

Question#:	1
Topic:	Prior Counter-Terrorism Models
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Several civil rights organizations have raised concerns that the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnership (CP3) is simply a repackaging of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) programs that existed under prior administrations. The Brennan Center for Justice has argued that CP3 would perpetuate law enforcement-centric approaches to prevention and invite "more police involvement in mental health and social services and bias against the same communities that bear the brunt of far-right violence."

Will the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commit that CP3 will transition away from CVE and TVTP models that conducted illegal surveillance against targeted minority communities, including immigrant, Muslim, and Black communities?

Please explain how CP3 will differentiate itself from prior counter-domestic terrorism programs to ensure that undue resources are not wasted investigating the very groups that are primarily targeted by domestic violent extremists.

Response: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans' (PLCY) Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) and its predecessors never engaged in illegal activity Previous efforts proved ineffective and, at times, harmful by creating community mistrust among certain groups. This is why DHS, and in particular CP3, adopted a more inclusive model predicated on behavioral cues to prevent targeted violence and terrorism. The new approach draws on decades of public health research that tackles societal problems including substance abuse, intimate partner violence, and suicide. The approach is multidisciplinary to engage all of society and the approach draws on a variety of subject matter expertise including educators, health providers, social services, community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), law enforcement, threat assessment experts, and the general public.

Today, CP3 is focused on supporting local communities across the country to reflect this new approach. CP3 is bringing together multidisciplinary stakeholders to get help to individuals displaying concerning behaviors associated with the pathway to violence. Emphasizing interventions and help, CP3's approach uses significant and continued stakeholder engagement at the state and local levels to build transparent and trusted connections among an inclusive cross-section of society.

This approach is in contrast to DHS's previous combating violent extremism (CVE) efforts that focused on specific communities (e.g. Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim and South Asian

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communities) that were thought to be targeted for recruitment. By and large, DHS's efforts focused on building prevention efforts within communities that foreign terrorist organizations appeared to be targeting rather than focusing on addressing shared risk and protective factors for violence within society.

As noted previously, CP3's focus is different in that it builds effective prevention efforts regardless of community demographics. Achieving this goal requires significant and continued stakeholder engagement at the state and local levels to build transparent and trusted connections among an inclusive cross-section of society, not specific sub-sets of society.

Question#:	2
Topic:	CP3 Mission
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Please explain how the CP3 mission is different from the TVTP/CVE model of prevention, if both are predicated on the idea that we can identify "risk factors" that make individuals prone to violent extremism.

Response: DHS's previous CVE efforts addressed specific communities (e.g., Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian communities) and did not prioritize risk factors, protective factors or behavioral indicators associated with potential violent actions. These efforts tended to focus on specific communities that were thought to be targeted for recruitment.¹ By and large, these previous efforts focused on building prevention efforts within communities that foreign terrorist organizations appeared to be targeting rather than focusing on addressing shared risk and protective factors for violence within society.

CP3's focus is different. The current CP3 approach builds on effective local prevention capabilities, regardless of community demographics, to build overall community resilience. It is a public health-informed approach based on other successful violence prevention programs (e.g., the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) violence prevention programs on elder violence, youth violence, intimate partner violence, etc.), largely based on addressing broad risk factors as they occur (if needed), building protective factors, and intervening with individuals who are or have radicalized to violence. The goal is to ensure the health and well-being of all members of the community.

Achieving this objective also requires significant and continued stakeholder engagement at the state and local levels to build transparent and trusted connections among the whole-of-society. Such relationships reduce risk, enhance resilience, ensure information sharing, and fulfill requests for support services before concerns become a criminal justice matter.

¹Retrieved on 1/14/2022 from Statement for the record of OPE for a House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security hearing titled "Combating Homegrown Terrorism" | Homeland Security (dhs.gov)

Question#:	3
Topic:	Risk Factors
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Given the broad sweep of these "risk factors," please explain how you are ensuring that CP3 will not disproportionately invest resources in Muslim communities and other communities of colors that were the usual targets of CVE programs.

What other procedural guardrails are being put in place to ensure that CP3 does not become yet another retread of its predecessors?

Response: CP3's mission is to help communities build local prevention capabilities. The risk and protective factors for targeted violence and terrorism that are an integral part of a public health-informed approach are not unique to any group; consequently, CP3 advises local communities to not focus their prevention efforts on any specific group. Risk and protective factors are key to public health prevention for a number of societal concerns, such as suicide and substance abuse, and public health prevention looks to reduce or mitigate risk factors and enhance protective factors across society. Similarly, effective violence prevention approaches put protective factors in place to reduce or mitigate factors for everyone in society, from early, primary prevention stages to intervening to help individuals displaying behavioral indicators, to rehabilitation stages. Moreover, it is important to note that no single risk factor leads to radicalization to violence. Individuals may possess some or all of these factors and not radicalize to violence.

The DHS prevention mission focuses on supporting the development of local prevention capabilities through a multidisciplinary approach. CP3 ensures privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections are integrated in all aspects of its efforts. The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), the DHS Privacy Office (PRIV), and the Office of the General Counsel are involved in every aspect of our prevention mission. These offices continue to help oversee and train the Department and our partners on the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Locally, CP3 also seeks to ensure civil rights and civil liberties organizations are engaged in local prevention efforts to ensure they do not infringe upon civil rights and civil liberties.

Question#:	4
Topic:	Grant Program
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Please describe how CP3 will seek to broaden its grant program to provide resources to more non-law enforcement organizations, including community-based non-profits and research institutions with specific areas of expertise.

Response: The Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program supports a wide variety of organizations, as research indicates that multidisciplinary approaches to prevention are most likely to achieve success in local communities. The grant program supports numerous community-based nonprofit organizations, as well as institutions of higher education, and will continue to do so. For the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Program the TVTP grant program has developed new resources to assist first time applicants, particularly those in underserved communities and sectors. Furthermore, the Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) for these grants include clear objectives that are not the exclusive purview of law enforcement, as we seek to build broad, effective coalitions at the local level.

Question#:	5
Topic:	Programs to Combat Racism I
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: The fourth pillar of the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism (NSCDT) states, "Tackling the threat posed by domestic terrorism over the long term demands substantial efforts to confront the racism that feeds into aspects of that threat." However, entities within DHS, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP), have been involved in numerous controversies involving racist and racially motivated activity by their agents.

What efforts, if any, has DHS made to prioritize rooting out racism and bigotry in its programs and policies?

How does the presence of officers with white supremacist or other violent beliefs compromise the counterterrorism mission of DHS?

Response: U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Directive No. 51735-013B, Standards of Conduct, establishes CBP's policy on the ethical conduct and responsibilities of all CBP employees. It requires all employees to maintain high standards of honesty, integrity, impartiality, character, and professionalism to ensure the proper performance of government business and the continued trust and confidence of the public. Certain conduct, on or off-duty, may subject an employee to appropriate disciplinary action. As it relates to bias-motivated conduct, Section 7.:

7.11.1 Employees will not act or fail to act on an official matter in a manner which improperly takes into consideration an individual's race, color, age, sexual orientation, religion, sex, national origin, disability, union membership, or union activities.

7.11.2 Employees will not make abusive, derisive, profane, or harassing statements or gestures, or engage in any other conduct evidencing hatred or invidious prejudice to or about another person or group on account of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability.

CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), Investigative Operations Directorate (IOD) reviews all complaints and allegations referencing "Integrity-Related Misconduct" and "Bias-Motivated Conduct" by CBP personnel as defined by the CBP Standards of Conduct. OPR IOD as appropriate opens investigations to determine if criminal or administrative misconduct allegations are substantiated. This includes association with extremist groups such as anti-government groups and/or groups who espouse anti-government rhetoric, bigotry and racism.

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Under CBP’s Table of Offenses and Penalties, the recommended penalty associated with bias-motivated conduct is a 7-day suspension (for a first offense) and a 14-day suspension to removal (for a subsequent offense).

DHS does not tolerate racism and bigotry within its ranks, policies, or programs and takes any such allegations seriously. In April 2021, at the direction of Secretary Mayorkas, a cross-Departmental working group began a comprehensive internal review to identify how to best prevent, detect, and respond to potential threats related to domestic violent extremism (to include racially motivated extremism) within DHS. Secretary Mayorkas released the findings and recommendations of this review in March 2022, and directed DHS to implement the report’s recommendations to include the development of a Department policy on Domestic Violent Extremism (DVE).

The working group is developing policy that defines organizational roles and responsibilities, describes indicators of DVE, establishes prohibited violent extremist related activity, includes a mandatory reporting requirement for every DHS employee to report such activity within DHS, and establishes an interdisciplinary response team. In addition to the employee reporting requirement, one of the organizational roles and responsibilities outlined in the policy is an annual Component reporting requirement for any identified DVE related activity. This Component reporting will help the Department identify overarching issues that need to be addressed systemically, as well as specific pockets of the workforce that may be experiencing increased DVE related activity that calls for specific intervention within a group of employees or a specific Component.

The Department is working hard to address allegations of systemic bias.

