

Testimony Before the House Committee on Homeland Security on “Countering Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Security.” Wednesday, March 5, 2025. 310 Cannon House Office Building.

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Good morning Chairman Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and members of the Committee on Homeland Security.

Thank you for the opportunity to be one of your witnesses to comment on the subject of dealing with the China threat to U.S. national security.

I am a fan of this committee’s work on China. One vivid example is your February report on the committee website titled “China Threat Snapshot,” which provides voters with a detailed description of Chinese espionage in the last three years.¹ The revelation of these details will sicken American patriots. Another example: The committee has been rightly skeptical about the *2025 Annual Homeland Security Threat Assessment*, raising questions about how China is described. I would hope that the authors within the department’s 800-person Intelligence and Analysis unit are doing something more about China than the report seems to indicate.

My first recommendation today is that the committee provide focus by developing a list of specific initiatives on China to win the much-discussed strategic competition. There are some good ideas in Senator Tom Cotton’s new national number one bestseller, *Seven Things You Can’t Say About China*. I would recommend that everyone buy this short book of 30,000 words. I can’t resist revealing the seventh point he makes: “China May Win.” Now, as Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Cotton describes a world in which China will “supplant” America as the dominant superpower.² This is an important concept that I’ll return to. Our new CIA Director, John Ratcliffe, has also committed at his confirmation hearing to focus on the greatest threat: China. In this context, what exactly can the Committee on Homeland Security do? What is its comparative advantage among other committees and with respect to the executive branch?

Today, there is no shortage of ideas about how to deal with the threat from China. The problem is these ideas are often not relevant, filled with loopholes, or may never be implemented. The challenge we face is that ten years of complacency may stretch into ten more years. I served as a co-editor of one of the Heritage Foundation’s special reports, *Winning the New Cold War: A Plan*

¹ House Committee on Homeland Representative Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, “China Threat Snapshot,” <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/CCP-Threat-UPDATED-Feb-2025.pdf>

² Tom Cotton, *Seven Things You Can’t Say About China* (New York: Broadside Books, 2025), 154

*for Countering China.*³ We assembled as many legislative ideas as we could find to deal with the China threat. We found more than eighty and broke them down into four categories in our publication. Many of the ideas were proposed by single sponsors and a few co-sponsors, but didn't make it past committee.

China is watching this American inactivity. During my visits to China since my 2015 book, *The Hundred-Year Marathon*, was published, Chinese officials and scholars have pointed out how weak the American Congress has been in dealing with the China threat. Chinese think tanks and professors keep careful track of our China policy. A common Chinese view is that efforts by America's Congress to counter China have been vague and often watered down to mere rhetorical flourishes. Still other legislative proposals just disappeared in conference. Remember that Communist China's experts on American politics usually have American university degrees and read our press carefully. We lack equivalent coverage of China's politics, in part due to massive Chinese secrecy about issues we care the most about.

When I ask Chinese experts on America to score who is ahead, the answer is always "China."

In 2000, the National Defense University published my book on how the Chinese government scores power among nations using complex quantitative formulas. To my surprise, the Chinese translated that book and it was sold in China as *China Debates the Future Security Environment*.⁴ I revealed estimates by the PLA and other government sources that China would be equal or surpass America by around 2020—not in terms of GDP, but based on a more complex scoring system called Comprehensive National Power, or CNP. Soon after, China stopped making these forecasts public, although Xi Jinping himself often refers to the concept of CNP.

My recommendation is that we need to score our competition with China like any other game or match, just like how we count football touchdowns. But first, we need to decide what to cover.

The Heritage Foundation's *Winning the New Cold War* did not evaluate through an index of indicators the extent to which we are succeeding or failing in the Marathon against China. My speculative scoring (over the last two years since it was published) of the eighty legislative initiatives it assembled would be China: 80, America: 0. We would do better if we had concrete indicators showing what we should accomplish over the long term. This would enable legislative initiatives to turn into tangible outcomes which would give us what President Trump called "leverage" in his 2015 book.⁵ Frankly, we might have to go beyond legislative initiatives,

³ Heritage Foundation, "Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China," <https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2023-07/SR270.pdf>. See executive summary, 5-15. See also the final chapter by Michael Pillsbury, "The Way Forward," 116-118.

