

**Statement of**

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## **Who We Are – Our Mission**

U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) enduring purpose is to project and sustain combat power whenever and wherever our Nation chooses. As one of eleven combatant commands, our warfighting team is a diverse force, comprised of three component commands, one subordinate command, our allies, and our interagency and commercial partners—all of which constitutes the broader Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). Within the ever-changing strategic and operational landscape, our logistics and mobility enterprise continue to play an integral role in assuring our Nation's defense as well as to provide our national leadership strategic advantage. We must ensure the Joint Force can defend the Nation, take care of our people, and succeed through teamwork. To deter and win, the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs the Future Joint Force to be lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive.

The entire JDDE works together to move the right capabilities to the right place, at the right time. Our assigned Unified Command Plan (UCP) responsibilities are executed through three component commands (U.S. Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command, and U.S. Air Force's Air Mobility Command), and one major subordinate command (Joint Enabling Capabilities Command [JECC]). Our key mobility mission areas include sealift, strategic seaports, air refueling, airlift, aeromedical evacuation, domestic rail, and motor and barge freight. The JDDE operates as a Total Force, harnessing the unique skills of Active Duty, Reserve, National Guard, Merchant Marine, and Civilian teammates who are vital to our ability to bolster warfighting readiness.

The Department of Defense's (DoD) ability to project military forces is inextricably linked to commercial industry. Our industry partners provide critical transportation capacity and

global networks to meet day-to-day and wartime requirements. USTRANSCOM also partners with other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, such as the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Transportation (DoT), especially the Maritime Administration (MARAD) as it operates and maintains the government-owned sealift fleet and oversees the administration of the Strategic Seaport Program. Within DoT we also interconnect with the Federal Highway, Federal Motor Carrier Safety, and Federal Railroad Administrations regarding DoD transportation requirements within CONUS, including rapid equipment movement needs from “fort to the port” on our national highway and railroad networks. In addition to DoT, we partner with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the General Services Administration, and other key logistics partners who provide the funding for deployment and distribution operations as well as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Transportation Security Agency, and many more. Both individually as well as collectively, this entire collective group of partners support as well as guide our efforts and are also customers of the Defense Transportation System.

With our partners, USTRANSCOM works hard to develop the most robust transportation network possible, both for current and future operations. Because our networks are vulnerable to a wide range of threats, from climate change to nation-state cyber-attacks, USTRANSCOM plans, operates, and routinely exercises so that our forces can operate through disruption. This includes operating with partners in a cyber degraded or denied environment and quickly and creatively rerouting critical supplies to support our warfighters. I will address some of our flagship efforts today.

## **Strategic Seaport Program**

To successfully execute our deployment mission, USTRANSCOM relies on a collection of both DoD and commercially owned U.S. Strategic Seaports managed through the Strategic Seaport Program. Strategic Seaports are vital nodes in the Nation's transportation network and play a critical role in DoD's ability to deploy forces and equipment worldwide – six military seaports and eighteen U.S. commercial seaports are officially designated as primary DoD Strategic Seaports with an additional one military and thirteen U.S. commercial seaports identified as Alternate Seaports.

The basis for the program can be found in various government publications, including Executive Order 12656 regarding the assignment of emergency preparedness responsibilities. These publications direct Federal departments to identify facilities and resources, both government and private, essential to the national defense and mobilization readiness; assess the vulnerabilities and develop strategies, plans and programs to provide for the security of such facilities and resources; and to avoid or minimize disruptions of essential services during any national security emergency. The primary purpose of the Strategic Seaport Program is to ensure DoD has access to sufficient seaport capacity to meet the Nation's objectives.

## **Strategic Seaports**

Within the UCP, USTRANSCOM is identified as the DoD Single Port Manager. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), as the surface transportation component to USTRANSCOM, executes the Strategic Seaport Program for the DoD. Strategic Seaports are formally designated by the Commanding General, SDDC, based on anticipated deployment requirements related to plausible major contingencies, emergencies or disasters and

war. Although participation in the Strategic Seaport Program is voluntary, the Strategic Seaports accept specific planning and reporting responsibilities.

### **National Port Readiness Network**

Once designated, the Strategic Seaports are administratively managed through the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN). The NPRN is made up of nine government agencies including USTRANSCOM, SDDC, Military Sealift Command (MSC), U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Forces Command, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transportation Security Agency, and MARAD who Chairs the NPRN. The NPRN provides coordination and cooperation to support the safe and secure movement of military forces through the Strategic Seaports. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlines each of the nine agencies' roles, responsibilities, and authorities to facilitate planning and support port readiness.

#### ***Port Readiness Plans***

Each designated primary Strategic Seaport has a Port Readiness Plan (PRP) which identifies the specific port facilities and berths that would be made available to DoD within forty-eight hours of issuance of a rated order contract. These port facilities include berths, open and covered staging areas, rail spurs, and marshaling yards which can readily accommodate the trans-load of substantial numbers of DoD's rolling stock and containers within anticipated short timelines. MARAD serves as the primary interface with the commercial Strategic Seaports to establish and maintain the PRPs.

