- 1 {York Stenographic Services, Inc.}
- 2 RPTS BURDETTE
- 3 HIF212.020
- 4 PPACA IMPLEMENTATION: UPDATES FROM CMS AND GAO
- 5 THURSDAY, JULY 31, 2014
- 6 House of Representatives,
- 7 Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
- 8 Committee on Energy and Commerce
- 9 Washington, D.C.

10 The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:17 a.m., in
11 Room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tim
12 Murphy [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
13 Members present: Representatives Murphy, Burgess,
14 Blackburn, Gingrey, Harper, Gardner, Griffith, Johnson,
15 Ellmers, DeGette, Braley, Schakowsky, Castor, Tonko, Yarmuth,
16 Green and Waxman (ex officio).

17 Staff present: Mike Bloomquist, General Counsel; Sean Bonyun, Communications Director; Matt Bravo, Professional 18 19 Staff Member; Leighton Brown, Press Assistant; Karen 20 Christian, Chief Counsel, Oversight; Noelle Clemente, Press Secretary; Brad Grantz, Policy Coordinator, Oversight and 21 22 Investigations; Brittany Havens, Legislative Clerk; Sean 23 Hayes, Deputy Chief Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; 24 Emily Newman, Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Jean 25 Woodrow, Director, Information Technology; Phil Barnett, 26 Democratic Staff Director; Peter Bodner, Democratic Counsel; 27 Brian Cohen, Democratic Staff Director, Oversight & 28 Investigations, and Senior Policy Advisor; Lisa Goldman, 29 Democratic Counsel; Elizabeth Letter, Democratic Press 30 Secretary; Karen Lightfoot, Democratic Communications 31 Director and Senior Policy Advisor; and Matt Siegler, 32 Democratic Counsel.

33 Mr. {Murphy.} Good morning. I convene this hearing of 34 the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations to review 35 the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable 36 Care Act. Our first witness this morning, Mr. Andy Slavitt, 37 the Principle Deputy Administrator at the Centers for 38 Medicare and Medicaid Services. This is Mr. Slavitt's first 39 testimony as a CMS employee, but not his first appearance 40 before this Subcommittee. Some of you may recall that Mr. 41 Slavitt appeared before us last October to testify on behalf 42 of one of the contractors who built the Healthcare.gov site. 43 So welcome back.

44 Our ongoing concern about Healthcare.gov is one of the 45 reasons that we are holding this hearing today. Exactly one 46 year ago this week, members of this Committee will remember 47 that we heard from CMS Administrator Tavenner who told us 48 that Healthcare.gov would be ready on October 1. We were 49 told that it would work, everything we be fine. And later, 50 we found out that that wasn't quite the same thing. In fact, 51 the contractors told us the same thing that it would not be--52 that it would be working.

53 Our reviews of the website were brushed aside. But we 54 know how our fears of a massive flop were well-founded. The rollout of the Affordable Care Act was an unmitigated 55 56 disaster. I think everybody agrees with that. 57 So, Mr. Slavitt, we are hoping to hear from you today 58 candidly and honestly about how things are progressing. And, 59 frankly, we hope we hear with the same candor from you as an 60 administration official that we heard last fall when you 61 testified on behalf of QSSI, the company that built the hub

62 for Healthcare.gov.

63 Mr. Slavitt's new role also comes at an opportune time 64 for the Administration to address the systemic problems that led to the Healthcare.gov disaster. After Mr. Slavitt's 65 66 testimony, we will hear from William Woods with the Government Accountability Office. Today, the GAO has 67 68 released a review of the failed October 1 launch of 69 Healthcare.gov, confirming what this Committee learned during 70 its own review of the website, the Administration didn't have 71 the expertise, couldn't meet deadlines and didn't have the 72 leadership or organizational skills to manage this massive 73 undertaking. And GAO also has given us a price tag for this

boondoggle, a broken website that the President promised would be as easy to use any an ecommerce site, cost the taxpayers nearly one billion dollars. That took a lot of taxpayers money from--and their hard earned paychecks to come up with that one billion, and many taxpayers aren't happy about that.

80 We will also hear from the GAO that these costs are 81 still going up. Some of my colleagues may whine and complain 82 that we are spending too much time examining the failed 83 website launch. I am not surprised. They don't want to talk 84 about it. But the reality is these problems are still 85 playing out, and may impact this fall's open enrollment 86 period.

87 We still do not know if the Administration has a system 88 in place capable of handling inconsistencies, inaccurate 89 subsidies, web security, or whether CMS will ever put in 90 place a functioning payment system.

91 We will ask today about the Healthcare.gov contracts and 92 the GAO report. But as we head into open enrollment this 93 fall, patients and families need to know how this law will 94 affect them because, each day, the AC is making our

95 healthcare system more expensive, fragmented and restrictive. 96 Early this summer, insurers were required to notify the 97 Administration plans for premium rates in 2015. We hope that 98 witnesses today will provide information on the rates that have been submitted, when the public will know them with 99 100 enough time to plan for their purchase, and whether the 101 public will ever see \$2,500 in savings that the President 102 promised.

103 Speaking of promises, we also want to know if Americans 104 will be able to keep their doctor and if they were able to keep their plan if they liked it. Earlier this year, this 105 106 Committee heard testimony from representatives of the 107 insurance industry who noted that the requirements in the 108 healthcare law required the cancellation of millions of 109 policies. We hope to hear whether the Administration 110 predicts widespread cancellations and uncertainty again this 111 fall.

And it is not only individual plans that we are concerned about. Last week, the IRS finally released--it was--began releasing information related to the enforcement of the employer mandate. This may be surprising to many.

116	The Administration has after all delayed this several times.
117	But it certainly raises questions about what will happen when
118	one of the law's most controversial pieces finally goes into
119	effect.
120	Finally, I remain concerned about the overall impact of
121	this law. Millions of Americans had their health insurance
122	cancelled because of the law only to find that the plans they
123	are now forced to buy are much more expensive in premiums,
124	copays, deductibles or all the above. Some people may
125	qualify for subsidies and others do not. At the same time,
126	the law's massive cost and destructive impact on the economy
127	will continue to be felt for years.
128	I again thank both the witnesses for testifying.
129	[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]

131 Mr. {Murphy.} And now recognize the Ranking Member for132 5 minutes.

133 Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Well, I have got to say, I don't really think we could go on August 134 135 recess without having another hearing on the Affordable Care 136 Act, because this is now the twelfth one we have had in the 137 last 10 years. As I have been saying the last couple years, 138 the ACA Oversight is a really important topic, but I would 139 feel a whole lot better if we were actually doing oversight on what is happening now with the ACA instead of just 140 141 rehashing old issues over and over again.

142 You are right. We will stipulate the rollout of the ACA was an unmitigated disaster. But I guess I would like to 143 144 know how long we are going to keep beating this drum? 145 Because when you look at what has happened since the 146 unmitigated disaster of the rollout, things are actually 147 improving. And just about every prediction that was made 148 about the law has turned out to be wrong once we got going. 149 So I think we should spend our time trying to figure out how to make the law work even better for the millions of 150

151 Americans who are now enrolling and getting health insurance. 152 So in the last year, we had hearings where the majority 153 insisted that Americans would be hit by insurance rate shock. 154 Instead, the majority of new enrollees in ACA coverage are paying less than \$100 a month. The majority insisted that 155 156 the broken Healthcare gov --. gov website would never be fixed, 157 but thank goodness it was. And millions of Americans used it 158 to sign up for coverage. They insisted that many Americans 159 would not pay for coverage once they signed up. But the 160 insurers all came in here and told us that was not correct that people in fact were paying. They insisted that 2015 161 162 premiums would skyrocket. But again, that is proving not to 163 be true. In fact, in many cases, enrollees will be able to reduce their premiums next year. They insisted that 164 165 Americans did not want or need health insurance coverage. 166 But over 20 million Americans have received coverage under 167 the ACA, and the insurance rate--the un-insurance rate has dropped precipitously since January. The vast majority of 168 169 new enrollees are happy with their plans.

Now, these are important facts, Mr. Chairman. And inthe interest of making the hearing as fact based as possible,

172	I want to talk about some fact sheets released earlier today
173	by the Energy and Commerce Democratic staff on the benefits
174	of the Affordable Care Act in every congressional district in
175	the country. I would ask unanimous consent to enter the fact
176	sheets for each committee member into the record, Mr.
177	Chairman.
178	Mr. {Murphy.} Without objection, so ordered.
179	[The information follows:]

181 Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you. And I just want to talk 182 about some of the benefits of the law in my home State of 183 Colorado.

In Colorado, there are 240,000 state residents who were 184 185 previously uninsured but who now have quality affordable 186 health coverage because of the Affordable Care Act. In 187 Colorado, our uninsured state residents has declined by about 188 a third. Almost 2.1 million people in Colorado, including 460,000 children and 860,000 women, now have health insurance 189 that covers preventative services without any copayments or 190 deductibles. Fifty thousand young adults in Colorado 191 192 retained health coverage through their parent's plans. More than 40,000 seniors have received Medicare Part D drug 193 discounts worth \$118 million. 1.8 people in Colorado are 194 195 protected by ACA provisions that prevent insurance companies 196 from spending more than 20 percent of their premiums on 197 profits and administrative overhead. Because of these 198 protections, over 210,000 individuals in the state received 199 approximately \$41.7 million in insurance company rebates. Up to 294,000 children in Colorado with preexisting health 200

201 conditions can no longer be denied coverage by insurers.

202 So even if you disagree with the law, it is important to 203 note that the ACA is helping our constituents. I hope we can 204 end the relentless attacks and we can help more constituents 205 obtain coverage under the law.

206 We should look at the example for Medicare Part D. I 207 can attest to it, because I was here. Many Democrats, 208 including me, did not vote for the law and had real concerns 209 about how it was implemented. But we still had town hall 210 meetings and other events so that our seniors got coverage 211 that cut their drug costs. I hope we can work, as we look 212 into the next year, in a bipartisan way to make the ACA even 213 better, instead of trying to find ways to undermine and 214 repeal it.

Now, I appreciate the witnesses coming today. I know GAO has some important insights into CMS contracting for Healthcare.gov. And anything we can do to improve that contracting is good for me. I hope CMS has learned from the website's flawed launch. And I want to know the plan to make sure they do better moving forward.

221 And I want to welcome you, Mr. Slavitt. You are new to

222	CMS. You will have primary responsibility for the website.
223	So I hope you can tell us what you plan to do in 2015.
224	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
225	[The prepared statement of Ms. DeGette follows:]

Ι

227 Mr. {Murphy.} The gentlelady's time has expired. I now228 recognize Dr. Burgess for 5 minutes.

229 Dr. {Burgess.} I thank the Chairman for the

230 recognition, thank Mr. Slavitt for joining us here again at

231 our Subcommittee.

232 You know, throughout the development and the rollout of 233 Healthcare.gov, this Committee--this Subcommittee had 234 repeated assurances that the systems were and would be ready 235 to go, and that the implantation was on track. At a hearing in September, literally days before the October 1 launch of 236 237 Healthcare.gov, we had repeated assurances from the then 238 director of the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, Mr. Gary Cohen. He said unambiguously that on 239 240 October 1, Americans would be able to go online, would be 241 able to see premium net of subsidy, and would be able to sign 242 up. We all know now that those assertions were fact 243 challenged.

The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services undertook this mammoth project without effectively planning for its development or its oversight. This has led to hundreds of

247 millions of dollars of taxpayer--hundreds of millions of 248 taxpayer dollars being wasted. Again, Gary Cohen, other HHS 249 officials told us time and again that the website was 250 working. That was factually incorrect. It was not working. 251 And it still may not be working, because the backend systems, 252 those systems that are responsible for actually paying 253 providers, have not been built.

254 Consumers may be--believe the website is fixed because 255 some of the frontend problems have been addresses. But there 256 is no way to verify inaccuracies about things like 257 citizenship and income level, or insure that the correct 258 subsidies are being paid for insurance premiums.

259 Thanks to this investigation, we now have definitive proof that the Department of Health and Human Services was 260 261 fully aware that these systems were not ready for primetime. 262 Their own contracting documents show that they only expected 263 65 percent of the federal exchange to be ready on October 1. 264 And then, of course, we are continuously reminded that the 265 promises made by the Administration simply could not be kept because the groundwork had not been done and the website was 266 267 not prepared. We are all still wondering what happened to

the promised \$2,500 in premium savings that every family in America could look forward to. We are all wondering what happened to the ability for people to keep their doctors. We are all wondering what happened to the ability for people to be able to keep their insurance plan.

273 Now, Mr. Slavitt, Mr. Cohen also was asked at his last 274 appearance here in January about the issue on the risk 275 corridors and risk sharing. The question came up about what 276 if there is not enough money in the risk corridor to actually 277 cover the premium shortfalls that the insurance companies are experiencing. And would he look to--that was Mr. Cohen--278 279 would he look to supplementing those funds from general 280 revenue of the Treasury of the United States. He couldn't answer the question. I asked him if he could provide us with 281 282 a legal memorandum upon which he relied to obtain the ability 283 to get funding from other sources if they--if the internal 284 funding was not enough to cover the cost of the risk 285 corridors. That was January. I am still waiting. I would 286 like to know if I am going to receive an answer to that question. And if so, when that answer might be forthcoming. 287 The fact of the matter is, both the Department of Health 288

289	and Human Services and the White House failed to heed
290	internal and external warnings about the lack of readiness of
291	the exchanges. It isnow, we have the General
292	Accountability Office report. And it is astonishing to see
293	that after all the money has been spent, not all of it
294	wisely, the Agency continues to ignore recommendations and
295	continues to pump money into what may be a futile effort.
296	We are well on track to sink over \$1 billion into the
297	development of this website. We have very little to show for
298	our money. I am eager for the testimony of the witnesses
299	today. I thank the Chairman for the recognition. I will
300	yield back the time.
301	[The prepared statement of Dr. Burgess follows:]

303 Mr. {Murphy.} The gentleman yields back. I now 304 recognize the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. 305 Waxman, for 5 minutes.

306 Mr. {Waxman.} Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 307 This is the twelfth hearing this Committee has held on 308 the Affordable Care Act since enrollment began in--October 309 2013. These hearings, if you look at them, all have one 310 purpose, to undermine the Affordable Care Act regardless of 311 the facts. The hearings have misled the public and I think squandered taxpayers' dollars. In fact, the Affordable Care 312 313 Act is an historic success. It has made comprehensive 314 healthcare reform a reality for the American people. More than eight million people have signed up for private health 315 316 insurance plans through the federal and state marketplaces, 317 exceeding CBO's enrollment estimates by over a million 318 people.

319 An additional 6.7 million individuals have enrolled in 320 Medicaid or the CHIP program as of May of this year. Three 321 million young adults under the age 26 have enrolled in their 322 parent's health insurance plans. And the fact sheets the

323 Democrats put out from our staff reveal that in my district alone, if I can be parochial, 17,000 residents who were 324 325 previously uninsured now have quality affordable health coverage because of the Affordable Care Act. 326 327 So I am giving some perspective that the law has been a 328 success. It is accomplishing what Congress and President 329 Obama intended. Instead, we have another hearing of this 330 Committee, or another Subcommittee of this Full Committee, 331 trying to say how the Affordable Care Act has problems and 332 did things wrong and presumably should lead us to the conclusion it should be repealed. 333

334 Well, in a lawsuit, there is a word called stipulate. We can stipulate to what the GAO has reported. And they have 335 336 reported some things that for which we ought to be concerned. 337 Because despite the success of the law, the initial rollout 338 of Healthcare.gov had serious flaws. And I glad we are going 339 to hear from GAO, the Government Accountability Office, on 340 their investigation of Healthcare.gov contracting. We should 341 always try to learn from mistakes, not dwell on them but learn from them. And I am glad that Mr. Slavitt is here to 342 tell us what the Administration has learned and what is being 343

344 changed as a result.

345 I have had experience with flawed contracts. I was the 346 chairman of the Oversight Committee. And we released a report that identified nearly 200 contracts worth over a 347 trillion dollars that involved significant waste fraud abuse 348 349 or mismanagement. The FBI had a contract to create a virtual 350 case file system that had to be cancelled after spending over 351 \$100 million. The Department of Homeland Security's contract 352 to build a high-tech border fence--that was supposed to keep 353 out all these immigrants, and we are still having problems-that fence had to be canceled after wasting a billion 354 355 dollars. The Coast Guard had a multi-billion dollar deep water contract to build boats that would not float. 356

357 My point is not to excuse the Healthcare.gov problems, but to put them in context. With the exception of Tom Davis, 358 359 Congressional Republicans showed little interest in these 360 enormous wastes of taxpayers' dollars when George W. Bush was 361 President. I think we should care about waste, fraud and 362 abuse no matter who is President. And I am proud that Healthcare.gov was fixed quickly. Not as quickly as I would 363 364 have liked, but fixed nevertheless and in time to help

365 millions of Americans enroll for insurance coverage. But I want to learn what went wrong so CMS can do a 366 better job for the next time, not the way the Republicans 367 handle this, see we told you so. There are problems, we told 368 you there would be problems. Okay. And then their 369 370 conclusion is, repeal it so they can replace it. But they 371 have never given us a replacement. Well, people are getting 372 insurance who couldn't get it in the past because they had 373 preexisting medical conditions. People are finding that 374 their insurance can't be canceled on them after they have paid just because they got sick. Women are not discriminated 375 376 against. People who couldn't afford it can now get insurance 377 because we give them tax breaks in order to pay for it. 378 So I am eager to learn what the Agency is doing so enrollment in 2015 goes more smoothly. We have unequivocal 379 380 proof that healthcare reform is a success. We now need to 381 make the 2015 enrollment period as smooth as possible so we 382 can build on the success. Let us go toward trying to make 383 things better, not dwell on things that were wrong, especially if you learned the lessons and fixed the problems. 384

385 [The prepared statement of Mr. Waxman follows:]

Mr. {Murphy.} The gentleman's time has expired. Just a 387 message to members and to our folks giving testimony today, 388 389 we are expecting--well, it is around 10:30, 11:00--10:25, 10:40 I should say. And so we are going to try to go through 390 391 this. I will have a quick gavel and ask all members really 392 to stick with their 5 minutes as we go through this, or I will really bang it hard. And then we will move forward. If 393 394 we need to be interrupted by votes, we will come back right 395 after votes to complete things.