⁴ Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000), <https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/index.html>

⁵ Donald Trump, *Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2015), 45

embracing ideas like committee letters to the President or cabinet secretaries or a congressional committee visit to Beijing to convey seriousness and learn the source of Chinese arrogance stemming from their rise, as Xi Jinping repeats in speeches.

Why is this happening? The Heritage Foundation's special report, *Winning the New Cold War*, has highlighted that one source of China's success has been its successful lobbying by unregistered agents supported by the CCP who exploit a loophole in the Foreign Agents Registration Act.⁶ In the past few weeks, the U.S. Attorney General, Pam Bondi, has been seeking comments on tighter control of Americans acting as agents for China, but the public commentary to Justice seeks to block these crucial improvements. You can see for yourself by going to the DOJ website to read the debate.⁷ Foundations and universities who want to be rewarded for their pro-China advocacy fear the shame they would suffer if they had to register publicly as "foreign agents." If the online replies to Bondi's effort are any guide, Chinese lobbying operations inside our country will have free rein. After all, the criminal penalty for failure to register is five years in prison for each count.

Last month marked the ten-year anniversary of the publication of my book, *The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower*. In 2015, despite clear indications to the contrary, Washington was only just coming to the realization that China represents an existential, geopolitical threat to the United States. The book thus outlined twelve steps at the end that American policymakers would need to follow to compete in the so-called Marathon against China, the long-term race to the position of global superpower that we find ourselves in today.

Ten years after my attempt to alert Washington to the urgency of the 100-year Marathon, we have made almost no progress. It might be fruitful for me to walk through each of my twelve steps—which are even more pertinent today—to pinpoint the path that we need to follow in order to make up for our delayed start in the Marathon.

I must note the parallel recommendations offered in another best-selling book that appeared ten years ago called *Great Again: How to Fix Crippled America*. As I alluded to earlier, the author was President Donald J. Trump. Mr. Trump asserted correctly that there are two different kinds of Chinas: a good China that built great cities and provided housing and education for millions of people, and a "bad China," the one that "is the one mostly hidden to outsiders."⁸ Its government controls internet access, engages in political repression, stifles free expression, arrests dissidents, restricts individual freedoms, and launches cyberattacks.

⁶ Heritage Foundation, "Winning the New Cold War," 7

⁷ "Amending and Clarifying Foreign Agents Registration Act Regulations," *Federal Register*, January 2, 2025, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/02/2024-30871/amending-and-clarifying-foreign-agents-registration-act-regulations#>

⁸ Trump, *Great Again*, 42

Mr Trump was one of the first to identify the long-term China threat to our country. His stark conclusion in 2015 was the same as mine: We've been losing the battle to China for a long time. Trump warned that our economies are tied together in a very negative way. In his assessment, he used the exact same word as I did: "replace," writing that "economists have made predictions that within the next decade, China will replace the United States as the world's largest economy."⁹ Then, he raised the subject of this hearing today: "What have we done to beat them?" His answer was "I'll tell you what we've done. We've rolled over."¹⁰ They have "destroyed entire industries by utilizing low wage workers, cost us tens of thousands of jobs, spied on our businesses, stolen our technology, and have manipulated and devalued their currency, which makes selling our goods more expensive - and sometimes, impossible."¹¹

Mr Trump and I had parallel recommendations about the idea of leverage. Trump asked, "So what should we do about it? We're going to use the leverage we have to change the situation so that it favors America and our people. I've negotiated with Chinese companies. I know how they do business."¹²

Mr. Trump's diagnosis was more poignant than my book. He created a sentence I wish I had written which is still valid today: "When dealing with China we need to stand up to them and remind them that it's bad business to take advantage of your best customer."¹³ In words that sound like they were only spoken yesterday, Trump wrote, "We should sit down and figure out how to make this a more equitable relationship."¹⁴

Let's turn to my twelve recommendations, which remind us that we have been addicted to China and that we need to end our dependence and instead use our leverage, as Mr. Trump advised, to get back on track.

