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- 4 MEDICAID PROGRAM INTEGRITY: SCREENING OUT ERRORS, FRAUD, AND
- 5 ABUSE
- 6 TUESDAY, JUNE 2, 2015
- 7 House of Representatives,
- 8 Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
- 9 Committee on Energy and Commerce
- 10 Washington, D.C.

- 11 The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:16 a.m.,
- 12 in Room 2322 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tim
- 13 Murphy [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
- Members present: Representatives Murphy, McKinley,
- 15 Burgess, Blackburn, Bucshon, Brooks, Mullin, Collins,
- 16 DeGette, Schakowsky, Castor, Yarmuth, Clarke, Kennedy, Green,

- 17 Welch, and Pallone (ex officio).
- 18 Staff present: Noelle Clemente, Press Secretary; Jessica
- 19 Donlon, Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Brittany
- 20 Havens, Oversight Associate, Oversight and Investigations;
- 21 Charles Ingebretson, Chief Counsel, Oversight and
- 22 Investigations; Michelle Rosenberg, GAO Detailee, Health;
- 23 Chris Santini, Policy Coordinator, Oversight and
- 24 Investigations; Alan Slobodin, Deputy Chief Counsel,
- 25 Oversight; Jessica Wilkerson, Oversight Associate, Oversight
- 26 and Investigations; Jeff Carroll, Democratic Staff Director;
- 27 Ryan Gottschall, Democratic GAO Detailee; Ashley Jones,
- 28 Democratic Director, Outreach and Member Services; Chris
- 29 Knauer, Democratic Oversight Staff Director; Una Lee,
- 30 Democratic Chief Oversight Counsel; Elizabeth Letter,
- 31 Democratic Professional Staff Member; and Tim Robinson,
- 32 Democratic Chief Counsel.

33 Mr. {Murphy.} Good morning. I convene this hearing of 34 the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. We are 35 here today to discuss a continuing and increasingly expensive 36 problem, waste, fraud, and abuse in the Medicaid program. I 37 guess one way I could put this is, for centuries people have 38 tried to deal with the issue is there life after death, and 39 apparently there is in Medicaid, and we will get to the 40 bottom of that today. 41 Last year the Medicaid program provided medical services 42 for approximately 60 million people at a cost of \$310 43 billion. But during that same year, the Centers for Medicare 44 and Medicaid Services estimate that the improper payment rate was 6.7 percent, or \$17.5 billion. This is an increase of 45 46 almost one percent, or over three billion, from the previous 47 year. It is a troubling trend, especially as the program 48 continues to expand. 49 Unfortunately, the Medicaid program is far too 50 accustomed to fraud. In fact, the Government Accountability 51 Office has designated the Medicaid program as a high risk for fraud and abuse since 2003, and it has been the subject of 52

53 multiple GAO and Department of Health and Human Services 54 Office of Inspector General Reports over the past several 55 years, including a GAO report being highlighted today. 56 In 2012 the Committee requested GAO identify and analyze 57 indicators of improper and potentially fraudulent payments to 58 Medicaid beneficiaries and providers. In a trustworthy 59 study, another in a longtime examining Medicaid fraud, GAO 60 has reported that CMS needs to take additional actions to 61 improve provider and beneficiary fraud controls. GAO found 62 that thousands and Medicaid beneficiaries and hundreds of 63 providers in just four states, Arizona, Florida, Michigan and 64 New York--excuse me, New Jersey, were involved in possible improper or fraudulent payments during fiscal year 2011. For 65 66 example, almost 200 deceased beneficiaries received at least 9.6 million in Medicaid benefits. About 8,600 beneficiaries 67 68 received payments by two or more states, totaling at least 69 18.3 million. 70 The Social Security numbers for about 199,000 71 beneficiaries did not match the Social Security Administration databases. About 90 medical providers had 72

their medical license revoked or suspended in the state in

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74 which they received Medicaid payments. At least 47 providers had foreign addresses as their location of services, 75 76 including Canada, China, India, and Saudi Arabia. About 50 77 providers who received Medicaid payments were excluded from 78 the Federal program for a variety of reasons, including 79 patient abuse, or neglect, fraud, theft, bribery, and tax 80 evasion. 81 GAO acknowledged that regulations issued in response to 82 the Affordable Care Act may have addressed some of the 83 improper payment indicators found in GAO's analysis. For 84 example, CMS created a tool called the Data Services Hub to 85 help verify beneficiary application information, but questions remain whether this tool has been properly 86 87 implemented, and if the states have been effectively use this 88 tool to combat waste and fraud. In fact, just a few weeks 89 ago, a Reuters report found that more than one in five of the 90 thousands of doctors and other health care providers in the 91 U.S. prohibited from billing Medicare are still able to bill 92 state Medicaid programs. 93 The report included disturbing stories, such as a 94 Georgia optometrist who claimed he conducted 177 eye exams in

95 one day, yet remained on South Carolina's Medicaid rolls for after a year after he pleaded guilty in Georgia. In another 96 97 instance, an Ohio psychiatrist routinely over-reported the 98 time he spent with patients, and even billed for no-show 99 patients. CMS revoked his billing privileges after he was 100 convicted of felony Workers' Compensation fraud, yet he 101 continued to work in the Illinois Medicaid program, getting 102 paid \$560,000 for services or prescriptions he wrote after 103 his Medicare provider revocation. Shockingly, on the day he 104 was being sentenced in Columbus, Ohio, he also claimed that 105 he saw 131 group therapy patients at his Illinois practice. 106 Now, these stories, we know, are unacceptable. Medicaid 107 fraud undermines the integrity of the program, denies our most vulnerable the services they deserve, and waste 108 taxpayers' and--hard earned dollars. I hope we will hear 109 110 today about the steps that can be taken to further combat 111 fraud in the Medicaid program. That is what we want to focus 112 on. And GAO has recommended some common sense steps that 113 would reduce fraud, such as issuing guidance to states, 114 better identifying beneficiaries who are deceased, and the 115 availability of automated information through Medicare's

116 enrollment database. 117 In light of the history of fraud in the Medicaid 118 program, and its growing size, however, will these steps be 119 enough? Will we be here again in another 2 years discussing 120 the same thing? And with the Medicaid program continuing to 121 expand, the Committee is concerned that the opportunity and 122 motivation to defraud the program will only increase. 123 So I would like to thank our witnesses who are here 124 today. You have the ability to save the taxpayers a massive 125 amount of money. We hope to hear from you today how you plan 126 to do that, and we are grateful for your presence. 127 [The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:] \*\*\*\*\*\*\* COMMITTEE INSERT \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* 128

129 Mr. {Murphy.} And I now recognize the Ranking Member, 130 Ms. DeGette of Colorado, for 5 minutes. Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good news on a 131 bipartisan basis, we are against waste, fraud, and abuse, as 132 133 usual, in the Medicaid program, and everyplace else. I have 134 been on this Subcommittee now 19 years, and we have had a 135 whole series of hearings over the years. And as you 136 accurately point out, Mr. Chairman, it goes from 137 administration to administration, Medicaid seems to 138 particularly vulnerable to issues like fraud, and we have to 139 continue our oversight. So when you say will we be here 140 again in 2 years? Probably. We will probably be here in 10 years, because this kind of a problem takes ever vigilance by 141 142 this Committee. The GAO report we are talking about today tells us that 143 144 the Medicaid program, like many other large programs, like 145 Medicare, defense contracts, and private insurance plans, 146 experience thousands of improper, and possibly fraudulent, payments every year. Last year CMS found an estimated 147 148 improper payment rate of 6.7 percent, which amounted to about

149 \$17.5 billion for the Medicaid program in 2014. Now, as I said, and you said, like many other programs, 150 151 Medicaid is not--fraud is not unique to this Committee. 152 our report, which was published in 2003, which was 12 years ago, we said, ``Committee hearings last year revealed that 153 154 the cost of the Medicaid fraud program could exceed \$17 155 billion every year. This year, 2003, the Committee will 156 examine ways in which states could adopt more rigorous 157 enrollment controls to keep unscrupulous providers out of their programs, and improve their program integrity 158 standards.'' And we had laudable efforts since that time. 159 Truly, \$17 billion in 2003, and about \$17 billion now, even 160 161 with the Medicaid expansion, that is not something to be proud about, although I guess we should be glad it doesn't 162 163 seem to be getting a lot worse. Nonetheless, Congress, and 164 the Administration, and the governors all across the country 165 need to focus on improper payments. 166 There is something exciting, though, that I think may 167 actually make a major difference going forward. Under the Affordable Care Act, a number of important measures were 168 enacted to prevent or reduce improper payments in the 169

170 Medicaid and Medicare programs. For example, the ACA 171 provided nearly \$350 million in new funds for anti-fraud 172 efforts. It provided new authorities to the Secretary of HHS 173 to help shift from a traditional pay and chase model to a preventative approach, by keeping fraudulent suppliers and 174 175 providers out of the program before they commit fraud. And 176 now we have in place a host of new and enhanced anti-fraud 177 penalties to deter those attempting to improperly bill 178 Medicaid or Medicare. These are important new tools, and I 179 think they can help safeguard the program. I am looking forward to hearing from CMS and GAO on how these efforts are 180 working, and how they expect to build upon efforts to 181 strengthen Medicaid at both the Federal and State levels. 182 I think it is important to put this discussion of 183 184 improper payment rates in contacts -- in context with large 185 scale financing of other public and private sector programs. 186 For example, I can cite endless examples of major defense 187 contractors receiving improper payments from the Pentagon. 188 Last year the Washington Post revealed that one company 189 improperly charged the government more than \$100 million for services. DOD alone reported it had made \$1.1 billion in 190

191 improper payments for fiscal year 2011. 192 You know, overbilling occurs across all sectors of the 193 government, and we have to figure out why that is happening, 194 and how we can strengthen our financial controls across the government to prevent this kind of overpayment and fraud, and 195 196 find new ways to protect taxpayers. And so I think the GAO 197 does a really important job, both here, in helping strengthen 198 the Medicaid program, and many other places. 199 I have a lot of questions about the finding and recommendations, some of which may go beyond the scope of the 200 report. For example, and this is in context of the -- of ACA 201 202 too, the audit relies on data from fiscal year 2011. As we 203 implement these ACA provisions that have gone into place since that time, I would be interested to know, are they 204 205 really making a difference on the data in the 3 or 4 years since that time? The other issue we need clarification on is 206 207 the basis of the four states that were chosen for this audit. 208 So, as I say, I really want to thank the agencies for 209 coming in and helping us. Anything we can do to strengthen 210 the controls to prevent overpayment and fraud is great with 211 me, because the hard working Americans in all 50 states rely

217 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. Now I will recognize Dr. 218 Burgess for 5 minutes. 219 Mr. {Burgess.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an important hearing we are having today. Medicaid, a program 220 221 that is entirely under our jurisdiction in the Energy and 222 Commerce Committee, is a vital program that covers and 223 provides care for some of the nation's most vulnerable 224 populations. This Committee does have exclusive legislative 225 jurisdiction over Medicaid, and it is our responsibility to ensure that the long term sustainability of Medicaid is 226 227 assured through proper oversight. 228 Inefficient and misdirected payments within the Medicaid program have substantive budgetary, access, and provider 229 230 impacts that ultimately infect--affect patients. If states 231 do not have the proper tools available for monitoring 232 enforcement, there can be lasting effects on the nation's 233 Medicaid recipients, and the providers of their care. CMS 234 has report improper payments well over \$17 billion for fiscal year 2014 for the Medicaid program, an increase of nearly \$3 235 billion from the prior year. That is a trend that should 236

237 concern all of us. Each of those dollars that is spent inappropriately is a dollar not spent on a patient, and is, 238 239 in fact, a wasted taxpayer dollar. 240 I do want to point out that the recently passed H.R. 2, 241 that this Committee had a great hand in getting started, and 242 shepherding through the legislative process, and ultimately 243 it was signed by the President, but it did have a number of 244 anti-fraud provisions contained within. Most of those 245 pertained to the Medicare system, but I do wonder if some of those examples may not also be extrapolated to the Medicaid 246 system. Specifically, Mr. Chairman, Section 502, preventing 247 248 wrongful Medicare payments for items and services furnished 249 to incarcerated individuals, individuals not lawfully present, and deceased individuals. That may be something 250 251 worthy of study that the CMS may want to consider for the 252 Medicaid system as well. 253 I am also concerned about allowing entities engaging in fraud to continue to receive Federal funds. We want to 254 255 ensure provider participation in Medicaid, and patients should never be faced with a choice of no care or low quality 256 care from those providers. The Office of Inspector General 257

258 has the authority to exclude entities that employ deceptive businesses practices within the Medicaid program. In 2014 259 260 Ranking Member DeGette and I looked into the practices of 261 certain dental management service companies within the Medicaid program which not only provide managerial services 262 263 to dental clinics, but also, in fact, own these clinics, and 264 have direct control over the operations and finances of the 265 clinics. We became very concerned because this corporate 266 structure was resulting in failure to meet basic quality and 267 compliance standards. Unfortunately, many of these practices have continued, 268 269 despite Federal Government intervention. The Office of 270 Inspector General may initiate a corporate integrity 271 agreement, but these deceptive entities may dissolve under 272 bankruptcy, only to re-emerge under new management. 273 Office of Inspector General has the authority to exclude 274 individuals and entities that have engaged in fraud and abuse 275 related to Federal health programs, including Medicaid. 276 Following our investigation, we sent a letter to the Office of Inspector General recommending that OIG consider excluding 277 any corporate entity that employs deceptive practices that 278

279 result in substandard care. So we are grateful that some action was taken over that, 280 281 but it is incredibly important that there be a way to exclude 282 someone who is engaged in deceptive practice, and prevent 283 that process of dissolving, and then re-emerging in another 284 corporate form. We must ensure that states have the proper 285 tools available to ensure that tax dollars are never 286 fraudulently wasted in the Medicaid program, and that access 287 for Medicaid beneficiaries is subsequently protected. 288 Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the recognition, for the 289 time, and I will yield back. [The prepared statement of Mr. Burgess follows:] 290 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* COMMITTEE INSERT \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* 291

