a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee, I serve on the Select Committee on China, and I have experience as a bench scientist at Usamriid. I am sure you are familiar with it, it is the Army's Biological Warfare Headquarters, a BSL-4 facility.

The Select Committee recently published a bombshell bipartisan report \_ you are aware of it, you have said \_ on the illegal biolab that was discovered in Reedley,

2393 California. This warehouse was located in the center of a 2394 small town just across the street from an elementary school 2395 and a block down from the city hall. The clandestine \_ they 2396 are calling it a bio lab, it was more like a warehouse \_ was 2397 a disaster waiting to happen.

The CDC's response \_ or rather, the lack of response \_ clearly endangered millions of Americans. And there were a couple of things that really stood out to me. The first is that the CDC's select agent program completely failed the

people of Reedley, California. The CDC literally refused, 2402 2403 they did not respond when they were requested. They responded months later, and only when Congressman Costa made 2404 that request to come to the town and assess the situation. 2405 2406 The discovery, I remind you, was made by a housing code inspector who was tracing a garden hose that was went in a 2407 window. That is how this was found. It took a phone call 2408 from Costa to get there finally. 2409

Once the CDC arrived, months after the first request, the investigation you conducted was completely unprofessional and inadequate. And I say that as a professional in the field. The CDC didn't test one vial, even the ones that were labeled tuberculosis, SARS-CoV-2, and Ebola. An entire refrigerator listed \_ labeled "Ebola'' \_ that is a select Federal agent, by the way and HIV was there.

This is \_ this facility is a completely unlicensed warehouse, no licensing whatsoever. Over 20 potential pathogens, 1,000 transgenic mice, humanized. There was zero isolation facilities that would be necessary to either legally or safely handle these agents.

And perhaps most egregious and simple-minded, the agency didn't even bother to translate the Chinese labels. There were some vials that had only Chinese labels, didn't even ask for a translation on this. Amazing.

2426 When local officials started to dispose of these

2435 \*Mr. Dunn. Thank you.

The CDC branch chief belatedly responded, saying, "We don't see an urgent need to test these samples at the moment. Most of the material we identified was not considered a serious threat to public health.' HIV, SARS-CoV-2, hepatitis, malaria, and Ebola not considered a serious threat to public health.

You know, the conclusion made by the experts at CDC that 2442 a refrigerator labeled Ebola was unlikely to contain Ebola, 2443 2444 and you look at the totality of this situation, it reads like a nightmare, a horror story. In what world is this okay? 2445 You know, and I refer to my colleague Gary Palmer's 2446 2447 remarks on trust. How do you expect the American people to take our public health institutions seriously when this is 2448 their reaction to a very real situation? 2449

The CDC should not ignore pleas from local public health. And by the way, the California Public Health Service asked them to sample this stuff, too. The CDC should test substances if requested by local governments. Surely that meets a threshold test.

And I would like you to explain. I am giving you a chance to answer some questions here with the minimal time that is left. Is the CDC supposed to be the first line of defense for human infection agents in the United States? \*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the

2460 opportunity to respond.

There were a number of inaccuracies in that report. And 2461 2462 so I want to make sure you know that when we were asked and invited by the leaders of that investigation FBI, FDA, 2463 2464 state and local officials we did deploy. We did look at we were there for a two-and-a-half-day investigation. And we 2465 2466 did not see any evidence of select agents. Not only did we look at all of the paperwork, the vials, the freezers, we 2467 also 2468 2469 \*Mr. Dunn. Well, let me just because we are running out of time, let me reclaim it. 2470 Yes, they responded, but they did not respond when they 2471 were first requested. They responded months, months later. 2472 2473 \*Dr. Cohen. So that \*Mr. Dunn. I mean, and we have that on I mean, we had 2474 that examined by the FBI. They came to our committee and 2475 2476 told us that. That is who we got that information from. Ιf you have better information than the FBI, you need to let us 2477 know. 2478 \*Dr. Cohen. Great. We would be happy to share the 2479 more about the timeline. But when we were asked, we did 2480 deploy. No select agents on site there. And we 2481 \*Mr. Dunn. How do you know? You didn't test for 2482 2483 anything.

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, so, right, this is where our experts

2485 did a two-and-a-half day review.

