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**Statement of
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***Enhancing America's Maritime Security:
Countering China's Grey Zone Threat in
American Waters***



Presented on June 4, 2024, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security hearing entitled, “Combating the Grey Zone: Examining Chinese Threats to the Maritime Domain.”

Enhancing America's Maritime Security

Bottom Line Up Front:

China poses several threats to our nation's maritime sovereignty, most notably in the Pacific. The most insidious threats are termed "grey zone" because China's acts weaken the U.S. while avoiding conflict. Top of the threats – potential encroachment into and poaching of natural resources in our extensive Pacific waters. Backed by large Chinese Coast Guard cutters and paramilitary maritime militia craft, using tactics like water-cannoning, our fish stocks estimated worth more than \$6 billion annually are at increasing risk. At the same time, narcotics trafficking, to include fentanyl precursor chemicals overwhelmingly sourced from China, continue to enter our nation via a dynamic route over sea, through our too porous southern border, and even through ports of entry such as international airports. Unchecked these acts weaken confidence in the U.S. to protect its citizens, erode our society, and alienate the nation from allies. Finally, should these grey zone acts escalate, it exposes a Coast Guard of limited wartime utility in support of a too small Navy. These risks to the homeland are relatively new, and at a scale beyond the capacity of today's Coast Guard, which has performed admirably for decades in a range of important life-saving missions.

Maritime Threats:

Predatory Chinese distant-water fishing fleets are largely unregulated. China's distant-water fishing fleet is largely off-the-books, it has been estimated to consist of up to 17,000 ships by using location data (e.g., AIS location data) and unique vessel identifier databases (e.g., Krakken's FishSpektrum).¹ Attempts to regulate this fleet are hampered by opaque registration and ownership processes.² Even if regulated better, as seen in the South China Sea against the Philippines and Vietnam, these fleets infused with paramilitary maritime militia, escorted by Chinese Coast Guard and Navy have used a variety of tactics to impose Chinese will into others waters.

Chinese fentanyl precursors chemicals and narcotics cartels are killing Americans. The United States is suffering from a pandemic of illicit narcotics, notably fentanyl, which killed over 73,000 Americans last year. Putting an end to this deadly trade will require strangling the narco-cartels' bottom line by cutting their illicit smuggling networks connecting Latin America and China with the United States. Critically, the cartels rely on several sea routes to move the vast majority percent of their drugs, e.g. cocaine, fentanyl enabled by Chinese chemicals. These illicit routes cross the Pacific with fentanyl precursor chemicals from China, and cocaine from

¹ Brent D. Sadler, James DiPane and Chad Wolf, "Securing U.S. Maritime Rights in Our Unguarded Waters," The Heritage Foundation, March 14, 2022, pp. 3-4, <https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/BG3692.pdf> (accessed May 30, 2024).

² Guillermo Gutierrez Almazor et al., "China's Distant Water Fishing Fleet: Scale, Impact and Governance," Overseas Development Institute, June 2020, pp. 15-27, https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/chinesedistantwaterfishing_web.pdf (accessed May 30, 2024).

South America to intermediary stops in Central America before moving into the United States, or via Western Africa onward to Europe.

Chinese grey zone operations expose Pacific theater wartime vulnerability. The Coast Guard has a long history of fighting the nation's wars alongside the Navy, which is enshrined in law (14 USC ch.1 sec.103). A conflict with China be global, and certainly require defending U.S. coastlines and critical shipping lanes. Less certain is the readiness of the the Coast Guard to transition from a peacetime confrontation to wartime conditions.

Key Vulnerabilities:

Limited Coast Guard capacity for Pacific conflict support and counter-grey-zone operations. The Defense Science Board has concluded the U.S. military is underperforming and ill-equipped for great-power competition, and recommends that the military build new capabilities for gray zone operations.³ As the U.S. Coast Guard increasingly confronts Chinese and Russian naval and paramilitary forces, it will benefit from additional non-lethal options to compel harassing vessels to remain clear, and better control escalation. Like the Navy, the Coast Guard could look to the Marine Corps' efforts in crowd control by field testing non-lethal Active Denial Systems based on microwave and acoustic technologies.⁴ Failing to control the grey zone either see U.S. maritime rights ceded to China or escalation.

