

**OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE  
AND THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION  
OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
**COMMITTEE ON**  
**OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY**  
**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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JULY 22, 2024  
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*The documents listed are available at: [docs.house.gov](https://docs.house.gov).*

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**Monday, July 22, 2024**

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
*Washington, D.C.*

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James Comer [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Comer, Jordan, Turner, Foxx, Grothman, Cloud, Palmer, Sessions, Biggs, Mace, LaTurner, Fallon, Donalds, Perry, Timmons, Burchett, Greene, McClain, Boebert, Fry, Luna, Langworthy, Burlison, Waltz, Raskin, Norton, Lynch, Connolly, Krishnamoorthi, Khanna, Mfume, Ocasio-Cortez, Brown, Stansbury, Frost, Lee, Crockett, Goldman, Moskowitz, Tlaib, and Pressley.

Chairman COMER. This hearing of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability will come to order.

I want to welcome everyone here today.

And I know we also want to welcome Speaker Johnson, who is also in attendance today.

Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any time.

I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening statement, but, first, without objection, Representative Mills of Florida and Representative Miller of Ohio are waived on to the Committee for the purpose of questioning the witness at today's hearing.

Without objection, so ordered.

Good morning. Today's hearing is for the American people, who are seeking answers about the attempted assassination of President Trump.

A little over a week ago, Americans watched in horror as a shooter attempted to assassinate President Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. The gunman nearly succeeded. The bullet that struck President Trump's head was less than an inch from taking his life.

President Trump survived, but one rally goer, Corey Comperatore, tragically did not. Two others were seriously injured. It was a horrifying moment in American history.

The horror was exceeded only by the bravery of the law enforcement agents who threw themselves in harm's way when shots were fired, the bravery of a crowd unwavering in its refusal to panic, and the bravery of a bloody President Trump refusing to run.

While we give overwhelming thanks to the individual Secret Service agents who did their jobs under immense pressure, this tragedy was preventable.

The Secret Service's protective mission is to protect U.S. and visiting world leaders and safeguard U.S. elections through protection of candidates and nominees.

The Secret Service has a zero-fail mission, but it failed on July 13 and in the days leading up to the rally. The Secret Service has thousands of employees and a significant budget, but it has now become the face of incompetence.

The Committee has a long track record of providing oversight of the Secret Service. Our predecessors, both Jason Chaffetz and Elijah Cummings, among others, worked together to issue warnings and recommendations to address obvious shortcomings in the agency's makeup and operations. Unfortunately, those warnings and recommendations have gone unheeded.

A former President and current candidate for President was shot in the head by a sniper within 500 feet of the podium. This is unacceptable. And we are concerned the Secret Service lacks the proper management to keep protectees safe from bad actors.

Americans demand answers, but they have not been getting them from the Secret Service. We are instead learning about new facts about the events surrounding the attempted assassination every day from whistleblowers and leaks.

Americans demand accountability, but no one is yet to be fired for this historic failure.

Today's witness, Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle, is here under subpoena to answer questions about how the agency failed President Trump and the victims who attended the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.

It is my firm belief, Director Cheatle, that you should resign.

However, in complete defiance, Director Cheatle has maintained she will not tender her resignation. Therefore, she will answer questions today from members of this Committee seeking to provide clarity to the American people about how these events were allowed to transpire.

We will ask these questions because the Secret Service and its parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security, have been unwilling to provide answers to the American people. DHS has sought to push this hearing to a different time, Secret Service has suggested the hearing occur without media presence, and both agencies have provided only shallow explanations to Congress about what happened on July 13.

Indeed, DHS and Secret Service's lack of communication with the Oversight Committee required me to issue a subpoena compelling Director Cheatle to attend today. And, still, DHS requested more time to prepare.

It should not take this much time or preparation, Director Cheatle, to tell the truth and to be transparent with the American people.



I am thankful to the Ranking Member, Mr. Raskin, for joining me in insisting that Director Cheatle appear today. God knows the Ranking Member and I disagree on many things, but that does not matter today.

The safety of Secret Service protectees is not based on their political affiliation. And the bottom line is that, under Director Cheatle's leadership, we question whether anyone is safe—not President Biden, not the First Lady, not the White House, and certainly not the Presidential candidates.

The July 13 assassination attempt is one of the darkest days in American political history. It represents the ugliest parts of what American politics has become—hatred of each other and a dangerous turn to extremism.

Before we are Republicans or Democrats, we are Americans. If we place our political affiliations above our duty and love of country, we cannot maintain a country. We must ensure our Republic is strong. And our Republic cannot be strong when our leadership, our elections, our institutions, and our candidates are threatened by extremism and violence.

Today, Director Cheatle will answer questions about why she deserves to continue to play a critical role in preserving this country's safety and, at the very least, what led to the catastrophic deadly events on July 13 in Butler, Pennsylvania.

Again, I do not believe Director Cheatle deserves to maintain her position as head of the Secret Service, but members and the American people will make their own decisions based on her answers today.

I urge Director Cheatle to be transparent and forthcoming in her testimony today. Americans deserve no less. We have a duty to find out how this happened and to ensure it never happens again.

I now yield to Ranking Member Raskin for his opening statement.

Mr. RASKIN. Thank you kindly, Chairman Comer.

Elijah Cummings, whose beautiful visage looks down upon us, taught us that the way to find common ground in a crisis is to look for the higher ground. And, last week, Chairman Comer and I came together to reach for that higher ground. We made a joint statement condemning the mass shooting and assassination attempt against former President Trump as a grave assault on our democracy. As we wrote, we are united in condemning all political violence.

I join the good Chairman in expressing condolences to the family of Corey Comperatore and in sending healing wishes to the wounded victims also of this atrocious act of violence.

Some are calling it a miracle that former President Trump escaped this AR-15 attack unlike so many thousands of our fellow citizens who have been killed or seriously wounded in other AR-15 shootings.

Whether this miracle is of divine providence or of an adventitious nature will be up to each of us to ponder, but our job in Congress is not simply to marvel at miracles or count on good luck but to act as public policy legislators to do whatever we can to prevent future political violence, attempted assassinations, and mass shootings.

The Chairman and I are thus determined to get to the bottom of the stunning security failures that enabled this 20-year-old lone gunman who borrowed his father's AR-15 to perpetrate a mass shooting and assassination attempt at an event protected by the Secret Service as well as state and local police.

We will ask hard questions of Director Cheatle today in order to identify and understand the shocking security failures that occurred and to help transform the operations of the Secret Service to prevent anything like this from happening again.

But we cannot let ourselves off the hook either, dear colleagues. What happened in Butler, Pennsylvania, was a double failure—the failure by the Secret Service to properly protect former President Trump and the failure of Congress to properly protect our people from criminal gun violence. We must therefore also ask hard questions about whether our laws are making it too easy for potential assassins to obtain firearms generally and the AR-15 specifically.

Mr. Comperatore, former President Trump, and the other rally attendees wounded in Butler are now members of a club no one wants to belong to—the thousands of people who have fallen victim to mass shootings.

Last year, we had 655 mass shootings in America, defined as 4 or more people being shot or killed in a single event, not including the shooter. Seven hundred and 12 people died and nearly 2,700 people were wounded in these attacks in 2023.

Mass shootings are commonplace. They happen at political rallies and constituent meetings; in our elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools; in churches, synagogues, and mosques; in movie theaters and parades; in nightclubs and grocery stores; in concerts and on street corners.

Here are the worst mass shootings in the last 11 or 12 years. The list is a grim reminder of the horrific damage and death wrought by assault weapons, and the AR-15 in particular, that have taken the lives of our children, parents, colleagues, and neighbors. This is a very partial list.

Mass shootings have become so frequent that we do not even hear about them anymore. Since the mass shooting in Butler, there have already been at least 10 additional mass shootings in America, 2 of which took place the same day that former President Trump was targeted.

One of the mass shootings on that violent Saturday, July 13, happened at 11 p.m. at a nightclub in Birmingham, Alabama, where 4 people were shot dead and 10 others wounded. This means, amazingly, that the Butler attack was not even the deadliest mass shooting to happen in America on that day.

A weapon that can be used to commit a mass shooting at an event under the full protection of the Secret Service, together with dozens of state and local police, is obviously an intolerable threat to the rest of us who do not receive such protection and obviously does not belong in our communities.

It is time to pass universal background checks and build on this Administration's work to ensure that we permanently close the loopholes in the Brady Law for gun show purchases, online purchases, and private sales to prevent those weapons from getting into the hands of people we know to be a threat to others.

What happened in Butler shows why even closing these loopholes, however, will not keep assault weapons out of the hands of potential assassins and mass murderers. Under Federal law and in the vast majority of states, even young people not old enough to buy a beer legally can legally purchase and own the AR-15 and carry it in public. The shooter in Butler used his father's AR-15.

We have to find the courage and resolve to pass a ban on the AR-15 and other assault weapons. A ban has broad support. Even the *New York Post* loudly endorsed such a ban in 2019.

We have passed an assault-weapons ban before. Republicans and Democrats, together, passed it in 1994. Alas, in 2004, we allowed the ban to expire.

We know this weapons ban worked. One study found that in the decade that followed the ban's lapse mass shootings went back up 183 percent and deaths from mass shootings went up 239 percent.

But even as we change the Secret Service and act to ban weapons of war like the AR-15, we still will have fallen short of our duty if we fail to denounce every instance of politically motivated violence in whatever form it takes.

Republicans and Democrats again have come together to denounce this assassination attempt, just as we did the violent attempts on the lives of our colleagues Representative Steven Scalise and Representative Gabby Giffords and on Paul Pelosi, the husband of Speaker Nancy Pelosi who was attacked and brutalized in his home.

And in the immediate aftermath of the January 6 mass violence waged against Congress and the Vice President and the constitutional transfer of power, Democrats and Republicans alike, including Senator McConnell, Chairman Comer, and other colleagues, all denounced this violent assault on our democracy that wounded approximately 140 officers from the U.S. Capitol Police and the Metropolitan Police Department. And I commend them for acting to denounce that attack, just as Democrats moved swiftly to denounce the attack on Congressman Scalise.

Political scientists tell us that authoritarian attacks on democratic institutions begin with political parties refusing to disavow or openly embracing political violence. We have to reject that on a strong bipartisan basis, as Chairman Comer and I have done, even as we ensure our Secret Service is up to its vital task of protecting Presidents and candidates and as we work to ensure that America, the streets of our country are free from the violence of weapons of war.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back to you.

Chairman COMER. Thank you.

The gentleman yields back.

Today we are joined by Kimberly Cheatle, who was sworn into office on September 17, 2022, as the Director of the United States Secret Service.

Prior to her appointment, Director Cheatle was Senior Director of Global Security at PepsiCo. Before her role at Pepsi, she served 27 years in the Secret Service.

Pursuant to Committee rule 9(g), the witness will please stand and raise her right hand.

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do.

Chairman COMER. Let the record show that the witness answered in the affirmative.

Thank you.

We certainly appreciate you being here today and look forward to your testimony.

We normally limit testimony to—opening statement to 5 minutes, but take all the time that you need.

Obviously, the rules that we will abide by, when you are finished with your statement, we will then turn to questions. Each member will have 5 minutes.

And just a note to the members: I am going to strictly adhere to the 5 minutes. Once 5 minutes is up, I will hit the gavel. If the Director is in the process of answering a question, we will certainly let her finish her answers, and then we will move on.

We are going to have about 100 percent attendance here today, plus a few additional add-ons, so this will be a very lengthy hearing, and we want to make sure every member gets their 5 minutes, uninterrupted, to be able to ask these important questions in this very bipartisan hearing today.

I now recognize Director Cheatle for your opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF KIMBERLY CHEATLE  
DIRECTOR  
U.S. SECRET SERVICE**

Ms. CHEATLE. Thank you.

Good morning Chairman Comer, Ranking Member Raskin, and distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Kimberly Cheatle, and I am the Director of the United States Secret Service. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.

The assassination attempt of former President Donald Trump on July 13 is the most significant operational failure of the Secret Service in decades. And I am keeping him and his family in my thoughts.

I would like to offer my sincerest condolences to the family of Corey Comperatore, a former fire chief and a hero, who was killed in this senseless shooting.

I would also like to acknowledge those who were injured in Butler—David Dutch and James Copenhaver—and I wish them a speedy recovery.

I would be remiss if I did not also extend my condolences on the passing of your colleague, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee. Ms. Jackson Lee was always engaged in the oversight of the Secret Service, and her passing is a great loss to this body.

The Secret Service's solemn mission is to protect our Nation's leaders. On July 13, we failed.

As the Director of the United States Secret Service, I take full responsibility for any security lapse of our agency.

We are fully cooperating with ongoing investigations. We must learn what happened, and I will move heaven and earth to ensure that an incident like July 13 does not happen again.

Let me state, unequivocally, nothing I have said should be interpreted to place blame for this failure on our Federal, state, or local law enforcement partners who supported the Secret Service in Butler. We could not do our job without them. We rely on the relationships built over years of working together to secure events and conduct investigations.

Our agents, officers, and support personnel understand that every day, we are expected to sacrifice our lives to execute a no-fail mission. As witnessed on July 13, our special agents shielded former President Trump with their own bodies on stage while shots were being fired, selflessly willing to make the ultimate sacrifice without hesitation.

I am proud beyond words of the actions taken by the former President's detail, the counter-sniper team who neutralized the gunman, and the tactical team who was prepared to act.

I will be transparent as possible when I speak with you, understanding, though, at times that I may be limited in providing a thorough response in this open setting due to associated risks with sharing highly sensitive protective methodologies. I do not want to inadvertently provide you today with inaccurate information.

Since January 1, 2024, the Secret Service has successfully secured over 7,500 sites. Every protective advance comes with its own set of challenges and requires a customized mitigation strategy, including specific assets. Security plans are multilayered, providing 360 degrees of protection. These layers include personnel, technical and tactical assets, which are a force multiplier for our protective posture.

During every advance, we attempt to strike a balance between enabling the protectee to be visible and our protective requirements to be secure. I know this because I have spent 29 years in this agency.