I want to address what you were talking about related to Ebola. When we heard after the fact that someone said something was labeled "Ebola,' ' we took 300 pictures. We did not see one bit of evidence related to

2490 \*Mr. Dunn. It was on the front of a refrigerator.
2491 \*Dr. Cohen. We didn't see that. We asked folks to say,
2492 "Do you have a picture of that? Could we validate that for
2493 someone else?' No one could validate that for us. So, you
2494 know, we did not \_\_\_\_\_\_

2495 \*Mr. Dunn. So we just blow off the California Public
2496 Health Department and say, oh, we don't believe you.

You know, obviously, my time is expired, Mr. Chairman. I have to tell you, though, in my professional career in biological warfare, I have never seen anything like this. By the way, the worst concern I have, this may not be the only one. This is one that a housing code inspector found. Let's martial all the housing code inspectors \_

2503 \*Mr. Griffith. The gentleman \_

2504 \*Mr. Dunn. \_ in the country, turn them loose to find 2505 these things.

\*Mr. Griffith. I appreciate the gentleman's passion.
The gentleman's time is up. I now recognize Mrs. Cammack of
Florida for her five minutes of questioning.

2509 \*Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

2510 you hosting this today. So important.

Thank you to you, Dr. Cohen, for appearing before the committee. Without a doubt, public confidence in the CDC has been tremendously damaged by the actions of multiple directives, directors, and choices made within CDC leadership.

2516 For example, at one point in time CDC Director Redfield 2517 said that masks could offer more protection than vaccines. And of course, we now have scientific evidence that proves 2518 2519 masks do very little to prevent transmission of COVID-19. And certainly, we can dive into vaccine efficacy issues and 2520 questionable studies that were used to justify draconian 2521 lockdowns. But it is clear that the CDC has a very long road 2522 ahead to reestablish credibility and regain the trust of the 2523 American people. And I am hopeful that your answers today 2524 will determine if you are, in fact, serious about taking on 2525 2526 that challenge.

Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would ask unanimous consent to submit statistical numerical errors made by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention during the COVID-19 pandemic.

2531 \*Mr. Griffith. The gentlelady has requested a document 2532 to be recorded into the record?

2533 \*Mrs. Cammack. Yes, sir.

2534 \*Mr. Griffith. Is there any objection to her document?

I believe that is one that was presented to you all 20

2536 or 30 minutes ago.

2537 Okay, hearing no objection.

2538 [The information follows:]

2539

2540 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*COMMITTEE INSERT\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*Mrs. Cammack. Okay, I appreciate it, thank you.

2543 Dr. Cohen, your predecessor, Dr. Walensky, overruled the CDC's own external scientific advisory committees regarding 2544 vaccine recommendations. Now, at times she even refused to 2545 2546 convene the external advisory group at all. So one of the most glaring examples of this was when the CDC Director 2547 2548 Walensky pushed for a third vaccine shot, a booster for health care workers. This recommendation was rejected by 2549 CDC's advisory group, and in response she overruled the 2550 2551 advisory council, moved forward with her own recommendation for a third shot. 2552

2553 My question to you, Dr. Cohen, is this: Have you 2554 convened the external advisory committee since assuming this 2555 role?

2556 \*Dr. Cohen. Yes, ma'am.

\*Mrs. Cammack. Okay, perfect. With that being said, 2557 2558 there has been \$250 million on top of the 8.75 billion spent in COVID promotion, marketing, et cetera from the CDC for 2559 this. Sometimes those external advisory councils give 2560 2561 recommendations that are contrary to the administration's political agenda. Have you adopted any of the external 2562 committee's recommendations, or have you gone against those 2563 recommendations? 2564

<sup>2565</sup> \*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you so much. The \_ under my <sup>2566</sup> tenure the \_ I believe you are referring to our external \_ 2567 \*Mrs. Cammack. Yes.

\*Dr. Cohen. ACIP committee. Yes, they have met a 2568 number of times. We actually have new vaccines for the first 2569 time in history, so they had to meet for that. They met for 2570 2571 the updated COVID vaccine, the RSV vaccine, and all made recommendations for the vaccines that we then adopted. 2572 2573 \*Mrs. Cammack. So certainly there have been some troubling things coming out in recent years, particularly at 2574 the height of the pandemic, where members of that external 2575 2576 advisory committee were fired for presenting an opinion that was contrary to the political agenda of the White House. 2577 In a situation where one of your advisory members 2578 presents a divergent opinion, are you taking that into 2579 consideration, or are you simply firing these people? 2580 \*Dr. Cohen. So I am not familiar with the situation 2581 where folks were fired. The way the ACIP works, they have a 2582 2583 certain tenure, they serve for that tenure, and they do roll 2584 off, and we do choose additional new members.