CRCL conducts community engagement with diverse communities whose civil rights may be affected by Department activities in major cities and regions across the United States. Through its engagement efforts, CRCL hears from racial, ethnic, and religious community members regarding concerns with profiling in DHS policies, programs, and activities, among other issues. The goal of CRCL’s engagement is to learn and understand such community concerns, communicate information on avenues of redress and complaints, and work together with DHS Offices and components to effectuate policy and programmatic changes as necessary.

Profiling is wrong, ineffective, and cannot be tolerated. Aligning DHS policy and practice with this fundamental truth is a top priority. A careful and thorough review of the policies governing the Department’s use of race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, and other individual characteristics is underway.

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Action is already being taken in several areas. For example, the recently announced Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law require the protection of noncitizens' civil rights and civil liberties. A noncitizen's race, religion, gender, sexual orientation or gender identity, national origin, political associations, or exercise of First Amendment rights cannot be factors in deciding to take enforcement action. DHS also outlined continuing efforts to ensure our law enforcement personnel and our law enforcement partners have the training and tools to execute their mission, including by protecting civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy. A holistic review to be led by the new Law Enforcement Coordination Council will look at law enforcement training techniques and curricula, adhering to a set of key principles that include a rigorous protection of civil rights and civil liberties and respect for privacy, a data-driven focus on preventing implicit bias, the promotion of standards that prohibit improper profiling and enhance de-escalation techniques, policies that support mental health, and strategies to increase trusted community engagement.

CRCL has recommended that CBP provide its officers and agents with additional training on their obligations under law and DHS policy, that officers and agents be subject to additional supervisory and/or leadership oversight, and that CBP implement recommended policy changes to protect civil rights and civil liberties to the greatest extent possible. Further, CRCL routinely advocates for consistent, accurate and thorough reporting and data collection. For example, CRCL has investigated allegations of U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents conducting roving patrol stops motivated by considerations of race, color, or ethnicity. In 2019, CRCL issued recommendations to CBP regarding roving vehicle stops after investigating a number of complaints that alleged USBP violated the civil rights and civil liberties of individuals while conducting roving vehicle stops, including some allegations of racial profiling. CRCL also investigated allegations of discrimination at ports of entry. In 2021, CRCL investigated allegations that CBP engaged in discriminatory practices at the Blaine Port of Entry, specifically nationality and place of birth discrimination.

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Topic:	Programs to Combat Racism II
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Question: Has DHS developed any programs to combat racism through education and outreach, and if so, how does DHS plan to measure progress?

Has DHS implemented any new policies or procedures to address findings that employees have engaged in racially discriminatory activities related to their employment?

Response: CRCL issues final actions on behalf of the Department for all equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints filed against DHS. In cases where a DHS employee is found to have engaged in unlawful discrimination, CRCL's final action contains a requirement that the relevant office or Component consider imposing discipline against the employee for having engaged in discriminatory conduct. The employee's management chain decides whether discipline is imposed and the nature of any discipline. CRCL's final action also requires that the employee receive EEO training related to the discriminatory conduct at issue.

Upon President Biden's Executive Order ending restrictions on diversity training, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) secured a special session of the Police Executive Research Forum: Integrating, Communications, Assessment and Tactics training (PERF ICAT) Training Program for FPS staff (an initial train-the-trainer approach) on June 3, 2021 funded entirely through FPS Operational Funds. Although the course does not focus solely on combating racism, it is meant to be a tactical part of the FPS Social Justice Training Program. PERF ICAT is a nationally recognized training course that incorporates de-escalation tactics and critical thinking skills for the management of potentially volatile police-citizen encounters, encouraging the integration of crisis recognition and intervention, communication skills, and operational tactics in police responses.

Additionally, FPS is working with Fair & Impartial Policing, LLC (FIP) to schedule Mid-Manager courses, a Command Course, and a Civilian LE Course in the Spring/Summer of FY 2022. FIP is a top provider of implicit-bias awareness training for law enforcement in the U.S. and Canada, training officers on the effects of implicit bias and the skills needed to reduce and manage biases. The courses apply the modern science of bias to policing and decision-making and educates on the impact of implicit bias. The Command course includes assessments/reform of anti-biased policing policy, recruitment and hiring, training, supervision & accountability, operations, leadership, measurement, and outreach to diverse communities. Those who have participated in the training report that they now have a new perspective for thinking about how bias might manifest in policing and realize that biased behavior can be unintentional.

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Currently, FPS has plans to further develop the social justice training program by designing and piloting various courses, which may include immersion and experiential exercises and have ongoing discussions about how to best evaluate and measure progress through the utilization of the Kirkpatrick Model of Evaluation. The Kirkpatrick Model assesses learners' satisfaction of the training, training effectiveness, impact of training through learned behavior, and return of investment.

In addition, DHS policy on “[Nondiscriminatory Law Enforcement and Screening Activities](#)” prohibits the consideration of race or ethnicity in law enforcement, investigation, and screening activities, in all but the most exceptional circumstances. As stated in the DHS policy, personnel may use race or ethnicity only when a compelling governmental interest is present and only in a way narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.

On February 6, 2014, the Commissioner of CBP issued the CBP Policy on Nondiscrimination in Law Enforcement Activities and other Administered Programs. CBP's policy adopted the broader DHS policy. CBP has taken steps since the promulgation of this policy to train its agents and officers through muster modules, basic academy curriculum, and computer-based training. CBP has also periodically messaged key information about the policy to employees through Informational Display System messages, posters at the CBP training academies, payroll notice statements, and the CBP Intranet website.

In regard to accountability, CBP Directive No. 51735-013B, Standards of Conduct, establishes CBP's policy on the ethical conduct and responsibilities of all CBP employees. It requires all employees to maintain high standards of honesty, integrity, impartiality, character, and professionalism to ensure the proper performance of government business and the continued trust and confidence of the public. Certain conduct, on or off-duty, may subject an employee to appropriate disciplinary action. As it relates to bias-motivated conduct, this Directive states that “Employees will not act or fail to act on an official matter in a manner which improperly takes into consideration an individual's race, color, age, sexual orientation, religion, sex, national origin, [or] disability.” CBP OPR reviews all allegations of bias motivated conduct to determine whether criminal activity or administrative misconduct has taken place and investigates as appropriate. Under CBP's Table of Offenses and Penalties, the recommended penalty associated with bias-motivated conduct is a 7-day suspension (for a first offense) and a 14-day suspension to removal (for a subsequent offense).

There have not been new policies or procedures implemented recently. The current DHS Directive was put in place in 2016, while the Instruction was last updated in 2018. The Directive and Instruction, with the suggested guidance provided by the Table of Penalties, provide the

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means to hold employees accountable for racially discriminatory activities they are found to engage in on or off-duty when there is a nexus to their employment.

DHS CRCL issues final actions on behalf of the Department for all EEO complaints filed against DHS by either issuing a final agency decision or by issuing a final action where discrimination is found by an Equal Employment Opportunity Administrative Judge. In cases where a DHS employee is found to have engaged in unlawful discrimination, CRCL's final action contains a requirement that the relevant office or Component consider imposing discipline against the employee for having engaged in discriminatory conduct. The employee's management chain decides whether discipline is imposed and the nature of any discipline. Consistent with Section 724.303 of the Elijah E. Cummings Federal Employee Antidiscrimination Act of 2020 (Cummings Act), which became law on January 1, 2021, the Component submit to the EEOC a report stating (1) whether disciplinary action has been proposed against a Federal employee as a result of the discriminatory conduct; and (2) the reasons for any disciplinary action within 120 days of its decision. CRCL's final action also requires that the employee receive EEO training related to the discriminatory conduct at issue.

Question#:	7
Topic:	Programs to Combat Racism III
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: The fourth pillar of the NSCDT also states that DHS is prioritizing efforts to ensure that every component of the government has a role to play in rooting out racism and advancing equity for underserved-communities that have far too often been the targets of discrimination and violence.

What steps, if any, are DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ), taking to address racism and bigotry as a root cause of domestic terrorism?

What best practices and programs is DHS developing in coordination with other non-law-enforcement-focused federal agencies to address racism as a root cause of domestic extremism and prevent violence? Please identify the agencies and programs with which DHS is coordinating.

Response: DHS has two primary offices that coordinate with other non-law-enforcement focused agencies to address the root causes of domestic extremism and prevent violence – the CRCL and the CP3.

CRCL supports the Department’s mission to secure the nation while preserving individual liberty, fairness and equality under the law. Because there is frequently an element of racism in domestic terrorism, the DHS components rely on the assistance of CRCL to support Departmental efforts to counter the effects of racism. The role of CRCL is twofold: (1) to protect all communities, especially those most impacted, and thereby help the Department pivot towards focusing on protecting minority communities; and (2) to ensure that civil rights and civil liberties are not violated in the Department’s activities, taking into account that this is also an issue that disparately can impact minority communities.

DHS CRCL conducts extensive engagement with diverse communities across the country, including underserved communities, and frequently facilitates direct engagement between senior DHS leadership and these communities. At these engagement events, CRCL partners with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) as well as several non-law enforcement federal agencies including the U.S. Departments of Education (ED), Housing and Urban Development, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. These agencies provide valuable information to communities on their work in preventing and combating racism and discrimination and also hear directly from communities about concerns they need to address. The trusted partnerships built as a result of these CRCL engagements enable DHS, (including our colleagues at CP3) and other non-enforcement federal partners to work closely with diverse communities on domestic terrorism prevention efforts.