292 Mr. {Murphy.} Gentleman yields back, and--if there is anybody else on our side who wants the remaining 50 seconds? 293 294 And, if not, we will move over to the Ranking Member, Mr. 295 Pallone, for 5 minutes. 296 Mr. {Pallone.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For decades 297 Medicaid has been a lifeline for tens of millions of hard 298 working Americans across the country. That is why we must 299 make sure that the resources we devote to this program are 300 administered efficiently and effectively. Every dollar lost to misuse or fraud of our Federal health programs is one less 301 dollar available to fund essential lifesaving medical 302 303 services for Americans. Cutting down on waste, fraud, and abuse is, and must remain, a priority for CMS, state Medicaid 304 305 programs, and this Committee. 306 Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle 307 have expressed concerns that expansion of Medicaid will put 308 state budgets in an untenable position and increase fraud, 309 and that is simply not true. Beneficiary access and program 310 integrity efforts are not competing goals. Smart, effective regulation reinforces both goals simultaneously. 311

312 In the short time since states have had the option to expand Medicaid, those states have already realized 313 314 significant qualitative and economic benefits, as 315 uncompensated care rates drop, and states are able to collect more revenue. Expansion makes good economic sense, and good 316 317 moral sense. For instance, in my home state of New Jersey, 318 projects a nearly \$150 million decline in charity care in 319 fiscal year 2016, with savings from the Medicare expansion 320 totaling nearly \$3 billion through 2020. Let us also not 321 forget that Medicaid coverage lowers financial barriers to 322 access, increases use of preventative care, and improves 323 health outcomes. Making the program available to more 324 vulnerable Americans is a great achievement, and one that I 325 am very proud of having played a part in. 326 But, of course, it is now more important than ever that 327 we act as good stewards of Medicaid dollars, and ensure that 328 the benefits of this program are available for generations to 329 come. That is why, when we passed the Affordable Care Act in 330 2010, we included a number of measures to strengthen program integrity and reduce fraud in the Medicaid program. In 2011, 331 332 for example, CMS established procedures to screen providers

333 and suppliers based on their risk levels so we can prevent fraud before it occurs. This has changed the traditional pay 334 335 and chase model towards a preventative approach by keeping fraudulent suppliers out of the program before they can 336 337 commit fraud. 338 There are a number of other ACA anti-fraud measures that 339 have impacted the Medicaid program over the past few years. 340 These include new and enhanced penalties for fraudulent 341 providers. These new authorities allow the Inspector General to exclude from Medicaid any provider that makes false 342 343 statements on an application to enroll or participate in the 344 program. The ACA also requires state Medicaid agencies to 345 withhold payments to a provider or supplier pending 346 investigation of a credible allegation of fraud. The law 347 also significantly increased funding to fight Medicare and 348 Medicaid fraud. 349 So I want to hear today about how all these measures 350 have worked, and about how CMS is implementing regulations to 351 better protect patients and legitimate providers. Although 352 the ACA made significant steps to reduce fraud and abuse in 353 the Medicaid program, I know there is always room for

354 improvement, and I am glad the GAO is here today to share their findings and provide constructive advice about how can 355 356 we make the Medicaid program even stronger. 357 But I want to caution against applying GAO's findings 358 too broadly. First, the analysis focused on four states, 359 Arizona, Florida, Michigan, and New Jersey, and its findings 360 are not generalizable across the country. Second, the report 361 looked at data from fiscal year 2011, before many of the ACA 362 anti-fraud provisions went into effect. GAO acknowledges several times in a report that CMS has since made changes to 363 364 address improper payment issues. Third, I want to make the 365 point that many of the potentially improper payments listed in this report are likely examples of provider fraud, not 366 367 beneficiary fraud. The GAO report lists examples such as billing under deceased beneficiaries' identities, or billing 368 369 on behalf of currently incarcerated beneficiaries. Given 370 that these beneficiaries are hardly in a position to defraud 371 the government, I think it is likely that many of these are 372 examples of provider fraud. So, Mr. Chairman, good program integrity helps to ensure 373 374 that beneficiaries receive the care they need, so I look

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forward to hearing from CMS and GAO how these latest efforts
are being implemented by the states. I guess--I don't know
if anybody wants my 30 seconds, but--otherwise I will yield
back. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
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381 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you, I appreciate that. We will 382 proceed onward. It is good to see we are all on the same 383 team today, focused on this, and our witnesses are part of this too, so I would like to introduce the witnesses for 384 385 today's panel, make sure I get the names right. It is Seto 386 Bagdoyan, did I get that right? Good, thank you. The 387 Director of Audit Services in the U.S. Government 388 Accountability Office Forensic Audits and Investigative 389 Services Missions Team. Welcome here. And Dr. -- I know this, Shantanu Agrawal -- you have been 390 391 here before, welcome back--is the Deputy Administrator and 392 Director of the Center for Program Integrity at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 393 394 I will now swear in the witnesses. As you are aware, it 395 is the Committees holding investigative hearing to--when 396 doing so, has the practice of taking testimony under oath. 397 Do either of you have any objections to testifying under oath? Neither of you do, thank you. 398 399 So, as the Chair, I would advise you that you--under the rules of the House and rules of the Committee you are 400

401 entitled to be advised by counsels. Do either of you desire 402 to be advised by counsel during your testimony today? And 403 both of you say no to that, so, in that case, if you would 404 please rise, raise your right hand, I will swear you in. 405 [Witnesses sworn.] 406 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. You are now under oath, and 407 subject to the penalties set forth in Title 18, Section 1001 408 of the United States Code. You may now give a 5 minute 409 summary of your written statement. You know how to watch the 410 red light in front of you. Stick with that, and we will--I 411 guess we will start off with Mr. Bagdoyan.

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^TESTIMONY OF SETO J. BAGDOYAN, DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES,
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     FORENSIC AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT
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     ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND SHANTANU AGRAWAL, M.D., DEPUTY
     ADMINISTRATOR AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PROGRAM INTEGRITY,
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     CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT
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     OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
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     ^TESTIMONY OF SETO J. BAGDOYAN
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member
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     DeGette, and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be
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     here today to discuss results of GAO's recent report on
     Medicaid beneficiary and provider fraud controls. As you
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     know, and as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Medicaid is a
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     significant expenditure for the Federal Government and the
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     states, with combined outlays of about $516 billion in fiscal
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     year 2014, involving millions of beneficiaries and providers.
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          These numbers, as members mentioned, are all expected to
     grow as a result of the expansion of Medicaid under the
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     Affordable Care Act. A program of this scope and scale is
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430 inherently susceptible to error, including improper payments, as well as fraudulent activity. In fact, as mentioned again, 431 432 CMS reported an estimated improper payment rate of 6.7 percent, or \$17.5 billion, for Medicaid in fiscal year 2014, 433 434 compared to 5.8 percent, or 14.4 billion respectively, in FY 435 2013. Also, earlier this year we reported that Medicaid 436 remains on GAO's high risk list in part because of concerns 437 about the adequacy of fiscal oversight of the program, 438 including improper payments. 439 With this backdrop, I will now discuss our report's key findings. Overall we found thousands of Medicaid 440 beneficiaries and hundreds of providers were involved in 441 442 potentially improper or fraudulent payments during fiscal year 2011, the most recent year for which reliable and 443 444 comparable data were available in the four selected states we 445 reviewed, namely Arizona, Florida, Michigan, and New Jersey. 446 These states accounted for about 9.2 million beneficiaries, 447 and about 13 percent of all fiscal year 2011 Medicaid 448 payments. More specifically, examples of potentially improper or 449 fraudulent payments include about 8,600 beneficiaries had 450

451 payments made on their behalf concurrently by two or more of 452 the selected states, totaling at least \$18.3 million. 453 identities of roughly 200 deceased beneficiaries received 454 about 9.6 million in Medicaid benefits subsequent to the beneficiary's death. Some 3,600 individuals received about 455 456 4.2 million worth of Medicaid services while incarcerated in 457 State prison facilities. 90 providers had suspended or 458 revoked licenses in at least one state in which they received 459 payment. Associated Medicaid claims totaled at least \$2.8 460 million. 461 To its credit, as, again, mentioned in opening 462 statements, CMS has taken some regulatory steps to make the 463 Medicaid enrollment process more rigorous and data-driven. However, gaps in beneficiary eligibility, verification 464 465 quidance, and data sharing persist. For example, in 2013, 466 CMS required states to use electronic data maintained by the 467 Federal Government in its data services hub to verify 468 beneficiary eligibility. According to CMS, the hub can 469 verify key application information, including state 470 residency, incarceration status, and immigration status. 471 However, CMS regulations do not require states to review

472 Medicaid beneficiary files for deceased individuals more frequently than annually, nor specify whether states should 473 474 reconsider using the more comprehensive Social Security 475 Administration's full death master file in conjunction with 476 state reported data--death data when doing so. As a result, 477 states may not be able to detect individuals that have moved 478 to, and later died, in another state, or prevent the payment 479 of potentially fraudulent benefits to individuals using their 480 identities. Accordingly, additional guidance from CMS to 481 states might further enhance program integrity efforts beyond using the hub. 482 483 In closing, our findings underscore that, as Medicaid's 484 numbers grow as expected, both the Federal Government and the states need to maximize their efforts to promote program 485 486 integrity by preventing and reducing potential for improper payments and fraud. Our recommendations to CMS, which the 487 488 agency has accepted, are designed to enhance its toolbox to 489 this effect, help narrow the windows of opportunity for improper payments and fraud, and provide reasonable assurance 490 491 that Medicaid eligibility controls are functioning as 492 intended.

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498 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. Dr. Agrawal, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
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500 ^TESTIMONY OF SHANTANU AGRAWAL 501 Dr. {Agrawal.} Thank you. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you 502 503 for the invitation to discuss CMS's efforts to strengthen 504 Medicaid. We share the -- enhancing program integrity is a top 505 priority for the Administration, and an agency-wide effort at 506 CMS. We share the Subcommittee's commitment to protecting beneficiaries and ensuring taxpayer dollars are spent on 507 legitimate items and services, both of which are at the 508 509 forefront of our program integrity mission. 510 I would like to make three major points in my testimony 511 today. First, Medicaid program integrity is a shared 512 state/Federal responsibility, and I feel strongly that states 513 and the Federal Government share the goal that the Medicaid 514 program be as secure as possible to ensure beneficiaries are 515 protected, and the right payments are being made. Second, we 516 have made important progress in addressing beneficiary 517 eligibility and provider enrollment issues through advanced

data systems and improved collaboration. And third, it is

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519 clear that more work remains, that we can build on our accomplishments with improved guidance, building more 520 521 capabilities, and enhanced oversight. 522 States and the Federal Government share mutual 523 obligations and accountability for the integrity of the 524 Medicaid program, and the development, application, and 525 improvement of program safeguards necessary to ensure proper 526 and appropriate use of both Federal and state dollars. This 527 Federal/state partnership is central to the success of the Medicaid program, and it depends on clear lines of 528 responsibility and shared goals. Although the Federal 529 530 Government establishes general guidelines for the program, 531 states design, implement, and administer their own Medicaid 532 programs. Medicaid is currently undergoing significant 533 changes as CMS and states implement reforms to modernize and 534 strengthen the program and its services. 535 While focused on implementation of the Affordable Care 536 Act, CMS has been working closely with states to implement new, more modern delivery system and payment reforms. 537 last few years CMS and states have made important progress in 538 539 improving the systems and processes that determine a

beneficiary's eligibility for Medicaid, and that ensure only 540 legitimate providers enroll in and build a program. 541 542 made great strides. The error rate in beneficiary 543 eligibility, for example, has been cut in half since 2011. We recognize, however, that more remains to be done, and 544 545 continue to work collaboratively with states to further 546 improve Medicaid program integrity. 547 A critical component to preventing waste, abuse, and 548 fraud is ensuring that only legitimate providers have the 549 ability to bill Medicaid in the first place. While states 550 bear the primary responsibility for provider screening and enrollment for Medicaid, CMS is engaging in new efforts to 551 552 work with states to make sure that only legitimate providers are enrolling in the Medicaid program. The ACA required CMS 553 554 to implement risk-based screening of providers and suppliers 555 who want to participate in Medicaid. This enhanced screening 556 requires certain categories of providers and suppliers that 557 have historically posed a higher risk of fraud to undergo 558 greater scrutiny prior to their enrollment or re-validation in Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP. 559 560 To enroll providers more efficiently, CMS has provided

561 states with direct access to Medicare's enrollment database, the Provider Enrollment Chain and Ownership System, or PECOS, 562 563 and in response to input from states, began providing access 564 to monthly PECOS data extracts that states could use to 565 systematically compare state enrollment records against available PECOS information. 566 567 CMS also provides guidance, education through the 568 Medicaid Integrity Institute, which has reached over 4,200 569 state employees on enrollment and other topics, and oversight 570 through state program integrity reviews. Additionally, the ACA, and accompanying Federal regulations, have enhanced 571 572 beneficiary eligibility safeguards by establishing a modernized, data-driven approach to verification of financial 573 and non-financial information needed to determine Medicaid 574 575 eligibility. States now rely on available electronic data 576 sources, including the Federal data hub and PARIS system, to 577 confirm information included on the application and promote 578 program integrity, while minimizing the amount of paper 579 documentation that consumers need to provide. CMS has also developed its most recent comprehensive 580 Medicare--Medicaid integrity plan, in collaboration with our 581

582 partners, including the National Association of Medicaid Directors, and is working to implement this plan. This work 583 584 includes providing Medicare data to states for program 585 integrity purposes, expanding support and training of state 586 program integrity staff in vulnerable areas, such as program 587 integrity oversight of managed care and evolving integrated 588 care models, and facilitating development of state capacity 589 and access to cost-effective analytics technology. 590 The past several years have brought numerous gains in 591 compating -- in combating fraud, waste, and abuse in the 592 Medicaid program, but more work clearly remains. Today the 593 eligibility determination process for beneficiaries and 594 provider screening efforts are significantly more modern and digital than ever before. We thank the GAO for highlighting 595 596 critical issues in the Medicaid program, and look forward to 597 continue to work with states and other stakeholders to 598 establish new initiatives and expand upon our existing 599 programs to fight fraud, reduce improper payments, and 600 improve oversight. Thank you, and I am happy to answer any 601 questions.

