## SECURING PUBLIC AREAS OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

# FIELD HEARING

BEFORE THE

# SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY

OF THE

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## SECURING PUBLIC AREAS OF TRANSPOR-TATION SYSTEMS: STAKEHOLDER PERSPEC-TIVES

## Tuesday, November 28, 2017

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,

Trenton, NJ.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in the City Counsel Chambers, Second floor, Trenton City Hall, 319 E. State Street, Trenton, New Jersey, 08608, Hon. John Katko (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Katko, Watson Coleman, and Fitzpatrick.

Mr. KATKO. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation and Protective Security will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the existing security measures that safeguard surface transportation systems and identify ways that the Federal Government can help State and local transit agencies protect their enormous ridership.

I would like to thank the city of Trenton and the City Council for allowing us to have this very important hearing in these beautiful historic chambers.

This is an official Congressional hearing, and as such, we must abide by the rules of the Committee on Homeland Security and the House of Representatives. I kindly wish to remind the guests today that demonstrations from the audience, including applause and verbal outbursts, as well as any use of signs or placards are a violation of House rules. It is important that we respect the decorum and the rules of this committee. I have also been requested to state that photography and cameras are limited to access by accredited press only.

I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

I am very pleased to be joined today by two hometowners here, or close to being hometowners, Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman and Congressman Fitzpatrick, to discuss a topic that is vital to the safety and economic vitality of the northeast region and the greater United States.

I applaud the Ranking Member for her hard work and dedication to homeland security, and it is an honor to be here today in your district to hear directly from both you and Congressman Fitzpatrick's constituents on how to better secure the transit systems.

Mass transit is critical to the livelihood of many Americans and provides an integral backbone to this economy. Recent terror attacks like the one in Brussels that targeted an international airport and a metro station have made us more cognizant than ever of the vulnerabilities in our transportation systems.

Service transportation systems are a very attractive target due to their large volume of daily ridership and open infrastructure. Mass transit systems face unique challenges in screening passengers, closing resource gaps, and targeting assistance from the Department of Homeland Security. To put this into context, surface transportation modes serve over 10 billion riders annually compared to an average of 800 million U.S. aviation passengers a year. More than 12 times the number of people that fly take part in mass transit other than flying, and it is our duty to ensure that local stakeholders and law enforcement have the resources they need to keep their riders and their systems safe.

The purpose of today's hearing is to assess our ability and readiness to detect and disrupt threats to our Nation's critical surface transportation systems. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the current threat landscape, as well as the effectiveness of established security measures.

Surface transportation systems are largely owned and operated by State and local entities, further complicating the Department of Homeland Security's responsibility as a primary Federal agency responsible for securing the numerous and diverse modes of transit. These systems are difficult to secure due to their open infrastructure, multiple access points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and in some cases lack of access barriers.

Additionally, considering the significant volume of daily ridership via surface transportation modes, delays, or system shutdowns in response to threats can cripple the local economy. The multi-layered security approach at airports, including advance passenger screening, metal detectors, X-ray machines, and advance imaging technology, explosives detection K–9s, and armed law enforcement personnel cannot be easily replicated in the surface transportation sector. The delays and costs associated with measures would undermine the affordability and expediency of mass transit. Easy accessibility and relative affordability are part of what makes mass transit and rail transportation so popular among the American public and help keep our local, regional, and National economies humming.

However, these benefits can also be exploited by terrorists as inherent vulnerabilities in surface transportation. Because of the difficulties associated with security screening people and goods on a train, metro, or bus, intelligence-sharing deterrence and detection measures as well as modern technology are extremely important.

The security of a transit environment that spans multiple geographic jurisdictions and that integrates multiple law enforcement agencies depends upon seamless interagency coordination. All of you were invited here today because you are on the front lines, and your first-hand knowledge and expertise is going to be invaluable to us. I look forward to hearing from all of you about how the Federal Government can better coordinate with State and local surface transportation partners and law enforcement personnel to protect our traveling public, despite the fact that I understand that some of you are Philadelphia Eagles fans and I am a New York Giants fan, but we will have to deal with that as we move forward.

I now recognize the Ranking Member Mrs. Watson Coleman for her opening statement.

## [The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]

## STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN KATKO

#### NOVEMBER 28, 2017

Before I begin I would first like to thank the city of Trenton for graciously hosting us today. I am pleased to be joined by Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman and Congressman Brian Fitzpatrick to discuss a topic that is vital to the safety and economic vitality of the Northeast region and the greater United States. I applaud the Ranking Member for her hard work and dedication to homeland security and it is an honor to be here today in your district to hear directly from both your and Congressman Fitzpatrick's constituents on how to better secure transit systems.

Mass transit is critical to the livelihood of many Americans and provides an integral backbone to the economy of the region. Recent terror attacks like the one in Brussels that targeted an international airport and a metro station, have made us more cognizant than ever of the vulnerabilities in our transportation systems. Surface transportation systems are a very attractive target due to their large volume of daily ridership and open infrastructure. Mass transit systems face unique challenges in screening passengers, closing resource gaps, and targeting assistance from the Department of Homeland Security.

To put this into context, surface transportation modes serve over 10 billion riders annually compared to an average of 800 million U.S. aviation passengers per year, and it is our duty to ensure that local stakeholders and law enforcement have the resources they need to keep their riders and their systems safe.

The purpose of today's hearing is to assess our ability and readiness to detect and disrupt threats to our Nation's critical surface transportation systems. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the current threat landscape, as well as the effectiveness of established security measures. Surface transportation systems are largely owned and operated by State and local entities, complicating the Department of Homeland Security's responsibility as the primary Federal agency responsible for securing the numerous and diverse modes of transit. These systems are difficult to secure due to their open infrastructure, multiple access points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and in some cases, lack of access barriers. Additionally, considering the significant volume of daily ridership via surface transportation modes, delays, or system shutdowns in response to threats can cripple the local economy. The multi-layer security approach at airports, including advance passenger screening, metal detectors, X-ray machines, advanced imagining technology, explosive detection canines, and armed law enforcement personnel, cannot be easily replicated in the surface transportation sector. The delays and costs associated with such measures would undermine the affordability and expediency of mass transit.

Easy accessibility and relative affordability are part of what makes mass transit and rail transportation so popular among the American public and help keep our local, regional, and National economies humming. However, these benefits can also be exploited by terrorists as inherent vulnerabilities in surface transportation. Because of the difficulties associated with security screening people and goods on a train, metro, or bus, intelligence-sharing deterrence and detection measures are extremely important. The security of a transit environment that spans multiple geographic jurisdictions and that integrates multiple law enforcement agencies depends upon seamless interagency coordination. All of you were invited here today because you are on the front lines, and your first-hand knowledge and expertise is invaluable. I look forward to hearing from all of you about how the Federal Government can better coordinate with State and local surface transportation partners and law enforcement personnel to protect the traveling public.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Good morning. I would like to thank Chairman Katko for agreeing to hold this hearing today in the capital city of New Jersey: Trenton, New Jersey. I would also like to thank Mr. Fitzpatrick for traveling to my district to join us as we seek to better understand how the Federal Government can partner more effectively and make our surface transportation and public areas more secure.

Before I turn to the subject at hand, I would like to extend a special thank you to our hosts here at City Hall, who went the extra mile to help ensure that we have a successful hearing, and I particularly would like to acknowledge the president of our City Council, Mr. Zachary Chester, for being here this morning. Thank you.

The 12th Congressional District of New Jersey in which we sit today is connected by a complex web of transit systems. Every day thousands of passengers pass through my district on New Jersey Transit, SEPTA, and Amtrak trains. The safe and secure operation of transit systems is essential to the social and economic well-being of the people I serve. Their ability to travel safely depends upon the security efforts of today's panelists, who face a daunting task. Terrorists have targeted soft targets, such as subways, mass transit stations, and public airport areas in the United States and abroad.

Last year just up the road in Elizabethtown, five pipe bombs were found near a transit station, and one exploded as police were attempting to disarm it. Thankfully there were no injuries, but the need to protect against threats to these systems is very clear. The emergence of a class of would-be terrorists who with little to no training, financial support, or direction carry out crimes of opportunity against innocent people demands greater vigilance and collaboration at all levels of government.

Securing these critical transportation systems requires a layered, risk-based, well-resourced approach. Unfortunately, the budget that the president has proposed for fiscal year 2018 goes in the opposite direction and calls for draconian cuts to almost every relevant Federal program. Last year the president of the American Public Transit Association testified before a Senate subcommittee that transit agencies across the United States had identified \$6 billion in capital and operational security needs, yet the President wants to cut the Transit Security Grant Program, the primary source of Federal security funds for most transit agencies from \$88 billion to just \$48 billion.

He also was proposing significant cuts to the TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Program, also known as VIPR. Under this program TSA officials, Federal air marshals, and K–9 teams partner together with transit police and other local law enforcement to carry out security operations within surface transportation systems and public airport areas. Under the President's budget the number of VIPR teams would drop from 31 teams to 8.

Finally, the President is proposing a complete elimination of the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program. Under this critical program local law enforcement agencies receive partial Federal reimbursement for deploying officers at airports. In 2017 the program was funded at \$44 million. The cuts that the President is seeking would come at the cost of the security of transportation systems in the 12th Congressional District and across this country.

Later today when we return to Washington I will be introducing a bill to push back against these reckless cuts. My legislation known as the Surface Transportation and Public Area Security Act of 2017 seeks to not only secure, revamp, and resource important programs aimed at securing critical soft targets, but also greatly enhances Federal partnerships with Federal, State, and local stakeholders to protect those vital systems and the people who use them.

In addition to authorizing \$400 million for the Transit Security Grant Program, directing TSA to maintain 60 VIPR teams and restoring funding for Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Programs, my bill would also make law enforcement reimbursement available for surface transportation, increase the deployment of explosive detection K-9s to surface transportation, require a review of whether it is appropriate for people to be able to carry guns into public transportation areas, and direct the dissemination of best practices for securing against vehicle-based attacks such as the attack we witnessed recently in New York. A bill focusing on securing these aspects of our transportation system is long past due. Today's hearing is a great opportunity to start a meaningful conversation about how we can work together to make these systems more secure.

So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their security needs and how we can be helpful. Again, I thank my colleagues for joining me here today in Trenton and hope for a productive discussion today.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. [The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:]

#### STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN

#### NOVEMBER 28, 2017

The 12th Congressional District of New Jersey, in which we sit today, is connected by a complex web of transit systems. Every day, thousands of passengers pass through my district on NJ Transit, SEPTA, and Amtrak trains.

The safe and secure operation of transit systems is essential to the social and economic well-being of the people I serve. Their ability to travel safely depends upon the security efforts of today's panelists, who face a daunting task.

Terrorists have targeted soft targets such as subways, mass transit stations, and public airport areas in the United States and abroad. Last year, just up the road in Elizabethtown, five pipe bombs were found near a transit station, and one exploded as police were attempting to disarm it. Thankfully, there were no injuries, but the need to protect against threats to these systems is clear.

The emergence of a class of would-be terrorists who, with little to no training, financial support, or direction carry out "crimes of opportunity" against innocent people demands greater vigilance and collaboration at all levels of government.

Securing these critical transportation systems requires a layered, risk-based, well-resourced approach.

Unfortunately, the budget that President Trump proposed for fiscal year 2018 goes in the opposite direction and calls for draconian cuts to almost every relevant Federal program.

Last year, the president of the American Public Transit Association testified before a Senate subcommittee that transit agencies across the United States had identified \$6 billion in capital and operational security needs.

Yet, President Trump wants to cut the Transit Security Grant Program—the primary source of Federal security funds for most transit agencies—from \$88 million to just \$48 million. He also is proposing significant cuts to TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) program.

