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    TIKTOK: HOW CONGRESS CAN SAFEGUARD AMERICAN DATA
    PRIVACY AND PROTECT CHILDREN FROM ONLINE HARMS
    THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 2023
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    House of Representatives,
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    Committee on Energy and Commerce,
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    Washington, D.C.
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          The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in
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    Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cathy McMorris
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    Rodgers [chair of the committee] presiding.
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                    Representatives Rodgers, Burgess, Latta,
     Guthrie, Griffith, Bilirakis, Johnson, Hudson, Walberg,
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     Carter, Duncan, Palmer, Dunn, Curtis, Lesko, Pence, Crenshaw,
     Joyce, Armstrong, Weber, Allen, Balderson, Fulcher, Pfluger,
22
    Harshbarger, Miller-Meeks, Cammack, Obernolte; Pallone,
23
    Eshoo, DeGette, Schakowsky, Matsui, Castor, Sarbanes, Tonko,
24
    Clarke, Cardenas, Ruiz, Peters, Dingell, Veasey, Kuster,
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    Barragan, Blunt Rochester, Soto, Craig, Schrier, Trahan, and
26
    Fletcher.
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          Staff Present: Kate Arey, Content Manager and Digital
    Assistant; Sean Brebbia, Chief Counsel, Oversight &
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31
    Investigations; Jolie Brochin, Chief Counsel, Oversight &
    Investigations; Deep Buddharaju, Senior Counsel, Oversight
32
    and Investigations; Michael Cameron, Professional Staff
33
    Member, Innovation, Date, and Commerce; Sydney Greene,
34
    Director of Operations; Jack Heretik, Press Secretary;
35
36
    Jessica Herron, Clerk, Innovation, Data, and Commerce; Nate
    Hodson, Staff Director; Tara Hupman, Chief Counsel; Noah
37
    Jackson, Clerk, C&T; Sean Kelly, Press Secretary; Peter
38
    Kielty, General Counsel; Emily King, Member Services
39
    Director; Chris Krepich, Press Secretary; Tim Kurth, Chief
40
    Counsel, Innovations, Data, and Commerce; Giulia Leganski,
41
    Professional Staff Member, C&T; Kate O'Connor, Chief Counsel,
42
    C&T; Kaitlyn Peterson, Clerk, Energy & Environment; Brannon
43
    Rains, Professional Staff Member, Innovation, Data, and
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    Commerce; Olivia Shields, Communications Director; Lacey
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    Strahm, Fellow, Innovation, Data, and Commerce; Michael
    Taggart, Policy Director; Teddy Tanzer, Senior Counsel,
47
    Innovation, Data, and Commerce; Dray Throne, Director of
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    Information Technology; Hannah Anton, Minority Staff
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Assistant; Ian Barlow, Minority FTC Detailee; Jennifer
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    Epperson, Minority Chief Counsel, Communications and
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52
    Technology; Austin Flack, Minority Junior Professional Staff
    Member; Waverly Gordon, Minority Deputy Staff Director and
53
    General Counsel; Daniel Greene, Minority Professional Staff
54
    Member; Tiffany Guarascio, Minority Staff Director; Perry
55
    Hamilton, Minority Member Services and Outreach Manager; Lisa
56
    Hone, Minority Chief Counsel, Innovation, Data, and Commerce;
57
    Liz Johns, Minority GAO Detailee; Mackenzie Kuhl, Minority
58
    Digital Manager; Una Lee, Minority Chief Health Counsel; Will
59
    McAuliffe, Minority Chief Counsel, Oversight and
60
    Investigations; Dan Miller, Minority Professional Staff
61
    Member; Joe Orlando, Minority Senior Policy Analyst;
62
    Christina Parisi, Minority Professional Staff Member;
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    Caroline Rinker, Minority Press Assistant; Harry Samuels,
64
    Minority Oversight Counsel; Michael Scurato, Minority FCC
65
    Detailee; Andrew Souvall, Minority Director of
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67
    Communications, Outreach, and Member Services; Johanna
    Thomas, Minority Counsel; Caroline Wood, Minority Research
68
    Analyst; and C.J. Young, Minority Deputy Communications
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    Director.
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72 \*The Chair. The committee will come to order. Before I begin I would like to take a moment to address the guests in 73 74 the audience. First of all, thank you for coming. We think engaged 75 citizens are welcome, and a valuable part of the political 76 I do want to remind the quests in the audience that 77 the chair is obliged under the House rules and the rules of 78 79 the committee to maintain order and preserve decorum in the committee room. I know that we have deep feelings on these 80 issues, and that we all may not agree on everything, but I 81 ask that we abide by these rules, and be respectful of our 82 audience members, our viewers, and our witnesses. The Chair 83 appreciates the audience cooperation in maintaining order, as 84 we have a full discussion on these important issues. 85 The chair recognizes herself for five minutes for an 86 opening statement. 87 Mr. Chew, you are here because the American people need 88 89 the truth about the threat TikTok poses to our national and personal security. TikTok collects nearly every data point 90 imaginable, from people's location to what they type and 91 copy, who they talk to, biometric data, and more. Even if 92

93 they have never been on TikTok, your trackers are embedded in sites across the Web. TikTok surveils us all, and the 94 95 Chinese Communist Party is able to use this as a tool to manipulate America as a whole. 96 We do not trust TikTok will ever embrace American 97 values, values for freedom, human rights, and innovation. 98 TikTok has repeatedly chosen the path for more control, more 99 100 surveillance, and more manipulation. Your platform should be banned. 101 I expect today you will say anything to avoid this 102 outcome, like you are 100 percent responsible for what TikTok 103 does, that you suddenly endorse a national data privacy 104 standard, that Project Texas is more than a marketing scheme, 105 that TikTok doesn't harm our innocent children, or that your 106 ties to the Chinese Communist Party through ByteDance is just 107 We aren't buying it. a myth. 108 In fact, when you celebrate the 150 million American 109 110 users on TikTok, it emphasizes the urgency for Congress to act. That is 150 million Americans that CCP can collect 111

sensitive information on, and control what we ultimately see,

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113

hear, and believe.

114 TikTok has repeatedly been caught in the lie that it does not answer to the CCP through ByteDance. Today the 115 116 CCP's laws require Chinese companies like ByteDance to spy on That means any Chinese company must grant the their behalf. 117 CCP access and manipulation capabilities as a design feature. 118 Right now ByteDance is under investigation by the DoJ for 119 surveilling American journalists, both digital activity and 120 121 physical movements, through TikTok. We also know that many of your employees still report 122 directly to Beijing. Internal recordings reveal there is a 123 back door for China to access user data across the platform. 124 Your employees said, "Everything is seen in China." 125 A gateway to spy is not the only way TikTok and 126 ByteDance can do the bidding of the CCP. TikTok has helped 127 erase events and people China wants the world to forget. 128 has even censored an American teenager who exposed CCP's 129 genocide and torture of Uyghur Muslims. The facts show that 130 131 ByteDance is beholden to the CCP, and ByteDance and TikTok 132 are one and the same. TikTok also targets our children. The For You algorithm 133 is a tool for TikTok to own their attention and prey on their 134

135 innocence. Within minutes of creating an account, your algorithm can promote suicide, self-harm, and eating 136 137 disorders to children. It encourages challenges for them to put their lives in danger, and allows adults to prey on our 138 beautiful, beloved daughters. 139 It is also a portal for drug dealers to sell illicit 140 fentanyl that China has banned, yet is helping Mexican 141 142 cartels produce, send across our border, and poison our children. In China the CCP proactively prohibits this type 143 of TikTok content that promotes death and despair to kids. 144 From the data it collects to the content it controls, 145 TikTok is a grave threat of foreign influence in American 146 life. It has been said it is like allowing the Soviet Union 147 the power to produce Saturday morning cartoons during the 148 Cold War, but much more powerful and much more dangerous. 149 Banning your platform will address the immediate 150 threats. Make no mistake, this committee is also looking to 151 152 the future. America needs to be prepared to stop the next technological tool or weapon China will use for its own 153 strategic gain. We must prevent any app, website, and 154 platform like TikTok from ever spying on Americans again, and 155

- 156 we must provide the strongest protections possible for our 157 children. 158 That is why this committee is leading on a national privacy and data security standard. It restricts sensitive 159 American data from reaching our adversaries to begin with, 160 and what Big Tech and data brokers collect, process, store, 161 and sell. It makes it illegal for any platform to track and 162 163 target children under 17. Mr. Chew, the committee has requested that TikTok appear 164 before us for a long time. For those we serve, we are glad 165 the day has finally come. Today the world is watching. 166 ByteDance is watching. The Chinese Communist Party is 167 watching. But the answers you owe are to the American 168 people, a free people who cherish their God-given unalienable 169 rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for 170 all. They deserve the truth. 171 Complete honesty is the standard and the law you are 172 173 being held to before this committee as we seek to get answers and a full understanding of what happens at TikTok under your 174 watch. Thank you.
  - [The prepared statement of The Chair follows:]

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180 \*The Chair. The chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Pallone, for five minutes. 181 182 \*Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Madam Chair, and let me say that I agree with much of what you just said, and I certainly 183 appreciate your enthusiasm and your commenting on being a 184 mother and concerned about children. And I am glad that we 185 are having this hearing today. 186 187 Big Tech has transformed the information superhighway into a super spreader of harmful content, invasive 188 surveillance practices, and addictive and damaging design 189 features. Data is Big Tech's most valuable commodity, and by 190 collecting far more user data than they need, Big Tech 191 platforms can use, share, and sell information to generate 192 billions of dollars in revenue. 193 Today the American people are powerless to stop this 194 invasion of their privacy, and we can't wait any longer to 195 pass comprehensive national privacy legislation that puts 196 people back in control of their data. We must hold Big Tech 197 accountable for its actions, and transparency is critical to 198 that accountability. 199 In the past several Congresses, this committee has heard 200

201 from senior executives of other social media platforms about troubling and repeated instances where they put profits over 202 203 people. Now, today, we intend to bring more transparency to TikTok, which is controlled by its Beijing, communist-based 204 parent company, ByteDance. And while TikTok videos provide a 205 new, fun way for people to express their creativity and enjoy 206 the videos of others, the platform also threatens the health, 207 208 privacy, and security of the American people. And I am not convinced that the benefits outweigh the risks that it poses 209 to Americans in its present form. 210 More than 130 million people in the United States use 211 TikTok every month, including two-thirds of American 212 teenagers. TikTok collects and compiles vast troves of 213 valuable personal information to create an addictive 214 algorithm that is able to predict with uncanny accuracy which 215 videos will keep users scrolling, even if the content is 216 217 harmful, inaccurate, or feeds destructive behavior or 218 extremist beliefs. Now, the combination of TikTok's Beijing, communist-219 based China ownership and its popularity exacerbates its 220 danger to our country and to our privacy. The Chinese 221

222 communist government can compel companies based in Beijing like TikTok to share data with the communist government 223 224 through existing Beijing law or coercion. National security experts are sounding the alarm, 225 warning that the Chinese communist government could require 226 TikTok to compromise device security, maliciously access 227 American user data, promote pro-Communist propaganda, and 228 undermine American interests. Disinformation campaigns could 229 be launched by the Chinese communist government through 230 TikTok, which has already become rife with misinformation and 231 disinformation, illegal activities, and hate speech. A 232 recent report found that 20 percent of TikTok search results 233 on prominent news topics contain misinformation. 234 Social media's profitability depends on growth and 235 engagement. More eyes on their content for longer time leads 236 to more advertising dollars and revenue generation. 237 Addictive algorithms are fine-tuned to optimize growth and 238 239 engagement without necessarily taking into account potential 240 harms to users. Children and teens are particularly vulnerable. 241 Frequent online use of interactive media on digital devices 242

243 is associated with increased levels of depression among middle and high school students. Research has found that 244 245 TikTok's addictive algorithms recommend videos to teens that create and exacerbate feelings of emotional distress, 246 including videos promoting suicide, self-harm, and eating 247 disorders. 248 Public outrage and hollow apologies alone are not going 249 250 to rein in Big Tech. Congress has to enact laws protecting the American public from such online harms, and we simply 251 cannot wait any longer to pass the comprehensive privacy 252 legislation that I authored with then ranking member, now 253 Chair Rodgers, last Congress that overwhelmingly advanced out 254 of the committee. It ensures that companies, wherever they 255 live -- it ensures, I should say, that consumers, wherever 256 they live in this country, will have meaningful control over 257 their personal information. 258 Our legislation establishes baseline data minimization 259 260 requirements, ensuring that companies only collect, process, and transfer data necessary to provide a service. And it 261 provides heightened privacy protections for children and 262 teenagers. So I think it is time to make this legislation 263

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     the law of the land.
          And we also have to examine the reforms needed to
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     section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The liability
     shield for social media platforms has for too long been
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     abused, and led to a lack of accountability for social media
268
     platforms. So I hope we can find a bipartisan path forward
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     on that issue, too -- and I think you are having a hearing
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271
     next week on it -- so we can stop the very real harms to our
     country and democracy under the current law.
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           I look forward to the discussion today as we continue to
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     bring accountability to Big Tech.
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          And let me say to Mr. Chew I know this is about TikTok,
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     but I am focusing all my attention not only on TikTok, but on
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     these concerns, wide concerns about social media and the
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     protection of privacy.
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           [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
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284	*Mr. Pallone. And with that, I yield back. Thank you
285	again, Madam Chair, for having this very important hearing.
286	*The Chair. Our witness today is Mr. Shou Chew, chief
287	executive officer of TikTok.
288	You are recognized for five minutes.
289	

290 STATEMENT OF SHOU CHEW, CEO, TIKTOK, INC. 291 292 \*Mr. Chew. Thank you. Chair Rodgers, Ranking Member Pallone, members of the committee, thank you for your time. 293 I am Shou Chew, and I am from Singapore. That is where 294 I was born, as were my parents. And after serving in 295 Singapore's military, I moved to the UK to attend college, 296 and then here to the U.S. to attend business school. I 297 actually met my wife here. By the way, she was just born a 298 few miles away from here in Virginia. 299 Two years ago I became the CEO of TikTok. Today we have 300 more than a billion monthly active users around the world, 301 including over 150 million in the United States. Our app is 302 a place where people can be creative and curious, and where 303 close to five million American businesses, mostly small 304 businesses, go to find new customers and to fuel their 305 growth. 306 307 Now, as TikTok has grown, we have tried to learn the lessons of companies that have come before us, especially 308 when it comes to the safety of teenagers. While the vast 309 majority of people on TikTok are over 18, one of -- and one 310

of our fastest-growing demographics are people over 35, we 311 have spent a lot of time adopting measures to protect 312 313 teenagers. Many of those measures are firsts for the social media industry. 314 We forbid direct messaging for people under 16, and we 315 have a 16-minute watch time by default for those under 18. 316 We have a suite of family pairing tools so that parents can 317 318 participate in their teens' experience, and make the choices that are right for their family. 319 We want TikTok to be a place where teenagers can come to 320 learn, which is why we recently launched a feed that 321 exclusively features educational videos about STEM. STEM 322 videos already have over 116 billion views on TikTok, and I 323 think TikTok is inspiring a new generation to discover a 324 passion for math and science. 325 I would also like to talk about national security 326 concerns that you have raised that we take very, very 327 328 seriously. Let me start by addressing a few misconceptions about ByteDance of which we are a subsidiary. ByteDance is 329 not owned or controlled by the Chinese Government. It is a 330 private company. Sixty percent of the company is owned by 331

332 global institutional investors, twenty percent is owned by the founder, and twenty percent owned by employees around the 333 334 world. ByteDance has five board members; three of them are 335 American. Now, TikTok itself is not available in mainland China. 336 We are headquartered in Los Angeles and in Singapore, and we 337 have 7,000 employees in the U.S. today. Still, we have heard 338 339 important concerns about the potential for unwanted foreign access to U.S. data and potential manipulation of the TikTok 340 U.S. ecosystem. Our approach has never been to dismiss or 341 trivialize any of these concerns. We have addressed them 342 with real action. Now, that is what we have been doing for 343 the last two years: building what amounts to a firewall that 344 seals off protected U.S. user data from unauthorized foreign 345 346 access. The bottom line is this: American data stored on 347 American soil by an American company overseen by American 348 personnel. We call this initiative Project Texas. 349 where Oracle is headquartered. Today U.S. TikTok data is 350 stored, by default, in Oracle's servers. Only vetted 351 personnel operating in a new company called TikTok U.S. Data 352

353 Security can control access to this data. Now, additionally, we have plans for this company to 354 355 report to an independent American board with strong security 356 credentials. Now there is still some work to do. We have legacy U.S. 357 data sitting in our servers in Virginia and in Singapore. We 358 are deleting those, and we expect that to be complete this 359 360 When that is done, all protected U.S. data will be under the protection of U.S. law, and under the control of 361 the U.S.-led security team. This eliminates the concern that 362 some of you have shared with me that TikTok user data can be 363 364 subject to Chinese law. This goes further, by the way, than what any other 365 company in our industry has done. 366 We will also provide unprecedented transparency and 367 security for the source code for the TikTok app and 368 recommendation engine. Third-party validators like Oracle 369 and others will review and validate our source code and 370 algorithms. This will help ensure the integrity of the code 371

that powers what Americans see on our app.

372

374 helps them study and monitor our content ecosystem. Now, we believe we are the only -- the only -- company that offers 375 376 this level of transparency. Now, trust is about actions we take. We have to earn 377 that trust with decisions we make for our company and our 378 The potential security, privacy, content 379 manipulation concerns raised about TikTok are really not 380 381 unique to us. The same issues apply to other companies. We believe what is needed are clear, transparent rules that 382 apply broadly to all tech companies. Ownership is not at the 383 core of addressing these concerns. 384 Now, as I conclude, there are more than 150 million 385 Americans who love our platform, and we know we have a 386 responsibility to protect them, which is why I am making the 387 following commitments to you and to all our users. 388 Number one, we will keep safety, particularly for 389 teenagers, as a top priority for us. 390 391 Number two, we will firewall-protect U.S. data from unwanted foreign access. 392 Number three, TikTok will remain a place for free 393

expression, and will not be manipulated by any government.

394

395	And fourth, we will be transparent, and we will give
396	access to third-party independent monitors to remain
397	accountable for our commitments.
398	I will be grateful for any feedback that you have, and I
399	look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
400	[The prepared statement of Mr. Chew follows:]
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          *The Chair. As you know, the testimony that you are
     about to give is subject to title 18, section 1001 of the
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     United States Code.
          As you state in your testimony, ByteDance is TikTok's
407
     parent company. Is it accurate to say that you are in
408
     regular communication with the CEO of ByteDance, Liang Rubo?
409
          *Mr. Chew. Chair Rodgers, yes, I am in --
410
          *The Chair. Thank you.
411
          *Mr. Chew. -- communication with him.
412
          *The Chair. Okay. Kelly Zhang is the CEO of ByteDance
413
     China, overseeing Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok.
414
     you in regular communication with Kelly?
415
          *Mr. Chew. I am not in regular communication with her.
416
          *The Chair. The ByteDance editor in chief is Zhang
417
     Fuping, correct?
418
          *Mr. Chew. I believe so.
419
          *The Chair. And Wu Shugang is a Beijing ByteDance
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421
     Technology board member, and also an official of the
     Cyberspace Administration in China. Is this correct?
422
          *Mr. Chew. I believe so. I -- they are not in the
423
     right --
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425 \*The Chair. Thank you. All of these individuals work or are affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, are at 426 427 the highest levels of leadership at ByteDance, a company where you previously served as the chief financial officer, 428 and where you regularly communicate with their CEO. 429 TikTok has told us that you weren't sharing data with 430 the CCP. But leaked audio from within TikTok has proven 431 432 otherwise. TikTok told us that you weren't tracking the geolocation of American citizens. You were. TikTok told us 433 you weren't spying on journalists. You were. 434 In your testimony you state that ByteDance is not 435 beholden to the CCP. Again, each of the individuals I listed 436 are affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, including 437 Zhang Fuping, who is reported to be the Communist Party 438 Secretary of ByteDance, and who has called for the party 439 committee to "take the lead' 'across all party lines to 440 ensure that algorithm is enforced by "correct political 441 direction.' \ 442 Just this morning the Wall Street Journal reported that 443 the CCP is opposed to a forced sale of TikTok by ByteDance, 444 quoting a CCP spokesman as saying the Chinese Government 445

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     would make a decision regarding any sale of TikTok. So the
     CCP believes they have the final say over your company. I
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448
     have zero confidence in your assertion that ByteDance and
     TikTok are not beholden to the CCP.
449
          Next question. Heating content is a way of promoting
450
     and moderating content. In your current or previous
451
     positions within Chinese companies, have employees engaged in
452
453
     heating content for users outside of China? Very quickly,
454
     yes or no?
          *Mr. Chew. Our heating process is approved by our local
455
     teams --
456
          *The Chair. So --
457
          *Mr. Chew. -- in the various countries.
458
          *The Chair. -- the answer is yes. Thank you.
459
          Have any moderation tools been used to remove content on
460
     TikTok associated with the Uyghur genocide, yes or no?
461
          *Mr. Chew. We do not remove that kind of content.
462
463
     TikTok is a place for freedom of expression and, Chair
     Rodgers, like I said, if you use our app you can go on it and
464
     you will see a lot of users around the world --
465
          *The Chair. Thank you.
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\*Mr. Chew. -- expressing content --467 \*The Chair. Thank you. 468 469 \*Mr. Chew. -- on that topic and many others. \*The Chair. Thank you. What about the massacre in 470 Tiananmen Square, yes or no? 471 \*Mr. Chew. I am sorry, I didn't hear the question. 472 \*The Chair. The massacre in Tiananmen Square. 473 474 \*Mr. Chew. That kind of content is available on our platform. You can go and search it. 475 \*The Chair. I will remind you that making false or 476 misleading statements to Congress is a Federal crime. 477 \*Mr. Chew. I understand. Again, you can go --478 \*The Chair. Okay, thank you. 479 \*Mr. Chew. -- on our platform. You will find that 480 content. 481 \*The Chair. Next question -- okay, thank you. 482 Reclaiming my time, can you say with 100 percent certainty 483 484 that ByteDance or the CCP cannot use your company or its divisions to heat content to promote pro-CCP messages for an 485 act of aggression against Taiwan? 486

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\*Mr. Chew. We do not promote or remove content at the

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request of the Chinese Government.
488
          *The Chair. The question is --
489
490
          *Mr. Chew. We will --
          *The Chair. The question is are you 100 percent certain
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     that they cannot use your company to promote such messages?
492
          *Mr. Chew. It is our commitment to this committee and
493
     all our users that we will keep this free from any
494
495
     manipulation --
          *The Chair. If you can't -- okay.
496
          *Mr. Chew. -- by any government.
497
          *The Chair. If you can't say 100 percent certain, I
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499
     take that as a no.
          As I previously referenced, TikTok spied on American
500
     journalists. Can you say with 100 percent certainty that
501
     neither ByteDance nor TikTok employees can target other
502
     Americans with similar surveillance techniques?
503
504
          *Mr. Chew. Chair Rodgers, I, first of all, disagree
505
     with the characterization that it is spying. It was an
     internal investigation on --
506
          *The Chair. Surveillance. Yes or no, can you do
507
     surveillance of other Americans?
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509 \*Mr. Chew. We will protect the U.S. user data and fire it all from all unwanted foreign access is a commitment that 510 511 we have given to the committee. \*The Chair. So I guess my question is, can -- I want 512 you to -- I wanted to hear you say with 100 percent certainty 513 that neither ByteDance nor TikTok employees can target other 514 Americans with similar surveillance techniques as you did 515 516 with the journalists. \*Mr. Chew. Again, I disagree with the characterization 517 as surveillance, and we have given our commitments, Chair 518 Rodgers, the four commitments. I think -- is our commitment 519 that we will not be influenced by any government on these 520 521 issues. \*The Chair. DoJ is investigating this surveillance 522 right now. 523 To the American people watching today, hear this: 524 TikTok is a weapon by the Chinese Communist Party to spy on 525 526 you, manipulate what you see, and exploit for future generations. A ban is only a short-term way to address 527 TikTok. And a data privacy bill is the only way to stop 528 TikTok from ever happening again in the United States. 529

530 I yield back. I now yield to the ranking member for five minutes. 531 532 \*Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me just start out by saying, Mr. Chew, that I don't 533 find what you suggested with Project Texas and this firewall 534 that is being suggested to whoever will be acceptable to me. 535 In other words, you know, the -- I still believe that the 536 537 Beijing communist government will still control and have the ability to influence what you do. And so this idea, this 538 Project Texas, is simply not acceptable. 539 According to a recent report, TikTok is on target to 540 make between 15 and \$18 billion in revenue this year. 541 542 that an accurate forecast? 543 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, as a private company we are not sharing our --544 \*Mr. Pallone. I thought that is what you would say. 545 \*Mr. Chew. -- numbers publicly. 546 547 \*Mr. Pallone. How much money will TikTok make by delivering personalized advertisements just to your users in 548 the United States? Will you give me that information? 549 \*Mr. Chew. Again, Congressman, respectfully --550

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551
          *Mr. Pallone. I thought --
          *Mr. Chew. -- as a private company, we are not
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553
     disclosing that.
          *Mr. Pallone. I thought that is what you would say.
554
          Look, my -- the impression you are giving -- and I know,
555
     you know, I can understand why you are trying to give that
556
     impression -- is that, you know, that you are just performing
557
558
     some kind of public service here, right? I mean, this is a
     benign company that is just performing a public service. I -
559
     - maybe you are not, maybe that is not what you are saying,
560
     but I don't buy it, right?
561
          My concern here is primarily about the privacy issue,
562
     the fact that TikTok is making all kinds of money by
563
     gathering private information about Americans that they don't
564
     need for their business purposes, and then they sell it.
565
          And I mentioned this legislation that the chair and I
566
     have that would minimize data collection, and make it much
567
568
     more difficult for TikTok and other companies to do that. So
     what -- if you want to make some commitments today, why don't
569
     -- I will ask you to make some commitments with regard to
570
     this legislation. And, you know, you are going to tell me,
571
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- well, the bill isn't passed, and so therefore I don't have to
- do it. But, you know, you say you are benign, you want to do
- 574 good things for the public.
- 575 So let me ask you, why not -- what about a commitment
- that says that you won't sell the data that you collect,
- 577 would you commit to that, not selling the data you collect?
- \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I believe we don't sell data to
- any data brokers.
- \*Mr. Pallone. You don't sell it to anyone.
- \*Mr. Chew. We don't sell data to data brokers.
- \*Mr. Pallone. I didn't ask you -- data brokers. Do you
- sell it to anyone?
- In other words, under our bill, you could only use the
- data for your own purposes, not to sell it to anyone. Would
- you commit to not selling your data to anyone?
- \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I actually am in support of
- 588 some rules about privacy --
- \*Mr. Pallone. I didn't ask you whether --
- \*Mr. Chew. Yes.
- \*Mr. Pallone. -- rules. I asked you whether the
- company, TikTok, would commit to not selling its data to

593 anyone, and just using it for its own purposes internally. \*Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on the details of 594 595 that. \*Mr. Pallone. Okay, get back to me. All right. 596 Another thing that is in our bill says that we would 597 prohibit targeting marketing to people under the age of 17. 598 Would you be willing to agree to prohibit targeted marketing 599 600 to people, Americans, under the age of 17? \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, we have actually stricter rules 601 for our advertisers in terms of what they can show to our 602 users --603 \*Mr. Pallone. So do you prohibit --604 \*Mr. Chew. -- under the age of 18. 605 \*Mr. Pallone. Would you be willing to prohibit targeted 606 marketing to those under 17? That is what is in our bill. 607 \*Mr. Chew. I understand that there is some talk and 608 some legislation around this around the country --609 610 \*Mr. Pallone. Well, again, I am not interested -- I wanted you to make that commitment without the legislation. 611 Since you say you are a good company, you want to do good 612 things, why not? 613

\*Mr. Chew. It is something we can look into and get 614 back to you. 615 616 \*Mr. Pallone. Okay, I appreciate that. Okay, we also have in our bill a requirement of heightened protection for 617 sensitive data, particularly location and health data. Would 618 you commit to not gathering or dealing with location or 619 health data unless you get affirmative consent from the 620 621 consumer? In other words, under our bill those are categorized as 622 sensitive. And unless the person specifically says, "I want 623 you to collect that data,' ' you wouldn't be able to, location 624 and health data. Would you commit to that? 625 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, in principle I support that, 626 which -- by the way, we do not collect precise GPS data at 627 this point, and I do not believe we collect any health data. 628 \*Mr. Pallone. All right. So would you be willing to 629 make that commitment, that from now on you won't collect 630 location and health data without -- well, you are saying at 631 all. Is that a commitment? 632 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, this is data that is frequently 633 collected by many other companies. 634

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635
          *Mr. Pallone. I know other companies do it. I don't
     think they should without affirmative consent. You said you
636
637
     want to be a good actor, so why not make that commitment to
     me today?
638
          *Mr. Chew. We are committed to be very transparent with
639
     our users about what we collect. I don't think what we
640
     collect -- I don't believe what we collect is more than most
641
642
     players --
          *Mr. Pallone. You see --
643
          *Mr. Chew. -- in the industry --
644
          *Mr. Pallone. -- my problem here is you are trying to
645
     give the impression that you are going to move away from
646
     Beijing and the Communist Party. You are trying to give the
647
     impression that you are a good actor. But the commitments
648
     that we would seek to achieve those goals are not being made
649
             They are just not being made. You are going to
650
     continue to gather data. You are going to continue to sell
651
652
     data. You are going to continue to do all these things, and
     continue to be under the egis of the Communist Party through
653
     the -- through your, you know, organization that owns you.
654
     So in any case, thank you.
655
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656 Thank you, Madam Chair. \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair now 657 658 recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Burgess, for five 659 minutes. \*Mr. Burgess. I thank the chair. Thank you, Mr. Chew, 660 for joining us today. 661 I think we have heard you say multiple times that TikTok 662 663 is not a Chinese company, that ByteDance is not a Chinese company. But according to an article in today's Wall Street 664 Journal -- quoting here -- "China's Commerce Ministry said 665 Thursday that a sale or divestiture of TikTok will involve 666 exporting technology that has to be approved by the Chinese 667 Government.' Continuing to quote, "The reported efforts by 668 the Biden Administration would severely undermine global 669 investors' confidence in the U.S.,' 'said Shu Jueting, a 670 ministry spokeswoman. Continuing to quote, "If that is true, 671 China will firmly oppose it, ' ' she said, referring to the 672 673 forced sale. So despite your assertions to the contrary, China 674 certainly thinks it is in control of TikTok and its software. 675 Is that not correct? 676

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677
          *Mr. Chew. Congressman, TikTok is not available in
     mainland China. And today we are headquartered in Los
678
679
     Angeles and Singapore. But I am not saying that, you know,
     the founders of ByteDance are not Chinese, nor am I saying
680
     that we don't make use of Chinese employees, just like many
681
     other companies around the world. We do, you know, use their
682
     expertise on some engineering projects.
683
684
          Now --
          *Mr. Burgess. But according to their ministry
685
     spokeswoman, it would be a divestiture of exporting
686
     technology from China. So they -- again, China thinks they
687
     own it, even though you do not.
688
          Madam Chair, I would just like to ask unanimous consent
689
     to put today's Wall Street Journal article --
690
          *The Chair. Without objection, so ordered.
691
          *Mr. Burgess. -- into the record.
692
          [The information follows:]
693
694
     ********************************
695
696
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697 \*Mr. Burgess. Now, Mr. Chew, I wouldn't ask you to discuss any privileged attorney-client materials, but did 698 699 anyone, aside from your lawyers, assist you in preparation for today's hearing? 700 I prepared for this hearing with my team \*Mr. Chew. 701 702 here in D.C. \*Mr. Burgess. Did anyone at ByteDance directly provide 703 704 input, help, or instruction for your testimony today? \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, this is a very high-profile 705 hearing. My phone is full of well-wishers, you know, but I 706 prepared for this hearing with my team here in D.C. 707 \*Mr. Burgess. Are you willing to share who helped 708 prepare you for this hearing with the committee? And you can 709 do that in writing. 710 \*Mr. Chew. I can follow up with you, if you like. 711 \*Mr. Burgess. Okay. Can you quarantee that no one at 712 713 ByteDance had a role in preparing you for today's hearing? \*Mr. Chew. Like I said, Congressman, this is a high-714 profile hearing. A lot of people around the world were 715 sending me wishes and unsolicited advice, but I prepared for 716 this hearing with my team here in D.C.. 717

\*Mr. Burgess. Are the attorneys representing TikTok

- also representing ByteDance? 719 720 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, I believe so. \*Mr. Burgess. What percentage of TikTok revenue does 721 ByteDance retain? Just give me a ballpark estimate, if you 722 723 don't precisely know. \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, like I said, as a private 724 725 company we are not prepared to disclose our financials in public today. 726 \*Mr. Burgess. Can we ask you to get back to us with a 727 ballpark? We are not asking for the precise figures, but to 728 get -- so the committee can have some understanding of the 729 percentage of TikTok revenue that ByteDance retains. 730 \*Mr. Chew. I understand the question. Respectfully, as 731 a private company we are not disclosing our financials today. 732
- 736 management?