So now I would like to introduce the witness on the 396 397 first panel for today's hearing. Mr. Andy Slavitt is the 398 Principle Deputy Administrator for the Centers for Medicare 399 and Medicaid Services. In his new role, he will be 400 responsible for agency wide policy and operational program 401 coordination as part of a new management structure that comes 402 in response to lessons learned from the rollout of 403 Healthcare.gov and recommendations put forth to the 404 secretary.

405 I will now swear in the witness. Are you aware that the 406 Committee is holding an investigative hearing, and when doing

407	so has the practice of taking testimony under oath? Do you
408	have any objections to testify under oath?
409	Mr. {Slavitt.} No, I don't.
410	Mr. {Murphy.} And the Chair advised you that under the
411	rules of the House and rules of the Committee, you are
412	entitled to be advised by Counsel. Do you desire to be
413	advised by Counsel during today's testimony?
414	In that case, would you please rise, raise your right
415	hand? I will swear you in.
416	[Witness sworn]
417	Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. The witness answered the
418	affirmative, so you are now under oath and subject to the
419	penalties set forth in Title XVIII, Section 1001 of the
420	United States Code. You may now give a 5-minute summary of
421	your written statement, Mr. Slavitt.

422 ^TESTIMONY OF ANDREW SLAVITT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,423 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES

424 } Mr. {Slavitt.} Good morning, Chairman Murphy, Ranking
425 Member DeGette, and members of the Subcommittee. I am Andy
426 Slavitt, Principle Deputy Administrator of CMS.

I joined CMS 3 weeks ago from the private sector where I spent the last 20 years principally working with physicians, hospitals, health plans and employers on solutions to problems of healthcare cost, quality and access. In the private sector, I both started my own healthcare technology business and run larger scale health services organization with more than 30,000 employees.

In late October of last year, I began my involvement with the Affordable Care Act implementation when I joined a group of people helping the CMS team on the turnaround effort of the health insurance marketplace. I am very pleased to appear before you today. And before answering your questions, will briefly walk you through some of the progress of the Affordable Care Act to date and talk about our

441 priorities for the coming period.

442 There is growing evidence that suggests that the 443 Affordable Care Act is making a difference in the lives of 444 millions of Americans. In the first full year, millions of 445 Americans selected a private insurance plan through the state 446 or federal health exchange marketplace, and millions more 447 have retained coverage on their parent's policies or have 448 gualified for Medicaid or CHIP.

449 In addition, we are seeing historically low growth in overall health spending, which has continued into 2014. This 450 451 is good news for consumers with the typical premium paid for 452 a policy purchased in the marketplace under \$100, and good 453 news for taxpayers as the recent Medicare Trust Fund report shows. And, importantly, this success is not being achieved 454 by government policy alone, but in partnership with the 455 456 private sector as insurers grow by competing to provide 457 better access to quality affordable services.

Now, as we move into our second year of marketplace implementation, we must build on the progress that is underway and heed the lessons of the last year. Let me outline for you our highest priorities. First, we are

462 focused on increasing the value consumers get when they come 463 to the marketplace. This means continuing to improve the 464 information, plan options and affordability of the shopping 465 experience.

466 Second, we have critical technical and operation 467 priorities. We must continually add automation. That has 468 begun with critical releases this summer and will continue 469 this year and in following years. While the consumer facing 470 website is of course live, we are adding functionality to 471 allow consumers to easily renew their coverage. Whether on the consumer facing side or the backend, our technology 472 improvements will be more continuous and more incremental. 473 474 We have a very strong sense of our critical path. Our 475 software releases so far have been on time, and we are 476 managing these deliverables daily.

Third, let me address our management priorities to improve execution. As part of the turnaround team, I experienced firsthand the challenges of the first year of marketplace implementation. And at CMS, I am now helping to oversee a series of changes to improve the management of the marketplace. As Secretary Burwell announced in June, we have

483 created clear, top-down accountability. We have also 484 improved the management end of and communication with our key 485 contractor with better defined requirements, metrics driven 486 contract reviews and requirements for skinning the game. We 487 have expanded our testing protocols and built more testing 488 into the schedule.

Even as we address the major concerns from last year, new ones will emerge. And our management structure and team must surface and address issues in a disciplined manner, just as we did during the turnaround.

This coming year will be one of visible and continued improvement, but not perfection. We are in the early stages of a program newly serving millions of consumers and are still learning about the best ways to support their unique needs. And we are setting up and testing new processes and new technologies along the way.

From my experience at this stage, businesses begin to see how closely their design matches the battle tested needs of the market. Good organizations focus, prioritize and learn and continuously improve their operations and the services they provide. It is not always easy, but we

504	understand what we need to do and are making the right
505	progress to have a successful open enrollment, and continue
506	to deliver on the promise of the Affordable Care Act to
507	improve healthcare access, cost and quality for all
508	Americans.
509	Thanks, and I look forward to your questions.
510	[The prepared statement of Mr. Slavitt follows:]

512 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. I appreciate your comments and appreciate your candor here before, because my--back--my 513 514 very first job when I was a young man was mucking out horse stalls. And I felt like the difference between--but what I 515 516 got to do was I got to ride the horses. So it was a nice 517 reward. The difference between that job and this job is I 518 don't get to ride the horses anymore. So I appreciate your 519 honesty and candor in this. And I want to ask you some 520 questions on those lines. You may recall that a year ago, Congress was told repeatedly the Healthcare.gov website was 521 522 fine, it was ready. The months, days and weeks leading up to 523 it, everything was ready to go. And the President said it would mirror the public's experience with other websites. So 524 525 we have to ask, will Healthcare.gov be fully ready this fall? Mr. {Slavitt.} Thank you, Chairman. So I obviously 526 527 wasn't here last year. It does sound like certainly from the 528 GAO report that I have seen that a couple of things happened. 529 First, the technology build was certainly bigger and more 530 complicated than people expected. And I think the scope expanded because of that. And, secondly, as the GAO pointed 531

532	out, there were some significant issues with the management
533	of the project.
534	Mr. {Murphy.} But for the future? Because you said it
535	wouldn't be perfection. So are there going to be hiccups
536	this fall, too?
537	Mr. {Slavitt.} I am sorry?
538	Mr. {Murphy.} Are there going to be some hiccups in the
539	website implementation this fall?
540	Mr. {Slavitt.} I think this year, we can expectwe are
541	in a vastly different situation. For one, we have a website
542	that is already up and live and running.
543	Mr. {Murphy.} Yeah.
544	Mr. {Slavitt.} We are adding continued improvements.
545	And we are adding them in a much less risky fashion. We are
546	doing releases frequently over the course of the summer,
547	putting things live into production. We have built in a big
548	testing window. So, you know, everybody will remain on their
549	toes and nervous. Everybody knows what they need to do.
550	Mr. {Murphy.} But I
551	Mr. {Slavitt.} But we are expecting to have a good open
552	enrollment.

Mr. {Murphy.} But the GAO said there were still 553 significant risks for the next open enrollment period. So 554 vou are saying everything is going to be fine and ready? 555 556 Mr. {Slavitt.} I think our job is to manage those risks, understand those risks, surface them and--557 558 Mr. {Murphy.} I don't want to take out my shovel. I 559 just want to know--because if there is going to be problems, 560 I would much rather you just tell the Committee look, we 561 anticipate these problems, here is the actions we are taking 562 to move forward. I think the whole Committee would 563 appreciate that so we don't have to get caught up in this 564 quess game. Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. Sure. Well, I expect that it 565 566 won't be perfect with serving millions of people. 567 Mr. {Murphy.} Okay. Mr. {Slavitt.} There are certainly difficult 568 569 situations. People are--many of whom are enrolling in 570 insurance for the first time. It is a bumpy process at 571 times. I think we have got a committed team of people though that by and large are doing a very good job, but there will 572 573 clearly be bumps.

574 Mr. {Murphy.} Any anticipation how many more people you will be enrolling in the fall, or how many will be enrolling 575 576 for the first time? 577 Mr. {Slavitt.} I don't know that. Mr. {Murphy.} Do you know in terms of your review of 578 579 this, so far of those who have enrolled how many of those 580 have enrolled for the first time? 581 Mr. {Slavitt.} I have only seen the media reports, 582 which I can't pull a number. But it was I think far greater 583 than a half. But I have only seen that in the media. Mr. {Murphy.} When Secretary Sebelius was here before, 584 585 I asked her a series of questions. I will repeat those to you. But I asked her, how many were new. How many were 586 people who previously had insurance and got a pink slip and 587 588 was discontinued. How many were people who were newly eligible because of Medicaid. And of all those who signed 589 590 up, how many were paying the same, less or more. 591 Mr. {Slavitt.} Um-hum. 592 Mr. {Murphy.} And she said really the website has no way--there is no way of knowing any of those things. Would 593

594 you agree that is true?

595 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. I think that data is not yet 596 known by us. I think we are getting a beat as--on what 597 premiums people are paying. So that is good. We have a 598 sense that there is good affordability offered to--

599 Mr. {Murphy.} But when we--so we see these numbers on 600 how many people signed up, 10 million, 11 million, whatever 601 it is, compared to the 45 million for which there was a need 602 for health insurance, we really still don't know how many of 603 that original 40, 45 million are served new by this.

Mr. {Slavitt.} So the Administrator has a chart in her office which she calls her prettiest picture, and it is a graph of the uninsured rate over time. And it shows a drop to a 13 percent--

608 Mr. {Murphy.} So is that specifically reviewed by your 609 office or by HHS to specifically look at people who are 610 uninsured before and now are insured? Because you just told 611 me that you can't really determine that, and Secretary 612 Sebelius told me there was no way of knowing that.

613 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. It is--there is no way to614 determine that from the website.

615 Mr. {Murphy.} Okay.

616	Mr. {Slavitt.} We do know the uninsured rate from the
617	recent Gallup Report is down to 13 percent.
618	Mr. {Murphy.} Have you tried to sign up for one of the
619	plans on the website?
620	Mr. {Slavitt.} I havenow that I am a federal
621	employee, I am in the FEHBP Blue Cross plan.
622	Mr. {Murphy.} So you don't have to be in the Affordable
623	Care Act yourself?
624	Mr. {Slavitt.} I am a federal employee.
625	Mr. {Murphy.} Yeah, well okay. And I am just curious,
626	have you also reviewed with people if they have tried to
627	access their physicians? The plan allows an initial visit
628	and some other preventative carenot as much preventative
629	care as I would like. But have you surveyed persons to find
630	out if they have been able to see their physicians for
631	follow-up appointments, their costs for exampleto review
632	their costs, their payment levels, their copay, their
633	deductibles, have you reviewed any of those things? And
634	Mr. {Slavitt.} I will have to get back to you on that.
635	I don't think we have any hard data, but I can certainly look
636	and try to follow-up.

637 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. I will keep track of time here. And, Ms. DeGette, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 638 639 Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I agree that it is important to make the federal 640 641 exchange website, and also the states, work as well for 642 people. And I am sure, Mr. Slavitt, you agree with that too, 643 don't vou? 644 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yes, I do. 645 Ms. {DeGette.} And we want to make it as easy as we can for people to enroll. And especially as we reenroll in the 646 2015 plans, is that correct? 647 648 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct, Congresswoman. 649 Ms. {DeGette.} Now--up till now, even despite the 650 admitted problems with the website, eight million people 651 enrolled in the marketplaces, is that correct? 652 Mr. {Slavitt.} Correct. 653 Ms. {DeGette.} And about 6.7 million enrolled in the 654 Medicaid expansion, is that right? 655 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is right. Ms. {DeGette.} So, obviously, people were able to 656 utilize those websites to get health insurance, is that 657
658 right? Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct. 659 Ms. {DeGette.} Now, I was looking at the part of the 660 GAO report, and the GAO made five recommendations in the 661 662 report. Are you aware of that? 663 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yes, I am. 664 Ms. {DeGette.} And what is your opinion of those 665 recommendations? 666 Mr. {Slavitt.} We agree with most of those recommendations. 667 Ms. {DeGette.} Which ones done you agree with? 668 Mr. {Slavitt.} I think the only thing in the GAO report 669 that I think needs a little further clarification--it is not 670 that I don't necessarily agree with it, it is the 671 672 characterization of the Accenture contract. And I think it 673 was characterized as ballooning in cost when in fact I think 674 the Accenture contract was--there was an initial contract 675 before the work was completely scoped--676 Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. Let me stop you, because that was one of their findings. But that wasn't one of their 677 678 recommendations.

679 Mr. {Slavitt.} Correct. 680 Ms. {DeGette.} Their recommendations--681 Mr. {Slavitt.} So I agree with all their recommendations. 682 Ms. {DeGette.} You agree with all five of their 683 684 recommendations. And what steps are you taking to implement 685 those recommendations? 686 Mr. {Slavitt.} So we are doing a number of things. 687 First of all, in the contracting front, it is very clear now who can give work to Accenture, how work gets approved, how 688 689 that contract gets managed and, frankly, importantly, 690 Accenture has skin in the game to make sure that they 691 deliver. There is a--again, I wasn't here last year, so I can't speak precisely to how the project was managed. But I 692 693 can tell you that now, there is daily intensive management of the project. The risks and issues and concerns are also 694 surfaced and dealt with. We have built early warning 695 696 indicators, so there is an--and there is an accountability 697 difference that I think is very significant.

698 Ms. {DeGette.} Are you looking at the interoperability 699 issues as well? That was one of the problems we had before.

700 Mr. {Slavitt.} This is, as you point out, 701 Congresswoman, many different pieces of this project in order 702 to go well. And so the coordination and the systems 703 integration is something that I think was missing last year. 704 And it is in place this year. 705 Ms. {DeGette.} Now, are you doing anything that goes 706 beyond the recommendations in this GAO report, Mr. Slavitt? 707 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yes. Well, fortunately or 708 unfortunately, the GAO report wasn't news to the people at 709 CMS. I think the people at CMS who worked awfully hard but lived through that nightmare don't want to go through that 710 711 again. So I think actions were underway well before seeing 712 this report. And I think they fall into the categories that 713 I have talked about, contracting reform, technical and 714 managerial oversight, focused and disciplined project 715 management. 716 Ms. {DeGette.} Now, we keep hearing about how expensive 717 the cost overruns and everything else in setting up 718 Healthcare.gov were. I--just as an aside, Mr. Chairman, I 719 would like to know how much this lawsuit against the President is going to cost. But be that as it may, Mr. 720

721 Slavitt, I want to ask you do you think we are going to be 722 protected from cost overruns for the 2015 enrollment period? 723 Mr. {Slavitt.} So again, I wasn't here last year. But 724 the two things that went wrong last year, one of them actually was simply the inability for anybody, and quite 725 726 reasonably so--and this happens in the private sector--to 727 estimate how big this project is and how complex it is. We 728 have got a better handle on that now. I don't expect those 729 overruns. 730 Secondly, to the point of the GAO report, the contractor wasn't managed tightly with clear deliverables and 731 732 requirements. That has been put to bed as well. So those 733 two things are in much, much better shape. 734 Ms. {DeGette.} And were you aware--one last question. 735 Were you aware that the uninsured rate in this country 736 dropped 25 percent after the implementation of Healthcare.gov 737 and the full implementation of the ACA?

738 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yes. Yes, Congressman, that sounds 739 right.

740 Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you. I will yield back, Mr.741 Chairman.

742 Mr. {Murphy.} I will recognize--who is next--Mr. Harper 743 for 5 minutes. 744 Mr. {Harper.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 745 for being here today. And I have a couple of questions I would like to ask. 746 747 First of all, who is performing the role of systems 748 integrator now? Who has got--who is doing that? 749 Mr. {Slavitt.} Optum. The firm is Optum. 750 Mr. {Harper.} Okay. I am sorry. 751 Mr. {Slavitt.} My prior company. 752 Mr. {Harper.} And so who has that role now? 753 Mr. {Slavitt.} Optum. The firm Optum does. 754 Mr. {Harper.} Okay. 755 Mr. {Slavitt.} Plays that role. 756 Mr. {Harper.} I got you. Yeah. Some questions I would 757 like to ask about some reports. Early this summer, we 758 learned that there were nearly four million inconsistencies 759 in the applications submitted via Healthcare.gov. Those 760 inconsistencies are primarily for citizenship status or 761 income. The failure to calculate these properly could mean that millions of Americans could have to pay back incorrectly 762

763 calculated subsidies. So earlier this summer, it was 764 reported that there were millions of these. First of all, 765 how did this happen? And can't the website check for 766 accuracy?