I came up through the ranks. I have secured events for every President since President Clinton, supervised on Vice President Cheney's detail, led our Training Center, oversaw all of the investigations and protective visits in the state of Georgia, supervised on Vice President Biden's detail and the agency's entire protective mission during the Trump Administration.

The comprehensive advance process involves collaborative planning between our Secret Service, the protectee's staff, local law enforcement partners, and the level of security provided for the former President increased well before the campaign and has been steadily increasing as threats evolve.

The security plan included a full assessment of the Butler Farm Show grounds to identify security vulnerabilities and craft a security plan for the protectee, attendees, and the public.

Immediately following the assassination attempt, I directed the activation of my Crisis Center, I assembled my executive team to begin surging more protective resources to the former President and to ensure the wellness of our people post-incident, all while securing an active crime scene.

I immediately ordered a reevaluation of the Republican National Convention security plan, and I increased the security posture in the National Capital Region for all permanent protectees and sites.

At the same time, I initiated a mission assurance investigation within our agency. I have instructed my team that all necessary resources will be dedicated to investigating these matters. We will not rest until we have explored every option, and we will leave no stone unturned.

But I want to be clear: I am not waiting for these investigations to be completed prior to making changes.

Over the past 2 weeks, we successfully led the planning and execution of the 75th NATO summit and the Republican National Convention. Over the next few months, we will implement security plans for the Democratic National Convention, the United Nations General Assembly, and have already begun planning and coordinating the 2025 inauguration.

It is now more important than ever for the men and women of the Secret Service to remain resilient and to focus on what is necessary to carry out our critical mission.

Our agency needs to be adequately resourced in order to serve our current mission requirements and anticipate future requirements. The Secret Service currently protects 36 individuals on a daily basis, as well as world leaders who visit the United States, like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who arrived in Washington, DC, today. The coming years will bring an unprecedented heavy protection tempo.

I have no doubt that the processes that I have implemented during my tenure as Director, in addition to my nearly 30 years of experience in this agency, have positioned the Secret Service to be stronger.

Our mission is not political; it is literally a matter of life and death. And the tragic events on July 13 remind us of that.

I have full confidence in the men and women of the Secret Service. They are worthy of our support in executing our protective mission.

I will now answer any questions that the Committee may have. Chairman COMER. Thank you very much, Director Cheatle.

We will now begin our 5 minutes of questions, and I will begin.

Just for the record, the Secret Service has an annual budget of around \$3.1 billion and, I believe, around 8,000 employees. Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, sir.

Chairman COMER. Obviously, there were many security failures on the day of the attempted assassination and leading up to that day. Let us start with the building that the shooter used to shoot President Trump from.

At any point Saturday, did the Secret Service have an agent on top of that roof?

Ms. CHEATLE. Sir, I am sure as you can imagine, we are just 9 days out from this incident and there is still an ongoing investigation. And so, I want to make sure that any information that we are providing—

Chairman COMER. So—so—so—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Providing to you is factual.

Chairman COMER [continuing]. You cannot—OK.

Why did the Secret Service not—can you answer why the Secret Service did not place a single agent on the roof?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are still looking into the advance process and the——

Chairman COMER. All right. All right.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Decisions that were made——

Chairman COMER. OK. OK.

Was that building not within the perimeter that should be secured? Do we agree with that?

Ms. CHEATLE. The building was outside of the perimeter on the day of the visit. But, again, that is one of the things that, during the investigation, we want to take a look at and determine whether or not other decisions should have been made.

Chairman COMER. One of the things that you said, I believe in an interview, that there was not an agent on the roof because it was a sloped roof, is that normal? And do you fear that that immediately creates an opportunity for future would-be assassins to look for a slanted roof?

I mean, this is a huge question that every American has: Why was a Secret Service agent not on the roof? And there have been reports that agents were supposed to be on the roof, but it was hot that day and they did not want to be on the roof.

Can you answer any of those questions, Director?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, I appreciate you asking me that question, Chairman. I should have been more clear in my answer when I spoke about where we place personnel in that interview.

What I can tell you is that there was a plan in place to provide overwatch, and we are still looking into responsibilities and who was going to provide overwatch.

But the Secret Service, in general, not speaking specifically to this incident, when we are providing overwatch, whether that be through counter-snipers or other technology——

Chairman COMER. OK.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Prefer to have sterile rooftops.

Chairman COMER. Did the Secret Service use any drones for surveillance that day?

Ms. CHEATLE. Sir, again, I am not going to get into specifics of that day in itself, but there are times during a security plan that the Secret Service does deploy an asset like a drone.

Chairman COMER. There were reports that the shooter used a drone just a few hours before the rally start time. Is that accurate?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have heard those same reports and, again, am waiting for the final report.

Chairman COMER. Do you know—if you cannot answer the question, that is your answer, but can you answer this? Do you know—do you know—I am not asking “yes” or “no,” but do you know if the shooter used a drone before the shooting?

Ms. CHEATLE. That information has been passed to us from the FBI.

Chairman COMER. How many Secret Service agents were assigned to President Trump on the day of the rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I am not going to get into the specifics of the numbers of personnel that we had there, but we feel that there was a sufficient number of agents assigned.

Chairman COMER. There are reports that several agents assigned to the rally on July 13 were temporary agents, agents not normally assigned to President Trump. Is that accurate?

Ms. CHEATLE. What I can tell you is that the agents that were assigned to former President Trump are Secret Service agents that provide close protection to him, and that was what was actual on that day.

Chairman COMER. How many temporary agents were there that day?

Ms. CHEATLE. Quite frequently, sir, during campaign events, the Secret Service utilizes agents from HSI or the Department of Homeland Security—

Chairman COMER. But you do not know how many?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. To supplement—

Chairman COMER. Or you cannot answer it?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Our plan.

Chairman COMER. Have the investigators reconstructed the shooter's precise movements over the past days, weeks, and months?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, again—

Chairman COMER. We need to have confidence that, if the FBI is leading this investigation, that they are leading a credible investigation. Because there is some of us sitting up here today that do not have a lot of confidence in the FBI.

So, I will repeat the question. Have the investigators reconstructed the shooter's precise movements over the past days, weeks, and months?

Ms. CHEATLE. I understand your question, Chairman, and I share your concerns about wanting to make sure that we have factual information.

The FBI is conducting a criminal investigation. The Secret Service is conducting an internal investigation. There are a number of OIG investigations. And there is the external investigation—

Chairman COMER. OK.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. The President has initiated—

Chairman COMER. Last question for me: before July 13, had the Trump detail requested additional resources?

Ms. CHEATLE. What I can tell you is that, for the event on July 13, the details that were—the assets that were requested for that day were given.

Chairman COMER. OK.

My time has expired.

The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Raskin for 5 minutes.

Mr. RASKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It has been reported that, before former President Trump got up on the stage at around 6 p.m. on Saturday, July 13, that the local police had identified and even photographed a man who was acting suspiciously, and this man, who turned out to be the gunman, had been flagged as a potential threat.

Is that accurate?

Ms. CHEATLE. What I can say is that the individual was identified as suspicious.



Mr. RASKIN. So, he was known to be suspicious before former President Trump took the stage.

Ms. CHEATLE. That is the information I have received.

Mr. RASKIN. Why was he allowed to take the stage with a suspicious person having been identified in the crowd?

Ms. CHEATLE. Sir, I appreciate the question, and I would like to make two points.

If the detail had been passed information that there was a threat, the detail would never have brought the former President out onto stage. That is what we do, and that is who we are. We are charged with protecting all of our protectees.

Mr. RASKIN. So, you distinguish between someone who is suspicious and someone who is threatening? Is that—

Ms. CHEATLE. I do.

Mr. RASKIN [continuing]. Right?

Ms. CHEATLE. There are a number of times at protective events where suspicious people are identified, and those individuals have to be investigated and determined what is it that identifies that person as suspicious.

Mr. RASKIN. So, did you deny a request for additional resources that had been made by the Trump campaign?

Ms. CHEATLE. There were no assets denied for that event in Butler on the 13th.

Mr. RASKIN. I see. So, you are saying there were requests made for additional assistance for other specific events rather than for the campaign as a whole. Is that right?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am sorry. I am not understanding—

Mr. RASKIN. Well, you seemed to say that there were not additional resources requested for that event. And forgive me for being unfamiliar with this. Is it requested event by event, or is it requested just in general for the campaign?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, if I can explain the advance process, when an event or a venue is identified by, in this case, campaign staff, then the campaign staff works together with Secret Service agents who go out and conduct an advance.

Generally, that is a 5-day time period where those discussions are had about what the perimeter is going to look like, what the size of the event is, what the venue is.

And then, from there, there is a request made to mitigate potential risk and threat. And I am saying that, on that day, the requests that were pushed forward were granted.

Mr. RASKIN. So, the Secret Service did not know that the gunman actually had a weapon before President Trump was allowed to get up on the stage?

Ms. CHEATLE. To the best of our knowledge and the facts that we have at this point, that is correct.

Mr. RASKIN. So, can you answer this question, which I think is on the mind of most Americans thinking about this? How can a 20-year-old with his father's AR-15 assault weapon climb onto a roof with a direct 150-yard line of sight to the speaker's podium without the Secret Service or local police stopping him?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, again, sir, I will say, we are 9 days out from this event, and I would like to know those answers as well, which

is why we are going through these investigations to be able to determine that fully.

Mr. RASKIN. OK.

It has been reported that the shooter was not carrying a driver's license or any form of identification. They had no idea who he was. But then he was quickly identified, I think within 30 minutes, by using the serial number on the AR-15 under a tracing system that is now controversial. Some people say we should get rid of it; some people want to keep it.

But is that right, that the serial number was the key information which led to the identification of the shooter?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is my understanding, sir, yes.

Mr. RASKIN. OK.

If an American citizen were just to stop you and say, "Director Cheatle, we support your work, to the tune of billions of dollars and thousands and thousands of employees; what went wrong?" what would you say?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, knowing that we are 9 days out, I would say, as I have said from the very outset: I accept responsibility for this tragedy. We are going to look into how this happened, and we are going to take corrective action to ensure that it never happens again.

Mr. RASKIN. Well, I appreciate that, and I hope you will act with vigor and focus and intensity. And it seems you understand the gravity and solemnity of this to the American people.

Millions and millions of Americans do not feel safe with all the AR-15s out there. We thought at least the President of the United States or a former President of the United States would be safe, but now that is not even clear.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you.

Chairman COMER. The gentleman yields back.

The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Mr. Jordan from Ohio.

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director, were you guessing or lying?

The day after President Trump is shot, Secret Service spokesman Anthony Guglielmi said, quote, "The assertion that a member of the former President's security team requested additional security resources that the U.S. Secret Service or the Department of Homeland Security rebuffed is absolutely false."

The next day, Secretary Mayorkas said, "That is an unequivocally false assertion. We had not received any requests for additional security measures that were rebuffed."

But 5 days later, the *Washington Post* said this: "Top officials repeatedly rejected requests from Donald Trump's security detail for more personnel."

The next day, *The New York Times* said this: "Mr. Guglielmi acknowledged that the Secret Service had turned down some requests for additional Federal security assets for Mr. Trump's detail."

So, which is it? Because both statements cannot be true. Were you guessing or lying when you said you did not turn down requests from President Trump's detail?

Ms. CHEATLE. Neither, sir. And I appreciate the question—

Mr. JORDAN. Well, what were you doing? Because those statements do not jibe.

Ms. CHEATLE. So, what I can tell you is that, for the event in Butler, there were no requests that were denied. As far as requests—

Mr. JORDAN. Well, maybe they got tired of asking. Maybe you turned them down so darn much they said, not worth asking.

How many times did you turn them down ahead of that?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that it is important to distinguish between what some people may view as a denial of an asset or a request and not—

Mr. JORDAN. Well, is Mr. Guglielmi your spokesperson? He said—he acknowledged the Secret Service had turned down some requests. I am asking how many?

Ms. CHEATLE. A denial of a request does not equal a vulnerability.

Mr. JORDAN. Well, tell me what it is.

Ms. CHEATLE. There are a number of ways that threats and risks can be mitigated with a number of different assets, whether that be through personnel, whether that be through technology or other resources.

Mr. JORDAN. Well, tell the Committee which it was. They asked for additional help in some form or another. You told them no. How many times did you tell them no, and what did you tell them no to?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I cannot speak to specific incidents, but I can tell you, in general terms, the Secret Service is judicious with their resources based on—

Mr. JORDAN. What does “some requests” mean? How many times? “Some” indicates—“requests” is plural, so more than once they asked for additional help, and you turned them down. What did they ask for, and how many times did you turn them down? Pretty basic questions.

Ms. CHEATLE. So, again, without having all of the details in front of me, sir, what I can tell you is that there are times—

Mr. JORDAN. You did not get briefed on how many times you turned down the Trump detail when they asked for additional help?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am sorry—

Mr. JORDAN. You did not get briefed on that before you came to this hearing, knowing you were going to get asked that question?

Ms. CHEATLE. What I can tell you is that, in generic terms, when people—when details make a request, there are times that there are alternate ways to cover off on that threat or that risk.

Mr. JORDAN. But that is not what he said. He said they were denied certain requests—some requests.

Ms. CHEATLE. I—I—

Mr. JORDAN. This is your spokesperson, not me, talking. This is the Secret Service talking.

Ms. CHEATLE. I—

Mr. JORDAN. And what a change, from “absolutely false,” “unequivocally false,” to, “oh, by the way, there were some times where we did not give them what they wanted.” That is a huge change in 5 days.

And the fact that you cannot answer how many times you did that, that is pretty darn frustrating, not just for me but for the country.

Ms. CHEATLE. I hear your frustration—

Mr. JORDAN. Let me ask you this: were any of those requests denied to President Trump's detail after you knew about the Iranian threat?

Ms. CHEATLE. What I can tell you—again, I do not know the specifics—is that there are times when we can fill a request—it does not necessarily have to be with a Secret Service asset or resource; we can fill that request with locally available assets and resources.

Mr. JORDAN. Have you spoken to anyone at the White House since July 13?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I have.

Mr. JORDAN. Who did you talk to?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have briefed the President and the Vice President.

Mr. JORDAN. Did you talk to the First Lady?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, I have not.

Mr. JORDAN. Did you talk to the White House staff, anyone in White House communications?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, I have not.