718

733

734

735

737 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, since I have been CEO of this

hearing with you or anyone else on TikTok's senior

738 company I have not had any discussions with Chinese

\*Mr. Burgess. Prior to today's hearing, did anyone

affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party discuss this

739 Government officials. \*Mr. Burgess. So what -- but what about the Chinese 740 741 Communist Party itself? Have any of those officials discussed this with you? 742 \*Mr. Chew. Like I said, I have not had any discussion 743 with Chinese Government officials. I don't know the 744 political affiliation of everybody I speak to, so I can't 745 746 verify the statement. \*Mr. Burgess. Let me ask you a question in a different 747 direction. 748 A few weeks ago this committee had a field hearing down 749 in McAllen, Texas, and it was on the issue of fentanyl and 750 illegal immigration. And one of our witnesses, Brandon Judd, 751 a 25-year veteran Border Patrol agent, said that all social 752 media platforms play a role in illegal immigration. 753 one of the ways cartels advertise their services throughout 754 755 the world and convince people to put themselves in their hands and come to the United States. The cartels all use 756 social media platforms. Are you aware of this phenomenon? 757 \*Mr. Chew. Any content that promotes human abuse is 758 violative of our community quidelines, which dictates what is 759

- 760 allowed and not allowed on our platform. We proactively
- 761 identify and remove them from our platform.
- 762 \*Mr. Burgess. Well, it would be very helpful if you
- 763 would share with the committee examples of how you have
- removed people, because what we heard at the hearing was that
- 765 TikTok was one of the platforms that recruits adolescents in
- 766 the United States to help with transporting people who are in
- 767 the -- who have been trafficked into the country, as well as
- 768 contraband substances. Would you help us with that,
- understanding who you have removed from your platform?
- 770 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I would be delighted to check
- with my team and get back to yours, and be collaborative.
- 772 \*Mr. Burgess. Thank you.
- 773 I yield back.
- \*The Chair. The gentleman's time has expired. The
- 775 chair recognizes the lady from California, Ms. Eshoo, for
- 776 five minutes.
- \*Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
- Mr. Chew, thank you for being here today.
- As Members of Congress, our very first and top
- 780 responsibility is to protect and defend, protect and defend

781 our Constitution and the national security of our country. So I view this entire issue -- now, there are many parts of 782 783 it that are not part of our national security, in my view, but first and foremost, our national security. 784 So in examining TikTok breaking away from ByteDance, I 785 would like to ask you some questions about that, and how a 786 severance in terms of the relationship with ByteDance, how 787 788 user data, American user data, would be protected. under Beijing's security laws, article 7 compels companies to 789 provide data; article 10 makes the reach of the law 790 extraterritorial. Now, this is very clear. I don't need to 791 read all of it into the record, but those are the laws of the 792 793 PRC. How does ByteDance -- how does TikTok, rather -- how do 794 you convince the Congress of the United States that there can 795 be a clean break? Why would the Chinese Government sidestep 796 their national law, including article 7, article 10, in terms 797 798 of user data? \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, thank you for the question. 799 am glad you asked this. 800

801

As I said in the opening statement, our plan is to move

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802
     American data to be stored on American soil by an American
     company --
803
804
          *Ms. Eshoo. I understand that. I understand that.
     you are sidestepping -- or I haven't read anything in terms
805
     of TikTok -- how you can actually say -- and you spoke in
806
     your opening statement about a firewall relative to the data,
807
     but the Chinese Government has that data. What -- how can
808
809
     you promise that that will move into the United States of
     America and be protected here?
810
          *Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I have seen no evidence that
811
     the Chinese government has access to that data.
812
                                                       They have
     never asked us. We have not provided.
813
          *Ms. Eshoo. Well, you know what? I find that --
814
          *Mr. Chew. I have asked that question --
815
          *Ms. Eshoo. I find that actually preposterous.
816
          *Mr. Chew. I have looked, and --
817
          *Ms. Eshoo. I really do.
818
          *Mr. Chew. -- I have seen no evidence of this
819
     happening. And in order to assure everybody here and all our
820
     users, our commitment is to move the data into the United
821
     States, to be stored on American soil by an American company,
822
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823
     overseen by American personnel. So the risk will be similar
     to any government going to an American company asking for
824
825
     data, if that --
          *Ms. Eshoo. Well, I am one that doesn't believe that
826
     there is really a private sector in China. And when you look
827
     at their national law, and what -- specifically, these two
828
     articles, article 7 and article 10, are very clear. So I
829
830
     think that there is a real problem, a real problem relative
     to our national security about the protection of the user
831
     data.
832
          I don't believe that TikTok has -- that you have said or
833
     done anything to convince us that that information, the
834
     personal information of 150 million Americans, that the
835
     Chinese Government is not going to give that up. So can you
836
     tell me --
837
          *Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, if I --
838
          *Ms. Eshoo. Can you tell me who writes the algorithms
839
840
     for TikTok?
          *Mr. Chew. Today the algorithm that powers the U.S.
841
     user experience is running in the Oracle Cloud
842
     infrastructure.
843
```

844 Yes, you know, in the -- initially, there were parts of the source code, especially in the infrastructure layer, that 845 846 doesn't touch the user experience. Now, that is a collaborative global effort, including built by engineers in 847 China, just like many other companies, by the way. The phone 848 you use, the car you drive is a global collaborative effort. 849 Now, but today the business sites and the main parts of the 850 851 code for TikTok is written by TikTok employees. And, Congresswoman, what we are offering is third-party 852 monitoring of our source code. I am not aware of any 853 company, American companies or otherwise, that has actually 854 done that, because we are saying we want to give you 855 856 transparency and rely on third parties to make sure that we get all the comfort that we need about the experience. 857 \*Ms. Eshoo. Well, I -- my time is up, and I yield back. 858 Thank you. 859 \*The Chair. The lady yields back. I am pleased to 860 861 yield to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta, for five 862 minutes. \*Mr. Latta. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. Unlike the 863 Chinese Communist Party, the United States believes in 864

865 individual freedom, innovation, and entrepreneurship. is in part why Congress enacted section 230 of the 866 867 Communications Decency Act. Our goal is to promote growth of the online ecosystem in the United States, and to protect 868 companies from being held liable for good faith efforts to 869 moderate their platforms. 870 Last year a Federal judge in Pennsylvania found that 871 872 section 230 protected TikTok from being held responsible for the death of a 10-year old girl who participated in a 873 blackout challenge also known as the Choking Challenge. 874 TikTok actively pushed this video on her feed. 875 Unfortunately, this is one of the many devastating examples 876 of children losing their lives because of content promoted by 877 TikTok. 878 Section 230 was never intended to shield companies like 879 yours from amplifying dangerous and life-threatening content 880 to children. Do you consider this to be a good faith 881 882 moderation? \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, as a father myself, when I hear 883 about the tragic deaths of --884

\*Mr. Latta. And my question --

885

```
*Mr. Chew. -- people, it is heartbreaking.
886
          *Mr. Latta. Do you find that good faith moderation?
887
888
          *Mr. Chew.
                      Well, Congressman, section 230 is a very
     complex issue.
889
          *Mr. Latta. Okay, you know, yes or no?
890
          *Mr. Chew. We are very focused on safety, and all these
891
     dangerous --
892
893
          *Mr. Latta. Okay, I am going to have to --
          *Mr. Chew. -- challenges are removed when we find them.
894
          *Mr. Latta. -- assume that is a no.
895
          Do you believe TikTok deserves this liability
896
897
     protection?
          *Mr. Chew. I am sorry, Congressman, I didn't --
898
          *Mr. Latta. Do you believe that TikTok deserves this
899
     liability protection under section 230?
900
          *Mr. Chew. Congressman, as you pointed out, 230 has
901
     been very important for freedom of expression on the
902
                It is one of the commitments we have given to this
903
     community and our users, and I do think it is important to
904
     preserve that.
905
          But companies should be raising the bar on safety. I
906
```

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907
     really agree with that --
          *Mr. Latta. Let me follow up real quickly, from your
908
909
     own testimony. When you told us -- and you repeated it --
     "We will keep safety, particularly for teenagers, a top
910
     priority for us,'' you are saying you are making that
911
     following commitment. Why did you have to wait until now to
912
     make that following commitment now, and not having done it
913
914
     before, when this 10-year-old lost her life?
          *Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am reiterating the commitment
915
     internally in all my priorities, which is public to my
916
     employees --
917
          *Mr. Latta. Okay, this is a --
918
          *Mr. Chew. Safety has always been a priority.
919
          *Mr. Latta. This company is a picture perfect example
920
     of why this committee in Congress needs to take action
921
     immediately to amend section 230.
922
923
          When we recently met I asked you if the Chinese
924
     Communist Party can currently access user data, and you did
     not have a clear answer. So today I want to follow up. You
925
     heard it a little bit, but I want to be absolutely sure of
926
     this answer.
927
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928
          Are employees of ByteDance subject to Chinese law,
     including the 2017 national intelligence law which requires
929
930
     any organization or citizen to support, assist, and cooperate
     with state intelligence work in accordance with the law?
931
          *Mr. Chew. Like many companies, including many American
932
     companies, we rely on a global workforce, including engineers
933
     in China.
934
935
          *Mr. Latta. Okay, but yes or no --
          *Mr. Chew. So in the past, yes. In the past, yes, yes.
936
     But we are building Project Texas, and we are committing to
937
     firewall off --
938
          *Mr. Latta. Okay, I am taking that as --
939
          *Mr. Chew. -- all protected data from unwanted foreign
940
941
     access.
          *Mr. Latta. I am taking that as a yes, because, again,
942
     your article 7 -- the Article 7 of the 2017 national
943
     intelligence law, which I just said, because it says, in
944
     addition -- as was asked a little bit earlier -- the 2014
945
     counter-espionage law states that when the state security
946
     organ investigates and understands the situation of espionage
947
     and collects relevant evidence, the relevant organizations
948
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949
     and individuals -- it does not say "may''; it says "shall''
     provide it truthfully, and may not refuse.
950
951
          Yes or no, do any ByteDance employees in China,
     including engineers, currently have access to U.S. user data?
952
          *Mr. Chew. Today all U.S. user data is stored by
953
     default in the Oracle Cloud infrastructure --
954
          *Mr. Latta. Answer the question.
955
956
          *Mr. Chew. -- and access to that is controlled --
          *Mr. Latta. The question is do any ByteDance --
957
          *Mr. Chew. -- by American personnel.
958
          *Mr. Latta. -- employees in China, including engineers,
959
     currently have access to U.S. data?
960
961
          *Mr. Chew. Congressman, I would appreciate -- this is a
     complex topic. Today all data is stored by default --
962
          *Mr. Latta. Yes or no? It is not that complex. Yes or
963
     no, do they have access to user data?
964
          *Mr. Chew. We have -- after Project Texas is done, the
965
966
     answer is no. Today there is still some data that we need --
          *Mr. Latta. Yes, we have --
967
          *Mr. Chew. -- to delete --
968
          *Mr. Latta. Yes, we have heard already from the ranking
969
```

- 970 member that he hasn't, and -- that he doesn't really see that 971 Project Texas is going to be useful.
- So I think I am taking that as a no because, again, the question is -- come up earlier -- that on December the 22nd of last year, when ByteDance confirmed some of its Chinese employees had accessed TikTok data to monitor and track the physical location of journalists. So I took that as a yes from an earlier answer.
- You know, earlier this week you posted a TikTok video 978 asking American users to mobilize in support of your app and 979 oppose the potential U.S. government action to ban TikTok in 980 the United States. Based on the established relationship 981 between your company and the Chinese Communist Party, it is 982 impossible for me to conclude that the video is anything 983 different than the type of propaganda the CCP requires 984 Chinese companies to push on its citizens. 985
- 986 And I yield back.
- \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the lady from Colorado, Ms. DeGette, for five minutes.
- 990 \*Ms. DeGette. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

991 Mr. Chew, like my colleagues I am concerned about the influence of China on TikTok, and what that does for U.S. 992 993 users. But I am also concerned about how the content in TikTok is being distributed, particularly to young people. 994 This is not a problem unique to TikTok, but TikTok has 995 150 million users in the United States, and so I think you 996 will agree that TikTok has a particular responsibility to 997 998 monitor content to make sure that it is safe and accurate. Would that be fair to say? 999 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, I agree with that. 1000 \*Ms. DeGette. So, you know, I know you said in your 1001 opening statement there is a ban for or limited for kids 1002 under 13 and under 18, and so on. But I am -- I know it 1003 won't be news for you that computer-savvy kids actually can 1004 bypass some of those restrictions quite frequently, and they 1005 can do it even if they have parental oversight. 1006 And so what I want to ask you is, rather than putting 1007 1008 the burden on young people and parents to accurately put in the birth date and so on when registering for TikTok, I want 1009 to ask you what TikTok can do to make sure to monitor this 1010 content. 1011

```
1012
           And I want to give you some examples of some of the
      extreme content. Mr. Latta talked about the Blackout
1013
1014
      Challenge, and the -- some of the dangers to young people's
      safety. But there is also extreme content around health care
1015
1016
      information.
           In one study, 13 out of 20 results for the question,
1017
      "Does mugwort induce abortion.' ' it is -- it talked about
1018
1019
      herbal so-called abortifacients like papaya seeds, which
      don't work. And so, if people searching for information on
1020
      safe abortions went on TikTok, they could get devastatingly
1021
      incorrect information.
1022
           Another study showed that TikTok was -- had a
1023
1024
      hydroxychloroquine tutorial on how to fabricate this from
      grapefruit. Now, there is two problems with that. Number
1025
      one, hydroxychloroquine is not effective in treating COVID.
1026
      So that is one issue. The second issue is you can't even
1027
      make hydroxychloroquine from grapefruit. So, again, this is
1028
1029
      a really serious miscommunication about health care
      information that people looking at TikTok are able to get.
1030
      And in fact, it is being pushed out to them.
1031
           So I want to know from you -- and I will give you time
1032
```

1033 to answer this -- you have current controls, but the current controls are not working to keep this information mainly from 1034 1035 young people, but from Americans in general. What more is TikTok doing to try to strengthen its review to keep this 1036 information from coming across to people? 1037 \*Mr. Chew. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. 1038 The dangerous misinformation that you mentioned is not 1039 1040 allowed on our platform. It violates them. 1041 \*Ms. DeGette. I am sorry to report it is on your platform, though. 1042 \*Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I don't think I can sit here 1043 1044 and say that we are perfect in doing this. We do work very 1045 hard --1046 \*Ms. DeGette. How can you make yourself more perfect? I don't want you to say it is not there, or you apologize. 1047 What can you do to limit it as much as possible, more than 1048 what you are doing now? 1049 1050 \*Mr. Chew. We invest a significant amount in our content moderation work. I shared that number in our -- in 1051

\*Ms. DeGette. I know you are investing.

my written testimony.

1052

1053

1054 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. \*Ms. DeGette. But what steps are you taking to improve 1055 1056 the AI, or whatever else you are doing to limit this content? \*Mr. Chew. For example, if you search for certain 1057 search terms, we do direct you on TikTok to resource --1058 safety resources. That is one of the things we have done. 1059 We will continue to invest in this. 1060 1061 I recognize and fully align with you that this is a problem that faces our industry, that we need to really 1062 invest and address. I am very in alignment. 1063 The vast majority of our users come to our platform for 1064 1065 entertaining, safe content. But there are people who do have 1066 some -- who do spout some dangerous misinformation, and we need to take that very seriously, invest in it, proactively 1067 identify it, and remove it from our platform. 1068 \*Ms. DeGette. Okay. I am going to stop you right now. 1069 I asked you specifically how you were increasing -- how you 1070 1071 were trying to increase your review of this, and you gave me only generalized statements that you are investing, that you 1072 are concerned, that you are doing more. That is not enough 1073 for me. That is not enough for the parents of America. 1074

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1075
            I am going to ask you to supplement your testimony, and
      have your experts tell me what you are doing to make this a
1076
      higher level of scrutiny, not just pablum at a hearing.
1077
      Thank you.
1078
           I yield back.
1079
           *Mr. Chew. Thank you.
1080
            *The Chair.
                         The lady yields back. The chair recognizes
1081
1082
      the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hudson, for five
1083
      minutes.
            *Mr. Hudson.
                          Thank you, Chairwoman McMorris Rodgers,
1084
      for holding this important hearing. I appreciate the
1085
      witness, Mr. Shou Chew, for making yourself available here
1086
1087
      today.
1088
           While many consider TikTok to be just another video
      sharing app, in reality TikTok has been functioning as a
1089
      massive surveillance program, collecting vast swaths of
1090
      personal data from more than a billion people worldwide.
1091
1092
      This includes data from the personal devices of Federal
      employees, contractors, and, most concerning, U.S. military
1093
      service members and their families at places like Fort Bragg
1094
      in North Carolina.
1095
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1096 As Fort Bragg's congressman, I have serious concerns about the opportunities TikTok gives the Chinese Communist 1097 1098 Party to access the non-public, sensitive data of our men and This personal data and location women in uniform. 1099 information can be harvested, and could be used for 1100 blackmail, to conduct espionage, and possibly even reveal 1101 1102 troop movements. 1103 While the Department of Defense and most agencies have 1104 banned TikTok on government-issued devices, I believe more needs to be done at the command level to urge troops and 1105 their dependents to erase the app from the personal devices, 1106 and keep them off home WiFi. Having an app banned on a 1107 1108 device in one pocket but downloaded on your device in the other doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me. I believe 1109 Congress and DoD should address the continued use of TikTok 1110 on military installations, as well as any use that depicts 1111 U.S. military operations. 1112 1113 Mr. Chew, does TikTok access the home WiFi network? \*Mr. Chew. Only if the user turns on the WiFi. 1114 sorry, I may not understand the --1115 \*Mr. Hudson. So if I have the TikTok app on my phone, 1116

- and my phone is on my home WiFi network, does TikTok access
- 1118 that network?
- \*Mr. Chew. It will have to access the network to get
- 1120 connections to the Internet, if that is the question.
- \*Mr. Hudson. Is it possible, then, that it could access
- other devices on that home WiFi network?
- \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, we do not do anything that is
- 1124 beyond any industry norms. I believe the answer to your
- 1125 question is no. It could be technical. Let me get back to
- 1126 you.
- \*Mr. Hudson. Okay. I would appreciate it if you could
- 1128 answer that.
- 1129 I would like to change directions real quick. Do you
- 1130 receive personal employment, salary, compensation, or
- 1131 benefits from ByteDance?
- 1132 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, I do.
- \*Mr. Hudson. What is your salary from ByteDance?
- 1134 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, if you don't mind, I would
- 1135 prefer to keep my compensation private.
- \*Mr. Hudson. Okay. Do you personally have any company
- shares or stock in ByteDance or Douyin?

\*Mr. Chew. Congressman, if you don't mind, I would like

to keep my personal assets private. 1139 1140 \*Mr. Hudson. Is TikTok, the company, your only source of employment compensation? Where is your other source of 1141 income outside of TikTok? 1142 \*Mr. Chew. It is my only source of compensation. 1143 \*Mr. Hudson. Do you have any financial debts or 1144 1145 obligations to ByteDance, Douyin, or any other ByteDanceaffiliated entity? 1146 \*Mr. Chew. Personally? No, I do not. 1147 \*Mr. Hudson. Does your management team receive separate 1148 salary, compensation, or benefits from ByteDance? 1149 1150 \*Mr. Chew. We receive salaries from the employer -- the entities that we are employed in, but we --1151 \*Mr. Hudson. Is that --1152 \*Mr. Chew. -- do share in the employee stock option 1153 plan that is available from the ByteDance top company. 1154

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1158 \*Mr. Chew. You can characterize it as that, yes.

\*Mr. Hudson.

ByteDance?

but you have other compensation that comes directly from

So your primary salary comes from TikTok,

1159 \*Mr. Hudson. Does your management team have company shares or stock in ByteDance or Douyin? 1160 1161 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, we -- some of our employees are compensated in shares in ByteDance. 1162 \*Mr. Hudson. Does TikTok share technological resources 1163 with Douyin? 1164 Are the two technology systems or IT systems 1165 1166 interconnected in any way? \*Mr. Chew. They are. As with many companies, some 1167 share resources on some services, but it doesn't include --1168 anything that involves U.S. user data, Congressman, is in 1169 Project Texas, as we talked about, stored by default in 1170 1171 American soil by an American company. \*Mr. Hudson. Well, but currently there is shared 1172 technology or interconnected IT systems. 1173 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, with respect, I have to get 1174 back to you. This could be a very broad question. Like, for 1175 1176 example, we could all be using Microsoft Windows. \*Mr. Hudson. If you could get back with details on 1177 that, I would appreciate it. 1178

\*Mr. Chew. Yes.

1179

1180 \*Mr. Hudson. Can Douyin personnel or employees access TikTok user data? 1181 1182 \*Mr. Chew. Not after Project Texas. This is not allowed. 1183 \*Mr. Hudson. Are there employees who are employed by 1184 both Douyin and TikTok? 1185 \*Mr. Chew. I do not believe so. 1186 \*Mr. Hudson. Okay. So, "I don't believe so,' is that 1187 a -- I mean, again, I will allow you to come back in written 1188 response, if you could give me a definitive answer. 1189 \*Mr. Chew. I will go back and check to be very sure. 1190 \*Mr. Hudson. Okay. Thank you. I am also concerned 1191 1192 about an issue that our chairwoman brought up about an apparent pattern of misinformation or misrepresentation from 1193 your company in regards to the amount and extent of data that 1194 you are collecting, as well as how much has been accessed 1195 from inside China. 1196 1197 There are dozens of public reports that conclude individuals in the People's Republic of China have been 1198 accessing data on U.S. users, directly contradicting several 1199 public statements by TikTok employees. And I am referencing 1200

1201 Project Raven, which was first reported on by Forbes last Their investigation revealed -- I am sorry, I am 1202 October. about out of time. Do you want to respond to that? 1203 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, Congressman. We do not condone the 1204 effort by certain former employees to access U.S. TikTok user 1205 data in an attempt to identify the source of leaked 1206 confidential information. We condemn these actions. 1207 1208 After learning about them, we found a highly reputable law firm to thoroughly investigate the incident. We took 1209 swift disciplinary action against employees who were found to 1210 be involved, and are implementing measures to make sure this 1211 doesn't happen again. We have made this team available to 1212 1213 you. They -- I think they have briefed many of you in this committee very extensively, and I will continue to make them 1214 very available to you as part of our transparent commitment. 1215 \*Mr. Hudson. Thank you. My time is expired. 1216 I vield back. 1217 1218 \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. recognizes the lady from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky, for five 1219 minutes. 1220

\*Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. So today in The Wall

1221

1222 Street Journal, they said -- today China's commerce minister said that China opposes the sale of TikTok because it would 1223 1224 involve exporting China's technology, and would -- and this is the important part -- and would need to be approved by the 1225 Chinese Government, would need to be approved by the Chinese 1226 Government. 1227 So all of what you have been saying about the distance 1228 1229 between TikTok and China has been said to be not true in the in the paper today. And I would like to see what you have to 1230 say in response. 1231 \*Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I do disagree with that 1232 characterization. I think we have designed Project Texas to 1233 protect U.S. user interests, and to move forward here in the 1234 U.S. 1235 Again, it is the protections of storing American data on 1236 American soil by an American company looked after by American 1237 personnel. And I do not think that the -- you know, our 1238 1239 commitments to this committee and all our users is impacted by any event that you mentioned. 1240 Now, the whole, you know, discussion on this, the 1241 resolution of this, is an ongoing and developing event. 1242

we will continue to pay attention to this, and we will get 1243 1244 back to you when we have more specifics. But my commitment 1245 stands --\*Ms. Schakowsky. So if -- okay. 1246 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. 1247 \*Ms. Schakowsky. So if it is an ongoing debate, 1248 apparently with China -- so it is hard to say with any 1249 1250 certainty that China would not have any influence. 1251 But let me ask another question. So last fall, along with Gus Bilirakis, who -- were chair and co-chair of the 1252 subcommittee together -- were told that TikTok had surveilled 1253 -- was involved in surveillance of users' very personal 1254 information. And you might say, well, not more than other 1255 companies. And I agree with Ranking Member Pallone that I 1256 really don't want to go by that standard, particularly, but 1257 that TikTok's in-app browser surveilled everything from 1258 Americans, including passwords and credit card numbers, et 1259 1260 cetera. So I just want to ask you if TikTok did track and 1261 collect this sensitive data that Americans don't want to have 1262 disclosed. 1263

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1264
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, thank you. I am glad you asked
      this question because, like you pointed out, we actually do
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1266
      not believe we collect more data than any other social media
      company out there. A lot of these reports -- and I -- we can
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      talk about which specific one you are talking about -- a lot
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1269
      of them are not that accurate. Some of them we have
      contacted, we have actually gotten in touch with the authors
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1271
      to help them understand the data that we are collecting. A
      lot of it is speculation. You know, this is something they
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      could do, they could do.
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           But if you look at the subtext, this is something that
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      any company could do --
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1276
           *Ms. Schakowsky. So I am running out of time.
      just say that if TikTok chose not to take the sensitive --
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      this sensitive information that you don't need for a
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      transaction and support our comprehensive privacy bill, that
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      would be very helpful.
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1281
           The other thing I wanted to ask -- so really, this is a
      yes or no, that TikTok -- does TikTok share user information
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      from companies, from parent companies, from affiliated or --
1283
      or send user information to -- overseas?
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1285
           *Mr. Chew. In the past, yes, for interoperability
      purposes. Now, after Project Texas, all protected U.S. data
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1287
      will be stored here, with the access controlled by a special
      team of U.S. personnel.
1288
           Again, Congresswoman, this is something that, as far as
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      I understand, no other company, including American companies,
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      are willing to go. So maybe this is something that we can
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1292
      ask the industry to provide, not just us, to protect U.S. --
           *Ms. Schakowsky. In case of sharing information, I do
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      want to quote from employees that you had that -- and here is
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      the quote -- "Everything is seen in China,' ' is really what
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      they said. People who were in touch with the sensitive data
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      were saying that. How do you respond to that?
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           *Mr. Chew. I disagree with that statement.
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           *Ms. Schakowsky. Well, I know you disagree with that
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      statement. But my point is, how does that happen that
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      employees of the company are saying that, in fact, that is
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1302
      not true?
           *Mr. Chew. I cannot speak to -- I don't know who this
1303
      person is, so I cannot speak to what a person has or has not
1304
      said. What I can say is, you know, based on my position in
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1306 this company and the responsibility that I have, that statement is just not true. 1307 1308 \*Ms. Schakowsky. Okay. Unfortunately -- and I will close, I guess I am over my time -- we need to look into the 1309 facts of this, and so do you. 1310 And I yield back. 1311 \*The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. The chair 1312 1313 recognizes the lady from Florida, Mrs. Cammack, for five 1314 minutes. \*Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 1315 Mr. Chew, are you aware of Chinese Communist Party 1316 leader Chairman Xi Jinping's comments in May 2021 during a 1317 Communist Politburo study session, where he instructed 1318 colleagues to target different countries, different audiences 1319 with short-form video? Are you aware of these comments, yes 1320 or no? 1321 \*Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I am not aware of these 1322 1323 comments. \*Mrs. Cammack. Okay. Well, and as was pointed out by 1324 Chairwoman Rodgers, you have regular contact with Chinese 1325

Communist Party Secretary Mr. Zhang Fuping, who is your boss

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at ByteDance, correct?
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           *Mr. Chew. No.
1328
1329
           *Mrs. Cammack. No?
           *Mr. Chew. No.
1330
           *Mrs. Cammack. Interesting.
1331
           *Mr. Chew. He is neither my boss, nor do we have
1332
      frequent contact.
1333
           *Mrs. Cammack. But you have regular contact with
1334
      ByteDance.
1335
           *Mr. Chew. With the CEO of ByteDance.
1336
           *Mrs. Cammack. Who is -- Mr. Zhang Fuping is the editor
1337
      in chief.
1338
           *Mr. Chew. He is not --
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           *Mrs. Cammack. My colleague, Representative Burgess, a
1340
      few minutes ago exposed that TikTok and ByteDance share legal
1341
      teams. You confirmed this, correct?
1342
           *Mr. Chew. Our general counsel is --
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1344
           *Mrs. Cammack. Yes? Yes or no?
           *Mr. Chew. -- an American lawyer, a veteran of
1345
1346
      Microsoft --
           *Mrs. Cammack. Yes. Also --
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1348
           *Mr. Chew. And --
           *Mrs. Cammack. -- my colleague, Representative Latta,
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1350
      confirmed that your parent company, ByteDance, currently can
      access user data. Yes?
1351
           *Mr. Chew. Let's --
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           *Mrs. Cammack. Yes.
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           *Mr. Chew. We have to be more specific.
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1355
           *Mrs. Cammack. Yes.
           *Mr. Chew. After Project Texas, no.
1356
           *Mrs. Cammack. You say -- I am not asking after Project
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      Texas. I am asking now. Yes.
1358
           *Mr. Chew. Some user data is public data,
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1360
      Congresswoman, which means everybody --
           *Mrs. Cammack. So you confirm that.
1361
           *Mr. Chew. -- can search around the Internet.
1362
           *Mrs. Cammack. What is interesting to me is that you
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      have used the word "transparency' ' over a half a dozen times
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1365
      in your opening testimony, and subsequently again in your
      answers to my colleagues. Yet the interesting thing to me is
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      that ByteDance, your parent company, has gone out of their
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      way to hide and airbrush corporate structure ties to the CCP,
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1369 the company's founder, and their activities. You can look no further than the fact that ByteDance's 1370 1371 website has been scrubbed. In fact, we found web pages from the Beijing Internet Association, the industry association 1372 charged with Communist Party building work of Internet 1373 companies in Beijing. They have been archived, but since 1374 deleted. It makes you kind of wonder why. 1375 1376 Yes or no, ByteDance is required to have a member of the 1377 Chinese Government on its board with veto power. correct? 1378 \*Mr. Chew. No, that is not correct. ByteDance owns 1379 some Chinese businesses, and you are talking about a very 1380 special subsidiary that is --1381 \*Mrs. Cammack. Mr. Shou --1382 \*Mr. Chew. -- for Chinese business licensing --1383 \*Mrs. Cammack. Mr. Shou, I am going to have to move on. 1384 You have said repeatedly that there is no threat, that 1385 1386 this is an a platform for entertainment and for fun. to ask you then, if there is no threat to Americans, if there 1387 is no threat to our data privacy, security, why did an 1388 internal memo from TikTok corporate headquarters explicitly 1389

1390 coach senior management to "downplay the parent company ByteDance' '? Why would they say, downplay the China 1391 1392 Association and downplay AI? This is from an internal memo from your company. Why, 1393 if you had nothing to hide, would you need to downplay the 1394 association with ByteDance in China? 1395 \*Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I have not seen this memo. 1396 1397 \*Mrs. Cammack. You can't answer that question. \*Mr. Chew. I can say --1398 \*Mrs. Cammack. Mr. Shou, I would like to direct your 1399 attention to the screen for a short video, if you don't mind. 1400 [Video shown.] 1401 1402 \*Mrs. Cammack. Mr. Shou, that video was posted 41 days ago. As you can see, it is captioned, "Me asf [sic] at the 1403 House Energy and Commerce Committee on March 23rd of this 1404 year.' ' This video was posted before this hearing was 1405 publicly noticed. I think that is a very interesting point 1406 1407 to raise. But more concerning is the fact that it names this 1408 chairwoman by name. Your own community guidelines state that 1409 you have a firm stance against enabling violence on or off 1410

1411 "We do not allow people to use our platform to threaten or incite violence, or to promote violent extremist 1412 1413 organizations, individuals, or acts. When there is a threat to public safety or an account is used to promote or glorify 1414 off platform violence, we ban the account.' This video has 1415 been up for 41 days. It is a direct threat to the chairwoman 1416 of this committee, the people in this room, and yet it still 1417 1418 remains on the platform. And you expect us to believe that you are capable of maintaining the data, security -- privacy 1419 and security of 150 million Americans, where you can't even 1420 protect the people in this room? 1421 I think that is a blatant display of how vulnerable 1422 1423 people who use TikTok are. You couldn't take action after 41 days, when a clear threat, a very violent threat to the 1424 chairwoman of this committee and the members of this 1425 committee, was posted on your platform. You damn well know 1426 that you cannot protect the data and security of this 1427 1428 committee or the 150 million users of your app, because it is an extension of the CCP. 1429 And with that I yield back. 1430 \*Mr. Chew. Can I respond, Chair? 1431

1432 \*The Chair. No, we are going to move on. The gentlelady yields back. 1433 1434 The chairman recognizes the lady from California, Ms. Matsui, for five minutes. 1435 \*Ms. Matsui. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And I 1436 am really glad that we are having this very important hearing 1437 here today. 1438 1439 And let me just say, make no mistake, the Chinese Government represents a real and immediate threat. Look no 1440 further than even the vulnerable gear still in our telecom 1441 networks that needs to be ripped and replaced. 1442 But we can't lose sight of the important Internet 1443 governance issues TikTok and other social media companies 1444 represent. I am especially committed to demanding 1445 transparency from large platforms about the algorithms that 1446 shape our online interactions, especially for teenagers and 1447 young users. And that is why I introduced the Algorithmic 1448 1449 Justice and Online Platform Transparency Act to bring greater visibility into this ecosystem. 1450 My bill would require -- would prohibit algorithms that 1451 discriminate on the basis of race, age, gender, ability, and 1452

1453 other protected characteristics. It also would establish a safety and effectiveness standard for algorithms, while 1454 1455 requiring new forms of oversight. Now, this bill would require online platforms to publish annual public reports 1456 detailing their content moderation practices, which I believe 1457 should be a baseline requirement to enable meaningful 1458 oversight and consumer choice. 1459 1460 Mr. Chew, just yes or no, do you believe a requirement for annual content moderation practices for social media 1461 platforms would be beneficial? Yes or no. 1462 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. 1463 \*Ms. Matsui. This transparency bill would also require 1464 1465 online platforms to maintain detailed records describing their algorithmic process for review by the Federal Trade 1466 Commission in compliance with key privacy and data 1467 de-identification standards. 1468 Mr. Chew, does TikTok currently maintain records 1469 1470 describing their algorithmic processes? Yes or no. \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I would need to check and get 1471 back to you on what kind of specific records you are talking 1472 about. 1473

1474 \*Ms. Matsui. I will wait for that. Over the past few years, alarming information brought to 1475 1476 light by whistleblowers have shown that social media companies are intimately aware of the effect their products 1477 have on young women, political extremism, and more. 1478 this, they withheld those studies or declined to investigate 1479 In either case, it shows a pattern -- evasive or 1480 1481 negligent behavior that I find concerning in the extreme. Mr. Chew, does TikTok conduct its own studies on the 1482 effect of its algorithms and content distribution models on 1483 mental health or safety? 1484 1485 And if so, how and when are those findings made public? And if not, do you believe they are necessary? 1486 \*Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, we rely on external third 1487 parties, and fund their research to help us understand some 1488 of these issues. For example, we worked with the Digital 1489 Wellness Lab at the Boston Children's Hospital to understand 1490 1491 the 60-minute time limit that we put for all our under-18 users. And we are supportive of legislation that provides 1492 more funding for research like, for example, for the NIH. 1493 \*Ms. Matsui. Okay. TikTok tailors its recommended 1494

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      content based on user activity to encourage people to spend
      more time on the app. While this practice is by no means
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1497
      unique to TikTok, given the prevalence of young users and the
      digestible nature of short-form video, I am concerned about
1498
      the app's tendency to exacerbate existing mental health
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1500
      challenges.
           Mr. Chew, does TikTok have different policies for
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1502
      amplifying content that would be related to depression or
1503
      dieting, versus content like gardening and sports? If yes,
      describe these policy differences. If no, why not?
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           *Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, thank you for that.
1505
      a great question. The answer is yes. We are trying out some
1506
1507
      policies together with experts to understand certain contents
      that are not inherently harmful, like extreme fitness, for
1508
      example, but shouldn't be seen too much. And this is --
1509
      these are models that we are building, and we are trying to
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      understand, you know, together with experts, how to best
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1512
      implement them across our platform, particularly for younger
1513
      users.
           *Ms. Matsui. Okay, so --
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           *Mr. Chew. Under 18, yes.
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           *Ms. Matsui. -- in cases where users have been engaging
      with potentially harmful content, I believe it is imperative
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      that the app takes steps to moderate that behavior, rather
      than continuing to promote it. I mean, in a sense --
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           *Mr. Chew. I apologize, I --
1520
           *Ms. Matsui. -- very intentional about that.
1521
           *Mr. Chew. I wasn't clear. First, anything that is
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1523
      violative and harmful we remove. What I meant to say were
      things -- content that is not inherently harmful, like some
1524
      of the extreme fitness videos about people running 100 miles,
1525
      it is not inherently harmful, but if we show them too much --
1526
      the experts are telling us that we should disperse them more,
1527
1528
      and make sure that they are not seen too regularly --
           *Ms. Matsui. So you are very intentional --
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           *Mr. Chew. -- especially by younger users.
1530
           *Ms. Matsui. -- about that, then. It is something that
1531
      you are --
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           *Mr. Chew. We are working on it, yes, yes.
           *Ms. Matsui. You are working on it?
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           *Mr. Chew. Yes.
1535
           *Ms. Matsui. Okay, I yield back.
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1537 \*The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for 1538 1539 five minutes. \*Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate 1540 it very much. Thanks for holding this hearing. 1541 Mr. Chew, your algorithms have prioritized providing 1542 harmful content directly to children, like self-harm 1543 1544 challenges and even suicide. Just three days ago, Italy opened an investigation into the TikTok over user safety 1545 concerns after the so-called French Scar Challenge went viral 1546 on your platform. 1547 I know you know about the Blackout Challenge, which 1548 1549 others may know as the Choking Challenge that encourages children to bring them to the point of unconsciousness or, in 1550 some cases, tragically, death. If that isn't enough, I want 1551 to share the story of Chase Nasca, a 16-year-old boy from New 1552 York who tragically ended his life a year ago by stepping in 1553 1554 front of a train. I want to thank his parents again. They are here. I 1555 want to thank his parents for being here today, and allowing 1556 us to show this. 1557

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1558
           Mr. Chew, your company destroyed their lives. Your
      company destroyed their lives. I admire their courage to be
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1560
      here and share Chase's story in the hopes that it will
      prevent this from happening to other families. The content
1561
      in Chase's For You page was not a window to discovery, as you
1562
      boldly claimed in your testimony. It wasn't content from a
1563
      creator that you invited to roam the Hill today, or STEM
1564
1565
      education content that children in China see. Instead, his
      For You page was, sadly, a window to discover suicide. It is
1566
      unacceptable, sir, that, even after knowing all these
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      dangers, you still claim TikTok is something grand to behold.
1568
           I want you to see what Chase would see. And I think if
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      you want -- again, would you share this content with your
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      children, with your two children? Would you want them to see
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      this?
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           And again, I want to warn everyone watching that you may
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      find this content disturbing, but we need to watch this,
1574
1575
      please.
1576
           [Video shown.]
           *Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Chew, please, your technology is
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      literally leading to death. Mr. Chew, yes or no, do you have
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1579 full responsibility for your algorithms used by TikTok to prioritize content to its users? Yes or no, please. 1580 1581 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I would just like to -respectfully, if you don't mind, I would just like to start 1582 by saying it is devastating to hear about the news of --1583 \*Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, yes. 1584 \*Mr. Chew. As a father myself, this is tragic. 1585 1586 \*Mr. Bilirakis. Sir, yes or no. I will repeat the question. Do you have full responsibility over the 1587 algorithms used by TikTok to prioritize content to its users? 1588 Yes or no, please. 1589 1590 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, we do take these issues very 1591 seriously. \*Mr. Bilirakis. Yes or no? 1592 \*Mr. Chew. And we do provide resources for anyone who 1593 types in anything that --1594 \*Mr. Bilirakis. Sir, yes or no. 1595 1596 I see you are not willing to answer the question or take any responsibility for your parent companies, the technology, 1597 and the harms it creates. It is just very, very sad. Very 1598

1599

sad.