The first step I proposed then was the most basic one, and fortunately, perhaps the one where we can say that we have made some limited progress: recognizing that China is a competitor. Even if we have come to a general recognition, there are still strikingly some voices on both sides of the political aisle that hold out naive hopes about Beijing's future. Just recently, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer—who has expressed great concern over Trump's China tariffs¹⁵—was spotted posing for photos with CCP officials who have spread CCP propaganda and denied

⁹ Trump, *Great Again*, 43

¹⁰ Trump, *Great Again*, 43

¹¹ Trump, *Great Again*, 43

¹² Trump, *Great Again*, 45

¹³ Trump, *Great Again*, 47

¹⁴ Trump, *Great Again*, 47

¹⁵ Kevin Scott, "Schumer Melts Down Over Trump's China Tariffs," *Knewz*, February 24, 2025, <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/schumer-melts-down-over-trump-s-china-tariffs/ss-AA1zDkGj?ocid=Bin gHPCNews>

allegations about the mistreatment of Uyghurs in China.¹⁶ Although it is frequently repeated in Washington that China presents an existential threat to the U.S.’ geopolitical predominance, words do not equate to actions. Key politicians on both sides of the political aisle are hesitant to take decisive action that would harm their relationship with the CCP.

The second step that I proposed in my book was for Congress to enact an annual reporting requirement of all the assistance flowing from American agencies and departments to China. This has still not happened at a broad, congressional level. Various agencies have taken it upon themselves to verify whether they are directly or indirectly benefiting China. The Department of Defense’s annual reports on military and security developments relating to China¹⁷ and the Commerce Department’s tracking of whether key technologies are being transferred to China¹⁸ are two examples. But these agency-specific directives fall short of documenting the total financial assistance flowing from American coffers to the Chinese government.

The same pattern repeats itself for my third step. I had suggested that the White House “provide Congress with an annual report that includes trends and forecasts about how the United States is faring relative to its chief rivals.”¹⁹ There is still no single, consolidated report that does this, but just like the assistance reporting, some agencies are partially fulfilling this requirement. The ODNI’s Annual Threat Assessment, the White House’s periodic National Security Strategies, and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Annual Report are three examples of initiatives that are already underway that could be combined into a single, comprehensive report measuring U.S. competitiveness vis-à-vis China.

This ties in to the next recommendation which I included in the book, which was for the U.S. to create a competitiveness strategy. Again, we have made significant progress in terms of acknowledging the military, political, technological, and economic threat posed by China in our key defense and intelligence reports, but we are lacking multi-agency documents—somewhat like the IC’s National Intelligence Estimate—which regularly outline a strategy for competitiveness that we should follow to beat China in the Marathon. We don’t quite know what the finish line is, which makes it hard for us to determine what we are competing for. If this were well articulated in a coherent strategy, it would save a lot of time and dissonance between federal agencies all adopting their own unique strategies.

¹⁶ Andrew Mark Miller, Cameron Cawthorne, “Schumer spotted posing for photo with CCP official as warnings swirl about China influence,” *Fox News*, February 19, 2025,

<https://www.foxnews.com/politics/schumer-spotted-posing-photo-ccp-official-warnings-swirl-china-influence>

¹⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024,”

<https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-IN-VOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF>

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Congress, “U.S. Trade with China,” 2022,

<https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/country-papers/3268-2022-statistical-analysis-of-u-s-trade-with-china/file>

¹⁹ Michael Pillsbury, *The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015), 217

The fifth step which I proposed was to find common ground at home. There is admittedly a more broad consensus today compared to 2015 that China represents a critical threat to the U.S.-led world order. That being said, as just mentioned, we are missing a grand strategy as to *how* we should approach this threat. Nancy Pelosi's 2022 Taiwan visit and the subsequent backlash which this triggered was an example of an American failure in this regard. This episode signaled that we have two divergent China strategies—one provocative and the other conciliatory—which we cannot agree on.²⁰ In our competitiveness strategy, we need to get both parties and people from private companies, civil society, and government united behind a single approach as to how we should approach China in the decades to come.