Under this program, TSA officers, Federal Air Marshals, and canine teams partner with transit police and other local law enforcement to carry out security operations within surface transportation systems and public airport areas. Under President Trump's budget, the number of VIPR teams would drop from 31 teams to just 8. Finally, President Trump is proposing a complete elimination of the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program.

Under this critical program, local law enforcement agencies receive partial Federal reimbursement for deploying officers at airports. In 2017, the program was funded at \$44 million.

The cuts that President Trump is seeking would come at the cost of the security of transportation systems in the 12th Congressional District and across the country.

Later today, when we return to Washington, I will be introducing a bill to push back against these reckless cuts. My legislation, the Surface Transportation and Public Area Security Act of 2017, seeks to not only restore, revamp, and resource important programs aimed at securing critical soft targets, but also greatly enhance Federal partnership with State and local stakeholders to protect these vital systems and the people who use them.

In addition to authorizing \$400 million for the Transit Security Grant Program, directing TSA to maintain 60 VIPR teams, and restoring funding for the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program, my bill would:

• Make law enforcement reimbursement available for surface transportation;

- Increase the deployment of explosive detection canines to surface transportation:
- Require a review of whether it is appropriate for people to be able to carry guns • into public transportation areas; and

Direct the dissemination of best practices for securing against vehicle-based attacks, such as the attack we witnessed recently in New York.

A bill focused on securing these aspects of our transportation systems is long past due. Today's hearing is a great opportunity to start a meaningful conversation about how we can work together to make these systems more secure.

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman. Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]

### STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

## NOVEMBER 28, 2017

I would like to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for holding today's hearing

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today. We know that your testimony today will provide the committee with insight as we focus our efforts on addressing Surface transportation security. Immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, resources were rightfully focused on building a Federal agency to protect the aviation sector. However, in the 16 years since the attacks, the threat to surface transportation has steadily increased.

Both Nationally and internationally, we have seen terrorists target surface trans-

portation systems. The 2004 commuter train attacks in Madrid, 2005 London tube bombings, 2015 Paris train attack, and 2016 metro station attacks in Brussels underscore that bustling surface transportation hubs are attractive terrorist targets.

Similarly, the surface transportation terrorist incidents domestically are trending upward as well.

For example, in 2008, an individual was arrested for sharing details of the Long Island Railroad with al-Qaeda in an effort to help bomb New York City's Penn Station

In September 2009, three individuals were arrested for planning to detonate backpack bombs at Grand Central Station and Times Square.

In 2016, police successfully detected and removed pipe bombs at a New Jersey train station.

And, just last month, a terrorist mowed down 19 pedestrians on a bike path in Lower Manhattan.

That ISIL-inspired attack resulted in the deaths of 8 people.

The Federal Government must do more to help State and local stakeholders make surface transportation systems more secure.

With each passing terrorist attack on surface transportation, our enemies grow more emboldened to commit these heinous acts.

Today's hearing provides the opportunity for an honest discussion about how the Federal Government can be a better partner with key stakeholders, like the ones represented by today's witnesses, to raise the bar with respect to protecting at-risk surface transportation systems.

Certainly, action on the legislation that Representative Watson Coleman, a leader on transportation security matters on the committee, will be introducing later today—the "Surface Transportation and Public Area Security Act of 2017"—would be a major step forward in putting the Federal Government on a path to making these systems, which are essential to our Nation's economy, more secure.

To the witnesses and those in the audience, I hope you will see today's hearing as a starting point for engaging with the committee on surface transportation security and continue to have an open dialog with the committee.

Mr. KATKO. We are pleased to have a group of distinguished witnesses before us today to speak on this timely and important topic. Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written statements will appear in the record.

Our first witness is Mr. Charles Cunningham, the director of homeland security and emergency management for the Delaware River Port Authority. Mr. Cunningham previously served in the Federal Bureau of Investigation—I was a Federal organized crime prosecution for 20 years, so I like you guys—and more recently was a national account regional manager at Allied Universal. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cunningham to testify for 5 minutes.

## STATEMENT OF CHARLES CUNNINGHAM, DIRECTOR, HOME-LAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, DELA-WARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY (DRPA) PUBLIC SAFETY/ PATCO

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, sir.

Good morning, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Congressman Fitzpatrick. Thank you for inviting me to discuss security at PATCO and Delaware River Port Authority. Joining me today is William Shanahan, director of government relations and grant administration at the Delaware River Port Authority and chair of the Philadelphia Area Regional Transit Security Working Group, PARTSWG.

Before joining the DRPA–PATCO in August 2017 as the director of homeland security and emergency management I served as a special agent in charge of the Richmond division of the FBI and was responsible for national security crisis response, counterterrorism investigations, threats throughout the State of Virginia. I oversaw and directed the Virginia Joint Terrorism Task Force as well as counterintelligence matters.

During my 22-year career in the FBI I also served as a chief of organized crime and chief of violent crime for the bureau. Before joining the FBI I served as a police officer in Montgomery County, in Pennsylvania and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  years as Pennsylvania State trooper. I am proud to have served honorably in the United States Air Force.

I am responsible for the physical security of the DRPA PATCO assets. This includes four major river crossings, one bridge, the Benjamin Franklin is designated as a top transit asset that connects Philadelphia and South Jersey regions, as well as the PATCO line. The hallmark of protecting our 100-square-mile territory is collaboration. We work closely with numerous other police departments and municipalities to ensure that capital investments are consistent with current security and homeland security strategies. The DRPA and PATCO police departments were unified in recent years. The department has 150 sworn officers and two K–9 teams. Previously when funds were available we had strategically and successfully deployed VIPR units, or Visual Intermodal Prevention and Response teams on the PATCO line and stations. Currently we routinely parole the entire PATCO rail transit settlement.

Through our regional transit security working groups, PARTSWG, we have developed a robust public security awareness program with our award winning "Look Up Speak Up" campaign. This campaign engages the public through targeted advertising on both traditional and social media. Results are captured through the scientific polling by Zogby Analytics. The campaign teaches the riding public to observe what doesn't appear to be routine.

Look up and either text, call, or email information and speak up to train transit intelligence professionals for analysis. This is coupled with security awareness training for civilian front-line employees with the focus on education, educating individuals to be aware of suspicious activity and to report that behavior.

One critical layer to our security is the structure on technological hardening of our infrastructure since 9/11. The DRPA–PATCO leadership has created a robust capital program, which is dedicated to enhancing our security posture by hardening our subway and transit rail systems communications and our bridges.

Another layer of PATCO security strategy is communication and intelligence sharing. At the Federal level we have an excellent working relationship with our DHS partners, FEMA, and TSA. We meet regularly and continually exchange information with regional partners, and we maintain an outstanding level of collaboration to thwart potential attacks.

We share intelligence with many law enforcement agencies on a daily basis through our PARTSWG group. DRPA–PATCO coordinates with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI Cyber Crimes Unit, Delaware Valley Intelligence Center, the DVIC, the New Jersey Real-time Crime Center, and many others. We have benefited from over \$60 million in direct and regional support of our security program from the Department of Homeland Security since 2005.

This funding was essential in creating a true regional effort to detect, deter, protect, and mitigate the threat of terrorism against our regional transportation infrastructure. But this effort is far from complete. Physical hardening and regional asset integration must continue. Operational and sustainability efforts must continue. Investments in cameras, sensors, et cetera must be protected by continuing maintenance programs, and digital records must be managed and stored.

We need to continue reaching out to the public. They are surely the force multiplier that we must continue to engage, and last but not least specialized intelligence for transit partners in the center of gravity of this effort.

Stopping those would do our riders—would do riders harm before an incident is the best-case scenario.

Unfortunately, the trend of shrinking National grant programs has limited our ability to move forward with our capital security mitigations. Since to 2005 the National program is less than halffunded. That means that projects that met all the criteria funding and were funded and executed several years ago are no longer eligible because the money is no longer there. We need to change that narrative and evaluate security projects based on their merits again, and not solely on whether there is enough funding to move forward.

I am proud to be part of the proactive Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness DRPA–PATCO team and help to protect the people who travel on our bridges and rail transit system, our employees, and the region in general. We have dedicated personnel who work extremely hard to ensure the safety of all of our stakeholders and the assets with which we are entrusted, and we look forward to continuing to work with you, our elected Representatives in the House.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cunningham follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES CUNNINGHAM

#### NOVEMBER 28, 2017

Good Morning Chairmen Katko and King, Ranking Members Watson Coleman and Rice, and Members of the subcommittees. Thank you for inviting me to discuss security at PATCO and the Delaware River Port Authority. Joining me today is William C. Shanahan, director of government relations and grants administration at the Delaware River Port Authority, and chair of the Philadelphia Area Regional Transit Security Working Group (PARTSWG). Before joining the DRPA/PATCO in August 2017 as the director of homeland secu-

Before joining the DRPA/PATCO in August 2017 as the director of homeland security and emergency management, I served as the special agent in charge of the Richmond division of the F.B.I., and was responsible for National security, crisis response, and counterterrorism investigations/threats throughout the State of Virginia. I oversaw and directed the Virginia Joint Terrorism Task Force as well as all counterintelligence matters. During my 22-year career in the F.B.I., I also served as the chief of organized crime and chief of violent crime for the Bureau. Before joining the F.B.I., I served as a police officer in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, spent 4½ years as a Pennsylvania State Trooper and I am proud to have served in the U.S. Air Force.

In the O.S. All Porce. In my present position, I am responsible for the physical security of the DRPA/ PATCO assets. This includes 4 major river crossings (one bridge, the Benjamin Franklin Bridge is designated as a Top Transit Asset), that connect the Philadelphia and South Jersey regions, as well as the PATCO line. PATCO is the only transit rail system that connects New Jersey with downtown Philadelphia. I also coordinate DRPA/PATCO efforts with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Pennsylvania and New Jersey National Guard, the New Jersey State Police (NJSP), the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), the Philadelphia Police Department, and many other local jurisdictions. I oversee the Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department and work closely with the DRPA/PATCO Police Department. The DRPA/PATCO Police Department has jurisdiction in 2 States (New Jersey and Pennsylvania), 13 counties, and 12 municipalities. The 4 bridges and transit rail system covers approximately 100 square miles. I am responsible for the implementation and execution of an overarching security strategy that offers maximum protection to the public, DRPA/PATCO employees, as well as the 4 bridges and the PATCO transit assets.

Before I discuss security in more depth, I would like to set the stage with some basic facts about the DRPA river crossings and the PATCO rail transit line. Every year, we move more than 115 million vehicles and riders on our bridges and rail transit line. We are one of the few transit systems in the United States that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. If just one of our bridges fail, it would have an immediate, massive, and detrimental impact on the regional transportation infrastructure. In addition, the secondary and tertiary impact on commerce throughout the 6th largest Metropolitan Region in the country would be devastating. Just rebuilding our assets alone would cost billions of dollars.

Protecting hundreds of thousands of people a day and multi-billion-dollar assets is a huge task. I can tell you that the DRPA/PATCO priority is clear: Ensuring the safety and security of our customers, assets, and employees. This entails ensuring the regional economic well-being, protecting iconic assets for future generations and ensuring resilience and sustainability for the region. To protect them, the DRPA/ PATCO employs a multi-layered security strategy to prevent, detect, deter, and mitigate the ever-evolving threat against the transportation sector. Portions of our strategies involve high-visibility methods, like increased uniformed officer and K– 9 patrols, and Public Security Awareness campaigns. Other methods are less visible, like structural hardening, advances in technology, intelligence analytics, and improved communications.

proved communications. The hallmark of protecting our 100-square-mile territory is collaboration. Let me explain. The DRPA/PATCO Police Department is responsible for patrolling the most heavily-used portion of our network, the Benjamin Franklin, Commodore Barry, Walt Whitman, and Betsy Ross bridges, as well as the PATCO rail transit system. We work closely with numerous other police departments and municipalities to ensure that capital investments are consistent with current security and homeland security strategies. Our agency has been involved with developing and employing both anti-terrorism and counter terrorism strategies and practices since 2001.

anti-terrorism and counter terrorism strategies and practices since 2001. The DRPA and PATCO police departments were unified in recent years and both assets are overseen by the chief of police. The department has remained consistent over the years at approximately 150 sworn officers that cover the 4 river crossings and the PATCO rail transit system. We currently have 2 K–9 teams that are available for use throughout the rail transit system, and we strategically deploy officers on trains and at the 14 PATCO stations in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Previously, when funds were available, we had strategically and successfully deployed VIPR or Visual Intermodal Prevention and Response teams on the PATCO line and stations as well as the high density multi-jurisdictional, multi-modal transit hubs. Currently, we routinely patrol the entire PATCO rail transit system.