1600 \*Mr. Chew. It is very sad. \*Mr. Bilirakis. This is why Congress needs to enact a 1601 1602 comprehensive privacy and data security law to give Americans more control over their information, and to protect our 1603 children. We must save our children from Big Tech companies 1604 like yours, who continue to abuse and manipulate them for 1605 your own gain. 1606 1607 And I will yield back, Madam Chair. \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair 1608 recognizes the lady from Florida, Ms. Castor, for five 1609 minutes. 1610 \*Ms. Castor. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. 1611 Colleagues, it is urgent that the Congress pass an 1612 online data privacy law that protects the personal privacy of 1613 Americans online, and particularly our kids. While this 1614 hearing shines a light on TikTok, this hearing also should 1615 serve as a call to action for the Congress to act now to 1616 1617 protect Americans from surveillance, tracking, personal data gathering, and addictive algorithmic operations that serve up 1618 harmful content and has a corrosive effect on our kids' 1619 mental and physical well-being. 1620

1621	For many years I have sounded the alarm in this
1622	committee of how Big Tech platforms like TikTok and Facebook
1623	and Instagram incessantly surveil, track, gather personal
1624	private information, and use it along with data brokers to
1625	target and influence our behavior. This is a much broader
1626	issue than TikTok in China. There are other malign actors
1627	across the world who gather data to use it as an element of
1628	social control, and influence peddling, and worse.
1629	And as I detailed in this committee last year when we
1630	passed the our online privacy law, the harms to children
1631	are very serious, and demand swift action. Big Tech
1632	platforms profit immensely from keeping children addicted.
1633	They do not care about the privacy, safety, and health of our
1634	kids. They are the modern-day tobacco and cigarette
1635	companies that for so long resisted and misled Congress. And
1636	it took the Congress it took action by the Congress to
1637	actually protect our kids, and to outlaw smoking by young
1638	people.
1639	In early 2020, based upon the growing body of evidence
1640	to harm of to kids online, I introduced the Kids Privacy
1641	Act and the KIDS Act. And I want to thank all of the

1642 researchers, the young people, the parents, the surgeon general of the United States, who have explained the 1643 1644 correlation between social media usage and body dissatisfaction, disordered eating habits, anxiety, 1645 depression, self-injury, suicide ideation, and cyber-1646 bullying. 1647 Heck, Frances Haugen, the Facebook whistleblower, was 1648 1649 right here and testified to us that Facebook and Instagram conducted research on this topic. They knew and understood 1650 the harms, but they continued to elevate profits over the 1651 well-being of children. And TikTok does the same. 1652 1653 Last Congress, when we passed the ADPPA, the committee 1654 incorporated many of these important child online privacy and safety provisions from my bills. But we can make the 118th 1655 Congress's version of this bill, of this new law, even more 1656 protective of children. And I look forward to working with 1657 the chair and the ranking member to make that happen. 1658 1659 Mr. Chew, TikTok has incredible sway over children in the U.S., but you don't have a very good track record. 1660 2019 TikTok was hit with the largest civil penalty by the 1661 Federal Trade Commission in a children's privacy case. Four 1662

years later, TikTok still has not taken sufficient action to

fix the problems, I assume, because child users are 1664 1665 incredibly profitable to your bottom line. So answer me this: TikTok allows advertisers to 1666 specifically target advertising to children aged 13 to 17, 1667 1668 correct? \*Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I do want to disagree with 1669 1670 the statement --\*Ms. Castor. Yes or no? 1671 \*Mr. Chew. -- that child abuses are not allowed on our 1672 1673 platform. \*Ms. Castor. Just yes or no. 1674 \*Mr. Chew. It is deplorable conduct, and it is not 1675 1676 allowed on our platform. \*Ms. Castor. Do you target advertising to young people 1677 aged 13 to 17? 1678 \*Mr. Chew. We do serve personalized advertising --1679

\*Ms. Castor. Okay, thank you.

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safe for them.

83

\*Ms. Castor. How much money does TikTok make off

\*Mr. Chew. -- at this point, but the policies are very

selling ads targeted to minors? 1684 \*Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, can I clarify? Minors in 1685 1686 what age? \*Ms. Castor. From just say age 13 to 17. 1687 \*Mr. Chew. For the teenager population, I want to 1688 clarify that. We do have a 13 -- under 13 experience, and 1689 with zero advertising on that platform. For those --1690 1691 \*Ms. Castor. Well, that is a whole other topic. Okay. \*Mr. Chew. Between 13 and 17, if you don't mind, I will 1692 check in with my team and get back to you on those answers. 1693 \*Ms. Castor. You know, TikTok could be designed to 1694 minimize the harm to kids, but a decision was made to 1695 1696 aggressively addict kids in the name of profits. And it is our responsibility, Members, to act swiftly to address this. 1697 This has gone on for too long. We have dilly-dallied too 1698 This committee, thankfully, we have taken 1699 responsibility and enacted, but we have an enormous 1700 1701 responsibility to act swiftly, and get this bill to the floor of the House, and passed into law as soon as possible. 1702 Thank you. I yield back my time. 1703 \*The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. The chair 1704

1705 recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for five 1706 minutes. 1707 \*Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, I am an information technology professional. 1708 I have been doing it for the most of my life. You have been 1709 evasive in many of your answers. I am going to talk to you 1710 in some language that maybe you will better understand, ones 1711 1712 and zeros. Okav? 1713 Let's talk about the Citizen Lab Report. This is something your team frequently mentions in hearings as a way 1714 to exonerate yourself. For example, in the limitations 1715 section it reads, "We could not examine every source code 1716 1717 component and test in the apps in every circumstance, which means our methods could not find every security issue, 1718 privacy violation, and censorship event. So it is an 1719 incomplete assessment.' \ The report notes that TikTok's data 1720 collection using third-party trackers was in apparent 1721 1722 conflict with the GDPR, and that multiple themes were censored by TikTok. 1723 What is shocking to me is the shared source code between 1724 TikTok in the United States and the CCP-centered Douyin. 1725 The

1726 Citizen Labs Report says that many of the functions and classes were identical, and that the differences in behavior 1727 1728 between TikTok in the United States and Douyin in China are slight changes in hard-coded values. Incredibly, specific 1729 censorship parameters from Douyin are present in TikTok, but 1730 just turned off. The authors say that, for unknown reasons, 1731 the parameter variable itself is preserved. 1732 1733 So while Citizen Labs may have been afraid to say the obvious conclusion, Mr. Chew, I am not. TikTok's source code 1734 is riddled with backdoors and CCP censorship devices. 1735 is the truth: in a million lines of code, the smallest shift 1736 from a zero to a one on just one of thousands of versions of 1737 1738 TikTok on the market will unlock explicit CCP censorship and access to American data. 1739 Mr. Chew, as CEO of TikTok, why have you not directed 1740 your engineers to change the source code? 1741 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, thank you for the question. 1742 1743 I --\*Mr. Johnson. Have you directed them to change the 1744 source code? 1745 \*Mr. Chew. Like what we are offering --1746

1747 \*Mr. Johnson. Yes or no, have you directed them to change that source code? 1748 1749 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, if you give me a bit of time to just --1750 \*Mr. Johnson. No, I don't -- it is a yes or no 1751 question. Have you directed your engineers to change that 1752 source code? 1753 1754 \*Mr. Chew. I am not sure I understand. \*Mr. Johnson. Why are you allowing TikTok to continue 1755 to have the capacity for censorship, and yet you claim here 1756 that you don't? 1757 \*Mr. Chew. It doesn't --1758 1759 \*Mr. Johnson. Let me remind you of something. Do you realize that making false and misleading statements to 1760 Congress is a Federal crime? 1761 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, I do. 1762 \*Mr. Johnson. Okay. So have you directed your 1763 1764 engineers to change that source code? \*Mr. Chew. I am giving third-party access monitoring by 1765 experts. 1766

\*Mr. Johnson. Okay.

1767

1768 \*Mr. Chew. And Congressmen, you are an expert on 1769 this --1770 \*Mr. Johnson. What percentage --\*Mr. Chew. -- you could agree with me that no other 1771 company does this --1772 \*Mr. Johnson. What percentage of TikTok source code is 1773 the same as Douyin, what percentage? 1774 1775 \*Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on the specifics. \*Mr. Johnson. Okay, I would appreciate that. 1776 Where was the source code for TikTok developed? Was it 1777 developed in China or in the United States? 1778 \*Mr. Chew. It is a global collaborative effort, like a 1779 1780 lot of --\*Mr. Johnson. And was it developed in --1781 \*Mr. Chew. -- codes in a lot of countries. 1782 \*Mr. Johnson. Was it developed in China? Some of it? 1783 \*Mr. Chew. Some of it is. 1784 1785 \*Mr. Johnson. Okay. And ByteDance. Can the -- when it is compiled in the compilation 1786 process, can byte code be manipulated? We have talked a lot 1787 about source code. What about the byte code, the ones and 1788

zeros that actually execute on the device? 1789 \*Mr. Chew. That is --1790 1791 \*Mr. Johnson. Can it be manipulated? \*Mr. Chew. Congressman? 1792 \*Mr. Johnson. 1793 Yes. \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, to give you comfort, that is 1794 why we are giving third-party monitors. 1795 1796 \*Mr. Johnson. As --\*Mr. Chew. As an expert, I think you can agree that 1797 very few companies do this --1798 \*Mr. Johnson. I have got the report here by Citizen 1799 Lab. I want to read you something from Ron Deibert. 1800 1801 Specifically in your written testimony to Congress you stated on page nine, "Citizen Lab found that there was no overt data 1802 transmission by TikTok to the Chinese Government, and that 1803 TikTok did not contact any servers within China.' 'You 1804 implied that Citizen Lab exonerated TikTok from any 1805 1806 information-sharing with China. Well, the director of Citizen Lab saw this, and issued a 1807 statement correcting the record yesterday. And I am quoting 1808 Ron Deibert, the director of the lab: "I am disappointed 1809

that TikTok executives continue citing the Citizen Lab's 1810 research in their statements to government as somehow 1811 1812 exculpatory. I have called them out on this in the past, and it is unfortunate that I have to do it again.' ' 1813 He goes on to say, and I quote, "We even speculated 1814 about possible mechanisms through which the Chinese 1815 Government might use unconventional techniques to obtain 1816 1817 TikTok user data via pressure on ByteDance.' ' Mr. Chew, you sent Congress written testimony citing 1818 this lab as a support of your claim that China cannot access 1819 user data, U.S. user data. And now this lab has come out to 1820 say, "We never said that, that is misleading.' Mr. Chew, I 1821 hope you understand what that is. That is misleading. Mr. 1822 Chew, this is yet another instance of TikTok attempting to 1823 mislead Americans about what their technology is capable of, 1824 and who has access to their information. 1825 Madam Chair, I would like to --1826 1827 \*Mr. Chew. Madam Chair, I would like to respond to that very quickly, please. 1828 \*Mr. Johnson. -- enter this statement by Ron Deibert 1829 and the Citizens Lab into the record. 1830

1831	*The Chair. Without objection, so ordered.
1832	[The information follows:]
1833	
1834	**************************************
1835	

1836 \*Mr. Johnson. With that I yield back. \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. 1837 The chair 1838 yields to the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes. minutes. 1839 \*Mr. Sarbanes. Thanks very much, Madam Chair. 1840 Mr. Chew, I am going to pick up on a theme we have 1841 already covered here, which is the effect that your platform, 1842 1843 along with many other social media platforms, by the way, has in terms of mental and behavioral health in this country. 1844 won't speak to what is happening elsewhere in the world, but 1845 we have talked about the impact that it is having on 1846 1847 children, on teens. We took some action last year in this committee to try 1848 to improve access to resources, reauthorize critical programs 1849 to address mental health needs. But we need to do even more 1850 than that. And we have got to address what the Big Tech 1851 companies like TikTok are doing, because those are platforms 1852 1853 that expose children and teens to additional risks. The more time that middle and high schoolers spend on 1854 social media, the evidence is, the more likely they are to 1855 experience depression and anxiety. And this is particularly 1856

1857 troubling since, apparently, 16 percent of American teenagers report that they use TikTok "almost constantly.' ' That is, I 1858 1859 think, about five million teenagers in this country that are on TikTok all the time. 1860 And we know that Big Tech, including TikTok, uses design 1861 features that can manipulate users, including children and 1862 teens, to keep them engaged, designed to feed them a never-1863 1864 ending stream of content, keep their attention for hours on end, which includes capitalizing on the desire for others' 1865 approval through "like' ' features, preying on the fear of 1866 missing out through push notifications, and so forth. 1867 Again, you are part of an industry that is set up to do 1868 1869 this. You, in some sense, don't appear to be able to help yourselves in reaching out and finding that new user and then 1870 TikTok itself has acknowledged that these holding onto them. 1871 features and others, like the Endless Scroll feature, can 1872 have an outsized effect on teens, and we have been discussing 1873 1874 today how your app only intensifies that harm by amplifying dangerous content and misinformation. 1875 I don't want to be too paternalistic here, because we 1876 have young people in the audience. We have got TikTok users 1877

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that are watching this hearing, and I am sure they have their
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      own ideas about how this technology is being managed by
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      TikTok and other social media platforms. They like to access
      the platforms, and they should be able to do that safely.
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      it is certainly in their interest, and they can drive this
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      conversation, I think, perfectly well.
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           But it is not a fair fight, is it? I mean, the
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1885
      algorithms are on one side of the screen.
                                                  The human brain is
      on the other side of the screen, drowning in these
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      algorithms, in many instances, at an age where the brain is
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      not even fully developed yet. So those addictive impulses
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      are being sort of perfected by the technology. And again, it
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      leaves the users sort of helpless in the face of that.
           Are you looking at ways to redesign core features like
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      the ones I mentioned to be less manipulative and addictive
1892
      for users, and can you commit to making some of those
1893
      modifications here today?
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1895
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, thank you. We do want to be
      leading in terms of safety of our users, particularly for
1896
      teenagers. We were the first to launch a 60-minute watch
1897
      limit.
1898
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1899 \*Mr. Sarbanes. Yes, let's talk about the 60-minute watch limit. 1900 1901 \*Mr. Chew. And I am very glad to see people, others in our industry, follow. 1902 For many of your recommendations, we will study them 1903 very seriously. We actually have a series of features. 1904 Like, for example, if you are under 16 you cannot use a 1905 1906 direct messaging feature because, you know, we want to protect those younger users. If you are under 16, you cannot 1907 go viral by default. If you are under 18, you cannot go 1908 live. And --1909 \*Mr. Sarbanes. Let me go back to the 60-minute limit, 1910 1911 because my understanding is that teens can pretty easily bypass the notification to continue using the app if they 1912 want to. 1913 I mean, let's face it, our teens are smarter than we are 1914 by half, and they know how to use the technology, and they 1915 1916 can get around these limits if they want to. Are you measuring how many teens continue to exceed the 60 minutes of 1917 time on that app? 1918 \*Mr. Chew. We understand --1919

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1920
           *Mr. Sarbanes. -- how that is working?
           *Mr. Chew. We understand those concerns. What we --
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1922
      our intention is to have the teens and their parents have
      these conversations about what is the appropriate amount of
1923
      time for social media. That is why we give the parents what
1924
      we call Family Pairing --
1925
           *Mr. Sarbanes. Let me ask you this question before I
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1927
      run out of time. If you concluded that putting some
      reasonable limits in place and trying to find a way to
1928
      enforce them would lead some percentage of your users to
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      leave TikTok and go somewhere else, is that something that
1930
      you are prepared to accept?
1931
           *Mr. Chew. Yes.
1932
           *Mr. Sarbanes. Really? Well, I would love to get the
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      research on how these limits are being implemented, how they
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      are being bypassed, and the things that you are taking -- the
1935
      measures you are taking to address those issues going
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1937
      forward. Please bring that information back to our committee
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      as we move forward.
           *Mr. Chew. I will be happy to.
1939
           *Mr. Sarbanes. I yield back.
1940
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1941 \*The Chair. The gentleman yields. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Guthrie, for five minutes. 1942 1943 \*Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Madam Chair, for yielding. I appreciate the time. 1944 Mr. Chew, your terms of service specifically state that 1945 TikTok does -- and I quote -- "not allow the depiction, 1946 promotion, or trade of drugs or other controlled 1947 1948 substances.' \ Despite this content being against your terms of service -- and I have brought this up with other service 1949 providers -- but despite this content being against your 1950 terms of service, content on your platform related to illicit 1951 drugs like fentanyl, drug trafficking, and other illicit 1952 1953 activity is pervasive, and racks up hundreds of thousands of 1954 views. For example, in 2020 the Benadryl Challenge resulted in 1955 the death of an American teenager. And we heard of another 1956 one, a challenge earlier today that brought a death of a 1957 1958 teenager. While you were at ByteDance, you were the CFO for 1959 ByteDance, did Douyin allow related illicit drug trafficking 1960 or challenges resulting in death or injury to kids? 1961

1962 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I represent TikTok here today. I can tell you that TikTok does not allow illegal drugs --1963 1964 \*Mr. Guthrie. Does Douyin --\*Mr. Chew. -- on our platform. 1965 \*Mr. Guthrie. Does Douyin do it in China? 1966 \*Mr. Chew. I believe they don't allow this, but I will 1967 need to check. I don't run that business. 1968 1969 \*Mr. Guthrie. So my question is --\*Mr. Chew. I can tell you TikTok does not allow this. 1970 \*Mr. Guthrie. Because all we are concerned about -- and 1971 my guess -- and would Douyin allow for 41 days a threat 1972 against a member of the Chinese Communist Party to stand on 1973 1974 their site for 41 days? 1975 \*Mr. Chew. Again, I cannot speak for Douyin and, I am sorry, I didn't hear the second part of what you said. 1976 \*Mr. Guthrie. Well, we had a threat against the 1977 chairman of our committee that was on your site for 41 days. 1978 1979 My guess is that would not be allowed in China. \*Mr. Chew. That content is violative. I would look 1980 into the specifics, and I would -- if it violates our 1981 quidelines, it will be taken down on TikTok. 1982

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1983
           *Mr. Guthrie. Yes, surely.
           *Mr. Chew. Yes.
1984
1985
           *Mr. Guthrie. It appears that it does. But the problem
      is that -- what I am trying to get at is you seem to be able
1986
      to prevent this content in China, but you -- so not even
1987
      taking it down, just prevent it from being posted. And yet
1988
      it is all -- it is on your website.
1989
1990
           So I have a couple of questions about -- you said
      earlier as soon as you find this information, you take it
1991
      down. So how quickly does your algorithm detect keywords or
1992
      content that involve illicit drug trafficking before these
1993
      posts are self-reported or used by others?
1994
           *Mr. Chew. We have about 40,000 people working on this
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      now, together with the machines that we train. I don't think
1996
      any company in our industry can be perfect at this.
                                                            This is
1997
      a real big challenge for our industry, but our goal is to get
1998
      this -- any violative content, including illegal drugs, down
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2000
      to a very, very small number.
           *Mr. Guthrie. That is the problem. When we have these
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      hearings we have CEOs of different companies, and of your
2002
      colleagues and competitors. And we always hear apologies,
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      and we always hear, "We want to do better at this,' ' but it
      just doesn't seem to keep improving. And we are hearing
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2006
      stories of our children and, obviously, that has been talked
      about today.
2007
           So how many posts and accounts have been identified and
2008
      removed from TikTok due to content posts posted related to
2009
      illicit drugs or other controlled substances?
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2011
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, we do publish that in a
      transparency report. I can get my team to get the
2012
      information to yours.
2013
           *Mr. Guthrie. Thank you. I appreciate that.
2014
           Also, we understand that the way that people use TikTok
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2016
      or other platforms similar to yours is that they ensure
      flagged user content isn't permitted to jump from -- so my
2017
      question -- so what we have heard is that the instances --
2018
      the users see a drug advertisement, and then give a code to
2019
      go to another site. So my question is, do you work with
2020
2021
      other platforms to ensure flagged user content isn't
      permitted to jump from one platform to others?
2022
           *Mr. Chew. I will check with my team. I would love to
2023
      work with our industry to make sure that we stamp out these
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2025
      problems. You know, violative content should not be allowed
      on any platforms, in my opinion.
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2027
           *Mr. Guthrie. Well, this is what is, you know, kind of
      frustrating to all of us here, is that we look at what is
2028
      happening on your sites and others, and particularly that --
2029
      we know, because we have done the research, that you can't
2030
      have access to illicit drug information on Douyin, which is a
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2032
      sister company, as you say, in China. And so it absolutely -
      - if you can prevent it on one and not the other, you
2033
      obviously have the ability to stop it from moving forward,
2034
      and yet you don't.
2035
           Would you like to expand how one of your sister
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2037
      companies can prevent that, and you not -- I know you don't
      represent Douyin, but they don't allow it. But it happens on
2038
                      What is the difference?
      your platform.
2039
           *Mr. Chew. First of all, the majority of the content on
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      TikTok is fun, entertaining, informative, and very positive
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2042
      for our users. Like other companies that operate in this
      country, we have to deal with some bad actors who come and
2043
      publish some content on illegal drugs, you know, other --
2044
           *Mr. Guthrie. But the bad actors don't seem to be able
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2046 to access Douyin. \*Mr. Chew. The TikTok U.S. experience should be 2047 2048 compared to other U.S. companies, because this is a common --\*Mr. Guthrie. But your parent company has the 2049 technology to prevent it, because you prevent it in China, 2050 but you can't prevent it here. What is the difference? That 2051 is what I am asking. 2052 2053 \*Mr. Chew. Oh, Congressman, there is no technology that is perfect in doing this. We have to deal with the reality 2054 of the country that you are operating in. And here in the 2055 United States, as with other companies, we share this 2056 challenge. We are investing a lot to address the challenge. 2057 2058 But we are -- you know, it is a shared challenge --\*Mr. Guthrie. But you invest a lot to -- seem to be 2059 able to address it in China, but not here. 2060 \*Mr. Chew. Again, you know, I think the comparison has 2061 to be within the single country. You know, we face the same 2062 2063 set of challenges here in the U.S. --\*Mr. Guthrie. What is the difference -- oh, I am sorry, 2064 I am out of time. But what is the difference in China and 2065 here? 2066

2067 \*Mr. Chew. Let me give you an example, Congressman. my home country, Singapore, there is almost no illegal drug 2068 2069 content because Singapore has very strict drug laws. \*Mr. Guthrie. Thank you. 2070 My time is expired, and I yield back. 2071 \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. 2072 recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Tonko, for five 2073 2074 minutes. \*Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am concerned 2075 that TikTok's algorithm prize -- preys on vulnerable people, 2076 including those struggling with addiction, eating orders --2077 disorders, and other mental health conditions. The platform 2078 2079 is designed to push content to users that will watch more frequently and for longer periods of time. 2080 Unfortunately for many people suffering from certain 2081 mental health disorders, videos that reinforce their fears or 2082 negative self image are more engaging. On top of that, 2083 2084 TikTok has received sensitive patient health information and records of browsing activity from multiple telehealth 2085 companies like BetterHelp and Cerebral. 2086 People's personal struggles should not be fuel for 2087

2088 TikTok's profits. People should be able to seek help to address serious medical concerns without being afraid that 2089 2090 their information will be shared with social media companies trying to push more products, services, or content at them. 2091 So Mr. Chew, will TikTok continue to get information 2092 from third parties on its users' health, including their 2093 mental health? Yes or no. 2094 2095 \*Mr. Chew. We will continue to work with experts -yes, if that is the question -- to identify these issues. 2096 \*Mr. Tonko. Will you continue to get information from 2097 these third parties, including their mental health? Yes or 2098 2099 no. 2100 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am sorry. I may not understand your question. If your question is if I am 2101 working with them on these issues, the answer is yes. 2102 \*Mr. Tonko. It is not the question. It is will you 2103 continue to get information from these third parties on its 2104 2105 users' health. \*Mr. Chew. Get information? We do not get any user 2106 health information from third parties, Congressman. 2107 \*Mr. Tonko. You have talked a lot about user privacy 2108

2109 and safety. Will you commit here today to no longer using data about users' health, particularly their mental health, 2110 2111 to push them content or sell ads? Yes or no. 2112 \*Mr. Chew. We take our users' mental health very seriously. We --2113 \*Mr. Tonko. Yes or no? 2114 \*Mr. Chew. As far as I am aware, we don't do that, 2115 2116 Congressman. It is not what --2117 \*Mr. Tonko. So the answer is no, you will no longer use data about users' health. 2118 TikTok systematically exploits users' anxieties by 2119 pushing alarming and distressing content onto their For You 2120 page. For example, in May of 2022 the LA Times found that 2121 some pregnant users searching for information about their 2122 pregnancies on TikTok were then shown information about 2123 miscarriages, stillbirths, and delivery room traumas. 2124 Your company knows that distressing content can have the 2125 2126 perverse effect of feeding user engagement. And for TikTok, engagement means money. In the course of a week, what 2127 percentage of content that a user sees is considered 2128 potentially harmful or distressing content? 2129

2130 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, we work with a lot of experts on this. Even before we set the 60-minute time limit for 2131 2132 under 18s, if you spend too much time on our platform -- you can try it. If you spend too much time, we will actually 2133 send you videos to tell you to go out and get some air and 2134 get off the platform. 2135 \*Mr. Tonko. What percentage of content that a user sees 2136 2137 is considered potentially harmful? \*Mr. Chew. I would need to follow up with my team and 2138 get back to you on that, if that is okay. 2139 \*Mr. Tonko. Well, a ballpark. 2140 \*Mr. Chew. I would need to follow up with my team. 2141 2142 \*Mr. Tonko. So are teenagers in particular shown more 2143 distressing content? \*Mr. Chew. The opposite is true. We actually put in 2144 more restrictions to make sure that our teenagers get a 2145 better experience, you know --2146 2147 \*Mr. Tonko. Are expecting or new parents showing more 2148 distressing content? \*Mr. Chew. I know of many parents, including one I met 2149

recently, who actually used our platform to find communities

2150

2151 to connect with other parents and learn a lot more. I have heard amazing stories of creators who have difficulties, you 2152 2153 know --\*Mr. Tonko. Reclaiming my time, are individuals with 2154 eating disorders shown more distressing content? 2155 \*Mr. Chew. We do not -- we remove all content that 2156 glorifies eating disorders, and we have worked with experts 2157 2158 to look at certain inherently -- certain content that may not inherently be harmful, like diet trends, and make sure that 2159 we disperse them more throughout our algorithm. 2160 \*Mr. Tonko. What about those with mental health issues, 2161 2162 are they given --2163 \*Mr. Chew. This is an issue --2164 \*Mr. Tonko. -- more distressing content? \*Mr. Chew. If a user searches, you know, words that 2165 expresses mental health issues, we actually redirect them to 2166 a safety page. Like, for example, if you -- I don't know if 2167 2168 I should say this in public -- if you search, "I want to die, ' ' we will redirect you to a safety page, for example. 2169 \*Mr. Tonko. So what about those suffering from 2170 addiction? Are they given more distressing content? 2171

2172 \*Mr. Chew. I am sorry, Congressman, I missed that question. 2173 2174 \*Mr. Tonko. Those suffering from addiction, are they given more distressing content? 2175 \*Mr. Chew. I missed the first few words, I apologize. 2176 \*Mr. Tonko. What about those suffering from addiction? 2177 Are they given more distressing content? 2178 2179 \*Mr. Chew. Oh, those suffering from --\*Mr. Tonko. Addiction. 2180 \*Mr. Chew. Addiction? Do you mean drug addiction or --2181 \*Mr. Tonko. Yes, or any order of addiction. 2182 \*Mr. Chew. If people search for content -- and you can 2183 try it on a variety of subjects -- we will actually direct 2184 you to a safety page to give you more resources. 2185 And a lot of recovering addicts have actually found 2186 communities on TikTok. And it has really helped them, you 2187 know, find the voices and the community and the courage to 2188 2189 really overcome their addiction. I personally have heard stories of that. 2190 \*Mr. Tonko. Well, I appreciate your answers, but I was 2191

looking for yes or no, and we did not get those. And again,

2192

2193 I think the more that they watch this distressing content, the more profit TikTok makes. And that is distressing. 2194 2195 I yield back. \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair 2196 recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for five 2197 minutes. 2198 \*Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Madam Chair. 2199 2200 And we are glad that you are here, Mr. Chew. As Chair 2201 Rodgers and Representative Burgess mentioned this morning, the Wall Street Journal reported that China will firmly 2202 oppose any forced sale or divestiture of TikTok. And this is 2203 based not on conjecture, but it is based on comments provided 2204 2205 by the official spokesperson at the Ministry of Commerce, who said that any TikTok sale or spinoff would amount to a 2206 technology export, and would have to adhere to Chinese law 2207 and approval. This spokesperson was quoted as saying the 2208 Chinese -- and I quote -- "The Chinese Government will make 2209 2210 decisions according to the law.' The Chinese Government. Mr. Chew, do you agree with this official? Yes or no. 2211 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I cannot speak on behalf of a 2212 Chinese Government official. 2213

2214 \*Mr. Walberg. Do you agree with that official? \*Mr. Chew. We will need to look at this, because 2215 2216 Project Texas is designed to move forward here in the United States, and we are not discussing this. So I don't have 2217 specifics. 2218 \*Mr. Walberg. You know, your company is valued at 2219 upwards of \$50 billion, and has been on the verge of forced 2220 2221 sale or ban for three years, at least, correct? Do you expect this committee to believe you haven't 2222 already discussed this scenario with your team? 2223 And you should have an answer to this, yes or no, I 2224 agree with the Communist Party or I don't agree with the 2225 2226 Communist Party. So I guess I would say at that point you disagree with 2227 the Communist Party. Explain your discrepancy. 2228 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, for two years we spent a 2229 billion-and-a-half U.S. dollars to build Project Texas. 2230 2231 is after very extensive discussions with relevant folks --\*Mr. Walberg. Project Texas is just something expanded 2232 for the future. We are talking about now. We are talking 2233 about what you are doing now, what your expectations are now, 2234

2235 what your relationship is with the Communist Party, which is our major concern of what the impact that will be with a 2236 2237 country -- let me rephrase that -- with the Communist Party that doesn't care about America, and sees us as standing in 2238 their way for super power. That is our concern. 2239 And for you to have direct relationship, direct 2240 ownership with ByteDance, and to not have a characterization 2241 2242 or an agreement or disagreement that you say -- explicitly 2243 with this party policy, it is hard for us to believe what you are saying. 2244 Let me move on. Following up on what Mr. Latta asked 2245 about data access by Chinese engineers, in responding to Mr. 2246 Latta you talked about where American user data would be 2247 stored in the future. But the question was about access 2248 today. Storage in the future versus access today. This is 2249 total redirection. This blows up any trust we could desire 2250 to develop. 2251 2252 So to be clear, Mr. Chew, today do ByteDance employees in Beijing have access to American data? 2253 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, we have been very open about 2254 this. We have relied on global interoperability --2255

2256 \*Mr. Walberg. You have access to American data. \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am answering your question, 2257 2258 if you give me just a bit of time. We rely on global interoperability, and we have employees in China. So, yes, 2259 the Chinese engineers do have access to global data. 2260 \*Mr. Walberg. They have access to global data. 2261 \*Mr. Chew. We have heard. 2262 2263 \*Mr. Walberg. Not storage. 2264 \*Mr. Chew. No, storage has always been in Virginia and Singapore. The physical servers --2265 \*Mr. Walberg. You have no access to storage, to 2266 2267 American data today. \*Mr. Chew. That is not what I said. I said --2268 \*Mr. Walberg. So you do have access to American data, 2269 and you have storage of American data. 2270 \*Mr. Chew. The American data has always been stored in 2271 Virginia and Singapore in the past, and access of this is on 2272 2273 an as-required basis --\*Mr. Walberg. As required of who? 2274

\*Mr. Chew. By engineers for business purposes.

\*Mr. Walberg. By engineers.