767 Mr. {Slavitt.} Sure. So appreciate the question. 768 Inconsistencies occur because of the changes that occur in 769 peoples' lives. And people end up having more current 770 information than government databases. So we run last year, 771 during open enrollment, hundreds of millions of checks 772 against government databases to check on income and citizenship status and so forth. And in some occasions where 773 774 people particularly are in low-wage jobs, they are in 775 seasonal work and other kinds of circumstance, their income 776 is unpredictable. Or in other cases, they haven't file taxes 777 before because they haven't made enough money. So what 778 happens when that happens--and just to give you a perspective 779 on this, for a typical family of four, there are 21 records 780 searched through our automated process. If even one of those 781 records turns up not to be a match because of income or some 782 other thing, we have to pursue documentation. And we do indeed pursue documentation to try to ensure that these 783

784 people are in fact telling the truth. And we have done that-785 \_ 786 Mr. {Harper.} How--787 Mr. {Slavitt.} I am sorry? 788 Mr. {Harper.} How could a person on the form be a 789 citizen or not be a citizen? Is that something that is you 790 can verify? 791 Mr. {Slavitt.} There is documentation status. There 792 is--whether it is a naturalization status and so forth. 793 Those are sometimes not as current in the government database 794 as what the individual resident has in fact in their life. 795 Mr. {Harper.} So in an application--one application 796 could have multiple inconsistencies, correct? 797 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct. 798 Mr. {Harper.} And do you have a number of how many Americans were affected by this problem? 799 800 Mr. {Slavitt.} So I think there were a couple of 801 million people who had--inconsistent information that needed 802 to be matched of some form or another. About--I would say 803 roughly half of those are income changes. So these are 804 people who will have to have--come back to the website--and

805 we are urging people to do that -- and make some adjustment, because it will spill out of course on their tax form. Of 806 807 the other half, we have cleared, as of July 1, 425,000 808 inconsistencies. And 90--greater than 90 percent of those are indeed in favor of the individual consumer who had more 809 810 up to date information than we did. 811 Mr. {Harper.} You know, and this is obviously something 812 we want to make sure doesn't continue. So what assurances 813 can you give us today that we won't see these problems during

814 the next enrollment period?

815 Mr. {Slavitt.} Well, I think--we are learning is that a 816 certain amount of these data discrepancy problems are going 817 to be a fact of life.

818 Mr. {Harper.} Yeah.

Mr. {Slavitt.} Because of the fact that we have people who do have variations--high variations in their income levels. And so that is going to occur in coming years. What is going to be different next year is we have now just released software that allows us to get at those inconsistencies much more quickly. What is important though is that people who we reach out to and we need additional

826 documentation from, get in touch with us and get them back to 827 us. 828 Mr. {Harper.} Thank you, sir. And I will yield back. Mr. {Murphy.} Mr. Tonko for 5 minutes? 829 830 Mr. {Tonko.} Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Slavitt, 831 welcome. 832 And you earlier went through some national stats. And I 833 have received information on my district who have been 834 waiting to get info. And in the 20th congressional district 835 in New York, 11,000 residents who were previously uninsured 836 now have quality, affordable health coverage because of ACA. 837 The number of uninsured residents in my district has declined 838 by some 23 percent. 214,000 individuals in the district, including 137,000 women and 54,000 children now have health 839 840 insurance that covers preventative services without any 841 copays, coinsurance or deductible. And 262,000 individuals 842 in my district now have insurance that cannot place annual or 843 lifetime limits on their coverage. And up to 37,000--37,000 844 children in my district with pre-existing conditions can no longer be denied coverage for health insurance purposes. 845 846 I think that is a tremendous bit of improvement. We

847 obviously want to continue to grow those numbers. But it is 848 comforting to know that that kind of success is coming the 849 way of our district.

850 And so, Mr. Slavitt, part of the promise of creating the 851 one-stop marketplaces was the ability to shop for health 852 plans side-by-side and then apply in an apples to apples 853 comparison. While the federal Healthcare.gov site has done a 854 good job in this regard in displaying the premiums and 855 deductibles of various plans, it has been more difficult to assess differences in health plan networks or whether a 856 857 particular doctor is in-network for a given plan. Could you 858 tell us what CMS is doing to make it easier for consumers to 859 access this information in advance of the upcoming open enrollment period? 860

Mr. {Slavitt.} Thank you, Congressman. So you are indeed correct. And in fact in last year, I believe the typical consumer had dozens--several dozens of options to choose from in health insurance. And our job is to try to continue to grow that. But as you point out, we have to make the information people are looking for more readily apparent and more easy to see. So we are asking the insurance

868 companies this year to put direct links to the provider directory that fits the individual plan. But I would also 869 870 just ask consumers to do, and I would ask if you would talk 871 to people in your district, is that those directories that the insurance companies keep, they are not always up to date. 872 873 They try to keep them up to date. But it is always good to 874 call the insurance company or to check with your--if there is 875 a physician that you want to see to make sure that they are 876 in the network, because this is really important information 877 for people to choose from.

878 Mr. {Tonko.} Okay. And in terms of allowing a consumer 879 for example to search only for plans in which their doctor is 880 covered, could--

881 Mr. {Slavitt.} We don't have that ability. That is the 882 kind of thing that might come in future years.

883 Mr. {Tonko.} What kind of obstacles stand in the way of 884 that happening?

885 Mr. {Slavitt.} You know, I think one of the lessons 886 learned from this project is to take disciplined incremental 887 steps to making progress, not trying to do too much. And, 888 you know, this--our schedule is pretty much filled with

889 things that are important to make sure we are executing well. 890 And I think those are the kinds of innovations that I could 891 really see us getting excited about adding in future years. 892 But it didn't make the cut this year. Mr. {Tonko.} Um-hum. And if I could just ask you a 893 894 quick question about the Medicare Trust Fund? The trustee's 895 report, as you know, came out on Monday. And they are 896 talking about the fund being secure through 2030. That is 13 897 years longer than was projected in 2009 when the ACA was 898 passed. The report noted that these changes may be due to the cost saving provisions of the ACA. Do you believe that 899 900 to be correct? 901 Mr. {Slavitt.} Well, I am not going to hold myself out an expert, but it sounds logical. 902 903 Mr. {Tonko.} And in fact, since passage of the ACA, the 904 Medicare costs have grown at or near record lows, is that not 905 correct? 906 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct. Mr. {Tonko.} So would you anticipate any continuing or 907 908 additional benefits coming via Medicare? 909 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yes, I would.

910 Mr. {Tonko.} Okay. Well, we appreciate the leadership 911 that you have born with the ACA. And we thank you for the 912 improvements. And I know on behalf of the district that I 913 represent, the numbers are very encouraging. I share them 914 with you here this morning, and we are going to continue to 915 work to further improve so that one of these fundamental 916 rights, the affordable and accessible quality healthcare for 917 all, is continued. So--and strengthened.

So with that, I yield back. And thank you, Mr. Chair. 919 Mr. {Murphy.} The gentleman's time has expired. Now, I recognize Mr. Griffith for 5 minutes. 920

921 Mr. {Griffith.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do 922 appreciate that. Mr. Slavitt, thank you for being here this 923 morning.

924 You have indicated and testified that you were previously employed by Optum/QSSI, is that correct? 925 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct. 926

918

927 Mr. {Griffith.} And I think I heard you say in your 928 opening statement that you left their employee approximately 929 three weeks ago, is that also correct?

930 Mr. {Slavitt.} A little longer than that. Yes, that is

931 correct. 932 Mr. {Griffith.} A little longer, how long? 933 Mr. {Slavitt.} I could get you the exact date. 934 Mr. {Griffith.} Well, I don't need the exact date. Four-between 3 and 4 weeks? 935 936 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah, yeah, yeah. You are--something in 937 that nature. 938 Mr. {Griffith.} Okay. 939 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. 940 Mr. {Griffith.} Here is the question. You now work for 941 CMS. 942 Mr. {Slavitt.} Um-hum. 943 Mr. {Griffith.} And from what I understand, you are a very talented individual. And that is a good thing for CMS. 944 945 But if I understood your testimony as well, you have 946 indicated that your previous employer is managing the website 947 as the systems integrator, is that correct? 948 Mr. {Slavitt.} Um-hum. That is correct. Mr. {Griffith.} Okay. So then the natural question, as 949 950 an oversight committee is, how are you able to manage your 951 former employer? And doesn't this create a conflict of

952 interest?

953 Mr. {Slavitt.} Sure. Thank you for the guestion. So, 954 Congressman, there is, as you know, an ethics pledge that I 955 signed. And along with that, disposed of all of my stock 956 basically that I had had in the company. 957 Mr. {Griffith.} I--958 Mr. {Slavitt.} It is completely clear. I recused myself. 959 960 Mr. {Griffith.} You disposed of all of your stock? You 961 said basically. 962 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah, all of--yes. 963 Mr. {Griffith.} Okay. 964 Mr. {Slavitt.} I am--yes, I am not trying to qualify 965 that. 966 Mr. {Griffith.} I didn't think you were, but I wanted to make sure on the record that you are saying you got rid of 967 968 all of your stocks. 969 Mr. {Slavitt.} Okay. Thank you. Yes, I got rid of all my stock and any other ties, as appropriate. I have signed--970

971 and I am not qualifying with as appropriate--as was

972 appropriate. So now as a public servant, I have a very clear

973 set of rules to follow. I have a--this ethics pledge. And 974 then within that ethics pledge, I have a limited waiver which 975 allows me for the purposes of health reform implementation 976 only on the website to be able to interact with all of the contractors, including Optum, as it solely benefits the 977 978 implementation of the project. And so I do that and exercise 979 that very carefully and very prudently. But that is a 980 publicly available waiver that I can make sure to get to you, 981 if you would like.

982 Mr. {Griffith.} If you would, that would be great.983 Mr. {Slavitt.} Okay.

Mr. {Griffith.} And then I would like to talk about 984 985 that waiver process. Because normally, in my experience, 986 when you move from the private sector into the public sector, 987 there is usually some kind of a period of not dealing with your former employer. That is usually a year or more. And 988 989 if you could explain that process, how they came to this? 990 And you said it was a limited waiver. We can certainly look at that later. But if you could explain that process, I'd 991 992 appreciate it.

993 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. So it is I think a 15-page

994 document, which is--and I can get you the details. But--995 Mr. {Griffith.} I would appreciate that. 996 Mr. {Slavitt.} But it is a--2 years is the waiver. And 997 I think the only exception--I am sorry, 2 years is the agreement not to communicate with my old employer. And then 998 999 there is this narrow exception for interaction relative to 1000 this implementation process. 1001 Mr. {Griffith.} All right. And I appreciate that. Let 1002 me ask you some questions about your former employer, because 1003 Optum/QSSI is a subdivision or is a subsidiary of 1004 UnitedHealth Group, isn't that correct? 1005 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct. 1006 Mr. {Griffith.} And in their 4/17 quarter one of this 1007 year earnings call, the UnitedHealth Group President and CEO, 1008 Steven J. Helmsley, recognized employees and said that, you 1009 know, we try to move our employees around in different divisions of the company. And so I am a little concerned 1010 1011 about how much of a firewall is built between Optum/QSSI and 1012 UnitedHealth Group, because UnitedHealth Group is 1013 participating in some of the exchanges and in the federal 1014 exchange. And so we have a situation where again there is an

1015 appearance of a conflict or in-propriety because if you are 1016 shifting folks around, I said to one of my staffers this 1017 morning, what do they have a machine like they did on Men in 1018 Black and they zap their memories and they remember nothing 1019 that they saw? Because it would appear that the folks at 1020 OSSI who then report to UnitedHealth Group--and, in fact, 1021 Larry Renfrow is--has an office--a title or a hat in both 1022 companies. And if that is the case, aren't they able then to 1023 gain information on competitors by participating in the 1024 process and in all these meetings, and then get an advantage 1025 over their competitors in the healthcare websites? 1026 Mr. {Slavitt.} So let me clarify two things. 1027 Mr. {Griffith.} Okay. Please. 1028 Mr. {Slavitt.} First, nobody on the Healthcare.gov 1029 project is permitted to go back and to go outside of the 1030 project and transfer into United Healthcare. That is expressly prohibited. Secondly, just to--just an important 1031 1032 clarification, because it is a little bit confusing. United 1033 Healthcare and UnitedHealth Group are two different things. 1034 So UnitedHealth Group is a parent company that has two 1035 divisions.

1036 Mr. {Griffith.} Right. 1037 Mr. {Slavitt.} One is called Optum. One is United 1038 Healthcare. And so I don't want anybody to have the 1039 impression that Optum is a part of this insurance company. 1040 It is actually a sister company, a separately run entity--1041 Mr. {Griffith.} Well, but it is a wholly un-subsidiary, 1042 is it--1043 Mr. {Slavitt.} Correct. Correct. 1044 Mr. {Griffith.} Okay. All right. 1045 Mr. {Murphy.} The gentleman's time has expired. 1046 Mr. {Griffith.} Thank you. I will have some follow-up questions and will present for answers after the meeting. 1047 1048 Okay. Thank you. 1049 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. I now recognize Ms. Castor 1050 for 5 minutes. 1051 Ms. {Castor.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Throughout the country, everyone is seeing the benefits 1052 1053 of the Affordable Care Act. And as of today, Americans who 1054 are interested can access new fact sheets that provide 1055 statistics based upon each congressional district. So I 1056 encourage you to go to the Democratic website of the Energy

1057 and Commerce Committee and--or call your member, and we can 1058 provide those. 1059 Now, I want to share some facts about the benefits of 1060 the law in my Florida district in the Tampa Bay area. There 1061 are over 24,000 individuals in my district who were 1062 previously uninsured but now have quality, affordable health 1063 coverage because of the Affordable Care Act. The number of 1064 uninsured in my district has declined by 15 percent. Now, 1065 that could have been higher if the Republican controlled 1066 legislature and our governor would have expanded Medicaid in 1067 Florida. In fact, almost a million additional residents, 1068 Floridians, could have health insurance. That is 43,000 of 1069 my neighbors in the Tampa Bay area who could have been 1070 covered, but they remain uninsured because Florida refused to 1071 expand Medicaid. But over 40,000 people in my district were 1072 able to purchase coverage through the new health insurance marketplace, and nearly 10,000 young adults were able to 1073 1074 retain coverage through their parent's plans. 43,000 of my 1075 older neighbors received Medicare Part D prescription drug 1076 discounts worth \$8.2 million. I mean, that is a great shot 1077 in the arm and terrific money back into their pockets.

1078 So as we plan for the second year of open enrollment, we 1079 all want to make sure that we don't have the computer 1080 problems that we had last go around. So I want to ask you 1081 some questions about premiums, especially for the 2015 1082 period. Now, open enrollment begins in November, is that 1083 correct? Mr. {Slavitt.} Correct. 1084 1085 Ms. {Castor.} November--1086 Mr. {Slavitt.} 15. 1087 Ms. {Castor.} 15. 1088 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. Ms. {Castor.} So folks need to at some point--when will 1089 1090 the website be ready to compare plans? 1091 Mr. {Slavitt.} So we are going to be sending out 1092 notices to people starting in October to come back to the 1093 website, update their information and letting them know that 1094 on November 15, they will be able to either, if they choose, 1095 come back to the website, shop for a plan, compare premiums 1096 and chose the plan they want, or as happens with Medicare 1097 Part D, Medicare Advantage and most employers, if they choose to do nothing, they will be able to automatically reenroll if 1098

1099 their existing plan is offered.

1100 Ms. {Castor.} Okay. And the deadline is in February--

1101 Mr. {Slavitt.} February 15.

1102 Ms. {Castor.} February 15 of 2015.

1103 Mr. {Slavitt.} 2015.

Ms. {Castor.} Now, Republicans have predicted that premiums would skyrocket for the next go around, increasing by as much as 50 percent. But we can now test those numbers because the new rates are rolling out across the country. Are there any signs of the out of control rate increases that

1109 the Republicans have predicted?

1110 Mr. {Slavitt.} So far, the rate increases that have 1111 been publicly available from Rhode Island, Washington, 1112 Delaware have all been in the mid-single digits. California, 1113 I believe has a big--is going to come out with their numbers today. So I think that will be closely watched, because of 1114 1115 the size of the state. Colorado's I believe have been very 1116 steady by and large. So while this isn't going to be true 1117 for every single individual in every single county in 1118 America, by and large the early results look positive--very 1119 positive.

1120 Ms. {Castor.} Great. And your--is it accurate to say 1121 that there are more choices in the marketplace this go 1122 around, or will it depend upon the state? 1123 Mr. {Slavitt.} By--there will be more choices this year 1124 than last year. 1125 Ms. {Castor.} So what does competition tend to do when you have--when consumers have more choices? 1126 1127 Mr. {Slavitt.} Better prices, better value, better 1128 services. 1129 Ms. {Castor.} Does that mean that if you have greater competition that puts pressure on the insurance companies to 1130 1131 keep their premiums low? 1132 Mr. {Slavitt.} I think this is one of those win-win 1133 situations where the private sector can grow by actually 1134 providing more value to consumers. And that appears to be 1135 what is happening. 1136 Ms. {Castor.} And what else helps keep premiums low 1137 under the Affordable Care Act? 1138 Mr. {Slavitt.} Well, certainly, the preventive visits The ability for people to qualify for tax credits. You 1139 do. know, I think there is a whole host of things that --1140

1141 Ms. {Castor.} You know, one of my favorite ones--what 1142 we did in the Affordable Care Act is the 80/20 rule, the 1143 medical loss ratio that says when a consumer purchases a 1144 policy, they have to get something meaningful. And insurance 1145 companies can't spend too much on profits and administrative 1146 costs. And when they do, they have to rebate the money back 1147 to consumers. And for my--because I represent the State of 1148 Florida, we are really happy that our consumers are going to 1149 receive \$42 million back this summer. I have already heard 1150 from many of our--my neighbors. And sometimes those rebates 1151 go back to the employer. So you do need to keep an eye, 1152 isn't that right? 1153 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yes. In fact, the numbers that I have seen are that something like \$9 billion has been returned and 1154 1155 saved to consumers in that process. 1156 Ms. {Castor.} That has been very important in this day 1157 and age. Thank you very much.