The sixth step I had proposed is one where we are not doing as poorly. I had argued for the necessity of building a vertical coalition of nations. There has been some laudable bipartisanship in terms of U.S. rapprochement to our Asian allies. The U.S. has spearheaded trilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea, both administrations have reinforced our contributions to the Quad, both have supported the Philippines in the face of Chinese bellicosity in the South China Sea, and our bilateral talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have been regular and productive.²¹ Secretary of State Marco Rubio's decision to exempt Taiwan and the Philippines from the recent foreign aid freeze demonstrates the Trump administration's willingness to reinforce its coalition of Asian allies to encircle China.²²

In my seventh step, I had noted our obligation to shine a light on China's political dissidents pushing back against the authoritarian system from which they have fled. I criticized the Obama Administration for not including human rights in the 2009 Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Once again, we have failed to be on the side of dissidents exposing China's humanitarian crimes. Admittedly, Trump's two administrations took a tough stance against China with regards to the Uyghurs. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo systematically highlighted the religious persecution happening in China, which drew responses from human rights organizations in the United States and inspired a series of legislative efforts from several U.S. federal agencies.²³ Current Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently condemned Thailand for sending Uyghurs back to China.²⁴ Since then, however, most of that progress has grinded to a halt because of how much Beijing has tightened its security apparatus. The U.S. will have to continue funding outlets which

²⁰ Isaac Chotiner, "The Provocative Politics of Nancy Pelosi's Trip to Taiwan," *The New Yorker*, August 4, 2022, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-provocative-politics-of-nancy-pelosis-trip-to-taiwan>

²¹ Derek Grossman, "The State—and Fate—of America's Indo-Pacific Alliances," *RAND*, November 1, 2024, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/11/the-state-and-fate-of-americas-indo-pacific-alliances.html>

²² Jimmy Quinn, "Rubio Exempts Taiwan and Philippines Security Programs from Aid Freeze," *National Review*, February 23, 2025, <https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/rubio-exempts-taiwan-and-philippines-security-programs-from-aid-freeze/>

²³ United States Holocaust Museum, "US Responses to China's Crimes Against the Uyghurs," <https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/china/us-responses-to-chinas-crimes-against-the-uyghurs>

²⁴ Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom, "US condemns Thailand's return of 40 Uyghurs to China," *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-condemns-thailands-return-40-uyghurs-china-2025-02-27/>

give dissidents the ability to criticize the regime from afar. This will be discussed more further in my remarks.

The eighth step in the 100-Year *Marathon* is one that has dominated headlines in the past decade, and often not for the right reason: stemming Beijing's anti-American competitive conduct. The U.S. has still failed to decouple its military supply chain production from China.²⁵ Chinese cyberespionage has recently targeted American telecommunications²⁶ and NATO military systems.²⁷ Chinese hackers have targeted intellectual property to match the pace of American research—which has become especially concerning as of late in the AI sphere.²⁸ There is a constant tension between transparency and geopolitical competitiveness in the American system: We have a tendency to make our models open source and to reveal more than we should about the details of our military programs, which allows competitors to replicate our strengths. One need only look at the plagiarism in Chinese military aircraft and ships.²⁹ Since there is an obligation for Chinese citizens abroad to report back to the CCP, states will have to tighten their security to prevent CCP-controlled firms from collecting information on American citizens, buying farmland, and infiltrating American military infrastructure. Arkansas Governor Sarah Huckabee just recently took a stand against this by introducing new legislation to curtail the ability for CCP-operated firms to operate in her state—a move in the right direction.³⁰

My ninth step leads us to the topic of pollution. At the time, I had suggested that American public officials emphasize China's failure to uphold climate agreements and unacceptable pollution levels. It is more difficult to make this argument today with regards to electric vehicles, since Beijing strives to have 40 percent of the vehicles sold at home be EVs by 2030.³¹ China has also determined that it is in its own interest to refine its early warning systems and launch ozone pollution reduction programs by the end of 2025 to address the smog and air contamination problem it has been facing for several decades.³² Whether or not it will succeed in this goal