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CRCL is partnering with colleagues throughout the Department to better assess the needs of communities under threat, build trust, and provide access to our resources to help protect against domestic terrorism. Some examples include:

- CRCL provides DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) professionals with regular training and guidance to promote the protection of civil rights and civil liberties while fulfilling their intelligence mission.
- CRCL subject matter experts perform pre-publication review of finished intelligence products intended for dissemination outside the Federal government by I&A. Products developed by I&A's Domestic Terrorism Branch are subject to this review process to ensure compliance with civil rights and civil liberties law and policy.
- CRCL also supports DHS's vetting and screening activities, including regular oversight of many key DHS screening programs, some of which include the use of publicly available social media, to ensure civil rights and civil liberties are safeguarded.
- CRCL continues to support the Domestic Violent Extremism Internal Review Working Group established by the Secretary to prevent, detect, and respond to DVE threats internal to the Department.

DHS is actively advancing equity for racial minorities and members of other underserved communities throughout its programs and operations.

Through policy development and oversight, complaint investigations, and renewed community engagement efforts, CRCL is leading DHS in efforts to advance equity. The CRCL Officer leads the DHS Equity Task Force, charged with leading the Department's implementation of President Biden's equity-based executive actions. This task force was established following the tragic shootings in Atlanta in March 2021, to coordinate DHS efforts to combat domestic violent extremism and targeted violence against members of the Asian-American, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander community. In September 2021, the task force was broadened and renamed the DVE Equity Task Force to respond to additional communities impacted by targeted violence and domestic violent extremism. The Task Force takes a collaborative approach to address the needs of communities threatened by domestic violent extremism while building trust and providing increased access to DHS resources for affected communities to help protect them against hate-based domestic violent extremism.

The CP3 was established to improve the Department's ability to combat terrorism and targeted violence, consistent with privacy protections, civil rights and civil liberties, and other applicable laws. CP3 seeks a resilient America where communities are united to help end targeted violence and terrorism. To work with the whole-of-society to build local prevention frameworks.

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CP3 seeks to prevent acts of targeted violence and terrorism by working with the whole of society to establish and expand local prevention frameworks. Through technical, financial, and educational assistance, CP3 supports local efforts that prevent individuals from radicalizing to violence and intervene with individuals who may be radicalizing, or have radicalized, to violence.

The DHS targeted violence and terrorism prevention approach proactively places civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy concerns as a core component of its programs. CRCL, PRIV, and OGC are involved in every aspect of the DHS prevention mission, particularly in ensuring strategies, programs, and materials are developed and reviewed through these critical lenses. Additionally, CP3 has initiated a strategic engagement process focusing on proactively working with civil rights and civil liberties organizations with the goal of ensuring that these organizations are a key local voice and component in the development and implementation of local prevention efforts.

While not limited to racism and equity, DHS CP3 has begun working more closely with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and ED to harmonize efforts in the violence prevention space. For example, in January 2022, both DHS and ED co-sponsored a Digital Forum on Prevention that focused on keeping students safe and included discussions of online hate speech. CP3 also is working with other federal agencies to enhance equity in its grants process, such as recent discussions with the U.S. Department of the Interior to enhance outreach to potential applicants in the American Indian and Alaska Native communities.

Question#:	8
Topic:	Shift Resources
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Does the inclusion of this pillar as part of the Strategy reflect a commitment from DHS to shift domestic terrorism resources away from communities of color to right-wing groups that have shown a far greater propensity to commit acts of terrorism?

Response: Regardless of the specific ideology or motivations, the Department will seek to address all forms of terrorism and targeted violence. Allocation of DHS resources are informed by the Department's assessment of the threat, risk, incident data, lethality of the violence, and any other relevant factors. With respect to the threat landscape, as noted in the February 2022 National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) bulletin, the primary terrorism-related threat to the United States continues to stem from lone offenders or small cells of individuals who are motivated by a range of foreign and/or domestic grievances often cultivated through the consumption of certain online content. Among DVEs, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, including white supremacists, likely will remain the most lethal DVE threat in the United States. Since 2020, however, we have also seen a significant increase in anti-government and anti-authority violent extremism, particularly from militia violent extremists, which typically target law enforcement, elected officials, and government personnel and facilities. DHS will continue to assess this activity and will prioritize and allocate its resources as needed to address such threats.

Question#:	9
Topic:	Right-Wing Extremists Near the Border
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, militias in Arizona have documented (via social media) their detainment of migrants, friendly interactions with some Border Patrol agents, and in certain cases, the seizure of migrants' personal property.

How does the presence of right-wing extremists near the border impact your counterterrorism strategy?

What policies and procedures are in place that prohibit this conduct?

Response: DHS recognizes the significant threat domestic terrorism poses to our nation, and has undertaken efforts to address domestic terrorism threats over the past year. The Intelligence Community (IC) has assessed that DVEs, who are motivated by a range of ideologies and galvanized by recent political and societal events in the United States, pose an elevated threat. In March 2021, DHS, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a joint baseline assessment that found racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) and militia violent extremists (MVEs) present the most lethal DVE threats, with RMVEs most likely to conduct mass-casualty attacks against civilians and MVEs typically targeting law enforcement and government personnel and facilities. This assessment represents our view of the DVE threat at a strategic level, and reflects the most comprehensive analytic work of intelligence professionals and available data.

DHS has noted through several NTAS bulletins that narratives surrounding immigration issues have resonated within both RMVEs and MVE circles, for different but sometimes overlapping reasons. RMVEs may view immigration issues as consistent with “Great Replacement” theories of foreigners changing the demographic composition of the United States. MVEs often view perceived inabilities of the government to successfully secure the Southwest Border as evidence of governmental failure.

To strengthen intelligence analysis, in May 2021, I&A established a new, dedicated domestic terrorism branch to produce the sound, timely intelligence needed to counter related threats. The Department also expanded its evaluation of online activity as part of efforts to assess and prevent acts of violence, in ways that ensure robust protections for Americans’ speech and privacy rights. As a result, over the past year, DHS has produced more than 80 intelligence products related to domestic violent extremism, which have informed five NTAS bulletins issued by DHS to explain the evolving threat landscape to the public and provide resources for how to stay safe.

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In addition to these efforts, the White House released the *National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism* in June 2021. This strategy provides a first-ever framework for the federal government to better understand and share information related to domestic terrorism; prevent recruitment and mobilization to violence; disrupt and deter domestic terrorism activity; and confront long-term contributors to domestic terrorism, while embracing the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties as national security imperatives. DHS is deeply engaged in executing and implementing the strategy.

In implementing the *National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism*, DHS remains focused on reducing the threat of violence, while vigilantly safeguarding constitutionally protected expression and freedom of political association. We are doing this through enhanced intelligence analysis, as well as improved information sharing with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners through the dissemination of timely and actionable information and intelligence regarding the evolving threat environment. In the past year, DHS has convened more than 50 engagements to inform our partners about the threat environment, including biweekly calls with state and local law enforcement executives and national-level calls with a broad group of stakeholders on emerging threats. These engagements have ranged from dozens of participants to over 800 participants on national-level outreach efforts, totaling thousands of participants over the course of the year.

DHS is also taking a new approach to preventing terrorism and targeted violence. In May 2021, the CP3 was established to expand the Department's ability to prevent terrorism and targeted violence by providing communities with the tools and resources to address early-risk factors and ensure individuals receive help before they radicalize to violence. DHS has also increased funding to combat DVE. For the first time, countering domestic violent extremism was designated a "National Priority Area" in Federal Emergency Management Agency grant programs, resulting in approximately \$77 million being spent on capabilities to combat this threat nationwide. In this past FY, DHS also awarded \$20 million under the TVTP Grant Program, doubling the funding for the only federal grant program dedicated to enhancing the capabilities of local communities to address targeted violence and terrorism. Over the last year, DHS's Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) also has invested over \$7 million in research, development, program evaluation, data development, and national and international cooperation and information sharing on DVE.

Question#:	9
Topic:	Right-Wing Extremists Near the Border
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

CBP does not have a role or partner in any way with militia organizations. Militia groups are private citizens with no law enforcement authority. Therefore, Border Patrol agents do not coordinate any law enforcement operations or share intelligence with them. CBP encourages all private citizens to provide information to the pertinent law enforcement agency regarding any suspicious activity or safety concerns.

Furthermore, Border Patrol agents will treat members of militias the the same as anyone else regarding their access to public or private lands. If local or state laws are violated, agents will contact the appropriate agency for response.

Question#:	10
Topic:	CBP Policies
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Have CBP agents been disciplined for violations of these policies? Are there active investigations into potential collaboration between federal agents and border militias?

What training is currently in place to help ensure that agents do not act on or sympathize with extremist and anti-government ideologies?

To the extent that policies exist, how are they enforced?

Response: Although CBP OPR has conducted investigations into allegations of collaboration between federal agents and border militias, the allegations were unsubstantiated and not sustained. OPR does not have any active investigations into potential collaboration between federal agents and border militias.