Through our regional transit security working group (PARTSWG) we have developed a robust Public Security Awareness Program with our award-winning "Look up . . . Speak up" campaign. This campaign engages the public through targeted advertising on both traditional and social media. Results are captured through scientific polling by Zogby Analytics. The campaign teaches the riding public to observe what doesn't appear to be routine, *Look Up*, and either text, call, or email information, and *Speak Up*, to trained, transit intelligence professionals for analysis. This is coupled with security awareness training for civilian front-line employees. Since 2008, the Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department has conducted "awareness" training for 100% of new DRPA/PATCO employees. Using the general riding public and our front-line employees further augments our sworn police officers' efforts by encouraging vigilance, as well as educating individuals to be aware of suspicious activity and to report that behavior.

Behind the scenes, one critical layer to our security is the structural and technological hardening of our infrastructure. Since 9/11, the DRPA/PATCO leadership has created a robust capital program which is dedicated to enhancing our security posture by hardening our subway and transit rail system, communications, and our bridges. Critical stations and vulnerable areas have been identified and secured with a digital camera system and access control devices.

Another layer of the PATCO security strategy is communication and intelligence sharing. At the Federal level, we have an excellent working relationship with our DHS partners, FEMA, and TSA. We attend regular meetings and conference calls, and continually exchange information with regional partners. When potential threats are identified, they are communicated immediately. National events are often held within our area of responsibility and this outstanding level of collaboration, allows the DRPA/PATCO, and its regional, State, and Federal partners to work in concert to thwart potential attacks.

We share intelligence with many law enforcement agencies on a daily basis, through our PARTSWG group. We were selected to host the recent I–STEP exercise by TSA. DRPA/PATCO coordinates with the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI Cyber Crimes Unit, the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program, and the NJSP Counter Terrorism and Intelligence units, Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC), New Jersey Real-Time Crime Center.

We've benefitted from over \$60 million dollars in direct and regional support of our security program from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) since 2005. This funding was essential in creating a true regional effort to detect, deter, protect, and mitigate the threat of terrorism against our regional transportation infrastructure. But this effort is far from complete. Physical hardening and regional asset integration must continue. Our systems are large and spread out and each facility must be prioritized and hardened. Operational and sustainability efforts must continue. Investments in cameras, sensors, etc. must be protected by continuing maintenance programs and digital records must be managed and stored. We need to continue reaching out to the public—they are surely the expediential force multiplier we must continue to engage. And last, but not least, specialized intelligence for transit partners is the center of gravity of this effort. Stopping those that would do our riders harm before an incident is the best-case scenario. Unfortunately, the trend of a shrinking National grant program has limited our ability to move forward with our capital security mitigations. Since 2005, the National program is less than half-funded. That means that projects that met all the criteria for funding, funded, and executed several years ago, are no longer eligible because the money is no longer there. We need to change this narrative and evaluate security projects based on their merits again, and not solely on whether there is enough funding to move forward.

I am proud to be part of the proactive Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness DRPA/PATCO team and help to protect the people who travel on our bridges and rail transit system, our employees and region in general. We have dedicated personnel who work extremely hard to ensure the safety of all of our stakeholders and the assets with which we are entrusted. We coordinate with our law enforcement colleagues and we look forward to continuing to work with you—our elected representatives in the House—to keep our customers safe and our system secure. Once again, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I'm happy to answer any questions you might have.

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Cunningham, for your testimony. I now thank you for your service with the FBI and in your current position. We definitely appreciate you being here today.

Our second witness is Thomas Nestel, who currently serves as the chief of transit police at the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority. Previously Mr. Nestel was a chief of police for the Upper Moreland Township.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Nestel to testify for 5 minutes.

## STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. NESTEL, III, CHIEF, TRANSIT PO-LICE, SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (SEPTA)

Mr. NESTEL. Good morning, Chairman Katko, Congresswoman Watson Coleman, and Congressman Fitzpatrick. I count on the fact that the statement is part of the record, so I am not going to read you that statement. I would like to amend one section, and that is the paragraph regarding the special events that SEPTA has been responsible for providing service and add the upcoming Super Bowl Championship parade that we will be covering.

Mr. KATKO. It is nice to dream, Mr. Nestel. That is what I like to hear or should I say fantasize, one or the other—

Mr. NESTEL. I think that everybody that is coming here to address you today and each of you understands that technology is the greatest need in mass transit, and second to that is grant funding, so I am going to steer away from those two because I don't think that we can more strongly emphasize the fact that those two are necessary.

I want to bring to your attention a couple of other issues. I am a fourth-generation police officer. I have been a police officer for 35 years. When I got up this morning I still love my job. I love being a police officer. I think that the folks that are out on the line and working in cities and States throughout our Nation are dedicated people who are challenged every day with making the public safe. I have officers that I admire greatly who keep our system safe with a million rides a day.

I think that I have learned that presenting complaints is less memorable than presenting solutions, so I want to be remembered. I would like to give you some potential solutions to problems that I have recognized in my jurisdiction.

The first is the need for resources. Everyone needs resources. I think that the VIPR program was a wonderful program for us because the Federal air marshals teamed up with our officers and patrolled high-volume areas during special events. I think that that can be expanded to a number of Federal agencies that work in Philadelphia, who could supplement our patrols during specific times of the day to provide a counterterrorism front. We have to address crime control every day. We look to our partners to help us with terrorism prevention. So that is the first.

The second is communication. I know that every study that has been done and every investigation since 2001 says that interoperability and communication between agencies is very important. There are radios that we purchased that have the ability to speak in every county that we cover in Pennsylvania. That is five counties. Those radios are \$8,000. The issue that we have run into is that jurisdictional blockades are presented in using those radios in some jurisdictions because they don't want other police agencies communicating on their band. I think that the FCC could probably become involved and encourage multijurisdictional areas to be able to communicate on the same band if the radios are available. SEPTA committed to purchasing several of those radios, so it wasn't even a grant function, and yet we can't use it in some places. That is important.

The third issue is jurisdictional issues. Transit agencies have a unique jurisdictional challenge. During the Pope's visit a highranking police official from a jurisdiction showed up at a pre-planning meeting and read a letter saying that the Transit Police Authority ends at the sidewalk, and they do not possess police authority beyond that sidewalk. That is not the kind of jurisdictional assistance that needs to be had in policing and preventing terrorism. We need to have that ability for transit police to travel across State lines, to travel within county borders and to have the same police authority as the jurisdictions that are responsible for protecting that community.

So those are three recommendations and three issues that I wanted to bring to your attention aside from the technology and grant funding issues. I am happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nestel follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. NESTEL, III

#### NOVEMBER 28, 2017

Good morning Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, Congressman Fitzpatrick, and the other Members of the Transportation and Protective Security Subcommittee. Thank you for holding this important hearing on securing public areas of transportation systems. On behalf of our board chairman Pasquale T. "Pat" Deon, Sr., general manager Jeffrey D. Knueppel, and the members of the SEPTA Transit Police Department, I am grateful for the opportunity to testify today about security at the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) and discuss our policing strategies, technology deployment, and inter-agency partnerships.

My name is Thomas J. Nestel, III. I have served as the chief of the SEPTA Transit Police Department since August 2012. I began my career in law enforcement in 1982 as a patrol officer with the SEPTA Transit Police. I then served on the Philadelphia Police Department for 22 years, attaining the rank of staff inspector, and

later as the chief of police for Upper Moreland Township (Montgomery County, PA). I received a Bachelor's degree in Criminal Justice from Chestnut Hill College, a Master of Science in Public Safety from Saint Joseph's University, a Master of Arts in National Security Studies from the United States Naval Postgraduate School, and a Master of Science in Criminology from the University of Pennsylvania. I am cur-rently completing a Doctorate in Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania. SEPTA is the sixth-largest public transportation system in the Nation, and the largest in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, serving more than 4 million people living across 2,200 square miles in the five counties of southeastern Pennsylvania (Ruefic Chestern Dalaware Mantagement and Pennsylvania). The SEPTA system is

(Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia). The SEPTA system is an expansive multimodal transit system, operating buses, subways, trolleys, Re-gional Rail (commuter rail), trackless trolleys, an interurban high-speed line and paratransit. Regional Rail service extends to Trenton and West Trenton, New Jersey and Wilmington and Newsyk Delaware. The Authority 1000 (2000) and Wilmington and Newark, Delaware. The Authority maintains 230 active rail stations, over 450 miles of track, and more than 2,350 bus and rail revenue vehicles. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 2017, SEPTA provided more than 308 million unlinked passenger trips-an average of approximately 1 million trips each weekdayon 150 fixed bus and rail routes.

As chief of the SEPTA Transit Police Department, I have the honor of leading 270 sworn officers whose core mission—providing for the safety and security of SEPTA's 1 million daily customers, 9,400 employees and the communities we serve—is guided by a commitment to service, integrity, and professionalism. Formed in 1981, the SEPTA Transit Police Department is now the fifth-largest police department in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. SEPTA Transit Police officers are commissioned by the Governor and exercise full police powers in the five-county area served by SEPTA, as well as New Jersey and Delaware. SEPTA most recently received the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Gold Standard Award in 2016, scoring in the top 10 percent of transit agencies evaluated through TSA's Baseline As-sessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) Program, a voluntary evaluation of 17

security and emergency preparedness action items. The five southeastern Pennsylvania counties that make up the majority of the SEPTA service area are the engine of Pennsylvania's economy, generating 41 percent of the State's economic activity, with 32 percent of its population on just 5 percent of the State's economic activity, with 32 percent of its population on just 5 per-cent of its land. This degree of productivity would not be possible without safe, reli-able, and accessible public transportation. That accessibility and openness—hall-marks of what makes SEPTA, and all public transportation, such an important re-gional asset—are the very conditions that keep me up at night. SEPTA Transit Police officers work hard every day to respond to public safety matters and personal and property crimes while preparing for unknown and un-thinkable threats. Protecting SEPTA's multi-modal and heavily-used transit system from terrorism is an immense responsibility. The urgency of which L am places

from terrorism is an immense responsibility. The urgency of which, I am pleased to say, is understood and shared by SEPTA leadership, SEPTA Transit Police, Fed-

eral, State, and local law enforcement partners, and our employees and customers. Uniformed police officers patrolling the SEPTA system are the most visible public face of our policing efforts, riding buses and rail vehicles, patrolling stations and reduce crime and make SEPTA safer.

In addition to regular patrols, SEPTA's policing activities are augmented by Special Operations Units that assist in the day-to-day operations of the police departweapons of mass destruction detection and prevention. SEPTA special operators serve in a variety of units

- The members of SEPTA's Special Operations Response Team (SORT) Unit have received specialized training to handle situations such as armed hijacking, hostage situations, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) and tactical response. The SORT unit is comprised of 12 officers, 2 sergeants, and 1 lieutenant
- SEPTA's Canine (K-9) Unit currently has 14 specially-trained bomb-sniffing dogs (4 TSA-certified), who are deployed along with an officer to the daily unat-tended bag reports. These rapid response teams are the foundation to swiftly evaluate the threat of an unattended bag.
- The Tactical Unit teams of uniform, canine, and plainclothes officers are specifically deployed during peak travel hours to address crime patterns and quality
- of life issues throughout the transportation system. The Transit Police Department's Criminal Investigations Section (CIS) inves-tigates crimes committed on SEPTA property. The CIS works with many local, State, and Federal law enforcement departments and has a detective assigned to a regional FBI Multi-Agency joint Terrorism Task Force.