Mr. JORDAN. Have you talked to the counter-sniper who took the shot that took out the bad guy?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I have.

Mr. JORDAN. And can you tell us about that conversation?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would not want to reveal conversations that I have had with my employees.

Mr. JORDAN. But that is exactly the kind of information the American people want to know, the American people who pay your salary.

Ms. CHEATLE. I understand. This is an ongoing investigation, and I want to—

Mr. JORDAN. Who is all doing the investigating at Secret Service? I know the Inspector General, but is there also an internal investigation in addition to the Inspector General?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are conducting a mission assurance investigation internally, yes.

Mr. JORDAN. You know what it looks like, Director? It looks like you will not answer some pretty basic questions. It looks like you got a 9-percent raise and you cut corners when it came to protecting one of the most important individuals, the most well-known individuals on the planet, a former President, likely the guy who is going to be the next President. It looks like you guys were cutting corners. That is what it looks like to me.

Is that true?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am here today because I want to answer questions, but I also want to be—

Mr. JORDAN. You might want to, but you have not answered—I do not think you have answered one question from the Chairman, the Ranking Member, or me. We have got a lot of other people to ask them; we will see if your record improves. But right now, you have not answered, I do not think, any questions.

I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The gentleman yields back.  
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Norton from Washington, DC.  
Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the summer of 1963, as a law student, I traveled to the South to work in the civil rights movement. When I arrived in Jackson, Mississippi, I was met by a civil rights activist who showed me around town and tried to convince me to work in Jackson that summer. I recall talking with him and his wife about the raw atmosphere in Jackson.

Later that day, he took me to the bus station for my trip to my assignment. That night, he was assassinated outside his home. His name was Medgar Evers.

I condemn the political violence. It is a threat to democracy.

I want to discuss one of the roots of political violence: guns.

For years, Republicans, including a member of this Committee, have introduced legislation and amendments to repeal or block the District of Columbia gun violence protection laws, including its bans on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines.

The shooter at the Trump rally used the mass shooter's gun of choice, an assault weapon, specifically an AR-15-style rifle, and presumably a large-capacity magazine, which is defined in D.C. as a magazine that can hold more than 10 bullets.

Under current D.C. law, D.C. does not recognize concealed-carry permits issued by other jurisdictions, but it does issue concealed-carry permits to both residents and nonresidents.

However, D.C. imposes a number of requirements on concealed-carry applicants, including suitability, such as not having exhibited a propensity for violence or instability. Moreover, D.C. residents—restricts where the guns can be carried, such as a political demonstration near the White House and Naval Observatory or near people under Secret Service protection, provided the permit holder has been given notice.

This week, the House is expected to consider the Fiscal Year 2025 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill. This Republican-drafted bill would allow an individual with a permit to carry a concealed handgun issued by a state or territory—to carry a concealed handgun in D.C., regardless of that jurisdiction's permit requirements.

A Republican has filed an amendment to that provision to allow such an individual to carry a magazine of any size with that handgun.

In short, the pending bill and amendment would allow any person with a carry permit issued by another jurisdiction to carry a concealed handgun with a magazine of any size in any location in the District of Columbia.

The Secret Service is responsible for protecting a large number of people and facilities in D.C.

Director Cheatle, would Secret Service protectees in D.C. be safer or less safe if people who have exhibited a propensity for violence or instability could carry a concealed—concealed handguns in D.C.?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think being a Secret Service agent and an officer or a law enforcement officer in any state is difficult. They are required to make decisions and snap judgments in the blink of an eye. And I think that the officers and the agents that work here

in the D.C. area do a great job of monitoring the public and reacting to threats as appropriate when they arise.

Ms. NORTON. Well, would Secret Service protectees in D.C. be safer or less safe if people in D.C. could carry concealed handguns with large-capacity magazines?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think, ma'am, that we work in parameters where we travel around North America, and the rules on open carry and concealed carry are different from state to state, and that is part of what the Secret Service takes into account when we develop a security plan.

Obviously, anyone that comes into one of our protective sites, we would establish magnetometer support, metal detectors that personnel would have to process through, eliminating that potential.

Ms. NORTON. Would Secret Service protectees in D.C. be safer or less safe if more people could carry handguns in D.C.?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think, again, as I stated, ma'am, we want to make sure that we provide a safe environment for all of our protectees, and whatever measures we would need to put in place for a secure site, we would do so.

Ms. NORTON. I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The gentlelady's time has expired.

The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Mr. Turner from Ohio.

Mr. TURNER. Director Cheatle, your opening statement indicates that the Secret Service constructed a security plan for the site in Pennsylvania.

I am assuming that security plan would also include the security footprint for the site, but it also would be based upon a threat assessment for the risk threats associated with Donald Trump and the crowd in attendance.

Would it not include a threat assessment?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, it would.

Mr. TURNER. So, that threat assessment, as we know, basically would have started with, there is a generalized threat against Donald Trump because he is a Presidential candidate. Then it would have gone to, he is a former President, and he gets the security coverage just as Bush, Clinton, Carter, and Obama do. And then you also have the heightened political environment.

Even for those, it is clear that the security footprint, that the threat assessment was insufficient, which permitted a 20-year-old to actually enter with a weapon and shoot Donald Trump.

But I want to ask you about two other aspects of the threat assessment.

It is known and public that Iran is a threat risk for Donald Trump. They are a threat risk for John Bolton, former Secretary of State Pompeo, and Donald Trump because they have indicated they want to assassinate them as a result of retaliation for the killing of Soleimani.

That is both, for Iran, a generalized threat—they are targeting these individuals—but also, most recently, a specific threat to Donald Trump himself.

Now, I want to enter into the record by UC a Department of Justice public affairs release, a CNN article, an article from FOX News, and an article from CBS, all of which acknowledge—

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. That this threat exists for Donald Trump from Iran and that there are specific threats, most recently, that have been acknowledged.

Mr. TURNER. Director Cheatle, have you read the intelligence of the generalized threat to Donald Trump by Iran as a result of their desire to retaliate for the killing of Soleimani?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have.

Mr. TURNER. Have you read or been briefed about the intelligence of this specific recent threat to Donald Trump from Iran?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I have.

Mr. TURNER. Director Wray, when we were getting our briefing, indicated that he thought the threat assessment should have included this threat from Iran.

Is it your testimony today that the threat assessment, since you have read this intelligence, was sufficient to protect him from this threat from Iran?

Ms. CHEATLE. My testimony today is that the information that we had at the time was known—that is——

Mr. TURNER. Was it sufficient? Director Cheatle, was it sufficient for the Iranian threat that you said you have read the intelligence briefings for?

Ms. CHEATLE. That information was passed to——

Mr. TURNER. Well, I am not asking the bureaucratic issue of who did it get passed around to.

Director Cheatle, was it sufficient for the specific and generalized threat to Donald Trump's life from Iran?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I do believe it was.

Mr. TURNER. Director Cheatle, is an Iranian assassin more capable than a 20-year-old?

Ms. CHEATLE. Sir, I think we have acknowledged that there was gaps and a failure that day. We are——

Mr. TURNER. When I raised this issue with Director Wray, he was incensed. He was shocked that the threat assessment of Iran did not seem to be, as he and I discussed, baked in to your security footprint and your threat assessment.

And he went on to say that the generalized threat that he has told the whole country that we are under from a terrorist—a potential terrorist threat—he has said, we are under the highest threat level since 9/11, that the lights are flashing red.

And he has specifically indicated that people have crossed the southern border as a result of the Biden Administration's policy and that there are in our country today terrorists and individuals who are affiliated with terrorist groups and organizations.

That would be a heightened threat environment, Director Cheatle, would it not?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. TURNER. In his public statements, he has said he is making these statements because he wants people to take them into consideration in threat assessments specifically.

Ms. CHEATLE. Uh-huh.

Mr. TURNER. Now, that would be a threat not just to Donald Trump, but it would also be a threat to the crowd there, would it not?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. TURNER. Are ISIS terrorists and al-Qaida terrorists and international groups and terrorists more capable than a 20-year-old in pulling off either a mass shooting or an assassination of Donald Trump?

Ms. CHEATLE. Sir, again, there was clearly a breakdown—

Mr. TURNER. Right.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. And a failure that day.

Mr. TURNER. Have you read the intelligence of the terrorists that are currently in the United States that Director Wray speaks—and those individuals that are here that are affiliated with terrorist groups and organizations that are in the process, as Director Wray said, of representing a significant threat of a terrorist attack occurring in the United States?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have read reports that apply specifically to the Secret Service's mission.

Mr. TURNER. Director Cheatle, because Donald Trump is alive—and thank God he is—you look incompetent. If Donald Trump had been killed, you would have looked culpable.

There is no aspect of this that indicates that there has been any protection to Donald Trump. The threat was identified before he took the stage, and the shooter was only killed after Donald Trump himself was killed [sic].

Not only should you resign, if you refuse to do so, President Biden needs to fire you. Because his life, Donald Trump's life, and all the other people which you protect are at risk because you have no concept of the aspect that the security footprint needs to be correlated to the threat.

I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lynch from Massachusetts.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Cheatle, there were multiple security failures at the former President's rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.

First of all, there was a failure to isolate the podium from exposure to direct fire. Do we know who made that decision, to allow that rooftop to remain as an unprotected area? Do we know who came up with that security plan that omitted that?

Ms. CHEATLE. Sir, I do not have a specific person to identify for you—

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Well, that is what I am looking for, so let us move on.

There was also a breakdown in security in failure to confront the shooter over an hour before the former President began his remarks when the shooter was identified as a person of interest.

What, particularly, allowed agents or law enforcement to identify him as a person of interest?

Ms. CHEATLE. Sir, I appreciate the question. And, again, I will say that we are 9 days out, and there are a multitude of interviews that are still taking place—

Mr. LYNCH. OK.

So, did he have a rangefinder? There were some reports that the individual had a rangefinder. That would certainly raise my suspicion. Did he have a rangefinder?



Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, he did. But——

Mr. LYNCH. OK.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. May I explain that, at a number of our sites, especially when you are at outdoor venues, a rangefinder is not a prohibited item. It is sometimes an item that is brought in by individuals that——

Mr. LYNCH. But did anybody——

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Are going to be in the back——

Mr. LYNCH [continuing]. Confront him on that? Anybody ask him questions, what are you doing with a rangefinder? Anybody confront him on his presence where he was in proximity to the President?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, again, to my knowledge, I believe that that was the process that was taking place, was to locate the individual——

Mr. LYNCH. Did they—did they confront him? Did they go up to him? Did they talk to him?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have those details at this time.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Those are important details.

There was also a failure to communicate between law enforcement to act quickly upon information, provided by either local law enforcement or rally attendees, that the suspect was positioned on the roof. There were minutes of delay before any meaningful action was taken even though he was several hundred feet from the podium, and this was obviously minutes before the shooting.

Let me ask you—there was considerable delay in removing the President from the podium after the shooting began. He was shot in the ear; it was still over a minute before he was removed from the stage.

Meanwhile, this shooter had multiple clips, several clips. He got off eight shots, and he had the capacity and the ability, if he was not neutralized, to basically mow down that whole Secret Service detachment as well as the President.

What, from your own investigation, caused that delay under the circumstances?

Ms. CHEATLE. What I can tell you is that, when the agents identified that the shooting was taking place, in under 3 seconds they threw themselves on top of the President——

Mr. LYNCH. Oh, I understand that. There was heroism there, no question about it, no question about it.

But protocol would indicate—and these are—you know, these are the opinions of various former Secret Service agents, people who have done this work in the past—that over a minute of exposure on that podium, with a shooter with a high-capacity weapon who had already wounded the President and could have got off we do not know how many more rounds, and yet the President remained exposed, even though he was joined in that exposure by the Secret Service in their heroic acts.

It just—it—I do not know if there is a good explanation for that.

Ms. CHEATLE. Our personnel created a body bunker on top of the President——

Mr. LYNCH. I get that. I get that.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Shielding him——

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. This was—this was an AR-15-style weapon that would have made pretty quick work if he was determined and able to do so.

This is not the first investigation that we have had of the Secret Service during my time here on this Committee. And the last one we had; our previous investigation determined that the Secret Service was experiencing a staffing crisis “that poses perhaps the greatest threat” to the agency. And that is a quote.

Is that staffing crisis still in place? Is that still something that you deal with on a daily basis?

Ms. CHEATLE. As of today, the Secret Service has just over 8,000 employees. We continue to hire, knowing that we need to ensure that we keep pace with a—

Mr. LYNCH. What would be the full complement of—

Chairman COMER. And the gentleman’s time has expired, but please answer the question.

Mr. LYNCH. Yes.

Ms. CHEATLE. I am sorry?

Mr. LYNCH. What would be the full complement that you are looking for? You have got 8,000, and how many would be a full complement for the Service?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, we are still striving toward a number of 9,500 employees, approximately, in order to be able to meet future and emerging needs.

Mr. LYNCH. OK.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy. I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The Chair recognizes Dr. Foxx from North Carolina.

Ms. FOXX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Cheatle, what grade would you give the Secret Service’s performance in Butler, Pennsylvania, on July 13?

Ms. CHEATLE. As I have stated, ma’am, this was clearly a failure.

I would grade the agents and officers who selflessly threw themselves in front of the President and neutralized the threat an “A.”

I think that we need to examine the events that led up to and prior to that day.

Ms. FOXX. You stated in 2021 that the Secret Service has a zero-fail mission.

It is clear that the events of July 13 show a cascade of failures that cost Corey Comperatore his life, nearly cost the former President his life, and injured David Dutch and James Copenhagen.

When an agency fails spectacularly in its mission, those responsible must be held accountable and the problems must be fixed so they cannot happen again.

Why should the American people or the officials you are responsible for protecting have confidence in your ability to lead the Secret Service after such a spectacular failure?

Ms. CHEATLE. I appreciate the question, and I am committed to finding answers so that we can make the agency stronger after this.

Ms. FOXX. You said on July 15 that “the buck stops with me.” How are you taking accountability for the Secret Service’s failures during the July 13 assassination attempt on President Trump?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have taken accountability, and I will continue to take accountability. I am responsible for leading the agency, and I am responsible for finding the answers to how this event occurred and making sure that it does not happen again.