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Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you very much. Let me recognize
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    myself for 5 minutes and keep this moving. We appreciate
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     your input on this, and some ideas here.
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          Dr. Agrawal, the improper payment rate for Medicaid
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    program was 6.7 percent in fiscal year 2014. That was an
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     increase over fiscal year 2013, where it was just 5.8
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    percent. Now, CMS set the target rate for Medicaid payments
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     at 5.6 percent, so CMS failed to meet the target rate for
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     2014, is that correct?
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          Dr. {Agrawal.} That is correct.
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          Mr. {Murphy.} So what was the--why was the target rate
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    not met?
          Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah, there are three major components
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     of the PERM rate of the Medicaid improper payment rate.
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     is--there is a fee for service component, a Medicaid managed
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     care component, and then a beneficiary eligibility component,
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     and what I think you see in the error rate is a bit of a
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    mixed picture. So on one hand, the beneficiary eligibility
     rate, which was a central topic in the GAO report, did
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     actually decrease, from 3.3 percent to 3.1. Where we saw the
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624 biggest rise was in the provider screening and enrollment standards in the fee for service component. What I think the 625 626 increase shows is that states are in various places of implementing those screening standards, which has led to an 627 628 increase in the error rate in that part of perm. 629 Mr. {Murphy.} Now--but for 2015 they have set this 630 improper payment rate target at 6.7 percent, and that is the 631 same rate it was in 2014. It is actually higher than the 632 improper payment rate for 2013 and 2014. So why is CMS actually raising that improper payment rate, that error rate, 633 in--for Medicaid instead of lowering it, and setting a target 634 for reduction of errors? 635 636 Dr. {Agrawal.} Well, I think, you know, we clearly want 637 to make progress on the improper payment rate and Medicaid. 638 The biggest driver right now are those provider enrollments 639 and screening standards. You know, obviously we want to 640 continue to make progress on the beneficiary eligibility 641 requirements as well. You know, what we find is that states are in various different places of implementing their 642 screening and enrollment for providers. It is a major 643 644 driver.

645 I think there are a lot of tools that we have to help states make progress, including oversight, education, 646 647 guidance, giving access to more data systems. But I think we want to set realistic targets and, you know, work on that to 648 649 make sure states can meet them. 650 Mr. {Murphy.} And we want to help you with this. We 651 just want to make sure that the information that this 652 Subcommittee gets, this Committee gets, can help facilitate 653 that process. But if we have--raise our tolerance level for errors, and then we say, well, it is all within what we 654 accept, that's not acceptable, so I really want to caution 655 656 you on that. I am--what I am hoping, that we can not have that goal, but really work towards of a goal of how to lower 657 it, and then identify those outliers. And, I mean, you heard 658 the opening statements. This Subcommittee is with you on 659 660 trying to identify mechanisms for this. 661 Now, the Office of Management and Budget has designated Medicaid as one of 13 programs as higher, with Medicaid 662 ranking third, with 17.5 billion in improper payment amounts. 663 Though does -- so does CMS know why Medicaid has been 664 665 designated by OMB as a high error agency, Dr. Agrawal?

666 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah. You know, I--there are clearly important factors in the size and scope of the program. 667 668 fact that the program is administered in numerous, you know, different state Medicaid agencies, and require a great deal 669 670 of collaboration. I am sure it does also reflect, you know, 671 the--our historical error rate. So I think the designation 672 of it being, you know, a high risk program certainly makes 673 sense. 674 I would also add just--Chairman, to your last question that part of, you know, what we see as the dynamic in program 675 integrity, which is, I think, important to think about, is 676 677 that as requirements increase, as the stringency of the program increase--increases, oftentimes we also see an 678 679 increase in the error rate as a result, because providers, or 680 other stakeholders, such as states, need time to catch up to 681 requirements. I think that is a common underlying element to 682 many factors in the error rate, but specifically the provider 683 enrollment standards that the ACA created. 684 Mr. {Murphy.} Well, let me move on to something else here. Director Bagdoyan, the GAO has also designated 685 Medicaid as a high risk program since 2003. All right. 686

687 are the criteria that land the Federal program into that kind of category, and it has been that way for a long time? 688 689 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Yeah. For Medicaid, Mr. Chairman, the specific factor that we cited in our report is the fact that 690 its fiscal oversight over the years has been not where it 691 692 should be, and within that, the--693 Mr. {Murphy.} Fiscal oversight at the Federal level, or 694 state, or both? 695 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} That would be at both levels, since it 696 is--697 Mr. {Murphy.} Okay. Mr. {Bagdoyan.} --a joint program. And then, further 698 699 within that context, of course, the risk of improper payments 700 and/or fraudulent activity contributes to that designation. 701 Mr. {Murphy.} And part of this too is--we see that you are collecting data. You couldn't even get data from some of 702 703 the states because it just isn't there. Is there things we 704 need to do with--you can recommend as well that--what we need 705 to make sure that states have been presenting data so we can 706 analyze it and identify the problem, either one of you? 707 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} I would go first. Obviously data

708 analytics is the growing field, and it would be incumbent 709 upon both the Federal Government and the states to really pay attention to the quality of their data, the collection, the 710 711 analysis, the reliability to make cross-comparisons and other 712 analyses. 713 Mr. {Murphy.} And what we usually have as our tools in 714 Congress is a carrot or a stick to enhance that, so--I am out 715 of time here, but I would be looking forward to your comments 716 of what we could do, because without the data, you can't 717 provide an accurate recommendation to us. Ms. DeGette, 5 718 minutes. 719 Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you. Dr. Agrawal, in March 2011 720 CMS put into place new requirements for enrolling and re-721 validating Medicaid providers and suppliers, is that correct? 722 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yes, that is correct. 723 Ms. {DeGette.} And the new process separates providers 724 and suppliers into categories of risk, either high, moderate 725 or limited risk for additional screening before enrollment or 726 re-validation in the Medicaid program, is that correct? Dr. {Agrawal.} That is correct. 727 728 Ms. {DeGette.} And, briefly, how does CMS determine

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    which risk category an individual provider or supplier will
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    be put into?
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          Dr. {Agrawal.} Sure. So these risk categories are done
     at the provider sort of group level, or provider type level.
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     So it isn't an individual provider that we would be placing
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     in these various categories, it would be a whole class, such
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     as--newly enrolling home health agencies are considered high
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    risk.
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          Ms. {DeGette.} I see.
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          Dr. {Agrawal.} And we designated these risk levels
    based on input from multiple sources, including the HHS OIG,
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    based on historical levels of fraud or--
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          Ms. {DeGette.} Fraud.
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          Dr. {Agrawal.} --issues with those specific provider
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     types.
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          Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. And do the states also have to
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     implement screening requirements before they enroll a
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     provider in the Medicaid program?
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          Dr. {Agrawal.} They do. Those requirements are largely
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Ms. {DeGette.} And those go into effect March 2016, 5

identical to Medicare's.

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750 years after the regulation first went into effect, is that 751 right? 752 Dr. {Agrawal.} Many of the requirements have had to be 753 implemented by now already. 754 Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. 755 Dr. {Agrawal.} There were already deadlines. I think 756 what you are referencing is a re-validation deadline--757 Ms. {DeGette.} Right. 758 Dr. {Agrawal.} --yes, is March of 2016. 759 Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. And then, after everything is either validated or re-validated, it has to go--be re-760 validated again every 5 years, is that right? 761 762 Dr. {Agrawal.} That is correct. Ms. {DeGette.} Now, is CMS working with the states to 763 764 implement these new requirements? 765 Dr. {Agrawal.} We are, across the board. So we have 766 largely the same requirements in Medicare, and therefore are 767 undertaking the same work in the Medicare program. Where 768 possible, we have made data assets available to states so 769 that they can utilize the results of our screening. For example, I referenced PECOS, where we have done a site visit, 770

- 771 or fingerprint-based background check. States have access to
- 772 that data so that they don't have to duplicate those--
- Ms. {DeGette.} Okay.
- 774 Dr. {Agrawal.} --initiatives.
- 775 Ms. {DeGette.} And are they--the states generally on
- 776 track with their implementation?
- 777 Dr. {Agrawal.} You know, states are in really different
- 778 places, what we--
- 779 Ms. {DeGette.} Okay.
- 780 Dr.  $\{Agrawal.\}$  --find. So when we do the PERM rate
- 781 measurement every year, or do state program integrity
- 782 reviews, there are certain states that are well advanced in
- 783 the--in their implementation of these requirements, and other
- 784 states that are lagging quite far behind.
- 785 Ms. {DeGette.} And so I assume those are the states you
- 786 are focusing on, trying to get them--
- 787 Dr. {Agrawal.} Correct. We can increase the number of-
- 788 -amount of oversight, we can offer more technical assistance,
- 789 education efforts, things like that.
- 790 Ms. {DeGette.} Now, these efforts were not included in
- 791 the data of the GAO report, which went for 2011 data, is that

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     right?
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          Dr. {Agrawal.} That is right.
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          Ms. {DeGette.} Yes or no will work.
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          Dr. {Agrawal.} Yes.
          Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you. Now, Mr. Bagdoyan, in your
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     testimony--your written testimony, which you confirmed in
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     your testimony today in the Committee, you said CMS has taken
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     steps since 2011 to make the Medicaid enrollment verification
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    process more data-driven. I am assuming you are talking
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     about some of these implementations that--
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          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Right.
          Ms. {DeGette.} --Dr. Agrawal is--
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          Mr. {Baqdoyan.} Yeah.
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          Ms. {DeGette.} --talking about.
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} That is correct.
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          Ms. {DeGette.} Do you think that these steps will help
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     close some of the gaps GAO identified in the report with
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     regard to potentially improper fraudulent payments?
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Sure. As I mentioned in my closing,
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     those steps will definitely add to the toolbox that CMS and
     the states have, and narrow the opportunities for potential
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     improper payments and fraudulent activity. They will
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    probably play out over time. As Dr. Agrawal said, some
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     states are in different places than others, so--
         Ms. {DeGette.} And we have to focus on the ones who
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817
     are--
         Mr. {Bagdoyan.} That is correct.
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         Ms. {DeGette.} Yeah.
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          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Long term implementation success and
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     sustainability will be key in these areas.
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          Ms. {DeGette.} And--now, since 2011, do you agree that
     CMS has taken measures to address some of these real concerns
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     that you raise in your report, like the deceased providers
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    billing Medicaid, providers with suspended or revoked
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     licenses, and people inappropriately using virtual addresses?
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    Are they working on that now?
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          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} I think they are taking steps. They
     are in the right direction, we believe, but execution and
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     sustainability will be, again, key for both--
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          Ms. {DeGette.} I agree.
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} --Federal Government and the states.
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         Ms. {DeGette.} Yeah. I appreciate GAO's sustained work
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834 on this issue. Excuse me, that is my child. I programmed my phone to bark when--835 836 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Distinct voice that your child has. Ms. {DeGette.} Yeah. That is my other one. But I am 837 838 glad that you both agree that the Affordable Care Act has 839 changed the way we prevent and address Medicaid fraud, and I 840 am--I look forward to it. As we said, Mr. Chairman, we are 841 going to be back here in a couple of years, making sure that 842 these ACA requirements have been implemented. Thank you. 843 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. I now recognize Mr. McKinley for 5 minutes. 844 845 Mr. {McKinley.} Two quick questions. One is--the CMS has raised its proper payment rate target from fiscal year 846 2015 to 6.7 percent, from the 5.6 target rate in 2014. Is 847 848 that a good internal control practice, to raise the target 849 rate? 850 Dr. {Agrawal.} Sir, are you asking me? 851 Mr. {McKinley.} Yes. 852 Dr. {Agrawal.} No. I do appreciate the question, and, again, I think it is important to set realistic targets and 853 854 goals that do push us to improvement, but at the same time

855 recognize that Medicaid is a state and Federal program that states are in various places of implementing. Things like 856 857 the provider enrollment standards, which are the major driver 858 of the improper payment rate at this point. Mr. {McKinley.} Okay. Let me get to the real--the 859 860 question I had from West Virginia, and it is more of a 861 question, I think, of--perhaps abuse and errors. Let me 862 frame the argument. In West Virginia, 1/3 of the hospitals 863 we have in West Virginia are critical access hospitals. are a very rural state. And for nearly 30 years, since the 864 early '80s, West Virginia's critical access hospitals have 865 866 been using a provider tax to supplement and provide resources 867 for them. In 2012 CMS hired a different auditor from all of these 868 past 30 years, and this new auditor stepped in and said that 869 870 is--process isn't approved anymore, and we are going to go 871 back and -- we are auditing you back until 2009, and -- trying to 872 recover the money that you previously were working under the 873 idea that this was the appropriate way to go about getting the provider tax revenue coming in. This is going to be an 874 875 incredible hindrance for these hospitals to provide medical

876 care in rural areas of West Virginia, when we go backwards on 877 them after they were working under the idea that they thought 878 they were working properly. 879 So we have talked about -- can we go forward from here, 880 not go back and try to penalize them for following someone 881 else's advice, that was also with CMS? Now we go forward. 882 We are not--we have written letters. We have had 883 conversations with--until recently, but CMS really was 884 disengaged with us. Now these hospitals are all getting 885 invoices based--3 years after the--2012, when they were told, we are not going to allow that anymore, now in 2015 they are 886 887 getting invoices that they say they have to pay them within 888 15 days, or they are going to have the funds withheld. 889 I--first, I don't know of any private sector--coming 890 from the private sector--I have got 50 years in the private 891 sector. I have never heard of someone saying, if you don't 892 pay within 15 days, we are taking it out of your hide. How 893 are they--that just doesn't work. These--there are no 894 details on the--on these invoices. And when they have asked, 895 can we get a detail of what this invoice includes, and they are saying that they can't have it. They are being denied 896