While well-trained and properly-equipped police personnel are both the first and last line of defense, technology is an indispensable part of SEPTA's security and counterterrorism efforts. It expands the reach of law enforcement to every corner of our service territory, it enables and maximizes the effectiveness of inter-agency coordination and communication, and it puts critical information into the hands of officers patrolling our vehicles and stations.

Closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras are a critical component of SEPTA's policing strategy, with approximately 27,300 fixed and mobile cameras deployed throughout the system. Cameras in stations can be viewed live, allowing SEPTA police and operations personnel in SEPTA's Control Center to monitor activities and incidents in real time. These virtual patrols allow Transit Police officers to provide greater coverage and deliver valuable information to responding officers. Camera footage on vehicles can be downloaded at the scene of an incident and this information has aided SEPTA and Philadelphia Police in the apprehension of suspects and securing convictions.

securing convictions. SEPTA took the lead in developing interoperable communications with the hundreds of law enforcement and public safety departments in the communities SEPTA serves. SEPTA developed a radio interoperability system (RIOS) that allows dissimilar communications systems to communicate during major incidents when more than one agency responds to more than one scene. Additionally, because so much of SEPTA's transit infrastructure in the city of Philadelphia is underground, SEPTA is investing approximately \$25 million to replace 40-year-old radiax cable in the Market-Frankford Subway and Broad Street Subway, and procure new radio equipment for the Market Street, Trolley, and Regional Rail tunnels. This will upgrade SEPTA's subsurface communications, and will enable Philadelphia police, fire, and emergency medical services that operate on a different bandwidth from SEPTA, to communicate both above and below ground.

communicate both above and below ground. Earlier this year, SEPTA partnered with a ELERTS Corp. to release SEPTA Transit Watch, a mobile app that empowers SEPTA customers to discreetly report security or safety issues directly to SEPTA Transit Police in a matter of seconds. The National "If You See Something, Say Something" campaign has taught us that our customers play a vital role in helping secure the transit system as well as their fellow riders, and the Transit Watch App is a way for them to communicate with SEPTA Transit Police and provide real-time information that can make a critical difference to responding personnel.

difference to responding personnel. In partnership with Amtrak, New Jersey Transit and PATCO, SEPTA is an active participant in the regional "Look up. Speak Up" transit security campaign. Upon being named General Manager in 2015, Jeff Knueppel renewed and strengthened the Authority's commitment to safety and security—making safety the foundation of everything we do. Through the annual "Make the Safe Choice" safety awareness day and monthly safety blitzes, SEPTA provides customers with information and resources to be safe and observant riders and remind them of the key role they have in helping keep their fellow customers safe. Similarly, SEPTA holds two annual "Never too Busy for Safety" employee safety

Similarly, SEPTA holds two annual "Never too Busy for Safety" employee safety days for managers and direct reports to discuss safety protocols and concerns. SEPTA employees, along with our customers, are the eyes and ears of the system, last year, our entire workforce received training on anti-terrorism and security awareness to help identify suspicious incidents or individuals and how to properly report them. This year, SEPTA employees received video instruction on what to do in the event of an active-shooter situation. Because SEPTA regularly and proactively engages its customers and employees on matters of safety and security, and not just when issues arise, SEPTA has credibility when reaching out to customers to "Look up. Speak up" or "See Something, Say Something."

Securing public areas of transportation systems against terrorism and mass casualty incidents requires regional, inter-agency collaboration, training and information sharing. Federal, State, and local law enforcement coordination proved vital over the past several years as the Greater Philadelphia region hosted major National and international events, including the 2013 United States Open, the 2015 Papal Visit, the 2016 Democratic National Convention (DNC) and the 2017 National Football League Draft (the Papal Visit and DNC were both National Special Security Events (NSSE) under the direction of the United States Secret Service).

Preparedness and tactical assistance from the Department of Homeland Security, TSA, and FBI are also invaluable resources for local and regional coordination. Following National or international terrorism or mass casualty events, TSA shares information and threat assessments with transportation law enforcement officials that have helped SEPTA evaluate procedures and develop new responses and protocols. In response to a recent TSA Security Awareness Message regarding rail and track infrastructure, SEPTA responded by deploying aerial drones as a force multiplier in delivering security on our track network.

However, it is the day-to-day intelligence and resource sharing that is such an effective law enforcement tool. In this region, we are fortunate to work effectively with the Philadelphia Police Department, the Philadelphia Fire Department, the Philadelphia Office of Emergency Management, the Pennsylvania State Police, county and local law enforcement, and our partners in public and rail transportation, including PATCO, NJ Transit, DART—members with SEPTA of the Philadelphia Area Regional Transit Security Working Group (PARTSWG)—and Amtrak.

SEPTA is a working partner in the Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC) initiative—the regional intelligence fusion center that integrates Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to facilitate information and resource sharing to enhance the region's ability to detect, prevent, and respond to emerging threats, terrorism, and other suspicious activities. SEPTA has an officer assigned to the DVIC and video feeds from SEPTA transit facilities are made available to DVIC personnel in real time.

The Department of Homeland Security's Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) is perhaps SEPTA's most effective Federal security partnership. The TSGP provides funds to operators of public transportation systems to protect critical surface transportation assets and the traveling public from acts of terrorism, and to increase the resilience of transit infrastructure. From this grant program, SEPTA has funded closed CCTV cameras on vehicles, multi-jurisdictional counterterrorism emergency simulation drills on various transit modes, directed SEPTA Transit Police Patrols in strategically-designated areas during periods of elevated alert using specially trained anti-terrorism teams, hazardous material identification kits for SORT operations, the purchase of explosive detection devices, intrusion detection and surveil-lance equipment, and bulletproof vests, upgraded mobile communications and Control Center monitoring equipment, installation of video surveillance cameras at transit facilities, RIOS implementation, and maintenance of a computer-aided dispatch and records management system (CAD/RMS) for the Philadelphia region. The grant has also funded SORT and K-9 patrol teams. However, as funding for the grant program has been significantly reduced in recent years, SEPTA has been severely limited in its ability to use TSGP funding for anything other than sustaining existing special operations teams.

From fiscal year 2012 to 2017, SEPTA received \$15.3 million in TSGP funding, including \$3.8 million in fiscal year 2017. On average, SEPTA typically receives one-third of the TSGP funding that it applies for, and while these are 3-year grants, SEPTA generally expends its allotment during a single fiscal year. Like most Federal programs, demand for TSGP far outpaces available funding, and funding Nationally for TSGP has dropped by 75 percent since 2009. If not for SEPTA absorbing the cost, critical security and antiterrorism activities would go unfunded. SEPTA, and transit agencies across the Nation, are partners in securing their communities and preventing acts of terrorism. We need strong Federal support to ensure our efforts are effective, and I am grateful to the Members of this subcommittee for working to preserve the program and authorize increased funding for transit agencies to support this National priority.

ing to preserve the program and distance is support this National priority. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee on SEPTA's efforts to secure our system for our customers, employees, and the region. I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

Mr. KATKO. That is amazing. It is almost 5 minutes exactly. Not bad. Thank you, Mr. Nestel, for your testimony. We appreciate you taking time to be here today.

Normally I would continue introducing the witnesses, but Mrs. Watson Coleman I think would like to introduce the next two, and Mrs. Watson Coleman.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our next witness is Mr. Douglas Lemanowicz. Did I slay that?

Mr. LEMANOWICZ. No, ma'am.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you so much. Mr. Lemanowicz is a member of the Fairleigh Dickinson University School Safety Board. He also helps to provide analysis of school violence and school shootings to Homeland Security personnel. He is a New Jersey State Trooper, and is currently assigned as a unit head for the urban search and rescue unit within the emergency management section.

Prior assignments were on the technical emergency admission specialist unit with the NJSP Homeland Security branch and special operations section. Through his specialized training Mr. Lemanowicz has gained experience in special weapons and tactics, counterterrorism methods, weapons of mass destruction, crisis preparedness, and active shooters. We are delighted to have you here.

Mr. LEMANOWICZ. Thank you.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. We welcome your testimony.

## STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS LEMANOWICZ, LIEUTENANT, SPE-CIAL OPERATIONS SECTION, NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. LEMANOWICZ. Thank you for the opportunity. The New Jersey State Police is comprised of four primary branches: Administration, Investigations, Homeland Security, and Operations. Through these branches and other specialized offices the division maintains a network of information sharing and collaborative efforts to conduct effective operations. The members within these groups also maintain critical relations with outside agencies to promote abilities to counterterrorists and criminal activities and numerous critical infrastructure sectors and countless soft targets.

Presidential Policy Directive 8 National Preparedness describes the Nation's approach to preparing for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risks to the security of the United States. National preparedness is defined as the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the Nation. Through the guidance of PPD–8 frameworks consideration must be given to enhancing and fortifying capabilities in preventing, detecting, and deterring the threats and attacks within the State of New Jersey.

The threat of terrorism and the acts of violent crime has become too common in the United States. The New Jersey State Police assumes the great duty in defending the State against terrorist attacks and violent crimes. Preparedness is a shared responsibility and requires a whole community effort to promote safety and resilience through a common goal. It is vital that all partners build, organize, and enhance capabilities in a unified approach to be better prepared to counter all hazard threats in our communities.

A mission within the division of the State Police is to develop innovative strategies and partnerships with public and private entities to prevent, interdict, protect, and respond to threats that target our State. Through communal target hardening and coordination protective measure consultation infrastructure and event vulnerability assessments, real-time data analysis and situational awareness tracking, interagency communication, and direct counterthreat operational deployments our goal is to thwart terror.

The Office of Target Hardening was established in a special operations section in the Homeland Security branch in July 2016. Their primary mission is to effectively implement and develop target hardening strategies to deter terrorist activities. This office works collaboratively with other specialized groups within the division, as well as with other Federal, State, county, and local mission partners. This is demonstrated in the monthly meeting at the Regional Operation Center known as the ROC where mission partner representatives assemble to discuss new intelligence, special events, current threats, lessons learned, best practices, and operational recommendations. These partners include but are not limited to the New Jersey State Police Threat Analysis and Critical Infrastructure Units, Joint Terrorism Task Force, Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Transportation Security Administration, New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, and the National Counterterrorism Center. The New Jersey State Police is—excuse me. These daily, weekly, and monthly discussions are our cycle of

These daily, weekly, and monthly discussions are our cycle of preparedness where we as a team of teams auto-adapt to the evolving threat through collaboration, information sharing, intelligence, prevention, awareness, and response. The Division of State Police deploys target-hardening missions regularly due to the shared network from our mission partners. The Office of Target Hardening organizes and directs New Jersey State Police units, which specialize in explosive and hazardous materials detection, suspicious activity detection and interception, counterassault tactics, maritime security, commercial motor vehicle and motor coach safety, aviation surveillance and insertion operations, and highway transportation systems resilience in two target areas. This office also deconflicts with other agencies and specialized units in order to conduct safe, coordinated prevention and protection-based operations.

Today's threat of environment domestically and internationally is wrought with an ideology committed to the destruction of established Western culture. The world has seen a significant spike in foreign and domestic terrorist attacks resulting in death, destruction, intimidation, and fear. The United States is the ultimate prize for those seeking to strike a blow at our way of living. This ideology is evident in the rise of home-grown violent extremist attacks utilizing both complex and rudimentary means. As a State we witnessed and responded to these types of attacks during the September 2016 New Jersey and New York bombings. The terrorist threats we face are only limited by the creativity and sense of purpose of those planning and executing them.