Ms. FOXX. So, I would like to explore how you got the job as Director of the United States Secret Service.

Is it typical for the Director of the Secret Service to be recommended for the role at the behest of a President's family and senior staff, perhaps at the request of Jill Biden or Anthony Bernal?

Ms. CHEATLE. I got the job as the Director of the Secret Service because I spent 27 years in an agency with a mission that I absolutely love. I started my career in Detroit. I worked my way up through investigations and protection—

Ms. FOXX. Were you—was there competition for the position?

Ms. CHEATLE. You would have to ask those who were involved in the interview process.

Ms. FOXX. But you think you are the best person in the country to head the Secret Service?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that I am the best person to lead the Secret Service at this time.

Ms. FOXX. The Secret Service receives billions in funding each year, as has been explained by my colleagues here. In fact, you have had an increase in real terms of 55 percent.

As you are no doubt aware, staffing levels for those assigned to protect the President, former Presidents, and other senior officials has decreased by about 350 between 2014 and today.

Clearly, a lack of financial resources is not to blame for the staffing shortage.

In 2022, the Secret Service saw nearly half its work force leave in 1 year. And, during the same year, it was ranked dead-last among law enforcement agencies in the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government.

Can you explain why your agency was so poorly rated and why so many staff left in just 1 year?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, with all due respect, I dispute the statistic of half of the employees leaving in 2022. I think that that has been inaccurate data that has been reported out there.

But what I can tell you is, as I have returned as the Director of the agency, we have had an increase in hiring and staffing and an increase in resources, and we are committed to continue to hire so that we can be staffed appropriately to meet the dynamic mission that we have.

Ms. FOXX. Well, you may want to dispute it, but it is out there.

My understanding—given the high-profile failures and rotten culture at the Secret Service during your nearly 2-year tenure, why should the American people have any confidence in your ability to lead the Secret Service to perform its zero-fail mission to protect our senior leaders?

Ms. CHEATLE. The Secret Service has an incredible culture. Our men and women place service over self. They come in every day willing to risk their lives for our protective mission, and they work investigations that thwart people who would do harm to children,

child exploiters. We have an incredible mission, and our culture is we will get the job done no matter what.

Ms. FOXX. Well, those on the front lines certainly have a great culture, and they were willing to risk their lives for President Trump, but I am not sure the leadership at the agency has the right kind of culture.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Connolly from Virginia.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, I hope the American people do appreciate the incredible daily risks Secret Service agents take on our behalf.

You mentioned there are 36 regular clients you have got that you protect constantly, but I was participating in the NATO summit just 2 weeks ago. We had 32 heads of government and heads of state plus visiting heads of state and heads of government. Presumably, you provided protection for all of them.

Ms. CHEATLE. That is correct.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Just saying.

Help us understand, however—I will stipulate that there is an ongoing investigation and you do not want to go into too much detail on that until you have been able to ascertain all the facts and analyze what they mean.

You can understand, however, the anxiety we and the American public have about how could this happen and how can we ensure it cannot recur.

Now, there are some things my friends on one particular side of the aisle do not really want to talk about, like AR-15s and access to them by a 20-year-old, or anybody for that matter.

Presumably, Director Cheatle, the ubiquity of weapons, guns in America, especially assault weapons or semiautomatic weapons, that has helped your job and the mission of your agencies, right? It has made it less complicated. Is that not true?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am sorry. I am not understanding your question.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Real simple. More guns, especially dangerous ones, have made your job protecting people easier. Is that not right?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think from every—

Mr. CONNOLLY. Director Cheatle, this is simple English. More guns, do they make your job more complicated or less complicated in protecting these 36 clients and visiting heads of state and heads of government that come to Washington?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think the Secret Service needs to take into account—

Mr. CONNOLLY. I did not ask that. I am sorry. I asked a simple question which deserves a simple answer.

The ubiquity of guns, dangerous weapons in America, like AR-15s, has that made your job—that is to say the mission of the Secret Service—easier or more difficult?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think the threat environment for protecting our Secret Service protectees is always difficult, and that is dynamic, and it is always evolving.

Mr. CONNOLLY. We stipulate it is always difficult. Again, this is a simple one.

Does the ubiquity of guns make your job easier or more difficult today?

Ms. CHEATLE. I understand the Second Amendment rights of individuals.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I did not ask that question. I am not questioning the Second Amendment. I am asking a simple analysis, Director Cheatle.

And I can tell you, you are not making my job easier in terms of assessing your qualification for continuing on as Director.

Please answer the question. You are the head of the Secret Service. You are speaking on behalf of 8,000 members who put their lives on the line. We just had a failure by your own admission.

Do guns make your job easier or harder?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think the job of the Secret Service is difficult on every day, and we need to make sure that we are mitigating all threats, whether that be weapons—

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is not my question. That is not my question. And now I think you are evading the answer, which is not a hard one.

Ms. CHEATLE. I am sorry that you feel that way, sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY. How else could I feel, Director Cheatle, when you are clearly avoiding a direct answer to a very simple declarative question?

We almost lost a Presidential candidate the other day. A 20-year-old had access to his father's AR-15 and got on top of a roof within 500 yards or feet of the podium.

And I am asking you, did the availability of that AR-15—which is replicated all across America—make your job harder or easier, and you are not willing to answer that question? And you think—and you wonder why we might have a lack of confidence in your continued ability to direct this agency?

Ms. CHEATLE. I understand your question, and that is the environment—

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, if you understand my question, why not answer it?

Ms. CHEATLE. Because it is the environment that the Secret Service works in every day.

Mr. CONNOLLY. That does not tell me anything. That is the environment we work in.

I had an attack on my office a year ago. I know a little bit about violence, too. He came to kill me. When he could not, he beat one of my staffers eight times with a baseball bat on the head. We live with the threat of violence.

But a simple answer from the Director of the Secret Service would be helpful, and I am sorry you have chosen to evade it.

I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Grothman from Wisconsin.

Mr. GROTHMAN. Thank you.

When this guy took the shots, he climbed a ladder to get on the roof, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am unable to answer details of exactly how the individual accessed the roof at this time.

Mr. GROTHMAN. Do you know when the—if he did use the ladder, do you know when the ladder was placed there? Was the ladder there 2 days before? Just the night before? Do you have any information at all as to when the ladder got there?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would like to be able to answer those questions. The FBI is still conducting an investigation.

Mr. GROTHMAN. How did the rifle get to the roof?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, sir, at this time, I am unable to answer questions to provide clarity.

Mr. GROTHMAN. Have they cleaned the roof since the assassination attempt?

Ms. CHEATLE. Have they cleaned the roof?

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right. Has anything been done to the roof? Is it just like it was, you know, whatever, 10 days ago or not? Has anything been done to the roof?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have an answer for that.

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK.

Were President Trump's normal agents, normally assigned to him, there that day?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. GROTHMAN. There was no—these were the same agents that were always there?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, sir. The people that are assigned to his detail were working on that day.

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. There is stuff on the internet that says they were not there that day, but these are the same agents who are routinely there?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. Do we know which agents fired the shots that finally took down the potential assassin?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. GROTHMAN. Could you give us those names or the background of those agents?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would not offer their name up in this setting, but it was one of our technical officers, our counter-snipers.

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. So, can we privately get those names to the Committee?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am certain that we can make names available privately.

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK.

Do we know where all the shots landed?

First of all, how many shots did the potential assassin—how many shots came out of the rifle?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, again, I would hesitate to offer that information as the FBI is conducting an investigation.

Mr. GROTHMAN. Have we got the bullets from all the shots?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, that would be the responsibility of the FBI to collect that evidence.

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. Do we have any—do we have the correspondence from the shooter? Has that been recovered from his phone, whatever?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I would have to defer you to the FBI for details on that investigation.

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK.

You have spent some time trying to change the makeup of the Secret Service, OK? You feel there are, whatever, too high a percentage are men.

Does this affect at all who you are hiring for the Secret Service?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have spent my time as the Director trying to increase the number of people that we hire in the Secret Service so that we have the best and the brightest, and that has been my concentration as the Director.

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK. You ever hiring—hiring—not hiring men because of your desire to hit certain targets?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am hiring the best-qualified candidates that put in an application that want to work for our great organization.

Mr. GROTHMAN. OK.

Next question. The shooter obtained a direct sight of President Trump from the position on the rooftop. I assume that is not something that should ever happen. It should never happen.

Do you want to elaborate a little on how that happened or what you wish you had done differently or would do differently next time there is a Trump rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, sir, the facts of this particular event are still unfolding. Nine days, there have been a number of reports that have been out there. So, I do not want to provide information that perhaps would contradict something that has been erroneously reported or is not factual. But there clearly was a mistake, and we will take every effort to make sure that this never happens again.

Mr. GROTHMAN. Could you elaborate why you want one-third of the Secret Service to be women?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have never stated that I want one-third of the Secret Service to be women.

Mr. GROTHMAN. Thirty percent or something. You had some target, no? OK.

Mr. JORDAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROTHMAN. Sure. I will yield.

Mr. JORDAN. What was, Director, what was erroneously reported? You said, to Mr. Grothman's question, you said something was erroneously reported. What are you referring to?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am referring to—

Mr. JORDAN. His question was in the context of the shooter using a ladder to get on the building. What was erroneously reported? Because you will not tell us anything, but you will tell us something that was not reported accurately?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am saying, sir, that there have been a number of reports that are out there that have been speculation, and until we have the actual facts, I do not want to report anything that would contradict speculation that has been out there.

Mr. JORDAN. I yield. Thank the gentleman for yielding.

Chairman COMER. The Chair recognizes Mr. Krishnamoorthi from Illinois.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Thank you, Mr. Chair, thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, for bringing us together this morning.

One question I get asked a lot from my constituents is, what can Congress actually do to stop this from happening again?

And I would like to share a graphic from a very recent study conducted by Professor Robert Pape, a world-renowned expert in com-

bating political violence. The graphic shows that 74 percent of Americans want this Congress to come together to denounce political violence of all stripes. I mean, you can tell it is across party lines.

I commend the Chair and Ranking Member for putting out the statement the other day condemning political violence, and to further this effort, I would like to ask all my colleagues to join Dr. Brad Wenstrup and me in introducing a resolution that we think can secure unanimous House passage in deploring and condemning political violence. And we will be circulating that resolution shortly.

Director Cheatle, as you know, the shooter began shooting at 6:11 p.m. eastern on July 13. NBC reported that at 5:51 p.m., 20 minutes before the shooting began, the state police informed the Secret Service of their concern.

Now, the rally was not paused at that point, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. And according to NBC, just 2 minutes later, at 5:53 p.m., the Secret Service notified its snipers about the gunman.

The rally was not paused at that point either, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. Let me show you some video footage by rally goers.

If you could play the video on the screen up here.

This was taken 2 minutes before the shooting started.

If you could turn up the volume.

[Video shown.]

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. Ma'am, that does not look like suspicious behavior. That looks like threatening behavior to me. And the rally was not paused at that point either, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. I can tell you, as I stated earlier, sir, that the moment that the shift surrounding the President were aware of an actual threat—

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. That is a threat right there. The guy is on the roof, and everybody is yelling at him—

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY [continuing]. And directing the officers' attention to him. The rally was not paused at that point, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are currently still combing through communications and when communications were passed.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. Well, I can point you to this communication. It is 2 minutes before the shots started ringing out.

Director Cheatle, yes or no, was there ever a moment where the Secret Service actually considered pausing the rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. The Secret Service would have paused the rally had they known or been told—

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. So, the answer is no?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. That there was an actual threat.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. The answer is no, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. I can speak to you in generalities.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY. No, no. I do not want generalities. I want specifics.

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not know all of the communications—



Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. The answer is no, you did not consider pausing the rally, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. The people that are in charge of protecting the President on that day would never bring the former President out if there was a threat that had been identified to them.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Well, they did, because we have now identified three points in the 20 minutes before the shooting that the threat emerged.

Let me point you to something else, which is the building that the shooter was perched on seen here. This building is called the AGR building. I am sure that you are familiar with it. It is no more than 150 yards from the stage where Donald Trump stood, yet the security perimeter was drawn such that the AGR building was placed outside of it.

Director Cheatle, according to the *Washington Post*, the AR-15-styled rifle used in the shooting had a range of 400 to 600 yards, and therefore the AGR building is—was clearly within rifle range of the stage, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. NBC News has reported that, in the days before the rally, the Secret Service had identified the building as a vulnerability that required special attention, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is reporting from NBC?

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Yes.

Ms. CHEATLE. So, I am still looking into an active investigation.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. I know, but it has been 9 days. I mean, you should know that, right?

And yet, despite the fact that the AGR building was in rifle range of the stage and it was flagged as a vulnerability, this building was put outside of the Secret Service's security perimeter.

And I respectfully submit the Secret Service must expand its security perimeter to account for the kinds of weapons that can be used outside the perimeter to endanger the protectees inside the perimeter, ma'am.

Let me turn your attention to some conspiracy theories that have been circulating and ask you to comment on them.

First, you have not found evidence that the incident was a staged shooting, right?

Ms. CHEATLE. Correct.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. And you have not found evidence that this was a result of a conspiracy of high-ranking government officials, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. Correct.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. And you have not found evidence that this incident was, in fact, directed or perpetrated by a foreign state or entity, right?

Chairman COMER. And that is the last question, but I will let the Director answer that, please.

Ms. CHEATLE. Not at this time.

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The gentleman's time has expired.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cloud from Texas.

Mr. CLOUD. Thank you.

I just wanted to confirm, there was only one counter-sniper who took one shot? Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. We had multiple counter-sniper teams available that day.

Mr. CLOUD. Yes, on the premises, but only one took one shot? Is that correct? Or only one—

Ms. CHEATLE. Correct.

Mr. CLOUD. OK.

How many spent shell casings were found on the roof?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I would have to defer you to the FBI's criminal investigation.

Mr. CLOUD. OK. Word is, is that the car was rigged with explosives?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, sir, I would have to defer you to the FBI's investigation.

Mr. CLOUD. OK. You are not curious about—you do not communicate with them? No? OK.