897 access as to what the invoice reflects. 898 So the--I hope you understand, this is--this kind of smacks of bullying on the part of CMS to rural hospitals. 899 900 Especially given the fact that they were told to use this, 901 this was okay. And now a new auditor has a different 902 opinion. So do you think CMS is handling this crisis in West 903 Virginia, and probably in other rural areas of this country? 904 Do you think CMS is handling this sensitively and 905 appropriately? 906 Dr. {Agrawal.} Congressman, I appreciate the question. I can tell you that CMS has definitely been focused on 907 critical access hospitals and rural hospitals, and the 908 909 various policies we promulgate, including payments and other 910 policies. I will tell you, I am not aware of the specifics 911 of this particular situation. I understand some of the 912 details now from what you have explained. However, I think I 913 would have to connect you to the other folks in the agency 914 that are directly working on this issue, but I would happy to 915 take it back. 916 Mr. {McKinley.} If you would, please. We have been given the runaround. Everyone--the fingers--I have never 917

918 seen so many fingers pointing in different directions. It is 919 not my problem, it is someone else, and we have been trying 920 to pursue that. So if you can help us on that, we will put 921 you on record. Okay. You are under oath that you said you 922 were going to help, so--923 Dr. {Agrawal.} Thank you, Congressman, I appreciate that. I will--924 925 Mr. {McKinley.} I will remind you--926 Dr. {Agrawal.} I will think of that. 927 Mr. {McKinley.} --of that in the future. But thank you, because we need to get this resolved. Remember, a third 928 of the hospitals could very well go under if they have to 929 930 make these payments. Thank you. 931 Dr. {Agrawal.} Thank you. 932 Mr. {McKinley.} Yield back the--933 Mr. {Murphy.} Gentleman yields back. Now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes. 934 935 Mr. {Pallone.} Thank you. GAO reports that CMS has 936 made several changes since 2011 to help limit improper 937 payments, and these steps may address many of the potential improper payments GAO found in their analysis of 2011 claims. 938

939 In addition, to note in their progress already made, GAO made two recommendations to further improve efforts to limit 940 941 improper payments by increasing information and data sharing 942 efforts between the Federal Government and the state Medicaid 943 programs, and GAO first recommended that CMS help states 944 better identify deceased beneficiaries. 945 I want to ask a question of each of you, but I have got 946 three sets here, so we have got to go fairly guickly. Mr. 947 Bagdoyan, can you comment on GAO's findings that led to this 948 recommendation? Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Well, we did matching of deceased rolls 949 950 form the death master file. That is the complete file that 951 has about 98 million records, and we matched those against 952 claims data, and we discovered those beneficiaries who had 953 been deceased after their--or before their services were 954 billed for, so--955 Mr. {Pallone.} Okay. And, Dr. Agrawal, what steps is 956 CMS taking to implement this recommendation? 957 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah. We take the recommendations very seriously, and, as I mentioned, I--we do appreciate the 958 959 report. Specifically for the dead beneficiaries issue, you

960 know, there are clearly things that we have done, like 961 implement the Federal data hub that allows states to check 962 for death and other issues on the front end. We are also 963 looking to work with our technical advisory groups with the states and recommend more guidelines for the states both--to 964 965 both access the right data, and then access it frequently 966 enough. 967 Mr. {Pallone.} Okay. The GAO next recommended that CMS 968 apply more complete data for screening Medicaid providers by providing states with full access to the Provider Enrollment 969 Chain and Ownership System, or PECOS, database. So, again, 970 971 Mr. Bagdoyan, can you describe the PECOS system? Can you 972 comment on how states are using PECOS, and why GAO issued a 973 recommendation for CMS to provide additional guidance to 974 states? 975 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Sure. Thank you for your question. With PECOS it is a situation where states would need access 976 977 to the system electronically so they can be able to run batch 978 searches, if you will. I know it is a little technical term, 979 but right now they have to do a manual search on a case by case basis each name, each time in order to get a result, 980

981 whether there is an issue or not. So that is the essence of our recommendation, is to get them the automated access that 982 983 would allow them to do bigger and wider searches at once. Mr. {Pallone.} Thanks. Dr. Agrawal, what training and 984 quidance has been provided to states on using the PECOS 985 986 system, and what additional efforts will you be undertaking? 987 Dr. {Agrawal.} Sure. So we have two different kinds of 988 access to PECOS, one that is the sort of provider by provider 989 real time access to the system, but since this analysis was 990 done, we have also been making data extracts available to 991 states so that they can use those extracts and compare them against their entire enrollment file. We are looking--we 992 993 have already made changes to those extracts based on state 994 input, and are looking to expand them as we go on. 995 With respect to guidance, we do offer education in using 996 CMS data assets to states through things like the Medicaid Integrity Institute. We also offer other technical guidance, 997 998 and sort of case by case help as needed, and states can 999 contact us for that. 1000 Mr. {Pallone.} All right. Let me see if I get my third 1001 question in. Given that Medicaid is a joint state/Federal

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     program, states have a very important role to play in
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     preventing improper payments. It sounds like there is a fair
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     amount of Federal information available to states, but that
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     not all states are taking full advantage of what is
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     available. So I will start with Dr. Agrawal. How can states
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     be encouraged to use the data available to them?
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           Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah, I think that is a great question.
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     So there are data assets like PECOS and Paris, where we know
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     that all states have access. And I think part of getting
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      them to use it offering the guidance, offering the technical
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      input to make sure that they are using the data in the right
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     way, and using it as frequently as they can. With something
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      like Paris, for example, we were able to release guidance,
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      and ask all states to not only input their data every
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     quarter, but also to use that data in their enrollment
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      efforts every quarter.
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          Mr. {Pallone.} Okay. And, Mr. Bagdoyan, based on GAO's
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      findings, how can the states more effectively use the data
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      available to them?
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           Mr. {Bagdoyan.} I think I would echo Dr. Agrawal's
     comments. I think, if they are available, once they are
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1023 available, they would be encouraged through guidance, they 1024 would be held to account to make sure that this works as 1025 intended. I mean, again, it is a partnership. It is a 1026 common model, if you will, to make this work. 1027 Mr. {Pallone.} All right. Just want to thank both of 1028 you. In addition to the important tools already added by the 1029 Affordable Care Act, I am encouraged that CMS implementation 1030 of GAO's recommendations will further help state Medicaid 1031 programs in their efforts to address this persistent issue. 1032 So thanks again. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. Now recognize Dr. Burgess for 1033 1034 5 minutes. 1035 Mr. {Burgess.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, one 1036 of the hazards of having been on this Committee for a number 1037 of years is you see themes repeating themselves. And, 1038 Chairman Murphy, I remember very well a morning in late 1039 September 2008, when we held a Health Subcommittee hearing 1040 downstairs, and we had some, I don't know, eight, 10, 12 1041 witnesses. It was a pretty varied panel. Karen Davis from 1042 Commonwealth, Steve Parenti from the McCain campaign, the 1043 late Elizabeth Edwards was one of the panel members, and it

1044 was all a panel to discuss what is it going to cost to 1045 provide health care to everyone who lacks health insurance in 1046 this country. And the estimates were quite varied, and they 1047 ran from \$60 billion a year to \$800 billion a year. 1048 Chairman Murphy, I remember you asking the question, how 1049 could it be--how could there be so much variation? And Steve 1050 Parenti, on the panel, was the only one willing to take it 1051 on, and said, well, if you provide Medicaid to everyone, and 1052 that is how you expand your coverage, that is the lower 1053 number. If you provide Federal employee health benefit plan 1054 to everyone, which was being talked about by some of the 1055 candidates at the time, that is the higher number. 1056 So I guess my point is, everyone knew going into everything that became the Affordable Care Act that the way 1057 1058 to expand coverage without blowing up the cost was Medicaid 1059 expansion. Why wouldn't you fix some of these problems 1060 before you undertook to expand a program that, if I 1061 understand correctly, Mr. Bagdoyan, it was already on a watch 1062 list in 2008, and certainly on a watch list in 2009, when the 1063 law was written in 2010, or the law was signed. But really, 1064 why not put the effort on the front end? The way we are

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      going to expand coverage is through Medicaid, maybe we could
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     deal with some of these problems. What about the fact we
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     have got dead people that we are paying money for? What
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     about the fact we have got people who are receiving benefits
      in two states simultaneously? That is not supposed to
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     happen, is it, Dr. Agrawal?
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           Dr. {Agrawal.} That is correct.
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          Mr. {Burgess.} Then the whole issue--GAO in 2005 or
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      2006 put out a report about the third party liability--
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     Medicaid will pay a claim when a person has private health
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      insurance. And, really, Medicaid is supposed to be the payer
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     of last resort, not the payer of first resort. And we have
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     never really satisfactorily dealt with that problem, have we?
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          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} I am not familiar with the report.
          Mr. {Burgess.} Well, I will tell you, no, we have not.
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      So here we have it here, three very basic steps, don't pay
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      the dead people, don't pay people twice, and, hey, if Aetna,
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     United, Cigna is supposed to be paying the bill, you get them
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      to pay first, before the state reimburses on their Medicaid
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      system. Relatively simple steps that could have been done
     before expanding a program massively. And now we are in a
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1086 situation where not every state has expanded their Medicaid. 1087 And, Dr. Agrawal, let me just ask you, when states come in with their proposals, if a state is considering expanding 1088 1089 Medicaid in their state, and some states are, whether I think 1090 that is correct or not, some states are, when they come in 1091 with those proposals, are you talking to them about the fact 1092 that there are some inherent problems in the Medicaid system, 1093 and we would like to see those fixed before you double your 1094 number? 1095 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah, thank you for the question, Dr. Burgess. So I think our relationship with the states is such 1096 1097 that we are talking to them regardless of whether or not they 1098 are seeking to expand their Medicaid programs. There are 1099 current program integrity challenges and vulnerabilities, as 1100 the GAO has pointed out. They exist in the current Medicaid 1101 program. Our state oversight efforts, whether it is the PERM 1102 rate, or state program integrity reviews, include all states, 1103 not just those that are expanding. 1104 I think, you know, to your larger point, what we are 1105 trying to do is balance real program integrity interests and 1106 needs against the needs of socioeconomically disadvantage

1107 population that needs access to health care and health--1108 Mr. {Burgess.} Let me stop you there, because time is going to become critical. I--in my opening statement I 1109 1110 reference a problem that was related to dental care in the 1111 State of Texas. You have got a real problem. People who 1112 should be barred from ever participating in the program again 1113 simply dissolve into bankruptcy, and re-emerge in--someplace 1114 else. What are you doing to keep that from happening? 1115 Dr. {Agrawal.} There are clearly efforts that we have. 1116 You know, we do conduct collaborative audits and 1117 investigations with states and, where appropriate, encourage 1118 states to take termination actions in their programs. I 1119 think you referenced the exclusion authority by the HHS OIG. 1120 We obviously, you know, agree that that is a very powerful 1121 authority. We encourage OIG to implement it where appropriate. And where they do, we can take revocation 1122 1123 action quickly behind it. 1124 Mr. {Burgess.} Let me just, before time expires, Dallas 1125 Morning News over the weekend, series of--or an article that 1126 I think is part of a series of articles about how private nursing homes are drawing down dollars by combining with a 1127

1128 public entity, and some of these are fairly low ratings on 1129 the star rating on the nursing homes. Are you working with 1130 the states to address this problem? 1131 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yes. I am not aware of the specific 1132 nursing homes, but, you know, we do have survey, and 1133 certification, and other rating functions to CMS that can 1134 work with states on these issues. 1135 Mr. {Burgess.} Well, \$69 million just to these nursing 1136 homes identified last year, so it is a place where we need to 1137 put some effort. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 1138 Mr. {Murphy.} Gentleman yields back. Now recognize Mr. 1139 Kennedy for 5 minutes. 1140 Mr. {Kennedy.} Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 1141 Thank you for -- to our witnesses for coming today, and for 1142 your testimony at an important hearing. I want to touch base a little bit on the improper payment rate, and put that in 1143 1144 context. Medicaid program provides about 70 million low 1145 income and disabled Americans with vital health care 1146 services, and we must do everything we can to strengthen it 1147 and protect it. No one--as you have heard from my colleagues here this morning, no one, Democrat or Republican, is in

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1149 favor of fraud. We clearly want to make sure this program is 1150 as lean as it possibly can be, and that the people that need 1151 help and need the services are getting them. 1152 So, to that end, Mr. Bagdoyan, I would like to begin 1153 with you. Since its peak of 9.4 percent in 2010, the 1154 improper payments rate for the Medicaid program has steadily 1155 decreased, reaching a low of 5.8 percent in 2013, or 14.4 1156 billion. That number rose to 6.7 percent in 2014, or 17.5 1157 billion. Is that right? 1158 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} That is correct, sir. 1159 Mr. {Kennedy.} So I want to dig into that number a little bit deeper and see if I can better understand the 1160 1161 dynamics that are, in fact, driving that improper payment 1162 rate. The ACA provided CMS with a number of new tools to 1163 strengthen program integrity in the Medicaid program. 1164 2011 CMS established a new risk-based screening procedure for Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP providers. CMS also promulgated 1165 1166 new regulations, requiring the states to use electronic data 1167 maintained by the Federal Government to verity and re-1168 validate beneficiary eligibility through the data services 1169 hub.

1170 So, Dr. Agrawal, let us break down that payment rate a 1171 little bit into its relevant components. I know you touched 1172 on this a little bit earlier. If I understand this 1173 correctly, Payment Rate Measurement Program, or PRM, measures 1174 error rates both overall for the Medicaid program, as well as 1175 for certain subcategories, fee for service, managed care, and 1176 beneficiary eligibility. Is that right? 1177 Dr. {Agrawal.} That is correct. 1178 Mr. {Kennedy.} So what has happened to that beneficiary 1179 eligibility error rate since 2011? Dr. {Agrawal.} I think that is an important point, and 1180 it does highlight some of the intricacy in the rate. The 1181 1182 beneficiary eligibility error rate has actually been cut in 1183 half since 2011. 1184 Mr. {Kennedy.} So the error rate for--beneficiary eligibility rate cut in half, declined by three percent. 1185 Is 1186 that a substantial improvement, major improvement, small 1187 improvement? How do you characterize it? 1188 Dr. {Agrawal.} I think, given the issues that GAO has 1189 highlighted, that is obviously a substantial improvement.