There is a DHS Performance and Learning Management System training available to employees, titled Violent Extremism Awareness Briefing (Course Number C06AA0v1-VEAB). This training is “intended to raise awareness of how violent extremists and targeted violence actors get recruited to commit illegal acts, thereby negatively impacting the lives of individuals, families, and communities.” All CBP employees are also required to complete Counter-Intelligence Awareness Training and Inside Threat Awareness Training annually.

OPR IOD reviews all complaints and allegations referencing “Integrity-Related Misconduct” and “Bias-Motivated Conduct” by CBP personnel as defined by the CBP Standards of Conduct. OPR IOD as appropriate opens investigations when criminal or administrative misconduct is identified related to “Inappropriate Associations” to include association with violent extremist groups such as anti-government and anti-authority violent extremist groups.

Question#:	11
Topic:	Allocate Resources
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: How does DHS prioritize and allocate resources between domestic and international terrorist threats, and how will that balance change as a result of the NSCDT?

Response: June 15, 2022 marked the one-year anniversary of the release of the Strategy. The one-year anniversary provides an opportunity to mark progress made on the three pillars of the Strategy assigned to DHS. Pillar 1 improves our understanding of the domestic terrorism threat. Pillar 2 focuses on working with our partners outside of government to prevent acts of domestic terrorism better sharing threat-related information with state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement. Pillar 3 looks to find solutions to better disrupt and prosecute such acts. This response will summarize the Department's efforts implementing the strategy organized around these three pillars where DHS has equities.

In support of Pillar 1, to better understand and share domestic terrorism related information, DHS has enhanced domestic terrorism analysis and improved information sharing with the federal government, SLTT law enforcement, and private sector partners where appropriate. In May 2021, DHS established a new, dedicated domestic terrorism branch to produce the sound, timely intelligence needed to counter related threats. Since 2021, DHS has also issued six National Terrorism Advisory System bulletins to the US public providing unclassified insights and resources to assist them in countering the threat from domestic terrorism—the most recent bulletin was issued on June 7, 2022. DHS will continue to use the NTAS process and other information sharing mechanisms to inform the public about terrorism related threats. Further, the FBI, DHS, and the National Counterterrorism Center have increased intelligence production substantially during the last year, sharing additional domestic terrorism specific products with SLTT and foreign partners.

In support of Pillar 2, to prevent domestic terrorism recruitment and mobilization to violence, DHS has been actively enabling local non-governmental partners to prevent domestic terrorist recruitment and mobilization to violence. DHS provides resources and empowers individuals to seek help when they, or others they know, need it—and as early as possible. This effort centers on the CP3, which is entering its second year of operation. CP3 educates and trains stakeholders on how to identify indicators of radicalization to violence, where to go for help, and on the resources that are available to prevent targeted violence and terrorism. CP3's Regional Prevention Coordinators work at the state and local level to help communities prevent targeted violence and terrorism; they share information, provide training, and help build networks of community partners who can engage in prevention.

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The Department also provides financial assistance to support the prevention and protection missions. CP3's TVTP Grant Program released its 2022 NOFO on April 12, 2022, of which addressing domestic terrorism is a key focus for applicants to that program. The 86 applications received during this application period are currently under review. Additionally, the Department's FY 2022 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) will continue to include combating domestic terrorism as a National Priority Area of concern and requires that recipients allocate at least 3 percent of their award to that area. The HSGP NOFO was released publicly on May 13, 2022. Last, DHS is enabling nonprofit organizations, including houses of worship and other religious institutions, to upgrade physical security and protect themselves from terrorism, hate crimes, and targeted violence through the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP). Following the hostage situation at the Congregation Beth Israel synagogue in Colleyville, Texas, DHS Secretary Mayorkas called for an increase in funding for the NSGP to \$360 million; this increase is reflected in the President's FY 2023 Budget request to Congress. In 2022, Congress will provide a total of \$250 million, an increase of \$70 million from 2021. The increase enables DHS to expand participation in this critical program and increase our support to historically marginalized communities and Historically Black Colleges and Universities.

In support of Pillar 3, to disrupt and deter domestic terrorism activity, DHS is ensuring that its SLTT law enforcement partners have the resources, training, and information necessary to identify and disrupt acts of domestic terrorism. Our SLTT partners often serve as the first line of defense against domestic terrorism and targeted violence. To assist with disrupting threats of extremist violence, especially those that do not rise to the level of a federal crime, DHS and FBI are working to develop threat assessment and threat management capacities at the state and local level. DHS provides support by through training and technical assistance, sharing best practices to support the local development of these capabilities, and providing resources through the Department's preparedness grant programs. Additionally, on March 11, 2022, DHS released its report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, *Domestic Violent Extremism Internal Review: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations*. Recommendations included improving workforce training for how to identify and report the domestic terrorism threat and the development of a centralized, DHS-wide investigative case management system and information sharing mechanism for investigating related allegations.

With respect to the Department's evaluation of counterterrorism (CT) priorities, in July 2021, the Secretary created the Counterterrorism and Targeted Violence Action Group, a standing Subcommittee of the Department's Counterterrorism Advisory Board, to address gaps and ensure implementation of priority actions identified in the National Strategy and the DHS Counterterrorism Posture Review.

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DHS prioritizes and allocates resources through its Program and Budget Review process, an annual process that facilitates resource allocation across DHS's diverse portfolio based on emerging risks and threats. As threats change, priorities and funding will shift accordingly.

Regardless of the specific ideology or motivations, the Department will seek to address all forms of terrorism and targeted violence. Allocation of DHS resources will be informed by the Department's assessment of the threat risk, incident data, lethality of the violence, and any other relevant factors. The Department looks forward to discussing its resource needs with Congressional authorizers and appropriators following the submission of the President's Budget for FY 2023.

Question#:	12
Topic:	January 6 International Actors
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Do you have any knowledge of international actors or transnational terrorism organizations organizing in advance of the deadly January 6 attack on the United States Capitol?

Please detail the policy changes made by the Department following January 6, 2020.

Response: I&A did not have any knowledge of international actors or transnational terrorism organizations organizing in advance of the deadly January 6 breach on the United States Capitol.

- **Issue Updated Guidance:** I&A has been carefully re-examining its approach to open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection and dissemination. I&A recently published dissemination guidance to promote sharing of most OSINT reports (OSIRs) and will continue to refine that guidance to enhance information sharing, consistent with law and policy. I&A's Intelligence Oversight (IO) Guidelines implement I&A's authority to collect publicly available information in furtherance of one or more national or departmental missions, including its missions to counter domestic terrorism, protect critical infrastructure and key resources, and support the lawful missions of other DHS components. IO Guidelines, approved by the Attorney General, also prohibit I&A personnel from engaging in any intelligence activities "for the purpose of affecting the political process in the United States, for the sole purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or for the purpose of retaliating against a whistleblower or suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent." These restrictions help ensure that I&A's activities are conducted in a manner that is consistent with the First Amendment and the Privacy Act of 1974.

I&A is currently reviewing its guidance for collecting and disseminating information collected via publicly available sources, including social media, in order to improve its ability to detect and communicate threats without infringing on First Amendment and other protections.

- **OSINT personnel and management:** I&A has made substantial changes to the management, supervision, policies, equipment, personnel, organization, and training associated with its OSINT activities in order to improve the ability to rapidly identify, assess, and communicate threats to homeland security manifested on the publicly available internet, including social media platforms. I&A has appointed new leadership and expanded the number of supervisors that oversee OSINT activities and implemented a new technical solution that greatly improves both the efficiency and oversight of I&A's dissemination of OSIR to its federal, state, and local partners. I&A is also utilizing IC Joint Duty

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Assignments (JDAs) to expand resident expertise and introduce additional outside perspectives to its work in this space.

During 2020, I&A's intelligence training academy created an OSIR writing course, that includes guidance on producing and disseminating intelligence reports based on publicly available information. All open-source collectors have successfully completed this course. I&A will continue to evaluate and improve its OSINT training through DHS and IC course offerings.

In early 2021, I&A added four new Assistant Intelligence Oversight Officers, doubling the size of its Privacy and IO Branch. One of the new Assistant IO Officers works exclusively with I&A open-source collectors and provides daily guidance to improve the efficiency of I&A's open-source reporting activities. This enhanced IO support enables open-source collectors to move forward quickly with actionable intelligence while enhancing their ability to avoid reporting on the activities of Americans that would violate I&A's IO Guidelines; including reporting that would be contrary to the First Amendment or in excess of I&A's legal authorities.

I&A works to provide actionable intelligence to the broadest set of homeland security customers at all levels of classification. For many customers, this requires I&A to disseminate intelligence at the lowest classification possible. As the threat environment continues to evolve, it is imperative that DHS continues to improve its ability to identify and rapidly communicate intelligence information to its state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners via intelligence channels and threat assessments to the American public, as appropriate.