1158 Mr. {Murphy.} The gentlelady's time has expired. I now 1159 recognize Mr. Johnson for five minutes.

1160 Mr. {Johnson.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Slavitt, 1161 it is good to see you today. You and I have had chances to

1162 interact before, and I appreciate you being with us. I agree 1163 with Mr. Griffith, based on your background, it looks like 1164 CMS is going to be the beneficiary of your experience and 1165 background.

1166 Mr. {Slavitt.} Thank you.

Mr. {Johnson.} You have talked about your many years in the private sector. Could you give a very quick summary of your years of experience and expertise and what it primarily focused on?

1171 Mr. {Slavitt.} Sure. So I started my own health information technology company back in the '90s. It was a 1172 1173 small business that ended up serving consumers. I ended up 1174 selling that business. I worked with Optum for a number of 1175 years. I oversaw the health information technology business 1176 and grew that. I worked very closely on building lots of 1177 industry wide capabilities around things like revenue cycle 1178 management, population health management. I worked closely 1179 with hospitals, with physician groups, with health insurance 1180 plans, state governments, all really focused on guality, cost 1181 and access issues.

1182 Mr. {Johnson.} Okay. And to summarize, I think when

1183 you were responding to Mr. Griffith's questions, you led the 1184 team that basically made Healthcare.gov usable in October, 1185 correct? 1186 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct. 1187 Mr. {Johnson.} Okay. So I want to ask you, you have 1188 all of those years of experience and expertise in information 1189 technology, specifically in the healthcare arena. How much 1190 should Healthcare.gov have cost? 1191 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is a really good question, and I am 1192 not sure I know the answer to it. It is a--it is not unusual for large scale health projects--for example, I can think of 1193 1194 big projects from Kaiser Permanente when they installed 1195 electronic medical records, cost a couple billion dollars to 1196 put in place. It is hard to know what the benchmark is to 1197 build a consumer facing website and set of backend systems to 1198 connect to 50 states to Medicaid plans, to insurance 1199 companies. So I am not quite sure. 1200 Mr. {Johnson.} Well, let me help you a little bit. 1201 Because I don't know if you remember or not, but my 1202 background is a 30 year information technology professional. 1203 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. I do.

Mr. {Johnson.} So I have been through the lessons learned and the trial by error of trying to project costs of complex IT systems like this. The GAO says that we spent nearly a billion dollars on this, with the cost climbing. Do you believe that taxpayers have received a good return on their investment thus far?

1210 Mr. {Slavitt.} Congressman, I think two things 1211 happened. And it is hard to know how much fits into each 1212 category. The one thing that happened is clearly, this was a 1213 more complex project and needed a lot more work than people 1214 expected. And for that part, I think--

1215 Mr. {Johnson.} And that goes without--yeah. And see, 1216 that goes back to the genesis of some of the questions that 1217 we got into the last time you and I were here. If you have a 1218 firm set of requirements, and if you have a systematic 1219 lifecycle design process, it is much easier to project those 1220 costs.

1221 Mr. {Slavitt.} Right. Yeah.

1222 Mr. {Johnson.} I know when I was doing large scale 1223 program management on large IT systems, the industry general 1224 rule was that in the lifecycle of a complex system, that the

1225 implementation part--the design, the building, the 1226 implementation part is only about 25 percent of the cost--the 1227 lifecycle cost of a system. The rest of the cost is in 1228 maintenance, operations and further on down the road. So if 1229 this thing has already cost the taxpayers a billion dollars 1230 or more to get to where we are today, we can reasonably 1231 expect that this is going to cost billions, billions more 1232 over the lifecycle of this thing, correct? 1233 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah, I couldn't put an estimate on 1234 that. Mr. {Johnson.} But you do agree with the concept in 1235 general that maintenance and operation costs a heck of a lot 1236 1237 more overtime than the initial implementation does, right? 1238 Mr. {Slavitt.} I do think there will be an ongoing 1239 operating cost. I don't know that it will be greater. I think that I have to look, and I--I would have to look at the 1240 1241 budget request, which I don't have with me. Mr. {Johnson.} Okay. Well, the budget request has 1242 1243 nothing to do with how much it is going to cost. 1244 Mr. {Slavitt.} To do--1245 Mr. {Johnson.} You understand how the industry works.

1246 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. 1247 Mr. {Johnson.} You understand the lifecycle of software 1248 development. You understand that. But I appreciate it that 1249 you don't really want to answer that question. 1250 Mr. {Slavitt.} I don't know the answer. 1251 Mr. {Johnson.} The GAO says ultimately more money was 1252 spent to get less capability. Do you agree with that? 1253 Mr. {Slavitt.} I think there were clear inefficiencies-1254 \_ Mr. {Johnson.} Because a lot of it is still not 1255 1256 working. 1257 Mr. {Slavitt.} I think there were clear inefficiencies 1258 in how this was managed. I think didn't it also say, 1259 Congressman, is in the real world, it is not always possible 1260 to know your scope going in. It is--in an ideal world, you 1261 can. But I think the estimates proved that they need to do 1262 more work in the--1263 Mr. {Johnson.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I agree 1264 that it is not always possible to know the scope, but it is possible to fence the scope and, therefore, knowing that what 1265

65

you are going to pay for is what you are going to get, which

1267 is clearly not what happened here.

1268 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. The gentleman's--

1269 Mr. {Johnson.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1270 Mr. {Murphy.} The gentleman's time has expired. I

1271 again remind members, please keep it in the timeframe,

1272 because we are expecting votes in a few minutes. And I want

1273 to be fair to everybody. Mr. Yarmuth, you are recognized for

1274 5 minutes.

Mr. {Yarmuth.} Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.Slavitt, thank you for your testimony and your work.

1277 One of--I want to talk about some of the things that

1278 have happened in Kentucky since we are actually doing an

1279  $\,$  update, and I am very proud of the experience we have had so

1280~ far in my state. But there was actually some pretty

1281 astounding news earlier this week that--regarding the

1282 trustees of Medicare coming from them about the prospects for

1283 viability of the Medicare trust fund. Are you familiar with

1284 that information?

1285 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yes, I am, Congressman.

1286 Mr. {Yarmuth.} Would you--could you tell us what has 1287 happened? Because as I recall when we passed the Affordable

1288 Care Act in 2010 at that time, the trustees were projecting 1289 the trust fund would be insolvent by 2017. 1290 Mr. {Slavitt.} I believe if I am not mistaken that in 1291 summary that the projection is the trust fund was--life 1292 expectancy extended to 2030. 1293 Mr. {Yarmuth.} 2030. So that is pretty astounding that 1294 in four years the projection extended the life--the viability 1295 of Medicare by 13 years. And there was also some really 1296 fascinating and I think impressive data about pro-beneficiary 1297 expenditures that they essentially were flat year to year, there is no increase when historically they have been running 1298 1299 at somewhere between 5 and 10 percent annually, is that 1300 correct? 1301 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct. 1302 Mr. {Yarmuth.} All right. Thank you. So one of the 1303 things that I know we have spent a lot of time talking about, 1304 people who have signed up for insurance in the private

1305 insurance in--under the Affordable Care Act. But these are--1306 this is a data that has come about from the Commissioner of 1307 Medicaid in Kentucky. And I think this is so impressive. If 1308 you look at the top map, that is the 120 counties of

1309 Kentucky, color coded by the amount of--the percentage of 1310 uninsured citizens in those counties prior to the ACA. 1311 [Chart] 1312 Mr. {Yarmuth.} And red and orange, the--which are most of the counties in Kentucky, I think all but probably a 1313 1314 dozen, were rates of 17 to 20 percent, and then more than 20 1315 percent. This is--the bottom map is the current situation. 1316 And it is staggering to me that because the green is under 1317 13--is under 11 percent--8 to 11 percent. And blues, 5 to 8 1318 percent. And the dark blue, less than 5 percent. We have 1319 counties in Appalachian, southeastern Kentucky, that went 1320 from having the highest uninsured rate in the state, over 20 1321 percent, to the lowest uninsured rate, under 5 percent. And 1322 that to me is a staggering accomplishment. In Kentucky, we 1323 essentially have insured about half of the previously 1324 uninsured population of the Commonwealth, in a state that has 1325 very poor health historically and currently, and people who 1326 are in desperately in need of healthcare. And what is even 1327 more important I think than that is that the report of the 1328 commissioner--again, of Medicaid in Kentucky, talked about how preventive service utilization has increased dramatically 1329

1330 to almost 16 percent. An annual dental visit, which they 1331 weren't doing before. Adult preventive services increased by 1332 almost 37 percent, breast cancer screening by 20 percent, 1333 colorectal cancer screening by--up by 16 percent. Very, very 1334 important health measures that I think will pay off for the 1335 Commonwealth economically but also for the life of these 1336 citizens going forward. 1337 And also what is I think very important to note is how 1338 much reimbursements went up for providers in the

1339 Commonwealth, totals of--let us see. Reimbursements from 1340 now--those now covered under Medicaid expansion went up by 1341 \$284 million in just the first 6 months. So many of those 1342 hospitals and doctors and other providers who were providing 1343 uncompensated care for Kentucky residents are now being 1344 compensated. And that also is a great benefit to the

1345 taxpayers and the treasury of the Commonwealth.

So I just mention those things because it is very clear to me that states that embrace the Affordable Care Act and committed to making it work are having very, very positive experiences. The adverse experiences are coming in states where the administrations of those states, the governments

1351 decided in some cases just not to participate in, and other

1352 cases to try and sabotage the law.

1353 So I thank you for your work and for the information you
1354 brought to us today. I yield back.

1355 Mr. {Slavitt.} Thank you.

1356 Mr. {Murphy.} The gentleman yields back. Dr. Gingrey,1357 you are recognized for 5 minutes.

1358 Dr. {Gingrey.} Mr. Slavitt, one of the members earlier 1359 asked or made the comment that because of the medical loss 1360 ratio, I think maybe they were talking about the State of 1361 Florida, how much money was returned to the consumer of 1362 health insurance through the plans. Let me start out by 1363 specifically asking you this, because this is also been 1364 reported. If an individual ended up receiving an incorrect 1365 subsidy that they were not entitled to, what will be done to 1366 rectify this issue? Specifically, will they be sent 1367 additional funding if the subsidy was too low? Or will they 1368 need to pay back the money if the subsidy was too high? And when will consumers know if they owe the government more 1369 1370 monev?

1371 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. Thank you for the question,

1372 Congressman. So if individuals have changes in their income, 1373 the best advice is they should come back to the website and 1374 update that information so that their tax credit and premium 1375 can be updated. For those adjustments that are not made, 1376 when it comes to tax time, they will either receive a refund 1377 or they will have additional that they will owe. 1378 Dr. {Gingrey.} Well, I think we need to get some 1379 specific answers on questions like that, because this pay and 1380 chase model, as we know in past, absolutely in regard to let 1381 us say paying Medicare claims that were fraudulent, and then 1382 you have to go chase them down to try and get them back, you 1383 never do. If--you are aware this GAO report that came out--1384 well, I quess today. And it states that in January, CMS 1385 awarded a new company a contract to continue work on the 1386 federal marketplace for \$91 million, right? 1387 Mr. {Slavitt.} Correct. 1388 Dr. {Gingrey.} GAO says in the report that the cost now 1389 has ballooned to more than \$175 million, is that correct? 1390 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is what the report says, yes. 1391 Dr. {Gingrey.} Yeah. Right. And the investigation of

71

course ended a few months ago. Do you know if the cost--this

estimated cost of 91 million that is now 175 million that is 1393 1394 in the report, has it gone up even further since the report? Mr. {Slavitt.} No. I think the estimate of the total 1395 1396 contract--and again, this is not what has been paid. This is 1397 what is being budgeted is about 170 million. That is 1398 correct. 1399 Dr. {Gingrey.} You know, that is a pretty big error, 91 1400 million versus 175--how is it you can offer a contract for 1401 \$91 million and have it grow that much over such a short 1402 period of time? 1403 Mr. {Slavitt.} So I think the proper characterization 1404 of that contract is that the scope of the contract was 1405 completed after the initial contract was awarded. So I 1406 don't--I wouldn't characterize the cost as ballooning. I 1407 would actually characterize it as the proper scope with the 1408 contractor, Accenture, was determined after they got going. And the reason for that, if you don't mind me saying, is 1409 1410 because Accenture needed to be brought in in an urgent 1411 situation to take over for a contractor that was leaving. 1412 And so they agreed to an initial amount. And I--and this was 1413 before my time. And then agreed that they would come back
1414 after they got started, started the transition from CGI. And 1415 then they would come to terms with how much the scope ought 1416 to be. 1417 Dr. {Gingrey.} Mr. Slavitt, in my remaining time, let 1418 me ask you this. You have been with CMS now for what, 3 1419 weeks? 1420 Mr. {Slavitt.} Three weeks. 1421 Dr. {Gingrey.} And you are the number two quy there, 1422 right? 1423 Mr. {Slavitt.} Correct. Dr. {Gingrey.} You know, when--back in 2009/2010 1424 1425 timeframe when we marked up this Bill, a lot of us on this 1426 side of the aisle felt like that if the American people were 1427 going to have this Affordable Care Act--un-Affordable Care 1428 Act forced down their throat, that members of Congress and 1429 members of the Administration, the President, cabinet 1430 members, political appointees like yourself--you are not a 1431 career bureaucrat--1432 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct. 1433 Dr. {Gingrey.} You have been appointed by the President to come into this important position. We felt, and still 1434

1435 feel--many of us still feel that you ought to eat your own 1436 dog food. And members of Congress, I think it is 1437 appropriate, we are doing that. We had to come off the 1438 federal employee health benefit plan and get on the VC health link. And yet you members of the Administration, the 1439 1440 President and his family really ought to be doing the same 1441 thing. If--I know you worked in IT. But let us just say if 1442 you worked for Ford Motor Company, would you drive a 1443 Chevrolet? I kind of doubt it. 1444 Mr. {Slavitt.} I would hope not. 1445 Dr. {Gingrey.} I think you probably would drive a Ford. 1446 Mr. {Slavitt.} I would--1447 Dr. {Gingrey.} But what do you think about that in these remaining few seconds? Respond to me. Do you--like it 1448 1449 would be appropriate as a show of good faith to the American 1450 people that you guys and gals that are running this show that 1451 forced it upon us would be in the same plan that the American 1452 people have to be in?

1453 Mr. {Slavitt.} My understanding is that the President 1454 and his family are on the exchange. I don't know this for a 1455 fact. But that is my understanding. And if it is determined

1456 that the rest of us should be on the exchange, I would 1457 happily do that. Dr. {Gingrey.} Well, if you--if that is true, please 1458 1459 let me know. And I know we are limited in time. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 1460 1461 Mr. {Slavitt.} Okay. 1462 Mr. {Murphy.} I thank the gentleman to yield back. I 1463 now recognize Mr. Green for 5 minutes. 1464 Mr. {Green.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to my good 1465 friend and colleague from Georgia who I am going to miss, I not only drive Chevy's, but I am also on the plan. We had to 1466 buy ours through our exchange. And so--but I want to thank 1467 1468 the Chairman and Ranking Member and our witness for 1469 testifying. 1470 For decades, the United States has had the highest rate of uninsured in the industrialized world. This drives up 1471 1472 costs and puts families at risk of bankruptcy when they get 1473 sick. The main reason is why we have a health sick system 1474 rather than a healthcare system, because millions of

1475 Americans can't get the care they need outside the emergency 1476 room. In our own district in Texas, a very urban Texas, the

1477 Affordable Care Act's enabled almost 20,000 people previously 1478 uninsured to get quality, affordable coverage. Overall, the 1479 insurance rate in our district has fallen by eight percent. 1480 52,000 people in the district would have had access to 1481 coverage if Texas had expanded Medicaid, and hopefully we 1482 will still get to that.

1483 Earlier this month, the New England Journal of Medicine, 1484 not Fox News, not a left or right wing Internet site, but the 1485 New England Journal of Medicine released two reports on 1486 coverage under the ACA. And I would like to read a quote 1487 from them. With continuing enrollment, the numbers of 1488 Americans getting insurance for the first time, or insurance 1489 that is better in quality or more affordable than their 1490 previous policy, will total in the tens of millions.

1491And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent1492to place that article in the record?