²⁵ Dan Nidess, "Face the facts: America has outsourced its military supply chain to China." *The Hill*, January 17, 2025, <https://thehill.com/opinion/5090860-us-china-trade-war-impact/>

²⁶ Amir Daftari, "Major Chinese Cyber Espionage Targeting US Telecom Networks Uncovered by FBI," *Newsweek*, November 14, 2024, <https://www.newsweek.com/fbi-chinese-cyber-espionage-multiple-telecom-networks-1985617>

²⁷ Micah McCartney, "China's Spies Hacked NATO Allies Defenses, Official Says," *Newsweek*, February 8, 2024, <https://www.newsweek.com/china-spies-hacked-nato-ally-netherlands-defenses-1868006>

²⁸ House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Egregious Cases of Chinese Theft of American Intellectual Property," <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Egregious-Cases-of-Chinese-Theft-of-American-Intellectual-Property.pdf>

²⁹ Alex Hollings, "Counterfeit Air Power: Meet China's Copycat Air Force," *Popular Mechanics*, September 19, 2018, <https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/g23303922/china-copycat-air-force/>

³⁰ Eric Shawn, "The plan to confront China and kick out companies controlled by the Chinese Communist Party from the U.S.," *Fox News*, February 26, 2025, <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/plan-confront-china-kick-out-companies-controlled-chinese-communist-party-u-s>

³¹ Jennifer Conrad, "China is Racing to Electrify its Future," *WIRED*, June 29, 2022, <https://www.wired.com/story/china-ev-infrastructure-charging/>

³² "China aims to eliminate severe air pollution this year," *Reuters*, February 25, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/china-aims-eliminate-severe-air-pollution-this-year-2025-02-25/>

remains to be seen. There seems, at least, to be some effort on China's side to reduce pollution and the harm it has done to the planet, though with self-interested goals in mind, of course. If anything is to be learned from the past few years, though, it is that if the United States slows down its industrial production for climate objectives, other countries like China will not necessarily follow suit. Climate agreements, from China's eyes, are only valid so long as they benefit Beijing's national security.

My tenth recommendation revolved around the fight against China's Great Firewall. I commended Wikipedia's battle against Chinese censorship, but encouraged the United States government to take the company's side and boost activity through Radio Free Asia. Unfortunately, there is little success to report in this regard. Last year, Radio Free Asia shut off all operations in Hong Kong due to fears that it would not comply with a security law.³³ This is understandable, since the families of Radio Free Asia journalists are often at risk, especially if they are of Uyghur descent.³⁴ But if Washington isn't able to penetrate the Great Firewall through outlets like Radio Free Asia, it should devise a concerted soft power or communications strategy that allows its information to infiltrate into Chinese society. Why is it that an application like TikTok has divided American society while no comparative American app like YouTube is able to convey information to Chinese people? Cracking the code of the Great Firewall will be one of the most pressing challenges for private companies assisting Washington.

Xi Jinping's authoritarian crackdown has made the eleventh step which I outlined excruciatingly difficult. I had suggested that the State Department fund more projects to promote the development of the rule of law and civil society in China. There has, of course, been no progress in this vein since Beijing strictly monitors State Department activities and the flow of money going to local initiatives and elected village officials. This should not prevent the American Embassy in Beijing from coordinating with Americans involved in the educational and private sector in China to provide support encouraging pro-democracy reform (or at least more separation from the CCP) to local institutions, however difficult that might be.

Finally, although Washington has recognized that China poses a threat to our global predominance—as stated at the start of my testimony—we still are dreadfully unfamiliar with the internal debates happening between the so-called 'hardliners' and 'reformers' in Chinese society. Since Xi runs the country in an authoritarian manner, we assume that China is a monolith, which disincentivizes us from having serious discussions in Washington about the disagreements that divide the CCP regarding China's future. The United States can only follow the strategies previously outlined—such as creating a competitiveness strategy—if we are aware of which faction within the CCP is prevailing at a given time. When the hawks are in power, we can

³³ David Pierson, "U.S.-Funded Broadcaster Leaves Hong Kong, Citing Security Law," *The New York Times*, March 29, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/29/world/asia/hong-kong-security-media.html>

³⁴ Jay Nordlinger, "A Uyghur Daughter, and Journalist," *National Review*, May 4, 2021, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/05/a-uyghur-daughter-and-journalist/>

expect a more violent response from China every time we undertake some sort of rapprochement with our Asian allies or rid ourselves of Chinese technology in our military supply chains. Our strategy must be tailored to the internal dynamics within China, or else we risk missing opportunities to be more forward-leaning in our approach when reformers are more prominent in the CCP's leadership.