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2277
           *Mr. Chew. This is a private --
           *Mr. Walberg. ByteDance?
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2279
           *Mr. Chew. ByteDance --
           *Mr. Walberg. The Communist Party.
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           *Mr. Chew. No, no.
2281
           *Mr. Walberg. How can you say that --
2282
           *Mr. Chew. This is a --
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2284
           *Mr. Walberg. -- if they have access?
2285
           *Mr. Chew. This is a private business. And like many
      other businesses, many other American companies, we rely on a
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      global workforce.
2287
           *Mr. Walberg. So the global workforce that includes
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2289
      ByteDance, which is connected directly to the Chinese
      Communist Party, has access --
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           *Mr. Chew. That is a characterization that we disagree
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      with.
2292
           Now, in the future --
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2294
           *Mr. Walberg. That is not what we can disagree with.
      That is a fact.
2295
           *Mr. Chew. It is not, unfortunately.
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           *Mr. Walberg. The CEO of ByteDance and your
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- 2298 relationship to them --
- 2299 \*Mr. Chew. It is not -- Congressman, respectfully, in
- 2300 my opening statement I said this is a private company. It is
- owned 60 percent by global investors. Three out of the five
- 2302 board members of ByteDance are Americans. This is a private
- 2303 business.
- \*Mr. Walberg. And you report directly to ByteDance,
- 2305 with a CEO who is a member of the Communist Party. Let me
- 2306 move on.
- 2307 \*Mr. Chew. He is not.
- 2308 \*Mr. Walberg. I think we got the answer, sadly, at this
- 2309 point.
- I believe my time is expired, so I yield back.
- \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair
- 2312 recognizes Ms. Clarke for five minutes.
- \*Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Chairwoman Rodgers, thank the
- 2314 Ranking Member Pallone for holding today's hearing.
- 2315 Throughout this hearing -- I also want to thank our
- 2316 witness for being here to testify on what are very important
- issues before us today.
- 2318 Throughout this hearing my colleagues have outlined the

2319 potential threat posed by the security of Americans' data by TikTok being affiliated -- and some would say owned -- by a 2320 2321 Chinese company, foreign adversaries having direct access to Americans' data, as well as the ability to influence this 2322 content Americans see on a prolific social media platform 2323 represents an unprecedented threat to American security and 2324 to our democracy. However, the problems of social media 2325 2326 platforms' content moderation, algorithmic discrimination, and safety are neither new nor unique to TikTok. 2327 Mr. Chew, I share the concerns raised by my colleague, 2328 Congresswoman Matsui, related to algorithms. I believe that 2329 without mitigation against bias, platforms will continue to 2330 2331 replicate, exacerbate discrimination that is illegal under civil rights law, as well as exclude important dialogue about 2332 sensitive topics like race from occurring on the platform. 2333 For example, I was disturbed by reports that TikTok content 2334 moderation algorithm flagged words like Black or Black Lives 2335 2336 Matter as inappropriate content. So my first question, Mr. Chew, is do you agree that 2337 platforms like TikTok should be subject to regular audits or 2338 transparency requirements to identify whether policies have a 2339

2340 disparate impact on communities that are protected classes like race, religion, national origin, or gender? 2341 2342 \*Mr. Chew. I think, Congresswoman, I think platforms should be very transparent on what they do there, and 2343 disclose a lot of information. We can get back on the 2344 specifics of what we mean by an audit. 2345 But I do agree very strongly that platforms should be 2346 2347 very transparent, and it is a commitment that we are giving to this committee and all our users that our platform will be 2348 a place for freedom of expression. We embrace all diverse 2349 points of view, all ethnic minorities. You can come and say 2350 whatever you want, as long as you don't violate the rules of 2351 2352 safety that were put in place. And we will -- we also commit to be free of all and any 2353 government manipulation. So I think I am in strong agreement 2354 with a lot of what you said. 2355 \*Ms. Clarke. Well, thank you. My bill, the Algorithmic 2356 2357 Accountability Act, would require platforms to be transparent about their algorithms, measure disparate impact, and require 2358 risk mitigation. It is vital that the diverse culture of the 2359 United States is reflected online. 2360

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2361
           But I am concerned the algorithms and content moderation
      practices employed by TikTok are ignorant to the fundamental
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2363
      diversity, while also failing to remove content that is
      harmful, like child sexual abuse material, hate speech, or
2364
      domestic terrorism content.
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           My next question to you is it is my understanding that
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      users must be in good standing to be eligible for
2367
2368
      compensation from TikTok's Creator Fund. For example, they
      can't have violated community guidelines. Is this correct?
2369
           *Mr. Chew. There are some details there, but
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2371
      directionally, yes.
           *Ms. Clarke. If TikTok's algorithm is flagging content
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2373
      incorrectly, resulting in creators violating community
      guidelines when in fact they have not, those creators would
2374
      not be eligible to receive compensation under the Creator
2375
      Fund, correct?
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           *Mr. Chew. We do have an appeals process.
2377
2378
           *Ms. Clarke. You have an appeals process.
           *Mr. Chew. Yes --
2379
           *Ms. Clarke. In my view, if TikTok employs algorithms
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      that disproportionately misremove content from Black
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      creators, it disproportionately silences and excludes Black
      creators from compensation opportunities. And this problem
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2384
      happens in parallel to the lack of adequate recognition,
      attribution, and compensation to Black creators for their
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2386
      content.
           The exploitation, cultural misappropriations, the
2387
      erasure of Black creatives' ownership of their fashion, art,
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2389
      and media is nothing new. We need transparency,
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      accountability, and bold action to mitigate against
      misinformation, bias, and exclusion of certain communities
2391
      from the opportunities present on platforms like TikTok.
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           So let me just say this. I am concerned about
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      transparency. I am concerned about algorithmic
      accountability. And I am not clear that your organization
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      holds those values. So I want to ask that you take a look at
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      this, because this is all part and parcel of what we are
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      concerned about with respect to social media platforms and
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      the misappropriation, the ways in which those algorithms can
      discriminate within the context of the social media platform.
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           With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
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           *Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, is it okay if I just very
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2403 quickly respond? This is a very important topic. \*The Chair. Unfortunately, we only have 4.5 hours with 2404 2405 you, and I am going to try to get to every member. So we are going to keep going. 2406 \*Mr. Chew. It is very important. I would love to 2407 follow up. 2408 \*The Chair. Well, there will be other opportunities. 2409 The lady yields back. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Buddy 2410 Carter, is recognized for five minutes. 2411 \*Mr. Carter. Thank you, Madam Chair. 2412 Mr. Chew, welcome to the most bipartisan committee in 2413 Congress. We may not always agree on how to get there, but 2414 2415 we care about our national security, we care about our economy, and we sure as heck care about our children. 2416 sure do. 2417 And that is why you are here today, because two-thirds 2418 of all the youth in our country are on your app. They spend 2419 2420 an average of 95 minutes on your app. And, you know, research has shown that TikTok is the most addictive platform 2421 out there. And the reason for that is, we have been told, is 2422

because it has the most advanced algorithm. And the Chinese

2423

2424 Communist Party knows this. And I don't speak for everyone, but there are those on this committee, including myself, who 2425 2426 believe that the Chinese Communist Party is engaged in psychological warfare through TikTok to deliberately 2427 influence U.S. children. 2428 [Slide] 2429 \*Mr. Carter. You know, you see behind me, if you look 2430 2431 behind me, Mr. Chew, you see some of the challenges that we have seen on TikTok. You know about them. You know about 2432 the Milk Crate, you know about the about the Blackout 2433 Challenge, you know about the NyQuil Chicken Challenge, the 2434 Benadryl Challenge, the Dragon's Breath Liquid Nitrogen 2435 2436 Trend, or the challenge that promotes car theft. I want to ask you. As I understand it, there is a 2437 sister app in China, Douyin -- I am sorry if I am butchering 2438 the pronunciation. Do they have these same things over 2439 there? Do they have these kind of challenges in China? 2440 2441 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am really glad you asked this 2442 question. \*Mr. Carter. Do they, yes or no? 2443 \*Mr. Chew. I am not sure, because --2444

2445 \*Mr. Carter. Whoa, whoa, whoa, come on, now. You are not sure? 2446 2447 \*Mr. Chew. I really am not sure. \*Mr. Carter. Remember, you took -- the chairlady, she 2448 said you got to tell the truth, okay? Do you know whether 2449 they have these kind of challenges like this over in China? 2450 Because it is my understanding they don't. 2451 2452 \*Mr. Chew. I am not sure, because I spend my energies 2453 running TikTok. \*Mr. Carter. And you don't look at any of your other 2454 competitors, or look at anything similar to yours. So you 2455 don't know whether they have -- they don't have this over in 2456 2457 China. \*Mr. Chew. I did --2458 \*Mr. Carter. We have it here, but they don't have it 2459 here. And that is why I am asking you this. Why is it that 2460 TikTok consistently fails to identify and moderate these 2461 2462 kinds of harmful videos? \*Mr. Chew. Did --2463 \*Mr. Carter. Why is it? Why is it that you allow this 2464 to go on? 2465

2466 We have already heard, God bless you, from parents who are here with us who have lost children. I submit to you 2467 2468 everybody up here cares about the children of this country. Tell me, tell me why. 2469 This is a real industry challenge, and we 2470 \*Mr. Chew. are working very hard --2471 \*Mr. Carter. No, no, no. It is not industry. This is 2472 2473 TikTok. \*Mr. Chew. It is --2474 \*Mr. Carter. We are talking about TikTok. We are 2475 talking about why is it that you can't control this? 2476 And although I believe in giving credit where credit is 2477 due, I want to thank you. It is my understanding that the 2478 video that threatened the life of the chairwoman has been 2479 removed. Thank you for doing that. Sorry we had to bring it 2480 to your attention here, but it has been removed. 2481 Tell me why this goes on. 2482 This is an industry challenge for all of us 2483 here, operating in this industry. 2484

want to shift gears real quick.

\*Mr. Carter. Okay. So much for industry challenge.

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2487 I want to talk about biometric matrix, and I want to talk specifically -- can you tell me right now, can you say 2488 2489 with 100 percent certainty that TikTok does not use the phone's camera to determine whether the content that elicits 2490 a pupil dilation should be amplified by the algorithm? 2491 you tell me that? 2492 \*Mr. Chew. We do not collect body, face, or voice data 2493 2494 to identify our users. We do not. The only --\*Mr. Carter. You don't? 2495 \*Mr. Chew. No. The only face data that you will get 2496 that we collect is when you use the filters to have, say, 2497 sunglasses on your face. We need to know where your eyes 2498 2499 are. Why do you need to know where the eyes 2500 \*Mr. Carter. are, if you are not seeing if they are dilated? 2501 \*Mr. Chew. And that data is stored on your local 2502 device, and deleted after use if you use it for facial. 2503 2504 Again, we do not collect body, face, or voice data to identify our users. 2505 \*Mr. Carter. I find that hard to believe. It is our 2506 understanding that they are looking at the eyes. 2507

2508 How do you determine what age they are, then? \*Mr. Chew. We rely on age gating as our key age 2509 2510 assurance --\*Mr. Carter. Age --2511 \*Mr. Chew. Gating, which is when you ask the user what 2512 age they are. 2513 We have also developed some tools, where we look at 2514 2515 their public profile to go through the videos that they post to see whether --2516 \*Mr. Carter. Boy, that is creepy. Tell me more about 2517 2518 that. \*Mr. Chew. It is public. So if you post a video that 2519 2520 is -- you choose that video to go public, that is how you get people to see your video. We look at those to see if you --2521 it matches up the age that you talked about. 2522 Now, this is a real challenge for our industry, because 2523 privacy versus age assurance is a really big problem. 2524 2525 \*Mr. Carter. Look, look, you keep talking about the industry. We are talking about TikTok here. We are talking 2526 about children dying. Do you know how many children have 2527 died because of this? Do you have any idea? Can you tell 2528

2529 me? \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, again, it is heartbreaking. 2530 2531 \*Mr. Carter. Can you tell me if --2532 \*Mr. Chew. It is heartbreaking. \*Mr. Carter. How many children in America have died 2533 because of challenges like this? 2534 \*Mr. Chew. The majority of people who use our platform 2535 2536 use it for positive experiences. There are --\*Mr. Carter. That is not what I asked you. 2537 \*Mr. Chew. There are some --2538 \*Mr. Carter. I asked you, tell me the number of 2539 children, of U.S. children who have died because of these 2540 2541 challenges. 2542 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, again, the majority of people who come on our platform get a good experience --2543 \*Mr. Carter. I am not talking about the majority of 2544 children. I want to know a number. 2545 2546 Dangerous [inaudible] are not allowed on our If we find them, we will remove them. 2547 this very seriously. 2548 \*Mr. Carter. Obviously, you found one today and you 2549

2550 removed it. We had to bring it to your attention. And I know I am out of time. Thank you for being here. 2551 2552 Welcome again to the most bipartisan committee in Congress. The gentleman yields back. We will now \*The Chair. 2553 take a brief recess, and resume in 10 minutes. The committee 2554 stands in recess. 2555 2556 [Recess.] 2557 \*The Chair. The chair recognizes the gentleman from 2558 California, Mr. Cardenas, for five minutes -- Cardenas, 2559 sorry. \*Mr. Cardenas. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 2560 appreciate this opportunity for this committee to have this 2561 2562 important hearing regarding TikTok and its effect on the American people, especially the American children, and the 2563 potential effect -- not potential, but the effects that it 2564 has had, and may have in the future when it comes to our 2565 democracy and misinformation and disinformation that 2566 2567 permeates on TikTok. It is unfortunate that I think most Americans -- or most 2568 parents -- think that TikTok is this innocent little thing 2569 where kids get on there, and they do a little dance or 2570

- 2571 something like that. But TikTok is much, much more, as some
- of my colleagues -- and I thank them for bringing up some of
- 2573 these serious issues, literally life and death issues that
- 2574 TikTok is right in the middle of.
- 2575 And also, what I would like the witness to acknowledge
- is that it appears that Ms. Cammack, my colleague, brought up
- 2577 those two posters, and since then TikTok has taken them down.
- 2578 Since then, not before then. Are you aware of that, Mr.
- 2579 Chew?
- 2580 \*Mr. Chew. I was briefed during the break that they are
- 2581 taken down, Congressman.
- \*Mr. Cardenas. Okay. How do you feel about the fact
- 2583 that they were -- it was up for apparently 40-some days, 41
- 2584 days, and yet in the middle of this hearing it was brought
- 2585 directly to your attention. And as a result, it has been
- 2586 taken down so quickly.
- 2587 \*Mr. Chew. It goes to show the enormous challenge that
- 2588 we have to make sure that, although the vast majority of our
- users come for a good experience, we need to make sure that
- 2590 bad actors don't pose violative content.
- 2591 \*Mr. Cardenas. Yes. And the way, Mr. Chew, that you

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2592
      can make sure is that you can make sure that you choose to
      invest more resources, more money into more ability to pull
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2594
      down damaging and deadly information from your platform.
      you investing more and more and more every day into bringing
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      down that kind of content? That is my question. Are you?
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           *Mr. Chew. Yes. And I have committed to investing more
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      in this regard to stay on top of the growth.
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2599
           *Mr. Cardenas. Right here in the United States, many,
      many languages are used and spoken. For example, TikTok in
2600
      the United States is being used in many languages.
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      Specifically when it comes to Spanish language, are you
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      dedicating more resources today than you did months ago,
2603
2604
      years ago, on making sure that you are combing through that
      content to make sure that, if content is dangerous or
2605
      damaging or deadly, that you are bringing it down as guickly
2606
      as possible?
2607
           *Mr. Chew. Yes, we are investing in more Spanish
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2609
      language content moderation. And yes, we will -- once we
      identify --
2610
           *Mr. Cardenas. Okay.
2611
           *Mr. Chew. -- violative content, we will take it down
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2613 as soon as possible. \*Mr. Cardenas. Thank you. And your testimony today 2614 2615 isn't the only opportunity for you to commit to answering questions to this committee. So I would like you to forward 2616 to this committee -- again, I am not asking for trade 2617 secrets, but I would like to get some semblance of 2618 understanding as to how much you are investing with the 2619 2620 number of bodies, the number of people, the number of resources in making sure that you are investing more in 2621 pulling down content that is either deadly or dangerous on 2622 your platform. Can you forward that to the committee? 2623 \*Mr. Chew. I will check with my team and get back to 2624 2625 you on this, Congressman. 2626 \*Mr. Cardenas. Thank you very much. I appreciate that opportunity. 2627 As was mentioned earlier, it might sound a little funny, 2628 but you have in fact been one of the few people to unite this 2629 2630 committee -- members Republicans and Democrats -- to be in agreement that we are frustrated with TikTok. We are upset 2631 with TikTok. And yes, you keep mentioning that there are 2632 industry issues that not only TikTok faces, but others. You 2633

2634 remind me a lot of Mike Zuckerberg. He -- when he came here, I said to my staff, "He reminds me of Fred Astaire, a good 2635 2636 dancer with words,' ' and you are doing the same today. A lot They are not yes or no. of your answers are a bit nebulous. 2637 So I would like to ask you a question. Yes or no, is 2638 your revenue going up at TikTok month over month or year over 2639 2640 vear? 2641 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, our revenue is going up year over year. \*Mr. Cardenas. Okay. And with that, some of the 2642 answers I would like you to forward this committee is are you 2643 investing more and more money into making sure that content 2644 that is dangerous and/or deadly, you are investing more and 2645 more resources in that aspect of your expenditures and your 2646 commitment to your users and to your organization? 2647 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, I commit to that, and we will -- we are 2648 investing more, and we will continue to do that. 2649 \*Mr. Cardenas. Okay. My last question is this: 2650 2651 you a Chinese company? \*Mr. Chew. TikTok is a company that is now 2652 headquartered in Singapore and Los Angeles. 2653 \*Mr. Cardenas. Okav. 2654

2655 \*Mr. Chew. We are not available in mainland China. users are in other countries around the world. 2656 2657 \*Mr. Cardenas. Okay. Is there a corporation that has any authority above TikTok? 2658 TikTok is a subsidiary of ByteDance, which 2659 \*Mr. Chew. is founded by a Chinese founder. 2660 \*Mr. Cardenas. And ByteDance is a Chinese company? 2661 2662 \*Mr. Chew. Well, ByteDance owns many businesses that 2663 operates in China. 2664 \*Mr. Cardenas. Is it or is it not a Chinese company? \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, the way we look at it, it was 2665 founded by Chinese entrepreneurs --2666 2667 \*Mr. Cardenas. No, no, no, I am not asking you how you look at it. Fact. Is it a Chinese company or not? 2668 For example, Dell is a company. It is an American 2669 company. They have activities all over the world. 2670 Is it a Chinese company? 2671 2672 \*Mr. Chew. I frequently have this discussion with others on what is a company that is now global. 2673

question and stop dancing verbally on it.

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\*Mr. Cardenas. That is okay. I prefer you answer the

Madam Chair, my time is expired. Thank you very much. 2676 \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair 2677 2678 recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Obernolte. \*Mr. Obernolte. Well, thank you very much. 2679 Mr. Chew, it is nice to see you again. If I could just 2680 bring us back up to 30,000 feet for a second, I just want to 2681 talk about what we are afraid of here. You know, what we 2682 2683 fear might happen. Social media companies -- and TikTok is unique in this 2684 -- is not unique in this -- gather a tremendous amount of 2685 user data, and then use powerful AI tools to use that data to 2686 make eerily accurate predictions of human behavior, and then 2687 2688 seek to manipulate that behavior. And that is something that it is not just TikTok, it is all our social media companies 2689 that are doing this. 2690 Ultimately, the solution is to enact comprehensive 2691 Federal data privacy legislation that will prevent that kind 2692 2693 of behavior, or at least allow users to consent to it. And that is, I know, something that the chair is working on, the 2694 ranking member. I hope that this committee will act on that 2695 this year. 2696

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           The specific concern here, though, as regards TikTok, is
      that this type of capability falling into the hands of
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      foreign countries is something that has national security
      implications. And that is why Congress is getting involved
2700
      on this issue. So I know that you have proposed Project
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      Texas in an effort to alleviate these fears. So I wanted to
      ask some specific technical questions about Project Texas,
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2704
      and the way that you believe that it will solve this problem.
           So one of the things that you have said in your
2705
      testimony is that part of Project Texas will have engineers
2706
      at Oracle going through the source code for TikTok.
2707
      large is that code base?
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2709
           *Mr. Chew. Well, it is not small, but it is not just
      Oracle, Congressman. We are also inviting other third-party
2710
      monitors. We are in the process of figuring out who the
2711
      best --
2712
           *Mr. Obernolte. Sure.
                                    So we are talking -- are we
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2714
      talking millions, tens of millions of lines of code? How big
2715
      is the base?
           *Mr. Chew. It is significant, but it is something that
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      we believe can be done. And again, I want to say that I
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don't -- I have not heard of an another company, American or

not allowed for this to happen. 2719 \*Mr. Obernolte. I mean, you are kind of at a unique 2720 position, having to answer these concerns of Congress. 2721 So are they going through the code for just the app, or 2722 the app and the server code? 2723 \*Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on the --2724 2725 \*Mr. Obernolte. Okay. \*Mr. Chew. -- on the technical details. 2726 \*Mr. Obernolte. Well --2727 \*Mr. Chew. But it is comprehensive, including the 2728 software that powers the -- a lot of the software that powers 2729 2730 the experience. \*Mr. Obernolte. And how long will that review take? 2731 \*Mr. Chew. I need to get back to you on the timeline, 2732 but we are progressing quite well on Project Texas, and 2733 whenever we hit a milestone I commit to be very transparent 2734

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about it.

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also concerned, as a software engineer, about the process in

which new code is introduced into the code base. Do you use

\*Mr. Obernolte. Okay. So I am wondering, because I am

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a software configuration management system at TikTok?
2739
           *Mr. Chew. The way we plan for new code to be done is
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      that, even before the code becomes live, it has to be
      reviewed. The changes have to be reviewed by the --
2742
           *Mr. Obernolte. Okay, so you are talking about --
2743
           *Mr. Chew. -- third-party monitor.
2744
           *Mr. Obernolte. -- a code review. That was good.
2745
      was another question I had for you. So the code review, is
2746
      it done with a team of engineers or just with a single
2747
      engineer?
2748
           *Mr. Chew. Oh, it is going to be a team effort.
2749
           *Mr. Obernolte. Okay.
2750
2751
           *Mr. Chew. Yes.
2752
           *Mr. Obernolte. And that is going to be done at Oracle
      or elsewhere?
2753
           *Mr. Chew. It is going to be done in one of our
2754
      transparency centers, so that we -- you know, we still need
2755
2756
      to make sure that the code itself is secure, and, you know,
2757
      so --
           *Mr. Obernolte. Okay, so --
2758
           *Mr. Chew. Yes.
2759
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2760
           *Mr. Obernolte. What I am hearing you say is that, even
      though the code might be written by someone not in the United
2761
2762
      States, before the code is integrated it will be reviewed in
      a code review by a team of engineers within the United
2763
2764
      States?
           *Mr. Chew.
                       That is the plan.
2765
           *Mr. Obernolte. Okay. And the back to the question
2766
2767
      about the software configuration management system, how do
      you manage the integration of that code change into the rest
2768
      of the TikTok code base?
2769
                       The long and short of it is we have built a
2770
           *Mr. Chew.
      team of American personnel with security credentials. The
2771
      person who leads the team used to work for the Secret --
2772
           *Mr. Obernolte. No, no, I understand, but, I mean,
2773
      there is a software solution for integrating those code
2774
      changes into the code base. What solution is that?
2775
           *Mr. Chew. I would need to check --
2776
2777
           *Mr. Obernolte. Is it a commercial one?
           *Mr. Chew. -- and get back to you on the details.
2778
           *Mr. Obernolte. Okay.
2779
           *Mr. Chew. Yes.
2780
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2781 \*Mr. Obernolte. Well, specifically, what I would like to know is to make sure that this isn't something that TikTok 2782 2783 has created custom, which many companies do, because that would mean that you would have to review the source code for 2784 that, as well --2785 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. 2786 \*Mr. Obernolte. -- for security. 2787 2788 How do you protect against threats like the -- a malicious actor being hired not by TikTok, but by Oracle, for 2789 example, or by USDS? 2790 \*Mr. Chew. The approach that most companies take for 2791 2792 these things is to have several layers of monitoring to make 2793 sure that everything that somebody has reviewed, there is a secondary review so that one malicious actor is not able to 2794 create the damage that the malicious actor can do. 2795 But you rightly pointed out these kind of problems are 2796 industry-wide problems. 2797 2798 \*Mr. Obernolte. Right. \*Mr. Chew. Every company has to deal with them. 2799 \*Mr. Obernolte. Okay. Well, let me ask a specific 2800 question about that. I mean, I -- in thinking about -- if I 2801