The Navy expects the Coast Guard to be ready for nine specific wartime missions, which are detailed in a 2008 memorandum of agreement between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense. The list, which includes theater security cooperation, combating terrorism, and environmental response, among other issues,⁵ reflects the time period in which it was written and does not address the types of missions that would be required in a prolonged war with China today—notably anti-submarine warfare. A Government Accountability Office audit says that defense readiness is consistently a low priority. Between 2011 and 2020, the Coast Guard devoted only 4 percent of its operational hours to defense readiness, at an

³ U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, “2019 DSB Summer Study on: The Future of U.S. Military Superiority,” Executive Summary, June 2020, https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2020s/2019_Future_of_U.S._Military_Superiority_Executive_Summary.pdf (accessed May 30, 2024).

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program, “Active Denial Technology (ADT),” Fact Sheet, updated August 2020, https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Fact_Sheets/FACT%20SHEET_ADT_AUG20.pdf (accessed May 30, 2024). “The Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program stimulates and coordinates non-lethal weapons requirements of the U.S. Armed Services and allocates resources to help meet these requirements. The Commandant of the Marine Corps serves as the Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Executive Agent. Located at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va., the Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office serves as the Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program Executive Agent’s day-to-day management office.” Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, “Organization,” <https://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/Organization/> (accessed May 30, 2024).

⁵ Heather MacLeod, “Coast Guard: Information on Defense Readiness Mission Deployments, Expenses, and Funding,” Government Accountability Office, September 15, 2021, p. 12, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-104741.pdf> (accessed May 30, 2024).

average of 7 percent of total operational expense.⁶ Gauging whether this is adequate requires a closer look at the Coast Guard’s wartime training regimen.

Moreover, given the paucity of U.S. merchant mariners and the fact that there are too few U.S. commercial ships, any loss to this fleet would imperil a long-term war effort. This reality places added importance on protecting every U.S.-crewed merchant ship, making convoy missions a potential deciding factor in the next major war.⁷ However, the Navy has stated that it would not be able to fulfill this role, given its limited capacity to conduct wartime operations and defend critical shipping and sea lanes.⁸ The U.S. would likely have no allies to turn to for help with escorting vital shipping, as most U.S. allies have similarly neglected this mission.⁹ So, in this

GAO’s Summary of DHS and DOD Agreement

Operational Activity	Description
Maritime interception/ interdiction operations	Stopping, boarding, searching, diverting, or redirecting vessel traffic to enforce certain sanctions
Military environmental response	Responding to incidents of pollution in and around the battle space
Port operations, security, and defense	Ensuring port and harbor areas are free of hostile threats, terrorist actions, and safety deficiencies that would be a threat to the deployment of military resources
Theater security cooperation	Conducting humanitarian assistance, professional exchanges, combined operations, training, exercises, and other diplomatic activities to foster international cooperation
Coastal sea-control operations	Ensuring the unimpeded use of designated offshore areas at home and abroad by U.S. and friendly forces and deny the use of those areas by enemy forces
Rotary wing air-intercept operations	Conducting national air defense activities
Combatting terrorism operations	Providing special capabilities, such as training host nation forces and building the capacity of foreign maritime security forces, that serve as a force multiplier to Defense Department forces
Maritime operational threat response	Supporting Defense Department response to maritime security threats, including terrorism, piracy, and other criminal or unlawful acts
Military cyberspace operations	Conducting offensive and defensive cyberspace operations to achieve military objectives and preserve system availability, integrity, and confidentiality

SOURCE: U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Coast Guard: Information on Defense Readiness Mission Deployments, Expenses, and Funding,” September 15, 2021, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-104741> (accessed March 8, 2022).

⁶ Ibid., pp. 7 and 14.