In addition, law enforcement officers and military personnel have become a preferred target of those seeking to do harm. In order to be able to continue to detect, deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist and criminal activities our law enforcement must continue to develop its capabilities. Collaboration and information sharing are most vital pieces that need to be nurtured in order to sustain strong relations. Stakeholders need to be able to train, equip exercise personnel, as well as provide routine education to develop decision-making abilities. Our first preventers should be prepared with the institutional knowledge of the threats of practices in order to mitigate radicalization and immobilization phases before our men and women in blue encounter them as first responders.

Counterterrorism and target-hardening operations need effective means of communications and plans that are interoperable and standardized. The State of New Jersey lacks digital technologies and personnel to support planning and operational phases and providing consistent real-time interagency communications during a multi-agency phase to an incident or an event. We collectively must continue to foster sustainable relationships, enable efficient information exchange, and implement an integration and analysis function to inform planning and operational decisions in order to protect our citizens and critical infrastructure in unified approach. Thank you.

### [The prepared statement of Mr. Lemanowicz follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS LEMANOWICZ

### NOVEMBER 28, 2017

The New Jersey State Police (NJSP) is comprised of four primary branches: Administration, Investigations, Homeland Security, and Operations. Through these branches and other specialized offices, the division maintains a network of information sharing and collaborative efforts to conduct effective operations. The members within these groups also maintain critical relations with outside agencies to promote abilities to counter terrorist and criminal activities in numerous critical infrastructure sectors and countless soft targets. Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) describes the Na-

Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) describes the Nation's approach to preparing for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United States. National preparedness is defined as the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the Nation. Through the guidance of PPD-8 frameworks, consideration must be given to enhancing and fortifying capabilities in preventing, detecting, and deterring of threats and attacks within the State of New Jersey.

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These daily-weekly-monthly discussions are our "cycle of preparedness" where we, as a team of teams, auto-adapt to the evolving threat through collaboration, information sharing, intelligence, prevention, awareness, and response. The Division of State Police deploys target-hardening missions regularly due to the shared network from mission partners. The Office of Target Hardening organizes and directs NJSP units, which specialize in explosive and hazardous materials detection, suspicious activity detection and interception, counter assault tactics, maritime security, commercial motor vehicle and motor coach safety, aviation surveillance and insertion operations, and highway transportation systems resiliency, into targeted areas. This office also deconflicts with other agencies and specialized units in order to conduct safe, coordinated prevention and protection-based operations. Today's threat environment domestically and internationally is wrought with an

Today's threat environment domestically and internationally is wrought with an ideology committed to the destruction of established Western culture. The world has seen a significant spike in foreign and domestic terrorist attacks resulting in death, destruction, intimidation, and fear. The United States is the "ultimate prize" for those seeking to strike a blow to our way of living. This ideology is evident by the rise in Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) attacks, utilizing both complex and rudimentary means. As a State, we witnessed and responded to these type of attacks during the September 2016 New Jersey and New York Bombings. The terrorist threats we face are only limited by the creativity and sense of purpose of those planning and executing them. In addition, law enforcement officers and military personnel have become a preferred target for those seeking to do harm.

In order to be able to continue to detect, deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist and criminal activities, our law enforcement must continue to develop its capabilities. Collaboration and information sharing are most vital pieces that need to be nurtured in order to sustain strong relations. Stakeholders need to be able to train, equip, and exercise personnel as well as provide routine education to develop decision-making abilities. Our "first preventers" should be prepared with the institutional knowledge of the threats and practices in order to mitigate radicalization and mobilization phases before our men and women in blue encounter them as "first responders." Counterterrorism and target-hardening operations need effective means of communications and plans that are interoperable and standardized. The State of New Jersey lacks digital technologies and personnel to support planning and operational phases and in providing consistent real-time, interagency communications during a multi-agency response to an incident or event. We collectively must continue to foster sustainable relationships, enable efficient information exchange, and implement an integration and analysis function to inform planning and operational decisions in order to protect our citizens and critical infrastructure in a unified approach.

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Lemanowicz, for your testimony. We appreciate you taking the time to be here today, and you definitely are thought-provoking like the others have testified before you. Mrs. Watson Coleman.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony, and thank you for emphasizing the need to be collaborative and to interact because Mr. Katko and I are constantly talking about whether or not information is being shared in real time and best practices and things of that nature, so thank you.

Our next witness is Mr. Trucillo, Mr. Christopher Trucillo. Mr. Trucillo was sworn in as the chief of New Jersey Transit Police Department on July 26, 2010. He began his law enforcement career in 1978 as a municipal police officer in Harrison, New Jersey. In 1986 he joined the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department where he rose to the ranks to become the chief of the department. Chief Trucillo was instrumental during the aftermath of September 11, 2001, transforming the transit police into an antiterror force.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Trucillo for his testimony, and thank you for being here today, sir.

## STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER TRUCILLO, CHIEF, TRANSIT POLICE, NEW JERSEY TRANSIT

Mr. TRUCILLO. Thank you, Congresswoman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee. I welcome this opportunity to appear before you today and discuss the challenges of securing passengers utilizing surface transportation in New Jersey, New York, and this region.

As the Congresswoman mentioned, before joining the Transit Police Department I served as the chief of the department for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and while there I was the commanding officer of the the port authority bus terminal in Manhattan and Newark International Airport. As the chief of that department I was responsible for the busiest aviation system in our Nation, as well as the PATH system where at that time we moved 240,000 people a day between New York and New Jersey.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me. We appreciate the important role this committee has in matters related to transportation security, and I and the agency look forward to working with you.

Just a little background on New Jersey Transit. We are the third-largest transit agency in the Nation. We are also the Nation's largest State-wide transportation system. We encompass over 5,000 square miles. We provide almost a million trips a day. We have 257 bus routes, 12 commuter lines, three light rail systems and our paratransit system. We have 166 heavy rail stations, 62 light rail stations in this State, and over 19,000 bus stops.

Mr. Chairman, the transportation services provided by New Jersey Transit are vital to the economic well-being of our State and the region. We provide an essential service to the nearly 10 percent of all New Jersey commuters who use and depend on New Jersey Transit. It is important to note that these services reduce traffic congestion by providing commuters alternatives to our crowded highways and trans-Hudson crossings.

Mr. Chairman, as you know public transit agencies have unique security challenges due to the large numbers of people we serve in publicly-accessible facilities traveling on predictable schedules. Over and over we have seen carnage inflicted by radicalized extremists on innocent people using publicly-accessible spaces. Just recently on a public bike path in nearby Manhattan and unfortunately mass transit systems world-wide continue to be a preferred target of terrorists. Our most important priority is keeping our customers and employees safe, as we continue to provide essential transportation services.

Safety and security are obviously the top priority for everyone in New Jersey Transit and within the transit police department. Counterterrorism is this police department's No. 1 priority, and we take that mission very seriously. New Jersey Transit utilizes a risk-based approach to our security efforts.

In all hazards and threats the police department's intelligence section provides the agency with strategic-level risk management tools in support of our counterterrorism efforts and coordinates intelligence collection analysis and production efforts, including reporting and monitoring of suspicious activity and individuals. They work cooperatively and collaboratively with the FBI offices in Newark, New York City, Philadelphia, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TSA, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security, NYPD, and the State Police State Fusion Center.

Mr. Chairman, Members, almost all of our over 11,000 employees at New Jersey Transit have received security awareness training. From conductors, the bus operators, to office staff, our employees are force multipliers, extra eyes and ears for the police department. We also work in cooperation with the hundreds of businesses located near train stations to encourage them to report suspicious activity.

We also continue to work closely with those first responder agencies at the municipal, county, and State levels. To give you an example, several times a year we take partner agencies to Texas A&M at a DHS center of excellence for incident command so we can train together for an event, God forbid, that may happen here at home. To date we have trained over 600 New Jersey Transit employees from all business lines, not just the police, as well as over 500 of our partner agencies, some of whom are at this table today. To assure that we are prepared and able to respond adequately to a terrorism incident, the Office of Emergency Management conducts 5 to 7 exercises every year within the State with those partners.

Our ability to respond quickly and capably has been enhanced further because this year we opened an emergency operations center. State-of-the-art operations center, which we have already used this past summer with Amtrak work out of Penn Station New York.

The EOC provides information and support to incident management and coordinates all response and recovery efforts when there is an incident. We, as my partners have mentioned, also promote our customers to see something and say something. We have 800 lines, text tip lines. We also have a new mobile app that people can buy tickets and use a digital ticketing, and on that app it gives them an opportunity with one press of a button to report something into our police department.

While we don't give out specific deployment information about how we deploy our police officers, we use as my partners have mentioned many different tools that are seen and some not seen to protect our passengers. We have specialized police officers who are all fully certified in urban search-and-rescue. Their skill sets came to bear recently when we had the Hoboken train accident in Hoboken, New Jersey.

We have explosive detection K–9s, which are probably our most important deterrence. We are also a test bed for TSA's office of requirements and capabilities analysis formerly science and technology.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee, every one of these efforts that I have spoken of requires resources. We simply could not carry out our mission without the help and support of Congress and the Department of Homeland Security. We believe that increased Federal investment in public transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical to that effort.

New Jersey Transit has made great strides in transit security improvements in the recent years, but much more needs to be done. So we are very grateful for the interest and focus of this committee and the subcommittee and very grateful to Representative Coleman for her efforts. They are not only most welcome, they are essential.

We look forward to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and Congress to further these needs. On behalf of New Jersey Transit and the New Jersey Transit Police Department I again thank you and the committee for allowing us to submit testimony on these critical issues. [The prepared statement of Mr. Trucillo follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER TRUCILLO

#### NOVEMBER 28, 2017

Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I welcome this

oportunity to appear before you today to discuss the challenges of securing pas-sengers utilizing surface transportation in New Jersey, New York, and the region. Before joining New Jersey Transit in July 2010 as the chief of police for the New Jersey Transit Police Department, I served for 5 years as the chief of department for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department. During my 23-year career with the Port Authority I served as the commanding officer of inter-nal afficies and spacial invastigations the commanding officer of the Port Authority nal affairs and special investigations, the commanding officer of the Port Authority bus terminal in Midtown Manhattan, as well as the commanding officer of Newark Liberty International Airport

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing, "Securing Pub-lic Areas of Transportation Systems: Stakeholder Perspectives." We appreciate the important role of this committee in matters relating to transportation security, and we look forward to working with you on these issues.

## ABOUT NJ TRANSIT

NJ TRANSIT is the third-largest transit system in the country and also the Nation's largest State-wide public transportation system in the country and also the Na-tion's largest State-wide public transportation system serving an area encompassing 5,325 square miles. We provide more than 915,000 weekday trips on 257 bus routes, three light rail lines, 12 commuter rail lines, and through Access Link, our para-transit service. We serve 166 rail stations, 62 light rail stations and more than 19,000 bus stops linking major points in New Jersey, New York, and Philadelphia. Mr. Chairman, the transportation services provided by NJ TRANSIT are vital to the economic well-being of our State and the region. We provide an essential service to the nearly 10 percent of all New Jersey computers who use and depend on the

to the nearly 10 percent of all New Jersey commuters who use and depend on the NJ TRANSIT system. It's important to note that these services reduce traffic congestion by providing commuters with alternatives to our crowded highways and trans-Hudson crossings.

#### OVERVIEW

Mr. Chairman, as you know, public transit agencies have unique security challenges due to the large numbers of people we serve in publicly-accessible facilities, traveling on advertised predictable schedules.

Over and over, we have seen carnage inflicted by radicalized extremists on innocent people using the most publicly accessible of spaces, just recently on a public bike path in nearby Manhattan. Unfortunately, mass transit systems world-wide continue to be preferred targets of terrorists.