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2802
      were a malicious actor, a software engineer on one of your
      projects, how I would go about writing a malicious code, I
2803
2804
      wouldn't put it right there and say, hey, I am malicious. I
      would put unrelated lines of code in different sections of
2805
      the code that work together to do something malicious.
2806
      do you think that that could get caught?
2807
           *Mr. Chew. Again, you know, we have to rely on third-
2808
2809
      party experts to help us with that. I think there are enough
      experts who can catch a lot of these things. The work on
2810
      security globally, on all data security, is never perfect.
2811
           *Mr. Obernolte. Yes, I understand.
2812
           *Mr. Chew. But we can have a lot of oversight to keep
2813
2814
      it safer than any other experience.
2815
           *Mr. Obernolte. I appreciate the effort. My concern,
      Mr. Chew, is I don't believe that it is technically possible
2816
      to accomplish what TikTok says it will accomplish through
2817
      Project Texas. I just think that there are too many
2818
2819
      backdoors through that process to allow that to be possible,
      and I think a malicious actor would succeed in inserting
2820
      malicious code in there if they wanted to. But I hope we --
2821
      I see we are out of time. I hope we get an opportunity to
2822
```

2823 talk some more about this. I yield back, Madam Chair. 2824 2825 \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. Dingell, for 2826 five minutes. 2827 \*Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Chairman Rodgers and Ranking 2828 Member Pallone, for holding this hearing, and to Mr. Chew for 2829 2830 testifying here today. Your good news: you are halfway 2831 through with me. As screen time increases, so do inherent risks. 2832 with the proliferation and popularity of new social media 2833 platforms, so does the potential reach of dangerous, 2834 2835 provocative, and often harmful content and, my fear, the abuse of collected data. 2836 As a representative from the State of Michigan, I can 2837 speak from experience on how social media has been used to 2838 target members of the Michigan delegation, including a plot 2839 2840 to kidnap our governor, and how it can be weaponized to perpetuate harms towards individuals and communities, and you 2841 saw firsthand how it targeted the chair of this committee. 2842 Today many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle 2843

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2844
      have raised legitimate concerns about protecting children
      online, misinformation, and securing our data, concerns that
2845
2846
      I share and -- has been said by many of my colleagues are
      bipartisanly shared. I think, in many ways, these myriad of
2847
      issues highlight the need for comprehensive data privacy
2848
      legislation that would ensure the safety and integrity of
2849
      every American's data on every social media platform and
2850
2851
      mitigate potential harms.
2852
           One important area of concern I have regarding data
      collection is geolocation data and how it can be abused.
2853
      have seen it abused. I have seen women die because it has
2854
      been abused. This subject has dangerous implications for
2855
2856
      survivors of domestic violence, people seeking medical care,
      and protecting children from potential predators.
2857
           Mr. Chew, in your testimony you wrote that current
2858
      versions of the app do not collect precise or approximate GPS
2859
      information from U.S. users. Yes or no answers, please.
2860
2861
      Chew, have any prior versions of TikTok's app collected
      precise GPS information from U.S. users? Yes or no.
2862
           *Mr. Chew. Yes, from back in 2020, about 3 years ago.
2863
           *Mrs. Dingell. Are there currently TikTok users who
2864
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- still hold old versions of the app that collect precise GPS
- 2866 information from U.S. users? Yes or no.
- \*Mr. Chew. There could be, but that is a small
- 2868 percentage today.
- 2869 \*Mrs. Dingell. Still dangerous. Has TikTok at any time
- 2870 fed precise GPS information collected from U.S. users into
- 2871 algorithms to serve user ads? Yes or no.
- \*Mr. Chew. I will need to check on the details, because
- 2873 we do not currently collect that. So I need to check on the
- 2874 details.
- 2875 \*Mrs. Dingell. Yes, I am sure there is a yes, there.
- 2876 But has TikTok at any time fed precise GPS information
- 2877 collected from U.S. users into algorithms -- I am having --
- 2878 talk today -- to make inferences about users? Yes or no.
- 2879 \*Mr. Chew. I am not sure of the specifics. I --
- 2880 \*Mrs. Dingell. I would like answers, yes or no, after
- 2881 this. Has TikTok at any time sold precise GPS information
- 2882 collected from U.S. users? Yes or no.
- \*Mr. Chew. We do not sell data to data brokers, if that
- is the question.
- \*Mrs. Dingell. That -- and you have never done that?

2886 \*Mr. Chew. I do not believe so. \*Mrs. Dingell. Has TikTok at any time sold or shared 2887 2888 with third parties algorithmic inferences that were made using, in part or in whole, precise GPS information collected 2889 from U.S. users, yes or no? 2890 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I need to check on these 2891 specifics. What I can tell you is right now we do not 2892 2893 collect precise GPS location data in the United States. \*Mrs. Dingell. All right. Does TikTok still use 2894 inferences that were made using, in part or in whole, precise 2895 GPS information collected from U.S. users? 2896 \*Mr. Chew. I am sorry. Would you repeat that? 2897 \*Mrs. Dingell. Does TikTok still use inferences that 2898 you have gained that were made using, in part in -- or whole, 2899 precise GPS information collected from U.S. users in your 2900 algorithms? 2901 \*Mr. Chew. That will be a very technical question. 2902 2903 would have to check and get back to you. \*Mrs. Dingell. Has TikTok at any time provided the 2904 Chinese Government with either precise GSP [sic] information 2905 collected from U.S. users or inferences made from that data? 2906

2907 \*Mr. Chew. That I can give you a straight -- no. \*Mrs. Dingell. Mr. Chew, even in Congress -- even if 2908 2909 Congress were to ban TikTok, I am concerned that China or others would still have access to U.S. consumer data by 2910 purchasing it through data brokers. Will you commit not to 2911 2912 sell any of TikTok's data to data brokers now or in the 2913 future? 2914 \*Mr. Chew. We do not do that. We do not sell data to 2915 data brokers now. \*Mrs. Dingell. Will you commit to not do it in the 2916 future? 2917 \*Mr. Chew. This is a -- there are certain members of 2918 2919 our industry who do this. You know, I think this has to be broad legislation to help us, the whole industry, address 2920 this problem. 2921 \*Mrs. Dingell. I think I am out of time. 2922 Thank you, Madam Chair. I will yield back. 2923 2924 \*The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. The chair yields five minutes to the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. 2925 Palmer. 2926

\*Mr. Palmer. Thank you.

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2928
           When the Chinese communist government bought a share of
      ByteDance, it has been described as the Chinese communist
2929
2930
      government's way of quieter form of control. And the
      companies have little choice in selling a stake to the
2931
      government if they want to stay in business.
2932
           And what I would like to know is when the Chinese
2933
      communist government moved to buy shares of ByteDance, were
2934
      you informed beforehand? Yes or no.
2935
2936
           *Mr. Chew. No. Congressman --
           *Mr. Palmer. Okav.
2937
           *Mr. Chew. ByteDance --
2938
           *Mr. Palmer. Were --
2939
           *Mr. Chew. -- hasn't --
2940
           *Mr. Palmer. Were you or anyone with TikTok asked for
2941
      your opinion about the sale of shares of ByteDance to the
2942
      Chinese communist government? Yes or no.
2943
           *Mr. Chew. It just -- this hasn't happened.
2944
2945
           *Mr. Palmer. Did you or anyone employed by or
      affiliated with TikTok state any objections or concerns about
2946
      the possibility of the Chinese communist government, once
2947
      they had shares in ByteDance, exercising control over
2948
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2949
      content, using your platform for conducting misinformation
      campaigns, or restrictions ensuring nothing is posted that
2950
2951
      reflects badly on the Chinese Communist government, or for
      surveillance and data collection for use against anyone?
2952
           Did any of your -- you or anyone affiliated with TikTok
2953
      raise any concerns about that?
2954
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, we do not collect -- we do not
2955
2956
      promote --
2957
           *Mr. Palmer. I didn't ask you that.
           *Mr. Chew. We do not promote --
2958
           *Mr. Palmer. Yes or no, did you raise any concerns
2959
      about it? Because that is why we are here.
2960
           *Mr. Chew. But we do not promote or remove any content
2961
2962
      on --
           *Mr. Palmer. I didn't ask you that.
2963
           *Mr. Chew. -- the behalf of the Chinese Government.
2964
           *Mr. Palmer. Did you communicate in any form or fashion
2965
2966
      with the directors of ByteDance that there might be concerns
      about government control over content? Yes or no, did -- you
2967
      either did or you didn't.
2968
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, I --
2969
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2970
           *Mr. Palmer. You didn't.
           *Mr. Chew. I just want to make this clear. We do not
2971
2972
      remove --
           *Mr. Palmer. Let me ask you this.
2973
           *Mr. Chew. -- or promote content at the request of the
2974
2975
      Chinese Government.
           *Mr. Palmer. TikTok insiders have already said that the
2976
2977
      company is tightly controlled by ByteDance. It even gets
      down to the hours they work. So obviously, you didn't say
2978
      anything. There is a serious concern by Chinese companies,
2979
      privately-held companies, about doing anything against what
2980
      the Chinese communist government wants.
2981
2982
           I want to ask you this. Does TikTok screen against
      manipulative content from child predators? Yes or no.
2983
           *Mr. Chew. Do we screen against --
2984
           *Mr. Palmer. Do you screen against them --
2985
           *Mr. Chew. Yes, we do this --
2986
2987
           *Mr. Palmer. How about --
           *Mr. Chew. -- child predator --
2988
           *Mr. Palmer. How about drug cartels?
2989
           *Mr. Chew. Drug cartels, child predatory content, this
2990
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2991
      is all violative --
           *Mr. Palmer. You had a drug cartel that was engaged in
2992
2993
      a police chase with Spanish authorities, and they posted it
      on TikTok, and got over a million views. Why wasn't that
2994
      taken down? And are you doing it with human traffickers or
2995
2996
      terrorists?
           I mean, do you withhold content from nations that might
2997
2998
      be committing crimes against humanity? Yes or no.
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, our platform is a place of --
2999
           *Mr. Palmer. Yes or no?
3000
           *Mr. Chew. -- freedom of expression. And users come
3001
3002
      here, and --
3003
           *Mr. Palmer. Yes or no? I know, you talk about that.
      But yes or no, do you screen against content from nations
3004
      that commit crimes against humanity?
3005
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, our users come and --
3006
           *Mr. Palmer. Yes or no?
3007
3008
           *Mr. Chew. Our users come and --
           *Mr. Palmer. Yes or no?
3009
           *Mr. Chew. -- present any points of views that they
3010
      want, and --
3011
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3012
           *Mr. Palmer. You don't.
           *Mr. Chew. And it is a commitment to keep this free
3013
3014
      from --
           *Mr. Palmer. Let me ask you this. Michael Beckerman,
3015
      who is your vice president and head of public policy for the
3016
      Americas, right? Is he part of the team that helped you
3017
      prepare for this meeting? Yes or no.
3018
3019
           *Mr. Chew. Can I clarify who you mean?
           *Mr. Palmer. Michael Beckerman?
3020
           *Mr. Chew. Yes, he is.
3021
           *Mr. Palmer. Okay. Where is he at this moment?
3022
           *Mr. Chew. I am sorry?
3023
           *Mr. Palmer.
                         Where is Mr. Beckerman at this moment?
3024
           *Mr. Chew. He is probably here.
3025
           *Mr. Palmer. No, you know he is here. He is sitting
3026
      right behind you. I want to know why, when Mr. Beckerman was
3027
      on with Jake Tapper on CNN and asked repeatedly to condemn
3028
3029
      Chinese communist government's treatment of the Uyghurs when
      that treatment has been classified by the United States as a
3030
      genocide, when a UN report classifies it as a crime against
3031
      humanity, why after multiple questions Mr. Beckerman refused
3032
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3033
      to address that. Are you afraid of the Chinese communist
      government?
3034
3035
           *Mr. Chew. No, because you --
           *Mr. Palmer. Are you concerned that --
3036
           *Mr. Chew. -- can find that content on our platform.
3037
      Any content that our users want to express their views on
3038
      this issue --
3039
3040
           *Mr. Palmer. Well, why couldn't your --
           *Mr. Chew. -- is freely available on our platform.
3041
           *Mr. Palmer. -- vice president of public policy, the
3042
      guy who is head of public policy for the Americas, and an
3043
      American on an American television news channel, why couldn't
3044
      he say -- why couldn't he condemn that?
3045
           *Mr. Chew. I think it is very important to look at our
3046
      platform. And if you use our -- and open our app, and search
3047
      for any content --
3048
           *Mr. Palmer. I am not talking about your platform.
3049
3050
      am asking about your personnel now, because personnel is
      policy. Everybody in this room understands that, except
3051
      maybe you. Personnel is -- let me just conclude with this.
3052
      And I hate to bring this up, because I -- this is part of the
3053
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3054 stuff that I have studied. But deception is fundamental to the Chinese Communist Party's political intelligence and 3055 3056 military strategy. And you have repeatedly used the word "transparency' ' throughout this hearing. And every time you 3057 have said it, what I have heard is deception. 3058 And I yield back. 3059 \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair 3060 3061 recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Veasey, for five 3062 minutes. \*Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Madam Chair. I got to tell 3063 you, Mr. Chew, as a father of a 16-year-old that likes social 3064 media, the -- a lot of your evasiveness today in answering 3065 3066 many of these questions really disturbs me, because I can tell you that the teenagers of today, they really don't want 3067 to be on Facebook. They want your platform. And you were 3068 asked to come before this committee to testify about many 3069 things, and a lot of us are worried about our kids' personal 3070 3071 data. As the co-chair of the Congressional Voting Rights 3072 Caucus, I also worry that TikTok is the world's most powerful 3073 and extensive propaganda machine, allowing the Chinese 3074

3075 Communist Party to use TikTok's platform to influence public opinion and undermine the integrity of our democratic 3076 3077 elections. And I have a report called "TikTok and Facebook Failed 3078 to Detect Election Disinformation in the U.S., While YouTube 3079 Succeeds.' And this report was published by the non-profit 3080 Global Witness, and the Cybersecurity for Democracy Team at 3081 3082 NYU. And the purpose of the study was to test platforms like TikTok and whether or not they can detect and take down false 3083 political ads targeted at U.S. voters, young voters, ahead of 3084 last year's midterm elections. And according to this report, 3085 90 percent of election disinformation ads tested were 3086 3087 approved by your platform. Again, that is 90 percent of ads containing false and 3088 misleading election misinformation went undetected on TikTok. 3089 And just to add some color to the type of misleading ads that 3090 were approved by TikTok, this included ads that were live on 3091 3092 TikTok that said the wrong election day, and actually encouraged people to vote twice. 3093 You do know that voting twice is a felony. Mr. Chew, 3094 you do know that it is illegal to vote twice. 3095

3096 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, any misinformation that comes around a political action --3097 3098 \*Mr. Veasey. Okay. \*Mr. Chew. -- is something we take very seriously. 3099 \*Mr. Veasey. Let me -- I am particularly troubled about 3100 this type of information, because it can run rampant on 3101 TikTok. And given that TikTok -- again, you all are 3102 3103 appealing to a very young and diverse user base. exactly the people that we have seen targeted time and time 3104 again with voter suppression campaigns run by malicious 3105 3106 actors. 3107 Mr. Chew, do you agree with me that it is completely unacceptable that 90 percent of these ads were undetected on 3108 your platform? 3109 And can you detail for us right now TikTok's policy 3110 regarding election misinformation and paid political ads, and 3111 how the company monitors such information, and how you plan 3112 3113 to get that number down to zero? \*Mr. Chew. Well, TikTok is a place for our users to 3114 come and express their points of views freely. We do take 3115 misinformation, dangerous misinformation particularly around 3116

an election, very seriously. And we will work with third-3117 party experts to identify misinformation --3118 3119 \*Mr. Veasey. Do you call allowing 90 percent of false content, political content on your platform to be taken --3120 you call that -- you define that as being taken seriously? 3121 \*Mr. Chew. I need to look into the specifics. 3122 you know, not sure where the number came from, but I can tell 3123 3124 you, Congressman, that we are the only platform that I know of that doesn't actually take political ads. We don't accept 3125 money. I don't think other platforms can say that. 3126 \*Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chew, can you detail how you responded 3127 to that report? Did you respond to that report that I just 3128 3129 mentioned? \*Mr. Chew. I need to look at the specifics of the 3130 report, Congressman, and I can get back to you on that. 3131 \*Mr. Veasey. All right, Mr. Chew, I want to shift to 3132 Project Texas. 3133 3134 I know that we have discussed this initiative throughout today's hearing, but I want to dive deeper into your notion 3135 that promises about Project Texas should give us any 3136 confidence in TikTok's ability to localize U.S. data and 3137

3138 discontinue access to that data to ByteDance employees in Why? Because we have already had a TikTok executive 3139 China. 3140 appear before Congress and give sworn testimony about the comfort that we should take in TikTok's U.S.-based resources. 3141 Well, TikTok data security practices were being scrutinized 3142 by the U.S. Government -- and unfortunately, we have since 3143 found out from a -- from journalists and recorded 3144 3145 conversations that those assurances were worthless. 3146 In your testimony you also mentioned that Oracle has already begun inspecting TikTok's source code, and has access 3147 to the platform's recommendation algorithm. Why should this 3148 give the American public any great assurances, particularly 3149 given that Oracle now owns a stake in TikTok and stands to 3150 3151 gain monetarily, the more revenue that TikTok and its algorithm generates? 3152 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, not only is Project Texas 3153 unprecedented in our industry in protecting U.S. user data 3154 3155 and interests, we are inviting third parties to come in and monitor this. And we will, you know, be transparent in that 3156 process. And this is more -- beyond most -- all companies 3157 that I know of in my industry --3158

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3159
           *Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am out of time.
           *The Chair. The gentleman yields back.
                                                     The chair
3160
3161
      recognizes the gentleman from Florida for five minutes, Mr.
3162
      Dunn.
                       Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
3163
           *Mr. Dunn.
           Mr. Chew, I am aware that on arriving in D.C. this week
3164
      you appeared on TikTok and boasted you had 150 million U.S.
3165
3166
      users, 5 million U.S. businesses. That represents a lot of
      data. You also referenced your appearance before this
3167
      committee as a chance to share all that TikTok is doing to
3168
      protect Americans using the app.
3169
           Mr. Chew, has ByteDance spied on Americans at the
3170
3171
      direction of the Chinese Communist Party?
           *Mr. Chew.
3172
                       No.
                       Madam Chair, I would like to enter into the
            *Mr. Dunn.
3173
      record this October 2022 Forbes article entitled, "TikTok
3174
      Parent ByteDance Plan to Use TikTok to Monitor the Physical
3175
3176
      Location of Specific U.S. Citizens.' \
            *The Chair. Without objection, so ordered.
3177
           [The information follows:]
3178
3179
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3182 \*Mr. Dunn. Thank you. The project assigned this to a Beijing-led team, and they were going to follow individual 3183 3184 American citizens. I ask you again, Mr. Chew, has ByteDance spied on 3185 American citizens? 3186 \*Mr. Chew. I don't think that spying is the right way 3187 to describe it. This is ultimately --3188 3189 \*Mr. Dunn. We can differ on that. 3190 \*Mr. Chew. This is, ultimately, an internal investigation --3191 \*Mr. Dunn. Any TikTok or ByteDance data that is viewed, 3192 stored, or passes through China is subject to the laws of 3193 3194 China, a one-party, authoritarian state, hostile to all American standards of privacy. 3195 China's court system reports to and falls under the 3196 Chinese Communist Party. And like fentanyl analogues, which 3197 we all know are also manufactured in China, although they are 3198 3199 illegal there, I fear TikTok will grow into a much bigger problem -- a cancer, if you will. And I am deeply worried 3200 that it may be too late to stop the spread of this cancer. 3201 Like fentanyl, another China export which causes addiction 3202

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3203
      and death, dangerous algorithms and the Chinese Communist
      Party are not good for Americans, not good for our families,
3204
3205
      and definitely not good for the United States.
           Mr. Chew, prior to serving as the CFO of ByteDance, you
3206
      served as a CFO and director of global operations for Xiaomi
3207
      from 2015 to 2021. Is that correct?
3208
           *Mr. Chew. Are you asking me in 2015?
3209
3210
           *Mr. Dunn. Very good --
           *Mr. Chew. Would you mind repeating that, please?
3211
           *Mr. Dunn.
                       Madam Chair, I would like to enter another
3212
      article into evidence. This is from the National
3213
      Cybersecurity Center in Lithuania.
3214
3215
           *The Chair. Without objection, so ordered.
           [The information follows:]
3216
3217
      *********************************
3218
3219
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3220
           *Mr. Dunn. Thank you. This report outlines numerous
      data security risks, including how the privacy of European
3221
3222
      users was violated in clear cases of unauthorized collection
      of user data by Xiaomi. This sounds exactly -- what many of
3223
      my colleagues have been talking about today.
3224
           Worse yet, the Xiaomi phones sold to Europeans had a
3225
      list of 449 words and phrases which would be automatically
3226
3227
      censored on the device. Censored phrases included the Voice
      of America and "democratic movement,' ' among others.
3228
      analysis was conducted on devices which were manufactured and
3229
      sold to Europeans while you were the head of operations for
3230
3231
      Xiaomi.
3232
           It does not follow that you expect us to believe that
      you would not censor on behalf of the Chinese Communist
3233
      Party, since you have already done so.
3234
           *Mr. Chew. I want to be unequivocal on this. We do not
3235
      remove or promote content on behalf of --
3236
3237
           *Mr. Dunn. I reclaim my time.
           *Mr. Chew. -- the Chinese Government.
3238
           *Mr. Dunn. While TikTok, in your words, strives to
3239
      deliver on their mission to inspire creativity and bring joy
3240
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3241
      to American users, I assure you that is not the mission or
      goal of the Chinese Communist Party, which runs the People's
3242
3243
      Republic of China, that TikTok's parent company, ByteDance,
      is domiciled in.
3244
           Mr. Chew --
3245
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, you can check with our users --
3246
           *Mr. Dunn. -- straightforward --
3247
           *Mr. Chew. -- to see the experience that they are
3248
      getting.
3249
           *Mr. Dunn. -- answer. You have not given
3250
      straightforward answers. We don't find you credible on these
3251
      things.
3252
3253
           And with that, Madam Chair, I would like to yield the
      balance --
3254
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, you have given me no time to
3255
      answer your questions.
3256
           *Mr. Dunn. -- to Congressman Obernolte of California.
3257
3258
           *Mr. Chew.
                       I reject the characterizations.
           *Mr. Dunn. I yielded to Mr. --
3259
           *The Chair. Who are you yielding to?
3260
           *Mr. Dunn. -- Obernolte.
3261
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3262
           *The Chair. Dr. Dunn, Mr. Obernolte?
           *Mr. Dunn. Yes.
3263
           *The Chair. Okay.
3264
           *Mr. Obernolte. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
3265
           Mr. Chew, I would like to continue our discussion of
3266
      Project Texas, if we could.
3267
           Part of Project Texas is that engineers at Oracle will
3268
3269
      review the algorithms used by TikTok to confirm that they are
      free of foreign influence. I have a question about that,
3270
      because we are talking about AI. That is a very generic
3271
      term. Do you use machine learning to influence the
3272
      algorithms at TikTok?
3273
3274
           *Mr. Chew. This gets very technical, and we have
      published several blogs about this, which I can forward to
3275
      your team.
3276
3277
           *Mr. Obernolte. Okay.
           *Mr. Chew. But yes, it is mainly based on interest
3278
3279
      signals.
           *Mr. Obernolte. Right, okay.
3280
           *Mr. Chew. Yes.
3281
           *Mr. Obernolte. So here is my question. How could
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3283
      looking at the algorithm confirm that it is for -- free from
      foreign influence? Because the algorithm is just a neural
3284
3285
      net architecture with inputs and outputs and weights, and how
      to train that.
3286
           I mean, the influence is an external factor. So I would
3287
      appreciate it if you could give us -- I see we are out of
3288
      time again -- a written answer to that.
3289
           [The information follows:]
3290
3291
      ********************************
3292
3293
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3294 \*Mr. Obernolte. But again, I am concerned that what you are proposing with Project Texas just doesn't have the 3295 3296 technical capability of providing us the assurances that we 3297 need. I yield back, Madam Chair. 3298 \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair 3299 recognizes Ms. Kuster. 3300 Ms. Kuster is not here. Ms. Barragan for five minutes. 3301 3302 \*Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, TikTok warns users when content is graphic or 3303 disturbing, and labels state-affiliated media accounts to 3304 ensure the viewers aren't seeing propaganda. Does TikTok 3305 provide similar information to Spanish speakers -- users, as 3306 3307 well as English speakers? \*Mr. Chew. I believe so, Congresswoman. I will get 3308 back to you on that. 3309 \*Ms. Barragan. Okay. And do you know if TikTok has a 3310 3311 specific strategy for tackling Spanish language content that violates its trust and safety guidelines? 3312 \*Mr. Chew. We do. I will get back to you on the 3313

specifics on that.

3314

3315 \*Ms. Barragan. Okay. When offensive English language search terms or hashtags are blocked for violating community 3316 3317 guidelines in English, is the Spanish translation of the term or the hashtag automatically blocked, as well? 3318 \*Mr. Chew. I believe so, but let me check the specifics 3319 and get back to you. 3320 \*Ms. Barragan. Do you have any idea how many people 3321 3322 that you might have working at TikTok that addresses Spanish misinformation? 3323 \*Mr. Chew. I know ballpark. It is quite a significant 3324 team, but I can get back to you on the details. 3325 \*Ms. Barragan. You said significant. So are you saying 3326 it is -- do you have a ballpark at all you can give us? 3327 Would you say it is like 10 percent of your force, or more 3328 than --3329 \*Mr. Chew. It is an important number, so I want to be 3330 precise, and I will get back to you. 3331 3332 \*Ms. Barragan. Okay. Do you happen to know how TikTok 3333 -- how -- if TikTok can effectively ensure that Spanishspeaking users between the ages of 13 and 17 are not being 3334 targeted by ads promoting harmful content? 3335

3336 \*Mr. Chew. We have very strict policies for our users who are in the teenage age group, and regardless of what 3337 3338 language that they speak. So we want to make sure that they are given a very safe experience on our platform, regardless 3339 of the language they --3340 \*Ms. Barragan. Well, I know. I am just trying to -- I 3341 am trying to ascertain resources you may be putting into 3342 3343 Spanish speaking -- Spanish language. 3344 Last year the Congressional Hispanic Caucus met with This was one of the conversations, and a source of 3345 the discussion was addressing Spanish language disinformation 3346 and misinformation. It remains an urgent priority for the 3347 Congressional Hispanic Caucus, as Hispanics across the 3348 country increasingly turn to social media for vital 3349 3350 information. We heard earlier in this hearing that there was, you 3351 know, video -- there was a TikTok post threatening the chair 3352 3353 of the committee, and it took some 40 days to take it down. So I guess I am a little concerned if you -- if your team 3354 doesn't have the resources and the capability to flag that, 3355 what kind of capability is it going to have to bring down 3356

3357 misinformation, disinformation to Spanish speakers, which I am assuming is a smaller fraction of the workers that you 3358 3359 have at TikTok? TikTok is a place for, you know, all our \*Mr. Chew. 3360 users to come and express their very diverse views. And, you 3361 know, we are open to all ethnicities, you know, and we are 3362 open to all, everyone to come here and express their --3363 3364 freely express their views. So it is our commitment to make sure that the safety of 3365 those users, regardless of the language, you know -- and of 3366 course, you know, the Spanish language user base is super 3367 important to us. 3368 \*Ms. Barragan. Okay, so you can't --3369 \*Mr. Chew. So we need to make sure that we continue to 3370 invest in that --3371 \*Ms. Barragan. Okay, so you don't have an answer, then. 3372 Okay. I will look forward in your coming back. 3373 3374 We have heard a lot about the concerns about children who may be on TikTok. Mr. Chew, at what age do you think it 3375 would be appropriate for a young person to get on TikTok? 3376 \*Mr. Chew. We have three different experiences here in 3377

3378 the United States. There is an experience for under 13s, which is highly, highly restricted. 3379 \*Ms. Barragan. I am asking what you think would be the 3380 appropriate age to have a child get on TikTok. 3381 \*Mr. Chew. Our approach is to give differentiated 3382 experiences for different age groups, and let the parents 3383 have these conversations with their children to decide what 3384 3385 is best for their family. \*Ms. Barragan. So you think that there is a sufficient 3386 safety mechanism for an eight-year-old to be able to access 3387 TikTok? 3388 \*Mr. Chew. An eight-year-old's experience on TikTok 3389 would be so highly restricted that every single piece of 3390 content he or she will see will be vetted by common sense, 3391 our third-party child safety expert, and the eight-year-old 3392 would not be able to post, and the eight-year-old would not 3393 be able to see any personalized feed, and zero advertising in 3394 3395 that experience. So I believe, yes, it is the appropriate experience for an eight-year-old. 3396 \*Ms. Barragan. Well, then why don't you let your eight-3397 year-old child on TikTok? 3398

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3399
           *Mr. Chew. I have seen these news articles.
                                                          I would
      like to address that. My kids live in Singapore.
3400
                                                          And in
3401
      Singapore we do not have the under-13 experience.
                                                          If they
      lived here in the United States, I would let them use the
3402
      under-13 experience.
3403
           *Ms. Barragan. Okay. So you are saying it is because
3404
      of the country you live in doesn't have the same mechanisms.
3405
3406
      Is there a reason you don't have those same mechanisms
3407
      everywhere?
                       In principle, we want to provide, you know,
3408
           *Mr. Chew.
      a good experience for our users in general. We don't want to
3409
      monetize from people who are under 13. In the U.S. we are
3410
3411
      COPPA compliant, and as part of that we will deem as a -- I
      want to get the specifics right. We will deem as a
3412
      particular type of audience -- mixed audience app. We want
3413
      to make sure that that is right. And as a result of that, we
3414
      have to provide an experience to our under-13 users in this
3415
3416
      country, as well.
           *Ms. Barragan. My time has expired. Thank you.
3417
           I yield back.
3418
           *The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. The chair
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recognizes the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Curtis.
3420
           *Mr. Curtis. Thank you, Madam Chair.
3421
3422
           Mr. Chew, my children are getting ready to run a
      marathon. And I know that during this hearing that they will
3423
      be running for about the same amount of time that you will be
3424
      sitting in that chair today. Unfortunately, I only get you
3425
      for five minutes. So instead of a marathon, I would like to
3426
      do a sprint with you. And I want to go back up to that
3427
      30,000-feet level.
3428
           Would you agree with me that section 230 was created to
3429
      protect platforms like yours from lawsuits when you
3430
      distribute information?
3431
           *Mr. Chew. I --
3432
           *Mr. Curtis. Don't over-complicate it. Just, like,
3433
      30,000 feet.
3434
           *Mr. Chew. I understand.
3435
           *Mr. Curtis. Yes.
3436
3437
           *Mr. Chew. Yes.
           *Mr. Curtis. So then would you agree that there is a
3438
      line drawn between publishers of information and distributors
3439
      of information in --
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3441
           *Mr. Chew. I --
           *Mr. Curtis. Specifically in the section 230 language.
3442
3443
           *Mr. Chew. I think 230 is a very complex topic.
           *Mr. Curtis. Yes, I understand. But remember, we are
3444
      at 30,000 feet. So in short, your platform distributes
3445
      content that other peoples publish.
3446
           One of the early challengers to section 230 was when AOL
3447
3448
      refused to take down a post of somebody that had
      inappropriately put a phone number -- associated a phone
3449
      number with the Oklahoma City bombings. The courts ruled
3450
      that AOL was not liable for that post because of section 230.
3451
           Now, I want you to do a hypothetical with me, because I
3452
      am going to use the absurd to try to make a point here.
3453
      Let's suppose, hypothetically, that AOL, instead of just
3454
      posting that actually wanted to magnify that voice, and so
3455
      they took out an ad in The Wall Street Journal linking that
3456
      phone number with the Oklahoma City bombing. And let's
3457
3458
      suppose they didn't stop there, but they went further and
      they took out a Super Bowl ad linking that phone number with
3459
      the Oklahoma City bombing. And let's suppose,
3460
      hypothetically, they didn't stop there, they sent a flier to
3461
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3462
      every home in America linking that phone number to the
      bombing.
3463
3464
           And I quess the question is, would AOL have moved from a
      distributor to a publisher in this made-up example?
3465
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, respectfully, I --
3466
           *Mr. Curtis. I think everybody can see that they would.
3467
      This is not a hard question. Moving that far away from the
3468
3469
      intent would have moved them to a publisher.
           So my question is -- platforms are protected because
3470
      they post content. But I want this room to see -- not just
3471
      you -- that protection has limits. And if AOL moves to a
3472
      distributor instead of a publisher, they go outside of those
3473
3474
      limits.
           Now let's talk algorithms just super quickly. We have
3475
      thrown that word around a lot today. Let me here again go
3476
      30,000 feet, and we will use another platform so it is not
3477
      sensitive. But Pinterest, I like to go on Pinterest. My
3478
3479
      home -- my wife and I are building a home. I am working on
      the yard right now. If you went on my Pinterest page, you
3480
      would see swing sets, and things made for my grandkids.
3481
           Now, another hypothetical. Let's suppose there is some
3482
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3483
      devious intent inside Pinterest, and they decide they want to
      influence John Curtis with these algorithms, and they want me
3484
3485
      to believe it is the end of the world. And all of a sudden
      now I am buying bomb shelters instead of swing sets for my
3486
      kids. Have they become a publisher? And should that be
3487
      protected from section 230?
3488
           And if you don't feel -- I am pretty sure the room
3489
3490
      understands that they have crossed this line, and you can
      tell me if you think they have or not.
3491
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, I will have to study that
3492
      specific example and get back to you.
3493
           *Mr. Curtis. It is a hypothetical, but you can see the
3494
      -- at some point they have crossed a line, and they have
3495
      become a publisher and a distributor.
3496
           So we have touched on this today, but I want to be super
3497
      specific. Is it possible that TikTok had enough data --
3498
      could get enough data on me that you could use artificial
3499
3500
      intelligence and your algorithms and machine learning to
      write an algorithm that could persuade me to change how I
3501
      view a policy issue? Does that possibility exist?
3502
           *Mr. Chew. The way we look at it --
3503
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*Mr. Curtis. Thirty-thousand feet. We are on the
3504
      sprint.
3505
3506
           *Mr. Chew. I will stay very high level.
           *Mr. Curtis. Okay, please.
3507
           *Mr. Chew. The way we look at it is our users come in
3508
      and express whatever views they want.
3509
           *Mr. Curtis. But that is not the point. The point is
3510
3511
      you could write an algorithm that would change. And we have
      actually seen -- the Washington Post reported the Stop the
3512
      Willow campaign shows how TikTokers are tackling climate
3513
      change. I think that is all fine, right, and all good,
3514
      unless somebody has interjected into that and magnified or
3515
3516
      diminished voices in that. And what I am proposing to you
      today is that that pushes them across the line from a
3517
      distributor to a publisher if they make those decisions.
3518
           Now, serious allegations have been made against your
3519
      platform and others, many of them here today. And you are
3520
3521
      not new to these -- right, to these allegations.
      your platform, but some time ago there was an allegation that
3522
      a platform recommended ISIS-related videos. We have talked
3523
      about the weight loss videos, we have talked about -- we
3524
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- 3525 didn't talk about it, but the stealing the elections.
- 3526 Whatever the motivation, I am trying to point out that as you
- 3527 move from a publisher, you manipulate this data with
- 3528 algorithms, that you step out from the protections of section
- 3529 230. Do you see that logic?
- 3530 \*Mr. Chew. This is a very complex --
- \*Mr. Curtis. I understand it is very complex.
- 3532 \*Mr. Chew. Yes.
- 3533 \*Mr. Curtis. But you see the logic. In your mind, has
- 3534 TikTok ever stepped across the line from a distributor to a
- 3535 publisher?
- \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, again, this is a very complex
- 3537 topic. I would need to get back to you on --
- 3538 \*Mr. Curtis. I understand that. Okay.
- 3539 And finally, very quickly, you produced a video that now
- is well known about your visit here today in Washington, D.C.
- 3541 Can you tell me 100 percent that no TikTok employees manually
- 3542 manipulated that to get more views?
- \*Mr. Chew. I checked. And as far as I know, there was
- 3544 no boosting and heating. I went viral organically.
- \*Mr. Curtis. Okay, Madam Chair, I am sorry, I am out of

3546 I yield my time. time. \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair 3547 3548 recognizes Ms. Blunt Rochester for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. \*Ms. Blunt Rochester. 3549 Mr. Chew, as I am sure you know, this hearing is part of 3550 an ongoing effort by our committee to examine data security 3551 and other concerns with social media companies broadly. And 3552 3553 I have to tell you, I came to this hearing interested to hear the actions that TikTok is taking to combat misinformation, 3554 protect our young people, and ensure our national security. 3555 But I have not been reassured by anything you have said so 3556 far. And I think, quite frankly, your testimony has raised 3557 more questions for me than answers. 3558 As some of my colleagues already noted, platforms like 3559 TikTok can easily manipulate and undermine user autonomy with 3560 addictive features, invasive data collection practices, and 3561 disseminating misinformation and disinformation. That is why 3562 3563 I will be reintroducing the DETOUR Act to mitigate this harm. Mr. Chew, yes or no, would you oppose legislation that 3564 banned the use of intentionally manipulative design 3565 techniques that trick users into giving up their personal 3566

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3567
      information?
                       In principle --
           *Mr. Chew.
3568
3569
           *Ms. Blunt Rochester. It is just a yes or no.
                       In principle, I agree that the kind of
           *Mr. Chew.
3570
      practices is not --
3571
           *Ms. Blunt Rochester. And can TikTok users opt out of
3572
      targeted ads, yes or no?
3573
3574
           *Mr. Chew. At this moment in time, we believe that this
      is a very important part of the experience --
3575
           *Ms. Blunt Rochester. Yes or no? Time is ticking.
3576
           *Mr. Chew. It is an important part of the experience.
3577
           *Ms. Blunt Rochester. If -- even if someone wants
3578
3579
      targeted ads, do you give a user a clear opportunity to
      prevent TikTok from using tools like pixels to collect their
3580
      data and track them off of the TikTok platform?
3581
           *Mr. Chew. We give our users a lot of tools to control
3582
      their privacy settings on our app.
3583
           And by the way, if you are below 16, it is private by
3584
      default. So you cannot even go viral.
3585
           *Ms. Blunt Rochester. An August of 2022 response to a
3586
      letter I wrote to your company on abortion misinformation,
3587
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3588
      TikTok asserted several actions to address abortion
      misinformation. In light of recent attacks on safe and
3589
      effective medication abortion, I am -- remain worried by this
3590
      misinformation.
3591
           And following on Ms. DeGette's questioning, how many
3592
      posts did you actually take down that contained abortion
3593
      misinformation?
3594
3595
           *Mr. Chew. Contents and views on both sides of the --
      on abortion is allowed on our platform. It is just freedom
3596
      of expression. If it is dangerous misinformation, we rely on
3597
      third-party experts to help us identify and remove them.
3598
      can get back to you on specifics.
3599
3600
           *Ms. Blunt Rochester. Yes, please get back with us --
3601
           *Mr. Chew. Yes.
           *Ms. Blunt Rochester. -- on the specifics.
3602
           Mr. Chew, in your testimony you indicated TikTok has
3603
      taken several steps to implement Project Texas. You have
3604
3605
      said you have spent -- in your testimony -- $1.5 billion, you
      have hired 1,500 full-time employees. Can I ask for some
3606
      specifics about the implementation? This $1.5 billion, what
3607
      was it used for? The employees, were they people that you
3608
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3609 already had that you just transferred over? And what types of roles will they have? 3610 3611 \*Mr. Chew. Oh, okay. This billion-and-a-half U.S. dollars is spread across many things, including the 3612 infrastructure we have to build, the migration of the data to 3613 a new cloud infrastructure, and all the third-party security 3614 partners that we are hiring, and, of course, the new 3615 3616 employees. Now, this team will now be run by a gentleman who used 3617 to be the -- who has spent his career as a chief security 3618 officer in other companies, and another gentleman who used to 3619 work, I believe, in --3620 3621 \*Ms. Blunt Rochester. If you could just follow up --\*Mr. Chew. Yes. 3622 \*Ms. Blunt Rochester. -- with us, that would be very 3623 helpful. 3624 \*Mr. Chew. I will, I will. 3625 3626 \*Ms. Blunt Rochester. Because we would really like to understand the details. Where is the money going? How many 3627 people are -- and what will they be doing? 3628 \*Mr. Chew. Okay. 3629

3630 \*Ms. Blunt Rochester. You know, as I put just kind of a finer point on this, one of my concerns is that we came here 3631 3632 hoping to hear some actions that would alleviate some of our concerns and our fears. We have got family members, we have 3633 a lot of folks here that are constituents, that are content 3634 creators. And for us, we were looking for action. We wanted 3635 to see -- make us feel like we really can "trust,' ' as you 3636 3637 use the word. 3638 What I leave here with is thinking about the fact that your company is -- I learned that you are -- you have 3639 personalized data advertising for kids as young as 13. 3640 we have heard until Project Texas is supposedly stood up, 3641 3642 engineers in China still have access to personal data, and that means engineers in China have access to personal data of 3643 13-year-olds in the United States. And I think that really 3644 summarizes why you see so much bipartisan consensus and 3645 concern about your company. And I imagine that it is not 3646 3647 going away any time soon. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back. 3648 \*The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. I yield to the 3649 lady from Arizona, Mrs. Lesko, for five minutes. 3650

3651 \*Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, do you agree that the Chinese Government has 3652 3653 persecuted the Uyghur population? \*Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, you -- if you use our app and 3654 you open it, you will find our users who give all sorts of 3655 content --3656 \*Mrs. Lesko. That is not my question. My question is, 3657 3658 do you agree that the Chinese Government has persecuted the 3659 Uyghur population? \*Mr. Chew. Well, it is deeply concerning to hear about 3660 all accounts of human rights abuse. My role here is to 3661 3662 explain --3663 \*Mrs. Lesko. I think you are being pretty evasive. \*Mr. Chew. -- what our platform does on this. 3664 \*Mrs. Lesko. It is a pretty easy question. Do you 3665 agree that the Chinese Government has persecuted the Uyghur 3666 population? 3667 3668 Congresswoman, I am here to describe TikTok, and what we do as a platform. And as a platform --3669 \*Mrs. Lesko. All right. 3670 \*Mr. Chew. -- we allow our users to freely express 3671

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3672
      their views --
           *Mrs. Lesko. All right. Earlier today --
3673
3674
           *Mr. Chew. -- on this issue and any other issue that
      matters to them.
3675
                         Well, you didn't answer the question.
3676
           *Mrs. Lesko.
           Earlier today Chairman Rodgers asked you, and I quote,
3677
      "Have any moderation tools been used to remove content
3678
3679
      associated with the Uyghur genocide, yes or no?''
      answer, "We do not remove that kind of content."
3680
      2019 TikTok suspended the account of Feroza Aziz, an American
3681
      17-year-old, after she put out a video about the Uyghur
3682
      genocide. So your answer, sir, does not align with history.
3683
3684
           *Mr. Chew. That particular case was a mis-moderation.
3685
      I believe that video had a picture of Osama bin Laden, so we
      thought it was --
3686
           *Mrs. Lesko. No, I --
3687
           *Mr. Chew. -- content that was inappropriate.
3688
3689
           *Mrs. Lesko. Yes, I looked it up. That was a different
      post that they banned, TikTok banned.
3690
           *Mr. Chew. I can get back on the specifics, yes.
3691
           *Mrs. Lesko. My next question. India banned the use of
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3693 TikTok in their country in 2020. New Zealand has banned the installation of TikTok on devices connected to the country's 3694 3695 parliamentary network. Canada banned the installation of TikTok on government devices. The United Kingdom has banned 3696 the TikTok app from government-owned devices. Belgium banned 3697 the TikTok from government phones. The European Union banned 3698 the installation of TikTok on government devices. All cited 3699 3700 security risks with the company's data collection and connection to the Chinese Communist Party. 3701 Recently, our U.S. FBI director, Christopher Wray, said 3702 about TikTok, "This is a tool that is ultimately within the 3703 control of the Chinese Government. And it -- to me, it 3704 screams out with national security concerns.' ' 3705 Mr. Chew, how can all of these countries and our own FBI 3706 director have been wrong? 3707 I think a lot of risks that I pointed out 3708 \*Mr. Chew. are hypothetical and theoretical risks. I have not seen any 3709 3710 I am, you know, eagerly awaiting discussions where we can talk about evidence, and we then can address the 3711 concerns that are being raised. 3712 \*Mrs. Lesko. Yes. My next question revolves around an 3713

3714 "India Banned TikTok in 2020.' A March 21st Forbes article revealed how troves of personal data of Indian 3715 3716 citizens who once used TikTok remain widely accessible to employees at the company and its Beijing-based parent, 3717 3718 ByteDance. A current TikTok employee told Forbes that nearly anyone 3719 with basic access to company tools, including employees in 3720 3721 China, can easily look up the closest contacts and other sensitive information about any user. This current TikTok 3722 employee also said, "If you want to start a movement, if you 3723 want to divide people, if you want to do any of the operation 3724 to influence the public on the app, you can just use that 3725 information to target those groups.'' 3726 Why would a -- Mr. Chew, why would a current TikTok 3727 employee say this if it wasn't true? 3728 \*Mr. Chew. This is a recent article. I have asked my 3729 team to look into it. As far as I know, there is -- we have 3730 3731 rigorous data access protocols. There is really no such thing where anybody can get access to tools. 3732 \*Mrs. Lesko. All right. 3733 \*Mr. Chew. So I disagree with a lot of the conclusions 3734

3735	of that.
3736	*Mrs. Lesko. Madam Chair, I request unanimous consent
3737	that the Forbes March 21st, 2023 article be added to the
3738	record.
3739	*The Chair. Without objection.
3740	[The information follows:]
3741	
3742	**************************************
3743	

3744 \*Mrs. Lesko. And I have -- would like to turn over the rest of my time to Mr. Obernolte. 3745 3746 \*Mr. Obernolte. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, I would like to continue asking the question 3747 that we were -- ran out of time last time. 3748 So as part of Project Texas, you are going to have 3749 engineers at Oracle review the algorithms, the machine 3750 3751 learning algorithms that TikTok uses to ensure that they are free from foreign influence. But as you and I were 3752 discussing, reviewing the algorithms doesn't do anything. 3753 The algorithms are simple. That is not where the secret 3754 The secret sauce is in the data used to train 3755 sauce is. 3756 them, and the outcomes that you are asking them to predict. Would you agree with that? 3757 \*Mr. Chew. I actually believe that, with third-party 3758 monitoring, you can identify a lot of the motivation of the 3759 code. And with enough third-party experts, you can identify 3760 3761 a lot of what the code is designed to do. \*Mr. Obernolte. But how would --3762 \*Mr. Chew. So I --3763 \*Mr. Obernolte. How would you verify that you couldn't 3764

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3765
      ask the algorithm for a different outcome than the one that
      the rest of the source code is asking for?
3766
3767
           *Mr. Chew. The algorithm will be trained with this --
      it gets very technical, but it will be trained based on
3768
      weights, for example. And those are things that we can
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3770
      verify. You know, what weights are you putting on --
           *Mr. Obernolte. Well, if you could give us a written
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3772
      response to that, I would appreciate it, because I am
      interested.
3773
           [The information follows:]
3774
3775
      ********COMMITTEE INSERT******
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3778
           *Mr. Obernolte. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
           *The Chair.
                        The lady yields back. The gentleman --
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3780
      gentlelady yields back. The chair recognizes for five
      minutes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Soto.
3781
           *Mr. Soto. Thank you, Madam Chair. The genie is really
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      out of the bottle on this now, so to speak.
3783
           A hundred and fifty million Americans are now on TikTok.
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3785
      That is almost half of America.
                                        They are expressing
      themselves in art and music, poetry, short film, comedy,
3786
      among other creative expressions. And many of them are
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      inspiring, talented young people. But we also on the
3788
      committee recognize there is a darker side to it, right?
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3790
      Violence, adult themes, drug and alcohol, sexualization,
      suicide, all major issues on TikTok, but also Twitter,
3791
      Facebook, YouTube, and other social media platforms.
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           So the solution, as I see it, is to regulate TikTok and
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      other social media platforms. And that job, Mr. Chew, as you
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3795
      know, really falls to us. There are real concerns,
      bipartisan common ground we have already had. We had a
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      Federal device ban that was voted on bipartisan in the
3797
      omnibus. And I co-introduced a bill with my dear friend,
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3799 Representative Cammack, about notices of that Federal ban. Madam Chair, I think the first key is privacy. We have 3800 3801 to pass the comprehensive legislation that got out of this committee but eluded us in the last Congress. I am really 3802 hoping we can get that done, and I am really excited about 3803 hearing that from folks. 3804 The other thing is that TikTok needs to be an American 3805 3806 company with American values, and end its ties to the Chinese Communist Party. This is something that will be critical as 3807 we look and go forward. 3808 And then three, we all agree we have to protect our 3809 The committee should consider banning the use for 3810 children under 13 of not just TikTok, but all social media 3811 platforms, or at least empower parents. 3812 In addition, have rules of the road for teens that are 3813 13 to 17, so that families can do what is right for their 3814 families. 3815 3816 So for privacy, that is on us. Internet privacy is on 3817 us. As far as being an American company, Mr. Chew, as you 3818 know, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 3819

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      States at the Department of Treasury reviews foreign
      investment that affects national security. Right now they
3821
      have negotiated with your company about this Oracle set-up
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      that you have talked about, servers in an American company in
3823
      America, in Texas, and then Oracle would monitor the
3824
      algorithms. But pressure is mounting.
3825
           So, Mr. Chew, would TikTok be prepared to divest from
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3827
      ByteDance and Chinese Communist Party ties if the Department
      of Treasury instructed you all to do so?
3828
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, I said in my opening statement
3829
      I think we are -- need to address the problem of privacy. I
3830
      agree with you. I don't think ownership is the issue here.
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3832
      With a lot of respect, American social companies don't have a
      good track record with data privacy and user security. I
3833
      mean, look at Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, just one
3834
3835
      example.
           So I do think that, you know, it is not about the
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3837
      ownership. It is a lot about making sure we have Project
      Texas, making sure that we are protecting and firewalling
3838
      U.S. user data from unwanted foreign access, giving third
3839
      parties to come in to have a look at this, and making sure
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3841 that everybody is comfortable. We are giving transparency and third-party monitoring, and that is what we are doing for 3842 3843 Project Texas. \*Mr. Soto. Well, I would at least encourage you all to 3844 start having the dialogue, should that be where the President 3845 and the Congress ends up going. 3846 The third thing is on parents. I had a constituent of 3847 3848 mine, Brandy of Lake Nona, say, "I am a parent of 2 teenagers, 14 and 18 years old, both of whom have been harmed 3849 by social media. TikTok's algorithms supply my 14-year-old 3850 son with a continuous stream of inappropriate content, and 3851 has negatively influenced his perception of all females. I 3852 noticed the attention span of both of my teens has changed or 3853 decreased dramatically, and social media has made my daughter 3854 insecure, leading to an eating disorder, and ultimately 3855 depression.' \ 3856 What safeguards do you have, and what should we tell 3857 3858 Brandy of Lake Nona on -- about how we can help her protect 3859 her children? \*Mr. Chew. We have a differentiated experience. I 3860 mentioned just now about the experience. If you are below 3861

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      13, very, very restricted. If you are below -- 13 to 17,
      Congressman, we actually have a whole series of things. The
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3864
      first -- the content that you see, you know, we make sure
      that we remove things that could be mature themes from your
3865
      from your feed. We also, by default, do not allow under-16s
3866
      to use direct messaging. We do not allow under-16s to -- we
3867
      set their accounts to private, by default. They can't go
3868
      viral. If you are below 18, we shut off some features for
3869
      you. Like, for example, you are not allowed to post live
3870
      streams. Neither are you allowed to send virtual gifts.
3871
           So we take this very seriously, and we want to continue
3872
      to build to ensure that we are giving our under-18 teenagers
3873
      on our platform -- although they -- today they are only a
3874
      minority of our user base today, but we still take it very
3875
      seriously.
3876
           *Mr. Soto. Mr. Chew, I would encourage you to continue
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      thinking about how to get the word out to parents across the
3878
3879
      nation on some of these tools, as well, as we here craft a
      privacy law that will help provide well-needed regulation to
3880
      social media companies across the nation.
3881
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Thank you, and I yield back.

3882

3883 \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence, for five 3884 3885 minutes. \*Mr. Pence. Thank you, Chairwoman Rodgers and Ranking 3886 Member Pallone, for holding this hearing. I love both of 3887 your opening remarks. 3888 Like my colleagues have discussed today, our 3889 3890 increasingly digital world leaves Hoosiers and all Americans in the dark about who has access to their information. 3891 TikTok users, that could be third-party data brokers, 3892 advertisers, or the Chinese Communist Party. TikTok 3893 aggressively feeds addictive content to users to glean 3894 3895 massive amounts of personal data that is worth a fortune. For Hoosiers watching at home, this isn't just data about 3896 your favorite sports team. 3897 You know, if there really are 150 million users in the 3898 U.S., this suggests to me that the CCP has a finger on the 3899 3900 pulse of almost half our nation's population. I find that hard to believe. But this week I decided I would ask my 3901 constituents in southern Indiana to share their stories with 3902 I went out Monday night, and we got 800 responses in 3903

3904 less than 12 hours, okay? Let me share a couple of those with you. 3905 One of my constituents shared, I quote, "I am a mental 3906 health counselor. Most of my teenage clients are on TikTok. 3907 They spend hours online being negatively influenced by 3908 I have seen kids experience self-harm, gender 3909 dysphoria, and many mental illnesses they have picked up from 3910 3911 I will not allow my children to have TikTok. creators know the algorithms are addicting our children. 3912 They know that children are suffering more anxiety and 3913 depression from screen time, but they do not care. They will 3914 not change their algorithms because it is financially 3915 lucrative for them to keep their kids addicted.' ' 3916 Another parent said, "We let our child, our daughter, 3917 try it out. The feed was continuously suggesting sexually 3918 explicit, stupid, and vulgar videos. We discontinued it 3919 within a week.' \ And there has been many more, many more. 3920 3921 Like I said, 800, okay? In your testimony, Mr. Chew, you walked through a number 3922 of supposed actions taken by your company to create a safe 3923 environment, empower parents to oversee content shown to 3924

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3925
      their children. But virtually everything we have heard
      reflects the opposite. And some of your answers are a little
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3927
      confusing.
           You know, all of those sitting here and maybe watching
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      on C-SPAN, this is the thirty-second hearing we have held
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      about privacy and Big Tech. Each hearing I have been part
3930
      of, we have heard the same stories about our constituents'
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3932
      experience, and the same promises for Big Tech to do better.
      The truth of the matter is, this disgusting and dangerous
3933
      content littered across your platform is not justifiable, and
3934
      it is uncontrollable. Americans' data is not safe, and Big
3935
      Tech is doing nothing to protect it.
3936
3937
           Putting aside the dangers of the CCP involvement and
      after these 32 hearings, I believe it is actually time to
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      change the narrative, change the focus, and change the
3939
      outcome by talking about the money you are making at TikTok.
3940
      Mr. Chew, I have a question. How much revenue is generated
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3942
      per user?
3943
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, we --
           *Mr. Pence. It is a private company, and you are not
3944
      going to tell me.
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3946
           *Mr. Chew. A private company, yes.
           *Mr. Pence. Does each user receive a comparable benefit
3947
3948
      for the amount of profit their data brings to your company?
           *Mr. Chew. We do share some revenue with some creators
3949
      who produce, say, one-minute-plus informative content.
3950
           *Mr. Pence.
                        Thanks. When am I going to get paid for
3951
      the data that you are selling or your -- or you are getting
3952
3953
      revenue from advertisers -- when am I going to get paid for
      the data you are getting from my children, my grandchildren,
3954
      my neighbors? I think that is the only way to get your
3955
      attention, is talk about the money you are making, and maybe
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      that will get you all to do what you are supposed to do.
3957
           *Mr. Chew. I respect and understand your opinion.
3958
      vast majority of our users have a great experience. I sent a
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      video recently, as well. I got hundreds of thousands of
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3961
      comments.
           *Mr. Pence. But what am I getting? It is a great
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3963
      experience? What about these 800 bad experiences that people
      in the Indiana 6th district have been getting?
3964
           *Mr. Chew. We will look into them, and a lot of the
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      issues --
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3967
           *Mr. Pence. You are going to look into it? But this is
      my -- this is the thirty-second Big Tech hearing, and you are
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3969
      always going to look at it. Frankly, I think you are all
      stalling is what you are doing. You are just trying to buy
3970
      time while you are making the 18 billion, perhaps, whatever
3971
      you are making.
3972
                       I -- the majority of our users have a great
3973
3974
      experience on our platform. It is our duty to keep it safe.
      I agree with you. That is why our commitment is to make sure
3975
      that safety --
3976
           *Mr. Pence. I think it is --
3977
           *Mr. Chew. -- is a priority for --
3978
           *Mr. Pence. I think it is your duty to pay attention to
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      what you are doing, and maybe you paying people for the
3980
      information that you are getting from it is a way to get that
3981
      done.
3982
           Thank you, I yield back.
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3984
           *The Chair. The gentleman yields back.
      recognizes the gentlelady from Washington, Ms. Schrier, for
3985
      five minutes.
3986
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3987

\*Ms. Schrier. Thank you for being here, Mr. Chew. I am

3988 really concerned about everything that we are hearing in this conversation today, and I appreciate your good intentions, 3989 3990 but the actions are really falling short. As a pediatrician and the parent of a teenager, I am 3991 particularly concerned about how social media generally and 3992 TikTok specifically is affecting our kids and teens. We just 3993 heard a lot about this from testimony from a psychologist. 3994 3995 Last year the American Academy of Pediatrics sounded the alarm about our children's mental health crisis. And as a 3996 pediatrician, I know this has been going on for more than a 3997 In fact, it tracks perfectly with social media 3998 engagement. And during the pandemic, teens who are missing 3999 out on in-person interactions turned even more to social 4000 media to connect with friends. 4001 Social media is designed to be addicting. That is the 4002 business model. And your platform is the most addictive of 4003 all. And this endless, mindless scrolling takes teens away 4004 4005 from human relationships. And here is what is important. keeps teens awake all night, well past their bedtime at a 4006 time in their lives when sleep is critical for brain and 4007 physical development. In fact, sleep deprivation alone --4008

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4009
      ignoring even content -- alone can cause depression, anxiety,
      social withdrawal, inattention, poor coping skills, and
4010
4011
      academic failure.
           So, Mr. Chew, I just want to follow up a little bit on
4012
      what my colleague, Mr. Sarbanes, was discussing. It is your
4013
      business model to keep eyes on the app, to keep it addictive.
4014
      I know you likely have experts who have advised you on how to
4015
4016
      design this to keep those eyes on your platform for the
      longest possible time. So I want to know if you have
4017
      psychologists or other health experts on staff looking at
4018
      screen time, hours of use, and sleep.
4019
           *Mr. Chew. We worked with the Digital Wellness Lab,
4020
4021
      Congresswoman, and -- at the Boston Children's Hospital, and
      we came up with a 60-minute default limit for any users under
4022
      18.
4023
           *Ms. Schrier.
                           Okay, so that is a --
4024
           *Mr. Chew. We were the first to do it in our industry.
4025
4026
           *Ms. Schrier.
                           That is an opt out, and I can tell you
      they are going to immediately opt out. It is addictive.
4027
           *Mr. Chew. We also give tools --
4028
           *Ms. Schrier. It is like asking a chain smoker not to
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4030 take the next cigarette. It is not going to happen. And by the way, so -- first I have a question, then I 4031 4032 will go back to Boston Children's. Mr. Sarbanes asked earlier, what is the percentage of teens who actually adhere 4033 to the 60-minute limit? 4034 \*Mr. Chew. I would need to check on those numbers and 4035 get back to you on specifics. 4036 4037 \*Ms. Schrier. I would appreciate those numbers. \*Mr. Chew. Yes. 4038 \*Ms. Schrier. I am quessing it is an incredibly low 4039 percentage who actually heed that. 4040 Now, as far as Boston Children's goes, I know you are 4041 4042 referring to them as a source for these ideas about, you know, go outside, get some air, take some time out. But I 4043 can tell you, as a pediatrician, I am guessing their 4044 suggestions were a little stronger than that. And so I am 4045 wondering, what is the next step? What are you doing when 4046 4047 you find out that almost nobody is really opting out after 60 minutes, to take this burden off of the kids and off of the 4048 parents, and change your algorithms to make them not so 4049 hooked? 4050

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4051
           *Mr. Chew. We give our parents, as you pointed out, the
      family -- the family pairing tool. And in that tool, if you
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4053
      pair it with your teenager's phone, you can actually set a
      restriction, how many minutes. And we believe it is very
4054
      important for parents to have these conversations with their
4055
      teenagers, so -- to decide what is best for their family.
4056
           I also -- Congresswoman, a lot of people come to our
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4058
      platform to have a really informative experience. Like I
      said, there were 116 billion pieces of content on STEM, and
4059
      we are creating a feed dedicated to that. Book Talk has 115
4060
      billion --
4061
           *Ms. Schrier. We also -- we have also heard today that
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4063
      well over 20 percent of the information is misinformation.
      We heard that about medical remedies that are not really
4064
      remedies. We have heard it about mental health topics.
4065
           I mean, this becomes very dangerous, especially when
4066
      people who are not trained to think very critically are being
4067
4068
      given information and thinking that it is true. And you have
      said many times that the destructive information isn't
4069
      available to kids, but it is. Like, we keep seeing examples
4070
      here.
4071
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4072 And so I am just wondering, what are you going to do with the algorithms? I mean, just because you are removing 4073 4074 something that says anorexia, bulimia, or eating disorder, that doesn't do it. If you show girls repeatedly skinny 4075 bodies and advice on how to cook meals that are less than 300 4076 calories, that is dangerous. 4077 \*Mr. Chew. We have worked with -- first of all, all --4078 4079 anything that glorifies eating disorders, we remove that from our platform as violative. We are working with experts now. 4080 It is a challenging problem for our industry, but we are 4081 actually identify -- identifying some of these themes that 4082 you are talking about, and trying to build models where that 4083 kind of content is not up for the younger users. So it is 4084 something we take very seriously, too. 4085 \*Ms. Schrier. We are seeing eating disorders in 4086 elementary-age kids now, and I need you to expedite that 4087 process as much as possible, because parents out there are 4088 4089 worried, and I am worried as a pediatrician. Parents can't take themselves off of these platforms. Kids, there is no 4090 way they are going to take themselves off. And we need you 4091 to do your part. It may affect your bottom line, but it 4092

4093 could save this generation. \*Mr. Chew. I share your concerns, and I commit to doing 4094 4095 more. \*Ms. Schrier. I yield back. 4096 \*The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. The chair 4097 recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Joyce. 4098 \*Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chair Rodgers and Ranking Member 4099 4100 Pallone, for holding this hearing. According to an August 2022 article in the New York 4101 Times, TikTok's in-app web browser can track every individual 4102 keystroke made by a user. We have heard today about the 4103 various ways in which the app's code could be used to monitor 4104 4105 or track users. And likewise, we have heard concerns that 4106 this data may not be fully isolated from access by the Chinese Communist Party. 4107 That said, I would like to know more about the 4108 historical non-public U.S. personal data that your company 4109 4110 has already amassed. Mr. Chew, you have publicly stated that the non-public information of TikTok users in the United 4111 States is being transferred to an Oracle-based cloud 4112 infrastructure because of safety concerns. Will that be 4113

- 4114 completed by the end of this week, by the end of this month?
- What is the outline for dealing with that data that you
- 4116 have already amassed?
- \*Mr. Chew. All new data is already stored by default in
- 4118 this Oracle Cloud infrastructure, with the --
- 4119 \*Mr. Joyce. No, I am talking about the data that you
- 4120 have already amassed.
- \*Mr. Chew. We are in the process of deleting.
- \*Mr. Joyce. What timeline will that data be able to be
- 4123 stored?
- \*Mr. Chew. We will -- I believe we will be able to get
- 4125 it done this year. I am hiring --
- 4126 \*Mr. Joyce. This year. Thank you. It is not going to
- 4127 occur any time soon.
- To be clear, until that data transfer happens, user data
- 4129 remains accessible to the Chinese Communist Party.
- On March 1st of this year, the committee asked you when
- 4131 you plan to delete non-public historical U.S. user data. Are
- 4132 you aware of this?
- \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I disagree with this assessment
- 4134 that the Chinese Government can get access to the data. It

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4135
      is really for -- look, this is a private company. This is
      what -- Chinese employees --
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4137
           *Mr. Joyce. You responded in writing to this committee.
      I have the response that we got back from you on March 7th,
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      just 6 days later. Your attorneys wrote, "The company' ' -- I
4139
      am quoting -- "The company plans to begin the process of
4140
      deleting non-public historic U.S. user data this month, and
4141
4142
      anticipates that the process will be completed this year.' \
           You came up with a supposed plan in the summer of 2022,
4143
      specifically based on our concerns that the communist Chinese
4144
      government was spying on U.S. users. But you only just came
4145
      up with the idea to delete historic non-public U.S. data just
4146
4147
      two weeks ago?
4148
           Let me read it again: On March 7th, your attorneys
      wrote -- and I quote -- "The company plans to begin the
4149
      process of deleting non-public historical U.S. data this
4150
      month, and anticipates that the process will be completed
4151
      this year.' \
4152
           Mr. Chew, did you just come up with this plan only
4153
      because we asked about it on March 1st?
4154
           *Mr. Chew. No, we started deleting this --
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4156
           *Mr. Joyce. Because that is what it looks like to me.
           *Mr. Chew. We hired a third-party auditor --
4157
4158
           *Mr. Joyce. This is incredibly disappointing.
           *Mr. Chew. -- to help us with this.
4159
           *Mr. Joyce. Wouldn't you agree that awaiting even
4160
      minutes for this personal privacy protection is absolutely
4161
      wrong, and it is not in the best interest of your users?
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4163
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, respectfully, there are many
      companies that use a global workforce. We are not the only
4164
      one. We are just taking action after hearing --
4165
           *Mr. Joyce. Given the delay --
4166
           *Mr. Chew. Many other companies have not.
4167
           *Mr. Joyce. -- in reading this data, and what we have
4168
      already established about the ability of the Chinese
4169
      Communist Party to access personal user data, would you agree
4170
      that no U.S. Government electronic devices should have access
4171
      to TikTok platform, as your lackluster security currently
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4173
      stands?
                       I disagree with that characterization.
4174
      I said, the U.S. --
4175
           *Mr. Joyce. Do you think that any individual should be
4176
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- utilizing that on any government platform? 4177 \*Mr. Chew. I think the government devices should have 4178 4179 no social media apps, to be honest, but --\*Mr. Joyce. And particularly TikTok. 4180 \*Mr. Chew. -- targeted to us. 4181 \*Mr. Joyce. Mr. Chew, during this hearing you have 4182 mentioned several times that there is a "different 4183 4184 experience,' ' your words, for children under the age of 13. \*Mr. Chew. That is correct. 4185 \*Mr. Joyce. A different experience. Mr. Chew, do you 4186 allow your children under the age of 13 to participate in 4187 TikTok? Yes or no. 4188 4189 \*Mr. Chew. I did just explain this in detail. experience doesn't exist in Singapore, where my children 4190 live. If my children lived here, then yes. 4191 \*Mr. Joyce. Based on what we have heard today, it is 4192 clear to me that TikTok, as a company, cannot be trusted, and 4193 4194 that Americans remain significantly at risk because of the TikTok app. I still contend that TikTok is the spy in 4195 Americans' pockets. 4196
- I want to acknowledge that TikTok does have the ability

4198 to make those changes. But unfortunately, we have not heard that from you today. We have not heard a commitment to be 4199 4200 able to protect the personal privacy that Americans expect and that Americans deserve. 4201 Thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield the remainder of my 4202 4203 time. \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair 4204 4205 recognizes Mrs. Trahan for five minutes. 4206 \*Mrs. Trahan. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, many Big Tech CEOs have sat where you are 4207 seated today and tried to run out the clock during a hearing 4208 like this one. They were trained not to answer questions, 4209 and just wait for the news cycle to pass so that they could 4210 get on with business as usual. Those same executives want 4211 this moment, TikTok's moment under the microscope, to 4212 distract Congress and the American people from the very real 4213 issues that exist on their platforms. 4214 4215 You have an opportunity to turn the tables on them. While U.S.-based social media giants have regressed on 4216 protections for children and teens, on protecting our data 4217 privacy, and on embracing transparency, you can lead, and you 4218

4219 should lead. Last month you announced that TikTok would expand access to its researcher API. But I am concerned that 4220 4221 your new policy could be more bark than bite, that it won't 4222 actually lead to the rigorous research that we, as lawmakers, and that parents and everyday TikTok users need. 4223 In fact, your terms of service demand that researchers 4224 delete their data at TikTok's unilateral direction. 4225 4226 onerous restrictions on how researchers' findings can be published, and it only allows access to public data, which 4227 researchers already have access to within the app. 4228 In order to actually address the content moderation and 4229 algorithmic amplification concerns that my colleagues have 4230 raised here today and that I have heard about directly from 4231 parents in my home state of Massachusetts, independent 4232 researchers, not just other tech companies like Oracle, need 4233 to be able to evaluate how TikTok's algorithm is making 4234 decisions to promote content. 4235 4236 Mr. Chew, will you commit to expanding your API to include data that would let researchers investigate how your 4237 algorithm is pushing content to users, whether it is showing 4238 up on your For You page, the hashtag page, or somewhere else? 4239

4240 \*Mr. Chew. We are -- one of the commitments I gave in the opening statement is a commitment to transparency and 4241 4242 third-party monitoring. So Congresswoman, I will look into the details of that, and get back to you. 4243 \*Mrs. Trahan. And as well as the algorithm, including 4244 data on what types of users were targeted by the algorithm so 4245 that researchers can fully understand what content is being 4246 4247 prioritized and who it is being pushed to. 4248 \*Mr. Chew. Again, we have a commitment to transparency. These are very important questions, and I will get back to 4249 you on the specifics. 4250 4251 \*Mrs. Trahan. Under this same proposal, you require 4252 that researchers give TikTok "worldwide, free, non-exclusive, and perpetual' rights to their papers. This threatens to 4253 clash directly with well-established practices of exclusive 4254 publication rights in research journals. 4255 Mr. Chew, why does TikTok need those rights? 4256 4257 \*Mr. Chew. I would need to get back to you on the specifics, if that is okay. 4258 \*Mrs. Trahan. Yes. I don't see how we can expect 4259 researchers to do their work under these terms, and then tout 4260

4261 transparency. I am going to shift gears with the time that I have 4262 4263 remaining, Mr. Chew. I would like to talk about TikTok's efforts to protect children and young users. In 2021 the 4264 UK's age-appropriate design code went into effect, mandating 4265 15 standards that companies like you need to follow to 4266 protect children on your platform. You still operate in the 4267 4268 United Kingdom, which means you should be in compliance with this code. 4269 So my question is simple: Will you commit to extending 4270 the protections currently afforded children in the UK to the 4271 millions of kids and teens who use your app here in the 4272 4273 United States? 4274 \*Mr. Chew. We take the safety of the younger users on our platform very seriously. Every --4275 \*Mrs. Trahan. That is a good way to prove it. 4276 \*Mr. Chew. Every country is a little bit different in 4277 4278 context, and in -- so let me look at the specifics, and bring some of the best practices across the world. But --4279 \*Mrs. Trahan. Well, those best practices are in -- they 4280 are being executed around the world. We just want the same 4281

4282 for our kids here in the United States. I mean, Mr. Chew, when we spoke a couple of weeks ago 4283 4284 you indicated interest in taking steps to earn trust, our trust. And to me, it hasn't happened today so far. But 4285 rather, you have ducked behind industry standards and 4286 comparables to your competitors, which we know are woefully 4287 insufficient. 4288 I strongly urge you to consider these terms, these 4289 4290 commitments. Make the case for why you are different from your American competitors, and do better on -- than them on 4291 transparency, which you have mentioned countless times today, 4292 but which we don't really have anything tangible to point to. 4293 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, I don't want to make excuses for our 4294 industry or ourselves. I think there is a lot of work that 4295 needs to be done. We take this very seriously. Nothing is 4296 -- it is not perfect. We need to keep investing to stay 4297 ahead of our growth. 4298 4299 So I agree that, you know, we need to prioritize safety, and continue to do that as part of our company. And --4300 \*Mrs. Trahan. Well, I look forward to getting back your 4301 comments and your commitments, and those updated terms of 4302

4303	service when you write back to the committee.
4304	[The information follows:]
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4308
           *Mrs. Trahan.
                          Thank you, Madam Chair.
           *Mr. Chew. Thank you.
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4310
           *Mrs. Trahan.
                          I yield back.
           *The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. The chair
4311
      recognizes the gentleman from North Dakota, Mr. Armstrong,
4312
      for five minutes.
4313
           *Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Madam Chair. You know, we
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4315
      have heard a lot today about the procedural safeguards,
      independent code review, server locations, and the corporate
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      independence between ByteDance and the CCP. But I think
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      there is something else a little more telling.
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           You know, when you were asked about Chinese censorship,
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      you pivoted immediately to drug use in Singapore. You have
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      absolutely tied yourself in knots to avoid criticizing the
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      CCP's treatment of the Uyghur population. And I think it
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      begs the first question: before we ever get to Project
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      Texas, which I will get to in a second, if the CCP demanded
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      that ByteDance hand over all of the data that they had on
      user -- on U.S. users in their possession and ByteDance
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      refused, I wonder what would happen. I wonder if Jack Ma
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      might have an opinion on that, and I wonder if he would be
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4329 allowed to give it. But let's talk about Project Texas for a second. 4330 4331 Project Texas envisions a new U.S.-based TikTok subsidiary. You have stated that this arrangement is unprecedented. I 4332 would argue the reason it is unprecedented is because it 4333 requires continual oversight and monitoring by the U.S. of a 4334 private business because it poses a national security threat. 4335 4336 The new subsidiary's board would report to and be 4337 approved by CFIUS. CFIUS will also specify hiring requirements, as well as interact with Oracle as it performs 4338 its data role. That is an extraordinary corporate governance 4339 structure. I have questioned whether it complies with 4340 corporate law and fiduciary duty to shareholders. 4341 Yet the core concern is that the -- proposes 4342 unparalleled integration with the U.S. Government with a 4343 private company, which will require significant government 4344 resources, all of that to allow a continued operation of a 4345 4346 social media platform that has serious national security implications. And CFIUS's workload has already dramatically 4347 increased in recent years, with a 30 percent increase in 4348 declarations and a 45 percent increase in joint voluntary 4349

4350 notices. And there is bipartisan consensus that CFIUS needs to be expanded as we speak. 4351 4352 The only -- Mr. Chew, can you identify any similar corporate arrangement that requires Federal Government to 4353 expand such resources to monitor an alleged data privacy and 4354 national security risk? 4355 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am not an expert on this 4356 4357 matter. I believe that there are certain similar arrangements, but I am not the expert on this matter. 4358 \*Mr. Armstrong. Well, the only one I could find was the 4359 UK created the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Center in 4360 2010 to assess Huawei's tech, and to detect malicious 4361 activity and quard UK's networks. That has worked so well 4362 that the United Kingdom is now planning on kicking Huawei out 4363 of Great Britain. 4364 You have stated that TikTok has invested \$1.5 billion in 4365 Project Texas. Are you aware of any discussions or proposals 4366 4367 that entail TikTok funding or offsetting the costs of CFIUS's 4368 role? \*Mr. Chew. Those discussions are -- I need to get back 4369 on you -- on the specifics. But I can tell you, yes, we did 4370

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spend approximately 1.5 billion U.S. dollars on our side.
4371
           *Mr. Armstrong. You spent $1.5 billion on Project
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4373
      Texas. But do you have any -- I mean, you agree that, if
      CFIUS takes on this role, they are going to need a massive
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      influx of dollars in human resources, right?
4375
           *Mr. Chew. I cannot speak on behalf of CFIUS,
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4377
      Congressman.
4378
           *Mr. Armstrong. Should the U.S. Government expend such
      resources to create this extraordinary arrangement for
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      TikTok, especially considering alleged data privacy and
4380
      national security risks?
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           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, I cannot speak on behalf of the
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4383
      United States --
           *Mr. Armstrong. Well, the Project Texas doesn't work
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      without CFIUS, right? And Project Texas, as you guys have
4385
      proposed it, does not work without CFIUS involvement.
4386
           *Mr. Chew. The idea behind Project Texas is the
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4388
      firewall of U.S. user data, make sure it is stored by an
      American company overseen by American personnel, and we will
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      invite third-party monitors to monitor this. So that, in
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      essence, at least as far as I know, is the majority of the
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4392 cost, because it will rely on not just us building the infrastructure, but us, you know, finding and hiring these 4393 4394 third-party monitors who are vetted to come in and monitor this structure. 4395 \*Mr. Armstrong. You talked earlier about the 4396 shareholder's ownership of TikTok, and you said 60 percent 4397 global investors, 20 percent is employees, and 20 percent is 4398 4399 original founders. Are all those voting shares the same? 4400 \*Mr. Chew. No, the founder has weighted voting rights, as is common in our industry. 4401 \*Mr. Armstrong. So do -- as far as a voting block of 4402 shares owned in ByteDance, do you know if the Chinese 4403 Communist Party -- not Chinese Communist Party officials, the 4404 Chinese Communist Party -- do you know what their percentage 4405 of the actual voting block share of ByteDance is? 4406 \*Mr. Chew. The Chinese Communist Party doesn't have 4407 voting rights in ByteDance. 4408 4409 \*Mr. Armstrong. Chinese Communist Party members is a different question. Do the founders control the voting block 4410 of ByteDance's shares? 4411 \*Mr. Chew. I do know that the founder himself is not a 4412

member of the Communist Party, but we don't know the 4413 4414 political affiliation of our employees, because that is not 4415 something we ask. \*Mr. Armstrong. Does the Chinese Government know the 4416 political affiliation of their Chinese citizens? 4417 \*Mr. Chew. I cannot answer that question on their 4418 behalf. 4419 4420 \*Mr. Armstrong. I yield back. \*Mr. Chew. The gentleman yields back. I yield to the 4421 lady from -- the gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms. Kuster, 4422 five minutes. 4423 \*Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Madam Chair. 4424 Mr. Chew, I just want to say I agree with all of the 4425 comments of many of my colleagues today that we need to take 4426 a close look at whether TikTok poses a national security 4427 risk. For today I am going to focus my limited time on how 4428 TikTok can better protect its youngest users. And I think a 4429 4430 number of us have identified as parents today, and have serious concerns, as we relayed to you. 4431 Just this week I heard from a parent in my district in 4432

Nashua, New Hampshire, whose child was served harmful content

4433

4434 on TikTok, and has needed counseling as a result. experience is not unique to this family, and it underscores 4435 4436 the need for better child protections on your app. I would like to dig further into TikTok's current safety 4437 and privacy controls for children. I understand that TikTok 4438 restricts certain app capabilities for users under age 18, 4439 and has additional restrictions for users under age 16 or 13, 4440 4441 such as limiting who can interact with them on the platform. However, these protections are worthless if any savvy child 4442 can easily bypass these age restrictions by deleting their 4443 own account and creating a new one with a different age. And 4444 by "easily,' ' I mean you can literally go in and open another 4445 account using the same email address. 4446 So I have been made aware by child safety groups, 4447 including Fair Play for Kids and Common Sense, that it is 4448 that simple for young users to bypass the age restrictions on 4449 TikTok. Yes or no, are you aware of this issue? 4450 4451 \*Mr. Chew. I apologize. I think that is a great issue -- question that you raised. If a user inputs an age and is 4452 blocked, my understanding is that if the user tries to do it 4453 again within a short period of time -- and I won't disclose 4454

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4455
      publicly --
           *Ms. Kuster. We did it in our office yesterday. You
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4457
      can go right back in, use the exact same email address, and
      open a new account. So can I get your commitment that you
4458
      will at least fix that bug?
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           *Mr. Chew. I will go and have a look at it, yes.
4460
           *Ms. Kuster.
                         Thank you. If -- we are here today to
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4462
      talk TikTok and not other platforms, but I am happy to look
      at legislative solutions.
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           In the interim, TikTok has a responsibility to do more
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      to protect its young users, and I will accept your commitment
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      to take a look at fixing that issue. Will you -- let's see
4466
      -- sorry. I recognize that TikTok has made efforts to
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      provide parents and guardians -- increase options to monitor
4468
      and limit their child's activity on the app, including family
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      pairing and time limit features. But I still have concerns.
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           In order to access family pairing, parents then must
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4472
      download the app onto their phone, and this sounds like a
      design to lure more users onto the app, rather than a
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      practical safety feature. Furthermore, downloading the app
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      may not be a viable option for many patients -- parents.
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Mr. Chew, will TikTok commit to developing other methods
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      for parents to monitor their child's use of the app without
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4478
      having to download the TikTok app on their phone?
           *Mr. Chew. I can look into that specifically, and get
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4480
      back to you.
           *Ms. Kuster. Okay.
4481
           *Mr. Chew. But the family pairing that you mentioned is
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      a very good tool that we developed. I encourage parents with
4483
      teenagers to --
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           *Ms. Kuster. But it is not a perfect --
4485
           *Mr. Chew. -- to use it.
4486
           *Ms. Kuster. -- tool, and let me just say one of my
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      concerns is that the minimum time limit TikTok lets parents
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      set for their children is 40 minutes, which, for a young
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      child, is a very long period of time. Actually giving
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      parents control would mean providing them the freedom to set
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      the screen time that makes sense for their family.
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4493
           Now, I have got a copy of the app page that shows just
      the four options. Would you commit to adding another option,
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      so that the parent can easily set their own screen time
4495
      limit?
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4497 \*Mr. Chew. I can take a look at that. \*Ms. Kuster. I think it is important. I think parents 4498 4499 are looking for control. They are looking to allow their family to use these apps without TikTok taking over their 4500 child's media use. 4501 I have heard use reports -- I have heard reports of 4502 users struggling to access the feature. And so I will look 4503 4504 forward to hearing back from you on adding an "other,' ' so that a parent can add a custom limit. 4505 So finally, I ask that you commit to report back to this 4506 committee and the American public on how TikTok addresses 4507 these safety issues, and the steps that you are taking to 4508 4509 default children's accounts to the most protective possible 4510 settings. And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back. 4511 \*The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. I yield to --4512 the chair yields to the gentleman from Ohio. 4513 4514 Five minutes, Mr. Balderson. \*Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Madam Chair. 4515 Thank you, Mr. Chew, for being here today. 4516 I would like to start by inserting into the record a 4517

4518	report entitled, "TikTok, ByteDance and Their Ties to the
4519	Chinese Communist Party,'' which was published by the
4520	Australian Parliament just over a week ago. If I could add
4521	that to the record, please.
4522	*The Chair. Without objection, so ordered.
4523	[The information follows:]
4524	
4525	*********COMMITTEE INSERT******
4526	

4527 \*Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, we know that your company's algorithm has been 4528 4529 exposed for delivering videos to China that encourages them to develop eating disorders, promotes challenges that have 4530 caused children to accidentally commit suicide, glorifies the 4531 use of drugs and pornography. Despite the constant media 4532 coverage of this issue, your company continues to feed our 4533 4534 children this dangerous and harmful content. 4535 Can you explain to parents back in my congressional district why it should be their burden and not TikTok's to 4536 set up the quardian parental controls for their children so 4537 that they do not view content which encourages eating 4538 4539 disorders or committing suicide? 4540 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I take these issues very seriously. If the user is between -- is a teenage user on 4541 our platform, we actually have a differentiated experience, 4542 including certain models that we are building with experts to 4543 4544 help identify certain content that is not inherently harmful, but could lead people to eating disorders. Anything that 4545 glorifies eating disorders is violative of our platform, and 4546 we remove that. And I want to assure you that I take this 4547

4548 very, very seriously, this commitment. \*Mr. Balderson. Okay. Mr. Curtis, my colleague, 4549 4550 mentioned the use of a heating tool on your platform to make specific videos go viral or get more views. Does TikTok use 4551 a cooling tool, where employees can manually limit the 4552 amplification of content that TikTok should hide, like 4553 content that promotes eating disorders, drug use, or suicide 4554 4555 among children? 4556 \*Mr. Chew. The only promotion tool that we have is approved by the local teams -- so in the U.S. by the U.S. 4557 team -- and it is for commercial purposes. Like Taylor 4558 4559 Swift, you know, I think when she onboarded we, you know, 4560 heated --\*Mr. Balderson. So would that be a yes or no? 4561 \*Mr. Chew. My -- I just want to make sure that I am 4562 answering your question with specifics. 4563 \*Mr. Balderson. If this tool exists, why isn't it being 4564 4565 used to cool then the spread of dangerous content? I mean, why is it still happening? 4566 \*Mr. Chew. Dangerous content has -- that violates, we 4567 remove them. When we see them, we actually remove them from 4568

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4569
      the platform.
           *Mr. Balderson. Okay. The fact of the matter here is
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4571
      that, despite whatever action you take, that TikTok is taking
      to protect teens, your algorithm continues to promote harmful
4572
                Wouldn't you agree that indicates there is
4573
      something inherently wrong with the algorithm your platform
4574
      employs?
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4576
           *Mr. Chew. I do respectfully disagree with that.
      algorithm drives a great user experience for many, many
4577
      users. Well, I talked about STEM content. That has 116
4578
      billion views on our platform. One more example: Book Talk
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      is a trend that happened on our platform. It is to encourage
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      people to read. And globally, it has 115 billion views, and
4581
      it is fantastic. I have heard people telling me that they
4582
      are reading more because of Book Talk. So there is a lot of
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      good, and joy, and positive that can be derived from the
4584
      TikTok experience. Yes, there are some bad actors who come
4585
4586
      in and post violative content, and it is our job to remove
      them. But the overwhelming experience is a very positive one
4587
      for our community.
4588
           *Mr. Balderson. But if it is your job to remove them,
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4590 it has been said many times here today about the 41 days that that video stood up with addressing Mrs. -- the chairwoman. 4591 \*Mr. Chew. After this I am going to go and look into 4592 the specifics of that. 4593 \*Mr. Balderson. All right, thank you. 4594 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. 4595 \*Mr. Balderson. Madam Chair, I yield back. 4596 4597 \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the lady from Texas, Mrs. Fletcher, for five 4598 4599 minutes. \*Mrs. Fletcher. Thank you, Chairwoman McMorris Rodgers, 4600 and thanks to Ranking Member Pallone for holding today's 4601 hearing. And thank you, Mr. Chew, for appearing today. 4602 It has been a long day, but we are here to learn about a 4603 complex set of issues that relate to TikTok and how to 4604 address them. And I think that is what we are hearing from 4605 colleagues on both sides of the aisle today, is a real effort 4606 4607 to grapple with the challenges that we see for national security, and for the safety and protection of American 4608 citizens, especially our children and young adults. 4609 And we have already covered today a lot of the 4610

4611 information about the extensive use of the app, the number of users who are children and young adults. But I think it 4612 4613 bears repeating, as Mr. Veasey mentioned, that TikTok is the preferred platform of young Americans, and they use it for 4614 all kinds of creative and important things. And we have seen 4615 that. But there are also some dangerous things that we know 4616 it has and continues to be used for, and that -- also that 4617 4618 the data that is collected is posing additional dangers. And that is what we are here for. 4619 Most people using TikTok do not realize that TikTok is 4620 collecting data about their keystrokes, or about their 4621 browsing history on other sites, and so much more. And I 4622 agree with my colleagues that we need a comprehensive set of 4623 data privacy laws here in the country, and we have heard some 4624 very good ideas today. 4625 Mr. Chew, you have mentioned several times today that 4626 these are industry-wide issues, and I agree with you that 4627 4628 there are industry-wide challenges here. But there are also some specific things relating to TikTok that I want to focus 4629 my questions on, and really want to understand where there is 4630 a difference, and how we can craft legislation that addresses 4631

- the very real challenges that we have been hearing about today.
- As you know, states across the country have joined an
- ongoing investigation into possible violations of consumer
- 4636 protection laws by TikTok as they pertain to TikTok's effect
- on the mental health of American children and teenagers. As
- 4638 part of this investigation, states have requested to review
- 4639 internal TikTok communications that takes place on Lark.
- That is TikTok's primary instant messaging system. Is that
- 4641 right?
- 4642 \*Mr. Chew. Yes.
- \*Mrs. Fletcher. Okay. And does every TikTok employee
- 4644 have a Lark account?
- \*Mr. Chew. It is very similar to companies that use
- 4646 Slack or any other instant messaging tool.
- \*Mrs. Fletcher. But Lark is a proprietary instant
- 4648 messaging tool. It is not Slack.
- 4649 \*Mr. Chew. It is something that was developed, yes, by
- ByteDance.
- \*Mrs. Fletcher. And it was developed by TikTok?
- \*Mr. Chew. No, it was developed by ByteDance.

4653 \*Mrs. Fletcher. It is developed by ByteDance. Okay. And so a couple of questions stemming from that. 4654 4655 Is it true that Lark videoconferencing has a translation feature in which Chinese is translated to English text and 4656 4657 vice versa? \*Mr. Chew. That is correct. It helps with global 4658 cooperation. 4659 4660 \*Mrs. Fletcher. Okay, and those translated conversations are somehow saved into the Lark system? 4661 \*Mr. Chew. I would need to get back to you on the 4662 specifics. There is a -- you know, I will get back to you on 4663 4664 the specifics. \*Mrs. Fletcher. Okay. That would be great to know. 4665 And I neglected to ask, but does every TikTok employee have a 4666 Lark account? 4667 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, I believe so. Yes. 4668 \*Mrs. Fletcher. Including you, do you have one? 4669 4670 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, I believe so, yes. \*Mrs. Fletcher. And then do you have a -- there is some 4671 kind of profile for your instant messaging system so every 4672 employee identifies their manager, and their department, who 4673

4674 they work for, what they do. Is that all included in their Lark profile, do you know? 4675 4676 \*Mr. Chew. It is very common for companies to have enterprise messaging tools that --4677 \*Mrs. Fletcher. Sure. 4678 \*Mr. Chew. -- companies use. 4679 \*Mrs. Fletcher. It does. And I guess I am asking 4680 4681 specifically about Lark, since it is specific to TikTok, whether it includes information like identifying who, for 4682 example, your manager is. Do you know whether that is 4683 something that is identified in Lark? 4684 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. Again, some of these HR features are 4685 built into a lot of enterprise tools that we use. And --4686 4687 yes. \*Mrs. Fletcher. So, like, for your own profile, does it 4688 identify who your manager is? 4689 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, it does. 4690 4691 \*Mrs. Fletcher. And who does it identify as your 4692 manager? \*Mr. Chew. I report to the CEO of ByteDance. 4693

4694

\*Mrs. Fletcher. Okay. And so that is Zhang Yiming. Is

4695 that identified as your manager? That is the former CEO. \*Mr. Chew. He has stepped down from the board. And --4696 4697 \*Mrs. Fletcher. Okay, so --\*Mr. Chew. That is the CEO, yes. 4698 \*Mrs. Fletcher. Okay. So Mr. Rubo is identified now as 4699 your manager on --4700 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. 4701 4702 \*Mrs. Fletcher. -- the system? Okay. And as you mentioned, it was developed by ByteDance. So it is not just 4703 used by TikTok employees, it is also used by ByteDance 4704 employees, is that right? 4705 \*Mr. Chew. Also by other companies now. I think Lark 4706 is selling it, and it is a good tool for instant messaging. 4707 \*Mrs. Fletcher. So Lark is available to third parties 4708 outside of the ByteDance system, as well, like Slack? 4709 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. 4710 \*Mrs. Fletcher. And do you personally ever use Lark to 4711 4712 communicate with ByteDance? \*Mr. Chew. With employees at ByteDance? Yes, I do. 4713 \*Mrs. Fletcher. You do? Okay. Well, I am running out 4714

of time, and I am sorry to say, because this is really

4715

- 4716 interesting. I do think it underscores some of the concerns
- 4717 that have been raised in this hearing. So I think it is
- 4718 clear we have work we need to continue to do here in the
- 4719 Congress to address data protection and privacy.
- And with that, Madam Chairwoman, I thank you, and I will
- 4721 yield back.
- \*The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. The committee
- 4723 stands in recess, and we will reconvene immediately following
- 4724 the third vote being called.
- 4725 [Recess.]
- \*The Chair. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Weber is
- 4727 recognized for five minutes.
- 4728 \*Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair and, Mr. Chew,
- 4729 thanks for being here.
- 4730 Mr. Chew, I am one of six Texans on this committee. I
- 4731 am over here. So when you invoke the name of Texas, you get
- 4732 my attention.
- 4733 Mr. Chew, when you were the CFO of ByteDance, did the
- 4734 Chinese Government instruct you on how content was to be
- 4735 moderated on Douyin or TikTok, yes or no?
- 4736 \*Mr. Chew. Sorry, Congressman, would you mind repeating

4737 that question? \*Mr. Weber. When you were the CFO of ByteDance, did the 4738 4739 Chinese Government instruct you on how content to be moderated -- was to be moderated on Douyin or TikTok? 4740 \*Mr. Chew. I was not in charge of that. That is the 4741 CFO of --4742 \*Mr. Weber. You were not? 4743 4744 \*Mr. Chew. -- of ByteDance. 4745 \*Mr. Weber. Okay, we have a discrepancy there. Reports have shown that TikTok accounts managed by media 4746 links to be a propaganda arm of the CCP, pushed divisive 4747 content before the recent midterm election. Mr. Chew, yes or 4748 no, has -- to your knowledge, has the CCP coordinated or 4749 utilized TikTok to influence users through algorithms, state-4750 paid content creation, or in any other capacity? 4751 \*Mr. Chew. No, they do not do that. We do not promote 4752 or remove any content on behalf of the Chinese Government. 4753 4754 \*Mr. Weber. You don't, but did the Chinese Government? Do you have any knowledge of that? 4755 \*Mr. Chew. We do not do -- Congressman, we have only 4756 one process of removing content on our platform --4757

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4758
           *Mr. Weber. Okay.
           *Mr. Chew. -- and the process is done by our content
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4760
      moderation team headquartered in Ireland, in Dublin -- sorry,
      Ireland and the U.S. And we will only remove content if it
4761
      violates our guidelines. And that is something that we
4762
      audit, you know, or if there is a valid legal order.
4763
           *Mr. Weber. Okay. Several reports, hearings, and
4764
4765
      leaked internal documents have indicated that TikTok has
4766
      repeatedly censored or de-amplified content that is critical
      of the Chinese Communist Party's party policies in the U.S.
4767
      and abroad. Are you aware of those reports?
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4769
           *Mr. Chew.
                       I don't think that is accurate, Congressman.
4770
      I do not --
4771
           *Mr. Weber. Are you aware of those reports?
           *Mr. Chew.
                       There could be some reports that say that,
4772
      but that action itself is not something --
4773
           *Mr. Weber. But your testimony here today is that you
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4775
      can keep up with stuff and make it as "clean as possible.' \
4776
      Are you aware of those reports?
           *Mr. Chew. I want to make it very clear that we --
4777
      there is content on TikTok that is great and fun. There is
4778
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4779 content that is critical of China, and --\*Mr. Weber. That is not what I am saying. Are you 4780 4781 aware of the reports citing that fact? \*Mr. Chew. Again, like I said, the fact is if you go 4782 onto our platform, you will find content that is critical of 4783 China. 4784 \*Mr. Weber. Well, we are going to talk about that. 4785 4786 Now, this committee is looking at reforming section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which has already been 4787 mentioned here today. Do you think that censoring history 4788 and -- historical facts and current events should be 4789 protected by section 230's good faith requirement? 4790 4791 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, that is a more complex topic. I would need to speak to my team and get back to you on the 4792 specifics. 4793 \*Mr. Weber. Is your team behind you? 4794 \*Mr. Chew. It is my broader team. I will speak to them 4795 4796 and I will get back to you. \*Mr. Weber. It is always good to have folks behind you, 4797 isn't it? 4798

\*Mr. Chew. Not them.

4799

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4800
           *Mr. Weber. Oh, no? Okay, I got you.
           Here are my concerns with TikTok. Your claims are hard
4801
4802
      to believe. It is no secret to us that TikTok is still under
      the thumb of CCP influence. And let's be honest, TikTok is
4803
      indoctrinating our children with divisive, woke, and pro-CCP
4804
      propaganda, all while threatening our national security with
4805
      Chinese spyware.
4806
4807
           In fact -- let me look at my notes here -- you had an
      exchange with Anna Eshoo. In your exchange with
4808
      Congresswoman Eshoo you said that "extreme fitness videos
4809
      shouldn't be viewed too much,' ' do you remember that exchange
4810
      here today?
4811
4812
           *Mr. Chew. What extremist videos?
           *Mr. Weber. With Anna Eshoo out of California.
4813
           *Mr. Chew. I -- any content that is -- has extremist
4814
      content --
4815
           *Mr. Weber. Okay.
4816
4817
           *Mr. Chew. -- is not allowed on our platform.
      be -- we identify them, and we --
4818
           *Mr. Weber. Was that also true about the gun video that
4819
      you saw today? Was that extreme content that should have
4820
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4821 been taken down? \*Mr. Chew. I would need to look at the specifics of the 4822 4823 whole video. There was a bit of lag just now. We couldn't see the whole video. 4824 \*Mr. Weber. Okay. You know it threatened our committee 4825 chair here? 4826 That is unacceptable. 4827 \*Mr. Chew. 4828 \*Mr. Weber. Okav. \*Mr. Chew. And, you know --4829 \*Mr. Weber. So you are aware of that extreme video. 4830 And why did it take 40-plus days to get it down? Does it 4831 take literally an act of Congress? Should we plan to have a 4832 committee hearing every time, every day, every time there is 4833 something brought up, so that we can limit the content on 4834 TikTok? Should Congress plan to do that, Mr. Chew? 4835 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, we work very hard to remove 4836 violative content on our platform. 4837 4838 \*Mr. Weber. Okay. Well, let me move on. Congressman Hudson, he asked you about your wages and your 4839 stocks, and you said you would prefer to keep that 4840 information private. Now you know how we feel about American 4841

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public's information. We prefer to keep it private, as well,
4842
      and we don't think TikTok does that.
4843
4844
           So, Madam Chair, my time is up. And if this committee
      gets its way, TikTok's time is up.
4845
           *Mr. Chew. Madam Chair, if I may --
4846
           *The Chair. The gentleman --
4847
           *Mr. Chew. -- in my response to an earlier question --
4848
4849
           *The Chair. The gentleman -- I am sorry, the
4850
      gentleman's time has expired, or -- yes, I - -the chair
      recognizes Mr. Ruiz from California for five minutes.
4851
           *Mr. Ruiz. Thank you, Chair Rodgers. I echo my
4852
      colleagues' concerns about TikTok's impacts on the health and
4853
      well-being of the American public.
4854
4855
           As a doctor and the ranking member of the Select
      Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, I am troubled that
4856
      TikTok is rife with medically inaccurate information,
4857
      including dangerous misinformation and the intentional
4858
      disinformation about COVID-19 and vaccines.
4859
      community quidelines state that the company will remove
4860
      content or accounts that involve "misleading information that
4861
      causes significant harm.' \ However, since the early stages
4862
```