#### ***Port Readiness Committees***

Chaired by the USCG Captain of the Port (COTP), the Port Readiness Committee (PRC) is convened biennially to facilitate training and periodic exercises to ensure the readiness of the

port to support military operations. The PRC is comprised of local port or port area representatives that coordinate, evaluate, and test military out load plans, force protection/ military out load security and facilitate out loads.

### ***Readiness Reporting***

The Strategic Seaports formally report to MARAD quarterly on their ability to make PRP facilities available to support DoD's needs. Informal, off-cycle reporting is also completed as events warrant. Additionally, MARAD conducts an annual Enhanced Port Readiness Assessment on each Strategic Port, with the assistance of the other members, to ensure the PRC has a current understanding of the port's ability to support military operations. These assessments cover the availability of facilities and labor, port access, port security, and other factors that may interfere with deployment.

### **Ports for National Defense Program**

The Director of SDDC's Transportation Engineering Agency is designated as the Special Assistant for Transportation Engineering to provide executive-level representation for DoD on all transportation engineering matters related to the National Defense Programs (Ports, Highways, Railroads). These programs ensure DoD can readily access and utilize the Nation's civil sector infrastructure to support major force deployments by assessing and monitoring the sufficiency and viability of all elements of the related infrastructure. The Ports for National Defense Program (PND) provides the engineering / analytical foundation for the DoD Strategic Seaport Program pursuant to Executive Order 12656 and in accordance with the authority in the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. Section 4502, et seq.) by managing the identification and assessments of Strategic Seaports.

The PND Office views Strategic Seaport capacities from an aggregated coastal perspective (East, Gulf, West, Alaskan), and in the Pacific. Each coast currently has the aggregate capacity necessary to respond to plausible deployment requirements while also accounting for normal delays (e.g., weather, transportation, etc.) and the potential loss of one or more Strategic Seaports to manmade events or natural disasters. The criteria PND uses to support the designation of a Strategic Seaport extends beyond port infrastructure and throughput capability. Proximity to origins (primarily Army Power Projection Platforms) and the capabilities of the transportation networks connecting these origins to the ports are also considered.

### ***Port Look Studies***

Beginning in 2008 with the publication of the original “Port Look Study,” DoD has completed multiple reviews/assessments of the sufficiency of the Strategic Seaports in meeting DoD needs. Many of these reviews/assessments were congressionally directed via National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) language or were the result of Government Accountability Office audit recommendations; however, some were self-imposed in keeping with the tenets of the Strategic Seaport Program.

To evaluate physical conditions at the Strategic Seaports, the PND Office completed the “Assessment and Report on Strategic Seaports” as directed by Section 3515 of the 2020 NDAA (Public Law 116-92). USTRANSCOM submitted this report to Congress in July 2020. This study found that while many of the ports assessed were found to have varying degrees of structural deficiencies associated with PRP facilities, none of these deficiencies were assessed to have significant impacts on near-term deployment operations.

The PND Office also recently completed the “Port Look 2021” study. This study assessed throughput capabilities at current Strategic and Alternate Seaports, accounted for threats that could have an impact on deployment operations (including cyber), assessed sufficiency of existing Strategic Seaports to meet expected deployment requirements and made recommendations to address capability gaps. The Port Look 2021 study recommended the designation of an additional Strategic Seaport on the U.S. West Coast to ensure the Strategic Seaports on that coast can overcome normal delays and the loss of a port due to manmade events or natural disasters. In response to that recommendation, the commercial Port of Everett, Washington, was formally designated a Strategic Seaport in September 2021.

### **Interagency Security of the Strategic Seaports**

While the Coast Guard is designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security as the lead DHS agency for maritime security, seaport security is a shared responsibility among private ownership, civil authorities, DoD, and other federal agencies. For example, owners, operators, masters, and agents of vessels or owners and/or operators of waterfront facilities have the primary responsibility for the protection of their vessels or waterfront facilities. Military unit commanders are responsible for the physical security of all equipment and resources under their command. Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies provide civil support, to include preventing the escalation of lawful protest activity and ensuring continuity of port operations when operations are potentially threatened by labor actions or other forms of civil disturbance

USCG and the Department of Homeland Security have overall responsibility and enforcement authority for the safety, protection and security of vessels, harbors, waterfront facilities, and maritime critical infrastructures and key resources that are carried out by the



USCG Captain of the Port. As mentioned earlier, the COTP is the chair of respective NPRN PRCs, and assists in further coordinating interagency efforts regarding port readiness issues.

The Navy (delegated to the Naval Component Commanders) is responsible for force protection of military sealift assets. MSC, the naval component to USTRANSCOM, its Area Commands, and/or the local MSC Office coordinates for appropriate security support at commercial ports with the USCG COTP and the SDDC Brigade/Battalion Commander.