CNN reported that the Secret Service did not sweep the building the shooter was used to shoot President Trump and other attendees. Is that true or false?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, we are conducting a mission insurance investigation, and it will depend on the information that we obtain from our investigations.

Mr. CLOUD. OK. The Secret Service knew there was a suspicious person anywhere from 8 minutes before the President walked on stage to 30 to 60 minutes. We have different reports.

Was President Trump or his team notified of the threat?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think there is a difference and a distinction between suspicious—

Mr. CLOUD. Suspicious person.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. And threat.

Mr. CLOUD. Yes.

Ms. CHEATLE. So, we are going back and looking at communications to know when the information about a suspicious person was passed to Secret Service personnel.

Mr. CLOUD. OK. But was President Trump or his team notified?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, we are going back and looking to make sure that we have the exact information of when those notifications were made and who those notifications were made to.

Mr. CLOUD. OK.

I think it is troubling for a lot of us that the No. 1 question everyone in America is wondering is why was the roof left open, and after 9 days, we should at least maybe have a little bit of that information. And when you come to this Committee hearing and you do not have anything to say about that, it is very, very troubling.

Did you review the security plan for this event?

Ms. CHEATLE. I personally do not review security plans for events that take place across the country.

Mr. CLOUD. Any of them?

Ms. CHEATLE. We have a number of events that take place—

Mr. CLOUD. Who is the top-level official who reviews the security plan?

Ms. CHEATLE. There is a number of people that review security plans as they unfold.

Mr. CLOUD. Who is ultimately responsible for signing off on a security plan?

Ms. CHEATLE. It is a conjunction of personnel. There are people on the ground. There are supervisors on the detail. There are people at headquarters.

Mr. CLOUD. So, there is not one person who says, "OK, this is good, it is copacetic, we are going for it"?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think much in the way that we build our security plans where they are multilayered—

Mr. CLOUD. No doubt there are teams working different aspects of it, but ultimately, is there not an individual who signs off on the plan?

Ms. CHEATLE. Much like how we design our security plans, they are multilayered. There are multiple layers of people.

Mr. CLOUD. So, there is no accountability?

Ms. CHEATLE. There is accountability, sir.

Mr. CLOUD. This is, whether it is the FBI or Fauci or anything, it is time after time after time these multiple layers of accountability turn into layers of plausible deniability in agency after agency after agency.

That has got to be fixed, because you keep coming here and expecting—yes, you are saying, "I am responsible," but—and you are accountable for it—but then there is nothing. What do you mean by that? I mean, you are saying you are going to keep your job, right?

Ms. CHEATLE. I assure you, sir, that if we determine through the course of our investigation that someone or people need to be held accountable, we will do so.

Mr. CLOUD. What level of—if President Biden, God forbid, had been shot and killed, would you think that was worthy of resignation?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would do the same thing that I am doing here where I would want to make sure that we are conducting an investigation, that there is continuity in that investigation, and that we could find the answers for what happened.

Mr. CLOUD. You do not think the assassination of somebody under your detail is worthy of resignation?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that this event was tragic and deserves answers.

Mr. CLOUD. The thing that you have said so far is that you want to make sure that this never happens again. The thing is, everyone in America knows that is not the job description that you are tasked with. The job description you are tasked with is to make sure it never happens, period.

One of your goals in the strategic plan is to champion diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility. You have accomplished the accessibility part.

What standards—do you keep the same standards for all applicants and all—does every Secret Service agent meet the same qualifications, or do you have different standards for different people?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, sir. Everyone who moves through the application process has to meet the same standards to become a special agent.

Mr. CLOUD. OK.

The trouble I think we are having with right now—so far, you gave a lame excuse for sloped roof. You said that local law enforcement's job was to cover up the building before backtracking on that. We were told that President Trump's team did not ask for security before you backtracked on that. You have not provided the audio recording that this Committee—the Chairman requested that was due Thursday. You did not give us an advanced copy of your opening statement, but yet there was reporting on it somewhere else. There seems to be more information from YouTube videos than you are able to provide for us.

And it begs the question to anyone, you are in charge of the investigation of your own failure, so how is anybody in America supposed to be able to trust the results of that investigation as being anything transparent and genuine?

Chairman COMER. That is the last question, but please feel free to answer the question, Director.

Ms. CHEATLE. Sir, I have been a Secret Service agent for nearly 30 years. I have led with integrity, and I follow our core values of duty, justice, honor, loyalty, and courage, and I am doing that in this case. And I assure this Committee that I will provide answers when we have a full and complete report in addition to cooperating with all of the other investigations that are ongoing.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Khanna from California.

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the Chair and the Ranking Member for convening this hearing on a bipartisan basis. I join them in condemning the horrific assassination attempt on the former President. I am relieved for the sake of the country that he was not seriously hurt and that he survived, and my thoughts are with him and his family during such a traumatic event.

I also want to express condolences to Corey Comperatore's family and recognize his heroism in saving his daughters' lives and to the victims of that awful event.

Now, Director Cheatle, would you agree that this is the most serious security lapse since President Reagan was shot in 1981 of the Secret Service?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, sir, I would.

Mr. KHANNA. And, you know, do you know what Stuart Knight did when—he was in charge at the time of the Secret Service. Do you know what he did afterwards?

Ms. CHEATLE. He remained on duty.

Mr. KHANNA. He resigned. He resigned. And Stuart Knight was not a Democratic appointee or a Republican appointee.

Look, I am not questioning your judgment. I just do not think this is partisan. If you have an assassination attempt on a President, a former President, or a candidate, you need to resign. That is what Stuart Knight did. He was a Republican appointee, and he took responsibility.

And I think you need to reflect. This is not a question of you. It is a question of the American people. You cannot go leading a Secret Service agency when there is an assassination attempt on a

Presidential candidate. I would say that about anyone who is running.

And so, I guess my question to you is, what is the difference between your position and what Stuart Knight did?

Ms. CHEATLE. What I will tell you, sir, is that I am dedicated to finding the answers to what happens. And like every Secret Service agent, we do not shirk our responsibilities. I will remain on and be responsible to the agency, to this Committee, to the former President, and to the American public.

Mr. KHANNA. But is there a reason you would not just do what Stuart Knight did after the Reagan assassination attempt?

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe that I provided an answer.

Mr. KHANNA. There is nothing more that you have to say? I mean, do you really believe at this moment, given how divided the country is and the questions asked, that your service in this role is the best for the Nation? I mean, I am not saying you cannot do public service again, you cannot do something else again.

Do you really genuinely in your heart believe that you being in this role is what is right for America at this moment? I mean, do you think there are people who are Trump supporters who have confidence in you?

The one thing that the—we have got to have agencies in this country that transcend politics, that have the confidence of independents, Democrats, Republicans, progressives, conservatives.

Do you really believe that the majority of this country has confidence in you right now?

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe that the country deserves answers, and I am committed to finding those answers and providing those answers.

Mr. KHANNA. Well, I believe, Director Cheatle, that you should resign. I think there are colleagues on both sides of the aisle who believe that. And I hope you will consider it.

I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Palmer from Alabama for 5 minutes.

Mr. PALMER. Director Cheatle, did local law enforcement ESU teams have compromise authority to engage a perceived threat?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. PALMER. Why do you think they did not use it?

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe that they follow the same use of force that our agents—

Mr. PALMER. You do not—when you have compromise authority, you do not have to get permission if you perceive a threat. And there were not just the ESU units, but there were local law enforcement that had line of sight on the shooter before the shots were taken.

So, one of my questions is, there was supposed to be a briefing with the Secret Service sniper units, your counterassault team members, with the contract team, with the local ESU teams. That did not take place. Why was that?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, I have been told that there has been a briefing. There was a briefing that took place.

Mr. PALMER. I have been told that there was not one.

Ms. CHEATLE. And, again, we are still looking into the facts of the investigation, so—

Mr. PALMER. Let me ask you this. When were you informed that there was a credible threat against President Trump—former President Trump? When did you learn of that?

Ms. CHEATLE. Sir, the former President has a number of threats.

Mr. PALMER. I did not ask you that. There was a credible threat from Iran. When were you informed of that? Answer the question.

Ms. CHEATLE. We have been monitoring the threats for the former President—

Mr. PALMER. You knew before the rally. OK? All right?

The site security plan is generally drafted by the site supervisor and the site agent, probably out of the Pittsburgh district office. Did they take into account the credible threat against President Trump?

Ms. CHEATLE. Our personnel take into account the threats that are out there.

Mr. PALMER. Then why would they leave a building—and I will correct the distance that has been quoted, it was about 140 yards with clear line of sight to the President. Why was that building not occupied on the roof? I mean, you could have put Barney Fife on the roof and kept somebody from getting up there. So, why was that not done?

Ms. CHEATLE. The plan that was developed that day encompassed a number of security mitigations.

Mr. PALMER. No, ma'am. The issue is the site supervisor, the site agent, and the special agent in charge—who I think signed off on the plan—did not include that in the inner perimeter, and they did not have a plan to secure the building.

As I understand it, the Butler County ESU unit was situated on the second floor of a building next to that, but they did not have a clear line of sight of the roof. The angle was too severe.

The photograph that was taken of the young man—of the shooter—when he had the range finder was taken at 5:15. It was not until 5:38 that that photograph was transmitted to the Secret Service sniper unit.

I do not understand the lack of interoperability here in the communication process. I do not understand why people did not perceive that as a credible threat. The video that Mr. Krishnamoorthi had shown there was clearly a credible threat.

So, how is it that all of these mistakes could be made?

How many explosive devices were found on or near the site?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I would have to defer you to the FBI—

Mr. PALMER. Madam, I believe they were in his car, and I think there might have been one near a main gas line.

It was not just the fact that he had a rifle. It was the fact that he had the ability to inflict enormous harm, enormous numbers of casualties had those devices exploded.

I want to know also, when your agents conduct a site review, are they fully informed of all of the threats that are being made against the principal that they are protecting?

Ms. CHEATLE. What I can tell you is that when our agents go out to conduct an advance their whole goal is to ensure the safety and security—

Mr. PALMER. I understand what the goal is. The failure to secure that building not only put the former President's life in danger, it put the lives of individuals in the crowd in danger as well. I mean, the Reagan shooting, there were other people shot at that time as well, and the Secret Service members' lives were in danger.

So, I do not understand how you can continue to stay in the position you are in when this was a failure of historic magnitude. Forty-three years without anything like this happening, and you failed, in this case, in a spectacular way.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The gentleman yields back.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Mfume from Maryland.

Mr. MFUME. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to commend you and the Ranking Member on your joint statement and for holding this hearing that we might all at least attempt to try to get some answers.

Some of us, Ms. Cheatle, grew up in an era not too unlike what we see today in terms of political violence. And some of us remember the November 22, 1963, assassination of President Kennedy. Some of us, like myself, remember 2 days later when Jack Ruby, on live TV, shot and killed Lee Harvey Oswald.

We have seen over and over and over since that time these kind of attempts, whether it was the assassination of Martin Luther King or Bobby Kennedy, or the attempted attack on George Wallace in Laurel, Maryland, the shooting in 1981 of Ronald Reagan, our friend and colleague Steve Scalise shooting here in D.C., and the unfortunate attack on Paul Pelosi, and now this matter regarding former President Trump.

Let me try, if I might, to take another walk at this.

People just assume that whoever is in charge takes full responsibility when there has never been, at least on this magnitude and scale, this sort of failure. So, when Members ask you are you going to resign and you say you have no intention to, they are perplexed, like many people who watch what is going on.

And there are some things I just do not understand.

Why was the building, the ARG building, placed outside of the perimeter when, clearly, it was close enough for someone to launch an attack?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, again, sir, we are looking into all of the details of how the advance was comprised, but I can tell you that there was overwatch on that building provided that day.

Mr. MFUME. By a drone?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not going to get into the specifics of technology or assets that were used in this forum.

Mr. MFUME. OK. OK. Well, I think it is fair to say the overwatch failed because the shooter got up on the roof and stayed there for a while, and people had pointed him out.

So, do you think that your overwatch was a failure in that case?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that we need to know the full details to understand how this occurred.

Mr. MFUME. And why was the rooftop left naked to begin with, can you tell us that, considering it was within the line of sight and so very close?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I cannot speak to the specifics of this particular event site. But what I can tell you is that, when the Secret Service develops an advance plan, they take into account a number of factors when they are building their advance. If there are buildings or areas of concern and overwatch is one of those mitigations that they want to put in place, then they will cover off areas of responsibility.

Mr. MFUME. I understand that, but the shooter came to the attention of your agency 52 minutes before the former President got to the stage.

Did anybody get assigned to watch or cover that individual who had already been seen with an advanced finder on him and other suspicious matters? Was anybody assigned to track him?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, what I would like to clarify is that a suspicious individual—

Mr. MFUME. I got that part, is not a threat. I know. I know.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Was brought to the attention of our personnel. And, again, having a range finder at an outdoor event—

Mr. MFUME. Well, let me ask you this. When the suspicious person was brought to the attention of the Secret Service, was anybody in the detail ordered to follow and stay with that suspicious person just because they might become a threat?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, we have a number of teams that are on the ground. And, again, we are trying to verify the timelines of when those notifications were made to our personnel so that they could assume the responsibility of trying to track that individual.

Mr. MFUME. Ms. Cheatle, there has been a lot of discussion—some of which raised itself earlier in this hearing—about poor staff morale within your agency. And I have the July 17 report of Government Executive, which is a credible reporting service for the Federal Government for employees, and the 2023 ranking of places to work within the Federal Government showed—and this is through the Office of Personnel Management—that the Secret Service came in 413th out of 459 subagencies and agencies.

Can you explain that?

Ms. CHEATLE. Certainly. What I can tell you is the Secret Service is a difficult job. It challenges our employees daily. It is holidays. It is weekends. It is no-leave periods.

Mr. MFUME. But, madam, people come to work knowing that. You do explain that when you hire somebody. They know that. It is the same with other agencies. They miss holidays. They come to work at odd hours.

But to be worst, one of the worst places to work within the Federal Government, 413 out of 459, I just need an explanation. What do you think as the Director there?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think—

Chairman COMER. And that is the last question, but please answer Mr. Mfume's question.

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that this is a challenging job. I think that it is a challenging environment to be in law enforcement. And we do have a no-fail mission, and our folks are tasked with that every day, 365 days of the year.