1493 Mr. {Murphy.} Without objection.

1494 [The information follows:]

1496 Mr. {Green.} Thank you. 1497 Mr. Slavitt, are you familiar with these reports? 1498 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yes, at the high level. 1499 Mr. {Green.} Earlier this week, the Gallup Poll released their own latest total numbers of Americans having 1500 1501 insurance. Are you familiar with that survey? 1502 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yes, I am, Congressman. 1503 Mr. {Green.} The--similar, the Urban Institute and 1504 Commonwealth Fund conducted surveys. Can you discuss that 1505 also? 1506 Mr. {Slavitt.} I am familiar with those two, yes. Mr. {Green.} Okay. Would you agree that the findings 1507 of both Gallup and the New England Journal of Medicine are 1508 1509 consistent with the millions of Americans signing up for 1510 healthcare? 1511 Mr. {Slavitt.} They are consistent, very encouraging. 1512 Mr. {Green.} Okay. At this point, the only thing 1513 keeping millions more Americans from signing up for the 1514 coverage is the refusal of Republican governors and state 1515 legislatures to expand Medicaid. If they did, another five

1516 million Americans would be eligible for insurance.

1517 Mr. Chairman, I think the Affordable Care Act obviously 1518 coming out of the shoot, it was a problem. But it has been 1519 fixed. And hopefully we will see in the renewals it happen. 1520 But it is working, although a lot of us had tough times in 1521 October into mid-November who supported it.

1522 Mr. Slavitt, what is CMS doing to address the execution 1523 of the technology lessons learned from the first enrollment 1524 section?

1525 Mr. {Slavitt.} Well, Congressman, I got to this project when it was beginning the turnaround stage at the end of 1526 1527 October. And I think what we are doing now is essentially 1528 carrying over from what--just as we did in the turnaround. 1529 It is--there is no magic to it. It is basic blocking and 1530 tackling. It is good communication. It is guite frankly a lot of the recommendations that have come out of the GAO 1531 1532 report and making sure that we have precise requirements. It 1533 is daily management. It is senior level accountability that goes all the way up to the secretary. 1534

1535 Mr. {Green.} You know, I advocated in Texas, having
1536 served a lot of years in the state legislature, is that we

1537 should have had a Texas plan that we could have done. Some 1538 states had good examples of their plan, some not. Could you talk about that? Like, I know the State of Maryland and some 1539 1540 other states had problems. And I don't know if they are 1541 fixed or not. But were they similar to what we had on a 1542 national scale for our states that didn't have a state plan? 1543 Mr. {Slavitt.} In terms of the challenges, or just in 1544 terms of what they got done in their state? 1545 Mr. {Green.} Yeah. Were they on a smaller scale, 1546 having the same challenges that we were? 1547 Mr. {Slavitt.} I think it is probably safe to conclude 1548 at this point, towards the end of 2014, that it was the rare 1549 state, and maybe Kentucky's one of them, that didn't 1550 underestimate how difficult this would be, given all of the 1551 complexities of tying into Medicaid, tying into insurance 1552 companies, offering a consumer website. In the first year of 1553 any new program, in my experience, whether it is public 1554 sector or private sector, it is sometimes bumpy. The same is 1555 going to be true in the second year. But those problems 1556 become more and more minor, and we get better all the time. Mr. {Green.} To the best of your knowledge, for example 1557

1558 if a state wanted to create their own plan now, there is 1559 nothing in the law that would prohibit them from approaching 1560 CMS or HHS, either that or expanding in Medicaid coverage? 1561 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct. Mr. {Green.} Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will 1562 1563 yield back my time. 1564 Mr. {Murphy.} The gentleman yields back. I now 1565 recognize Dr. Burgess for 5 minutes. 1566 Dr. {Burgess.} Again, thank you, Mr. Slavitt, for being 1567 here. You heard my comments during the opening statement about the memorandum that Mr. Cohen suggested that I might 1568 1569 have. And I again just want to underscore that that is 1570 important to me. And even though Mr. Cohen is no longer at 1571 CMS, I would very much like to see that. 1572 Mr. {Slavitt.} It is my understanding that we have just sent it--we recently sent it. So if you don't receive it, I 1573 1574 will follow-up with your office and make sure that you have 1575 it. 1576 Dr. {Burgess.} All right. Very well. You know, and it 1577 is kind of--I was just thinking it has been almost a year ago, really right now, that your boss, Marilyn Tavenner, was 1578

1579 here. And we talked about some things about the upcoming 1580 launch of Healthcare.gov. But of course, that was just a 1581 little less than a month after the unilateral decision by the 1582 President to delay the employer mandate. Now, I remember 1583 asking Ms. Tavenner about how--was she involved in that 1584 decision. And she asserted that she was not. I asked her how she found out about it. And she said her chief of staff 1585 1586 told her, which I found rather astonishing. If my chief of 1587 staff came and gave me information like that, I mean I would 1588 be curious as to where that came from. And she seemed to 1589 lack curiosity about how that decision was reached. But let me ask you this, we are a year later. The employer mandate 1590 1591 is now supposed to kick in about a week and a half after 1592 Election Day in November. Is it your understanding that the 1593 employer mandate will in fact be enacted in November, or can 1594 we expect a further delay of that?

1595 Mr. {Slavitt.} So I am still working my way around the 1596 federal government, trying to understand how it all works.

1597 Dr. {Burgess.} Good luck.

1598 Mr. {Slavitt.} Thank you. My understanding--and you 1599 could please correct me if I am wrong is that that is an IRS

1600 and Treasury area of responsibility. So I haven't been 1601 exposed to that so much yet. 1602 Dr. {Burgess.} I--my personal belief is that we will 1603 never see the employer mandate. I have no inside 1604 information, obviously. I am not speaking for the Committee. 1605 I am just speaking for myself. When you look at the 1606 disruption that was caused in the individual market, October, 1607 November, December of last year, and remind yourself that 1608 that was only 15 percent of the insurance market that had 1609 that convulsion, had that happened to the entire--both the 1610 large group market, the small group market, the individual 1611 market all at once, it would have been pretty disruptive. 1612 Now, you heard Mr. Gingrey talk about members of 1613 Congress and members of the Administration should take the 1614 same thing people have to take. I agree with that. In fact, 1615 I did not take the BC Exchange that was offered to members of Congress and their staff. I said look, I'll do what other 1616 people in my district have to do. I went to Healthcare.gov, 1617 1618 bought a bronze plan off the website. The biggest mess I 1619 have ever been involved in in my life. But I finally got through. It took about three and a half months to do so. 1620

1621 Now, I am wondering what my rate is going to be next year. I 1622 have got the most expensive insurance--health insurance policy I have ever had, an enormous deductible. But what can 1623 1624 I look forward to in the next insurance year? You talked 1625 about you wanted a successful open enrollment. Is it going 1626 to be successful? What are the rates going to look like? 1627 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. So I think we are at a stage now 1628 where--and indeed, this is one of our high measures for 1629 success is making sure that there is enough choices and 1630 enough affordability. And, of course, each state is going 1631 through their own process and going through rate reviews. We 1632 have seen some states publicly now come out with their rates. 1633 I believe Rhode Island, Washington. California today is 1634 going to have I think an announcement with what their rates 1635 are. I couldn't tell you, Congressman, about Texas, because 1636 I don't know. But generally speaking, what we have seen are 1637 rates that are in not the double digit increased levels but 1638 in the mid-single digit levels. That is not going to 1639 necessarily be the case in every county in America, but that 1640 seems to be what is happening on average. 1641 Dr. {Burgess.} But still, I mean, you mentioned that in

1642 three or four states. We have got a long way to go before 1643 renewal rates across the country are in evidence. 1644 Mr. {Slavitt.} No question. No question. 1645 Dr. {Burgess.} I mean, you are the Principle Deputy Administrator. Do you have any responsibility or involvement 1646 1647 in the renewal or the rate filings? 1648 Mr. {Slavitt.} I think these are--these rate filings 1649 get reviewed and approved, you know, at the state level. 1650 There is a process. And I think it is in the mid-process. I 1651 believe right now that the --1652 Dr. {Burgess.} Let me just interrupt you, because my time is running up. Do you receive interim reports or 1653 1654 updates on what those state filings are? 1655 Mr. {Slavitt.} I think there has been an initial 1656 submission, and I have seen a high-level report. But this is 1657 not yet final information. 1658 Dr. {Burgess.} And are--is your office going to make 1659 those rate filings public information? Will we have the 1660 availability to access that? 1661 Mr. {Slavitt.} When they become final, absolutely.

1662 Absolutely.

1663 Dr. {Burgess.} Again, as a Healthcare.gov member from 1664 the State of Texas of the federal fallback, I would very much 1665 like to know what my renewal rates are for next year. 1666 Mr. {Slavitt.} Of course. 1667 Dr. {Burgess.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield 1668 back. 1669 Mr. {Murphy.} The gentleman's time has expired. I 1670 recognize Ms. Schakowsky for 5 minutes. 1671 Ms. {Schakowsky.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1672 I just wanted to tell you, Mr. Slavitt, I don't know if your office and your position is actually in charge, but we 1673 1674 have gotten tremendous cooperation from CMS when we have had constituent issues. And, you know, clearly, it comes out. 1675 1676 Consumers get confused, have a lot of guestions, have some 1677 problems. I got irritated sometimes. On the other side, I feel like there is an embracing of these problems rather than 1678 1679 a constituent service attitude to fix the problems. And when 1680 we have tried, we have had good success. And so I just 1681 wanted to tell you I appreciate that. 1682 I also just wanted to say that the minority staff has

1683 done a district by district, the benefits of the healthcare

1684 reform law in all the districts in the country. And it is 1685 just wonderful to see how the number of people that in my 1686 district, 283,000 people in my district, including 51,000 1687 children and 120,000 women now have health insurance that 1688 covers preventive services without any copays, coinsurance or 1689 deductibles. Needless to say, that is huge. 1690 Mr. {Slavitt.} Very good news. 1691 Ms. {Schakowsky.} And up to 36,000 children in my

1692 district with preexisting conditions can no longer be denied 1693 coverage by health insurers. It is just lots and lots of 1694 good news, including the new Medicaid enrollees that are now 1695 being covered.

1696 But I did have a question. So we are talking somewhat about the states that have expanded Medicaid and have not. 1697 1698 Twenty-six states, the District of Columbia, have expanded 1699 Medicaid coverage under the Affordable Care Act. And in 1700 those states, Medicaid is seeing great success. Enrollment 1701 has increased substantially, and the percentage of the 1702 population without insurance has declined dramatically. And 1703 I am asking you, Mr. Slavitt, if you have seen studies that 1704 compare the decline in the number of uninsured in states that

- 1705 did and did not expand Medicaid?
- 1706 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yes, I have seen those studies.
- 1707 Ms. {Schakowsky.} And can you tell me what you found?

1708 Mr. {Slavitt.} The states that have expand Medicaid--

1709 and I will have to get back to you on the exact figure--have

1710  $\,$  seen significantly lower rates of uninsured than those states  $\,$ 

1711 that did not expand Medicaid.

1712 Ms. {Schakowsky.} But we have seen a decline in any

1713 case in most--isn't it in all states?

1714 Mr. {Slavitt.} Declined in any case, and a bigger

1715 decline in states that have expanded Medicaid.

1716 Ms. {Schakowsky.} And have you seen the estimates about

1717 the number of Americans that would receive healthcare

1718 coverage if all 50 states expanded Medicaid? Do you know the

1719 size of this estimate?

1720 Mr. {Slavitt.} I believe that it is an additional five1721 million, if I am not correct--if I am not mistaken.

Ms. {Schakowsky.} All right. Thank you. And if that is the case, and I believe you that it is, this is really an appalling number, five million Americans who would receive healthcare coverage if Republican governors and state

1726 legislatures took the simple step of expanding Medicaid. Ιt 1727 is obviously good for people when more people have health 1728 insurance. 1729 But, Mr. Slavitt, what about healthcare providers? How does the Medicaid expansion help them? 1730 1731 Mr. {Slavitt.} So my information is anecdotal. But it 1732 appears that if the dramatic reduction, or a significant 1733 reduction in uncompensated care, it appears that this has 1734 been a very good thing for providers. 1735 Ms. {Schakowsky.} And this Committee has spent the last three years looking for some Affordable Care Act related 1736 1737 scandal. And despite all their concern, they have 1738 systematically ignored an ongoing healthcare tragedy, the 1739 dereliction of duty by Republican governors around the 1740 country who refuse to expand Medicaid. For those who have not been following this closely, the Affordable Care Act 1741 provides 100 percent federal funding for the first three 1742 1743 years for the states to expand Medicaid coverage to millions 1744 of low-income Americans, right? 1745 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct.

1746 Ms. {Schakowsky.} And yet for some reason, Republican

1747 governors in dozens of states have refused to expand coverage 1748 to low-income insured individuals in their states, correct? 1749 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is correct. 1750 Ms. {Schakowsky.} Well, this to me is a real scandal. 1751 The expansion doesn't cost states a dime. It provides 1752 qualified--quality affordable coverage for millions of Americans working hard just to get by. Yet some Republican 1753 1754 governors and state legislatures are deliberately refusing to 1755 provide coverage to millions of uninsured Americans. 1756 And, Mr. Chairman, that it seems to me is an issue this Subcommittee really should look into. And I yield back. 1757 1758 Mr. {Murphy.} The gentlelady yields back. I now 1759 recognize Ms. Blackburn for 5 minutes. 1760 Mrs. {Blackburn.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank 1761 you for being with us today. Overseeing this implementation, getting to the bottom of a lot of the questions, I think is 1762 1763 very important, and continuing to do our due diligence. And 1764 I know that several people have mentioned the New England 1765 Journal of Medicine article from last week, the health reform 1766 and changes in health insurance coverage. And my friends 1767 across the aisle have wanted to tout that as being something

1768 to prove their point.

1769 I think that it is important though to go in here and 1770 look at how the authors came to the conclusion that 5.2 percent more had insurance, that there was a decline in those 1771 1772 without insurance from September 2013 to June of 2014. And 1773 then the authors mention the limitations of their study. 1774 They said that the study did not distinguish between persons 1775 enrolling for the first time and those who were changing 1776 their enrollment. And I really wonder how many of those that 1777 had to buy more expensive policies, new policies that were 1778 Obamacare compliant? How did that affect that number? 1779 And the authors measured improvement and access to care 1780 by asking two questions. First, did the survey participants 1781 identify a personal doctor? And, second, did the survey 1782 participants report difficulty paying medical bills? Well, 1783 it seems to me a more important outcome measure would be whether a person was actually able to see the doctor. 1784 1785 Because in our district, we hear from people they can't get 1786 access to the doctor. They have got access to the gueue, 1787 because they have got a card. They can't get access to the 1788 doctor.

1789 So while my colleagues across the aisle talk about how 1790 many people have insurance, I would like to remind everyone 1791 that having an insurance card is not the same as having 1792 medical care. And I continue to hear from people in 1793 Tennessee who lost their health plan. They liked it. They 1794 can't keep it. I hear from people that have not been able to 1795 keep their doctor because of the narrow networks in 1796 Obamacare. I hear from people who go to the doctor and need 1797 a test, but can't get the test because their copays and their 1798 coinsurance are too high. They can't afford it. This stuff 1799 is too expensive to afford.

1800 And, finally, we are hearing from some of our Tennessee 1801 insurance carriers, they are going to have a 19 percent 1802 increase in the health insurance premiums in 2015. So it is kind of like adding insult to injury. You have got this 1803 1804 stuff. You can't use it because it is too expensive to 1805 afford. The copays are too high. You have an insurance 1806 card, but you can't get into see the doctor and you are 1807 having to wait. I don't understand why my colleagues across 1808 the aisle continue to defend this thing.

1809 But, today, we are shifting our focus to oversight and

1810 the way that taxpayer dollars--I remind everyone, taxpayer 1811 dollars are paying for this. And the people don't like it. 1812 On January 1, 2014, HHS certified to Congress that the 1813 American health benefit exchanges, the marketplace, were 1814 verifying their applicants for advanced payments of the tax 1815 credits. Cost share and reductions were indeed eligible. 1816 However, the GAO secret shopper investigation found that 11 1817 out of 12 secret shoppers were able to obtain health 1818 insurance and qualify for premium tax credits using 1819 fictitious identities and fraudulent documents. Now, let me, for the benefit of my colleagues, talk a little bit about 1820 what a secret shopper program does. 1821 1822 When I had my marketing business, we would run secret shopper programs for malls and shopping centers and chambers 1823 1824 of commerce. You would identify where your problems are. And then you get in there and you clean them up. The problem 1825 is the system allows fraud. If you have got 11 out of 12 1826 1827 that something is wrong, Mr. Slavitt, that is a failing 1828 grade. There had been over 30 delays in implementation. The 1829 President has made multiple unilateral changes. And, you know, we are here to learn about the contracting practices 1830

1831 that took place at CMS with the botched implementation of 1832 this law. We are looking at the GAO study. That is--this 1833 thing is not much better. 1834 Let us talk about this contract. So January, CMS awarded a contract to a new company to continue work on the 1835 federal marketplace. It was a \$91 million contract, correct? 1836 1837 Mr. {Slavitt.} Correct. 1838 Mrs. {Blackburn.} Okay. Now, GAO says that cost has 1839 ballooned to more than \$175 million, is that correct? 1840 Mr. {Murphy.} You can answer that question. 1841 Mr. {Slavitt.} That is what the report says. I don't agree with that characterization, but that -- it is what the 1842 1843 report says. 1844 Mrs. {Blackburn.} Okay. Thank you. I will submit the 1845 rest of my questions. I yield back. Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. Now, we have just been called 1846 to vote. We will go through Ms. Ellmers' questions, and then 1847 1848 we will take a break and come back for the second part. 1849 Ms. Ellmers, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 1850 Mrs. {Ellmers.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 1851 for being with us, Mr. Slavitt.