⁷ Salvatore R. Mercogliano, “Suppose There Was a War and the Merchant Marine Didn’t Come?” USNI Proceedings, Vol. 146, No. 1 (January 2020), <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/suppose-there-was-war-and-merchant-marine-didnt-come> (accessed May 30, 2024).

⁸ David B. Larter, “‘You’re on Your Own’: US Sealift Can’t Count on Navy Escorts in the Next Big War,” *Defense News*, 10 October 2018, <https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/10/10/youre-on-your-own-us-sealift-cant-count-on-us-navy-escorts-in-the-next-big-war-forcing-changes/> (accessed May 31, 2024)..

⁹ Matthijs Ooms, “It’s a Navy’s Job, Only No Navy Can Do It! Understanding and Addressing Western Neglect of Maritime Trade Protection,” *International Journal of Naval History*, May 12, 2021, <https://www.ijnhonline.org/its-a-navys-job-only-no-navy-can-do-it-understanding-and-addressing-western-neglect-of-maritime-trade-protection/> (accessed May 30, 2024).

vacuum, the Coast Guard will need to be prepared to protect vital U.S. shipping against long-range aircraft that employ anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as against submarines.

Too lightly patrolled U.S. Pacific waters. In an arc stretching over 1,400 miles from Wake Island to Johnston Atoll and south 1,900 miles to American Samoa are six U.S. exclusive economic zones (EEZ), rich in fish and untapped natural resources. Without improved U.S. maritime capacity and allied coordination these U.S. waters are at risk. Chinese distant fishing fleets are affecting American Samoa, Guam, and Hawaiian fisheries. Regionwide, the overall revenue loss to illegal fishing in the Pacific is estimated to be between \$4.3 billion to \$8.3 billion.¹⁰ U.S. fish stocks in the Atlantic accounts for 39 percent, Alaskan waters 32 percent, and rest of the Pacific (i.e., American Samoa, Guam, and Hawaii, etc.) 12 percent of U.S. seafood by value.¹¹ To better protect these resources, the Coast Guard has increased its assets based in the Pacific. Today, the Coast Guard's District 14 patrols the South, Central, and Western Pacific with 11 cutters and maritime patrol aircraft.¹² To increase this fleet, in July 2021, the Coast Guard commissioned three new Guam-based Fast Response Cutters.¹³ Due to the FRC's limited range (2500 nautical miles), the Coast Guard has had to use a buoy tender as a mother-ship for a deployment from Hawaii to American Samoa (2000 nautical miles) and Tahiti (3000 nautical miles).¹⁴ These smaller cutters are helpful, but alone are inadequate to cover the vast spaces of U.S. Pacific EEZs. The challenge is made worse by poor recruiting results seeing cutters being idled like medium endurance cutter *Dependable* in March 2024 due to too few available sailors.¹⁵

¹⁰ Manaswita Konar et al., "The Scale of Illicit Trade in Pacific Ocean Marine Resources," World Resources Institute Working Paper, October 2019, <https://www.wri.org/research/scale-illicit-trade-pacific-ocean-marine-resources> (accessed May 30, 2024).

¹¹ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "Fisheries of the United States," <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/sustainable-fisheries/fisheries-united-states> (accessed May 30, 2024).

¹² U.S. Coast Guard, "History of the Fourteenth District," <https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-14/> (accessed May 30, 2024).

¹³ "U.S. Coast Guard Commissions Three Fast Response Cutters in Guam," Maritime Executive, July 29, 2021, <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/u-s-coast-guard-commissions-three-fast-response-cutters-in-guam> (accessed May 30, 2024).


¹⁴ Edward Lundquist, "USCG Report: Small Cutters Prove They Can Patrol a Big Ocean," Marine Link, June 14, 2022, <https://www.marinelink.com/news/uscg-report-small-cutters-prove-patrol-a-497335> (accessed May 16, 2024).

¹⁵ "U.S. Coast Guard Takes 210-Foot Cutter Out of Service to Fill Manning Gaps," The Maritime Executive, April 10, 2024, <https://maritime-executive.com/article/u-s-coast-guard-takes-210-foot-cutter-out-of-service-to-fill-manning-gaps> (accessed May 31, 2024).