DHS I&A's IO Guidelines, approved by the Attorney General, establish the requirements and procedures for I&A's dissemination of intelligence or information, which is permitted only to the extent that there is a reasonable belief that dissemination furthers one or more of the national or departmental missions identified in the IO Guidelines. These guidelines, as well as I&A's policies associated with the production, review, approval, and dissemination of finished intelligence products, lay out the parameters through which the suite of I&A's finished intelligence products are issued and communicated with external partners. Only after a product has completed all appropriate review processes and is in compliance with all analytic tradecraft standards; legal requirements; policies for the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties; and oversight and compliance guidelines, can the product be disseminated to appropriate partners.

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DHS manages the NTAS, which is designed to communicate information about terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to the American public. DHS issued the first NTAS Bulletin primarily addressing the threat from domestic violent extremists in January 2021 and issued five subsequent NTAS Bulletins addressing the DVE threat, highlighting the diverse and challenging threat environment.

I&A has also re-invigorated its dialogue with state, local, tribal, and territorial partners by hosting national, bi-weekly meetings to discuss relevant threats and ad-hoc national meetings related to emerging threats, issuing more than 100 intelligence products related to domestic violent extremism since 2021, including six NTAS bulletins to inform the public about the latest terrorism-related threats to the Homeland. This consistent dialogue allows I&A to incorporate these partners' perspectives into its analysis and improve its ability to recognize and respond to the most pressing homeland security threats facing those jurisdictions and communities.

In order to ensure all appropriate customers have access to the necessary intelligence, DHS has refocused its intelligence and information-sharing capabilities. Analysts typically write finished intelligence products for specific customer sets, but they strive to make those products available to all appropriate partners. I&A typically disseminates its products across multiple unclassified and classified platforms to federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as appropriate. I&A's deployed intelligence officers, which provide daily intelligence support to these partners, further share these products within their respective regions. These products provide I&A's partners with greater insight into evolving threats and vulnerabilities to inform public safety and security planning efforts to prevent violence.

Finally, it is important to note that DHS's ability to understand and combat the threat posed by domestic terrorism requires both sufficient funding for its intelligence activities, including through the National Intelligence Program, and the ability to expend such funding for intelligence activities and national intelligence activities (as such terms are defined under the National Security Act of 1947) without limitation to activities with a foreign as to nexus.

Question#:	13
Topic:	Militia Groups
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: On January 6, 2020, far-right militia groups and white supremacist actors collaborated to assault the Capitol. Evidence also suggests that they worked together in planning the insurrection.

Has DHS reconsidered how it categorizes domestic extremists, given the significant overlap between white supremacist and far-right militia organizations?

How does DHS work to ensure that threat patterns and connections between extremist actors are not missed, given the current categorization scheme?

What has changed about how DHS has evaluated the far-right militia threat since January 6, 2020?

Response: DHS I&A’s definitions of domestic violent extremist ideologies are consistent with those used by our FBI partners for their investigative purposes and by other members of the IC, and provide a means to helping differentiate protected activity and association with potential furtherance of violence. I&A can conduct analysis on both areas of violent extremism, and on blended ideologies without any need to update classifications.

Political views, on their own, absent any potential connection to violence, are protected by the United States Constitution, even if some might characterize them as “extremist.” I&A’s collection and analysis activities in this space focus primarily on the potential for violence.

Since 2020 and throughout 2021, DHS I&A has continued to release products examining potential drivers to violence that have since been linked to MVE activity, including the widespread civil unrest associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, and the rise in popularity of the “Boogaloo” concept—a belief prevalent in a variety of DVE ideologies, including RMVEs and anti-government/anti-authority violent extremists, which includes MVEs, espousing the collapse of U.S. society into civil war over racial and societal tensions or perceptions of government overreach, respectively. In general, I&A noted through 2020 that MVE activity had increased significantly over previous years, particularly with regard to Boogaloo-related activity that was noted in the May/June 2020 series of attacks by a Boogaloo adherent in northern California—one of which targeted DHS FPS officers. In addition, the FBI disrupted individuals who identify as Boogaloo adherents during the same time frame in Las Vegas who conducted violent acts in violation of federal law. These events in 2020, combined with the breach of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, have contributed to I&A’s ongoing assessments highlighting the elevated threat posed by MVEs to a variety of targets, including but not limited to: elected

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officials, law enforcement, government buildings, and ideological opponents. Membership in militia groups that do not engage in criminal activity is protected by the First Amendment. We defer to the FBI for more in depth information on how they investigate individuals assessed to be MVEs.

Question#:	14
Topic:	May 2021 Letter
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Will the Department commit to providing a response to the Subcommittee's May 2021 letter about its response to the threat of militia violent extremists and their overlap with white supremacists by December 1, 2021?

Response: The response letter has been delivered.

Question#:	15
Topic:	Safeguard Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: The NSCDT indicates that the Administration will use "pertinent external, non-governmental analysis and information that will provide enhanced situational awareness of today's domestic threat."

How will DHS screen this information for accuracy and to ensure that it was collected in a way that safeguards civil rights and civil liberties?

Will DHS implement regulations to ensure that the information and analysis used does not violate First Amendment-protected activity or prohibitions against discrimination?

Response: DHS does not profile, target, or discriminate against any individual for exercising First Amendment rights. In accordance with DHS Policy Statement 140-12, *Information Regarding First Amendment Protected Activities*, our activities, including prevention, intelligence, and law enforcement, are never based solely on First Amendment protected activity. Further, the Privacy Act and DHS policy prohibit DHS from maintaining records about how individuals exercise their First Amendment rights unless certain criteria are met. This includes collecting information about people's expression of their views online and over social media.

In combatting all forms of violent extremism, DHS CT efforts must respect First Amendment rights. To that end, DHS policy prohibits profiling, targeting, or discriminating against any individual for exercising their First Amendment rights. DHS policy, based on the requirements set forth in the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7), prohibits DHS employees from collecting and maintaining information that is otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Specifically, the policy directs that "DHS personnel shall not collect, maintain in DHS systems, or use information protected by the First Amendment unless (a) an individual has expressly granted their consent for DHS to collect, maintain and use that information; (b) maintaining the record is expressly authorized by a federal statute; or (c) that information is relevant to a criminal, civil, or administrative activity relating to a law DHS enforces or administers. In addition, DHS personnel should not pursue by questioning, research, or other means, information relating to how an individual exercises his or her First Amendment rights unless one or more of the same conditions applies."

Additionally, DHS screening and vetting activities with authorization for the limited and appropriate use of publicly available social media are designed to ensure compliance with the Privacy Act, as well as other relevant laws and DHS policies related to freedom of speech,

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nondiscrimination, and others that promote the fair and equitable treatment of the millions of individuals interacting with DHS on a daily basis.

I&A is additionally bound by its IO Guidelines, which were approved by the Attorney General in 2017. The IO Guidelines provide that—

I&A personnel are prohibited under all circumstances from engaging in any intelligence activities, including the dissemination of information to the White House, for the purpose of affecting the political process in the United States, for the sole purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or for the purpose of retaliating against a whistleblower or suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent.

The IO Guidelines further provide that I&A cannot access, collect, retain, or disseminate any information except to the extent that doing so furthers one of the national or departmental missions listed in the IO Guidelines and limits I&A to collecting information overtly or through publicly available sources. The IO Guidelines set forth additional requirements and restrictions concerning personally identifiable information about U.S. Persons, which are designed to ensure that I&A's acquisition, use, and sharing of such information is consistent with the requirements of the Constitution and the Privacy Act of 1974.

Question#:	16
Topic:	Disclosures
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Will DHS agree to disclose the identity of non-governmental entities that will be providing this external information, as well as the nature of any agreements governing these entities' relationship with the federal government?

Response: Regarding the evaluation of pertinent external, non-governmental analysis and information to provide enhanced situational awareness of the Homeland threat environment, I&A will adhere to its IO Guidelines, IC standards, and its obligations to keep its Congressional intelligence committees fully informed of its intelligence activities, including when potentially using this type of information in its analysis and work to protect the Homeland.

Question#:	17
Topic:	Violence Prevented
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: President Biden's NSCDT features "violence prevention" as part of its plan to combat far-right violence. In May 2021, DHS created a new Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) to help coordinate this effort. The CP3 program seeks to train law enforcement officials, educators, public health officials, social workers, and private citizens to identify and report people who show purported warning signs that they might commit an act of "targeted" violence or terrorism sometime in the future, and either connect them with mental health and social services-with police involved in that decision-making process-or refer them to law enforcement directly. The Department's prior programmatic evaluations have relied largely on administrative metrics (e.g., how many prevention trainings were held) and measuring changes in attitudes that are not specific to violence but rather are found in large parts of the general population (e.g., if participants in a program felt less socially isolated). These metrics do nothing to support the claim that CP3-style prevention activities accurately identify true threats or prevent violence.

What independent, third-party evidence do you have that CP3 or any of its predecessor programs (CVE, TVTP) have actually prevented violence?

Do you have any specific examples where any acts of violence would not have been prevented but for CP3 or its predecessor programs (CVE, TVTP)?