And we appreciate, you know, that these independent advisory committees advise CDC on this work. And I think they are an important component of how we are reviewing vaccines and our recommendations.

\*Mrs. Cammack. Okay. I was actually referencing Dr.
Martin Kulldorff. He was let go. This was very recent,
again, at the height of the pandemic. And I think that there

2592 should be a formal review of how that all transpired, because 2593 I think that has a direct impact on the guidance that then 2594 becomes issued in public from the CDC.

2595 [Slide]

\*Mrs. Cammack. At this time I would like you to take a look at the screen for me. There is a screenshot. We have here a sampling of dozens of errors within the data that the CDC was using to justify their positions during the pandemic. These errors excessively exaggerated the COVID risk to children, for example.

2602 One of the most damning errors was that the CDC repeated 2603 for over a month that COVID was a top five cause of death for 2604 children. It took months for the CDC to correct this 2605 statistical error. Now, during the course of those months, 2606 millions of taxpayer dollars were spent to promote the 2607 vaccine for children just because a basic data point was 2608 incorrect.

2609 Now, how do you plan to rectify this? Because, quite frankly, if the CDC can't get basic data points correct, the 2610 2611 credibility will never be restored within this institution. And also, children who really there was no scientific 2612 justification for them receiving the vaccine, could 2613 potentially and we have seen documented cases where they 2614 2615 have vaccine injuries as a result of that being pushed on them, and their parents fearing feeling pressure from the 2616

2617 CDC.

2618 So can you speak to these errors and how you plan to 2619 address these basic errors that have been documented over the 2620 past three years?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, Congressman, I appreciate \_ this is the first time I am seeing. So let me review, and we can \_ and follow up.

But what I would say is 1,700 kids have died of COVID. 2624 But let me tell you what I have done for my own daughters who 2625 are 9 and 11. I got them the original COVID vaccines, and 2626 just a few weeks ago they got the updated COVID vaccine. 2627 Because I have looked at the data, and I think that these are 2628 vaccines that the safety profile is there in terms of 2629 safety, and they are very effective at making sure that our 2630 kids are protected. I don't want them to either get into the 2631 hospital, nor do I want them to get long COVID. So I got my 2632 own kids vaccinated. 2633

2634 And so I am happy to look at this data, but I want to at least share how I made a decision as a mom for my own kids. 2635 2636 \*Mrs. Cammack. Well, and I know my time has expired, but I would love to have in writing from you a detail of the 2637 threat that COVID presents to children and young adults under 2638 the age of 18. I am sure you probably have that off the top 2639 of your head. If you can, provide us that number. 2640 \*Mr. Griffith. You can get that to us later. I would 2641

2642 appreciate it. The gentlelady's time is up.

2643 \*Mrs. Cammack. Thank

2644 \*Mr. Griffith. I now recognize Mrs. Miller-Meeks of 2645 Iowa.

2646 \*Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the 2647 opportunity to waive on to this important hearing.

Dr. Cohen, it is nice to see you again, and thank you 2648 2649 for testifying today before the subcommittee. As you know, I am a physician, and I was the director of the Iowa department 2650 2651 of public health before coming to Congress. I have not only served in this domain, but I value it and believe that robust 2652 public health infrastructure nationwide is crucial to the 2653 health and well-being of our country. That is why I released 2654 a request for information earlier this year on how to 2655 strengthen and reform the CDC to ensure that our nation's 2656 leading public health agency is performing as it should. 2657 Part of evaluating CDC and agencies in general is 2658

realizing when mistakes are made, when programs should be eliminated or altered, and when people need to be held accountable.

During the pandemic, in place of clear, reasonable guidance backed by the best scientific evidence available at the time, Americans were faced with confusing inconsistencies at best, and clear bias at worst. Whether this bias under a Democrat administration was politically motivated or not, it 2667 took public health backwards.