Strategic Significance of the Compact of Free Association States

Being as close as 1,500 miles from Taiwan, the Freely Associated States (FAS) can serve as an important staging ground for the U.S. Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific. Through the COFA agreements, the U.S. can also deny other countries military access to the FAS without explicit authorization.

Exclusive Economic Zones
■ Freely Associated States
■ United States



NOTE: Distances are approximate.
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

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Limited consequence management of maritime incidents. As of May 30, 2024, Baltimore Harbor has yet to resume normal operations following the March 26th collision of the containership *Dali* with the Key Bridge. Limited dredging and salvage capacity has hampered this recovery. Failing to rapidly reopen American ports in peacetime places the American economy at risk, while in wartime it can result in failure to sustain wartime operations. To potentially address this, the naval militia, like the better-known and larger National Guard, is a state entity that supports a range of state defense and disaster response missions. After the establishment of the naval reserve in 1915, the role of naval militias waned. However, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, New York and New Jersey naval militias returned to public awareness, ferrying people fleeing lower Manhattan and bringing in first responders. These state level units can assist federal agencies respond and recover from maritime incidents. Secondly, if conceived as an element of the National Guard -a naval guard- they can also support capacity building and training with key partner nations through the National Guard's State Partnership

Program (SPP), who can contribute to collective action that protects American waters.¹⁶ Potentially freeing the Coast Guard for more distant maritime patrol missions.

Incomplete maritime interdiction of narcotics flows. Established in 1989, the Joint Interagency Task Force South has had measured success interdicting this illicit trade. However, it has not been able to deliver a knockout blow to the cartels behind this scourge. In 2022, the Coast Guard overall removed over 212,000 pounds of cocaine and 54,000 pounds of marijuana with an approximate wholesale value of \$2.9 billion.¹⁷ This is good but not good enough, given the global trade in cocaine alone was estimated at over \$652 billion in 2017.

Securing Americans from the scourge of illegal drugs will mean putting the cartels out of business, who are enabled by China with its lax control of key fentanyl precursors. Importantly, in recent years, the cartels have expanded their European operations, making it a significant part of their bottom line. Unfortunately, the establishing legislation for JIATF-S focuses only on routes from Latin America to the United States. This has prevented broader interdiction on a scale that would seriously threaten the cartels' bottom line. Today China benefits by operating on both sides of the narcotics trade: Chinese criminal gangs generate income and influence while weakening local governments that increasingly turn to China for assistance.

MAP 1

Notional Deployment Sites for ESDs

Expeditionary Transfer Dock ships (ESDs) could be effectively deployed in areas around Central and South America known for narcotics trafficking. Using their existing radar systems augmented by drones, the ESDs would have a sensor coverage range of about 300 nautical miles.




¹⁶ Albert A. Nofi, *The Naval Militia: A Neglected Asset?* Center for Naval Analyses, July 2007, pp. 12–20, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0015586.A1.pdf (accessed May 30, 2024).

¹⁷ TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL LINDA L. FAGAN COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD ON “THE COAST GUARD’S FISCAL YEAR 2025 BUDGET REQUEST” BEFORE THE HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, MAY 23, 2024, pp. 1, https://transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/05-23-24_cgmt_hearing_-_admiral_fagan_-_testimony.pdf (accessed May 30, 2024).

Enabling effective counter-narcotic maritime operations, however, relies on sustaining forces at sea and providing wide-area maritime domain surveillance using drones and fixed wing aircraft. JIATF-S has been able to achieve modest improvement in this regard by contracting the ocean survey vessel *Kellie Chouest*.¹⁸ Limited replenishment and surveillance from this ship has helped to sustain multinational counter-narcotics operations. According to JIATF-S, this has accounted for 80-percent of interdictions, but only 10-percent of the overall cocaine trade.

Heavy Lift and Repair Ship

The 785-foot-long Expeditionary Transfer Dock ships have an open deck length of about 472 feet, which is long enough to hold and transport an *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyer.



SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

ArticleName  heritage.org

Cyber capacity limited. China is known to use cyber intrusions for intellectual property theft, market manipulations, surveillance, etc. Most recently, Chinese cyber group Mustang Panda has been accused of targeting shipping for the first time.¹⁹ As such, potential cyber-intrusion must be adequately investigated and ruled out in maritime incidents. The December 2020 National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan was intended to address these vulnerabilities.²⁰ While terrorism was

¹⁸ U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, U.S. Fourth Fleet, “Image Gallery: 211024-N-KY668-1208 [USMV *Kellie Chouest*],” October 24, 2021, <https://www.fourthfleet.navy.mil/Press-Room/Image-Gallery/igphoto/2002885818/> (accessed May 23, 2024).

¹⁹ Gary Dixon, “Chinese hackers ‘plant malware’ on Greek and Norwegian cargo ships,” TradeWinds, May 15, 2024, <https://www.tradewindsnews.com/technology/chinese-hackers-plant-malware-on-greek-and-norwegian-cargo-ships/2-1-1644278> (accessed May 31, 2024).

²⁰ Donald J. Trump, “The National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan,” The White House, December 2020, pg. 4-5, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/12.2.2020-National-Maritime-Cybersecurity-Plan.pdf> (accessed April 1, 2024).

ruled out quickly in the *Dali* allision, due diligence investigating the potential of cyber-intrusions or attacks contributing to the incident remain unclear. This, despite a month before the *Dali* allision, the White House issuing an executive order to bolster cybersecurity of U.S. ports that granted additional authorities to the U.S. Coast Guard.²¹ Over two months have passed and a May 14, 2024 marine investigation preliminary report failed to mention cyber investigations.²² Given that six people lost their lives on March 26th, and the port of Baltimore has yet returned to pre-allision shipping levels over two months later demands the fullest investigation.

Next Steps.

The Coast Guard is the best tool for protecting U.S. rights in our exclusive economic zones (EEZ) that extend 200 outwards from land. In these waters, the U.S. reserves the right to exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing its natural resources contained therein and on the sea floor. But underinvestment has left the Coast Guard poorly positioned to address growing challenges, principally from China. Actions to reverse this include:

1. ***Require annual public Coast Guard long-range shipbuilding plans.*** Unlike the Navy, who submits to Congress annual long-range shipbuilding plans, the Coast Guard relies on a Program of Record (POR) that dates from 2004 to convey its shipbuilding needs. A 2011 Coast Guard study estimated that its planned acquisitions would only provide 61 percent of the cutters needed to fulfill the Coast Guard's missions. A later analysis found it could take up to 57 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) to meet mission demands - the first of these cutters is estimated to be delivered in late 2024. That said, the Coast Guard's POR calls for a force of 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and up to 71 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard high-endurance cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and patrol craft.²³ Today it has 8 NSCs, 2 high endurance cutters, 28 medium endurance cutters and 41 FRCs for distant shore patrols and operations.²⁴ A public POR updated for today's challenges is needed to explain how our expansive waters are being adequately patrolled and emerging threats prepared for.
2. ***Establish forward bases in south and central Pacific.*** Complicating the Coast Guard's and the Navy's efforts to improve presence in the south and central Pacific is the lack of any permanently based ships and ready airfields. The problem is amplified as the existing

²¹ Joseph R. Biden, "Executive Order on Amending Regulations Relating to the Safeguarding of Vessels, Harbors, Ports, and Waterfront Facilities of the United States," The White House, February 21, 2024, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/02/21/executive-order-on-amending-regulations-relating-to-the-safeguarding-of-vessels-harbors-ports-and-waterfront-facilities-of-the-united-states/> (accessed April 1, 2024).

²² "Contact of Containership *Dali* with the Francis Scott Key Bridge and Subsequent Bridge Collapse," NTSB, May 14, 2024, [https://www.nts.gov/investigations/Documents/DCA24MM031_PreliminaryReport 3.pdf](https://www.nts.gov/investigations/Documents/DCA24MM031_PreliminaryReport%203.pdf) (accessed May 30, 2024).

