

Joint Statement of
Chairman Mike Rogers and Ranking Member C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Before the
Committee on House Administration
Committee Budget Request for the 113th Congress, 1st Session
March 5, 2013

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Brady, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Permanent Select Committee's budget request for the first session of the 113th Congress.

As you know, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence fulfills two roles critical to the government's continued conduct of successful intelligence activities. First, our Committee serves as a connection between the classified world of intelligence and the American people. The sensitive nature of intelligence sources, methods, and operations requires that much of what the Intelligence Community does remain secret and protected from public disclosure. Yet, in our open society, the American people must have confidence that their elected representatives are not only fully aware, but also fully approve of the government's efforts, having satisfied themselves that these activities are consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Second, the Committee must continue to ensure that the men and women of the Intelligence Community have the resources, capabilities, and authorities needed to keep our country safe. The United States and its interests around the world face

constant threats from state and non-state actors, ranging from conventional to those asymmetric in nature. Every day, around the world our government's intelligence agencies work to uncover, disrupt, and counter these threats. For continued success against those who seek to do us harm, Congress must provide the Intelligence Community the resources and authorities commensurate with the threats we face. In short, strong and effective oversight contributes to the successful conduct of intelligence activities, and to the safety of the United States, our interests, and our people. And the Intelligence Committee bears a unique responsibility for that oversight on behalf of the House.

It was not long ago that congressional intelligence oversight was hamstrung by crippling partisanship. When the ranking member and I assumed leadership of the Committee in January 2011, we dedicated ourselves to reestablishing the Committee's critical oversight. We believe we have achieved that goal. In the past two years, our work has produced three annual intelligence authorization acts; extended for five years the authorities provided by the FISA Amendments Act; reauthorized other key national security tools for investigators and prosecutors; resulted in House passage of a bipartisan information-sharing bill to improve the nation's cyber security; and identified the threat to U.S. national security posed by Chinese telecommunications companies. At the same time, we reestablished routine, effective oversight of covert action programs, counterterrorism operations, and counterintelligence investigations.

We achieved these successes while initially absorbing a 5% reduction from our authorized funding levels for the 111th Congress and an additional 6.4% decrease during the second session of the 112th Congress. We achieved much of these savings through reduced staffing levels. The Committee is authorized to fill up to

44 staff positions (26 majority, 13 minority, and 5 support staff). Yet throughout most of the 112th Congress, our Committee, which consisted of twenty members, had no more than 29 total staff, and at no time did we employ more than thirty-two staff members. Additionally, during the 112th Congress, the Committee avoided having to make additional investments in computers and equipment as a result of previous improvements to its information technology systems.

In considering the Committee's budget, it is important to note that the nature of the Committee's work imposes unique requirements and thus unique expenses that other Committees do not incur. Our staff are our most important asset. They are professionals with in-depth knowledge of and experience in the Intelligence Community. For example, each member of the Majority's professional budget staff, which oversees the budgets for the seventeen elements of the Intelligence Community, has had experience working in the Community, with an average of almost nineteen years of intelligence and national security experience. Each of our lawyers similarly has held positions within Intelligence Community legal or policy offices and has experience that can only be gained through working in the field of national security law. And all of our staff, including our research and executive assistants, are required to obtain and maintain a Top Secret/Special Compartmented Information clearance. Because of the security requirements and restrictions, we are also not able to supplement our staff with summer or academic year interns or law clerks. In addition to unique staff requirements, the Committee has additional technology and security requirements not common to other committees of the House. For example, the Committee is required to maintain three complete networks, with unclassified and classified computers at each work station. Further, much of the Committee's information technology support must be provided by cleared contractors, imposing additional costs. Each desk must also

have phones for both non-secure and secure conversations; and this past year the Committee had to upgrade its secure phone system, replacing outdated and increasingly unsupported technology with a new method of secure communication that is used across the Intelligence Community. Maintaining these systems imposes unique and additional charges. We also are required to constantly monitor the security of our spaces to ensure that we are adequately addressing the counterintelligence threat. For example, in the 112th Congress we upgraded the Committee's capability to detect electronic eavesdropping threats and therefore better protect the secrets we hold on behalf of the country.

While the Committee absorbed the cuts of the 112th Congress, a further 11% cut would have a significant negative impact on the Committee's operations and undermine our oversight of the government's intelligence activities and operations. Currently, the Committee intends to further pursue the threats revealed by our investigation into the national security threats posed by Chinese telecommunications companies; review the Intelligence Community's support to the CFIUS process; perform a comprehensive review of authorities, resources, and policies associated with the recently proposed Defense Clandestine Service (which is intended to completely reform DOD's human intelligence collection activities); pursue passage of a cybersecurity information-sharing bill; and establish a Business Advisory Team to propose additional reform and integration of the Intelligence Community's organization and structure, all while drafting and passing the Fiscal Year 2014 intelligence authorization bill and conducting our routine oversight of covert action, counterterrorism operations, and counterintelligence investigations. Further, in an uncertain and dangerous world, the Committee must be prepared to review and address national-security events as

they unfold; we must have the resources available to surge in the event of a national-security crisis, which – as the last decade has revealed – is unfortunately not infrequent.

An 11% cut would prevent us from hiring the additional staff and or replace departing staff necessary to complete this work. We would, of course, prioritize the activities we just listed; but some, undoubtedly, would have to be deferred. Additionally, the Committee would also have to further reduce its spending on computers and equipment and would eliminate any upgrades to either its unclassified or classified networks. The Committee would limit its spending on computers and equipment to only that which is required to continue information technology and network maintenance support contracts. Additionally, the Committee may be forced to consider alternate methods for continuity-of-operations replication and backups of its classified network in the event of a disaster.

If the Committee received a 5% increase over its 2012 expenditures, we would apply the additional money to personnel compensation. The addition, however, would not be sufficient to meet all staffing needs. And we would still be forced to cut all other categories of the budget, limiting computers and equipment upgrades, travel, and other Committee needs.

Given these facts and the unique situation of our Committee, we respectfully request that the Committee be authorized a total of \$4,978,280 for 2013. This is \$154,365.12 or 3.2% more than our authorized funding for 2012. We recognize that in our current fiscal environment, all of us must contribute to reducing government spending. Thus, we would still defer any additional information technology or security upgrades. We would use the additional funding instead to

hire needed staff and complete some domestic oversight travel necessary to complete all planned oversight activities.

Thank you for allowing the Ranking Member and me to present our request for 2013. We welcome any questions the Committee might have.