But I can tell you I have also taken a number of measures since I have been the Director to recruit and retain and stem the tide of attrition in our agency, which will hopefully alleviate some of that.

Mr. MFUME. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sessions from Texas.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I join in the calls of all of our Members to say thank you for doing this hearing on a bipartisan basis.

Director, I am not going to sit here and say you ought to resign, but I am going to say that you have not given us confidence that you have the ability to understand what happened, to take the responsibility in terms of understanding.

You have spent a number of years—how many years do you say you have been with the agency?

Ms. CHEATLE. Twenty-nine.

Mr. SESSIONS. Well, I spent 16 years with AT&T, moved seven times with them, and had a really good feel about their operations, how they worked, what was acceptable, who was responsible. And I have heard you say today numbers of times: Well, you have got to wait. Well, you have got to wait. Wait for the final report.

When is the “final” final going to happen?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am—

Mr. SESSIONS. I mean, how long do we have to wait before you can give us credible answers? You have been there 28 years. You have had a few days to be able to draw your own analysis of this. You should understand the entire process.

You talked about being on the team perhaps in Georgia. You have talked about your experience in this. You have talked about the professional nature of the agency. That, I do not doubt.

But the Director, just like it was when I ran my operations at AT&T, was responsible for making sure they worked. And in business, it either works or it does not work. There is no in between. It either works or it does not work.

And your job as the, in essence, administrator, the Director, is to make sure it looks right and works. And I have not heard you say one thing about, “my analysis is. I have asked these questions.” It is always, “I have got to sit back and wait for someone else to decide that.”

So, I am going to ask you a question that maybe you can answer.

Have any employees been disciplined for their role in the Butler, PA, incident?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, sir, not at this time. I am asking those questions.

Mr. SESSIONS. So, no employee has been disciplined and no employee has been placed in any position that would place their job in jeopardy nor their standing in the agency?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are still in the process of interviewing people.

Mr. SESSIONS. That is not what I asked. You are the person that runs the place. You are the person that knows right from wrong, good from bad. You have had a number of days. And now you come before this Committee, knowing you are going to be before us, and you have got to slough it off to someone else.

Do you see where there was something that went wrong, as a professional at an agency for 28 years, or do you have to count on someone else to give you the final report?

Ms. CHEATLE. I see that something went wrong, and I have acknowledged that something went wrong.

Mr. SESSIONS. Then what went wrong?

Ms. CHEATLE. I need to—

Mr. SESSIONS. Was the special agent in charge not doing their job? Was the shooter not—was the shooter given extra time? Was the sniper doing their job?

I mean, these are things that people who have been around for 28 years can analyze quickly.

I watched it live on TV and then within minutes saw a number of facts and factors that would have and should have been known by people who were there. You have got 28 years. You are showing up here telling us and the American public, “Well, I have got to wait for the final answer.”

What is your evaluation?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am asking those same questions.

Mr. SESSIONS. Well, no, you are before the Committee.

Ms. CHEATLE. And I—

Mr. SESSIONS. Tell us what went wrong. A special agent in charge? The person who was there? Tell us and do not try and play a shell game with us.

Do you have the ability to effectively, as the Director of this agency, to understand what went wrong and at least tell us, “I do or do not know what I am doing”?

And we come away with—and I am not asking for you to resign. I am asking for you, if you have got this experience, then you should be able to say to us, “We know what we did wrong. It was a failure in our system. And we are immediately making these corrections.”

That is why you are having a difficult time with this group of Members of Congress, because we saw it, too. We have seen the things.

But you are the 28-year expert. You are the person that—and only you—that can make the changes. And I hear you say, “Well, I have got to wait for a final report before I, at 28 years experience.”

That is why we think what you are doing, the answers you are giving us, are not correct and you are not using your professional expertise.

Mr. Chairman, I will allow her to respond.

Ms. CHEATLE. I am asking those same questions, sir. And I assure you, when I have a full and complete report of exactly what happened, there will be accountability, and we will make changes.

Chairman COMER. Before I recognize—just out of curiosity, Director, it has been 9 days. Every American wants these questions answered.

Do you have a ballpark estimate of when what Mr. Sessions asked you would be able to answer—

Ms. CHEATLE. So, I can tell you—

Chairman COMER [continuing]. Time-wise?

Ms. CHEATLE. I can tell you on our mission assurance internal investigation, we are targeting to have that completed within 60 days.

There is also an external investigation that is going to be taking place. There are a number of Office of Inspector General investigations as well, and we are working in concert. And then, of course, there is the Department of Justice/FBI criminal investigation.

Chairman COMER. The Chair recognizes Ms. Ocasio-Cortez from New York.

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Cheatle, respectfully, what you had just laid out about 60 days—we are currently in the midst of an especially concentrated Presidential campaign in the moment. That is also paired with, of course, elections happening across the country that are happening in about 100 days.

So, the notion of a report coming out in 60 days when the threat environment is so high in the United States—irrespective of party—is not acceptable, and I think it is very important to understand that.

This is not theater. This is not about jockeying. This is about the safety of some of the most highly targeted and valued targets, internationally and domestically, in the United States of America.

So, the idea that a report will be finalized in 60 days, let alone prior to any actionable decisions that would be made, is simply not acceptable. It has been 10 days since an assassination attempt on a former President of the United States. Regardless of party, there need to be answers.

Again, this party—this Committee—this is not a moment of theater. We have to make policy decisions, and we have to make them now. We do.

And that may be a—and that may require legislation. That may require policy that we must pass in the immediate term. And without that, we are flying blind.

So, the lack of answers and the lack of a report is just simply not something that we can accept here.

Director Cheatle, is there a standard perimeter that the Secret Service establishes around an event, or are those perimeters independently determined per event and scenario?

Ms. CHEATLE. There is no standard. Every event and every venue is different and treated as such.

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. So, each event has a different perimeter that is established depending on the logistics of that event.

Now, you established earlier that the building upon which the shooter operated from was outside of that established perimeter, correct, for the Butler, Pennsylvania, event?

Ms. CHEATLE. It was outside of our secure perimeter, yes.

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. Now, that building was, I believe, 500—how far away was that building from the President?

Ms. CHEATLE. It was approximately 200 yards.

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. Two hundred yards.

Now, the individual used an AR-15 in order to act out his assassination attempt. An AR-15 has a range of about 4-to 600 yards.

My question is, why does the Secret Service perimeter—why is the Secret Service protective perimeter shorter than one of the most popular semiautomatic weapons in the United States?

Ms. CHEATLE. There are a number of weapons out there with a number of ranges. Again, an advance was completed. The determination of the perimeter—I am not going to speak to specifics—but there are a number of factors that are taken into account when we determine our perimeter. Some of it has to do with terrain. Some of it has to do with buildings. Some of it has to do with assets and resources that are available.

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. And so, what I am hearing is that a perimeter was not established outdoors, in an outdoor venue, that would prevent an AR-15—which is one of the most common weapons used in mass shootings—from being able to be within the range of Secret Service protection?

Ms. CHEATLE. A perimeter was established, and even though there were buildings that were outside of that perimeter, it was not just that building, there were a number of buildings in the area, and there was overwatch that was created to help mitigate some of those buildings.

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. Respectfully, Dr. Cheatle, as well, as a person who has experienced an enormous amount of threat incidents, including incidents that have never been reported publicly, what—there is a common pattern that happens here, whether it is Secret Service, FBI, Capitol Police, local departments.

After a critical security failure, we often hear there will be an independent investigation. That independent investigation gets set up. Usually, the expectation is between 2 to 3 months after the incident. And then nothing really occurs from there. The report is usually not satisfactory to the questions that are usually being raised here, and most importantly, corrective action is rarely taken.

If I were to state anything that I think is profoundly important, it is that we need to have answers to the public. Ideally, I would encourage you and the agency to be more forthright with the Members that still have yet to have their questioning because the public deserves to have full confidence, and the stakes are too high.

The violence that could break out in this political moment, regardless of party, in the event of someone getting hurt constitutes a national security threat to the entire country.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Ms. CHEATLE. Can I go back to something you said?

Chairman COMER. Yes, please. Feel free, Director.

Ms. CHEATLE. Ma'am, if I could just speak to something you said at the outset when you started your questioning.

I want to assure you and everyone on this Committee that I am not waiting for a report to take action. We have been conducting analysis all along, and we have been adding additional features to our security details since this incident occurred.

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. And I would hope you can highlight and illuminate what some of those are in the event of other Members' questioning as well.

Chairman COMER. Very good.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Biggs.

Mr. BIGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I request unanimous consent for that photo to go into the official record.

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. BIGGS. Thank you.

Director, your agency has a no-fail mission, and on Saturday, July 13, your agency spectacularly failed. The failure resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore and serious injury to two other rally attendees, David Dutch and James Copenhaver, besides the injuries to President Trump.

It is unfathomable that a 20-year-old on the radar of Secret Service and local law enforcement before President Trump went on stage was able to climb onto the roof of a building with a rifle and fire off multiple rounds before he was neutralized.

Was Mr. Crooks acting alone?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I would have to refer you to the FBI's investigation.

Mr. BIGGS. Was he just a lone gunman?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would have to refer you to the FBI's investigation for motive.

Mr. BIGGS. What did the Technical Services Division determine was going to be the event perimeter?

Ms. CHEATLE. Those are questions that we are asking, and we are—

Mr. BIGGS. I mean, you are sitting here today. Come on, Director. Everybody said this. You knew you were going to be asked that question because it has been asked multiple times.

So, this is an easy one. What did they determine was going to be the event perimeter? So, you should know that. I mean, this is not, "Gee, I got to wait till someone else tells me." What was it?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I do not want to speak to specifics of the event that took place.

Mr. BIGGS. OK. This is a specific.

Ms. CHEATLE. I understand.

Mr. BIGGS. This is a specific that you ought to know. As someone who said, "The buck stops with me, I am going to stay in my job, I am going to give the answers to the American people, and I know what happened"—except you are not going to tell us and you are not going to tell the American people.

And you, yourself, said in an interview that that foments this notion of conspiracy theories. Guess what? When you sit here and repeatedly tell people, "Hey, I have to wait," as it frustrated everybody on this Committee, guess what? It undermines your credibility and whether you are really going to get to it.

So, I am going to ask you again. What did the Technical Service Division determine was going to be the event perimeter?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are still gathering reports. We are interviewing individuals.

Mr. BIGGS. You know what it is, though, now. You are just not going to tell us, right?

Ms. CHEATLE. When I have those details, I will most certainly share those.

Mr. BIGGS. Was the gun already on the roof, or did the shooter carry the gun up with him?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have that information at this time.

Mr. BIGGS. Well, when was the last sweep of that roof done prior to the rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have that information at this time.

Mr. BIGGS. So, how many holds—I mean, so most of us here have been in events and Secret Service has been there, there has been security. And I cannot tell you how many times we have said there is going to be a security hold right here, so we are going to wait. And we wait to 1 or 2 or 3 minutes. And yet we are hearing from you, apparently, that there were no holds in place ever instituted here with President Trump's going on stage.

And you said—and this is, I think, connected with this—you said they had not adjudicated the shooter to be a threat. He was adjudicated to be a suspicious person, even though we got some dynamic video that Mr. Krishnamoorthi put on the video for us.

So, I guess my question for you is—and I think you answered this, I just want to see if you are consistent with what you said about an hour and a half ago—what do you do if a suspicious person is identified by the agency?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, at a number of our events, it is not unusual for—

Mr. BIGGS. I know it is not unusual. What do you do?

Ms. CHEATLE. Those individuals that are identified as suspicious, we will send teams out to—

Mr. BIGGS. Was a team sent out here then?

Ms. CHEATLE. There were teams that were sent to identify and interview that individual.

Mr. BIGGS. They were sent to interview the individual who scampered up in camo on top of a roof within 130 yards of his target. And did they—did your team get there? When did your team get there to conduct that interview?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have the details on a timeline. It is my—

Mr. BIGGS. So, if you did send—if your team—if they did send a team and they are going to interview him, you said—you described that earlier as an investigation—why did they not put a security hold on President Trump going on stage at that rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. At a number of our protective sites there are suspicious individuals that are identified all the time. That does not necessarily mean that they constitute a threat.

Mr. BIGGS. Of course not. But here you have got a guy scampering up the side of a building on top of a roof, it is identified to you, and you said you sent a team there. And you cannot answer that.

And this gets to my—one of my finer points, Mr. Chairman, if I can make it, and that is, we can have these kind of interview sessions. Five minutes, you know, everybody gets a kiss at the pig. Five minutes, and she gets to stonewall us, not deliver answers.

So, we say, OK, we are going to put together a congressional committee, a blue-ribbon committee. Same crap will happen.

I am calling—and I will support that—but I will tell you this. I am calling on the Speaker to give us and put together a truly independent commission of qualified former Secret Service agents, Presidential and VIP protective services people who can actually conduct this kind of investigation and give us real answers, be-

cause I do not think you are going to give us those answers. You should have come today ready to give us answers. I call upon you to resign today—today.

And I also would say I have got a bunch of UC requests, if I can go ahead, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COMER. Proceed with the requests.

Mr. BIGGS. Thank you. I apologize. It might take——

Chairman COMER. That is all right. Go ahead.

Mr. BIGGS. It might take a moment.

Chairman COMER. Very important.

So, Anthony Guglielmi, the Secret Service spokesman, one from him.

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. BIGGS. Article: “U.S. Secret Service says it previously denied Trump requests for additional resources, *New York Times* reports.”

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. BIGGS. “Secret Service says it denied earlier Trump requests for more Federal resources.”

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. BIGGS. “Secret Service acknowledges denying some past requests by Trump’s campaign for tighter security.”

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. BIGGS. Preliminary findings by Senator Ron Johnson and his Committee.

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. BIGGS. Article is entitled, “Notice anything different about Trump’s Secret Service detail?”

Next. “Former Biden official corrects herself after saying Dems must turn their fire on Donald Trump to beat him.”

“Secret Service Director says buck stops with her, but she will not resign.”

“Disney’s ‘Star Wars’ Mark Hamill cracks joke about Trump’s ear bandage following assassination attempt.”