Politics aside, there is a near collective recognition 2668 that the CDC failed to execute its primary mission of 2669 protecting America from health, safety, and security threats 2670 2671 by conducting critical science and providing health information that protects our nation against expensive and 2672 dangerous health threats, and responding when these arise. 2673 This includes numerous core operational failures, as you 2674 mentioned, as well as total lapses in reliable communication. 2675 2676 The CDC's sprawling bureaucracy of siloed and uncoordinated administrative, research, and academic programs 2677 with disease condition or issue-specific programs was also 2678 2679 put on full display.

The CDC was originally created in 1946 as a communicable disease center with the mission of preventing the spread of malaria, but has since grown into a massive bureaucracy with a \$9 billion budget that supports research and initiatives which are not within the communicable diseases landscape.

Additionally, the inability to translate research or real-world published data and evidence rapidly into public health recommendations during the pandemic was detrimental. As a result, trust in public health and faith in our public health agencies and leaders has been decimated.

I don't say this lightly or with any satisfaction. Public mistrust of the CDC and health care professionals is

not good, and it presents a multitude of challenges for the 2692 2693 health and well-being of our nation. Unfortunately, however, 2694 the CDC has given people many reasons to not trust its recommendations. And given some of the answers you have had 2695 2696 just in this hearing, specifically in response to Representative Palmer, it gives me pause that this failure 2697 2698 to acknowledge certain things: infection-acquired immunity for COVID-19, its failure to communicate where the agency was 2699 getting information that was used to make decisions regarding 2700 2701 masking, social distancing, school closure guidance, who to mask, when to get a booster, how to get a booster, even the 2702 types of adverse events and adverse outcomes, and denial of 2703 adverse events and outcomes. 2704

I think, you know \_ to be clear, I vaccinated. I gave vaccines in all 24 of the counties in my district. But when the CDC inserted itself between the patient and the doctor, people rightfully became wary of the agency's

2709 recommendations, which we are seeing in this current

2710 respiratory illness season now.

2711 Dr. Cohen, you didn't lead the CDC during the pandemic, 2712 but you did lead North Carolina's department of public health 2713 and human services, where you were an ardent supporter of 2714 restrictive public health measures such as school closures 2715 which proved to be detrimental not only to the students' 2716 academic success, but also to their mental health and social 2717 development. Do you acknowledge that the CDC has given

2718 Americans good reason to question the agency's

2719 recommendations?

And can you please highlight how the agency is working to rebuild public trust, and why we should review [sic] these efforts as genuine?

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Representative Miller-2723 I do look forward to this new chapter to turn 2724 Meeks. together, and I want to partner with you as we do that. 2725 2726 So there are a lot of lessons learned from the pandemic. Nothing goes perfect in a crisis. I learned a lot of those 2727 in North Carolina. I was sharing earlier around 2728 2729 transparency, around operational effectiveness, around partnership. So those are all things I bring to the work at 2730 2731 CDC.

I think we do need to make sure we are learning those 2732 There were mistakes related to our lab test when 2733 lessons. 2734 that first came out, so we had to put processes in place to make sure that would never happen again. 2735 We are 2736 communicating differently. We are operating differently. But there is still more work to do here. But it is going to 2737 take a partnership with Congress and others to make sure that 2738 we are all moving in the same direction, that folks can feel 2739 2740 confident in vaccines, in the treatments that can save their 2741 lives. So I look forward to working with you on that.

\*Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Well, thank you very much, but I am 2742 2743 just going to end with, regardless of how transparent you may be, or operational excellence and relationships that you may 2744 build, if we continue to put recommendations that don't show 2745 2746 to the public the risks and the benefits in a transparent manner, we will continue to have a lack of trust in the CDC. 2747 Our local public health nurses and doctors did not deny 2748 infection-acquired immunity as the CDC and its public health 2749 professionals who testified before Congress did. And it was 2750 2751 embarrassing.

2752 With that, I yield.

2753 \*Mr. Griffith. The gentlelady yields back. I now 2754 recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter, for his 2755 five minutes of questioning.

2756 \*Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to waive on to this committee and to this important hearing. 2757 Dr. Cohen, thank you for being here. It seems that 2758 there has been a shift in the CDC toward addressing broader 2759 societal issues like climate change and social detriments of 2760 2761 health, and I am very concerned about that. You know, you have heard today the trust in CDC not only from Congress, but 2762 the general public. And you know this. You haven't been 2763 living in a shell. You understand that the trust, the public 2764 2765 trust is lacking right now.