More work remains to be done, which we are focusing on, but

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1191 it does indicate good progress. 1192 Mr. {Kennedy.} And so what is driving that improvement, 1193 then? Is it the--like the result of, in your opinion, the 1194 work CMS has been doing to implement the new program 1195 integrity tools in the ACA? Is it something else? What is 1196 behind the success? 1197 Dr. {Agrawal.} I think it is work that--being done at 1198 both the Federal and state levels between increased 1199 collaboration, more education and technical guidance going to 1200 states, better data assets that have been highlighted by Mr. 1201 Baqdoyan. 1202 Mr. {Kennedy.} And if--given that large drop in the 1203 error rate for beneficiary eligibility, what factors are 1204 driving the increase in the overall PERM rate? And I realize 1205 you touched on this a little while ago, but if you could 1206 flesh that out a little bit for me? 1207 Dr. {Agrawal.} Sure, no problem. The biggest driver of 1208 the increase in the rate are provider enrollment and screening standards. And, again, as with other PI aspects of 1209 1210 program integrity, whenever there is a new requirement,

certain stakeholders, in this case states, do--can experience

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1212 some difficulty in keeping up. So what we have found, that, 1213 while some states are quite far along, other states are 1214 lagging behind, and generally that is causing the error rate 1215 to rise. 1216 Mr. {Kennedy.} And how do we get those other states to 1217 pick up the pace? 1218 Dr. {Agrawal.} Well, we are--we exercise oversight in a 1219 variety of ways, so I think it is both what can we offer them 1220 in terms of collaboration that will help, like technical 1221 assistance, data assets like PECOS, and then where can we exercise real oversight? We do that through the PERM rate. 1222 1223 We require states to submit corrective actions to improve the 1224 error rate going forward, and also conduct state program 1225 integrity reviews, with associated corrective action plans 1226 where states fail to meet requirements. So I think it is a 1227 mix of both of those things. 1228 You know, I think the error rate increase in that 1229 particular aspect is the reflection of more stringent policy, 1230 which in and of itself is a good thing. We need that policy. 1231 Mr. {Kennedy.} What, if anything, can this Committee do 1232 to help you with that?

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           Dr. {Agrawal.} You know, I appreciate the question. I
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     think holding our feet to the fire is appropriate.
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          Mr. {Kennedy.} You are welcome.
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           Dr. {Agrawal.} Thank you very--I also think, you know,
     encouraging states to stay on the right path, take advantage
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     of the various resources that we offer, identify improvements
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     that we need to make so that they can make progress, would be
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     extremely helpful.
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          Mr. {Kennedy.} And, again, just putting this in
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     context, if I understand Mr. Bagdoyan, the GAO report, it was
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      four states, yes?
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          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Yeah.
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          Mr. {Kennedy.} And it covered 9.2 million Medicaid
     beneficiaries, right?
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          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} That is correct.
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           Mr. {Kennedy.} And I know we talked a little bit about
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     the 200 or so deceased beneficiaries that received payment.
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      If we were to put that--just so I understand it, that is 200
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     out of 9.2 million, right?
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          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} My math is not that good.
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Mr. {Kennedy.} Right. If we wanted to put that in that

1254 percentage, though, if you take my word for it that my iPhone 1255 calculator ain't so bad, that is .00002, four zeros and then 1256 a two--as far as error rates go, we are--nothing is 1257 acceptable, but we are doing okay if it is 200 out of 9.2 1258 million, right? You guys are doing your jobs? 1259 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Well, that is we found is 200 out of 1260 the 9.2 million. That is all I am prepared to say. 1261 Mr. {Kennedy.} Well, thank you for your work on this. 1262 Thank you for your research, and being here today, and 1263 highlighting an important issue for the hearing. 1264 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Thank you. Mr. {Murphy.} I guess this can go in the category of 1265 1266 lies, damn lies, and statistics. We appreciate it no matter 1267 what it is, and we are all in agreement that we want to make 1268 sure we rid that--Dr. Bucshon, you are next for 5 minutes. Mr. {Bucshon.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, 1269 1270 I was a practicing physician for 15 years, as I had mentioned 1271 to our witnesses beforehand. I have taken care of all 1272 patients, regardless of their ability to pay, which is what 1273 we do in health care. But I just want to highlight that all is not rosy with Medicaid. And I know this hearing is about 1274

1275 waste, and fraud, and abuse, but I am from Indiana, and I--1276 our medical practice routinely wrote off hundreds of 1277 thousands of dollars from a neighboring state's Medicaid 1278 program in billings every year because they ran out of money 1279 before the end of the year, and this pre-dates the ACA. 1280 The other thing is is that the program within our own 1281 state has been financially challenged historically with a 1282 significant Medicare provider cut within the last 10 years 1283 just to stay afloat. That said, Medicaid is a critical 1284 program that we have to have for our citizens. What can we do? Well, Indiana has expanded our Medicaid program using an 1285 1286 innovate plan called Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0, and I am 1287 hopeful that this state-based plan, as well as state-based plans around the country, can use--be used as a proving 1288 1289 ground how to move forward on our Medicaid program. 1290 Some facts about the Medicaid expansion that are not 1291 surprising to me, but seem to be surprising to those who 1292 wanted expand traditional Medicaid, is that ER visits are up, 1293 in some cases dramatically up, in multiple studies across the 1294 country. And why--and the hospitals are very happy, but we have made no progress because this is the highest cost form 1295

1296 of medical care available in the country. And so, you know, 1297 having a card in your pocket, but having no access to primary 1298 care physicians or others outside of the emergency room is 1299 not progress. And the encouragement to seek preventative 1300 care, as was mentioned earlier, may be technically true, but 1301 functionally not accurate because you can't get preventative 1302 care if no one takes your coverage. 1303 States that have expanded Medicaid are already starting 1304 to look for ways to pay for the program once the Federal 1305 money for the expansion goes down to 90 percent, and my 1306 concern is reimbursement cuts will be the way that will 1307 happen. And what does that do? Further limits access to the 1308 citizens in their states. And if anyone doesn't think that--1309 sometime in the future that this--that the Federal Government 1310 will look for a way to pay for other things by cut--further cutting that expansion money to the states on their Medicaid 1311 program, then I don't, you know, you are not following the 1312 1313 government very well. 1314 That said, I have a -- do have a couple of guestions. 1315 And, again this is a very important hearing. I saw the--I mean, we limited the study, Mr. Bagdoyan, to the four states. 1316

1317 Why did we pick these states, and did the GAO try to include 1318 other states in your study? 1319 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Thank you for your question, Dr. 1320 Bucshon. The way we picked our states is we began with the 1321 universe of beneficiaries per state, and then we also looked 1322 at data reliability, as well as geographic dispersion. So 1323 those were the three key factors that we used to pick these 1324 states. Now, data reliability being a very important factor, 1325 we don't have reliable data, we can't do our analysis. 1326 Mr. {Bucshon.} And that segues into Dr. Agrawal. How do you envision -- well, the data we were just talking about, 1327 1328 not accurate from states, how do you envision the progress we 1329 are making in information sharing on Medicaid between the states and the Federal Government? How can we improve on 1330 that situation so if, in the future, we want to study this 1331 1332 situation, we can pick any one of the 50 states? How are we 1333 doing? 1334 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah, thank you. I think that is a really important question. Data is really central to program 1335 1336 integrity work. What we have found is access to the right 1337 data set can really increase the sensitivity and specificity

1338 of our leads. The agency has made some of the biggest 1339 investments we have ever made in improving Medicaid data 1340 assets in programs like T-MSIS, which is seeking to 1341 dramatically increase the amount of data and the kind of 1342 breadth of that data that we get from state programs. 1343 In addition, Congress has funded previously programs 1344 like the Medi-Medi, which is--encourages Medicare and 1345 Medicaid data sharing and integration specifically for 1346 program integrity purposes, and we have been engaged in that 1347 process for years now. 1348 Mr. {Bucshon.} Can I--is proprietariness amongst 1349 different systems a problem? I mean, what are the barriers 1350 to, you know, it seems like it would be simple, right, but 1351 there are barriers. 1352 Dr. {Agrawal.} There are, and I am not a technologist, 1353 but there are clearly differences between systems, and getting data integration to occur, that is not a trivial task 1354 1355 at all, especially, you know, amongst 50 different states. 1356 So, yeah, there are some real technical barriers to getting 1357 the right data formatted in the right way so that it is readily accessible. 1358

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          Mr. {Bucshon.} But some of it is--it is not just about
     money, right, where the systems don't want to communicate
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     because of proprietary control over data?
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           Dr. {Agrawal.} You know, I am not sure how much
     proprietary issues stand in the way. I think it is more
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      technical implementation. And then, yes, resourcing is
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      important to make sure that we can adequately make this all
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     work together.
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          Mr. {Bucshon.} Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
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          Mr. {Murphy.} Ms. Clarke, you are recognized for 5
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     minutes.
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          Ms. {Clarke.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
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     Ranking Member, thank our witnesses for their testimony here
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      today. I am glad we have had the opportunity today to talk
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     about the Medicaid program, and how many people it helps
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      across the country. As February 2015 -- as of February 2015,
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     over 70 million people were enrolled in Medicaid. The number
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     of enrollees will continue to rise, as 30 states have
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     expanded Medicaid, and even more states are considering doing
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      so. We know that fraud and improper payments have long been
     a reality of the Medicaid system, but with the passage of the
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Affordable Care Act in 2010, we have made significant steps 1380 1381 to strengthen the Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP programs by 1382 reducing waste, fraud, and abuse. 1383 Dr. Agrawal, I would like to ask you about the 1384 Affordable Care Act anti-fraud measures, and how they have 1385 strengthened the Medicaid program. In your testimony you 1386 noted that the Secretary of HHS can temporarily pause 1387 enrollment for new Medicaid providers and suppliers if she 1388 determines certain geographic areas face a high risk of 1389 fraud. Dr. Agrawal, how does the Secretary make that 1390 determination? 1391 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah, thank you. So, you are right, the 1392 moratorium authority is one of many tools granted to CMS for 1393 its program integrity efforts. We have -- we currently have moratorium in place in seven different metropolitan areas in 1394 two main service categories, ambulance services and home 1395 1396 health agencies. And we arrived at those areas, both the 1397 service types and the geographies, by doing data analysis to 1398 look at where there was clear areas of market saturation of 1399 these provider types, and in all of these metropolitan areas 1400 we see somewhere between three to five times higher the

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     number of providers of these categories than, you know,
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     comparative metropolitan areas.
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           We also conferred with our law enforcement colleagues in
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     DOJ and OIG to assess where hot spots really are, and where
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     billing is really concerning for fraud, and it was really a
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     multitude of things that led us ultimately to implement these
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     moratoria.
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           Ms. {Clarke.} And how does the Secretary--excuse me,
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     how have they been effective in preventing and reducing fraud
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      in those affected areas?
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           Dr. {Agrawal.} So what the moratoria really do is,
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      essentially, pause enrollment. It stops new providers from
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      coming into those areas in these specific provider
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     categories. That affords both us and law enforcement the
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     opportunity to step up our activities in those areas and
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      remove bad actors that are already in those areas prior to
      lowering the moratorium, and allowing new providers to enroll
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1418
     again.
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           Ms. {Clarke.} And has that been effective, in your
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     estimation?
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           Dr. {Agrawal.} You know, I think we are still doing
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1422 data analysis to look at how effective the moratorium as a 1423 singular tool is, but what we are finding is that, in those 1424 area, which clearly are hotspot areas anyway, we have been 1425 able to effectuate literally hundreds of revocations of both 1426 home health agencies and ambulance companies. So we continue 1427 to assess the moratorium. We are obviously very concerned 1428 about access to care, want to make sure that the moratoria 1429 don't interfere in access. And so there are a lot of 1430 analytics that go on, as well as collaborating with the 1431 states. 1432 Ms. {Clarke.} And how does the affected states, during the moratorium period, how does CMS work with them? 1433 1434 Dr. {Agrawal.} So we engage--just as we do more 1435 broadly, we engage in data exchanges, we work with them on 1436 collaborative audits and investigations, and then we do those 1437 access to care analyses to make sure that the moratorium is 1438 not having an adverse consequence. 1439 Ms. {Clarke.} Yeah, and on that point, how do you make 1440 sure that Medicaid beneficiaries are continuing to receive 1441 the services they need? 1442 Dr. {Agrawal.} Right, that is of primary importance.