4863 of the pandemic, TikTok has been used as a platform for people pushing misinformation, disinformation, including by 4864 4865 those casting doubt on the safety and efficacy of lifesaving 4866 vaccines. And despite TikTok's pledge to address harmful 4867 misinformation, these videos are being viewed millions of 4868 times. For example, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue 4869 4870 found that a sample of 124 TikTok videos containing vaccine misinformation were viewed 20 million times. And Media 4871 Matters found that a sample of 18 videos with COVID-19 4872 misinformation were viewed over 57 million times. 4873 Here is another shocking study: the Journal of American 4874 Medical Informatics Association found that, when searching 4875 "#coronavirus' on TikTok, almost 30 percent of the videos 4876 that came up contained misinformation. Videos in that sample 4877 containing a high level of misinformation were viewed a 4878 median of 9.4 million times. 4879 4880 Mr. Chew, what are these -- why are these dangerous videos falling through the cracks of your company's efforts 4881 to enforce its own community guidelines and remove harmful 4882 misinformation? 4883

```
4884
           *Mr. Chew.
                       Before I answer that, in my response to an
      earlier --
4885
4886
           *Mr. Ruiz.
                       No, no, you are --
                       -- question from Representative Dunn --
           *Mr. Chew.
4887
                       You are in my -- Mr. Chew you are in my
4888
           *Mr. Ruiz.
      time. Answer my question.
4889
           *Mr. Chew.
                        I understand. But if -- I would like to
4890
4891
      clarify something.
           *Mr. Ruiz. I have five minutes.
4892
           *Mr. Chew.
4893
                       Okay.
           *Mr. Ruiz.
                       In my time. You are in my time now. Answer
4894
      my question.
4895
           *Mr. Chew. Yes. Any dangerous misinformation is -- we
4896
      partner with third-party experts to be able to identify and
4897
      help us with subject domain expertise, and with the expertise
4898
      that we recognize we rely on those to develop policies that
4899
      recognize and remove content that could be --
4900
4901
           *Mr. Ruiz. Well, your efforts are -- have failed, and
      they are dangerous. Okay? It is public health risks that --
4902
      you are putting millions of people's lives at risk for not
4903
      being able to do a better job.
4904
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4905
           And I am concerned that TikTok's features make it --
      users uniquely vulnerable to the spread of this
4906
4907
      misinformation. For example, TikTok makes it extremely easy
      to reuse audio and videos to create content, which allows
4908
      misinformation to quickly spread through the platform and
4909
      TikTok's algorithm. To recommend videos means that a user
4910
      viewing one video containing misinformation can easily result
4911
4912
      in their For You page becoming filled with videos containing
      similar misinformation. This is a dangerous feedback loop.
4913
           So is TikTok taking any action to modify these features
4914
      so that they no longer facilitate the spread of this
4915
      misinformation or this misinformation feedback loop?
4916
4917
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, again, like I said, any
      dangerous mis or disinformation we work with third parties to
4918
      recognize that, and it is proactively removed from our
4919
      platform.
4920
           *Mr. Ruiz.
                       Okay, so --
4921
4922
           *Mr. Chew.
                        So it doesn't get into those loops at all.
                       So I can go back and read you the data and
4923
           *Mr. Ruiz.
      the Journal of American Medical Informatics: 30 percent of
4924
      videos after searching for #coronavirus had misinformation.
4925
```