“Biden: I have not engaged in inciting rhetoric, Trump has, I am just talking about ‘threat to democracy.’”

A piece called, “Who is Secret Service Chief Kimberly Cheatle?”

“Charlamagne tha God says Trump is solely responsible for violent rhetoric that led to attempt on his life.”

“Video Actress Amanda Seales pushes conspiracy theory Donald Trump assassination trip was staged.”

“Report: Secret Service identified rooftop as a potential vulnerability days before the rally.”

“Watch: BlackRock removes ad showing former President Donald Trump’s would-be assassin.”

“Why does the Biden administration have 100 percent confidence in Secret Service after assassination attempt?”

“Secret Service Director: We did not put snipers on the roof because it was kind of sloped.”

“Here is what Thomas Matthew Crooks did in the days leading up to Trump assassination attempt.”

“Secret Service Director under scrutiny for diversity initiatives after Trump assassination attempt.”

“The official story on Trump shooting makes no sense at all.”

“Andrew McCabe says Trump assassination”——

Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Chairman, a point of order. I am happy to assent to all of them just to facilitate—

Mr. BIGGS. You do not want me to read—is it too tedious?

Mr. RASKIN. Well, we are not even really hearing them anyway, so if we could—it is up to you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BIGGS. Would you like me to slow—I will slow down. I was probably going too fast.

“Secret Service’s explanations for security failures ahead of Trump assassination attempt are not adding up.”

“U.S. reportedly received intel of Iranian plot to assassinate President Trump.”

“WTH? Secret Service now saying that they did not put any agents on the roof because slight slope was too dangerous.”

“Report: U.S. officials received intel of Iranian plot to assassinate Donald Trump before Crooks’ attempt.”

“Exclusive—GOP Rep Cloud: Homeland Security agency is interfering in House’s assassination investigation.”

“Why Trump’s raised fist after surviving assassination attempt is triggering to liberal media.”

“Questions swirl over the security lapse at Trump rally, reviving old concerns about Secret Service.”

“Secret Service scrambles to shift blame after Trump shooting as backlash hits hard—‘Nobody contacted me.’”

“Must see: Six-camera split screen of assassination attempt captures everything. Shooter was in open 2-plus minutes.”

Mario: “Five reasons you should be angry.”

“Breaking: Shooter spotted up to 30 minutes before firing. Reported multiple times. Pictures taken. No one stopped him.”

“Cheatle calls the 30 minutes between noticing and neutralizing shooter a very short period of time.”

“Secret Service Director says, ‘Buck stops with me’ on Trump’s assassination attempt but will not resign.”

Chairman COMER. Mr. Biggs, we will stop right there. We can re-take them on the next one. I know there are more.

Mr. BIGGS. OK.

Chairman COMER. But, without objection, we will enter into the record all of those, and we will take up the others after the next speaker.

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Brown from Ohio for 5 minutes.

Ms. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I first want to highlight certain comments from Ranking Member Raskin, my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, President Biden, and Vice President Harris, and that is, political violence is completely unacceptable in this country, full stop. It is an assault on our democracy itself and I am devastated by this attack on a candidate for the President, for the office of the highest office in the land and continue to pray for the victims of this shooting and their families.

As someone who has known gun violence firsthand, no one should have to experience the pain of losing a loved one to weapons of war.

It is deeply unfortunate political violence has become far too common. Whether it is the deadly attack on the Capitol on January 6, the assault on Speaker Pelosi’s husband, or the threats of violence



against election workers, we all must work to condemn political violence and tone down the rhetoric.

So, Director Cheatle, on behalf of the hardworking men and women of the Secret Service, can you give us some perspective into what goes into securing an event like the rally, like how much time do you have to prepare?

Ms. CHEATLE. Thank you for the question.

Generally, when we receive notification that there is going to be an event taking place at a venue, the advance team assignments are made, and there is a 5-day process to conduct walkthroughs, coordinate with staff, local staff, whether it be campaign staff or the protectee's staff, and then with local law enforcement on where the perimeter is going to be, the size and the scope of the event, how many attendees there are going to be, if it is an indoor rally/outdoor rally, what sort of assets are available locally, what sort of assets the Secret Service can bring to bear, and what the scope of the event that the staff is trying to accomplish.

Ms. BROWN. So, to that point, how many agents were recommended or requested, as opposed to how many were assigned?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, I am not going to get into specifics of how many were assigned, but those numbers that were requested were provided.

Ms. BROWN. And how many local agents were involved in the preparation, if you will, that you talked about, that 5-day preparation?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, there were a number of local agents from the local office, as well as agents from the former Trump detail, that were involved in that advance process.

Ms. BROWN. Do we have a number?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do have a number. I am not going to release that number in this setting.

Ms. BROWN. You are not making this easy for us.

This is a shocking incident on the former President's life and an appalling instance of political violence and a threat to our democratic values.

I am thankful that the former President is on the mend. And, again, I am grieving for the family and friends of Corey Comperatore who lost a loved one in this shooting and now know the unbearable pain of gun violence.

I really hope this serves as a reminder about our responsibility to attack policies, not personalities; to be honest and truthful; and to treat one another with dignity, respect, and thoughtfulness.

And, with that, I yield my remaining time to Ranking Member Raskin.

Mr. RASKIN. Thank you, Ms. Brown, for those very powerful and moving remarks.

Director Cheatle, we do not want to lose a Presidential candidate to an AR-15 attack. We cannot lose a Presidential candidate to an AR-15 attack. And we cannot lose any more citizens to AR-15 mass violence, mass shootings. And we certainly do not want an attempted AR-15 assassination or assassination attempt to set off political violence or riots in America. So, this is deadly serious business.

The Vice Ranking Member pointed out that a report in 60 days will not do it for us, because we have a responsibility, Members of Congress have a responsibility, to take action now if there is anything we can do to prevent this.

So, my question for you is, what is informing your operational decisions right now that you have invoked? Without a report, can you tell us what are the preliminary judgments? Or—if you do not want to foreshadow the report, fine—what are your personal, professional judgments informing the operational decisions you are making right now?

Ms. CHEATLE. Certainly. And I appreciate that question.

I do not want to make any preliminary judgments on what happened on this particular day, but I can tell you that we have looked at, as we did immediately in the aftermath, what the security plan for the Republican National Convention was going to be, and we made adjustments to the interior of the perimeter there.

We looked at the protectees that we have here in the Washington, DC, area and our protective sites, and we did make some adjustments to their security posture.

And as we continue to move through the next several weeks—even yesterday, with the announcement of the President no longer running, we have made adjustments to the Vice President's detail. We are already prepared for an eventual VP nominee, and we continue to make those assessments.

I think it just shows how dynamic the environment is that this agency works in every day.

Mr. RASKIN. So, you have made the same kinds of commonsense judgments and intuitive recommendations that members of the public and Members of Congress are asking about right—

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. RASKIN [continuing]. Now?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. RASKIN. OK.

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to the gentlelady.

Chairman COMER. And before I recognize Ms. Mace, I have to say, Director, we are pretty close to the halfway point during this. You answered more questions with an ABC reporter than you have with Members of Congress. We have a lot more questions. The American people are demanding that we get answers to those questions. And that is what the purpose of this hearing is today.

So, I am sure a lot of the questions that have already been asked are going to be asked again, and hopefully we can get some answers to those questions. I strongly implore you to answer those questions. You are here with a subpoena, and we expect you to answer the questions.

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Mace from South Carolina.

Ms. MACE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Cheatle, the American people are watching, and they are wondering if there are any questions you can answer honestly today.

So, Director Cheatle, I have a series of questions, very specific questions. I want very specific answers. Most of my questions are going to demand a “yes” or “no” answer. Do you understand?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do.

Ms. MACE. OK.

My first question: both sides of the aisle today have asked for your resignation. Would you like to use my 5 minutes to draft your resignation letter, yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, thank you.

Ms. MACE. Was this a colossal failure?

Ms. CHEATLE. It was a failure.

Ms. MACE. Yes or no, was it a colossal failure, is the question. Yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have admitted this is a terrible tragedy—

Ms. MACE. This is a “yes” or “no” series of questions. Was this a colossal failure, yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Ms. MACE. Was this tragedy preventable, yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Ms. MACE. Has the Secret Service been transparent with this Committee?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Ms. MACE. Would you say the fact that we had to issue a subpoena to get you to show up today as being transparent, yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have always been—

Ms. MACE. Yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Eager to come in—

Ms. MACE. You did not want to answer the question.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. And talk to the Committee.

Ms. MACE. We had to issue a subpoena to get you to show up today. That is not transparent, by the way.

You stated earlier, Secret Service is not political. Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Ms. MACE. OK. Would you say leaking your opening statement to *Punchbowl News*, *Politico's Playbook*, and the *Washington Post* several hours before you sent it to this Committee as being political, yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have no idea how my statement got out.

Ms. MACE. Well, that is bullshit.

So, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record articles by *Punchbowl News*, *Politico Playbook*, *Washington Post*, all done at 5:24 a.m., 6:12 a.m., 6:34 a.m., a solid 3 to 4 hours before this Committee got your statement.

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Ms. MACE. OK.

Is the Secret Service fully cooperating with our Committee?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Ms. MACE. OK. You say you are fully cooperating with this Committee.

On July 15, this Committee sent you a list of demands of information that we wanted. Has the Secret Service provided this Committee a complete list of all law enforcement personnel that were there that day? Have you done that? Have you provided a list to the Oversight Committee, yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE. I will have to get back to you on that.

Ms. MACE. That is a “no.”

Have you provided all audio and video recordings in your possession to this Committee, as we asked on July 15, yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would have to get back to you on that.

Ms. MACE. That is a “no.”

You are full of shit today. You are just being completely dishonest—

Mr. MFUME. Mr. Chairman—

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MFUME [continuing]. A point of privilege.

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ. Come on.

Ms. MACE. Mr. Chairman, I am going to continue.

Mr. MFUME. We have to maintain decorum in this Committee—

Ms. MACE. Any—

Mr. MFUME [continuing]. No matter how—

Ms. MACE. Have you provided—

Mr. MFUME [continuing]. Upset we get.

Ms. MACE [continuing]. Any and all memos to this Committee that we have asked you on July 15? Have you provided all memorandums within the Secret Service?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would have to get back to you on that.

Ms. MACE. That is a “no.”

You are being dishonest or lying. Like, I just—you are being dishonest here with this Committee. These are important questions that the American people want answers to. And you are just—you are just dodging and talking around it in generalities.

And we had to subpoena you to be here, and you will not even answer the questions. We have asked you repeatedly to answer our questions. This is not hard. These are not hard questions.

Have you provided us all communications from the Secret Service related to that day or that rally? Have you provided this Committee—we have asked for this information on July 15. Have you provided any of this information that this Committee has asked of the Secret Service, any of it?

Ms. CHEATLE. I will have to get back to you on that.

Ms. MACE. Have you even read this letter that we sent you? Did you even read this?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Ms. MACE. OK. And you have said you do not know, you have no idea. Well, the answer is “no.” We have not gotten a single document or piece of information or data from you or your agency related to the rally that we have asked you for.

So, is this—was this attempted assassination of Donald Trump a failure of training or execution or both?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that those are answers that we need to examine—

Ms. MACE. Training, execution, or both? Which one?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think those are answers—

Ms. MACE. All right. How many—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. We have to determine.

Ms. MACE. How many Secret Service personnel have lost their jobs due to this colossal failure?

Ms. CHEATLE. At this time, none.

Ms. MACE. How many Secret Service personnel have been required to take a refresher course on how not to let people shoot Donald Trump?

Ms. CHEATLE. Our personnel are currently operational. We are examining the facts of this investigation, and we will make the changes necessary—

Ms. MACE. What time did law enforcement become aware that there was an individual on the roof with a clear line of sight to President Trump?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am still verifying timelines.

Ms. MACE. Of course. Nine days in, you have no answers.

How many minutes went by between the time law enforcement saw and took photos of Crooks and the shooting? How many minutes?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am still verifying—

Ms. MACE. Fifty—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Timelines.

Ms. MACE [continuing]. Seven minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The gentlelady yields back.

Before I recognize Ms. Stansbury, I believe I want to recognize Mr. Mfume for a unanimous consent.

Mr. MFUME. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I beg your indulgence. I meant to do this earlier.

I would like to have unanimous consent that it be submitted for the record the “2023 Ranking of Best and Worst Workplaces in the Federal Government”, compiled by the Office of Personnel Management, which shows the United States Secret Service coming in, again, as I said earlier, 413th out of 459 sub-agencies. And this appears in the July 17 edition of *Government Executive*.

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Stansbury from New Mexico.

Ms. STANSBURY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, I want to start by just saying that part of why you have bipartisan agreement here on the dais about the severity and importance of this hearing is because this is not just a single shooting, this is about national security and the security of our democracy. It is not just one operational failure; this is about, are our public officials safe, and what does that signal to our country and to the world about American security and the ability of our officials to do their job safely?

So, I want to start by saying thank you to all of our brave men and women who are in the uniform, whether it is the Secret Service or local law enforcement, who put their lives on the line. I think, obviously, we honor their service, but this is really about operational failures and what it means for our country at large.

And I also want to reaffirm that we must condemn unequivocally political violence of any kind—violence of any kind, not just political violence, and that it cannot be tolerated in this democracy, and also to offer my prayers for the slain fire chief, Corey Comperatore, and also prayers for those who have been injured.

Now, I think, you know, the tone of this hearing is, how is it that a 20-year-old young man with a gun that was legally purchased by

his father could, on the day of a rally, go to a gun shop, legally purchase ammunition, show up to a secured site, and then not only attempt an assassination of a political figure but kill and injure two others? How could this happen? I am not asking yet. I think we have had a lot of testimony here today.

I want to talk a little bit about the timeline. Now, here is what we know.

And I know, Director, you were also on the call that we had a few days ago with the FBI and other law enforcement. So, I respect that you are not able to share, based on your testimony, some of the details that are currently being investigated, but I know you were on the call, because I heard you on the call, and you heard them too.

So, I am going to lay out the timeline a little bit.

On July 3, the rally was announced, that it was going to be in Butler.

On July 6, 3 days later, we know that the shooter searched for dates for Trump and DNC events.