Response: CP3 improves the Department's ability to combat terrorism and targeted violence, consistent with privacy protections, civil rights and civil liberties, and other applicable laws, by ensuring DHS's efforts are grounded in an approach to violence prevention that addresses early-risk factors that can lead to radicalization to violence. In support of this objective, CP3 enables and empowers local efforts that can either reduce the risk that individuals may radicalize to violence, intervene with individuals who have (or are) radicalizing to violence, and reduce recidivism of those that have committed acts of violence. However, the measurement of prevention, or risk reduction, is an inherently difficult task for even well-established prevention programs. According to the DHS commissioned report Practical Terrorism Prevention: Reexamining U.S. National Approaches to Addressing the Threat of Ideologically Motivated Violence² by the RAND Corporation "it is essentially impossible to definitively prove the negative: that a terrorist attack that would have happened in the absence of the program did not happen as a result of its efforts." The need for metrics in this type of violence prevention is clear;

²Jackson, Brian A. et al, Practical Terrorism Prevention: Reexamining U.S. National Approaches to Addressing the Threat of Ideologically Motivated Violence (2019). Page 51 of the report discusses the challenges in measuring prevention initiatives.

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however the field of terrorism research has not arrived at standard metrics for prevention. Relative to traditional crime, few people have radicalized to violence in the U.S., and therefore simple statistics rarely prove successful prevention precisely because successful prevention efforts may not come to the attention of the local law enforcement, do not make the headlines, or are difficult to measure through community organizations. While there is a consensus regarding the need for metrics, there is also recognition that measuring what a successful terrorism prevention initiative looks like needs to move beyond counting quantifiable data, such as downward trends in the number of incidents, and examine more qualitative measures that assess concepts like the ability for key stakeholders to recognize risk factors, behavioral changes, and know how to respond appropriately and get help to individuals of concern. We know that risk factors for terrorism are also risk factors for other societal problems and therefore, getting help that addresses risk factors can result in a number of positive outcomes for the individual, but it would be difficult conclude the violence would have happened otherwise.

S&T is working with CP3 to conduct independent, third-party evaluations of prevention programs (domestically and internationally). The goal of these evaluations is to develop an evidence base to increase our understanding of what works in targeted violence and terrorism prevention programming in the United States. S&T recently published a preliminary report of performance on five of the FY 2016 DHS Office for Community Partnerships grantees.³ While there were many accomplishments from the programs, the sites faced significant challenges related to implementation. Ongoing independent, objective evaluations will continue for prevention programming in order to develop the necessary corpus of knowledge regarding, “What works, what doesn’t, and what’s promising” in this type of violence prevention programming in the U.S.

S&T has additional independent, third-party evaluations underway examining CP3’s FY 2020 and FY 2021 grant recipient programs. The results from these evaluations will be useful to refine targeted violence and terrorism prevention interventions and increase the Department’s understanding of the effectiveness of community-based interventions. The Department will share the results of those evaluations as soon as they become available. DHS is one of the only federal agencies attempting to evaluate these programs.

As stated in the previous response, it is not possible to count numbers of attacks that did not happen through DHS-led or supported targeted violence and terrorism prevention programs, particularly because CP3 focuses on early prevention, before something becomes a law

³See OTVTP (2020) Fiscal Year 2016 Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program Preliminary Report on Programmatic Performance, retrieved on 1/14/2022:

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enforcement or criminal justice matter. It may never be possible to know whether any individual would have carried out an attack in the absence of an intervention. This metric also fails to capture the broader contributions of the dozens of prevention efforts that DHS, and others, have led or supported through research, financial assistance, and community development programs, or have provided subject matter expertise towards developing. Rather than focusing on measuring the number of attacks prevented, DHS focuses on measuring the type and number of new partnerships that grantees develop and the amount of training and engagements that local community partners can deliver to build capacity of partners to address risk factors that may lead to a number of societal concerns, including violence. Ultimately, these investments are intended to reduce overall risk in a community while empowering the local NGOs and organizations that are best suited to undertake these endeavors.

Local communities are best situated to identify their own needs and respond to the nuanced threats facing their own communities. By providing local, tailored services that are unique to their societies they are better able to mitigate the vulnerabilities of a person through established principals of threat assessment and management. One of the ways to provide federal support to local communities is through financial assistance to establish and expand their economic and social programs.⁴ Each grantee develops their own project, identifies their individual goals and objectives, identifies the resources that they think they need to meet those goals and objectives, and develops a plan for implementing the project. S&T-funded evaluations assess these communities' abilities to meet their goals and objectives. S&T's aim is to advance foundational research on the risk and mitigating factors influencing targeted violence and terrorism through partnerships with independent researchers and local communities across the U.S. through knowledge exchanges and convening activities.

S&T is actively providing evaluation support to local prevention programs funded by CP3. These evaluations provide scientific and programmatic support to local communities. Each of these programs have their own target population, needs, and abilities to deliver services that support their own unique communities. Some of this work has resulted in the development of training tools and practitioner resources for local communities, which has provided DHS S&T with the evidence to formulate a basis for evaluating this type of prevention programming. This knowledge will help communities plan and implement these programs more effectively in the future. The evaluations and continuous support and improvement of these programs will provide better evidence of the impact of these grant programs than attempting to measure the absence of attacks. Emerging research and evaluations suggest that violence prevention efforts such as these

⁴ Dymnicki, Allison B., Jason Katz, Xan J. Young, Mary Thorngren, Jazmine Orazi, Khiya J. Marshall, and Corey D. Lumpkin (2020) Supporting Local Health Departments to Lead Multisectoral Youth Violence Prevention Efforts 22:6, 863-72. Retrieved on 1/14/2022: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1524839920947766>

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can demonstrate promise,⁵ including work funded by DHS⁶ but conducted independently by researchers in the fields of public health and criminal justice.

⁵ See, inter alia, Hassan, G. et al., A Systematic Review on the Outcomes of Primary and Secondary Prevention Programs in the Field of Violent Radicalization, Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence, 2021; National Academies of Science, Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice: Proceedings of a Workshop, 2017

⁶ Savoia, E., Testa, M. A., Stern, J., Lin, L., Konate, S., Klein, N. "Evaluation of the Greater Boston Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Pilot Program". Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA. Retrieved on 1/14/2022: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/OPSR_TP_CVE-Formative-Evaluation-Greater-Boston-CVE-Pilot-Program-Report_161121-508.pdf

Question#:	18
Topic:	Gun Violence
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: In 2020, there was a significant rise in homicides, particularly gun homicides, along with a broader rise in shootings. Does CP3 or any other DHS counter-violence program specifically address gun violence and propose solutions to reduce gun crimes?

Response: The DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) maintains a comprehensive Active Shooter Preparedness Program that is focused on mitigating the threat of an individual that is actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people at public venues, stadiums, vaccination locations, or other potential mass gatherings. The program provides insight into behavioral indicators, potential attack methods, emergency action plan creation, actions (i.e., run, hide, fight) that may be taken to reduce impacts during an attack, and how to quickly recover from an incident. The emphasis of the program is to build public and private sector security capacity to preclude an attack and, if an attack occurs, effectively mitigate its impacts. The program does not focus on policies or advocacies associated with the reduction of gun violence or the reduction of gun crimes.

In addition to those efforts, DHS CP3 focuses on the prevention of targeted violence and terrorism, including where those forms of violence involve the use of firearms. For example, CP3 listed its grant and field operations resources as part of the Biden Administration's Community Violence Intervention effort, an interagency initiative that is deploying proven strategies that target those most at risk of committing violence, including gun homicides.

Question#:	19
Topic:	Referrals
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Please provide the precise number of law enforcement referrals and current dispositions of cases-state, local, tribal, territorial, or federal-arising from any program or activity that CP3 has provided support for or administers? If these were connected to terrorism, please disaggregate them by investigative category (e.g., Racially Motivated Violent Extremist) and sub-category (e.g., White Supremacists). Please also provide corresponding information regarding non-criminal referrals.

Response: CP3 works to support local prevention capabilities in communities across the country to provide support and resources broadly to the community in early prevention and intervention projects. While the goal of prevention programs is to get help to individuals before law enforcement is needed, CP3 recognizes that prevention practitioners are often mandated reporters in their states and therefore are required to report imminent threats of harm to self or others. Under the TVTP Grant Program, DHS specifically funds the establishment of threat assessment and management teams as part of a local prevention capabilities. During the period of performance, those teams are required to maintain anonymized data on cases such that DHS can assess if the programs are implemented as designed. The quarterly reports submitted by these grantees do not have the granularity of information that is being requested in this question, but CP3 has initiated a data call and will provide the information to the committee when it becomes available. Please note, DHS only has the ability to collect this anonymized information from grantees during their period of performance.

Question#:	20
Topic:	ShadowDragon
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: CP3 provides funds through its Targeted Violence and Terrorism (TVTP) grant program for institutions such as non-federal governments, non-profits, and universities to help carry out prevention efforts. The fiscal year 2021 grant awards were recently made public. One grant for \$451,255 went to the Michigan State Police. It funds training (for police, first responders, and unspecified "private sector partners") to better report suspicious activity to fusion centers and strengthen "information sharing." It also funds a regional threat assessment team to intervene with people who are said to be "mobilizing to violence."

According to recent media reports, the Michigan State Police has been working with a private firm, ShadowDragon, that provides software that it claims can scrape the web to build excruciatingly detailed profiles about individuals. ShadowDragon's founder, Daniel Clemens, said:

I want to know everything about the suspect: Where do they get their coffee, where do they get their gas, where's their electric bill, who's their mom, who's their dad?