1852 I would like to go back to a little bit of the 1853 discussion you had with my colleague from Ohio, Mr. Johnson. 1854 I know you had made some comments there at the end where you 1855 pointed out that in the real world, and, you know, that 1856 things are much more realistic. And that ideologically, many 1857 times things seem like they are going to be better than they 1858 are. I would say to you, sir, that that is exactly why I 1859 ended up running for office, being a nurse, because I did 1860 see--and my husband, as a doctor, saw that the plan that was 1861 going forward was not going to be realistic. And I think we 1862 have learned over time that that is the case, and that there 1863 were many promises made that have not been kept--well 1864 intended, but not true for the American people. So I do 1865 again--I share with you that same sentiment, but realize too 1866 that that is why we feel so strongly about this issue that 1867 the American people do need to see what can be realistic and 1868 achieved in good healthcare in this country, and good 1869 healthcare coverage.

1870 You did also have an exchange with Mr. Johnson on the 1871 cost of Healthcare.gov, and what it should have cost. You 1872 reluctantly did not answer the question of, you know, the

1873 cost being a billion dollars, is a billion dollars too much

1874 for the implementation thus far?

1875 Mr. {Slavitt.} So thank you, Congresswoman. I have not 1876 seen a study yet which looks at what the appropriate cost for building the entire Healthcare.gov system should be. But, of 1877 1878 course, I do acknowledge that our colleagues at the GAO 1879 pointed out that there were absolutely inefficiencies and 1880 waste in the way the contract was managed. So at the very 1881 least, we know there was some. I would hesitate to say 1882 though that it was entirely waste, because there was a really 1883 significant set of systems built. And I think those systems 1884 have significant long-term value for the country.

1885 Mrs. {Blackburn.} You know, there again, it gets back to that same issue of what is realistic, what is achievable. 1886 1887 And, you know, simply throwing money at it, and then looking 1888 back in hindsight to determine what did work and didn't, I 1889 think we all are learning from this experience. So that, of 1890 course, has value. I don't know how you measure it. But the 1891 American taxpayers are still on the hook for this. And that 1892 is again why we are taking the approach we are, which is, you know, when is it going to be enough? When are we going to 1893

1894 achieve the goals at a cost effective measure?

1895 I want to look into some of the issues with security 1896 breaches. Are you aware at this time of any problems that 1897 the websites--from the building of the website, and that there are still concerns? Are you aware of any right now? 1898 1899 Mr. {Slavitt.} So there have been no successful 1900 malicious attacks. And, certainly to the best of my 1901 knowledge, no one's individual data has ever been compromised 1902 from the Healthcare.gov website.

1903 Mrs. {Blackburn.} So to the best of your knowledge, and 1904 just based on the answer that you gave, you are not seeing 1905 that there were any related information breaches in 1906 Healthcare.gov or traveling through the federal exchanges 1907 that you would consider a security breach?

1908 Mr. {Slavitt.} We have not seen any malicious attacks 1909 that have been successful. And we have not seen anybody's 1910 personal information in any way get compromised.

1911 Mrs. {Blackburn.} What is the definition of a

1912 successful breach?

1913 Mr. {Slavitt.} Well, I am not trying to be cagy, just-1914 but other than to say that we--that nobody has successfully

1915	penetrated the security system to the best of my knowledge,
1916	Congresswoman.
1917	Mrs. {Blackburn.} Are you aware of any companies
1918	building, operating or otherwise working on federal
1919	exchanges, obtaining access to information that they should
1920	not have? Anyone who is outside of the system or working on-
1921	-that have?
1922	Mr. {Slavitt.} Not to my knowledge.
1923	Mrs. {Blackburn.} And information on enrollees or
1924	applicants, none there as well?
1925	Mr. {Slavitt.} No, not to my knowledge.
1926	Mrs. {Blackburn.} Are you aware of any changes to site
1927	protocols or standards to address breaches to accessed
1928	information?
1929	Mr. {Slavitt.} I think it is fair to say that the
1930	security team does continuous monitoring, and makes changes
1931	and puts in new patches as, you know, newas different
1932	security things I have found out about in the industry and so
1933	forth. So there is a continuous monitoring
1934	Mrs. {Blackburn.} Can we obtain that information over
1935	time, any of the changes and updates that may have taken

1936 place for the Committee?

Mr. {Slavitt.} Sure. Let me figure out what I can share. I obviously don't want all of the things that our security team does to be well understood by the wrong people. But I want to make sure to get you the information you need. Mrs. {Blackburn.} Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

1943 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. They have called votes.

1944 Mr. Slavitt, we thank you for your testimony. Members 1945 will have a few days to get other questions to you. And we 1946 would appreciate a quick and thorough and honest response.

1947 Mrs. {Blackburn.} Mr. Chairman, can I move to strike 1948 the last word, just very briefly?

1949 Mr. {Murphy.} Sure.

Mrs. {Blackburn.} I just want to--Dr. Burgess had mentioned earlier that HHS didn't respond to the Committee's request for an analysis of its legal authority to make payments in connection with the risk corridors program. I was told--I have just been told that HSS did respond to the request and provided a response to the Committee on Jun 18, 2014. And in the response, they also included a legal

1957 analysis. So I wanted to clarify the record. And I wanted

1958 to also make sure that if Dr. Burgess, or you or the

1959 Committee staff did not receive that, we will put--we will

1960 get another copy to you.

1961 Mr. {Murphy.} Dr. Burgess?

Dr. {Burgess.} Well, in fact, I did not receive it. 1963 But I would be anxious to look at it and see if it answers 1964 the question as it was asked. And, Mr. Chairman, if I could 1965 have the indulgence of one brief follow-up with Mr. Slavitt? 1966 Mr. {Murphy.} Yes, very brief.

Dr. {Burgess.} Mr. Slavitt, we have heard a lot of discussion about the fact that when this thing went live, the backend part of the system was not built. Is it now built and available and ready to use, the part that pays providers?

1971 Mr. {Slavitt.} So the part that pays the issuers,

1972 issuers are getting paid today.

1973Dr. {Burgess.}How about the doctors and hospitals?1974Mr. {Slavitt.}The doctors and hospitals get paid by

1975  $\,$  the health plans, not by the exchange--not by the

1976 marketplace.

1977 Dr. {Burgess.} So--okay. So the backend part of the

1978 system is up and fully functional?

1979 Mr. {Slavitt.} No, no, no. The backend part of the system is going through continuous releases. Today, we are 1980 1981 paying the issuers on an estimated basis. There will be a 1982 coming release this year where--by the end of this year where they will beginning to get paid at a policy level basis. And 1983 1984 then next year, continued automation will occur to tie 1985 everything into the backend of CMS' systems. 1986 Dr. {Burgess.} Okay. Mr. Chairman, it just begs the 1987 question. Have the right people been paid the right amount 1988 of money? These are taxpayer dollars that are--Mr. {Slavitt.} I will follow-up--1989

1990 Mr. {Murphy.} What we will do is we will follow-up with 1991 some questions to you.

1992 Mr. {Slavitt.} Yeah. I will be happy to follow-up.

1993 Mr. {Murphy.} Mr. Woods, we will probably reconvene--1994 our votes will probably take us to 11:30. So this will be in 1995 a brief recess until 11:30. And we will be back. Thank you 1996 very much.

1997 [Recess]

1998 Mr. {Murphy.} This reconvenes the Subcommittee on

1999 Oversight and Investigation. I would now like to introduce 2000 the witness on the second panel for today's hearing. Mr. 2001 William T. Woods is the Director with Acquisition and 2002 Sourcing Management Team at the Government Accountability 2003 Office. He provides overall direction for GAO's review of 2004 contracting activities at defense and civilian agencies. 2005 I will now swear in the witness. Are you aware that 2006 this Committee is holding an investigative hearing, and when 2007 doing so has the practice of taking testimony under oath? Do 2008 you have any objections to testifying under oath? 2009 Mr. {Woods.} None whatsoever. Mr. {Murphy.} The Chair then advised you that under the 2010 2011 rules of the House and the rules of the Committee, you are 2012 entitled to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be 2013 advised by counsel during your testimony today? Mr. {Woods.} No, I do not. 2014 2015 [Witness sworn] 2016 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. You are now under oath and 2017 subject to the penalties set forth in Title XVIII, Section 2018 1001 of the United States Code. You may now give a 5-minute 2019 summary of your written statement.

2020 ^TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM WOODS, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND 2021 SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

2022 } Mr. {Woods.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 2023 DeGette. It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon to talk 2024 to you about Healthcare.gov and the work that we have done 2025 looking into that system.

2026 When the website was launched in October of last year, 2027 there were, of course, a number of problems. We got a lot of 2028 requests from the Congress to review what happened and why. 2029 Those requests came from both the House and the Senate, from both sides of the aisle. We got requests from committee 2030 2031 chairs, from ranking members, from individual senators, 2032 individual congressmen across the board. And what we decided to do was to combine all of those requests and conduct a body 2033 of work that addressed all of the issues that were raised in 2034 2035 those various requests. We have a number of engagements 2036 underway to address all of those issues.

2037 The one that we will be talking about today is 2038 contracts. But let me just mention, we have one that has

2039 nearing completion on privacy and security concerns with 2040 respect to the website. And we also have a report that is 2041 on-track for issuance later this year on information 2042 technology management. That report will look at the use of 2043 best practices in the development of this information 2044 technology system.

2045 But I am going to be talking today about our first 2046 report that was issued--publicly released yesterday. And 2047 that is on the contracting aspects of Healthcare.gov. And we 2048 will--I am going to be talking about our three objectives. 2049 The first thing we reviewed was the acquisition planning by CMS for the website. Secondly, we looked at the oversight of 2050 2051 the cost schedule and performance of that system. And then, 2052 thirdly, we looked at a range of contractor performance issue 2053 with respect to Healthcare.gov.

We focused on the largest task orders and contracts that were involved here. Our report mentions that CMS had spent about \$840 million for development of the system. And that was through March. Obviously, the spending has continued. And that number is likely higher today. But as of the time that we completed our work, it was \$840 million.

And we focused on the largest. We reviewed in depth two task orders and one contract. Just briefly, those task orders are one, two. First, to CGI federal for development of the federally facilitated marketplace. That is basically the website itself, as well as some back office systems that support the enrollment process, the financial management process, plan management, et cetera.

2067 We also looked at a task order awarded to QSSI. And 2068 that is for the data hub. The data hub is a system that 2069 interfaces with other agencies. There are roles that other 2070 federal agencies need to play to make this system work, the 2071 Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Homeland Security 2072 to verify immigration status, et cetera. So lots of agencies 2073 have a role here. And the hub data system is that system 2074 that allows for communication among all of those agencies. 2075 And then the third contract that we looked at is one 2076 with Accenture. That was awarded on a sole source basis by CMS in January of this year for continued development of that 2077 2078 federally facilitated marketplace.

2079 Before I get to our specific findings, I just wanted to 2080 make an observation that there really are some common threads

that run through all of the work that we did here. And those 2081 2082 threads are first of all complexity. This was an enormously 2083 complex undertaking. As I said, there were lots of federal 2084 agencies involved, a number of states involved, industry partners, healthcare plans. Lots of players. There were 2085 2086 also lots of systems that had to interact with each other. 2087 And that added to the complexity. Another thread that runs 2088 through--and you will see that in the--when we get to the findings in a moment--is the pressure of deadlines. The 2089 2090 Affordable Care Act itself set January 1, 2014 as the date 2091 when the enrollment took effect. The Department of Health and Human Services backed up from that January deadline and 2092 2093 set an October 1, 2013 time for when the system needed to be 2094 ready to go, when they could throw the switch, the go-live 2095 date, that sort of thing. They needed to have things in place by October 1 of 2013. And that drove a lot of the 2096 decisions that were made by CMS. And then the third thread 2097 2098 that runs through all of our findings is the changing 2099 requirements. Things were constantly evolving, which made it 2100 difficult not only for CMS personnel to keep things on track 2101 but also for the contractors to keep up with those changes.

2102 Some of those were anticipated changes, things they knew 2103 going in they did not yet know. But others were, they were 2104 learning as they went along. 2105 Let me get into the specific findings in the three areas 2106 that I mentioned. In the area of--2107 Mr. {Murphy.} Could you summarize, because you are 2108 already a couple minutes over? We want to ask you a number 2109 of questions, so if you could just summarize your final 2110 findings? 2111 Mr. {Woods.} Certainly. Yeah. 2112 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. Mr. {Woods.} In the area of planning, our bottom line 2113 2114 assessment is simple yet sobering. And that is that CMS 2115 began and undertook the development of the Healthcare.gov 2116 system without adequate planning, despite facing a number of 2117 challenges that increased both the level of risk and the need 2118 for oversight.

2119 In the oversight area, we saw increasing costs across 2120 the instruments that we looked at. Both of the task orders 2121 experienced cost increases, and the new contract awarded to 2122 Accenture also saw cost increases. Those cost increases were

2123 due to a number of factors. As I said, some requirements 2124 were unknown at the time they awarded these instruments. 2125 When those costs became known, when those requirements became 2126 known, those--the costs increased. The cost schedule and 2127 performance issues were exacerbated by inconsistent and 2128 sometimes absent oversight. 2129 And then in the third area about contracting 2130 performance, we saw primarily in the CGI federal task order 2131 an increasing sense of frustration on the part of CMS of the 2132 contractor's inability to be able to comply with contract 2133 requirements and meet deliverable schedules. That 2134 frustration grew to the point where they decided not to renew the contract with CGI and instead to move to a different 2135 2136 solution, which is to award the contract to Accenture. So those are our three findings. We have a series of 2137 2138 recommendations to address some of the issues. And I would 2139 be delighted to get into the specifics of that as the hearing 2140 goes forward. 2141 [The prepared statement of Mr. Woods follows:]

2143 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you, Mr. Woods. We appreciate your 2144 thoroughness and your candorness.

2145 So as you described things like inconsistent or absent oversight, you said oversight weaknesses, a lack of adherence 2146 2147 to planning requirements compounded by acquisition planning 2148 challenges. And when Mr. Slavitt testified earlier, he said 2149 fortunately or unfortunately, the GAO report wasn't news. So 2150 as you are going through this, with regard to the oversight, 2151 did people within CMS and--know that these problems were 2152 brewing?

2153 Mr. {Woods.} We saw some indication that the problems 2154 were known, particularly with the CGI issue that I mentioned 2155 earlier. That was well documented what their concerns were. 2156 Other aspects though, Mr. Chairman, were not quite as 2157 visible. And let me point out one area. We found a number of instances--and our count was about 40--where changes were 2158 2159 being made to the contract requirements at the direction of 2160 people that did not have the authority to do that.

2161 Mr. {Murphy.} Within CMS--

2162 Mr. {Woods.} Within CMS. These were largely--
2163 Mr. {Murphy.} When you say did not have the authority, 2164 you mean they had not discussed these with Mr. Cohen or Ms. 2165 Tavenner? 2166 Mr. {Woods.} Well, the only person within CMS that has authority to change the contract in a manner that increases 2167 the government's obligations is the contracting officer. 2168 2169 Mr. {Murphy.} Who was? 2170 Mr. {Woods.} I am sorry? 2171 Mr. {Murphy.} And who was that? 2172 Mr. {Woods.} I don't have the name right at my finger--2173 Mr. {Murphy.} But what I am wondering here is do you know if--so what--the problems with the website--it took 2174 2175 longer to develop it. The security wasn't a question. 2176 People had problems signing up, and with inconsistent or 2177 absent oversight. So I am wondering in some case, you are 2178 saying there was actions taken without authorization. 2179 Several dozen of these, I believe, that you documented. 2180 Mr. {Woods.} That is correct. 2181 Mr. {Murphy.} So people were making change orders, and 2182 that was leaving some problems. But there was also absent oversight. So some people in charge were not meeting, were 2183

2184 not paying attention, were not monitoring this contract? Or 2185 they were monitoring some things and making the wrong 2186 decisions? Was it both, or one or the other? Mr. {Woods.} A combination of things. There are a 2187 2188 number of people with different roles to play. As I 2189 mentioned, there is a contracting officer. But there was 2190 also, on the program side, a governance board review process. 2191 And that process was designed to provide high level 2192 management oversight. And what we found there was that that 2193 process simply did not work as intended. 2194 Mr. {Murphy.} Now, we also had heard that there was a 2195 McKinsey Report commissioned by then Secretary Sebelius which 2196 made it pretty clear they weren't going to meet their 2197 deadlines. Did they know within CMS that this--these deadlines couldn't be met, and that under the pressure which 2198 2199 you had listed such as the January 1 deadline, or the 2200 complexity of this, did they know that this really wasn't 2201 ready for primetime? 2202 Mr. {Woods.} We found some indication in the files that 2203 we reviewed that in the spring timeframe, the spring of 2013, that estimates were made that the federally facilitated 2204

2205 marketplace would only be 65 percent complete by the October 2206 1 deadline. 2207 Mr. {Murphy.} So they knew then in the spring. Did 2208 they know that in August and September? 2209 Mr. {Woods.} There was--the state of knowledge 2210 continued to progress from the spring through the end of the 2211 summer. And they became increasingly concerned that the 2212 deadline would not be met. One of the principle oversight 2213 functions and processes that we saw, and that we were very 2214 concerned about, is there was supposed to be, according to 2215 the original schedule, an operational readiness review conducted in the spring of 2013. That operational readiness 2216 2217 review was moved from the spring to the fall, to September of 2218 2013, just weeks before--2219 Mr. {Murphy.} And when they did that review, did they know it wasn't going to work? 2220 2221 Mr. {Woods.} Well, as I said, there was some indication 2222 in the files that they thought only 65 percent complete. Mr. {Murphy.} So when Ms. Tavenner--2223 2224 Mr. {Woods.} The purpose of that operational readiness review is to either confirm that the system will work or find 2225 111

2226 out what is wrong.