Our most important priority is keeping our customers and employees safe as we continue to provide our essential transportation services. Safety and security are the top priority for all of NJ TRANSIT and within the New Jersey Transit Police Department—counterterrorism is our primary mission, and we take that mission very seriously

NJ TRANSIT utilizes a risk-based approach to maximizing our security efforts to protect our trains, buses, light rail vehicles, and stations from all hazards and threats. The Police Department's Intelligence Section provides the agency with strategic-level risk management tools in support of our counterterrorism efforts and coordinates intelligence collection, analysis, and production efforts, including the reporting and monitoring of suspicious activity and individuals, with the FBI's Newark, New York City, and Philadelphia Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the U.S. Depart-ment of Homeland Security and the TSA, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Secu-rity and Preparedness, the NYPD, the New Jersey State fusion center and other partners.

Almost all of our 11,000 employees have received security awareness training. From conductors to bus operators to office staff, our employees are "force multipliers"-extra eyes and ears for our police. We also work in cooperation with the thousands of businesses located near train stations to report suspicious activity.

In addition, we continue to work closely with first responding agencies at the municipal, county, and State levels. To give you just an example, several times per year members of New Jersey Transit's police, operations, and administrative staff partner with local police, fire, and EMS agencies in Incident Command Training at Texas A&M University. To date, more than 600 transit employees and over 500 of our partners have participated in these joint exercises.

To ensure that we are prepared for and are able to respond adequately to a terrorism incident, the NJTPD Office of Emergency Management conducts regular drills and exercises that ensures that our response to terrorism incidents is both effective and well-coordinated with our local, State, regional, and Federal partners. Our ability to respond quickly and capably has been further enhanced with the

Our ability to respond quickly and capably has been further enhanced with the opening earlier this year of a new, state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center, which is a critical tool that allows effective, efficient, and economical management of any event in one central location that could (or does) impact transit operations. The EOC provides information and support to incident management and response/ recovery coordination activities. NJ TRANSIT also promotes a campaign urging customers who see suspicious ac-

NJ TRANSIT also promotes a campaign urging customers who see suspicious activity or unattended packages at stations, aboard trains or buses, or near transit facilities to call the NJ TRANSIT security hotline at 1–888–TIPS–NJT, text us at NJTPD, or notify a New Jersey Transit Police officer.

The NJ TRANSIT mobile app for smartphones includes convenient one-touch access to call or text the New Jersey Transit Police Department directly. So, not only can customers purchase digital tickets by using the app, they can also easily say something if they see something. All calls are investigated, and all information is confidential.

Mr. Chairman, while we do not release details about police deployments or specific countermeasures, our uniformed police patrol officers remain vigilant in monitoring our system. I am pleased to say we recently graduated 25 new officers (who happened to attend the nearby Mercer County Police Academy, which I'm sure Representative Coleman is familiar with), and we have another class of 16 recruits which will graduate from the Essex County Police Academy on December 14 of this year. Our uniformed officers are supported by plain clothes detectives and anticrime officers throughout the NJ TRANSIT system.

Our Special Operations Division provides enhanced capabilities to protect and respond to terrorism on our system. Random baggage screening performed by our Emergency Services Units provides us with the capability to detect and respond to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive materials. ESU along with our Train Patrol Units and Conditions Tactical Unit also provide a specialized tactical response capability with unique training and capabilities specific to the mass transit environment.

Our canine unit officers along with their explosive detection dogs perform perhaps some of our most important functions. These officers along with their canine partners do not just detect explosives throughout the NJ TRANSIT system but their presence provides an effective visible deterrent against our adversaries.

presence provides an effective visible deterrent against our adversaries. Every member of the department is equipped with radiation pagers and we have tripled the number of officers trained in the use of long guns. We continue to work closely with the TSA's Office of Science and Technology to test the next generation of technology that will be utilized to secure surface transit.

## CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, every one of these efforts that I have spoken of requires resources. We simply could not carry out our mission without the help and support of Congress and the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security needs; we believe that increased Federal investment in public transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. NJ TRANSIT has made great strides in transit security improvements in recent years, but much more needs to be done. So we are very grateful for the interest and focus of the committee and the subcommittee, and very grateful to Representative Coleman for her efforts. They are not only welcome—they are essential.

We look forward to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and Congress to further address these needs. On behalf of NJ TRANSIT and the New Jersey Transit Police Department, I again thank you and the committee for allowing us to submit testimony on these critical issues, and look forward to working with you on safety and security issues.

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Trucillo, for your testimony, and I appreciate you being here, as well. The normal protocol at this time is for the Chair of the subcommittee to start with questioning, but

given the fact that Mrs. Watson Coleman and myself work in such a fine and bipartisan manner, and given the fact this this is the home turf, I am going to give her the honor of going first with questions. Mrs. Watson Coleman.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, thanks, each and every one of you for your testimony. I did read your testimony, and I am very impressed with the kind of robust and comprehensive training that the people that work for you have, not only those on the front lines, but even some of those who were in support capacities. It does make us feel better that these issues are being addressed.

I have a couple of general questions. One question, I don't know if you have had the opportunity to travel into other countries and to see what sort of security measures or technologies they employ in Europe and other places that would be very helpful to us here and very helpful to you that you don't have access to now. So I am wondering if you could just quickly share with me some of those things that you have observed if you have, and I will start—

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, I don't mind answering that question myself, also. I traveled extensively with the FBI and what I noticed in most of the European, as well as Asian is that there is a presence on the platforms absolutely. In Europe it is mostly an armed presence with K–9s actively walking and patrolling the entire length. It is not just one. It is multiple, and they have teams. That is the biggest that I have seen.

The other thing is, is that they also have a propensity for cameras, and I just know that—and assuming this position that I have now, the cost of maintaining them is also a consideration, and that is what sort-of happens. If you employ cameras from 2003, 2005 they are pretty much outdated and now, you know, are needed to be revamped, and so it is a big cost, but that is what I have noticed internationally is the presence on the platforms, and it is manpower. It is putting them out there, and meanwhile doing the other things that you have to do.

Mr. NESTEL. I think that if you go anywhere outside of the country you see a very robust camera network. We would love to have that. That doesn't exist for most transit agencies, I think, in the United States right now.

They also have things that you don't see, and those are chemical detection systems on trains and on platforms and also scanners, weapon scanners. All of that technology is being used elsewhere and is not as prevalent here in the United States.

Mr. LEMANOWICZ. In many ways our operations are there to support the different sectors, so in terms of us looking at a transportation sector we come in as a deployment model as a strike team to support the on-site, but the cameras would be a big piece, and when we are there we are bolstering that effect of having resources on scene, but when we are not, again, they are at their minimums that they are able to sustain.

I would also recommend that digital technology is continually on the rise, and it is not just—if we can put members out on the platforms or in terminals and things like that, but it is the accountability of our members, so from a management side, so when you have a critical incident, a catastrophic incident, that you know real-time where your people are and because of the radio traffic just gets overwhelmed.

So we are—in many ways we have come, we have improved since 9/11 with our communications, but in many ways we haven't made it to that point, and there are some simple systems out there that other countries are using, and it is not being Big Brother and where is my personnel, it is more of when something happens how do we quickly get them and communicate to them what is going on? Then you have a real-time two-way feedback of that situation.

Mr. TRUCILLO. I have had the opportunity while at the port authority to travel to London and to Israel to see how they handle security. In London the big difference that I noticed was the camera system that my colleagues mentioned, very robust, very coordinated, all the disparate systems no matter where they are are tied in, so it literally is one system, and operationally it was very good.

In Israel it is the mindset that everyone understands how important security is to their nation, and that I took back with me and that is why I mentioned earlier counterterrorism is the No. 1 mission of every New Jersey Transit police officer. They have to know that, not because I say it but because they are trained to that, and our training reflects that.

The other thing that I noticed in Israel, again, was the randomness of the way they do their patrols. The difficult thing we deal with in mass transit is not having the people to necessarily cover everywhere we have risk, and none of us can afford, nor do I believe as a Nation we can afford to put a police officer everywhere.

But we should be able to in a random way have someone who is preoperatively looking at a target, have a risk that a police officer is going to be there, that they should not be able to observe a target for a week and never have seen a police officer at that location because that is a very bad message to send to an adversary, that this is a very easy target. So I believe that was what I picked up from being overseas.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So it seems to me that both additional personnel, so that there is a robust presence, obviously K–9s that can detect explosives and gases and things of that nature, and so my question is, have you had a chance to review the sort-of proposed budget and have any idea how it would impact what you think you need as opposed to what you would be getting in any of those categories? For instance, the budget proposes just reducing VIPR teams to 8 teams.

It doesn't even propose necessarily the kind of support to the surface transportation facilities. The grants that would help you to hire people and I guess get other things has gone from \$88 million proposed to \$48 million. I am going to introduce a bill today that you know, I am hoping that Mr. Katko gets a chance to look at and find areas in which he can support because both of us are very interested in ensuring as well as Mr. Fitzpatrick.

It is very important to us that these surface transportation facilities, the infrastructures and operations are given the kind of attention that TSA doesn't seem to be giving them now and that the resources don't seem to be bearing out.

Mr. TRUCILLO. If I may, I can mention it very directly in two specific areas in terms of the decrease in the transit security grant program. You heard me talk about the training we do, and this training is critical. The drills, the exercises, you know, there is a saying that my colleagues and I all know. You don't want there to be a major event, all show up, and that is the first time you are seeing folks.

You need to have these relationships, get this collaborative working knowledge before you ever get to that scene, and through the drills and exercises that we are able to do, and the only way we do it is through the transit security grant program where we train together. We travel to a specialized facility to train together. These relationships are incredible.

I am going to go back just for a quick moment to that Hoboken train accident. We had over 350 people on this train when it crashed into Hoboken. They were all extricated from that train, evacuated from that train in a half-hour. There were 107 injuries in that incident. They were all triaged and transported to hospitals in under 1 hour.

In emergency management that is a remarkable job. That happened because everybody who responded to that scene has worked together before, has drilled together before.

The second item that would be critical and we would not be able to do what we do now if we lost the grant program my colleague from SEPTA mentioned it earlier special events. For instance, transit we have a train station within 100 yards of a football stadium. We have 16 football games every Sunday. NFL, AFL, every Sunday there is a game, and we have trains that go out to that stadium that we have to protect. We have concerts, festivals, fairs. They are all targets of opportunity. They are all where large crowds gather. Without the ability to put officers as a deterrent at these events, we are vulnerable, and those are two specific ways that a decrease in that grant program is going to have a tangible impact. Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. I guess one question I have is to what

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. I guess one question I have is to what extent do you rely upon the local police to participate in whatever needs you have in securing your surface facilities at events, at special events or just, you know, under normal circumstances because that particular program is slated for elimination, and we think that that is particularly problematic? Anyone.

Mr. NESTEL. I think that police departments and local jurisdictions are already stretched thin and have way too many responsibilities, which is why we ended up being formed in the first place. They can't assume the responsibilities that we are responsible for.

The gaps that exist because of the grant funding decrease from nearly \$200 million to \$80 million is very painful for the transit agencies. We have a significant K-9 explosive detection function, and, Congresswoman, if a bag is left unattended, if we don't get to that bag quickly we have to stop the system. This happens every day. So we have multiple K-9 units throughout our system that can respond within minutes to clear that bag to make sure that it is not a threat.

For us at SEPTA we have a special operations response team, which is basically a SWAT and rescue team that was funded through the transit grant program. We are not getting those funds now. So it has a dramatic effect on those specialized functions that are so important to transit right now. Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. I will yield back at the moment. I hope we have another round.

Mr. KATKO. We will be happy to do so, Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, and thank all of you gentlemen for being here today, as I said earlier.