1443 Again, you know, these areas in service categories were 1444 chosen in the first place because of really significant 1445 market saturation, making access not such a huge problem 1446 right at the outset. But as the moratoria have gone on, we 1447 have worked, through our regional offices at CMS, with the 1448 relevant states. We have stayed in contact with them, 1449 exchanged data to make sure that that picture has not 1450 changed, and thus far it hasn't. Access to care continues 1451 not to be a major issue. 1452 Ms. {Clarke.} And then, finally, ACA significantly increased funding to fight Medicare and Medicaid fraud. How 1453 will additional funding help CMS address program integrity 1454 1455 vulnerabilities? 1456 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah. We do appreciate the work of 1457 Congress, and the leadership of this Committee, in providing more resources for us. Those additional resources will allow 1458 1459 us to continue to invest in existing programs, to encourage, 1460 again, more data collaboration with Medicaid agencies, 1461 provide more technical guidance and education. And then, 1462 where necessary, especially to respond to recommendations like this, we will be implementing new initiatives and 1463

1464 programs to continue the Medicaid and Medicare programs. 1465 Ms. {Clarke.} Very well. And just out of curiosity, the implementation of the data hub, have you used that 1466 1467 collaboratively in those high concentrated metropolitan areas as you also employ the moratoria? 1468 1469 Dr. {Agrawal.} Well, the data hub is really more of a 1470 general Federal asset for states to utilize at the time of 1471 beneficiary enrollment and eligibility determinations. It is 1472 not really specifically focused on moratoria area. Rather, 1473 we see it as a tool that should be utilized across the 1474 program, across the Medicaid program, to ensure eligibility 1475 is done correctly the first time. 1476 Ms. {Clarke.} Very well. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. 1477 Chairman. 1478 Mr. {Murphy.} Now recognize Mr. Brooks for 5 minutes. Mrs. {Brooks.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to 1479 our witnesses for being here. I am a former United States 1480 1481 Attorney, and so have worked with Medicaid fraud control 1482 units in--run by our states' Attorney General, and also with 1483 HHS OIG agents, and my question is really to both of you about the staffing, and the number of people that we 1484

1485 dedicate -- so while you are very focused on prevention, I 1486 understand, but deterrence is also a wonderful tool, and I am curious about the effectiveness of our deterrence. Because 1487 1488 if we don't prosecute those, and -- while certainly I know U.S. 1489 Attorneys' offices and Attorney Generals are prosecuting all 1490 across the country, I don't believe they have the resources 1491 that they need. These are very complex investigations. 1492 last thing they want to do is prosecute someone wrongfully, 1493 and these are very complicated cases. 1494 So my question is to both of you about how our--whether it is our health care providers, or the beneficiaries who are 1495 1496 receiving improper payments, what is your thoughts on how we 1497 are doing with respect to prosecutions? 1498 Dr. {Agrawal.} So I appreciate the question. 1499 Prosecution is obviously an important aspect of health care fraud control generally. What we have been doing over the 1500 1501 last 5 years, since the creation of the Center for Program 1502 Integrity, is really investing resources in preventing these issues from arising in the first place. That includes, you 1503 1504 know, payment edits, audits, investigations, and ultimately removing a provider from the program, if necessary, to stop 1505

1506 inappropriate billing. 1507 As part of that work, we are also collaborating closely 1508 with OIG and DOJ, making sure that they have data that is 1509 adequate for their cases, providing them what additional 1510 services or resources they need, even using administrative 1511 authorities that CMS has, as long as, you know, we are 1512 obviously following those authorities and implementing them 1513 in the proper way. So I think it is a balance. I think 1514 deterrence is obviously very important, and, you know, we 1515 continue to collaborate with law enforcement as needed. 1516 Mrs. {Brooks.} Mr. Bagdoyan? 1517 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Yes, thank you, Ms. Brooks. The issue 1518 of prosecution was not within the scope of our audit, 1519 certainly, but I would see it certainly as part of the 1520 toolbox that I alluded to in my opening remarks. So, in its 1521 totality, it would have to have preventative controls, and 1522 the ability to investigate, and, if appropriate, prosecute. 1523 Mrs. {Brooks.} Let me get--dig a bit further on the 1524 investigation, though, because you have to do--and I have 1525 seen the reports done by those units, and the analysis they do, and it is very complex. And I know that in your written 1526

1527 testimony you talked about the medical -- Medicaid Integrity 1528 Institute, Dr. Agrawal. How many employees do you know 1529 across the country deal with Medicaid, state and Federal? 1530 Any idea? Because I saw that -- in the testimony -- or in a 1531 Reuters report that more than 4,200 employees have been 1532 trained, but there are thousands more, I would suspect, but I 1533 have no idea. 1534 Dr. {Agrawal.} Right. So I am not sure exactly what 1535 the total number of Medicaid employees is. I think the 4,200 1536 number, what that really sort of refers to are state employees that we have been able to bring over to the 1537 1538 Medicaid Integrity Institute to engage in an educational 1539 experience on some aspect of program integrity, whether it is 1540 working with law enforcement, or provider enrollment in 1541 screening standards, beneficiary eligibility, whatever the 1542 case may be. 1543 I think there certainly may be--there are definitely 1544 more than 4,200 out there. Right now our only constraint is 1545 the resourcing and the time to get as many employees in as 1546 possible. But the program is a strong one, I think, because it really allows us to spend Federal resources. States have 1547

1548 to pay very little to nothing for an individual employee to 1549 be educated and have access to those courses. 1550 Mrs. {Brooks.} And are all the courses required to be 1551 done in person, or could you move to an online training 1552 program to help states who have, you know, constrained 1553 budgets have more of their Medicaid employees trained? 1554 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah, that is a--1555 Mrs. {Brooks.} I think that is a challenge for a lot of 1556 states. 1557 Dr. {Agrawal.} Agreed, that is a great question. We have, up until now, done the vast majority of these--of this 1558 1559 educational work in person because there is a value to that 1560 in-person education, being able to conduct seminars, real 1561 sort of small group trainings. However, I think your point 1562 is a good one, and we are currently looking at ways of using more virtual training, as well as potentially putting MII on 1563 1564 the road, so that states that can't travel, or, you know, for 1565 their own policies or whatever, still have access to the 1566 education. 1567 Mrs. {Brooks.} Do you have any sense as to the success of this institute? I mean, how many folks have gone back and 1568

1569 have actually prevented fraud? 1570 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah. So measuring the impact of 1571 education, as you are probably aware, is really challenging 1572 to connect it to specific dollars and cents that are saved. 1573 What we find, in certainly post-course assessments, are--is a 1574 very high rating by state officials that indicate that they 1575 really did value the education that was given. We do also 1576 ask them to self-report where they feel the education 1577 contributed to recoveries or savings. We can give that 1578 number to you. But, again, I think, you know, it is hard to 1579 connect education to a specific dollar that is saved. I 1580 think it is often important to do these activities merely 1581 because that greater awareness at the state level is valuable 1582 onto itself. 1583 Mrs. {Brooks.} Thank you. I yield back. Mr. {Murphy.} The gentlelady yields back. Now 1584 1585 recognize Ms. Castor for 5 minutes. 1586 Ms. {Castor.} Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 1587 calling this hearing, and thank you to the witnesses. 1588 you for your attention to program integrity, and rooting out fraud in Medicaid. In Medicaid, every dollar counts, because 1589

1590 these are dollars that go, in large part, to children and 1591 their health care needs, and our older neighbors in nursing 1592 homes, and other hard working Americans. 1593 Now, CMS has issued several new regulations and guidance just in the past month, and I would like to ask you about 1594 1595 them today. Dr. Agrawal, as I understand it, under the 1596 proposed regulation for Medicaid managed care organizations, 1597 managed care providers would be subject to the same screening 1598 requirements as providers for the fee for service program, is 1599 that correct? 1600 Dr. {Agrawal.} That is correct. Ms. {Castor.} And that is especially important because 1601 1602 many states are moving their Medicaid programs to managed 1603 care models, is that right? 1604 Dr. {Agrawal.} That is correct. 1605 Ms. {Castor.} In fact, do you know how many states have 1606 already shifted, and have instituted Medicaid managed care? 1607 Dr. {Agrawal.} I think the majority have. They are at 1608 various levels. States like Arizona, where it is essentially 1609 all managed care at this point, other states that are, you 1610 know, have a hybrid population between fee for service and

1611 managed care. But that kind of enrollment requirement is a 1612 vulnerability or an issue that have been flagged by both OIB 1613 and GAO--1614 Ms. {Castor.} Um-hum. 1615 Dr. {Agrawal.} -- and so we are happy to get into a 1616 proposed rule. 1617 Ms. {Castor.} Okay. Elaborate on that. Why did CMS 1618 make that decision? 1619 Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah. So, as you mentioned, you know, 1620 the rise of managed care is definitely occurring in all 1621 states, with some at various levels of integrating managed 1622 care. Previous OIG and GAO reports have highlighted that as 1623 an issue because, up until now, providers that provide 1624 services in managed care programs, you know, through MCOs, 1625 aren't necessarily known to the states. They don't 1626 necessarily have to go through the same enrollment standards. Some states require that. Others--most don't. 1627 1628 We felt that this was an important vulnerability or an 1629 issue to address. Hence that was a part--sort of one piece 1630 of the program integrity provisions in that MPRM, and we think that requiring the same screening standards will ensure 1631

1632 beneficiary safety, regardless of whether they choose to stay 1633 in fee for service or managed care. 1634 Ms. {Castor.} Good. And, Mr. Bagdoyan, is this a 1635 policy change that the GAO supports? Mr. {Bagdoyan.} I am aware of the rule coming out, but 1636 1637 I am not familiar with its details. I would go back to my 1638 original point that steps like this one would, over time, if 1639 executed and sustained, help narrow that window of 1640 opportunity for fraud and improper payments. So that would 1641 be my assessment at this point. 1642 Ms. {Castor.} Okay. Dr. Agrawal, my understanding is 1643 that the proposed rule also imposes new internal compliance 1644 and program integrity requirements on Medicaid and CHIP 1645 managed care plans. Can you walk us through those 1646 requirements? 1647 Dr. {Agrawal.} Sure. There are other requirements of 1648 managed care plans that include elevating issues, or 1649 informing the state about audit issues, other vulnerabilities 1650 that they have identified. It is making sure that they have 1651 compliance programs in place to ensure the integrity of

payments, program integrity generally. Those are all new

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elements that the majority of states don't have.
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           In addition, there is a data sharing element, which
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      requires language in managed care contracts to ensure states
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     can still get access to managed care data as needed for
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     program integrity and other purposes. So I think that--
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      those, you know, MPRM, obviously we are in sort of the
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      rulemaking process. But, if finalized in its form, would
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     make really important progress in program integrity.
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          Ms. {Castor.} And your goal is to complement what is
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     already in place at some states? Some don't have the--
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      similar safeguards, is that right?
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Correct. You know, you can sort of
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      think of this as trying to build the safeguards in place that
     have been started in fee for service. So the same screening
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     and enrollment standards, the same kind of access to data,
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      and making sure that those go through to managed care plans.
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     So, again, beneficiaries have the choice for, you know, which
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      to engage in in states that have both, or states can make the
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     transition to managed care without necessarily feeling that
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      they have to give up program integrity along the way.
          Ms. {Castor.} Okay. I would also like to ask you about
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the guidance CMS issued earlier this week on criminal 1674 1675 background checks and fingerprinting of certain providers in 1676 the Medicaid program. First of all, who will be subject to 1677 the full background check and fingerprinting requirement, and 1678 how will CMS and state agencies determine if a provider 1679 represents a high risk? 1680 Dr. {Agrawal.} Sure. So you are referring to 1681 fingerprint-based criminal background checks that were one of 1682 the ACA requirements in enrollment and screening for 1683 providers. Generally fingerprint checks are utilized for 1684 provider types that are designated high risk. That would be, for example, a newly enrolling home health agency or DME 1685 1686 company where there has been a history of kind of endemic 1687 fraud issues. If you are newly enrolling in the state in one 1688 of those categories, you would be subject to a fingerprint-1689 based criminal background check. If CMS has already done it, states can utilize our results as their own. 1690 1691 The only other provider types are those that have already designated--been issues of the program, and therefore 1692 1693 are on an individual basis designated high risk if they try 1694 to re-enroll.

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          Ms. {Castor.} Thank you very much.
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          Mr. {Murphy.} Mr. Mullin, you are recognized for 5
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     minutes.
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          Mr. {Mullin.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Doctor, can you
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     walk me through the process of what happens when a state
     medical fraud unit identifies a provider that is committing
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      fraud within the system?
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           Dr. {Agrawal.} Broadly speaking I can. I will sort of
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     tell you the steps that I know, but I will just make the
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     point that MFCUs, or the Medicaid Fraud Control Units,
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     actually respond to the Office of Inspector General, and they
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     work with program integrity units at the state Medicaid
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     agency.
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           But I, you know, surmising that the relationship is
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      really similar to what we have with our Office of Inspector
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     General, we will often initiate investigations based on data
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     assets, beneficiary complaints, a host of other inputs. And
1712
      then, if there is any indication of fraud, or patient safety
1713
      issues, we will send that over to the OIG, and oftentimes
1714
      state Medicaid agencies with similar policies, engaging their
1715
      fraud control unit.
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1716 Mr. {Mullin.} Can the state medical--or Medicaid fraud 1717 units indict providers? 1718 Dr. {Agrawal.} I believe they can, working with, you 1719 know, regional DOJ offices. 1720 Mr. {Mullin.} What--when--with our--communication with our Oklahoma fraud unit for Medicaid, they indicated that 1721 1722 they couldn't. They had to basically turn it over to you 1723 all. 1724 Dr. {Agrawal.} Again, they might be referring to 1725 Federal law enforcement, either, again, OIG or DOJ. You know, as an administrative agency, we don't indict providers. 1726 1727 We have various administrative authorities and actions, but 1728 the most severe is kicking somebody out of the program. 1729 Mr. {Mullin.} So they can go in and be fraudulent, and-1730 -billing Medicaid for millions of dollars, and the worst 1731 thing that happens to them, they get kicked out of the 1732 program? 1733 Dr. {Agrawal.} Well, again, you know, we have the 1734 administrative authorities that we have. We are able to 1735 suspend payments, terminate the enrollment of providers. And then I think, you know, to the point that was made earlier, 1736

1737 we do work with law enforcement to bring other, you know, 1738 more criminal justice activities. 1739 Mr. {Mullin.} But we hear reports over and over again 1740 about providers that were kicked out of the program for having fraudulent claims, and then they turn back around, 1741 1742 change their name, and are back in business the following 1743 week. 1744 Dr. {Agrawal.} So--1745 Mr. {Mullin.} What is the indicator that you 1746 communicate with the Federal prosecutors and say, look, we 1747 want this guy to go to jail--1748 Dr. {Agrawal.} Right. 1749 Mr. {Mullin.} --or do you guys just don't do that? You 1750 say, well, whatever. You guys--I mean, he defrauded the--or 1751 she defrauded the taxpayers millions of dollars, but it is up 1752 to you? Dr. {Agrawal.} Well, specifically with working with law 1753 1754 enforcement, we make referrals -- I think hundreds, if not 1755 thousands of referrals, and we can actually get you some 1756 numbers for the last couple of years to show you how many, to 1757 law enforcement for those cases that are most concerning for

- 1758 fraud, and where we believe a law enforcement action would be
- 1759 appropriate, at least from our determination.
- But I think, to your larger question about providers
- 1761 kind of reinventing themselves, we too have noted that as a
- 1762 vulnerability, and, in fact, have promulgated rules that have
- 1763 allowed us to close it by, for example, tracking
- 1764 administrative actions, and actually applying them to owners
- 1765 who would try to reinvent companies.
- 1766 Mr. {Mullin.} Well, it seems like, to me, if more of
- 1767 them went to jail, that might prohibit them from going
- 1768 through. So we--do we know how many actually end up in--
- 1769 doing jail time?
- 1770 Dr. {Agrawal.} I think that is a question for at least
- 1771 the OIG, or the state law enforcement officials.
- Mr. {Mullin.} Could--is that a number that you guys can
- 1773 provide?
- 1774 Dr. {Agrawal.} We don't track--remember, our
- 1775 authorities don't involve--
- 1776 Mr. {Mullin.} So there is a breakdown in communication
- 1777 is what I am saying.
- 1778 Dr. {Agrawal.} No, I wouldn't say that--