2766 We want to help. We are not here to pile on. We are

2767 not here to beat you up. We need to help. But I am 2768 concerned now that you are biting off more than you can chew. 2769 What is up with this? What is up with these \_ you know, what 2770 is \_ has your mission changed all of a sudden now, you are 2771 going to bite off more than you can chew and talk about these 2772 issues?

Like, I mean, your mission beyond \_ has it expanded beyond communicable disease detection, investigation, outbreak control into areas such as non-communicable diseases, injury prevention, climate change, social determinants of health?

2778 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Congressman Carter, and 2779 thank you for, you know, obviously, CDC being located in 2780 Georgia. I appreciate your support of CDC and our work.

And look, we have a number of health threats that are at our doorstep. Many of them are infectious disease. Many of them are not. I look at too many suicides, too many overdoses. We the heat

2785 \*Mr. Carter. No, I would call those mental health 2786 issues. So I beg to differ on that. So I am not \_ that is 2787 not what I am talking about.

2788 \*Dr. Cohen. Okay, sorry. Then please \_ happy to have 2789 you clarify.

2790 \*Mr. Carter. Well, I mean, which agency in the Federal 2791 Government that you \_ do you think is more qualified or more 2792 prepared to deal with climate change, the EPD or the EPA, the 2793 Environmental Protection Agency, or the CDC?

\*Dr. Cohen. So, well, specifically related to health and heat, I mean, there are many health impacts of heat that we are understanding more and more. And, you know, what CDC is great at is bringing data and evidence and best practices to some of this.

Again, whether it is suicide or whether it is how things like heat or wildfires are affecting people's health, we need to have that data and evidence so that our health delivery system and others know how to react to protect

2803 \*Mr. Carter. Well, do you think the CDC has got too 2804 many missions, or not enough? Or are you looking for more, 2805 or what?

2806 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, we do need to make sure we have the 2807 resources

\*Mr. Carter. I mean, my hope, and I think the hope of the committee and the hope of Congress and the hope of the public, is that you focus on what you need to be doing, and that you do it well. I mean, obviously, if we have another pandemic, we don't want to see the same mistakes that we saw during this last one.

\*Dr. Cohen. Well, Representative Carter, we agree on
that. We need to learn the lessons from the pandemic.
I agree on focus and prioritization. I think we need to

2817 make sure we have risk-based prioritization of what we are 2818 doing. There are so many health threats out, we can't 2819 possibly a tackle them all. We have to be prioritized in 2820 doing that.

But those are infectious and non-infectious in those health threats. We don't want people in our country dying sooner than seeing early deaths

\*Mr. Carter. Okay, look, I am not trying to belabor this, but what about deforestation? I mean, that is affecting the environment. How many foresters have you got at CDC?

\*Dr. Cohen. I don't know the answer to that.

2829 \*Mr. Carter. You think you have any?

2830 \*Dr. Cohen. I don't know. I don't think so, but I
2831 don't know.

2832 \*Mr. Carter. I hope you don't.

2833 \*Dr. Cohen. I don't know.

\*Mr. Carter. Well, you know, I hope you understand my point. My point is that we want you to focus. We want you to get it right. And we want you to make sure that you are fulfilling your mission, and not trying to expand beyond your mission.

I mean, obviously, we want you to do well. We want you to succeed. But at the same time, you are not going to be able to do that if you broaden into these other things that 2842 are getting so much criticism.

2843 \*Dr. Cohen. Well, I appreciate wanting to work together 2844 on that important mission.

And again, some of the things we have been talking about to make sure we have the infrastructure needed, workforce response, our lab capacity, I think we are all talking about the same things.

2849 I do want to make sure, though, we have the ability to address some of these health issues upstream. I know, you 2850 2851 know, particularly your clinical background, you know, we spend a lot of time in different committees talking about the 2852 expense of chronic diseases and how much money we spend in 2853 Medicare and others on diseases that we know can be 2854 prevented. We need to do the research and know the best 2855 2856 practices so that we can be preventing these diseases like diabetes before 2857

2858 \*Mr. Carter. Okay, fair enough, fair enough. One last 2859 question before I let you go, okay?

Next to getting to move to the State of Georgia, where the CDC is located, what is the greatest thing that ever happened in your life?