2227 Mr. {Murphy.} So when--

2228 Mr. {Woods.} So that there is enough time to fix it. 2229 Mr. {Murphy.} So when Ms. Tavenner came before this 2230 Committee, or more specifically when Mr. Cohen came before 2231 this Committee within days of the launch, and he said 2232 everything was going to be fine by October 1, what you are 2233 saying to this Committee is there was ample evidence to say 2234 that was not true?

2235 Mr. {Woods.} We saw some indication that there was 2236 progressively increasing knowledge that there were problems 2237 in meeting that launch date.

Mr. {Murphy.} Okay. And did Mr. Cohen know that?Mr. {Woods.} I don't know that.

Mr. {Murphy.} But either through lack of oversight, he should have known it, or he knew it and reported to this Committee under oath that everything was fine, and August 1, it was going to be ready for launch? What you are telling us, there was ample evidence in what is reviewed that people within HHS knew it was not ready, and people under oath told this Committee something entirely different?

2247 Mr. {Woods.} Yeah. I don't know what specific 2248 individuals knew or did not know. But we saw evidence in the 2249 files that we reviewed that there was a knowledge within the 2250 Agency that the operation readiness was in jeopardy. 2251 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. I am over time. I will now turn to Ms. DeGette for 5 minutes. 2252 2253 Ms. {DeGette.} Well, this is an important issue. So 2254 you are saying people within the Agency knew that the website 2255 was not ready, correct? Yes or no? 2256 Mr. {Woods.} We did--we saw evidence in the files--Ms. {DeGette.} You saw yes that people--do you think 2257 2258 that people in the Agency knew that the website would collapse on October 1, yes or no? 2259 2260 Mr. {Woods.} I can't speak to that particular 2261 characterization. 2262 Ms. {DeGette.} You don't have any--do you have 2263 indication from the files that people in the Agency knew that 2264 the website would not work on October 1? 2265 Mr. {Woods.} Yes, we saw that. Yes. Ms. {DeGette.} Can you produce that to this Committee, 2266

2267 please?

- 2268 Mr. {Woods.} There was a series--
- 2269 Ms. {DeGette.} No, can you produce it--

2270 Mr. {Woods.} Absolutely, ma'am. Yes.

- 2271 Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you.
- 2272 Mr. {Woods.} Yes, ma'am.

2273 Ms. {DeGette.} Now, my next question, because Ms.

2274 Tavenner and Mr. Cohen did come in here and testify under

2275 oath several days before, as the Chairman has said, that the

2276 website would work. Do you have evidence in your files that

2277 Mr. Cohen or Ms. Tavenner knew that this website would not

2278 work, yes or no?

2279 Mr. {Woods.} No, I cannot speak to the knowledge of any 2280 individual.

Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you. Now, in your opening statement, you talked about some provisions the GAO was coming up with to strengthen the website for--some recommendations for privacy and security concerns, is that correct?

2286 Mr. {Woods.} Well, this particular report that we are 2287 speaking to today just deals with the contracting aspect--2288 Ms. {DeGette.} Right. But you talked about--

2289 Mr. {Woods.} Not--2290 Ms. {DeGette.} But--2291 Mr. {Woods.} Not for security and privacy. That--2292 Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. So you are not looking at privacy 2293 and security? 2294 Mr. {Woods.} Other teams within GAO are looking at--2295 Ms. {DeGette.} Are looking--2296 Mr. {Woods.} And that work--2297 Ms. {DeGette.} Are you aware of any security breaches 2298 in the websites, yes or no? 2299 Mr. {Woods.} No, I am not. Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. Now, the GAO made five 2300 2301 recommendations you reference in your opening statement to 2302 CMS to avoid the mistakes that you had identified, is that 2303 correct? 2304 Mr. {Woods.} Yes. 2305 Ms. {DeGette.} And I just want to go through those 2306 recommendations, because you said we should. And I think it 2307 is important to know. The recommendations I think are good 2308 recommendations, but they are a little vague. And so I am going to ask you about each one of them if you have specific 2309

2310 details. But then also, I am going to ask you, Mr. Woods, to 2311 supplement your testimony and provide to this Committee, and 2312 to CMS, specific details on each one of them. Because I 2313 think it is important for the CMS to actually be able to 2314 implement these recommendations. And our last witness said 2315 he agreed with the recommendations, and he did want to 2316 implement them. 2317 The first recommendation is that CMS should take steps

to assess the causes of the increase in cost of the continued development of Healthcare.gov and the delays in functionality of the website, and develop a plan to mitigate those costs and delays. Can you briefly give us a little more detail on what steps the GAO believes CMS should take to make those assessments?

2324 Mr. {Woods.} Certainly. We did see cost increases in 2325 the Accenture contract, the current contract--

2326 Ms. {DeGette.} So what steps do you think CMS can take 2327 to rectify these problems?

2328 Mr. {Woods.} We think that they need to step back and 2329 identify the causes, the reasons why costs continue to 2330 increase, in that particular contract.

2331 Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. And do you have any thoughts what 2332 should be included in a mitigation plan? 2333 Mr. {Woods.} They need to make sure that costs are 2334 under control, and that the schedule can be met. 2335 Ms. {DeGette.} Yeah. I think those two things are key. 2336 Now, the next thing the GAO recommends is that quality 2337 assurance surveillance plans and other oversight documents 2338 are collected and used to monitor contract performance. How 2339 can those documents be effectively used to monitor 2340 performance? 2341 Mr. {Woods.} The quality assurance surveillance plan is a standard document that is required in most efforts of this 2342 2343 size that provides a roadmap for how the Agency--any agency 2344 is going to oversee the contractor's performance. 2345 Ms. {DeGette.} Right. Does the GAO have thoughts on 2346 how it can be used to do that? Mr. {Woods.} Yes, it--2347 Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. If you can give us that 2348 2349 information, that would be great. 2350 Mr. {Woods.} Certainly. 2351 Ms. {DeGette.} I want to go through your other

2352	recommendations briefly while I still have time.
2353	Mr. {Woods.} Certainly.
2354	Ms. {DeGette.} The GAO also recommends that CMS
2355	formalize existing guidance of the responsibilities of
2356	personnel assigned oversight duties. So as I understand it,
2357	the roles and responsibilities were spelled out in some way.
2358	How would formalizing existing guidance prevent confusion
2359	about the responsibilities and authority going forward?
2360	Mr. {Woods.} This gets to the issue of unauthorized
2361	individuals making changes.
2362	Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. Great.
2363	Mr. {Woods.} And when they learned of that, there was
2364	internal guidance provided to all of the people thatbut
2365	that has not been institutionalized. It has not been made
2366	part of the permanent guidance at
2367	Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. Okay. So they already have a way
2368	they are doing it? That just needs to be formalized?
2369	Mr. {Woods.} It needs to take the next step.
2370	Ms. {DeGette.} Perfect. Now, the next thing, you
2371	recommend giving staff direction on acquisition strategies
2372	and developing a process to ensure that acquisition

2373	strategies are completed on-time. Can you flesh that out a
2374	little bit for us?
2375	Mr. {Woods.} That was a very important sufficiency that
2376	we identified is that there were a number of steps that CMS
2377	took to expedite the rollout of thisof Healthcare.gov.
2378	Ms. {DeGette.} Yeah.
2379	Mr. {Woods.} But each of those individual steps added
2380	risk to the process. And the purpose of the plan, of the
2381	acquisition strategy, is to first of all identify those risks
2382	to be able to come up with a plan to address them. And we
2383	found that that acquisition strategy was not prepared.
2384	Ms. {DeGette.} Right. So does GAO have some ideas what
2385	this process could look like if done appropriately?
2386	Mr. {Woods.} The process is already in place.
2387	Ms. {DeGette.} Okay.
2388	Mr. {Woods.} The regulations at HHS are very clear.
2389	Ms. {DeGette.} Okay.
2390	Mr. {Woods.} In fact, there is a template. It just
2391	wasn't done in this particular case.
2392	Ms. {DeGette.} Oh, great. So they just need to follow
2393	the existing way. Perfect.

2394 Mr. {Woods.} Exactly.

Ms. {DeGette.} Last, you recommended ensuring that information technology projects adhere to the requirements for governance board approvals before proceeding with development. What exactly does that mean? What governing board are you referring to? What are the requirements? And why did the board approval process fail the first time around with Healthcare.gov?

Mr. {Woods.} Yeah. The Agency had a system in place that provided for an oversight board to review the progress of the system. The problem that we found is that those governance board meetings were held with incomplete information, and that decisions were not made as we would have expected to either approve, disapprove or make modifications in the--

2409 Ms. {DeGette.} So what you are saying is once again, 2410 this was a failure to follow the existing rules that they 2411 had?

2412 Mr. {Woods.} There was a process in place. They did 2413 not follow it.

2414 Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you. Thanks for your indulgence,

2415 Mr. Chairman.

2416 Mr. {Murphy.} Yes. I know recognize Ms. Ellmers from2417 North Carolina for 5 minutes.

2418 Mrs. {Ellmers.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Woods, for being with us today. And, you know, as I am 2419 2420 sitting here listening to your report findings, I am 2421 incredibly amazed by the inefficiency that went forward with a plan of action that was in place. And I keep coming up 2422 2423 with the same question of why? Why were these steps taken? 2424 Why was action taken the way that it was? Why were there 2425 unauthorized individuals making decisions? But I think one 2426 of the most glaring questions that I have, based on your 2427 findings, is that -- and you use the word that they expedite -you know, they took measures to expedite the rollout, that 2428 2429 that added risk, obviously. And that was a strayed--failed strategy, essentially. Why in your opinion, based on your 2430 2431 findings, did they stay with that October 1 rollout date when 2432 they knew, based on what I am listening to, that it was not 2433 going to be accurate and successful, and that it would be a 2434 failure?

2435 Mr. {Woods.} Well, the law itself, the Affordable Care

2436 Act set a hard deadline of January 1, 2014.

2437 Mrs. {Ellmers.} Um-hum.

2438 Mr. {Woods.} And they needed to have some period where 2439 consumers could determine their eligibility, look at plan 2440 availability and make decisions about what plans they wanted 2441 to choose by that January 1 date.

2442 Mrs. {Ellmers.} Um-hum. Um-hum. So they stuck with 2443 the October 1 date knowing that their time was running out, 2444 and that they--so now, this is me just again trying to 2445 process why they would go forward with something that 2446 obviously was not put together well, and the steps were taken--it wasn't an efficient system. And yet they were 2447 2448 moving forward. So based on your knowledge, they had to go 2449 forward with that October 1 date so that they could have the 2450 enrollee numbers that they we relooking for by January 1, regardless of the fact that it wasn't going to work? 2451 2452 Mr. {Woods.} That has been CMS' position is that they 2453 needed to stick with that October 1--2454 Mrs. {Ellmers.} So they had to stick to that date, 2455 because they needed those numbers of individuals signing up

2456 essentially, yes?

2457 Mr. {Woods.} Well, they needed to comply to have a 2458 system in place by October 1--by January 1 in order to comply 2459 with the Affordable Care Act. 2460 Mrs. {Ellmers.} Right. Okay. So I am going to go back to some of the questions also on the tax surge--when the tax 2461 2462 surge was implemented. To the best of our knowledge, and 2463 based on your report findings, we understand that there was 2464 a, again, tax surge in October to fix the site after 2465 Healthcare.gov's failed October 1 launch. Based on your 2466 investigation, what actions did CMS take in October to fix the site? 2467 Mr. {Woods.} In October, they continued to work with 2468 2469 CGI Federal. 2470 Mrs. {Ellmers.} Um-hum. 2471 Mr. {Woods.} But the level of frustration reached the 2472 point in November of 2013 where they sent yet another letter 2473 detailing the shortcomings of the contractor, asking for a 2474 corrective action plan. CGI responded to that, and clearly 2475 disagreed with CMS' assessment at that point. Mrs. {Ellmers.} Okay. So they were disagreeing with 2476

2477  $\,$  it. Were--so was CGI--I mean, because there were other  $\,$ 

2478 contractors involved too, was that -- is that correct? 2479 Mr. {Woods.} There were many other contractors 2480 involved. 2481 Mrs. {Ellmers.} Yes. 2482 Mr. {Woods.} Correct. Mrs. {Ellmers.} Okay. But particularly, it was CGI 2483 2484 that is where the frustration was--where the disconnect was? 2485 Mr. {Woods.} They were responsible for the heart of the 2486 system, if you will. 2487 Mrs. {Ellmers.} Okay. Mr. {Woods.} And that is where most of the dollars were 2488 2489 in terms of contract expenditures. 2490 Mrs. {Ellmers.} Um-hum. So to that point, based on the 2491 fact that CGI was the main contractor for that, were there other contracts--was their contract extended? Was--were 2492 2493 there any new issued contracts based on the frustration that 2494 CMS had? 2495 Mr. {Woods.} The CGI contract had been extended earlier 2496 until February of 2014. 2497 Mrs. {Ellmers.} And that was before October 1? Mr. {Woods.} I believe that was before October--2498

2499	Mrs. {Ellmers.} Okay. So it was already extended
2500	before October 1?
2501	Mr. {Woods.} That is correct.
2502	Mrs. {Ellmers.} Okay. Then to that point, were there
2503	any otheragain, getting back to this, were there any other
2504	contractors that were selected, knowing that CGI was not
2505	necessarily doing what was necessary for the repair of the
2506	website?
2507	Mr. {Woods.} The only contract that I am aware of is
2508	the new one to Accenture to continue with development of the
2509	federally facilitated marketplace.
2510	Mrs. {Ellmers.} Accenture. And can you refresh my
2511	memory on when that actually took place, when the newthat
2512	new contract went forward?
2513	Mr. {Woods.} That was January of 2014.
2514	Mrs. {Ellmers.} That was January. Okay. Okay. Well,
2515	Mr. Speakeror excuse me. Sorry. Mr. Chairman, I have gone
2516	over on my time, and I apologize. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
2517	Woods.
2518	Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. I now am going to recognize
2519	the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, for 5 minutes.

2520 Mr. {Griffith.} Thank you so much for--sorry. Thank 2521 you so much for being here today. I appreciate it very much. 2522 The report indicates that CMS did not engage in 2523 effective planning or oversight. Did you--what do you recommend they do in the future to make sure they have proper 2524 2525 planning and oversight, because they apparently dropped the 2526 ball? 2527 Mr. {Woods.} They have the tools in place. 2528 Mr. {Griffith.} Okay. 2529 Mr. {Woods.} One of the primary tools is a strategic plan. An acquisition strategy is what it is called. There 2530 2531 is actually a template in the HHS' regulations for each of 2532 the areas that needs to be addressed. And fundamentally, it 2533 is a tool designed to identify the risks that the Agency is 2534 undertaking, and to be able to come up with a plan to be able 2535 to mitigate those risks. But they did not follow it. So the 2536 tools are there. They did not use the tools that were there. 2537 Mr. {Griffith.} Now, I might ask you an open-ended question because I think it is important that we get this 2538 2539 perspective from time to time. And that would be out of the report, what have we not asked you about that we probably 2540

2541 should have asked you about, or the people watching this at 2542 home, something that they ought to know about your report 2543 that you haven't already covered in your testimony here 2544 today? 2545 Mr. {Woods.} Well, one thing that comes to mind is the 2546 next enrollment period. 2547 Mr. {Griffith.} Um-hum. 2548 Mr. {Woods.} I think people are wondering, are we going 2549 to experience similar problems, or are we in better shape? 2550 And that is why we have one of our recommendations that is 2551 focused on the current contract with Accenture where we have 2552 seen some cost growth, and we think the Agency needs to make 2553 an assessment of why that cost growth has occurred, why--2554 whether they are in fact on schedule, and whether there are 2555 any risks to the 2015 enrollment period? 2556 Mr. {Griffith.} And my hearing is not as good as it 2557 should be. You are talking about the cost growth--what was 2558 that phrase you used? 2559 Mr. {Woods.} Cost increases. We--Mr. {Griffith.} Okay. 2560

2561 Mr. {Woods.} And we have somewhat of a disagreement

2562 with the Agency about the term cost growth. And that is why 2563 I am reluctant to use it. Their position is that any cost increase since about April of this year is totally based on 2564 2565 new requirements, so their--it is unfair to call that cost growth. Our position is that when you look--before that, 2566 2567 when the initially awarded that contract at an estimated 2568 value of \$91 million, and now it is at 175, that the Agency 2569 needs to make an assessment about why that--why those costs 2570 increased from the 91 to the 175.

2571 Mr. {Griffith.} What--

2572 Mr. {Woods.} And--let me just--and that may not--that is not the end of it. There are--that contract continues in 2573 2574 place today. Our numbers are dated in terms of, you know, we 2575 completed our audit work a couple of months ago. So costs on 2576 that particular contract are almost certainly higher today 2577 than they were at the time that we completed our audit work. 2578 And we think the Agency needs to make an assessment about why 2579 costs continue to grow.