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1779
          Mr. {Mullin.} I am asking you, because you kick them
1780
     out of the program, then turn it over, then no one pays
1781
     attention to them anymore. And if the Federal prosecutors
1782
     aren't willing to prosecute, then they come right back into
1783
     your system, no one is paying attention to them, and they end
1784
     up doing the same thing over again. Because if the worst
1785
      thing that happens to them is they get kicked out, then it is
1786
     not there.
1787
          Maybe it might be something that we might want to look
1788
     at. Maybe we ought to let the states do this. If they have
1789
     a unit that specifically identifies claims to Medicaid that
1790
      the state is issuing, and they see fraudulent activities, and
1791
      they turn it over to you, you all kick them out, they turn it
1792
     over--you all turn it to the Federal prosecutors, if they end
1793
     up getting lost in the chain, why don't we simplify the
     process and just let the state prosecute them?
1794
1795
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Just to be clear, states don't have to
1796
      go through CMS in order to get to prosecutors or law
1797
     enforcement. They do have Medicaid fraud control units that
1798
      they can go to directly.
1799
          Mr. {Mullin.} But they--
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1800
           Dr. {Agrawal.} They have other--
1801
          Mr. {Mullin.} --can't prosecute them, though.
1802
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Right. As administrative agencies, the
1803
      state Medicaid agency, CMS, we don't prosecute directly, but
1804
     we don't work with law enforcement to do that. I wouldn't
1805
     characterize it as a communication breakdown. I would
1806
     characterize it as different lines of authority. We are
1807
     happy to work with law enforcement. We provide law
1808
      enforcement with data on a routine basis, work with them
1809
      sometimes for years as they develop, investigate, and take
1810
     action on cases.
          Mr. {Mullin.} So do you think there is a better way--
1811
1812
     quickly, because I am running out of time, is there a better
1813
     way to handle this, then?
1814
           Dr. {Agrawal.} I think it depends on what the this is
1815
      that you are trying to improve.
           Mr. {Mullin.} Well, to prosecute the individuals,
1816
      rather than just kicking them out of the program, and not
1817
1818
     actually sending them to prison.
1819
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah. I--as a balance. So it is really
      important, I think, to engage in prevention, because
1820
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1821 prosecution takes, understandably, time, and what we don't 1822 want is folks billing programs that shouldn't be billing 1823 programs. And so it is useful to actually kick them out of 1824 the program and stop dollars from going out the door. At the 1825 same time, if we can work with our law enforcement colleagues 1826 to get the prosecution, we can have the deterrence effect, 1827 and other impact that we want. 1828 Mr. {Mullin.} Appreciate it. Thank you. 1829 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. Mr. Green, you are recognized 1830 for 5 minutes. 1831 Mr. {Green.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bagdoyan, 1832 the--Medicaid is a large program, as is Medicare, and would 1833 it be fair to say that as long as these programs existed, 1834 there have always been at least some improper payments, some 1835 people gaming the system? 1836 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} That seems to be the historical record, 1837 sir, yes. 1838 Mr. {Green.} I know it wasn't part of your audit 1839 specifically, but improper payments were not only associated 1840 with Medicare and Medicaid, but it is a challenge to our--

government-wide, I assume.

1841

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1842
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} That is correct. OMB measures that. I
1843
      think maybe the Chairman or the Ranking Member earlier
1844
      referred to the higher error programs that OMB tracks, so
1845
     yes.
1846
          Mr. {Green.} Okay. Clearly we want to lower the rate
1847
      of improper payments in the programs such as Medicare and
1848
     Medicaid, but it is important to put it in context. This
1849
     Committee examined this issue more than a decade ago. Then,
1850
     like what we are discussing today, there were improper
1851
     payments associated with Medicaid and Medicare. But do we
     want to constantly try to eliminate improper payments -- and we
1852
1853
     do want to try and eliminate improper payments and better
1854
     controls.
1855
           On page 14 of your report, your audit mentions that CMS
1856
      is--as part of the passage of the Affordable Care Act has put
1857
      in place some new tools that may help bring down improper
1858
     payments. And I realize that gaps remain, but do you see
1859
      this as an important step in the right direction?
1860
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} I would say they are, and they add to
1861
      their toolbox that I referred to in my opening statement.
1862
          Mr. {Green.} Okay. Do you see any new tools as a step-
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1863
      -the new tools a step in the right direction? If so, can you
1864
      explain how you think they will help us reduce the improper
1865
     payments moving forward?
1866
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Well, the two recommendations we make
     available to states, where the action happens, so to speak,
1867
1868
     with the data they need to better screen both beneficiaries
1869
     and providers.
1870
          Mr. {Green.} Okay. I understand more specifically that
1871
     CMS regulations established a more rigorous approach to
1872
     verifying financial and non-financial information that could
     help determine Medicaid beneficiary eligibility. It has
1873
1874
     created a tool called the data services hub. I know that
1875
     gaps will remain, and bad actors constantly try to find ways
1876
      to game the system, however, does the implementation of this
1877
     new tool, the data service hub, give you some encouragement
1878
      that we can reduce the rate of improper payments?
1879
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Again, by all means it is a step in the
      right direction. Getting the data right and reliable is a
1880
      key step there, as well as having states regular and
1881
1882
      electronic access would be also useful.
1883
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Mr. {Green.} I am guessing some of these new tools are

1884 already having some positive effect. I understand the DO--1885 GAO's audit has some limitation--mainly due to using data 1886 that is now almost 5 years old. While I applaud GAO's 1887 efforts to help strengthen Medicaid through its work, it is unfortunate we are not seeing how these new and encouraging 1888 tools are working until we can examine more recent billing 1889 1890 data. 1891 Mr. Chairman, I hope that we continue to work with GAO 1892 and CMS and see how these new tools CMS is working on, that 1893 can help us in taking out the fraud and abuse. And, again, I 1894 want to thank GAO for the excellent work you are doing, and 1895 also CMS for responding to what we did in the Affordable Care Act to give you those tools. And I yield back my time. 1896 1897 Mr. {Murphy.} Gentleman yields back. Now recognize Mr. 1898 Collins for 5 minutes. 1899 Mr. {Collins.} I come from the private sector. I am a 1900 Lean Six Sigma guy. I have brought Lean Six Sigma into a 1901 large municipal government. I think you all--both know where 1902 I am going. It is not a good place. This is the most 1903 disturbing hearing I have attended in 2-1/2 years. I hear 1904 you saying that making 67,000 errors per million

1905 opportunities is worth a gold star. Six Sigma says you make 1906 3.4 errors per million. 3.4, not 67,000. 1907 I will be using today's hearing in my stump speeches, in 1908 my town halls for a very long time. It is everything wrong 1909 with government. That you are setting a standard of making 1910 67,000 mistakes for every million times you try to do 1911 something, and you are going to reward and congratulate 1912 yourselves, this is disbelief, absolute, utter disbelief of 1913 what is wrong with government, to have you two individuals, 1914 with smiles on your face, and congratulating each other over 1915 trying to achieve 67,000 errors per million opportunities. I am just--my mind is blown. You know, I know if 1,000 1916 airplanes take off, and 67 of them crash, that is a 6.7 1917 1918 percent error rate. I don't think we are going to be flying 1919 on our airplanes it is -- if 67 airplanes crash for every 1920 thousand that take off. 1921 In the manufacturing world today, whether it was Toyota 1922 many years ago, whether it was General Electric, or what it 1923 is--some things I have done, we set a goal of Six Sigma, 3.4 1924 errors per million. It is achieved every single day in the private sector. And here we are in government, talking about 1925

1926 67,000 errors per million opportunities, and how this is 1927 progress? This is disgusting. It is a waste of taxpayer 1928 dollars. It is setting the bar so low that, yeah, I guess, 1929 you know, let us--we had a goal of 5.6, we hit 6.7, so next 1930 year let us make it 6.7. Well, if it is 7.2, then the next 1931 year it is going to be 7.2, and we are going to have a 1932 hearing, and you guys are going to self-congratulate each 1933 other on achieving something like that? I don't even know 1934 that you can--you can't defend the indefensible. 1935 So, while I am carrying on here a little bit, I know you can't defend the indefensible, but maybe I will let you try. 1936 1937 And I will also say there is a sign in my office, in God we trust, all others bring data. I am a data guy, if you can't 1938 1939 already tell. That means you need good data. And now I am 1940 reading that the PERM program, the Payment Error Rate Measurement Program, at best, it is using a rolling sampling 1941 of 17 states, the data is not consistent, it is not gathered 1942 1943 in a consistent way. I have one word for that data, and that 1944 is garbage. Garbage, complete garbage. 1945 So, I don't know, Mr. Bagdoyan, do you have anything to 1946 say?

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1947
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Well, Mr. Collins, I thank you for your
1948
      comments. I think our audit was thorough, by our audit
1949
      standards, and our findings speak for themselves.
1950
          Mr. {Collins.} You are familiar with Six Sigma, right?
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} I am indeed, yeah.
1951
1952
          Mr. {Collins.} All right. So, in my world--what would
1953
     you think if you are in my world, and I am used to 3.4 errors
1954
     per million, and you are at 67,000? How long do you think
1955
     you would work for me?
1956
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} I take your point.
          Mr. {Collins.} Yeah, not very long. And, Dr. Agrawal,
1957
1958
     again, you are--you seem okay with taking the 5.6 to 6.7.
1959
      Can you defend that? I am going to stand up in front of my
1960
      residents, and I am going to talk about this hearing, and
     they are going to be shaking their heads in total disbelief.
1961
1962
      You are going to be an example of everything wrong with
1963
      government from this day forward in western New York when I
1964
      tell them at 5.6 percent--you hit 6.7, so the next year you
      just changed it to 6.7. If that is not oh, my God, I am
1965
1966
      just--again, this is the most disturbing hearing I have ever
      taken place in. So what do you say to the third graders when
1967
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1968
      I tell them that?
1969
          Dr. {Agrawal.} I think I have made it pretty clear from
1970
     my opening remarks, Congressman, that we do view these
1971
      findings as important, and, while we have made progress,
1972
      there is more progress to be made. I don't view it as any
1973
      other way. I don't view it as just sort of being happy with
1974
     the results and where we are.
1975
          Mr. {Collins.} Well, my time has expired, but I would
1976
      suggest you set different standards for yourselves, ones that
1977
      respect the B in billions. We talk in government about
1978
     dollars like billions don't even matter anymore because we
1979
     are trillions in debt, and I would suggest that, as somebody
1980
     who has got something to do with this, next year, when they
1981
      try to raise the error rate to 7.2 percent, you actually
1982
      stand up and make a name for yourself and say, I am not going
1983
      to stand by and let that happen. With that, I yield back.
          Mr. {Murphy.} Gentleman yields back. Just to clarify,
1984
1985
     Dr. Agrawal, did you set the standard at 6.7 percent?
1986
           Dr. {Agrawal.} No. That is a process that involves a
1987
     different part of the, you know, it is obviously kept
      separate from folks that are trying to make the
1988
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1989
      interventions, right, so that there is some objectivity to
1990
     it.
1991
          Mr. {Murphy.} And, Mr. Bagdoyan, you more or less
      audited this information and provided it for us, correct?
1992
           Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Yeah. We use it as a point of
1993
1994
      reference, sir. We don't set the number.
1995
          Mr. {Murphy.} So the follow up to Mr. Collins's
1996
      question that is important for us to know, the process of how
1997
     that is done? Because I think you heard unanimity of
1998
      opinion, none of us want to tolerate that, but we need to
1999
     know how that is happening so we can make changes on this
2000
     very thing. But I thank you. I now recognize Mr. Yarmuth
2001
      for 5 minutes.
2002
          Mr. {Yarmuth.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank--
2003
      thanks to the witnesses. I want to get some clarification on
2004
      this PERM rate, because I am not sure I understand it. If
2005
     you characterize these as errors, are these errors that CMS
2006
     made, or are they errors that -- which -- just some kind of
2007
      incorrect payment was made? So you would have had, for
2008
      instance, a bill come in that was coded incorrectly, wrong
2009
     procedure, whatever it is, and--would that have been counted
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2010
     as an error?
2011
          Dr. {Agrawal.} Yeah, it would be.
2012
          Mr. {Yarmuth.} So you--it wasn't a mistake that you
2013
     made, it was a mistake that somebody who was sending the bill
2014
      in made, is that correct?
2015
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Yes. I mean, I think it could be
2016
     argued, and in fairness, that, you know, we need to have
2017
     preventative programs in place to catch that.
2018
          Mr. {Yarmuth.} I understand, but this is not
2019
     necessarily an--
2020
          Dr. {Agrawal.} Correct.
          Mr. {Yarmuth.} --indication of negligence on the part
2021
2022
     of CMS.
2023
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Correct.
2024
          Mr. {Yarmuth.} And, you know, I have got my problems,
      as everybody does, with CMS, but--so if somebody sent in a
2025
     bill for--on a fee for service basis that--for $100, and they
2026
2027
     were actually only entitled to $90, that would be an error
2028
     under this--
2029
           Dr. {Agrawal.} That would be--
          Mr. {Yarmuth.} --report? Now, would that total $100 be
2030
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2031
     counted in the 14 billion? My point being that--
2032
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Um-hum.
2033
           Mr. {Yarmuth.} --I think there is the danger here--and
2034
      I am a former generalist. There is a danger here that
2035
      somebody would look at this report and say four--the mistakes
2036
     cost taxpayers $14 billion in 2013, when, in fact, they
2037
     didn't cost taxpayers $14 billion, they cost them some--could
2038
     be a very small fraction of 14 billion. Am I analyzing that
2039
     correctly?
2040
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Right. I think what is really important
2041
      is the measured tone that GAO and Mr. Bagdoyan have taken
2042
      today, that these are all potentially improper payments, and
2043
     not, you know, the data inconsistency alone doesn't
2044
      absolutely establish that. It -- in many of the specific
2045
     claims where these improper payments have been noted, states
2046
     or CMS are able to actually recover those dollars, or Federal
     portions are withheld. So, yeah, there is obviously
2047
2048
      complexity underlying this that you are correct to point out.
2049
          Mr. {Yarmuth.} Right. I just want to make that clear,
2050
     because, again, I think there is a danger in taking these
     numbers and blowing them out, at least with a--not a full
2051
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2052
     understanding of what they represent.
2053
           And, Mr. Bagdoyan, looking at the numbers there, I did
2054
      the same calculations that Mr. Kennedy did, and on the
2055
      deceased question, looking at it another way, it was one out
      of every 46,000 beneficiaries. Just on the total beneficiary
2056
2057
     problems, it was one out of every 742, and on the provider
2058
     problems it was one out of every 2,753. Now, I think, again,
2059
      there is a danger in looking at it and saying, 8,600
2060
     beneficiaries got benefits in two states, but--
2061
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Um-hum.
2062
          Mr. {Yarmuth.} --it is a relatively small number. I
2063
     would be negligent if I didn't spend time talking about the
2064
     Kentucky experience, because I know my colleague from Indiana
2065
      talked about how states are worried about paying for the
2066
     Medicaid expansion. I think everybody has some concern over
2067
     what the impact will be, but--in Kentucky--and, you know, I
2068
     need to congratulate Governor Beshear and his team. Under
2069
      the expansion of Medicaid, more than 520,000 Kentuckians now
2070
     have insurance who didn't have it before. The ACA, in my--
2071
      the uninsured rate across the state has been reduced by
      almost half. In my district alone, the uninsured rate has
2072
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2073 been reduced by 81 percent, which is a phenomenal occurrence, 2074 another--I think a very humane one. 2075 But more importantly, the governor just had the Deloitte 2076 Firm, highly respected accounting and business consulting 2077 firm, do an analysis and a project as to what the ACA would 2078 mean to Kentucky over the next 6 years. And, again, most of 2079 this is because of Medicaid expansion, but the vast majority 2080 of the newly insured are part of the Medicaid expansion. The 2081 Deloitte Firm concluded that over the next 6 years the ACA, 2082 in Kentucky, would create 40,000 new jobs, it would have a positive impact on the economy--additional impact on the 2083 2084 economy positive of \$30 billion, and would have a positive 2085 impact on Kentucky's budget over the next 6 years of \$819 2086 million. 2087 So, you know, I think that it is easy to sit here and 2088 say, gosh, what are states going to do when they have to pay 90 percent in 2021, or 95 percent in 2017 or '18? But, in 2089 2090 fact, an analysis of our situation shows that it is going to 2091 have a positive impact well into the 2020s. So I wanted to 2092 get that on the record as part of this discussion, so--and with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 2093