When we analyze the twelve steps that I proposed in the 100-Year *Marathon*, it becomes obvious that we have made little progress in the past decade. Yes, it is generally recognized in Washington that China is a threat, but that has translated to little concerted governmental action. Instead, the way it currently works is that each agency has mechanisms to verify whether the United States is funding China or how Chinese military and economic metrics have changed. There are few oversight methods that unite every agency and create clear indices pointing to whether we are beating China in the 100-Year Marathon. Now that 10 years have passed, it is about time to move from recognition to action, or else we risk being unable to recover from such a slow start.

EXCERPTS FROM THE 12 STEPS IN THE HUNDRED YEAR MARATHON

It's easy to win a race when you're the only one who knows it has begun. China is thus on its way to supplanting the United States as the global hegemon, creating a different world as a result. Yet it doesn't have to end this way.

STEP 1—RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEM

If America is going to compete in the Marathon, its thinking about China must change radically. This means recognizing that China is a competitor, not a welfare case.

STEP 2—KEEP TRACK OF YOUR GIFTS

Every year, a small fortune of American tax dollars is being spent to aid China's rise. Most of this aid is kept low-profile, unnoticed by the media and the public. This is done intentionally.

Labor Department experts who the U.S. government had sent to China to boost Chinese productivity....the Treasury Department and the comptroller of the currency offered China to improve its banking practices....the Federal Aviation Administration's assistance to Chinese aircraft manufacturers....other U.S. government agencies have facilitated hundreds of science assistance programs in China.

There is still no available accounting of all the activities funded by the U.S. government to aid China. Not only is America funding its own chief opponent; it doesn't even keep track of how much is being spent to do it.

To compete in the Marathon, Congress should enact an annual reporting requirement of all agencies and departments of their assistance to China. If such programs were identified and publicized, three beneficial results would follow.

STEP 3—MEASURE COMPETITIVENESS

Many of the Warring States stories involve carefully measuring the balance of power before strategies are chosen. It is a classic American business principle that “What you measure improves.” The lesson is simple but profound: You can't improve unless you know what you need to improve. You can't come from behind in a race against your competitors unless you know the respects in which you have fallen behind. Every year, the Chinese create an annual analysis of their competitiveness relative to the United States. Why isn't America doing the same thing?

The U.S. government should be conducting a similar—but more robust—measure of American competitiveness. The White House should provide Congress with an annual report that includes trends and forecasts about how the United States is faring relative to its chief rivals. Many departments of the U.S. government, including the intelligence community, would have to be involved. It need not cover all other nations, just the top ten—beginning with China.

STEP 4—DEVELOP A COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY

Stratagems of the Warring States frequently describes how leaders compete by adopting “reforms” to grow their power more rapidly than their competition. The point was to be open-minded enough to recognize and act when one's strategy needed to change, and then impose new tactics to achieve one's desired result.

The public policy analysts Robert Atkinson and Stephen Ezell have proposed a multiagency program to enhance American competitiveness, but they fear that it will be hampered or eliminated because of partisan political considerations.

STEP 5—FIND COMMON GROUND AT HOME

Warring States leaders tried to keep their allies closely aligned and built ever shifting coalitions united behind a common goal. Disunity was dangerous. There are many advocates for reforming American policy toward China—inside and outside of the U.S. government—but they are fractured into factions that often do not see each other as allies. Since at least 1995, Chinese scholars in Beijing have delighted in telling me stories of how Americans who criticize U.S. policy toward China are so divided by their political differences that they never cooperate.