²³ Ronald O'Rourke, "Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R42567, pp. 18-19, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R42567.pdf> (accessed May 30, 2024).

²⁴ "Coast Guard Operational Assets," U.S. Coast Guard, <https://www.uscg.mil/About/Assets/> (accessed May 31, 2024).

infrastructure (ports, airfields) is antiquated; most dating to World War II or to the nation's early space program, such as the airfield at Canton Island, Kiribati, which was shuttered in 1976. To increase and sustain adequate maritime forces in this region, facilities in American Samoa will be needed. Better sustaining fixed wing patrol aircraft in the region would require access to and refurbishment of Canton Island airfield.

3. ***Develop techniques for countering large-scale illegal fishing.*** Given the size of Chinese distant-waters fishing fleets, the U.S. Coast Guard's training and techniques need to be assed against this threat and appropriate countermeasures developed and practiced. Additionally, the Coast Guard should deploy additional non-lethal weapons on its major cutters, and co-develop new counter-gray-zone tactics, drawing from the experience of regional Coast Guards, especially regional responses to "shouldering"²⁵ and swarming tactics employed by the Chinese forces in the South China Sea.
4. ***Increase the Coast Guard's operational budget to enable increased wartime training, and ensure future cutters are equipped to support anticipated wartime operations.*** Should the grey zone turn into conflict, current deployment training with the Navy and cutter capabilities in support of wartime operations is questionable.²⁶ This weakness could result in a proclivity to avoid confrontation in the grey zone due to a lack of confidence of escalation control, ceding our maritime rights piecemeal.
5. ***Routinize cyber investigations in all maritime incidents involving loss of life or significant damage.*** Despite executive orders to do so, the May 14, 2024, preliminary maritime incident report's silence on cyber indicates closer scrutiny of the capacity to conduct such investigations is warranted.
6. ***Support activation and repurposing of Expeditionary Transfer Dock ships (ESDs).*** The Navy maintains two Expeditionary Transfer Dock ships (ESDs) with a decade of life left in an inactive reduced operating status, which in the case of these ships means that they can be brought back to service within five days.²⁷ These ships could greatly enhance counter-narcotics operations as well as patrols of American Pacific waters.
7. ***Encourage U.S. states to establish Naval Guards.*** Given the limited capacity of today's Coast Guard, Navy salvage capacities, civil engineering of the Army Corps of Engineers, and the need to patrol vast stretches of American waters, state involvement through a naval guard should be encouraged.

Conclusion.

The United States has neglected a core element of its security and prosperity—its historic maritime strength for too long. This weakness is exposing Americans to new risks to their

²⁵ Shouldering refers to a tactic where the aggressor ship pushes a target ship off its intended course, or slows it down, without the use of weapons. It is a tactic used by the Soviet naval forces during the Cold War and today by the Chinese maritime militia and Chinese coast guard.

²⁶ Brent Sadler, "A Conflict-Ready Coast Guard Is Vital to U.S. Success in a Long War with China," The Heritage Foundation, March 21, 2022, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/conflict-ready-coast-guard-vital-us-success-long-war-china>.

²⁷ U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, "Navy Vessel Register: USNS Montford Point (ESD 1)," last updated May 10, 2022, https://www.nvr.navy.mil/SHIPDETAILS/SHIPSDETAIL_ESD_1.HTML (accessed May 23, 2024), and U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, "Navy Vessel Register: USNS John Glenn (ESD 2)," last updated May 10, 2022, https://www.nvr.navy.mil/SHIPDETAILS/SHIPSDETAIL_ESD_2.HTML (accessed May 23, 2024).

livelihoods on and from the sea. Addressing the various maritime grey zone challenges from China, will require new approaches such as repurposing inactive warships, return to basics such as enhancing Coast Guard's ability to support the Navy in wartime, and new posture investments to achieve the sustained naval presence needed to guard our waters.