2094 Mr. {Murphy.} Gentleman yields back, and I will 2095 recognize Ms. Blackburn for 5 minutes. 2096 Ms. {Blackburn.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank 2097 you all for being here. And, as Mr. Collins just said, this 2098 is really a frustrating hearing in so many ways for us. 2003, shortly after, I came here--we did a field hearing in 2099 2100 Tennessee, looking at the TennCare program, which was the 2101 test case for Hillary Clinton's health care, and implemented 2102 in Tennessee, and a lot of Obamacare has been built on it. 2103 And there--one of the focuses of that hearing was the waste, 2104 fraud, and abuse, and the fact that CMS just couldn't seem to 2105 get its act together when it came to dealing with waste, 2106 fraud, and abuse. 2107 And when you isolated our state and looked at it, the 2108 payment error rate, and the eligibility issues with 2109 verification of who was and was not eligible, and then the 2110 providers, and -- so to see this continue on, and your 2111 willingness to accept a failing grade in addressing this is 2112 just beyond us. Because you are not getting better, you are 2113 getting worse, and then you change the grading system to accommodate that you are not improving. 2114

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2115
           And, Dr. Agrawal, if I am understanding this right, you
2116
     moved from 5.6 to 6.7 in that rate, and it--you--this was
2117
     done by committee, so there is no one person in charge of
2118
      this debacle, is that correct?
2119
           Dr. {Agrawal.} I am sorry, ma'am, I don't understand
2120
     what you are asking about.
2121
          Ms. {Blackburn.} You changed your grading rate. You
2122
     went from a target for--5.6, a target rate, to 6.7 in your
2123
      improper payment rate. And, if I am understanding your
2124
     answer to Mr. Collins, there is no one person that decided
2125
     that, it was a committee, or a group, that decided that. Is
2126
      that correct? Who do we hold responsible for accepting a
2127
      failing grade?
2128
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Well, Congresswoman, you know, clearly
2129
      the target is set, but I think what is important is we
2130
      actually measure our--
2131
           Ms. {Blackburn.} Who sets the target? Who set it?
2132
           Dr. {Agrawal.} I don't know. We would have to--
2133
          Ms. {Blackburn.} Who accepts this?
2134
           Dr. {Agrawal.} --go back and identify that person.
          Ms. {Blackburn.} Who accepts the wasting of taxpayer
2135
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2136 money? You have got an issue that gets worse every year. 2137 Let me ask you this, we are going to get in behind this. You 2138 have got--was it 90 providers in one state that were found to 2139 be receiving erroneous payments? Did I understand that 2140 right, sir? 2141 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} It was--sorry, it was 90 in the four 2142 states we looked at. 2143 Ms. {Blackburn.} 90 in four states? 2144 Mr. {Bagdoyan.} That is correct. 2145 Ms. {Blackburn.} Okay. What would happen if we were to 2146 say there were a zero tolerance policy for improper payments, 2147 and for waste, fraud, and abuse that is taking place in CMS? 2148 What would happen? How would you all react? Because Federal 2149 agencies that deal with taxpayers, they pretty much have a 2150 zero tolerance policy. Or what if we did this, what if we were to look at these 2151 numbers--according to CMS, improper payments in the Medicaid 2152 2153 program rose from 14.4 billion in 2013 to 17.5 in 2014. What 2154 if we were to say, CMS, we are going to charge you back with 2155 this \$17.5 billion until you can get your act together? And you have got to take that out of your budget, and you have 2156

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2157
     got to find a way to deliver the services and avail
2158
     yourselves of technology.
2159
           Let me ask you a question too. When it comes to the
2160
      data, and transferring that into information that can be
2161
     used, have you looked? You say you offer guidance and
2162
      support to the states. Have you told the states, we are
2163
      going to hold you accountable for giving us data that can be
2164
      turned into information, and we are going to cut your
2165
     payments if you don't give us the data that can be used?
2166
     Garbage in, garbage out. It is not going to change.
2167
          And the fact that you have a secure job, and a paycheck,
2168
     and think you can't be fired, and then you come in here, and
2169
     what we hear is, going back to my first hearing on this in
2170
      2003, the problem gets worse, the problem doesn't get better,
      and when it does get worse, you just change the metrics and
2171
2172
      say, well, that is okay, we are going to do better next year.
2173
     No, it is not okay. The error rate is not okay. And it is
2174
      something we are going to push forward, and holding you all
2175
     accountable, and look for new ways of doing that. And I
2176
     yield back my time.
2177
          Mr. {Murphy.} Gentlelady yields back. I am going to
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2178
     let Ms. DeGette take a few--2 minutes, and Mr.--
2179
          Ms. {DeGette.} Yeah.
2180
          Mr. {Murphy.} --Dr. Burgess, and we will proceed from
2181
     there. Thank you.
2182
          Ms. {DeGette.} Now, in fairness, Dr. Agrawal, were you
      in your job in 2003, in this job?
2183
2184
          Dr. {Agrawal.} No.
          Ms. {DeGette.} Mr. Bagdoyan, were you in this job in
2185
2186
     2003?
2187
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} I was not, ma'am.
2188
          Ms. {DeGette.} I am going to ask you, because you are
2189
     with the GAO, have they--has the agency tried to institute
2190
     new metrics to try to prevent fraud since 2003?
2191
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} I think, as we reflect in our report,
2192
     and in my statement, they have. Those will have to play out
2193
     over the long term--
2194
          Ms. {DeGette.} Right, and as--
2195
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} --at all.
2196
          Ms. {DeGette.} And as we discussed when I was asking
2197
     questions, unfortunately, the data that you had for those
      four states was from 2011, so it didn't reflect some of the
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2199
     preventative efforts that have happened since--
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           Mr. {Bagdoyan.} That is correct. That was part of the
2201
     necessity of our methodology.
2202
           Ms. {DeGette.} Right, exactly, because you just didn't
2203
     have the data, right?
2204
           Mr. {Bagdoyan.} That is correct.
2205
           Ms. {DeGette.} And, Dr. Agrawal, do you think that it
2206
      is a good idea to have fraud? Do you support that? Because
2207
      I have been listening to these other questioners, they seem
2208
     to somehow imply that either you personally, or the agency,
      think that it is acceptable to have fraud.
2209
2210
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Obviously I do not.
2211
          Ms. {DeGette.} Why?
2212
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Well, I come at it from the perspective
2213
      of an ER physician. I have taken care of Medicaid and
2214
     Medicare beneficiaries, and other beneficiaries, the
2215
     uninsured. I do this work so that we can preserve resources
2216
      for the folks who need it.
2217
           Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you. I yield back.
2218
           Mr. {Murphy.} Dr. Burgess?
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          Mr. {Burgess.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do thank our
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     panel for being here, and I know it has been a long morning.
2221
     Let me just ask a question, because I am trying to get a
2222
     better understanding of the -- of what is referred to as the
2223
     PERM program. That is a 3 year rolling average of 17 states
      examined on a yearly basis, is that correct?
2224
2225
           Dr. {Agrawal.} That is correct.
2226
          Mr. {Burgess.} And, now, what kind of statistical
2227
     modeling was involved in coming up with that formula?
2228
           Dr. {Agrawal.} So there is a statistical sample done in
2229
      each of these states along the three major categories of the
2230
     PERM program. And, again, we conduct the cycle so that every
2231
      state is measured at least once in--or once at--in the 3 year
2232
     period. And there is statistical analysis behind it to make
2233
      sure that the results are generalizable, and can actually
2234
     arrive at a national rate.
2235
           Mr. {Burgess.} How do you select the 17 states to be in
2236
     the particular cohort?
2237
          Dr. {Agrawal.} They are--
2238
          Mr. {Burgess.} --alphabetical, and then you cut it off
2239
     at 17, and--
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Dr. {Agrawal.} That is a good question. Actually, you

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2241
      know, I am not sure. I don't think it is alphabetical, but
2242
      there are 17 in every cohort, and, you know, we make sure
2243
      that every state is represented once in a 3 year period.
2244
          Mr. {Burgess.} So the four states that Mr.--
2245
          Mr. {Bagdoyan.} Bagdoyan.
2246
          Mr. {Burgess.} --Bagdoyan was concerned about, are
2247
      those four states all in one cohort, or are they evenly
2248
     distributed between the three rolling averages?
2249
           Dr. {Agrawal.} They are distributed between them.
2250
          Mr. {Burgess.} Well, I guess, you know, it seems like
2251
      it is -- that is a difficult one. I don't understand why that
2252
     model was selected. Is it just simply too difficult to
2253
     assess every state on a yearly basis?
2254
           Dr. {Agrawal.} I think it would be a real resource
2255
      constraint to try to assess every single state every single
2256
      year, and it does also pose burden issues for the states.
2257
           Mr. {Burgess.} Everybody knows HHS has the best
2258
      computers in the world, right? So why can't you?
           Dr. {Agrawal.} You know, I can take that back as a
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2260
      specific question if we are going to alter the methodology,
     but I think the methodology itself has been--it is not the--
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2262
     sort of under--
2263
          Mr. {Burgess.} Yeah.
2264
           Dr. {Agrawal.} --your question here. It--
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          Mr. {Burgess.} It just struck me as unusual to do it in
      this fashion. So, again, that is why I was wondering, is
2266
2267
      there a particular statistical methodology that has been
2268
      followed, as far as the sampling, on a rotating basis, 17,
2269
      17, 17 year in and year out, and how long have you been doing
2270
     it this way?
2271
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Since the PERM program started.
2272
          Mr. {Burgess.} Which was?
           Dr. {Agrawal.} I believe we had the first rates in '07,
2273
2274
     but I would have to get back to you about that.
2275
          Mr. {Burgess.} And do you see consistency in those
2276
     numbers over those years that you go back and look at this?
2277
           Dr. {Agrawal.} What we do is we report a national
2278
     average rate, you know, every single year so you can actually
2279
      follow the rates, as people have done in this hearing, sort
2280
     of talk about the rates over time. What we don't report are
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      rates by state, because it is very difficult to compare two
     different Medicaid programs that might have two very
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2283
      different approaches to eligibility and other things.
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           Mr. {Burgess.} All right, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I
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      am going to submit a question in writing about the Dallas
     Morning News article that I referenced earlier in the
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2287
     hearing, and I would appreciate a response on that.
2288
           Dr. {Agrawal.} Sure. Thank you.
2289
           Mr. {Burgess.} Thank you.
2290
           Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. Let me just say this, I mean,
2291
      you heard a number of--first of all, we are grateful you came
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      to us in a candid way. But I think you hear among us, we
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     want to facilitate this. None of us are going to tolerate
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      any kind of acceptance of this. And there was a concern
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      about whoever made the decision to just raise the level, it
      is not really acceptable. What we want to know is the
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2297
     methodology, and work with you, and see what next steps we
2298
      need to take to deal with fraud and abuse.
2299
           Granted, this data is from 2011. Some changes, as Ms.
2300
      DeGette pointed out, may have already been put in place, to
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     whatever extent you can tell us about that. We want to move
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      a trajectory towards this, because, goodness knows, Federal
      dollars are limited, and anybody who is out there being a
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2304
     crook needs to be handled appropriately so the money can go
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     to those who need it. That is where our compassion should
     be. It is sort of in the category of those who can, those
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2307
     who can't, and those who won't. And those who won't play by
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      the rules, they need to face the consequences.
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           So we will be passing on other questions to you, and, to
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      that extent, I want to thank the members for participating,
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      and when the questions are submitted for the record, we would
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      appreciate it if you could get back to us with prompt
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      responses. So, to that extent, I now adjourn this hearing.
2314
     Thank you.
           [Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the Subcommittee was
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      adjourned.1
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