STEP 6—BUILD A VERTICAL COALITION OF NATIONS

There is a reason why China has been expanding its South China Sea claims, bullying Philippine fishing boats, cutting the cables of Vietnamese seismic survey ships, and recently establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. China wants to guarantee access to a wealth of natural resources in the region and is hoping to intimidate its neighbors so they are too scared of China to unite and oppose its ambitions.

Whether you play wei qi or not, you know that encirclement by a group of adversaries is dangerous. China's natural fear is that its neighbors will form such an alliance. That's exactly what the United States should be encouraging with nations including Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Even the threat of such a coalition—through movements in that direction—might give Beijing pause and temper its bellicosity. China knows how America and its allies contained the Soviet Union. As the United States increases aid and facilitates cooperation among China's neighbors, China's hawks will get the blame when China feels isolated and alone in the region.

STEP 7—PROTECT THE POLITICAL DISSIDENTS

Many of the soldiers on the front line of the Cold War were Soviet and Eastern European dissidents who refused to surrender to an unending future of censorship, propaganda, religious persecution, and economic enslavement. Their field marshals were men such as Václav Havel, Lech Wałęsa, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. And with their courage and passion and principles, they brought down the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain. But they didn't do it alone. Presidents from Truman to Reagan championed their cause. When they were imprisoned, American presidents demanded their release. When they needed money, Americans sent them funds. When they needed a platform for the free speech their regimes denied them, Americans shared their printing presses and broadcast their battles and beliefs into millions of homes through Radio Free Europe.

Today China has increased its persecution of Buddhist Tibetans and Muslim Uighurs. In Tibet, the government has imposed curfews, arrested protesters, killed innocent civilians, and transformed the region into, in the recent words of the Dalai Lama, a "hell on earth." In Xinjiang, the Internet and phones are routinely shut off, and the percentage of Han Chinese in Tibet and Xinjiang has risen dramatically due to state-sponsored migration.

China also persecutes Christians. It is a common practice in China for foreigners to show their passports before being allowed to attend a church service in China. Why? Because China is ruled by the atheistic Communist Party, and its government wants to keep Chinese nationals out of non-state-run churches. Many experts estimate that there are 60 million to 100 million Christians in China and that the number is growing. Bob Fu, the founder and president of China Aid, seeks to equip the Chinese people to defend their faith and freedom. The organization's

purpose is to promote legal reforms, fund “house churches” in China, and assist imprisoned Christians.

STEP 8—STAND UP TO ANTI-AMERICAN COMPETITIVE CONDUCT

China is not just a source of cyber spying against the United States; it is the primary source. According to some estimates, more than 90 percent of cyber espionage incidents against America originate in China. 14 Chinese hackers regularly infiltrate American businesses and government entities. An abridged list of victims includes Google, Booz Allen Hamilton, AT&T, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Visa, MasterCard, and the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and Energy. Hacking is central to China’s decades-long campaign to steal technologies it can’t invent and intellectual property it can’t create. A report by the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, led by the former director of national intelligence Dennis Blair and by the former U.S. ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, found that the theft of U.S. intellectual property likely costs the American economy more than \$300 billion per year. 15

STEP 9—IDENTIFY AND SHAME POLLUTERS

One of the more effective approaches to protecting the environment with regard to China occurred when Ambassador Huntsman authorized the U.S. embassy in Beijing to tweet the pollution levels in Beijing. 18 Similarly, Ma Jun the director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, a leading environmental watchdog organization in China, has compiled online maps of China’s water, air, and solid waste pollution.

But is fostering greater awareness the best we can do? The United States needs to go from asking China to act in an environmentally responsible way to insisting that China do so, even if that means using far more leverage than past administrations have been willing to exert. Otherwise, China will be at a competitive economic advantage—with Washington constraining American businesses in an effort to protect the environment while China goes right on exporting its products and its pollutants at breakneck speed.

STEP 10—EXPOSE CORRUPTION AND CENSORSHIP

One of the Chinese government’s greatest fears is of a free press. It knows that sunlight is a disinfectant for wrongdoing, and it is terrified of what its people would do if they knew the whole truth about Chinese leaders’ corruption, brutality, and history of lying about the United States and our democratic allies. Yet it remains a mystery why the United States doesn’t do more to fight China’s censorship and propaganda campaigns against the Chinese people.