4926 Like, almost one out of three. Your third party and your company are missing one -- almost one out of three 4927 4928 misinformed videos. So you are telling me what you are doing; I am telling you the data shows that you are grossly 4929 failing at that effort. 4930 The other thing, the other question I have for you is 4931 that TikTok is also in Spanish, and Spanish-speaking 4932 4933 populations have been specifically targeted to misinformation when it comes to many aspects, especially medical 4934 misinformation. And as chair of the Congressional Hispanic 4935 Caucus, we reached out to you last Congress on this issue. 4936 So what is your intent, or how does your team look like 4937 4938 to address Spanish versus English? How many staff do you have focusing on Spanish versus 4939 how many staff do you have focusing on English 4940 misinformation? 4941 Congressman, I was -- like I had explained \*Mr. Chew. 4942 4943 just now, the Spanish-speaking population is very important to our platform. We do have a lot of Spanish-speaking 4944 moderators, and we will continue to --4945 \*Mr. Ruiz. So how many Spanish-speaking staff versus 4946

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4947
      English-speaking staff for misinformation do you have?
           *Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on the specifics, but
4948
4949
      dangerous misinformation is moderated, regardless of
4950
      language.
           *Mr. Ruiz. Not to the degree that it needs to be.
4951
           *Mr. Chew.
                       We are -- we can continue to work hard to --
4952
           *Mr. Ruiz. And when there is misinformation, people
4953
4954
      base their decisions that often times put them at risk, and
      exposures, and their families at risk. And with the
4955
      coronavirus, especially prior to the vaccines, they -- the
4956
      risk was their life.
4957
4958
           Thank you, I yield back.
4959
           *Mr. Chew. Madam Chair, I would like to clarify
      something. In the follow-up question to Representative
4960
      Dunn's question just now, I misunderstood the follow-up about
4961
      ByteDance buying on behalf of the Chinese Government. My
4962
      answer to that question should be a no, because it came very
4963
4964
      rapidly. I just want to clarify that.
           *The Chair. The gentleman's time has expired.
4965
      gentleman -- or the chair, the chair recognizes the gentleman
4966
      from Idaho, Mr. Fulcher, for five minutes.
4967
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4968 \*Mr. Fulcher. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Chew, we have been going a long time here by now, 4969 4970 and a lot of questions have been answered, and a lot of them have not been answered. And the primary thing I want to do 4971 is just share some thoughts of what I have seen, learned 4972 today, been exposed to. 4973 First of all, I have got to compliment you on having a 4974 4975 product that is impressive. It is a very influential tool. 4976 It is addictive. And that is what you want users to be exposed to, something addictive. And it is a data-gathering 4977 masterpiece. So clearly, it has got the potential to sell 4978 products, connected like-minded people with that artificial 4979 intelligence capability in a viral, viral fashion, and 4980 perhaps spread information quicker, better than anything else 4981 that has been developed out there. 4982 Now, I am just going to tell you, I am not a subscriber, 4983 at least a willing subscriber. But probably in that database 4984 4985 somewhere is my preferences with colors, or foods, or who I have spoken to, or what I have said, my favorite newspapers, 4986 I don't know. But that is available to be sold or given to 4987 whomever or whatever. And the whatever is what bothers me. 4988

4989 And I will use myself as an example again. If for whatever reason I became a target in this, I became somebody 4990 4991 you didn't like -- and I know that would be hard to believe, because you have got to like me -- but let's say you didn't, 4992 or your company didn't. Or for whatever reason, I became an 4993 app target. That artificial intelligence algorithm could be 4994 shared or spread selectively to a targeted audience that --4995 4996 with negative information that maybe they -- has been paired up with that knowledge and that app to make me look really, 4997 really bad. Or to the converse, the same thing could be done 4998 to make me look really, really good. 4999 5000 Here is the problem. It is someone else or some 5001 artificial intelligence algorithm that has inordinate power to subjectively combine strategic data with strategic 5002 audiences to shape whatever thoughts and news they want. 5003 I have equipped it, not even knowing it. And that process 5004 could apply to anyone or anything. There is the danger. 5005 5006 could be the President of the United States, it could be their kids, it could be a company, it could be a political 5007 party, it could be a news outlet. Anything could be targeted 5008 for that selective viral spread of just some information. 5009

5010 Mr. Chew, this may be genius, but that doesn't make it fair, it doesn't make it good, and it doesn't make it 5011 5012 accountable. I wouldn't want my government to have that ability. I wouldn't want a company or a political party or 5013 my friend August here, or my mother to have that capability. 5014 And I certainly don't want that to be accessible to anyone in 5015 5016 China. 5017 Now, there is no question it has got immense value. And as proof that, you are here, because this hasn't been a fun 5018 day. I know that. It hasn't been a fun day for us, either. 5019 Artificial intelligence is difficult to manage once it 5020 is on auto cruise control. And it is, as we have talked 5021 5022 about, nearly impossible to wall off data. I know the idea, I know a little bit about databases, I know a little bit 5023 about corruption of those databases. It is very difficult to 5024 wall things off. 5025 And unfortunately, there is this thing called human 5026 5027 nature, where there is some dark components from time to There is always a temptation to monetize things, or 5028 perhaps use some of these tools for nefarious purposes, and 5029 they can have absolutely devastating consequences. 5030

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5031
           So, Mr. Chew, I am going to wrap up my comments and just
      say that this is so attractive. TikTok poses as a Mr.
5032
      Rogers' neighborhood, but it acts like Big Brother. And that
5033
      has got to stop.
5034
           Madam Chair, I yield back.
5035
           *Mr. Griffith. Will the gentleman yield?
5036
           *The Chair. The gentleman yields back. Oh --
5037
5038
           *Mr. Griffith. Will the gentleman yield?
           *Mr. Fulcher. The gentleman yields.
5039
           *The Chair. I yield to Mr. Morgan Griffith.
5040
           *Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
5041
           Mr. Chew, earlier we had submitted into evidence the
5042
5043
      TikTok, ByteDance, and their ties to the Chinese Communist
      Party report that was filed as an exhibit last week with the
5044
      Senate in Australia.
5045
           If you have any comment, I would like to get it on this
5046
      paragraph out of their summary: "Our research confirms
5047
5048
      beyond any plausible doubt that TikTok is owned by ByteDance.
      ByteDance is a PRC company, and ByteDance is subject to all
5049
      the influence, guidance, and de facto control to which the
5050
      Chinese Communist Party now subjects all PRC technology
5051
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5052
      companies. We show' ' -- in this report -- "how the CCP and
      the PRC state agencies together, ' ' the party state, "have
5053
5054
      extended their ties into ByteDance to the point that the
      company can no longer be accurately described as a private
5055
      enterprise.' \
5056
           You keep calling it a private enterprise, but all the
5057
      countries in the world are saying it is not a private
5058
5059
      enterprise, it is part of the Chinese Communist Party. What
      say you, sir? Yes or no, is it part of the Chinese Communist
5060
      Party, as everybody thinks, or are you still living in some
5061
      mystical world?
5062
           *Mr. Chew. I disagree with many conclusions --
5063
           *Mr. Griffith. So you are living in the mystical world.
5064
5065
           I yield back.
           *The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair
5066
      recognizes Ms. -- the lady -- gentlelady from Minnesota, Ms.
5067
      Craig, for five minutes.
5068
5069
           *Ms. Craig. Well, thank you so much, Madam Chair, for
5070
      yielding.
           Mr. Chew, I am probably like a lot of parents who are
5071
      also Members of Congress out here. I know a number of us --
5072
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5073 when you testified earlier today, you mentioned that the over-35 segment was a growing group of potential users, as if 5074 5075 over 35 is old. And I realize that my own children think that I am ancient, our four boys. 5076 But like a lot of us up here, we understand that there 5077 is some potential good. And of course, many of your 5078 influencers are doing what they are doing for all the right 5079 5080 reasons. But one thing in your testimony you said a lot was "safety.' ' But as a mother, and as a Member of Congress, and 5081 as someone who is very concerned about drug use in our 5082 country, I was surprised that that didn't come up once in 5083 your testimony. No real reference to it here today. You 5084 5085 know, I have raised my concerns in general about social media platforms serving as an illegal marketplace for drugs in 5086 prior Big Tech hearings. And I plan to continue that focus 5087 during today's hearing. 5088 Mr. Chew, a March 8th, 2023 article in the Washington 5089 5090 Post detailed the fact that TikTok has made little progress in combating the sale of illegal drugs on your platform. 5091 fact, Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser said that getting 5092 drugs on platforms like yours was nearly as convenient as 5093

5094 using a phone to order a pizza or call an Uber. That same article mentions that law enforcement agencies have been 5095 5096 frustrated by TikTok's lack of competition in the form of data sharing. 5097 In my view, TikTok has taken little action in response 5098 to this crisis. According to a May 2022 blog post from 5099 TikTok, you donated \$125,000 or 0.001 percent of your 2022 5100 5101 revenue to an anti-drug effort on your platform in the form of ad credits. You also redirected #drugs, #fentanyl, and 5102 other obvious hashtags away from posts selling drugs to a 5103 community resources page, as if a teenager looking for drugs 5104 is going to look for them at #drugs. 5105 5106 Drug dealers have easily worked their way around this, using emojis and slang to communicate that they have drugs 5107 for sale. To this day it is possible for anyone to log into 5108 your platform and acquire drugs, and the consequences of that 5109 can be fatal. 5110 5111 What are you doing to move past these token efforts to prevent teenagers from accessing drugs on your platform? 5112 Look, as parents up here today we not -- we may not 5113 understand everything about your platform. I am not a tech 5114

```
5115
      quru. Many of us up here may not use exactly the right
      language, but we know when our kids are at risk. And our
5116
5117
      kids are at risk on your platform. So what are you going to
      do to move past these previous token efforts?
5118
           *Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, we do take illegal drugs
5119
      content on our platform very seriously. It violates our
5120
      quidelines. We proactively identify and remove them. And as
5121
5122
      you pointed out, if anybody searches for any drugs on our
5123
      platform, we do point them to resources to help them with
5124
      that.
           At the same time, we have also taken product changes.
5125
      Like, for example, we don't allow our under-16 users to use
5126
5127
      the right messaging. And the reason is because, you know, we
      wanted to -- that was a trade-off here. And we believe that,
5128
      you know, it will protect these younger users better from
5129
      getting contacts from people trying to push illegal activity.
5130
           So we will continue to work on it. Again, no company
5131
5132
      can be perfect at this. We are not saying we are --
           *Ms. Craig. Mr. Chew, I -- with all due respect, the
5133
      "no company can be perfect' \ line has been used way too much
5134
      today.
5135
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5136
           I am going to reclaim my time. You know, clearly, in
      the three-plus hours you have been before us today, what you
5137
5138
      are saying about Project Texas just doesn't pass the smell
      test. My constituents are concerned that TikTok and the
5139
      Chinese Communist Party are controlling their data and seeing
5140
      our own vulnerabilities.
5141
           If you are an American company, we could look at your
5142
5143
      10-K, we could see who your shareholders are. The answer you
      provided earlier today, you would rather not tell us what
5144
      your compensation is, or how it is derived? Well, no
5145
      American CEO would like to tell us that, but they have to,
5146
5147
      because they are an American company. So what you are doing
5148
      down in Texas, it is all well and good, but it is not enough
      for us to be convinced that our privacy is not at risk.
5149
           So how can you say that you are protecting American
5150
      users' privacy with the CCP being so heavily involved with
5151
      ByteDance? It is not possible. China won't even carry your
5152
5153
      product. How is it that you can convince us that our privacy
      is not at risk and, more than that, our kids' privacy is not
5154
      at risk in this country?
5155
           *Mr. Chew. In my opening statement --
5156
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5157
           *The Chair. The gentlelady's time has expired.
           *Ms. Craig. Thank you, Madam Chair.
5158
5159
           *The Chair.
                        The gentlelady's time has expired. We are
      going to have to continue on. The gentleman from Georgia,
5160
      Mr. Allen, is recognized for five minutes.
5161
           *Mr. Allen.
                        Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr.
5162
      Chew, for being here today.
5163
5164
           In September 2021 the Wall Street Journal published an
      article titled, "How TikTok Serves Up Sex and Drug Videos to
5165
      Minors.' This article gives a chilling depiction of the
5166
      types of content that TikTok's algorithm is curating for our
5167
                 This article claims that your application served
5168
5169
      an account that was registered as a 13-year-old "videos about
      drug use' referenced -- it referenced to cocaine and meth
5170
      addiction, and promotional videos for online sales of drugs.
5171
           The algorithm was also found to have delivered countless
5172
      videos depicting "pornography and other adult content' ' to
5173
5174
      the device of an account that was registered as a 13-year-
5175
      old.
           Could you please explain to the members of this
5176
      committee and parents across the country why your company
5177
```

5178 deems it acceptable for such inappropriate content to be prominently featured on a child's For You page? 5179 5180 \*Mr. Chew. The -- a lot of the content that you mentioned, Congressman, are violative of our own policies. 5181 And we don't think they are acceptable, and we remove them 5182 when we identify them. We take this very seriously. 5183 mentioned this. 5184 This is an industry-wide challenge. We are investing as 5185 much as we can. We don't think it represents the majority of 5186 the users' experience on TikTok, but it does happen. 5187 bad actors try and come in and post some of this content, and 5188 we are doing our best to invest as much as we can to remove 5189 5190 them. \*Mr. Allen. Well, I would say you are not doing enough. 5191 I have 14 grandchildren, Mr. Chew. Do you personally 5192 believe that such content is appropriate for minor children 5193 to consume? 5194 5195 \*Mr. Chew. A lot of the content that you mentioned, like porn, for example, is not allowed on our platform. So 5196 no, I do not think they are acceptable for young people to 5197 5198 consume.

5199 \*Mr. Allen. Earlier this week the Wall Street Journal published an article titled, "TikTok's Chinese Partner Has 5200 5201 Another Wildly Popular App in the U.S.' This app is called It is a video editing tool to help users go viral on 5202 TikTok. While for obvious reasons most of our attention is 5203 focused on TikTok and ByteDance, other companies and their 5204 applications are also continuing to exploit the privacy of 5205 5206 Americans. TikTok, Capcut, Lark, FaceU, all of these apps are also controlled by ByteDance, and pose serious privacy 5207 5208 concerns. In 2022 it was reported that TopBuzz, an international 5209 version of ByteDance-censored Chinese news app was used to 5210 spread pro-China messages to Americans. When it comes to the 5211 data privacy of Americans, we must have a clear set of 5212 guidelines to ensure Americans' data is protected and not 5213 passed along to unknown third-party actors who could pose a 5214 threat to our security. 5215 5216 I urge my colleagues to continue to work together to pass a national data privacy bill, not just one out of the 5217 House Energy and Commerce Committee, but also through the 5218 House of this Congress. It is the only systematic way we can 5219

5220 address privacy concerns. Unfortunately, I have been given no reason to believe that TikTok does not pose a threat, and 5221 5222 cannot be trusted to follow our laws when they conflict with 5223 the desires of the Chinese Communist Party. Your firewall that you are talking about, if you had a 5224 bad actor in your -- what you call your Texas initiative --5225 could get through that firewall and send any information that 5226 5227 they wanted to send anywhere direct to the -- into -directly to the Chinese Communist Party, would you deny that? 5228 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, this risk that you talk about 5229 exists for every company. Bad actors --5230 \*Mr. Allen. I am talking about TikTok, sir. 5231 \*Mr. Chew. In fact, the risk is lower for us, because 5232 5233 these --\*Mr. Allen. It is a risk, correct? 5234 The personnel will be vetted. \*Mr. Chew. 5235 \*Mr. Allen. Yes. 5236 5237 \*Mr. Chew. So the risk is actually lower than most companies in the industry. 5238 \*Mr. Allen. Well, that is why we have to deal with your 5239 5240 company.

5241 And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back. \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The chair 5242 5243 recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Peters, for five minutes. 5244 Thank you, Madam Chair. 5245 \*Mr. Peters. Mr. Chew, thanks for being here today. You know, your 5246 testimony discusses an effort your company has named Project 5247 5248 Texas, and the investments your company has made in creating a firewall between the United States user data and entities 5249 in China susceptible to influence by China's government. 5250 And with your company's recent announcement by CFIUS --5251 that CFIUS has instructed TikTok to separate itself from 5252 5253 ByteDance or face a ban, TikTok's commitment to retaining this firewall is at a crossroads. So I want to ask you some 5254 questions about your company's long-term plans to ensure the 5255 safety and security of American data. And this, for me, is 5256 the crux of the concern for me about TikTok. 5257 5258 First of all, does the Chinese Government need to approve Project Texas for TikTok to agree to it? 5259 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, we have designed Project Texas 5260 to move forward in the United States. This is something that 5261

5262 we have described at length in the written testimony and in my opening statement: the firewall of American data stored 5263 5264 on American soil by an American company overseen by American personnel. This is designed to move forward in the United 5265 5266 States. \*Mr. Peters. But does the Chinese Government need to 5267 approve Project Texas for you to agree to it? 5268 5269 \*Mr. Chew. We do not believe so. \*Mr. Peters. How is TikTok considering the future of 5270 Project Texas in the event of a sale or other ownership 5271 5272 changes? Are there elements of the Project Texas that TikTok 5273 would change prior to, or --5274 \*Mr. Chew. I cannot speak on this hypothetical or on, 5275 you know, on potential, you know, owners who would -- I 5276 cannot represent. 5277 \*Mr. Peters. Okay. You don't know. 5278 5279 \*Mr. Chew. I don't know, yes. \*Mr. Peters. Despite Project Texas's planned positive 5280 changes, it does include several broad exceptions that would 5281

allow large amounts of U.S. user data to routinely leave the

5282

country. I want to know a little bit more about these 5283 exceptions so I can understand whether Project Texas can live 5284 5285 to -- live up to its promise of protecting Americans' user 5286 data. I understand that, under Project Texas, business data 5287 and public data will be permitted to regularly leave the 5288 United States. Is that correct? 5289 5290 \*Mr. Chew. Almost all the data is under the -- that is 5291 not public is under the definition of protected data. accepted data that you mentioned -- I can get back to your 5292 team on this -- is really for interoperability purposes, to 5293 5294 make sure that the business can still operate and American 5295 users are still getting the benefit --5296 \*Mr. Peters. Can you tell us what data -- where the data goes, and how it is used by the company? 5297 \*Mr. Chew. It will travel outside of the United States, 5298 but I can get back to you on the specifics. 5299 5300 \*Mr. Peters. Okav. \*Mr. Chew. It is data that doesn't -- it cannot be used 5301 to identify users, you know, so it really is data that 5302 ensures the interoperability of the platform. 5303

5304 \*Mr. Peters. And I understand that. I think we would want to have some understanding of how we would distinguish 5305 5306 that by definition, and then also how it would be enforced. \*Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on those specifics. 5307 \*Mr. Peters. How is the U.S. data used to promote 5308 certain content back in the United States market, for 5309 instance? 5310 5311 \*Mr. Chew. I am sorry? \*Mr. Peters. So what -- you have -- U.S. data feed the 5312 -- all right. 5313 How -- when you discuss where the data goes and how it 5314 is used by the company, how and at what points of data 5315 transfer does the U.S. data feed the PRC-developed algorithm 5316 5317 used by TikTok? How would the data that you are talking about --5318 \*Mr. Chew. We -- TikTok does not -- is not available in 5319 mainland China. 5320 5321 \*Mr. Peters. The PRC-developed algorithm used by TikTok, how does U.S. data get fed by that? 5322 \*Mr. Chew. The U.S. -- the algorithm that leads to the 5323 U.S. app is in the Oracle Cloud infrastructure, and is 5324

5325 trained by U.S. and global data. Again, TikTok does not -is not available in mainland China. 5326 5327 \*Mr. Peters. How can we trust that these exceptions for Project Texas won't be used abused by China's government or 5328 by foreign adversaries? 5329 \*Mr. Chew. We can -- we -- this is the fourth 5330 commitment, transparency, third-party monitors, including the 5331 5332 definitions of these exceptions. And, you know, we can be very transparent on how they are used. 5333 \*Mr. Peters. Okay. I guess my guestion will be, then 5334 -- and if you want to get back to me in writing, that is 5335 fine, but how we would distinguish between the data for 5336 5337 interoperability that you suggest needs to be shared with what data wouldn't be shared. 5338 \*Mr. Chew. It is -- again, you know, it is -- first of 5339 all, public data is not part of the protected data 5340 definition, because public data is what users want to share 5341 5342 globally. So if you post a video, and you want someone in France to see it, just by definition it has to leave the 5343 United States. Otherwise, the world cannot see it. 5344 Now, there are certain aggregated and anonymized data 5345

sets that is useful for interoperability, for advertising, 5346 for example. 5347 5348 \*Mr. Peters. Right. \*Mr. Chew. And that is part of what we are talking 5349 5350 about. \*Mr. Peters. Right. 5351 \*Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on the specifics, 5352 5353 but --\*Mr. Peters. I think we would also want to know how it 5354 is anonymized, and how -- what oversight and enforcement we 5355 5356 can count on. \*Mr. Chew. Okay, I can get back to you on specifics. 5357 \*Mr. Peters. Thank you. 5358 5359 I yield back. \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman 5360 from Texas, Mr. Pfluger, is recognized for five minutes. 5361 \*Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Madam Chair. 5362 5363 Mr. Chew, I got to hand it to you. You have actually done something that in the last three to four years has not 5364 happened, except for the exception of maybe Vladimir Putin: 5365

you have unified Republicans and Democrats. And if only for

5366

5367 a day, we are actually unified because we have serious concerns. 5368 5369 Do you -- does TikTok support good? I mean, is TikTok a platform for good? Just yes or no. 5370 \*Mr. Chew. I believe, yes. 5371 \*Mr. Pfluger. Okay. Does TikTok support freedom of 5372 speech? 5373 5374 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. It is one of the commitments I have given this committee. 5375 \*Mr. Pfluger. Do you personally support the First 5376 Amendment? 5377 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am here to talk about --5378 \*Mr. Pfluger. As the CEO of TikTok. 5379 \*Mr. Chew. I am here to talk about TikTok. 5380 \*Mr. Pfluger. As the CEO of TikTok, do you support 5381 the --5382 \*Mr. Chew. TikTok supports freedom of --5383 5384 \*Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. Does TikTok support genocide? \*Mr. Chew. Again, Congressman, I am here to talk about 5385 5386 TikTok.