The company also claims its tools can be used to predict violence:

Clever security teams use OIMonitor to find indicators of unrest and violence before they start. Because riots don't start in a vacuum; there are always indicators.

Have DHS-provided funds, whether through the TVTP program or any other grant funding program been used to purchase or support ShadowDragon or any similar software? If you cannot answer definitively, please advise why not.

Response: None of the funds provided by the TVTP Grant Program to Michigan State Police are allocated to software. The type of software described in the question is not allowable under our prevention grant program and is incongruent with the Program's mission. The TVTP Grant Program has specific requirements to protect the privacy of program participants and ensures that participation in a prevention program does not place their information in any investigative or intelligence database. Grant recipients are instructed to minimize the amount of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) collected to the minimum necessary to carry out their prevention work and to have publicly available privacy policy on their website. Recipients are prohibited from providing DHS with PII on program participants or beneficiaries.

Question#:	21
Topic:	Application Transparency
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: As part of its commitment to transparency, does DHS intend to make the full grant applications public (minus sensitive personal information)? If not, please explain why.

Response: CP3 works with the DHS Freedom of Information Act Office to redact and publish the applications of successful applicants on an annual basis. This not only helps with transparency but also gives first-time applicants assistance in how to properly develop a quality application to ensure new applicants every year. Currently, the 2016 awardee applications are available on the DHS website at: www.dhs.gov/publication/cve-grants-awarded. CP3 continues to work with PRIV to upload more recent awardee applications to the DHS website.

Question#:	22
Topic:	Fusion Center Audits
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Fusion Center activities, which the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships funds, have a poor track record. They are products of the post-9/11 push to supercharge information sharing and surveillance coordination between federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. These centers were roundly criticized in a bipartisan 2012 U.S. Senate investigation that found they had "yielded little, if any, benefit to federal counterterrorism intelligence efforts" while releasing reports that were useless or corrosive of civil liberties. Just last year, one fusion center was caught distributing fake posts by right-wing activists as evidence of potential violence at anti-police brutality demonstrations, while others were found to have monitored racial justice organizers and protests.

Does DHS, DOJ, or any other federal agency intend to conduct a full, public audit of fusion centers to evaluate their usefulness and their impact on civil rights and liberties, including privacy and First Amendment activity? Will DHS commit to conducting one?

Response: Fusion Centers are state and locally-owned and operated centers that serve as focal points in states and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related. Fusion centers bring critical context and value to homeland security and law enforcement that no other federal or local organization can replicate. Fusion Centers accomplish this through sharing information, providing partners with a unique perspective on threats to their state or locality and being the primary conduit between frontline personnel, state and local leadership and the rest of the Homeland Security Enterprise. In support of these efforts, DHS leads an annual assessment of the National Network of Fusion Centers, including their compliance with the [annual requirements](#) set forth in the Homeland Security Grant Program NOFO. The assessment accounts for each fusion center's privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties (P /CRCL) protections, to include a fusion center's maintenance of an approved policy, making that publicly available, and conducting a compliance review and audit of the policy. Additionally, as part of the annual assessment, fusion centers ensure there is a process for addressing and adjudicating alleged P/CRCL violations, as well as annual P/CRCL training.

Question#:	23
Topic:	Private Entities
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: A private web services contractor working with fusion centers was targeted by hacktivists last year, resulting in the release of tens of thousands of fusion center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and DHS intelligence reports and other law enforcement materials, in what became known as #blueleaks.

How many non-law enforcement entities participate in fusion centers across the country?

How many private contractors or other non-government entities are employed at fusion centers?

Response: DHS does not own or operate state and major urban fusion centers. Fusion centers are state and locally-owned and operated centers for receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners. Fusion centers do provide some data to DHS on an annual basis in support of the Annual Assessment of the National Network of Fusion Centers. This data does not provide information about what entities participate in a fusion center, but it is possible to distinguish between individuals from private or public sector as well as individuals' primary discipline, such as law enforcement or otherwise. According to FY 2021 fusion center data provided to I&A, the average staffing ratios included approximately 27 percent non-law enforcement personnel at each fusion center. Additionally, on average approximately 0.76 percent reported private sector personnel at each fusion center.

Question#:	24
Topic:	Contract Regulating
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Does DHS or DOJ regulate which private companies with which fusion centers contract, or otherwise provide access to sensitive law enforcement intelligence like the material that was made public in the #blueleaks release?

Does DHS or DOJ vet these contractors or do background investigations or security checks?

Response: DHS does not own or operate state and major urban area fusion centers. Fusion centers are state-owned and operated centers for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners and therefore DHS does not have information on the private contractors or non-government entities employed by the fusion center. In instances where fusion centers contract for classified support, requests submitted to I&A security or the supporting Federal agency with management or operational responsibility for the information sharing activity being supported for review. I&A has validated several contracts providing classified support to fusion centers but does not conduct background investigations on contractors hired by states.

Question#:	25
Topic:	Intelligence Breaches
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Is DHS aware of whether hostile foreign intelligence services have breached fusion centers? We will accept a classified briefing on this matter.

Response: The Department closely monitors, often in partnership with the FBI and other IC partners, and reports on the activities of foreign intelligence threats to the fusion centers and other sectors within the Homeland Security Enterprise. Although FBI is best postured to provide granular insight into counterintelligence threats, we assess that numerous foreign intelligence entities seek—and are determined to develop—access to information held by fusion centers, among other public and private entities at the state and local level.

Question#:	26
Topic:	CRCL Role
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: DHS represents that

[e]very aspect of CP3's work considers and respects civil rights and civil liberties and have incorporated steps to work with the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) to ensure those protections are included.

Please describe the "steps" taken with CRCL to ensure those protections are undertaken.

Please describe DHS CRCL's role in reviewing the CP3 program and any checks you have in place to continuously audit compliance.

Response: DHS CP3 takes its responsibilities related to the protection of civil rights, civil liberties and privacy seriously. CP3 and CRCL leadership meet biweekly to ensure close coordination of effort and programming. Moreover, CP3 welcomed a senior CRCL official into its organization as Acting Deputy Director from January 2021- October 2021. Currently, CP3 details a member of its staff on a 90-day developmental rotation to CRCL to ensure its staff will have the opportunity to gain an understanding of civil rights and civil liberties for better integration into CP3 programs. In October of 2021, CP3 provided a briefing on its approach and programs to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Last, CP3 has tried to elevate the importance of protecting civil rights and civil liberties through prevention efforts at the local level. An example of this was the October 2021 Digital Forum on Prevention that focused on civil rights, civil liberties and privacy.

CP3 seeks CRCL input in its programmatic activities, and welcomes CRCL oversight and guidance. In the past year, CRCL experts have reviewed numerous CP3 programs and publications. Examples include a revision of the community awareness briefing, review of the TVTP grant awards and supporting documents, and participation in CP3 Digital Forums on Prevention. Through its biweekly engagements and staff-level coordination, CP3 ensures CRCL oversight of its activities, publications and programs.

CRCL also collaborates with CP3's headquarters and field operations staff to coordinate our outreach to communities threatened by targeted violence across the country. Examples of recent collaboration include CRCL's October 2021 engagement with Latinx communities at which CP3 and other DHS partner agencies emphasized the Administration's prioritization of keeping communities safe and shared details about related policies and programs and CP3's November 2021 Roundtable on Prevention with Denver communities where CRCL discussed providing

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regular advice and support to CP3 to ensure the continued preservation of First Amendment rights and prevention of racial, religious, or other profiling.

Question#:	27
Topic:	CRCL Oversight
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: A major premise of CP3 is that it is locally oriented-that is, run by states and communities themselves. This often means that DHS provides support to state and local law enforcement, non-profits, etc. and sets the wheels in motion, without getting its hands in the day-to-day administration of the program.

How do you ensure DHS CRCL oversight given this dynamic as many local police departments around the country that DHS funds have a poor track record when it comes to racial bias?

Will DHS CRCL provide oversight or collect information if state, local, or tribal funded programs result in disparate impact or due process issues (e.g., distorted demographics of people subject to threat assessments, someone has been targeted for political speech, etc.)? If not, please explain why not.

If DHS determines that localized programs are violating individuals' civil rights, what mechanisms are in place to correct the matter, including if the entity in question is no longer receiving DHS funds?

Response: CP3 employs a multidisciplinary approach to local prevention efforts, seeking to have a variety and diversity of local organizations offering their resources to support prevention efforts. As part of this multidisciplinary effort, CP3 seeks to have local civil rights and civil liberties organizations as participants in local prevention efforts to ensure that CP3 does not infringe upon civil rights and civil liberties. In addition, TVTP grantees, like all DHS grantees, are required to submit the DHS Civil Rights Evaluation Tool to CRCL, a tool through which CRCL ensures grantees have basic policies and procedures in place to meet their nondiscrimination obligations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and related civil rights authorities. Where there are allegations of racial discrimination by any police department receiving DHS funds, CRCL would work closely with DOJ's Civil Rights Division.