2580 Mr. {Griffith.} Well, I think they do ask well. And I 2581 appreciate you raising that point. And it is kind of 2582 interesting, it would seem to me some of those new

2583 requirements are probably because it didn't work the first 2584 time around, wouldn't you agree? 2585 Mr. {Woods.} There are enhancements to the system. 2586 Mr. {Griffith.} Um-hum. Mr. {Woods.} They are constantly changing and trying to 2587 2588 make improvements to the system. The ones that--early on, I 2589 think you are right that those are related to the inability 2590 of the system to function as intended originally. But the 2591 Agency tells us the more recent cost increases are due to 2592 enhancements. Mr. {Griffith.} All right. Well, I appreciate that. 2593 And I appreciate your testimony here today. And I am happy 2594 2595 to yield my last 55 seconds to whomever might want it. 2596 Mrs. {Ellmers.} I will--2597 Mr. {Murphy.} Ms. Ellmers? Mrs. {Ellmers.} Thank you. Thank you. I do have one 2598 follow-up question. And it has to do with the conversation 2599 2600 you were just having with my colleague. When we are talking 2601 about the cost increases, you had mentioned that enhancements 2602 are what has been cited as the reasoning. My question for you is, did CMS get congressional approval for the additional 2603

2604 funding or spending, I guess I should say?

2605 Mr. {Woods.} Yeah. I am not aware of what that process 2606 was at all.

2607 Mrs. {Ellmers.} So to your knowledge, and based on the 2608 report, you did not see any effort put forward to come to 2609 Congress for additional funding for spending?

2610 Mr. {Woods.} I can't speak to that. We didn't see it,

2611 but that wasn't part of your review.

2612 Mrs. {Ellmers.} Okay. Thank you, Mr. Woods. And thank 2613 you to my colleague for yielding.

2614 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. I am going to do a second 2615 round with Ms. DeGette and I. So just as a follow-up here, 2616 are you saying that CMS is not analyzing why the contract 2617 with Accenture is growing in cost?

2618 Mr. {Woods.} We don't think that they have done that 2619 fully yet.

2620 Mr. {Murphy.} This original contract, which was a cost 2621 plus contract, who signed that contract? Who is responsible 2622 for that?

2623 Mr. {Woods.} Those contracts are signed by the 2624 contracting officer. And as I said, I don't have that name

2625 in front of me. 2626 Mr. {Murphy.} Do those have to be approved by Mr. Cohen and Ms. Tavenner? 2627 2628 Mr. {Woods.} I don't know. Mr. {Murphy.} Do you know, in their chain? 2629 2630 Mr. {Woods.} I don't know. 2631 Mr. {Murphy.} Is that something that your study 2632 encompassed to find that paper trail or look at that? 2633 Mr. {Woods.} We did not review--no--that, no. 2634 Mr. {Murphy.} Well, let me ask you too. You talked about the pressure of deadlines, the January 1, 2014. But a 2635 number of delays were put into place, the employer mandate or 2636 2637 the retirement issue, enforcement of canceled plans, 2638 individual man-night--individual mandate to the shop plan. 2639 Should the rollout have been delayed as well? 2640 Mr. {Woods.} I am not sure about that. But your 2641 observation about delays is accurate. When they realized 2642 that they would not be able to be fully functional by October 2643 1, they did make some tradeoffs and pushed projects that they 2644 thought they were initially going to be able to complete by October 1, pushed that off into the future. And the small 2645

2646 business program that you mentioned is one of them. The 2647 financial management module was also pushed off until a later 2648 date. 2649 Mr. {Murphy.} Now, did it--but none of those delays caused a delay in the website? Those were not--none of 2650 2651 those--many of things that are mentioned. They didn't cause 2652 a delay in the website readiness? There was--these several 2653 dozen other changes internally which--which were one of the 2654 factors in delay in the website readiness though, am I 2655 correct? 2656 Mr. {Woods.} Well, the website was launched. I am not 2657 sure--2658 Mr. {Murphy.} Well, you had said a number of decisions made during I guess this 2013 to 2012, were part of the 2659 2660 complexity that--you mentioned a couple--many things. One, 2661 there wasn't proper oversight of the contract. And the 2662 second thing, a number of internal changes were made by 2663 someone who didn't have the authority to make those changes. 2664 Mr. {Woods.} That is correct. Mr. {Murphy.} So do you know, or can you find out for 2665

132

us, in terms if someone is making these changes, who approved

2667 the decision for them to these changes, or who gave that person the authority to be in that position to make those 2668 2669 changes? Do you have that information? Mr. {Woods.} There are a number of people working with 2670 the contractors on a day-to-day basis. And the 40 instances 2671 2672 of changes, or direction to the contract, was made by 2673 multiple individuals. Some of these were technical people, 2674 as I said, working side-by-side with the contractor. Some of 2675 them were more senior officials. All of the changes though 2676 ultimately were ratified by the person with authority to do that, and that is the contracting officer. 2677 2678 Mr. {Murphy.} But what, did it go to the level of Ms. 2679 Tavenner or Mr. Cohen? 2680 Mr. {Woods.} I don't know. 2681 Mr. {Murphy.} Is that something your records could 2682 reveal? This is a follow-up to what Ms. DeGette was asking 2683 as well. We need to know if your records show, or if you can 2684 find out for us--I don't think--you have an excellent 2685 investigation. But it is very important to know this, if they knew or should have known in terms of approving these 2686 changes, or being aware that the website wasn't ready, or --2687

2688 well, just let me ask that part. Do you have any information 2689 on those? 2690 Mr. {Woods.} Well, as I said, we will certainly review 2691 our materials and provide an answer to that question. 2692 Mr. {Murphy.} Because it comes to this point, this 2693 Committee, members of each side of the aisle has different 2694 points of view on issues with regard to healthcare reform. 2695 That is fine. That is part of what makes our nation great. 2696 People have differences of opinion, they move forward on 2697 that. But there are certain standards within a committee that I think we should be unified in understanding that if 2698 someone comes before this Committee under oath and claims 2699 2700 that something is ready to roll out on October 1, that 2701 everybody should be able to sign up, knowing full well that 2702 it is not, it is either incompetence, it is dereliction of 2703 duty, it is sloppiness, it is lack of supervision oversight, 2704 or it is perjury to this Committee. It is perjury in terms 2705 of making they know is not true, or making the claim they 2706 have no business of making. The only answers to questions 2707 like is the website ready October 1 are yes, no or I don't 2708 know. Anything beyond that, when the claim was made by Mr.

2709	Cohen to this Committee under oath that October 1, everybody
2710	would be ready to sign up, it is clear from your
2711	investigation and your testimony that people within the
2712	agencies knew it was not ready. So any information you could
2713	provide us that tells us if they knew and made false claims
2714	to this Committee, or if they didn't know and made false
2715	claims to this Committee, it is important for the integrity
2716	of this Committee to let us know. And if you could submit
2717	thosethat information to this Committee, I would be
2718	grateful, your papers and other reviews of that.
2719	Ms. DeGette, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
2720	Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And,
2721	Mr. Woods, I can understand why the Chairman is concerned
2722	about this, based on your testimony today. So I want you to
2723	think very clearly about what your investigation found and
2724	what you have testified to this Committee today when I asked
2725	you these questions, because I don't want the record to be
2726	confused. And I don't want a misimpression to be left.
2727	Are you aware of aeither Ms. Tavenner or Mr. Cohen
2728	coming before this task Committee and lying about whether
2729	they knew that the website was not ready?

2730 Mr. {Woods.} No, I cannot speak to that. I don't know. 2731 Ms. {DeGette.} You don't know. Do you know whether Ms. 2732 Tavenner or Mr. Cohen personally knew that the website was 2733 not ready, yes or no? 2734 Mr. {Woods.} No, I do not know. 2735 Ms. {DeGette.} You don't know that. Do you know 2736 whether Ms. Tavenner or Mr. Cohen specifically approved those 2737 changes? 2738 Mr. {Woods.} No, I do not know. 2739 Ms. {DeGette.} You don't know that either. 2740 Mr. {Woods.} No. Ms. {DeGette.} Do you know who within the Agency did 2741 2742 approve those changes? 2743 Mr. {Woods.} Ultimately, those changes were ratified 2744 and approved by the contracting officer. 2745 Ms. {DeGette.} The contracting officer. So you could 2746 give us that information, who that was? Mr. {Woods.} Absolutely. Yes. 2747 2748 Ms. {DeGette.} Thank you very--I just think--and I know 2749 the Chairman agrees. We don't want to loosely be throwing around allegations of perjury or anything else when we know--2750

2751	and we don't want to put words in your mouth either. So I
2752	think we are clear on that.
2753	There is one more thing I wanted to clarify about your
2754	testimony today. Your first recommendation that in your
2755	report on this topic, as we discussed was taking immediate
2756	steps to assess the causes or continued FFM cost growth and
2757	delayed system functionality, and develop a mitigation plan
2758	designed to ensure timely and successful system performance.
2759	Is that right?
2760	Mr. {Woods.} That is correct.
2761	Ms. {DeGette.} And that is the one you are concerned
2762	about CMS following as they look at implementation of the
2763	2015 program, is that correct?
2764	Mr. {Woods.} The effort that is underway by Accenture
2765	is to move the development forward to be ready for the 2015
2766	Ms. {DeGette.} Right. And that relates to that
2767	recommendation?
2768	Mr. {Woods.} Yes, it does.
2769	Ms. {DeGette.} Okay.
2770	Mr. {Woods.} We think
2771	Ms. {DeGette.} And

2772 Mr. {Woods.} We--2773 Ms. {DeGette.} What? Mr. {Woods.} We think that CMS needs to make that 2774 2775 assessment in order to ensure itself it is on track for that 2776 enrollment period. 2777 Ms. {DeGette.} Right. For next year. Right. 2778 Mr. {Woods.} Right. 2779 Ms. {DeGette.} Now, you were sitting here I believe 2780 when we heard the testimony of the previous witness, is that 2781 correct? 2782 Mr. {Woods.} Yes, I was. Ms. {DeGette.} Mr. Slavitt. And I specifically asked 2783 2784 Mr. Slavitt if he had reviewed the five recommendations GAO 2785 had made. Do you remember hearing that? 2786 Mr. {Woods.} Yes. Ms. {DeGette.} And do you remember hearing Mr. Slavitt 2787 2788 say that CMS agrees with all five of the recommendations? Do 2789 you remember hearing that? 2790 Mr. {Woods.} I remember hearing that, yes. 2791 Ms. {DeGette.} Okay. So I would just--you know, sometimes I like to have both the Agency witness and the GAO 2792

2793 so that they can answer each other's issues. But I just want 2794 the record to be clear that Mr. Slavitt has said that they 2795 recognize this recommendation, they intend to comply with it. 2796 And I think, Mr. Chairman, we should follow-up and make sure 2797 that happens. Thank you. And I yield back the balance of my 2798 time. 2799 Mr. {Murphy.} Okay. Thank you. I now recognize Dr. 2800 Burgess for 5 minutes. 2801 Dr. {Burgess.} Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Woods, 2802 thank you for being here. And let me just commend the General Accountability Office on great work. This has not 2803 2804 been easy, and I appreciate how difficult it has been to be 2805 here today. And I appreciate your forbearance. 2806 Now, along the lines of what Ms. DeGette was just asking 2807 you, do you know whether or not the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services is adopting your recommendations right now? 2808 2809 Mr. {Woods.} What they told us is that they fully

2810 agreed with four of our recommendations, and they partially 2811 concurred with our fifth recommendation.

2812 Dr. {Burgess.} Have you any evidence that you can point 2813 to that shows that in fact they are taking steps to comply

2814 with four of those recommendations?

2815 Mr. {Woods.} We have seen some indication--

2816 Dr. {Burgess.} Well, you have their assurances, but is

2817 there anything in--that you can point to in data and fact

2818 that they are taking those recommendations?

2819 Mr. {Woods.} What they told us is that they are 2820 providing additional training in certain areas that they plan 2821 to implement those recommendations. We are hopeful that they 2822 do. We have a normal regular process for following-up with 2823 agencies to make sure that if they tell us that they are 2824 going to implement recommendations that they in fact do so. 2825 Dr. {Burgess.} Okay.

2826 Mr. {Woods.} So that process will continue at GAO.

2827 Dr. {Burgess.} Well, and I look forward to the follow-2828 up hearing we have about that implementation.

Now, you know, a lot was written in August of 2012 about the lack--CMS' or HHS' lack of production on rulemaking as it related to the essential health benefit. And, in fact, that rulemaking was delayed. The rule actually came out about a week after Election Day that year. I don't know if you recall that? In your work, was there any evidence that that

2835 delay was politically motivated? Or am I just being overly 2836 sensitive and overly cynical by the rule coming out a few 2837 days after Election Day 2012? 2838 Mr. {Woods.} We found no indication of that, sir. 2839 Dr. {Burgess.} So your inference is I am being overly 2840 cynical? 2841 Mr. {Woods.} We can't--we found nothing to point us in 2842 that direction. 2843 Dr. {Burgess.} Well, let me just point out to you, why-2844 -on this Committee, it has come up several times today. I 2845 mean, Mr. Cohen was here. I think it was about 10 or 11 days 2846 before October 1. And I asked him a very direct, very 2847 specific question. In fact, I tried to do a John Dingell and 2848 said yes or no, the website will be ready on October 1? He 2849 gave me what I presumed to have been a well-rehearsed and 2850 studied answer, because he repeated it verbatim twice. And it essentially said on October 1, consumers will be able to 2851 2852 go online, see premium net of subsidy, and make their 2853 purchase. Now, as we know, that didn't actually turn out to 2854 be the case. So it is a valid question to ask. He must have known that 10 days before the launch date, because it sounds 2855

2856 like from your report that it was pretty clear that things 2857 weren't going well. Am I wrong about that? 2858 Mr. {Woods.} I simply can't speak to what he knew or 2859 didn't know at any particular point in time. 2860 Dr. {Burgess.} Well--2861 Mr. {Woods.} But I can say that we found indications in 2862 the documents that we reviewed that the system was projected 2863 to be only 65 percent complete by that October 1 deadline. 2864 Dr. {Burgess.} If you had been sitting here and asked 2865 that question, and reminded that you were under oath, would you have answered it the same way Mr. Cohen did? 2866 2867 Mr. {Woods.} I can't really respond to--2868 Dr. {Burgess.} Well, let me ask you this, because you have got written in your report, as the October 1, 2013 2869 2870 deadline for establishing enrollment through the website neared, CMS identified significant performance issues 2871 2872 involving the FFM, the Facilitated Federal Marketplace, 2873 contractor. But the Agency took over only limited steps. 2874 Can you provide for the Committee what correspondence, what 2875 evidence, what documents you relied upon to come to that conclusion, to make that statement? 2876

2877 Mr. {Woods.} Absolutely. We can summarize what led us 2878 to that conclusion. And we would be happy to do that. 2879 Dr. {Burgess.} Were--as a part of making this 2880 statement, what--did you have access to internal e-mails 2881 within the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance 2882 Oversight at CMS?

2883 Mr. {Woods.} We reviewed lots of documents, contract 2884 documents, e-mails, memos. So we had very good access to 2885 lots of information from CMS.

Dr. {Burgess.} And I appreciate that. I would simply ask that that access be made available to this Committee, the documents, the e-mails, the transcripts that you have, would make that available to our Subcommittee, for the staff--

2890 Ms. {DeGette.} Mr. Chairman, I believe we already have 2891 that information in this Subcommittee.

2892 Mr. {Murphy.} Well, let us find out.

2893 Ms. {DeGette.} It has been produced already.

Dr. {Burgess.} Again, I would ask that we be certain that you have produced the information the Subcommittee staff is asking for.

2897 Mr. {Woods.} We would be happy to work with the

2898 Committee on that.

2899 Dr. {Burgess.} And let me just ask you one last thing. 2900 Are--in your opinion, is the website--open enrollment period 2901 this time is going to be much shorter than last time. In 2902 your opinion, are they going to be ready for the second open 2903 enrollment period?

2904 Mr. {Woods.} I am not in a position to make that 2905 judgment. That is why we had the recommendation that we did 2906 is that we think CMS needs to make that assessment of cost 2907 and schedule to make sure that they are on track.

2908 Dr. {Burgess.} Because there is the possibility they 2909 would not be able to meet that?

2910 Mr. {Woods.} We said in the report that that's the risk 2911 is that there could be some impact on the 2015 enrollment 2912 period, and that is why we had the recommendation that we 2913 did.

2914Dr. {Burgess.}Okay. And I thank you for your answers.2915Mr. {Murphy.}The gentleman's time has expired.

2916 Dr. {Burgess.} And I thank you for being here. I yield 2917 back.

2918 Mr. {Murphy.} Thank you. I ask unanimous consent that

2919 the member's written opening statements be introduced into 2920 the record. And without objection, the documents will be 2921 entered into the record. 2922 [The information follows:]

2924 Mr. {Murphy.} Mr. Woods, I want to thank you for your 2925 thorough and candid GAO report. All this Committee requests is honesty, thoroughness and details. And GAO's reputation 2926 2927 as a nonpartisan investigative report committee--2928 organization--is based on that ability to honestly and 2929 thoroughly provide the truth to a candid world. So we 2930 appreciate that. 2931 Members will have several questions for follow-up. We 2932 do ask that you respond to them in a quick manner. We also 2933 ask your commitment that you will share your work with our majority and minority staffs, so they can also review them 2934 2935 with you and get other details. 2936 So in conclusion, I would like to thank all the 2937 witnesses and members that participated in today's hearing, 2938 remind members they have 10 business days to submit questions 2939 for the record. 2940 And with that, I adjourn this hearing. [Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the subcommittee was 2941 2942 adjourned.]