SDDC Transportation Brigade/Battalion security personnel coordinate with the appropriate port security/law enforcement authority where DoD operations are being conducted. SDDC conducts threat assessments based on Force Protection Conditions, Maritime Security (MARSEC) level, applicable National Terrorism Advisory System alerts and available intelligence and will coordinate with the COTP and Port Support Activity to ensure appropriate balanced landside and waterside safety and security measures around deployment activities.

### **Mission Impacts – Resiliency**

In general, if Strategic Seaports fail to maintain viability and availability of the facilities outlined in their PRPs, the DoD could exercise several options to support deployment and the DoD response to national emergencies. Such options include increasing or changing PRP facilities at existing Strategic Seaports, for example negotiating for more or different marshalling areas, number of berths, staging area locations/square footage, etc. DoD could also consider designating different or additional Strategic Seaports. Finally, as previously explained, the Strategic Seaport Program is intentionally designed to carry excess capacity to mitigate lost seaport access due to exogenous events.

### ***Mission Assurance and Risk Management***

The Secretary of Defense's recently issued "Homeland Defense Policy Guidance 2023" which supports implementation of the 2022 National Defense Strategy's highest priority, defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by China.

Consistent with the Homeland Defense Policy Guidance, USTRANSCOM manages risk to Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) through the Mission Assurance (MA) Construct which is a process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains, critical to the execution of DoD mission-essential functions in any operating environment or condition. Central to this construct is the Secretary of Defense's signed Mission Assurance Strategy with the message that in today's global risk environment, strategic planning for core defense missions must account for a wide variety of manmade and naturally occurring threats and hazards and their resultant vulnerabilities. The Mission Assurance Strategy provides the Department with a Mission Assurance-centric framework focused on ensuring resiliency for the capabilities and assets supporting our core missions.

The MA Construct outlines the process to identify the most important capabilities and assets needed for the Department to carry out its missions. These capabilities face multiple threats such as natural disasters, foreign intelligence collection, and kinetic and cyber threats. To successfully address these threats and hazards requires the collective expertise, responsibilities, and authorities from multiple organizations within the DoD and external to the DoD.

Through the MA Construct, we work across DoD to identify, analyze, assess, and monitor DCI strategic-level risks to global mobility operations and mission execution. This strategic level of risk management effort addresses the protection and resiliency of DCI

identified as critical to Operation Plan execution. Commercial, privately owned and operated infrastructure, and non-DoD publicly owned infrastructure are considered DCI to include seaports if they support a DoD mission.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, Strategic Seaports are vital nodes in the Nation's transportation network and play a critical role in DoD's ability to deploy forces and equipment worldwide. We have designated eighteen Commercial Strategic Seaports and six Military Strategic Seaports, thirteen alternate commercial seaports and one alternate military seaport. Each designated Strategic Seaport has a mutually agreed upon Port Readiness Plan (PRP) which identifies both DoD's and the port's needs, expectations, and timeline requirements. Although participation in the Strategic Seaport Program is voluntary, each designated Strategic Seaports accepts specific planning and reporting responsibilities.

The coordination between USTRANSCOM and the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast Guard concerning the security of Strategic Seaports is multi-fold. Such coordination includes roles and responsibilities as identified within the NPRN nine-member interagency MOU. Each designated Strategic Seaport has an established Port Readiness Committee which is chaired by the USCG Captain of the Port. The committee is comprised of local port or port area representatives (both civilian and military) that coordinate, evaluate, and test military out load plans, force protection/ military out load security and facilitate out loads. Through the Mission Assurance Construct, USTRANSCOM also synchronizes inputs and coordinates discussions across USTRANSCOM staff directorates, component commands, DoT, DHS, as well as other relevant mission partners to include Federal Law Enforcement and Counterintelligence Communities directly supporting commercial ports.

To ensure the Joint Force's ability to deploy via our seaports, our Ports for National Defense Office has rigorously reviewed, analyzed, and compared DoD's requirements to port locations, viabilities, and capabilities. The Strategic Seaport Program is intentionally designed to carry excess capacity in order to mitigate potential lost seaport access. Each U.S. coast has the aggregate capacity necessary to respond to deployment requirements while also accounting for normal delays (e.g., weather, transportation, etc.) and the potential loss of one or more Strategic Seaports to manmade events or natural disasters.

All in all, to remain successful, USTRANSCOM must be ready to project power today and tomorrow, and we will only achieve this together. The contested nature of logistics highlights that our actions to improve mobility capabilities and to modernize the JDDE, must continue in order for the DoD to maintain advantages and deliver on our national security requirements.

Powered by dedicated men and women, USTRANSCOM underwrites the lethality of the Joint Force, advances American interests around the globe, provides our nation's leaders with strategic flexibility, and creates multiple dilemmas for our adversaries. I thank Congress for your continued support to the men, women, and mission of USTRANSCOM.