CRCL provides oversight to ensure DHS-funded programs and activities do not discriminate based on race, color, or national origin under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the DHS Title VI regulation. CRCL carries out this oversight function through review of funded entities' Civil Rights Evaluation Tool, complaint investigations, compliance reviews, the collection of data, and the provision of technical assistance.

The DHS Title VI regulation provides for compliance procedures that include provisions up to and including the termination of federal funds. DHS would not have jurisdiction under Title VI if an entity is no longer receiving funds from DHS; however, DHS could engage other federal

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Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
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agencies that award funds on actions those agencies could take to address reported civil rights violations.

Question#:	28
Topic:	Public Health Credentials
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: DHS bills CP3 as a "public health approach" to violence prevention. How many people with public health credentials are permanently employed at CP3, or at DHS who work on CP3?

Response: CP3’s mission is to support local communities’ efforts to build local prevention capabilities. These efforts are based upon a public health-informed model that prioritizes different strategies for prevention. CP3 does not, itself, conduct local prevention efforts. Instead, CP3 employs a team with a broad range of educational backgrounds, experience, and skillsets that enables it to provide valuable educational, technical, and financial support— informed by a variety of disciplines—for local communities to build their own local prevention frameworks. Within DHS, CP3 leads coordination efforts across the Department to streamline efforts to communities, so resources of the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), I&A and S&T are furnished in an synchronized manner.

Additionally, working with CP3, S&T has executed multiple research and development contracts with some of the leading public health research institutions in the United States including the Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston Children’s Hospital, University of Illinois School of Medicine, and UCLA Fielding School of Public Health to conduct research and design or evaluate local interventions. DHS S&T continues active engagement with our international partners through the Directorate’s bilateral and multilateral agreements which provide an additional means to engage with international experts in the field. DHS S&T also has engagements with Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, such as the RAND Corporation, MITRE, and leading research institutions, such as RTI International, who are responsible for many of the largest public health studies in the United States. DHS S&T, through the utilization of the various Centers of Excellence offers a consortium of U.S. academic institutions and network of researchers and educators that the Department can, and does, utilize.

Scientists from DHS S&T and other research organizations have documented the importance of applying public health methods and models to violence prevention for several years.⁷ The

⁷W. Rodney Hammond, Daniel J. Whitaker, John R. Lutzker, James Mercy, Pamela M. Chin, (2006) Setting a violence prevention agenda at the centers for disease control and prevention, *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 112-119, ISSN 1359-1789, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2005.07.003>. / Mercy, James A. and Alana M. Vivolo-Kantor (2016) The CDC’s Youth Violence Prevention Centers: Paving the Way to Prevention, *Journal of Primary Prevention*, 37:20-214 / Ashley S. D’Inverno and Bradford N. Bartholow, 2021: Engaging Communities in Youth Violence Prevention: Introduction and Contents *American Journal of Public Health* 111, S10_S16, <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306344> are but a few examples of the rich evidence in this area.

Question#:	28
Topic:	Public Health Credentials
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paradigm shift from a purely criminal justice to a public health approach is established in the scientific literature and has broad support from both violence prevention practitioners and the public, as shown through DHS-sponsored research.⁸ This new paradigm refers to the application of methods, practices, and theories that have been shown to have efficacy in preventing or slowing the transmission of violence through providing education on alternative healthy behaviors and addressing the root causes of poor outcomes through targeted interventions.⁹ By adopting a public health model, DHS is not offloading the responsibility of preventing violence to public health officials, it is merely pursuing its core mission with expectation of the most efficacious outcome.

Finally, CP3 continues to deepen its relationship with public health agencies in the Federal government. This includes HHS, particularly the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) and the CDC.

⁸ RTI International. 2017., “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) – Developing a Research Roadmap Final Report. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/861_OPSR_TP_CVE-Developing-Research-Roadmap_Oct2017.pdf

⁹ Eisenman, David, Steve Weine, and Myrna Lashley. 2020., “Can Public Health Help Prevent Violent Extremism? Should Public Health Help Prevent Violent Extremism”, In *Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Assessing Domestic and International Strategies*, ed. Stéfanie von Hlatky. Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 18-46; AND: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Health and Medicine Division; Board on Health Sciences Policy; Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies. *Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice: Proceedings of a Workshop*. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2017 Feb 17. 5, *Applying Public Health Models and Approaches to Countering Violent Extremism*. Available from: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK537576/>

Weine, Stevan; Chloe P. Smith; William Braniff; Max Erdemandi; Liberty Day (2019) *How Can A Public Health Framework Be Applied To Preventing Violent Extremism?* NCJ #256026 <https://www.ojp.gov/library/publications/how-can-public-health-framework-be-applied-preventing-violent-extremism>

Question#:	29
Topic:	Violence Prevention
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: The "violence prevention" framework CP3 promotes is also funded and administered through other parts of the federal government. For example, CP3's activities complement DOJ's "Disruption and Early Engagement" program (DEEP), which engages psychologists, community groups, and others with the goal of "assess[ing] the degree of threat posed by particular subjects and develop[ing] options to mitigate the threat and divert or disrupt mobilization to violence."

Please provide an itemized list of federal-government-supported "violence prevention" initiatives aimed at: (1) preventing terrorism and targeted violence and (2) supporting "prevention frameworks," including "threat assessments"? Please identify initiatives that overlap between the two categories.

Response: DHS cannot respond on behalf of other federal government programs working in this space. Within DHS, several entities have a role in supporting the Department's prevention activities, including PLCY, CISA, S&T, USSS, I&A, CRCL, PRIV, and others. DHS also communicates with a variety of other federal departments regarding violence prevention efforts including the DOJ (including FBI's Behavioral Threat Assessment Center), HHS, ED, and the U.S. Department of State.

Question#:	30
Topic:	Disclosing Private Partners
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: With the goal of preventing domestic terrorism, DHS officials aim to identify online "narratives" that they believe are likely to incite violence, as well as to identify people who may be susceptible to these narratives based on their social media behavior.

DHS is partnering with private firms to operationalize threat detection capabilities. For example, a Wall Street Journal article mentions the "Logically" threat intelligence platform (Logically Intelligence) used to monitor social media for the spread of damaging activity and narratives and effect countermeasures.

Will DHS commit to disclosing the identities of any private partners of the DHS Intelligence & Analysis Dragnet Social Media Surveillance Initiative, whether for-profit or non-profit, including academic institutions and NGOs, in a timely manner to the Subcommittee?

Will DHS commit to disclosing any formalized agreements between partners and the government that govern these types of interactions in a timely manner to the Subcommittee?

Response: I&A's intelligence activities are governed by its Attorney General-approved IO Guidelines. Consistent with I&A's legal authorities, I&A personnel may only use overt collection methods or collect information from publicly available sources. I&A is prohibited from tasking outside entities to collect information in a manner that would be forbidden to I&A. The Department conducts all of its intelligence activities consistent with the U.S. Constitution and law in a manner that protects privacy rights, civil rights, and civil liberties. The same authorities apply, regardless of whether DHS is conducting the work directly or through contracts. I&A will adhere to its IO Guidelines, IC standards, and its obligations to keep its Congressional intelligence committees fully informed of its intelligence activities, including when potentially using this type of information in its analysis and work to protect the Homeland.

Question#:	31
Topic:	Information Streams
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Will DHS commit to disclosing what streams of information are being exchanged, and whether they include, for example, personally identifiable information or information that would otherwise not be available to the government absent the partnership, in a timely manner to the Subcommittee?

Does DHS receive information from private partners (whether for-profit or non-profit) that it does not, or legally cannot, itself collect?

Response: The Department uses all resources at its disposal, including partnerships with private sector entities, in pursuing its lawful missions. The Department conducts all of its intelligence activities consistent with the U.S. Constitution and law in a manner that protects privacy rights, civil rights, and civil liberties. The same authorities apply, regardless of whether DHS is conducting the work directly or through contracts.

The Department leverages its relationships with private sector partners to supplement the information that it itself collects. The Department does not use its relationships with its private sector partners to circumvent its legal duties and obligations. The Department conducts all of its intelligence activities consistent with the U.S. Constitution and law in a manner that protects privacy rights, civil rights, and civil liberties. The same authorities apply, regardless of whether DHS is conducting the work directly or through contracts.

I&A will adhere to its IO Guidelines, IC standards, and its obligations to keep its Congressional intelligence committees fully informed of its intelligence activities, including when potentially using this type of information in its analysis and work to protect the Homeland.

Question#:	32
Topic:	Interaction Rules
Hearing:	Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part VI): Examining the Biden Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy
Primary:	The Honorable Rashida Tlaib
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: Will DHS commit to disclosing any applicable rules and standards governing the agency's interactions with technology companies in connection with a social media surveillance initiative in a timely manner to the Subcommittee?

Response: I&A's interactions with private sector partners, like all of its intelligence activities, are governed by its Attorney General-approved IO Guidelines. Consistent with I&A's legal authorities, I&A personnel may only use overt collection methods or collect information from publicly available sources. I&A is prohibited from tasking outside entities to collect information in a manner that would be forbidden to I&A. The Department conducts all of its intelligence activities consistent with the U.S. Constitution and law in a manner that protects privacy rights, civil rights, and civil liberties. The same authorities apply, regardless of whether DHS is conducting the work directly or through contracts.