As I was sitting here I was thinking you have  $12\frac{1}{2}$  times the number of passengers that travel on the airlines every year, and not only do you have the safety and prevention aspect you also have a law enforcement aspect that they don't have to deal with at airports very much, that is the unruly passenger, the unruly crowds at Eagles games, things like that.

So you really are wearing more than one hat, and I really commend you for the job you are doing. It is quite remarkable, given the target of opportunity that daily presents itself in your realm that you have kept people as safe as you have, and our Nation really owes you all a debt of gratitude and all your colleagues, so I want to thank you for all you do to keep people safe every day.

One thing I learned when I was a Federal organized crime prosecutor is that task forces are critical. Task forces at Federal, State, and local law enforcement are the force multiplier you need to really draw on the expertise and the manpower issues to get the job done. So it is really heartening to hear how well that concept works and it seems like necessity is the mother of invention, and everyone knows you want to keep people safe, so it is a lot easier to get them to work together under those circumstances, but that is really very important.

One thing that I was concerned with in my days as a prosecutor was the interoperability issue with radios, as well. We had a lot of those concerns, and I heard that from I think it was you Mr. Nestel or——

Mr. NESTEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KATKO. I would like to hear a little more about that and how we can help fix that because to me that should be an easy fix, and it is frustrating at times to me that when, you know, not all law enforcement agencies were on the same frequencies, and it is just maddening that we can't fix something as easy as that, so I would like to hear something we can do to fix that first of all.

Mr. NESTEL. Look, Congressman, the technology is there. It is expensive. Once it is expensive it is getting over the hurdles of jurisdictional acceptance. When a different jurisdiction is speaking on your radio band, it is the different languages, it is the control of those conversations. It is access to information. You know, there is always a concern when your radio communication is being monitored by others that you don't know.

So there are obvious hurdles that have to be crossed before we can have that ability to communicate. During an emergency we have interoperability where we can plug in from SEPTA headquarters, we can plug in all the local jurisdictions on to one band to handle that emergency. It exists. We have it.

This is the normal day-to-day communication. You know, a suspicious person in a track area between Warminster and Hatboro in Bucks County, would warrant communication with that jurisdiction, and we would have the ability to just switch a radio band and the officers responding would then be on the band of that jurisdiction, who is also responding. That is a huge benefit for us. Huge benefit. So it would be cost and it would be logistics of acceptance.

Mr. KATKO. OK. Thank you. Anybody else want to add to that?

Mr. LEMANOWICZ. There is a, it is called Statecom, which most of all our agencies across the State, as well as all local municipal county resources can all jump on.

We are in a process right now in trying to identify certain channels and right now so like a target-hardening channel where it is made up of different agencies, and they are going around with VIPR teams and other groups in an overt and covert capacities in a prevention and protection-based model; not response, prevention and protection.

So that is the collaboration part, but how do we talk? It is through these group channels. It is not taking ownership of another agency's primary, it is just giving an opportunity that they can quickly click over to this channel and speak.

So in terms of a special event, the Papal 2 years ago, we operate off of Statecom, Super Bowl, Statecom all these different special events. Now we think of a significant incident, you think about the Seaside and the bombings in New York, we were able to now move to a Statecom channel to now collaborate all resources on to that.

So now it is a point of education and training and exercising and you get everybody to get comfortable in using it, but like you said, it does exist.

Mr. NESTEL. Congressman, one-

Mr. KATKO. Sure.

Mr. NESTEL. One follow-up. Manufacturer, there are several manufacturers of radios and what we have seen is that when we try to integrate those systems using different manufacturers there is often another hurdle that comes up that there is a concern that there will be communication interference or not a smooth transition using different manufacturers. I am not a communications expert. I don't know if that is a realistic concern, but I know that it is an organizational concern.

Mr. KATKO. OK. OK. Now I am going to briefly touch on K–9s. It is amazing in this era of modern technology, which I will get to in a moment, that people often get back to saying K–9s are one of the most effective methods and tools we have in our arsenal, and it is also amazing to me how little they are really utilized. So does anyone want to kind-of share some opinions as to why that is, that K–9s aren't more readily used?

Mr. TRUCILLO. I won't speak to why they are not used. I will reaffirm what you mentioned, Congressman, about how important they are. I believe that it is probably the single best deterrent that we could have.

Mr. KATKO. We hear that all the time in the airport realm, as well, isn't that amazing?

Mr. TRUCILLO. You asked me what we can do to protect—the singular thing we can do to protect mass transit I would say put a K–9 and a trained partner in every train station, and I don't think you would have a better deterrent than that.

Mr. KATKO. OK. Anybody else?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. We have used the K–9 dogs when we shut down the bridge or we have a race that is being run like Loch Run or one of the other ones we searched 7,000 bike riders' bags with those dogs and were able to get them down to the shore before they arrived. I mean 7,000 bags, so irreplaceable.

Mr. Katko. OK.

Mr. NESTEL. I think that it cuts the needs for staffing because ordinarily you would have a two-officer team. That dog serves as a partner. It also serves multiple functions. It is not just an explosives detection, it is tracking of escaping persons. It is community relations. The dog has multiple functions, and the dog is much cheaper than electronic technology. It does the same thing.

Mr. Katko. OK.

Mr. LEMANOWICZ. Captain Scott Poulton in the audience. He was pretty much one of the supervisors in building this task force, this detection render safe task force for the K–9s State-wide capability in recalling in a preventative or in a response function for a special event or incident. But as everybody here at the table has said, they are a phenomenal resource, and many times it might just be seen that they are scent tracking a—you know, trying to find a suspicious item, but many times we start to think about the tactics that they are using overseas now it is not just an article of an item, it is an individual, it is a vehicle, and what we are finding now is we have to adapt, and that is going to require funding and training and exercise to now adapt to our threat, and that is a moving vehicle, that is a moving individual.

We don't have air—you know scent trackers that are moving with an individual. They come on to an article or an item and they scent it, but in terms of a moving subject our K–9s across the State at a local, county, and State, Federal level they still need that extra training so that is a huge piece for our future in combatting any type of terrorist.

Mr. KATKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Three words; funding, training, exercising, essential.

Mr. KATKO. The fourth word is savings, right, in some respects in compared to technology you are going to try, that may not work. Let's get to the technology a little bit. I am constantly frustrated, I think I might share this sentiment to my colleagues, when I note that Homeland Security is not the best at procurement, and it is not the best at getting technology to the front lines, and I will give you an example. We are at an airport in Amsterdam where they have American-made technology 3D scanners that are being implemented now. Now. Now. They are on the front line. They are working now. They are using them now. The Homeland Security Agency wants to study them until 2019, and hopefully get them on-line by 2019.

In the meanwhile the technology is probably going to advance because the bad guys are always advancing, and we know that what it takes to bring down an airplane is getting a smaller and smaller device. So with that being said, is there any one thing that we can get Homeland Security to do to get—help you get the technology to the front lines quickly other than money? Is there something in the process that is flawed that needs to be addressed or adjusted that we are missing because we are constantly on them, but it just seems to me that they can't get that process going in a timely manner.

I mean, Mrs. Watson Coleman and I were at a refugee camp on the border with Syria, and each refugee got \$28 a month. They never got the \$28 a month, but they had a \$28 voucher, and they would go into like this collective grocery store, 85,000 people on the Syrian border in the middle of the desert in the middle of nowhere they used American iris scan technology to detect who was using the money and how much was left in their account, and we don't even use that at airports today.

So with that being said, anyone want to share any thoughts on that?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I have one thing. We have 732 cameras on either the PATCO line or on the bridges. Integration, they are not integrated. What is the sense of having those cameras? Who can monitor that many? The ability, the analytics is—the capability is there, but the integrative factor of intrusion detection and alarm systems and the cameras themselves is essential, and so that is something that I am looking forward to trying to hoping the grant program, and that is why I brought Mr. Shanahan along with me—

Mr. KATKO. The grant man.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM [continuing]. To just force the situation that funding is essential and integration is essential, and I know that Tommy Nestel, this is a key thing for all of us on a regional level.

Mr. KATKO. Gotcha.

Mr. NESTEL. Congressman, I don't think anybody at this table is going to say that technology isn't one of the biggest pieces for securing mass transit, it truly is. I don't know where Homeland Security is testing it, but I will tell you I will push my peers out of the way and volunteer that it be on SEPTA.

We all need this technology. It is expensive. None of us can afford it. We look forward to the time where the tested opportunity becomes a reality, but it just doesn't seem to happen for us.

You know, each one of these agencies spends its own dollars to move forward with technology now rather than wait until, you know, that 5, that 10 years later when it is going to be at the point where we really need it because in 5 or 10 years it is going to change.

Mr. KATKO. Right. The TSA does the innovation lanes in our airports, but I don't know if they do much in the way of innovation with respect to service transportation, that is perhaps what I am going to get them to go with, but the bottom line is when the ideas are there and it takes so long to get them implemented because of their internal processes that is very frustrating for us.

Mr. TRUCILLO. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, New Jersey Transit, we volunteered to be a test bed for science and technology, the division within TSA.

We have been working hard with them, testing things like chem biodetection undercarriage screening. For instance, when we had to safeguard rail cars for the Super Bowl it was bomb detection, and we can get in the car and we can visually see the exterior of the car, but we were worried about the undercarriage. So they developed an undercarriage screening that at speed could read the underside of the rail car and give us a level of comfort before we sent that car within the secure perimeter to the State police.

So they are making some strides, but it is frustrating because those strides are coming very, very slow. I am not a science guy, but I believe technology has got to be the answer, but unfortunately, that technology is apparently not here yet.

Mr. KATKO. Yes. The problem is a lot of times it is here, it is just not getting implemented in a timely manner. Well, do you have anything to offer?

Mr. LEMANOWICZ. In making the transition in my career from urban search-and-rescue to special operations, and as a former special operations operator, and now as an operations officer and coordinator, the main thing is to go by the KISS method, and keep it simple; and for me, keep it simple, stupid. So all of our personnel are being tasked probably more than they can. Do more with less. For us to try to keep up with technology and deploy it the way we would envision it where the we see in the movies and it is not practical.

But in terms of going back to communications, so, and not talking prevention-based but talking about a response incident, they are on the rails, they are in some type of terminals, and they are now the immediate actors, you know, counter-assault personnel. They are trying to deal with a threat. How do you bring in the resources that are needed? We have actors now that are calling in SWAT incidents SWATing incidents to see how we respond to make, you know, to now try to—how can we counter their capabilities?

So it is very important for us to look at it in terms of making it very clear across all channels of the communication aspects of radio, but how could we use digital technology to make it very simple in terms of what is happening right now and then when you have additional resources coming in how can you provide a GIS layout of what the area of operation it is to make it very simplified to immediate point of contact? Very simple things. From there these men and women are trained in their tactics, and they can handle it.

Mr. KATKO. Thank you very much. I went well over my time, so I won't ask any questions in the second round, but, Mr. Fitzpatrick, the floor is yours sir.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to our region. To the Ranking Member, thanks for hosting us in your district and thank you all of you for being here. No. 1, thank you for what you do. I know it is not easy. It is a very, very significant responsibility under difficult circumstances, so I want to thank you for that and also thank you for testifying today because the recommendations that you share with us are very, very important. They become part of the Congressional Record for one, and second, we really do take these recommendations back to our committee, back to the floor of the House and they do in some form or fashion influence the final product, which is relevant to keeping everybody safe here in this country.

I want to touch on two issues. No. 1 is interagency cooperation. I formally was Mr. Cunningham's colleague in the bureau, and I know he can attest to the importance of task forces and the role that they play, and it is not just State-to-State, Federal-to-Federal, but it is Federal-to-State. I can tell you that in the area of Safe Streets task forces, bank robbery task forces, JTTFs the synergy that was developed not only the camaraderie and the relationships but everybody bought something unique to the table. Every single agency on different levels had something unique to offer to those investigations, and when we talk about force multipliers I think that plays into that.