\*Dr. Cohen. Thank you. Well, I am grateful to be in the State of Georgia. I do miss North Carolina. That will always have my heart. But it has been great to be at the CDC campus, and thank you for your support. \*Mr. Carter. Thank you, and I yield back.

\*Mr. Griffith. The gentleman yields back, and we are hopeful that Mr. Armstrong is in another committee. And he wanted to ask some questions. He may have to do those questions for the record. But in the meantime, we will have Ms. Castor wants to make a few comments, and then I will make a closing comment. And we will

2874 \*Ms. Castor. Great, yes. I just have a --

2875 \*Mr. Griffith. be done, unless Mr. Armstrong

\*Ms. Castor. -- a few unanimous consent requests.

2877 \*Mr. Griffith. Yes.

2878 \*Ms. Castor. And one was to submit a Politico article 2879 about the malaria in Florida.

And just for my colleague, Mr. Carter, the reason it is very important for the CDC to be focused on the changing climate, it is hotter. So in Florida we have longer wet seasons during the summer that -- where it breeds mosquitoes. So that is very important to combat malaria, dengue, Zika.

2885 So that is one of -- one article for the record. 2886 Another is the recent LA Times story that has the 2887 unfortunate statistic that more people died in the State of 2888 Florida out of the most populous states in the country. And 2889 we have talked a lot today about misinformation. A lot of 2890 that came -- a lot of the deaths in Florida came after the 2891 vaccine was available, and it is attributed to a lot of the 2892 misinformation from our governor and surgeon general that 2893 downplayed the effectiveness of vaccines. So that is another 2894 for the record.

And then two other -- one, a Center for American 2895 2896 Progress and the House Appropriations Committee reports because today we -- I have heard a lot of concern about 2897 learning loss and children during COVID, which was a concern 2898 2899 for everyone. But it rings hollow, the concern that comes from my Republican colleagues on this, when they have 2900 2901 proposed an appropriations bill that decimates investments in 2902 public education.

If you believe that children need support, that they need good teachers and strong schools, you would never pass these appropriations bills out of the House of

2906 Representatives. But yet that is what is on the table.

Thank you, and thank you, Dr. Cohen, for your appearance here today.

2909 \*Mr. Griffith. And for the record, that bill did not 2910 pass out of the House of Representatives.

2911 All right \_

2912 \*Ms. Castor. Let's hope it never will.

2913 \*Mr. Griffith. I don't see Mr. Armstrong. I will say a 2914 couple of closing things in regard to the vaccine hesitancy. 2915 It created a lot of mistrust when current-President Biden, 2916 during the campaign of 2020, cast aspersions on the vaccines 2917 before he became President and became an advocate.

Also, I would say that, if CDC is going to weigh in on 2918 climate, let's make sure we are taking a look at all aspects, 2919 and hopefully you can put some guardrails on the EPA, because 2920 2921 you are right, heat and cold can be a serious problem. And representing a district that take-home pay is 409th out of 2922 2923 435, one of my big concerns is we make the cost of electricity, we make the cost of heating your home and 2924 cooling your home much higher with some of the policies of 2925 2926 the Administration. We are actually affecting health for the poorest of Americans who can't afford to heat their homes 2927 2928 properly.

And as you know, sometimes what they will do is they will bring in an inappropriate kerosene heater, or they will bring in some other heat source that is not suitable for their particular living structure, and we end up with deaths because of a house fire or carbon monoxide poisoning. So these are things we have to take into consideration.

I see no one else here to ask questions. I am sorry that Mr. Armstrong is unavailable, he has another committee where he is stuck in the chair. I get it, but seeing that there are no further members wishing to ask questions, I would like to thank our witnesses \_ witness again for being here.

2941 Thank you, Dr. Cohen.

We have a document list. Many of them have already been mentioned, but I will ask unanimous consent to insert in the record the documents included on the staff hearing document list, which includes Mr. Palmer's, Mrs. Cammack's, and your documents, along with a couple of others, Ms. Castor. Without objection, that will be the order. [The information follows:] 

\*Mr. Griffith. Pursuant to committee rules, members 2952 have 10 business days to submit additional questions for the 2953 2954 record, and I ask that the witnesses respond to those questions that the witness respond to those questions 2955 2956 within 10 business days upon receipt of the request. And without objection, the committee is adjourned. 2957 [Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the subcommittee was 2958 2959 adjourned.]