But the government in Beijing uses its various tools to prohibit such information from reaching the Chinese people. In 2012 the Chinese government blocked Bloomberg News after it published a story on the family wealth of Xi Jinping. The implicit deal of working in China seems

to be this: you may report on China's fantastic growth, but if you start criticizing the Communist Party or its top officials you will be kicked out of the country.

During the Cold War, Radio Free Europe was an oasis for anti-Communist dissidents in a desert of Soviet censorship and propaganda. There's no reason why Radio Free Asia couldn't serve a similar purpose in the Hundred-Year Marathon, but its budget needs to be increased at least threefold.

STEP 11—SUPPORT PRO DEMOCRACY REFORMERS

China's concern when it talks about a new Cold War is that the Americans will revive their Cold War-era programs that helped to subvert the Soviet Union from within by using the power of ideas. Most Chinese hawks believe that this plan to subvert Chinese democracy has already been put into motion, much as it was for the Soviet Union in 1947. At least two Chinese books claim the CIA leads it.

Former secretary of defense Robert Gates has noted that the 1975 Helsinki Accords galvanized pro democracy groups inside the Soviet Union and played "a key role in our winning the Cold War." His view seems to be shared by the hawks of China, who write often about their fear that the United States has mounted a program to influence impressionable future civilian Chinese leaders to move toward democratic multiparty elections and a free market. 30 In October 2013, China's hawks revealed another fear—that America is seeking out a Chinese Gorbachev-like figure, a leader who will bring one-party rule to an end. The hawks' distrust of China's own leaders is shown in the tone of a ninety minute video released in October 2013 called Silent Contest. 31 China's hawks fear their civilian leaders are susceptible to influence from Western leaders who want to see multi party rule and an evolution toward democracy.

The truth is that there is no such concerted effort by the United States or the West to subvert China's Communist Party rule. The annual spending on programs to support democracy in China is less than \$50 million. 33 While the U.S. government has some underfunded civil society programs, they are not CIA covert actions, and they are small in scale compared to what will be needed. There are at least six such programs, originating during the Cold War and run by various American organizations with U.S. government funds, including the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, and both major U.S. political parties. They provide funding for a wide range of Chinese organizations inside China as well as for exile groups. 34

STEP 12—MONITOR AND INFLUENCE THE DEBATES BETWEEN CHINA'S HAWKS AND REFORMERS

Today, as China pursues its own Cold War strategy against America, it monitors carefully various factions in Washington, DC—those who are supporters of Beijing and those who are skeptics, those who can be manipulated and those who have caught on to the Marathon strategy. America used to be good at this, too. During the Cold War, the United States invested

time, technology, and personnel into discerning the activities among various members of the Soviet Politburo—those who advocated a more harmonious relationship with America and those who viewed the United States as a dangerous rival that must be overtaken. Yet unlike our activities against the Soviets, America is far behind when it comes to China.

It is crucial that the United States possess an understanding of the various actors in Beijing's sensitive internal debates. Though the Marathon strategy is moving apace, the Chinese government is not monolithic in its thinking. Hard-liners are certainly in the majority, but on the margins there are still sincere advocates of reform and liberalization who want a China that moves closer to an American-style model. They exist, and they must be identified and supported. The problem is that the U.S. intelligence community has not invested in the resources to determine who those true reformers are—as differentiated from the many Chinese leaders who make misleading reformist claims. This remains a massive intelligence challenge.

James Lilley, a former U.S. ambassador to China and a twenty-seven-year veteran of the CIA testified in August 2001, twelve years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, Lilley told a congressional commission that his greatest regret was learning a decade too late about internal Chinese documents revealing just how far China had moved toward democracy and how close the protests came to removing the Communist government. If only he had known at the time, the former ambassador said, he would have urged President George H. W. Bush to intervene firmly on the side of the real reformers, rather than being deceived by Beijing's leadership into siding with it.