Technology is important. K–9s are important. We talk about the force multiplier aspects. I think task forces are really important, which gets to my question. For task forces to work the relationships have to be good. We all know, and this isn't unique to law enforcement, it exists in all sorts of organizations, but often times there can be competitive jurisdictional battles, sometimes battles over funding that can hold back the success of task forces.

So my first question is: What can you share about what is working and what is not working in respective areas that you work with the task forces on both the State and Federal level?

The second is when it comes to the budget often times it is an issue of prioritization, and a lot of times those edicts come from the top of the Executive branch, and they may or may not be consistent with what you all are seeing based on you having your ears and eyes to the ground, knowing the threats on a more intricate basis than maybe the people that are at the top making the decisions and issuing the priorities that impact your funding and where it is going and what you can and can't do in keeping us safe.

So if we can just address those two issues, the task force and sort-of the relationship aspect to it, and second, on is there any disconnect between the priorities that sometimes are issued on high that affects the priority of where your funding streams are going and whether there is a disconnect between what you really need?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Well, first, the task force for us kind-of thing is our working group. For Tom Nestel and myself the DART team, we also have New Jersey Transit, and part of—is part of our group, the regional group, that works tremendously well. I will say one thing, though I found out that we had funding for two analysts who were working at the DVIC and providing transit transportation surface work as well, you know, processes and intelligence threats they were working on. That grant is running out, so we are not going to be able to fund it anymore, so those two analysts that were working and doing some things for us are now not going to be there.

We spoke to the people at the DVIC and the commanding officer there, and they are going to try to pick up that, but, again, there is a gap that causes there. Working together and cooperatively is fantastic as far as as I see, and the openness is there. It is what do we need, and we get back to the same thing. It is funding and direct, you know directed patrol funding, it is money to put systems in. It is the integrated. It is to make us better, you know, jointly, and that seems to be what is lacking, mainly the funding.

The camaraderie, the ability or the willingness is there. It is no longer a divided field, if you will. If I need something from the New Jersey State Police I feel very comfortable that I can go there and get whatever it is that we need, intelligence-wise or whatever. So I will open it to Tom.

Mr. NESTEL. I am going piggyback on exactly what you said, Congressman, and that was the value of task forces is beyond just the investigative function that they are serving is the development of the people that you assign to that task force is huge. The personal relationships that they develop in that Federal organization, State organization, local organization. The added resource. I know that I can call the detective on the Joint Terrorism Task Force on the FBI Violent Crime Task Force, on the DEA Task Force, I can call any of those detectives and immediately get resources from those organizations because of our participation and because of the relationships that are built.

When it comes to the transit group, this transit group, we have a phenomenal relationship, and, you know, it might be a case in other places where there is sparring over grant funds, that doesn't occur with our group. There is great collaborative effort when it comes to the grant funding and the group efforts, but Charlie hit the nail on the head. Somewhere above our group one of the most important parts of preventing terrorism is the intelligence element. You know, if we are relying on that cop on a platform to stop it, then a lot of things have failed to get to that point. We no longer will have an analyst after January, and that was funded by grant funding that we all agreed on, and it is gone.

Mr. LEMANOWICZ. The concept of the task force is what gets the job done. I have seen it with the USAR task forces. I was involved with that for 7 years. When a local or a county entity needed a good resource—they call it the USAR task force in the State. It is usually Task Force 1.

Now in terms of operations we have a bomb task force, we have a K–9 task force. You want the job done, you call the task force. Now we are in the process of the last year of building it is not called a task force yet, but we are essentially a planning task force that has built up at the ROC where you have all these entities and all these different agencies and offices coming together, sharing intelligence, and trying to develop a strategy to combat terrorism.

In itself it is a planning task force, and then that is what now gets put into the operational theater of how can we through operations prevent and detect and deter.

Mr. TRUCILLO. I think in terms of the task forces I agree with Charles in the south it is very good, and you heard the chiefs talk about it.

In the north the regional chief's task force with the transit part, NYPD Transit, New Jersey Transit, Amtrak, Port Authority, the MTA, I have been in this business for a long time, and I have been in the transit business for a long time, and I remember when TSA was stood up.

Those were difficult times. That was a head-butting time I gotta tell you. Thankfully we are beyond that, I believe. We are working together and cooperatively. That is the good news.

To your first point, Congressman, about the prioritization, I am very worried about that because transit agencies are not wellheeled. We all know the economic troubles that all transit agencies have. When you are trying to move people, your top priority every day, things will fall by the wayside, but my colleagues and I, our job is safety and security of those people who are using the buses and the rails.

We can't necessarily look at the budget and say, well, we are not going to put somebody there because we can't afford to put somebody there. If the situation and the intelligence dictates that somebody needs to be there, they need to be there. The grant funding gives us that ability to put that officer there. Without that grant funding we are putting people in harm's way, I believe.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. So beyond, and I think everybody not just on this panel, but in the room probably agrees that funding is the priority. Beyond that what is it, and this is a tough question, I acknowledge that, but beyond the funding constraints what is it that is frustrating when you are out doing your job every day, what is it that is holding you back? What is the causes of frustration beyond the resource issue?

Mr. TRUCILLO. I think from my perspective, and you touched on it earlier, we all deal with other issues. In transportation facilities we see a very high level of homelessness, drug addiction, mental issues, and we cannot say that our primary mission is counterterrorism, therefore, we are not going to deal with these issues. We have to deal with those issues. When we are dealing with those issues as best we can, we are being taken away from that primary mission.

So that is frustrating that in certain cases there aren't the services available to treat those with addiction, with homelessness issues. The mental health issue is probably the biggest problematic issue. People that come back day after day after day that you can't seem to move away from the transit facility to get them the help that they need. So that is my biggest frustration.

Mr. NESTEL. I am jumping right on that. Homelessness, poverty, and the opioid crisis are what takes up all of our time during the course of the day and redirects our efforts from crime control and terrorism prevention. Those social ills are absolutely the things that are most frustrating for us.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Just to change the tone of that for us and for transit that is traveling again it is jurisdiction, it is the ability to smoothly transition from location to location. Our officers cover in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. I think that is a factor that weighs on this kind of thing. We don't have necessarily the kind of issues that they were mentioning there, but one of the things that needs to get out is that—and I think Mr. Nestel said it about what happens in Israel, everybody feels like they are part of the solution, that they are all contributing no matter they are a store clerk or, you know, working as a police officer or a military person. They all have the same goal.

We try to put that out through our PSA kind of information, but if it came from like a National kind of method, as well, like to foster that attitude that because when I ride the train, too, even though we want them to look up and speak up and we want them to see something, say something, nobody is looking up. They are looking at their phones. The message has to be somehow we get it to them through that system or, but we have got to get them to communicate, too. Mr. FITZPATRICK. Well, I want to thank you all for sharing that, and I think it is a reminder to us up here that issues we deal with outside of the Homeland Security Committee are very relevant to what we deal with in the Homeland Security Committee.

Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. KATKO. Thank you very much, and I happen to chair the Mental Health Task Force, and I think you will probably—I am not sure you even know this, what is the No. 2 cause of death for people 24 and younger? Suicide. Number 10 cause of death for all Americans is suicide, and for every suicide attempt there is about 22—every suicide there is about 22 attempts, and you think about the cost to society and how little is being spent on mental health in this country and the crisis that it is. It far outstrips the opioid crisis, and look at what that is doing to our country.

So just be shocking to the mind going forward, but Mrs. Watson Coleman is going to have the last word here, so Mrs. Watson Coleman, you are up.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you very much, and thank you Mr. Fitzpatrick for coming here and Mr. Katko for holding this hearing. This has been very illuminating, and I thank you very much, you have been very helpful.

VIPR teams is something that I don't know because I am a dog lover or what but I recognize that they are vitally important, and in the piece of legislation that we are proposing—that I am proposing today it does include a significant increase in those teams somewhere upwards of 200 dogs in that situation.

Thank you for raising those sort-of cultural issues that also impact your ability to do your job and made me think about the budget and what could possibly happen as a result of some of the proposals that are taking place, including this tax reform proposal and what it might do to those people who are homeless, you know, who are addicted and who are impoverished. It certainly makes their life a little bit more difficult.

The last thing is that I just wanted to ask you this question, what do you have to say about sharing best practices and knowing whatever information exists that can help prepare us for things like what happened with that truck that ran into those bicyclists? It concerns me because it doesn't take a lot of education, it takes no education, obviously it takes no core value, it doesn't take any training, it just means that you are hell-bent on killing somebody, so these sort-of automobile-related terrorist attacks weaponizing our cars and our trucks, if you have anything that you would like to share that we might be thinking about as we move forward and what we need to do. That is my only last question other than to thank you. Anybody?

Mr. TRUCILLO. I will take a stab at that, and it deals with my trip to Israel. This was post-9/11 in 2005 where everyone, everyone was aware of the possibility of terrorism. My host said to me, "Chris, I can't believe that in America you are not doing more of this." I said to him, "Nicky, as horrible as 9/11 was, it would take many more 9/11s for Americans to give up their freedoms." I think we are torn as a Nation between giving up our freedoms and dealing with this specter of terrorism that keeps tapping on our shores. I think we just as a people need to be more aware. It sounds simplistic, but we need to be very aware every day at all times of our surroundings, and that sounds very simplistic, but unfortunately, I believe that that is where we are in society today.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Kind-of connected to that National message you were talking about, see something, say something. Yes, yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Katko. I yield back. Sorry, sorry, sorry.

Mr. LEMANOWICZ. I am a fan of education, and you have your front-line men and women, and many times in terms of what they gather through their own experience, however, there is a way of changing that mindset from a first responder to a first preventer, and that is through education. Not just the experience. If we can always chase TTPs the terrorists' tactics, techniques, and procedures, and sometimes, you know, you have a couple hits the same type of tactic in Rumiyah be published in the ISIS magazine and they are pretty much telling their people how to put it out, and now you will see it, you know, being conducted the same type of tactic in each country, including here in the United States.

It comes down to education. There is a program now CTCs, the counterterrorism coordinators. So it is trying to get down from a Federal down to a local level and educate them in terms of what are the best protective measures, so when you talk about a train platform or you talk about a special event, no matter what the theater of operational area is they know what the best means of, hey, how do I create a strong perimeter?

A reason why, because of these vehicles, because of these suicide bombers, because of what they could potentially bring in, and it is that. So that is something again it is developing, but it always needs support and that is providing education across all from Federal right down to local and using these counterterrorism coordinators as that mechanism to branch out to the municipalities.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Just one point. I totally agree with what the lieutenant said, and terrorism is asymmetrical now, I mean very asymmetrical with the advent of domestic terrorism and home-grown kind of things.

So I do believe that that kind of—that it is a constant training because the methodologies and the methods that are being employed now we have to plan for hotel rooms and apartments and parking lots above us to be looking out for whether it is going to be an active shooter, if you will, from above.

So everything has to be changed, and we have to adjust on the fly. All the officers have to adjust and learn from everything else, and it is important the sharing of information, best practices things like that is essential to our business in the transit and transportation industry.

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. KATKO. Thank you all very much. I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony today. It was excellent. It was very thought-provoking, and it gives us a lot of things to talk about and go back and take a look at what we can do to further help you in your mission to keep all of us safe. So we want to thank you for that. The Members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to these in writing.

Pursuant to committee rules the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Before I adjourn I just want to thank, once again, my colleagues from the local area here Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mrs. Watson Coleman for putting this on and Mrs. Watson Coleman in particular for your leadership on this one.

It is a very important issue. We spent an awful lot of time looking at airports and air travel, but this is another huge area that we need to make sure we pay attention to. So thank you very much, and with that the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]