\*Mr. Pfluger. Does TikTok support genocide? Does

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5388
      TikTok --
           *Mr. Chew. No, but --
5389
5390
           *Mr. Pfluger. Okay.
           *Mr. Chew. But --
5391
            *Mr. Pfluger. So -- reclaiming my time, I am going to
5392
      go to a video now, and it is from Enes Kanter Freedom. And I
5393
      would like you to see Enes Kanter Freedom, who has spent his
5394
5395
      entire career post-NBA fighting against human rights
      violations within the Chinese Communist Party.
5396
           Go ahead and play this video, which highlights a
5397
      situation that allegedly shows some human rights violations
5398
      inside China. Please play.
5399
5400
           [Video shown.]
           *Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Chew, this was a video that was
5401
      posted on TikTok by Enes Kanter Freedom. Are you familiar
5402
      with this basketball player?
5403
            *Mr. Chew. I am not familiar with the specifics of
5404
5405
      this --
5406
            *Mr. Pfluger. Are you --
            *Mr. Chew. -- but I can tell you that --
5407
           *Mr. Pfluger. Are you familiar with the player Enes
5408
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5409
      Kanter Freedom?
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am not --
5410
5411
           *Mr. Pfluger.
                          Okay.
           *Mr. Chew. -- familiar with this. You have -- you just
5412
      have to open TikTok and just search for this kind of content.
5413
           *Mr. Pfluger. Okay.
5414
           *Mr. Chew. It really exists.
5415
5416
           *Mr. Pfluger. I have read the moderation policy. Let
      me just quote what -- you have talked about content
5417
      moderation. TikTok has a moderation policy. Yes?
5418
           *Mr. Chew. We do have community guidelines that --
5419
           *Mr. Pfluger. One of the guidelines says, "material
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5421
      that in the sole judgment of TikTok is objectionable.' \ Is
      this an example banning Enes Kanter Freedom? Is that an
5422
      example of objectionable material inside the Chinese
5423
      Communist Party in mainland China?
5424
           *Mr. Chew. We do not take down content simply because
5425
5426
      it is critical of China.
           *Mr. Pfluger. He was banned one week after this video.
5427
           *Mr. Chew. We do not do that. And I can check about
5428
      the specific --
5429
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- 5430 \*Mr. Pfluger. If you need a note, go ahead. \*Mr. Chew. The note says he is not banned. 5431 5432 \*Mr. Pfluger. His account was taken off one week after. \*Mr. Chew. Well, we can check on the specifics. 5433 \*Mr. Pfluger. We can check. 5434 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. 5435 \*Mr. Pfluger. So let's get to some other questions. 5436 5437 Thank you for the slide. Your privacy policy states that you collect a great 5438 array of data: keystroke patterns, app file names and types, 5439 sometimes approximate location, GPS location. Are keystroke 5440 patterns and rhythms part of TikTok gathering -- the data 5441 5442 that is gathered by TikTok? \*Mr. Chew. If you are talking, Congressman, 5443 specifically about keystrokes, you know, keystrokes, we do 5444 not engage in keystroke logging to monitor what the users 5445 say. It is to identify bots. 5446 5447 \*Mr. Pfluger. Okav. \*Mr. Chew. It is for security purposes. And this is a 5448 standard industry practice. 5449
  - \*Mr. Pfluger. You gather a lot of data, it is safe to

5450

5451 say. \*Mr. Chew. We don't gather -- we don't believe we 5452 5453 gather more than any other social media company. \*Mr. Pfluger. TikTok gathers a lot of data, because 5454 your value proposition, as you sat in my office and told me, 5455 was to connect people to each other around the world. You 5456 told me this in my office. So you gather data on what they 5457 5458 like and what they don't like, and then you show them things that they don't know they like, but eventually they may. You 5459 5460 told me this. I think that is -- I don't think that is 5461 \*Mr. Chew. 5462 what I said. What I said is that we connect people together, 5463 yes. \*Mr. Pfluger. Reclaiming --5464 \*Mr. Chew. And that doesn't mean that we collect more 5465 data --5466 \*Mr. Pfluger. Are you aware of any instances of TikTok 5467 5468 distributing content from Chinese state media? \*Mr. Chew. I am sorry? 5469 \*Mr. Pfluger. Are you aware of any instances of TikTok 5470 distributing content from Chinese state media on the 5471

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5472
      platform?
           *Mr. Chew. We will label them clearly to -- for our
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5474
      users to understand that.
           *Mr. Pfluger. Do you disagree with FBI Director Wray
5475
      and NSA Director Nakasone when they said that the CCP could
5476
      have the capability to manipulate data and send it to the
5477
      United States? Do you disagree with their statement?
5478
5479
           *Mr. Chew. Their statement says "could.' \
           *Mr. Pfluger. So do you disagree with that?
5480
           *Mr. Chew. No, I don't disagree with that.
5481
           *Mr. Pfluger. Okay. So it is possible that the CCP,
5482
      under the auspices of ByteDance, which is your parent
5483
      company, which you get paid from, has the ability to
5484
      manipulate content that is being shared with 130 million
5485
      Americans. Yes?
5486
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, I just want to make sure I am
5487
      understanding all these questions.
5488
5489
           I don't disagree with them, that there are data risks in
                That is what I meant.
5490
      general.
           *Mr. Pfluger.
                          There is a big data risk, because --
5491
           *Mr. Chew. But on us, specifically --
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5493 \*Mr. Pfluger. Are there engineers located inside mainland China that work on TikTok? Not Douyin, but TikTok. 5494 5495 \*Mr. Chew. We are not the only company that has that. \*Mr. Pfluger. Are there engineers inside mainland China 5496 currently working on the algorithm for TikTok --5497 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, like I said --5498 \*Mr. Pfluger. -- as you told me in my office. 5499 5500 \*Mr. Chew. There are other companies that -- as I told you in your office, there are other companies that --5501 \*Mr. Pfluger. I am going to reclaim my time. 5502 Please rename your project. Texas is not the 5503 5504 appropriate name. We stand for freedom and transparency, and 5505 we don't want your project. 5506 I yield back. \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady 5507 from Tennessee is recognized for five minutes, Mrs. 5508 Harshbarger. 5509 5510 \*Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank 5511 you, Mr. Chew, for being here today. Both President Trump and now President Biden have backed 5512 forcing TikTok to sell to an American company. However, the 5513

5514 Chinese Communist Party has put export controls on algorithms ByteDance owns that power TikTok. And of course, this has 5515 5516 created a gauntlet of regulatory hurdles in China and the U.S. that prevented the sale of TikTok. 5517 Now, as a longtime business owner, I want to tell you, 5518 Mr. Chew, that waiting until your hands are forced will only 5519 drive down the price of your app. And right now, both your 5520 5521 hands are tied, and you are going to have to make a decision about whether you choose freedom from the CCP or you continue 5522 to be an agent of the CCP. 5523 And I will tell you why I say it that way. As a former 5524 member of Homeland Security, I point blank asked FBI Director 5525 Wray, "Is TikTok a national security threat?' ' 5526 And without hesitation, sir, he looked at me and said, 5527 "Yes, Congresswoman, it is." 5528 Now, how much data is ByteDance collecting through 5529 TikTok that is worth continuing to fight this regulatory 5530 5531 gauntlet? You know, why not take the money and run like any 5532 other company would do? \*Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, we built Project Texas in 5533 order to safequard, and we listened to the concerns that have 5534

5535 been raised, and we are building something that is unprecedented, that no other company is offering to protect 5536 5537 U.S. user interests. And we believe it is rigorous and robust. And, you know, we are even offering third-party 5538 transparency and monitors to come in to verify this. 5539 Frankly, I haven't heard any good reason why this 5540 doesn't work. I have heard a lot of rhetoric around this, 5541 5542 but I haven't heard a good reason why it doesn't work. \*Mrs. Harshbarger. Well --5543 \*Mr. Chew. I look forward to these conversations, by 5544 the way, with you. 5545 \*Mrs. Harshbarger. Absolutely. Well, let me go down 5546 5547 this road. When TikTok was unveiled to the public, its business 5548 model was solely based on generating revenue from 5549 advertising. Of course, ByteDance operated a separate app 5550 called Douyin for the Chinese marketplace. TikTok is 5551 5552 embarking on becoming a so-called super app. In other words, it is a one stop shop with everything you do, as 5553 Representative Fulcher said. 5554 It is reported that TikTok's algorithms are so powerful 5555

5556 that owner ByteDance has begun to license it to other companies. TikTok's recommendation engine drives usage on 5557 5558 the platform, and this leads to promises of quick exposure and fame that leads to even more people joining. And when 5559 you sign up, TikTok starts collecting data about you, your 5560 location, your gender, your age, your facial data. The user 5561 never gets to the end of the content. And that is by design. 5562 5563 And obviously, that makes you a lot of money. Now, I know that the Chinese Communist Party is 5564 preventing ByteDance from selling TikTok due to export 5565 restrictions on the technology. And this causes me to 5566 5567 question how are you going to power TikTok with your Oracle servers located in the U.S. with that Texas Project with 5568 ByteDance technology, if it can't leave China? How is that 5569 going to happen? I just want you to explain how it is going 5570 to happen. 5571 Congresswoman, the way that we design this 5572 5573 is so that any piece of software that is impactful to the code, that enters, you know, that -- some technical details 5574 around this will be reviewed by a third party or a few third-5575 party monitors, just to make sure that we are all comfortable 5576

5577 with the code. I want to say this again. I don't know of any other 5578 5579 company in my industry who is offering this level of 5580 transparency. \*Mrs. Harshbarger. Well, why are there two different 5581 versions of apps, one in China and one in the United States? 5582 \*Mr. Chew. It is just a different business. 5583 5584 \*Mrs. Harshbarger. Well, I think we all know the reason that the Chinese get a different version, because ByteDance 5585 puts China first and America last. 5586 And, you know, TikTok has -- with everything we have 5587 heard today, sir, when you see 13-year-olds, 16-year-olds, 5588 5589 you see the degradation that is happening to our youth and our society, you know, it is deceptive, and it is destructive 5590 comment, and it is comments, and the worst thing is that it 5591 is deliberate, sir. And that is not acceptable. 5592 And with that, Chairwoman, I yield back. 5593 5594 \*The Chair. The gentlelady yields back. The gentlelady from Iowa, Mrs. Miller-Meeks, is recognized for five minutes. 5595 \*Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I would 5596 just like to thank our witness, Mr. Chew. Having been in the 5597

- 5598 hot seat, so to speak, before, when I was in state Senate, I
- 5599 know how challenging this can be.
- And thank you for your demeanor throughout all of this.
- But certainly, as you can see, in a bipartisan way we have
- 5602 concerns, and those concerns are valid.
- And this is a yes-or-no question. Does TikTok track
- 5604 users' individual keystrokes?
- 5605 \*Mr. Chew. Only for security purposes, for -- like, for
- 5606 example, like detecting bots. But we don't monitor what
- users say.
- \*Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So the only purpose that you would
- 5609 monitor keystrokes is for security purposes.
- \*Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on more specifics, but
- this is not unlike what many other companies in the industry
- 5612 does.
- 5613 \*Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So the keystroke monitoring does
- 5614 not go beyond what common industry practice in comparison to
- 5615 platforms like Facebook or Instagram use.
- 5616 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, I believe so.
- \*Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Okay. And does TikTok keep records
- of users' credit cards and passwords?

5619 \*Mr. Chew. I am not aware of that. You don't need that to log in. Of course, I can get back to you on specifics if 5620 5621 you make a transaction on an e-commerce platform. But regardless, all that U.S. data will be stored within 5622 the Project Texas firewall, you know, within the Oracle Cloud 5623 infrastructure, and overseen by American personnel. 5624 \*Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So you would store credit card and 5625 5626 password information? 5627 \*Mr. Chew. I need to check on the specifics. We are launching a pilot e-commerce plan, and we are making sure 5628 that the data is very secure within the Oracle Cloud 5629 5630 infrastructure. \*Mrs. Miller-Meeks. I think you have made a point of 5631 saying that your platform is not different than other 5632 platforms on social media and, therefore, are no more 5633 responsible than Facebook or Instagram or Twitter or the 5634 other social media platforms. 5635 5636 The concern, however, comes with where the technology is generated, and whom it is owned by. And in the case of other 5637 companies, it is generated in the U.S., under U.S. 5638 quidelines, under U.S. privacy laws with certain parameters, 5639

5640 versus generated through a parent company, ByteDance, which, as we know, is susceptible to the laws of the Chinese 5641 5642 Communist Party, which has access to all of that data and information. 5643 And I understand that TikTok has just reinstated Enes 5644 Kanter's account recently. 5645 So our concern, and the question I have for you, is why 5646 5647 would China or the Chinese Communist Party be opposed to a forced sale of TikTok? 5648 \*Mr. Chew. I cannot speak on behalf of the Chinese 5649 5650 Government. I can say that we designed Project Texas to take it 5651 5652 forward here in the United States. And again, I believe it offers unprecedented protection for U.S. user data. 5653 \*Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, I think the problem is when 5654 there is a lack of transparency, then that leads people to 5655 believe that there is something more nefarious, and that 5656 5657 there is in fact data that is captured, is stored, and poses a risk not only to children in the United States, but also 5658 poses a risk to national security. 5659 With that, I yield the rest of my time to my colleague, 5660

- Jay Obernolte.
- \*Mr. Obernolte. I thank the gentlelady from Iowa for
- 5663 yielding.
- Mr. Chew, I would like to continue our discussion about
- 5665 Project Texas, and the technical details about what you are
- 5666 proposing to do. So you are migrating all storage of U.S.
- user data to the Oracle Cloud infrastructure, and you think
- that that will be done by the end of the year. Was that
- 5669 right?
- \*Mr. Chew. Again, I can get back to you on the
- 5671 technical parts of it, the migration. Today, by default, all
- 5672 U.S. -- new U.S. data is stored, by default --
- \*Mr. Obernolte. Sir, I am just using what you have said
- in your testimony in your opening here. So --
- 5675 \*Mr. Chew. It is stored there by default. What I said
- 5676 in my testimony is I am deleting legacy data.
- \*Mr. Obernolte. I see, okay.
- 5678 \*Mr. Chew. This is Virginia and Singapore. That is the
- 5679 difference.
- \*Mr. Obernolte. So who -- when this migration is
- 5681 complete, who will have access to that data?

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5682
           *Mr. Chew. Right now a team called TikTok U.S. Data
      Security, led by American personnel, they have access to
5683
5684
      that. We have begun these operations already.
           *Mr. Obernolte. Okay, but the app itself has access to
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5686
      the data, correct?
           *Mr. Chew. Only through them. Any employees that have
5687
      the data --
5688
5689
           *Mr. Obernolte. Oh, no. What I mean is, like, if I
      lose my iPhone and I reinstall the app, and I put in my
5690
      username and password, my app will reconnect to the
5691
      mothership and download some of that data, my settings --
5692
           *Mr. Chew. That is not the way it works, no.
5693
           *Mr. Obernolte. It is not?
5694
5695
           *Mr. Chew. That is not the way it works. It will go
      through the Oracle Cloud infrastructure, and that team --
5696
           *Mr. Obernolte. No, no. Yes, I realize that. So let
5697
      me ask you this: What would prevent them, someone with
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5699
      detailed technical knowledge of the way the app is
      constructed, from creating an almost identical version of the
5700
      app that could also access that data?
5701
           *Mr. Chew. That is -- we are giving you third-party
5702
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5703
      monitors and transparency --
           *Mr. Obernolte. Yes, but they are monitoring the source
5704
      code for your app. I mean, ByteDance, these engineers, have
5705
      been working on this app for years. What would prevent them
5706
      from making an app that could also access that data?
5707
           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, I think we are going into the
5708
      area where, you know, what if there is a hacker, what if
5709
5710
      there is this.
           *Mr. Obernolte. Okay.
5711
           *Mr. Chew. You know, this is a common industry problem,
5712
5713
      as you know.
           *Mr. Obernolte. Yes. But, well, I mean, it is just --
5714
5715
      I see my time is expired. It illustrates the point --
           *The Chair. Okay --
5716
           *Mr. Obernolte. -- I am just skeptical that you are
5717
      technically able to do --
5718
           *The Chair. The gentleman's time has expired.
5719
5720
           *Mr. Obernolte. -- what you promised.
           *The Chair. The gentlelady's time has expired.
5721
           Mr. Chew, I recognize that we have run over. I
5722
      appreciate your time. We have just a few members left, and
5723
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- $\,$  5724  $\,$  would appreciate the chance for them to get to answer -- or
- ask their five minutes' worth of questions.
- 5726 The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, is recognized
- 5727 for five minutes.
- \*Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
- 5729 Mr. Chew, you share legal counsel lawyers with
- 5730 ByteDance, yes or no?
- 5731 \*Mr. Chew. Yes, we do.
- \*Mr. Griffith. And you testified that you prepared
- 5733 extensively with your legal team for this hearing, yes or no?
- \*Mr. Chew. With my team in D.C., including the --
- \*Mr. Griffith. Including some of your legal counsel.
- 5736 \*Mr. Chew. Yes.
- 5737 \*Mr. Griffith. Right. And did they tell you about the
- 5738 report to the Australian Senate of March 14th that I
- 5739 referenced earlier? Did they tell you that that report was
- 5740 out there? Yes or no.
- 5741 \*Mr. Chew. I cannot recall how I found out about the
- 5742 report.
- 5743 \*Mr. Griffith. But you know about the report. Okay.
- \*Mr. Chew. I can check, and -- yes.

5745 \*Mr. Griffith. And did they tell you to favorably cite the Citizens Lab in your written testimony today, yes or no? 5746 5747 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I need to get back to you on specifics --5748 \*Mr. Griffith. They helped you with the preparation of 5749 your written statement, though, didn't they? 5750 \*Mr. Chew. A team prepares, yes. 5751 5752 \*Mr. Griffith. Yes. And did they tell you that the director of Citizen Labs says he has called out your company 5753 for misrepresenting their report repeatedly, and has -- and 5754 did so as late as yesterday? Did they tell you about that? 5755 5756 Yes or no. 5757 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, the Citizen Lab is saying they cannot prove a negative, which is what I have been trying to 5758 do for the last four hours. 5759 \*Mr. Griffith. All right. But you cited it favorably 5760 as saying that it did positive things for you. 5761 5762 That being said, let me ask you this. You keep talking about transparency, but you haven't been transparent with us 5763 here today. You were asked earlier by Mr. Hudson if you own 5764 stock in ByteDance. You said you didn't want to reveal that. 5765

5766 Well, we are trying to figure out what the ties are between ByteDance and TikTok. I am not going to ask you how many 5767 5768 shares you own, but do you own shares in ByteDance, sir? \*Mr. Chew. Yes, I do. 5769 \*Mr. Griffith. All right. There you go. How about in 5770 TikTok? 5771 \*Mr. Chew. Right now all employees own shares in one --5772 5773 \*Mr. Griffith. Yes, sure. I expected that. I just don't understand why you didn't tell Mr. Hudson that, and 5774 were transparent earlier. Instead, you made us drag it out 5775 of you. 5776 All right. Now let's talk about the kids. You told 5777 5778 several of our folks that there was a 60-minute deadline. You also told us that, if you were under the age of 18, you 5779 couldn't access the live section, the live option. So I 5780 texted my 17-year-old and my 15-year-old, and I basically got 5781 scoffs back, scoffs, when I said, "Are you all limited to 60 5782 minutes?' \ 5783 My older son said, "Well, there is a notice I get from 5784 time to time that says I shouldn't be on more than 60 5785 minutes, but it never has kicked me off.' ' 5786

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5787
           And my younger son said, "Oh, I am on as long as I want
      to be.' '
5788
5789
           So I am just informing you whoever told you,
      particularly if it was your legal team, that that is not
5790
      accurate, that they are on for more than 60 minutes, and they
5791
      can access the live section. I believe it was Mr. Carter
5792
      that you said they couldn't, under 18, access the live -- you
5793
5794
      know, being on the live section. He has done it. So
      whatever it is you think you are doing, it ain't getting
5795
      done.
5796
           Now, let's talk about the law for a minute. You share a
5797
      legal team, but you keep talking about how you got a firewall
5798
      between you and ByteDance. You can't have an effective
5799
      firewall under the United States interpretation of such if
5800
      you are sharing legal counsel, because anything that you say
5801
      to your legal counsel, they can share internally. If you
5802
      have got the same lawyers -- now, maybe you have two
5803
5804
      different teams of lawyers in the law firm, but that is not
      what you said to us today. You said you share lawyers.
5805
      There is no firewall, legally. I am just telling you.
5806
           So if you want to clean it up and be transparent, you
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5808 need to do something about that. Wouldn't you agree, yes or 5809 no --5810 \*Mr. Chew. Congressman --\*Mr. Griffith. -- that you need to do something about 5811 5812 that? \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I --5813 \*Mr. Griffith. You will look into it. 5814 \*Mr. Chew. Yes. 5815 \*Mr. Griffith. You will look into it. You have been 5816 looking into it all the time. 5817 All right. You told Dr. Burgess, when asked if your 5818 employees -- if your employees who were members of the 5819 5820 Chinese Communist Party had access to TikTok data from the U.S. You said you didn't know who was a member of the 5821 Communist Party. But then Congressman -- to Congressman 5822 Walberg you said that the CEO of TikTok was not a member of 5823 the communist -- the Chinese Communist Party. And to 5824 5825 Congressman Kelly you said the founder of TikTok was not a member of the Communist Chinese Party. 5826 Sir, either you know who is and isn't a member of the 5827 Chinese Communist Party or you don't. Which one is it? I 5828

5829 submit that you know, and you just aren't giving us the straight story. Clearly, you know, but you denied that to 5830 5831 Dr. Burgess. \*Mr. Chew. Congressman, I can ask one or two people, 5832 but we have no policy to ask all the employees. I can ask 5833 one or two people, but I -- you know, who are in --5834 \*Mr. Griffith. But it is reasonable to assume that, 5835 5836 with a significant number of members of the country of China being members of the Chinese Communist Party, logic would 5837 tell us -- you are a logical man, I assume -- logic would 5838 tell us that there are a fair number of your employees who 5839 are members of the Chinese Communist Party, at least a dozen 5840 or so, who have access to this data. Isn't that so? 5841 \*Mr. Chew. Again, like I said, I can ask one or two 5842 people. We don't have a policy to ask everybody. 5843 \*Mr. Griffith. I said earlier you are living in some 5844 kind of a cloud world, because either you know or you don't 5845 5846 know. Thank you, ma'am. 5847 I yield back. \*The Chair. The gentleman from South Carolina the chair 5848

recognizes for five minutes, Mr. Duncan.

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           *Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think it has
      been revealed today there is not a degree of separation
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      between ByteDance and TikTok.
           I would like to enter in the record a Heritage
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      Foundation document: "TikTok Generation: a CCP Official in
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      Every Pocket.''
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           *The Chair. Without objection, so ordered.
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           [The information follows:]
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5861 \*Mr. Duncan. And I would like to yield the balance of my time to Kelly Armstrong from North Dakota. 5862 5863 \*Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, the TikTok Privacy Policy details extensive 5864 data collection on users. One line states that, "We may 5865 collect information about you from other publicly available 5866 sources.' What publicly available data is TikTok collecting 5867 5868 and adding to the profiles of users? 5869 \*Mr. Chew. It will be publicly available, but I can get back to you on specifics. 5870 \*Mr. Armstrong. Okay. What is the purpose of obtaining 5871 even more data on your users beyond the data collected from 5872 5873 the platform? \*Mr. Chew. We collect data -- we want to give our 5874 users, by the way, a lot of transparency on what data we 5875 collect. We give them choices on the controls of their own 5876 privacy settings, and it really is to serve them a better 5877 5878 experience. This is the reason why so many people love the 5879 app. It is a great experience. \*Mr. Armstrong. So how does the non-TikTok-related data 5880 service -- relate to the service provided? 5881

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           *Mr. Chew. I need to check the specifics, and
      understand the question, and get back to you.
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           *Mr. Armstrong. Okay. Do you think the average TikTok
      user knows that you are -- and understands that TikTok's data
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      collection extends to information outside the use of the app?
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           *Mr. Chew. We do give transparent information on this.
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      And like I said, we -- I -- we don't -- I don't believe we
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      collect more information than most other social media
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      platforms out there.
           *Mr. Armstrong. Well, and the reason I ask this --
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      because I am going to go back into the corporate structure.
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      You described that TikTok is a subsidiary of ByteDance. Mr.
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      Griffith just said that you guys share the same lawyers.
      have stated that your direct report is the CEO of ByteDance.
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      But you have also stated that, at certain levels, TikTok
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      operates without direct daily control from ByteDance. You
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      have used content moderation as an example for that.
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           TikTok's privacy policy states that you may share user
      data within your corporate group. Does that corporate group
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      include ByteDance?
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           *Mr. Chew. If you are talking about that one entity
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      that has the share for the -- for Chinese media licensing
      purposes, I think it is called Beijing Douyin Services. If
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5905
      you are talking about that entity, of the government share,
      the answer is, you know, we have cut off, you know, all
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      access of U.S. data sets to that.
5907
           *Mr. Armstrong. So --
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           *Mr. Chew. Employees of the entity.
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           *Mr. Armstrong. But your user privacy -- so your
      corporate -- ByteDance is part of your corporate group.
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           *Mr. Chew. ByteDance is the top company.
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           *Mr. Armstrong. So --
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           *Mr. Chew. So, yes, you are talking about the other
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      entities within the group.
           *Mr. Armstrong. So you just testified that you
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      firewalled this. Does that statement -- so you are saying
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      the TikTok's executives you -- that operate independently of
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      ByteDance, but does that statement not hold for sharing of
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      access to data?
           *Mr. Chew. Well, I was talking about that one entity
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      that has -- that many of you have raised some concerns, you
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      know. That is the entity that I am talking about, the entity
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5924 with the Chinese Government's investment that has -- that is for the purpose of Chinese Internet licensing for the Chinese 5925 5926 business --\*Mr. Armstrong. Let me ask it a different way. What 5927 other entities have access to TikTok user data? 5928 \*Mr. Chew. Well, after Project Texas, we are going to 5929 move it so that only TikTok user data security has controlled 5930 5931 access of that data. 5932 \*Mr. Armstrong. Okay. So -- and we could bring you back either -- and after Project Texas is done. But right 5933 now, what other entities have access to TikTok's user data 5934 5935 today? 5936 \*Mr. Chew. Only by requirement. It is really only by requirement. Certain employees may use -- may need --5937 require some access of data to help build the product. 5938 But for U.S., you know, we have moved it from Project 5939 Texas, and by the end of this year it will be firewalled 5940 5941 awav. \*Mr. Armstrong. But this is your privacy policy today. 5942 Like, I understand what you are telling us, what is 5943 potentially going to happen in the future. I have concerns 5944

5945 again about CFIUS, and government involvement, private organization, all of that. I am just saying this is your 5946 5947 user agreement today. So your user agreement says that you share access with 5948 5949 your corporate group. \*Mr. Chew. You know --5950 \*Mr. Armstrong. You are telling me what is going to 5951 5952 happen whenever Project Texas gets done. I am asking you today. Who has access to TikTok's user data? 5953 \*Mr. Chew. In our user agreement, Congressman, in our 5954 privacy policy, we also added a link so that our users in the 5955 U.S. can be informed about Project Texas. The link is there. 5956 5957 \*Mr. Armstrong. So the link is there to private -- but -- I understand what you are trying to do moving forward. 5958 have my own concerns about that. But we are sitting here 5959 today in a hearing, and your privacy policy is different than 5960 your testimony. Your privacy policy specifically says that 5961 5962 you can share user data within your corporate group. So you are saying, even though you're your privacy 5963 policy says that, you are not doing it? 5964 \*Mr. Chew. Like I said, no, I don't think there is any 5965

5966 contradiction here. Like I said, Project Texas, when it is done, we firewall off that data. We still have some legacy 5967 5968 data in Virginia and Singapore that we started deleting, and we will be done by the end of this year. 5969 \*Mr. Armstrong. So at the end of this year, then you 5970 won't share it. Does that mean you are sharing it today? 5971 \*Mr. Chew. I don't believe so, but there is some --5972 5973 \*Mr. Armstrong. Then why haven't you changed your privacy policy? Why haven't you updated it? 5974 \*Mr. Chew. We did update it, and we gave our users more 5975 information on Project Texas. We did update it. 5976 5977 [Pause.] \*The Chair. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman 5978 5979 from Texas the chair recognizes for five minutes, Mr. Crenshaw. 5980 \*Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Madam Chair. 5981 Thank you, Mr. Chew, for bringing Republicans and 5982 5983 Democrats together. I appreciate that. I want to get right to the critical point of concern. 5984 So TikTok is able to collect massive amounts of personal 5985 data. We all know that. That means it could, if it desired 5986

5987 to, use this data to influence narratives and trends, create misinformation campaigns, encourage self-destructive 5988 5989 behavior, purposefully allow drug cartels to communicate freely and organize human and drug trafficking. 5990 Now, to be fair, all social media companies could do 5991 that. But here is the difference. It is only TikTok that is 5992 controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. All these other 5993 5994 social media companies are not. Mr. Chew, do you agree that TikTok is controlled by the CCP? 5995 \*Mr. Chew. No. 5996 \*Mr. Crenshaw. Okay, I thought you would say that. 5997 disagree, as you thought I might say. 5998 5999 Here is why I disagree: Your parent company is 6000 ByteDance, right? \*Mr. Chew. That is correct. 6001 \*Mr. Crenshaw. It is correct. So many of the workers 6002 who work at ByteDance are Communist Party members, right? 6003 6004 \*Mr. Chew. I wouldn't know. \*Mr. Crenshaw. Well, I think, for example, the chief 6005 editor at ByteDance, Zhang Fuping, is the Communist Party's 6006 secretary. Correct? 6007

6008 \*Mr. Chew. He works on the Chinese business, not on 6009 TikTok. 6010 \*Mr. Crenshaw. Right. He works for ByteDance, the 6011 parent company. \*Mr. Chew. He works on the Chinese business. 6012 \*Mr. Crenshaw. Right, the parent company of TikTok. 6013 \*Mr. Chew. The Chinese business is called Douyin. 6014 6015 \*Mr. Crenshaw. Yes, but it is all associated with 6016 ByteDance, right? 6017 \*Mr. Chew. So ByteDance owns a number of businesses. \*Mr. Crenshaw. Right. You all report to ByteDance. 6018 Everybody is part of ByteDance. Okay? And do you know of 6019 6020 any other employees that work for ByteDance that are part of the Chinese Communist Party? 6021 \*Mr. Chew. Like I said, you know, there are --6022 ByteDance has -- owns Chinese businesses, and they operate in 6023 6024 China. 6025 \*Mr. Crenshaw. You don't know how many, but you acknowledge many must be card-carrying members of the CCP, 6026 right? 6027

\*Mr. Chew. In the Chinese business, yes.

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           *Mr. Crenshaw. Yes. I mean, the CCP holds a -- what is
      called a golden share in ByteDance that allows the CCP to
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      control one board seat in ByteDance. That is public --
           *Mr. Chew. That is not correct.
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           *Mr. Crenshaw. It is not correct?
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           *Mr. Chew. No, it is --
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           *Mr. Crenshaw. It is publicly reported. They admitted
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      to it.
           *Mr. Chew. It is -- on our website we have updated it,
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      so we have -- can give people more transparent information on
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      this.
           They have a share in a subsidiary that is only for the
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      Chinese business. It has nothing to do with TikTok, and it
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      is for the purposes of content licensing in China.
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           *Mr. Crenshaw. So there is not an internal CCP
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      committee, which is a regular thing that happens in China,
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      they have a CCP committee internally inside the company.
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6046
           *Mr. Chew. I run TikTok. I cannot represent the
      Chinese business.
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           *Mr. Crenshaw. ByteDance, I am talking about ByteDance.
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      No arrangement in ByteDance?
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           *Mr. Chew. Again --
           *Mr. Crenshaw. Here is the main point of concern.
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      China's 2017 national intelligence law states very clearly
      that "any organization or citizen shall support, assist, and
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      cooperate with state intelligence work in accordance with the
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      law, and maintain the secrecy of all knowledge of state
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      intelligence work.' \
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           In other words, ByteDance, and also your TikTok
      employees that live in China, they must cooperate with
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      Chinese intelligence whenever they are called upon.
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      they are called upon, they are bound to secrecy. That would
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      include you. So, Mr. Chew, if the CCP tells ByteDance to
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      turn over all data that TikTok has collected inside the U.S.,
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      even within Project Texas, do they have to do so, according
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      to Chinese law?
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           *Mr. Chew. Congressman, first, I am Singaporean.
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           *Mr. Crenshaw. That is fine. But there are employees
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      of yours, and ByteDance is in China.
           *Mr. Chew. We understand this concern.
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                                                     In my opening
      statement we said we hear these concerns. We didn't try to
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      avoid them or, you know, trivialize them. We built something
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6071 where we take that data and put it out of reach. This is what we did. We put it out of reach. 6072 6073 \*Mr. Crenshaw. Out of reach. But they own you. \*Mr. Chew. No, we put it out of reach by storing 6074 6075 them --\*Mr. Crenshaw. ByteDance owns TikTok. If ByteDance is 6076 -- and the CCP owns ByteDance, because the CCP owns everybody 6077 6078 in China. \*Mr. Chew. Well --6079 \*Mr. Crenshaw. And so, by law, they can make them do 6080 whatever they want, and they say that, by law, you can't tell 6081 anyone about it. So they can make you hand over that data. 6082 6083 Is that correct? 6084 \*Mr. Chew. That data is stored here, in American soil, by an American company --6085 \*Mr. Crenshaw. Well, you say that. We --6086 \*Mr. Chew. -- overseen by American --6087 6088 \*Mr. Crenshaw. We thought that, but leaked audio from 80 internal TikTok meetings shows that U.S. user data has 6089 been repeatedly accessed from China when you said it hasn't 6090 been. 6091

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           And here is the other thing. Following back on my
      colleague's line of questioning, in your own privacy policy
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      it says that you may share information within your so-called
      corporate group. Is ByteDance part of that corporate group?
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           *Mr. Chew. If you are talking about the share of the
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      entity with the share, like I shared with the previous --
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           *Mr. Crenshaw. Is ByteDance part of the corporate
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6099
      group?
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           *Mr. Chew. ByteDance is a holding company. It is part
      of the corporate group, yes.
6101
           *Mr. Crenshaw. It is part of the corporate group.
6102
           *Mr. Chew. Yes.
6103
           *Mr. Crenshaw. Okay. So your own privacy policy says
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      you have to share data with ByteDance. And if the CCP says,
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      hey, ByteDance, you are going to do what we say, and you
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      can't tell anyone about it, because by law, according to that
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      2017 national intelligence law, they have to do it, that is
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6109
      our concern.
           *Mr. Chew.
                       This --
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           *Mr. Crenshaw. Maybe you haven't done it yet, but my
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      point is that you might have to. And that is where our
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6113 concerns come from. I mean, over 300 TikTok employees have worked for 6114 6115 China's state-run propaganda media. That is just from looking at their LinkedIn profiles. Okav? 6116 So here -- and my last point is this. I want to say 6117 this to all the teenagers out there, and TikTok influencers 6118 who think we are just old and out of touch and don't know 6119 6120 what we are talking about, trying to take away your favorite app. You may not care that your data is being accessed now, 6121 but it will be one day when you do care about it. 6122 And here is the real problem: with data comes power. 6123 They can choose what you see and how you see it. They can 6124 make you believe things that are not true. They can 6125 encourage you to engage in behavior that will destroy your 6126 life. Even if it is not happening yet, it could in the 6127 future. 6128 The long-term goal of the Chinese Communist Party is the 6129 6130 demise of the American power, and that starts with our youth. At any moment they could demand that all of TikTok's data be 6131 used to design an AI algorithm with the sole purpose of 6132 promoting Chinese interests and destroying our society from 6133

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      within. You want to know why that is Democrat -- why that is
      -- why Democrats and Republicans have come together on this?
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      That is why we are so concerned.
           Thank you, and I yield back.
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           *The Chair. The gentleman yields back.
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           I remind the members they have 10 business days to
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      submit questions for the record, and I ask our witness to
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6141
      respond to the questions promptly.
           Pursuant to committee rules, I ask unanimous consent to
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      enter the documents from the staff list into the record.
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           Without objection, so ordered.
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           [The information follows:]
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6149	*The Chair. Members should submit their questions by
6150	the close of business on April 6th.
6151	Without objection, the committee is adjourned.
6152	[Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]