On July 7—so this is 4 days after the announcement—the shooter went to the site. He actually, physically went to the site.

On July 12, the shooter went to a gun range where he and his dad regularly go and practiced shooting.

And the next day, on July 13, he went to the site again before the rally began.

We know that he then went and searched online for a gun store, where he went and he purchased 50 rounds of ammunition, went home, got his father's AR, which was legally purchased, and returned to the venue.

At 5 p.m. that evening—so this is more than an hour before Donald Trump actually took the stage that evening—local law enforcement made aware—were made aware that there was a suspicious man.

In fact, at 5:20, local law enforcement flagged that he had a rangefinder. And they radioed their concerns and sent around pictures of the individual at 5:40, 20 minutes before local law enforcement actually identified the shooter.

And, at 5:51, Secret Service notified—was notified of the suspicious person by the state police, and 1 minute later they distributed that information. That was before Donald Trump even took the stage. That was 11 minutes before he took the stage. So, the Secret Service was aware that there was a suspicious person.

At 6:03, he took the stage.

At 6:09, rally goers, as was shown in the video, identified this gentleman climbing on the roof.

At 6:11, three shots were heard, three rounds of shots and, of course, the President and the other victims were shot.

This shooter was a 20-year-old young man—no criminal record, legally purchased gun and ammunition—who for days in the lead-up to this shooting was searching mass shooters. He even had a picture of a mass shooter on his cell phone the day of the shooting. He searched for explosives; he searched high-level officials.

So, the American people want to know, how did a 20-year-old young man with access to a military-style weapon actually bring it

onto an unsecured perimeter, who for days had been planning a mass-shooting event?

And I think that, Madam Director, with all due respect, the answers that we have received here in this hearing today are completely unsatisfactory.

How could this happen? We need answers.

We need answers not just for the family members of the gentleman who was killed and those who were injured, but we need answers for our democracy. Because, as others have stated here today, we are in a highly politically charged environment right now. We are only weeks away from one of the most significant Presidential elections in American history, and it is clear that our public officials' safety has not been secured. And it is not just a matter of one shooting; it is a matter of national security.

So, I hope that you will take our comments to heart. I hope that there will be accountability. And we need answers.

Ms. CHEATLE. Absolutely.

Ms. STANSBURY. And, with that, I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. LaTurner from Kansas.

Mr. LATURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Cheatle, I have a question just right off the bat. Something that you have bragged about repeatedly is that you have increased protection for the 36 individuals that the Secret Service is also entrusted with. Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think I stated that we currently have 36 protectees and that we have—we continue to make evaluations on where those levels of protection are provided.

Mr. LATURNER. You have mentioned specific increases in protection that you have provided for some of those individuals, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. Correct.

Mr. LATURNER. Based on what?

Ms. CHEATLE. Well, some of it has been as a result of the tragic incident that occurred on the 13th. We went back and reassessed where we were at in providing protection and wanted to make sure that we were not, you know, overlooking anything, considering this most recent incident.

Mr. LATURNER. So, the Secret Service needed to learn that allowing a rooftop 150 yards away from a protectee—not putting that in a perimeter, not having someone guarding that roof—that information is new to you, and it has caused you to increase protection to other folks that are under your care?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think it is prudent after any incident that occurs to go back and take a look at your current practices and see if there is anything that needs to be done differently.

Mr. LATURNER. But it is inconsistent, because what you said earlier to Mr. Turner was that the protection that you were offering to President Trump was in line with the current threats—him being a former President, him being a nominee of a major political party, the threats from Iran—the protection that you are providing him was adequate.

Do you stand by that statement?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. LATURNER. OK.

Do you think it is a problem that the Americans' trust in the Federal Government is at an all-time low? Do you think that is a problem?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that it is unfortunate.

Mr. LATURNER. I do not know why you are quibbling with my word. Is it a problem, or is it not?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think the American public deserves to have trust in their Federal Government.

Mr. LATURNER. OK. I do not know why you are being difficult. I am just—it is a simple question.

Are you concerned about the increasing prevalence of conspiracy theories going on out there right now?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. LATURNER. I am too.

You have been incredibly inconsistent with your answers before this Committee today and what you are willing to reveal.

You have acknowledged that the shooter was identified with a rangefinder; that President Trump's detail was sufficient for the threats he faced from Iran; that certain details were erroneously reported, in your words. But you have not been willing to provide any information about the decision to place the building in question outside the perimeter; the explosives placed in the shooter's vehicle; the use of a drone by the shooter; or when exactly the Secret Service identified the shooter as a threat rather than merely suspicious.

What is your standard today for what you are willing to answer and what you are not? Because you have been inconsistent.

Ms. CHEATLE. I am certain that you can understand that some of the information that has been provided to you thus far has come from the FBI's investigation and has come from information that we have released. I want to make sure that information that is being provided to this Committee is consistent and is factual.

Mr. LATURNER. But the question about the drone that the Chairman asked at the beginning of the hearing, he said, do you know this information? And you acknowledged that, yes, you do know the information, you just do not want to tell us.

I guess my question is that, if you wanted to wait until the end of the investigation to draw conclusions—which you have acknowledged you are not; you are drawing conclusions right now and making changes. But if that was your standard, that you want to wait until the end of the investigation to draw conclusions, OK, at least you would be consistent in that.

But what we are wanting to know today and what would dispel some of the conspiracy theories out there, what would increase trust with the American people, is for you to let facts out, for you to tell us what you know.

And I want to understand from you, why is that a problem? Why is it inconsistent with a quality investigation to release to the American people today at least the information that you know for sure? Because you certainly know for sure more information than you are willing to give us today.

Ms. CHEATLE. I have released that there was a failure and that there are gaps that we need to make sure that they do not happen again. I—



Mr. LATURNER. That is not acceptable. That is not enough. That does not quell any conspiracy theories out there.

In your 27 years of experience, would you have been concerned about an elevated location within 150 yards of a protectee that did not have a Secret Service presence? Just based on your experience.

Ms. CHEATLE. What I can tell you is that every site and every venue—

Mr. LATURNER. No, no, no, no, no.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Is advanced differently—

Mr. LATURNER. I am asking for your experience. Looking at this situation, would that have been of concern to you? Or would you have agreed that it is fine, it does not need to be covered?

Ms. CHEATLE. What I have explained today—

Mr. LATURNER. You are not going to answer.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Is that there was—

Mr. LATURNER. Is it true that at 5:45 p.m., approximately 18 minutes before President Trump took the stage, the Beaver County Emergency Services Unit noticed the shooter on the roof and photographed him? Is that a fact or not?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is the information that I have from the FBI's report, yes.

Mr. LATURNER. You have not been willing to share whether or when this was communicated to the Secret Service, so I would like to get into the difference between suspicious activity and threatening activity.

Is it suspicious or threatening if an individual is seen around the perimeter with a rangefinder? Is that just suspicious?

Ms. CHEATLE. That could be termed as suspicious.

Mr. LATURNER. If that same individual with the rangefinder is found on a rooftop, is that still just suspicious, or is that considered threatening?

Ms. CHEATLE. That could be termed still as suspicious.

Mr. LATURNER. All right. My time is over.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman COMER. Thank you.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Frost from Florida.

Mr. FROST. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

I obviously want to start by stressing that political violence is always unacceptable and acknowledging that this is still an ongoing investigation. But oversight hearings like this are essential components of an investigation, and I want to thank the Chair for pulling this together.

Madam Director, I appreciate you for being here.

The events of July 13 raise serious questions about the efficacy and thoroughness of the security protocols in place.

The gravity of the fact that an unsophisticated gunman was able to secure his perch and take a shot at a former President despite multiple layers of security and intelligence are not lost on me. Before I came to Congress, I used to work advance for a major political candidate and have interacted with many different law enforcement agencies on large political events like the one that just happened.

How many times was the Secret Service alerted about a suspicious person at the July 13 campaign event prior to the first shot being shot?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have an exact number to share with you today, but from what I have been able to discern, somewhere between two and five times there was some sort of communication about a suspicious individual.

Mr. FROST. To the Secret Service specifically?

Ms. CHEATLE. Uh-huh.

Mr. FROST. According to reports, the shooter was photographed twice by security officers prior to the shooting. A police officer saw the shooter on the ground and reported him, with a photograph, as a suspicious person.

Multiple local law enforcement officers identified the shooter, radioed that he was acting suspiciously near the event's magnetometers.

A local law enforcement tactical team saw the shooter on a roof and notified other security services and also photographed him.

One police officer who was photographed—who photographed the shooter saw him scoping out the roof and carrying a rangefinder.

My question is—and you have answered this, but—why—or, you have not answered this—why was the event not paused right then?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I am not clear on the timeline of when the Secret Service shift and the counter-sniper were notified—

Mr. FROST. But, earlier, Madam Director, earlier, you said that the Secret Service would have paused the rally if they identified a threat.

Ms. CHEATLE. Correct.

Mr. FROST. So, why was it not paused?

Ms. CHEATLE. Because I have to assume that they did not know that there was a threat when they brought the President out on the stage.

Mr. FROST. I feel like this is a breakdown in communication between local law enforcement, you all, and other actors at the rally. And, again, as someone who has worked on these, I understand that there is multiple people with multiple decision—with the ability to make different decisions on the ground.

I have taken the—over the last week, I have spoken with a lot of folks in local law enforcement in my district and across the country that I have worked with before, and other people have brought up concerns around being able to communicate with law enforcement, or, with Secret Service during these big events and having their flags taken seriously.

I do believe that if Secret Service believed that there was a legitimate threat that they would have paused the rally. My concern is before that, that something was flagged and it was not taken as seriously as it should have been taken.

So, I think this shows an issue with communication. And I want to know, Madam Director, what you intend to do to fix that, not in 60 days, but now.

We are in the middle of a Presidential election. Obviously, a former President who had an attempt—assassination attempt; another rally goer who was killed due to this gun violence. We now have a presumptive nominee of the Democratic Party who is also

historic—first Black woman to be running for President. And so, I am worried about everybody's life.

What do you all intend to do to fix this communication breakdown and making sure that you actually take what local law enforcement or local folks are saying more seriously?

Ms. CHEATLE. We take what local law enforcement relays to us seriously. Let me just be clear on that.

As far as the communication—

Mr. FROST. But not this—not this time.

Ms. CHEATLE. We always trust our law enforcement partners and have a great relationship with them.

We are looking at whether or not there was a communication breakdown. If that was the case, we will take steps to ensure that we correct that, because, to your point, we cannot have a communication breakdown.

Mr. FROST. Madam Director, does the—you have mentioned that the perimeter of the event did not include the rooftop where the shooter was.

Does your responsibility and the Secret Service's responsibility to protect a principal stop at the perimeter of an event?

Ms. CHEATLE. Our responsibility is to ensure the safety and security of the event itself and the protectee who is attending that event and the personnel who are protecting that event.

Mr. FROST. So, you would say the fact that the rooftop was outside the perimeter is not an excuse for what happened, saying that it was outside the perimeter of the event?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not offering that as an excuse.

Mr. FROST. OK. Thank you.

I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The gentleman yields back.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Fallon from Texas.

Mr. FALLON. How did a 20-year-old loner with a week's notice pick the absolute best location to assassinate President Trump when the entire Secret Service missed it?

Director Cheatle, under your leadership, your agency got outsmarted and outmaneuvered by a 20-year-old. How can we have any confidence that you could stop trained professionals from a nefarious nation-state?

Ms. CHEATLE. Those are absolutely questions that we need to—

Mr. FALLON. I know they are questions—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Have answers to.

Mr. FALLON [continuing]. But, you know, the fact of the matter is, we cannot have that confidence.

Director, do you have the ability, personally—do you have the authority to beef up security of any of your protectees?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I do.

Mr. FALLON. OK.

So, were you also aware there was a credible threat President Trump was facing—he was facing a heightened security threat due to a foreign adversary?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. FALLON. OK.

So, given that there was an increased threat to President Trump's life, was he provided a full security complement akin to what a sitting U.S. President would receive?

Ms. CHEATLE. He was provided a full complement of security based on the threat assessment that we had—

Mr. FALLON. That is not my question.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. And the venue.

Mr. FALLON. My question is, if he had been the sitting President, would he have had the same security he had on July 13, or would it have been beefed up?

Ms. CHEATLE. There is a difference between the sitting President—

Mr. FALLON. So, he did not. So, your answer is he did not.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. And continuity of government—

Mr. FALLON. OK.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. And the responsibility that we have.

Mr. FALLON. So, he did not. OK. There was not a CAT team, a full CAT team onsite. There were not counter-surveillance teams onsite.

But this is the thing: you just said you have the ability to beef up the security, you knew about the threat, and you did not. And that is as telling as it is chilling.

We have satellite images from the Butler fairgrounds. Have you visited the site?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, I have not.

Mr. FALLON. Nine days and you have not visited the site. You should have been there that night.

Did you talk to that—that evening, did you talk to the team, the heroes that surrounded the President? Did you call them that night?

Ms. CHEATLE. They were still operational, working the protection—

Mr. FALLON. So, that is a—the answer is “no.”

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Of the President.

Mr. FALLON. Did you call them the next day?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I spoke with them.

Mr. FALLON. You called them the very next day, not the day of? Or was it 72 hours after?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not know the timeline, but I spoke with them—

Mr. FALLON. OK, because you are under oath.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Immediately following.

Mr. FALLON. I think it was 72 hours after. You waited 3 days.

What is immediately clear is that there were a number of structures that needed to be secured. Of these, Director, other than the first, you know, immediate four, what is the most dangerous site that should have been secured? Because, you know, security 101, you have got to mitigate the high ground.

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. FALLON. OK.

Do you know what the next-most-dangerous site—what was the closest structure to the President other than the four immediate ones that you had your counter-sniper teams on?

Ms. CHEATLE. There are a number of structures around that event site.

Mr. FALLON. You know who—the shooter knew. The shooter has visited the site two more times than you have, and he had a drone, and he picked the AGR building.

So, you said, do you remember, in an ABC interview you did, that you did not have people on the roof of the AGR building because you were worried about safety because of the slope?

Ms. CHEATLE. I recall that statement.

Mr. FALLON. OK. Does the Secret Service have a written policy you could share with us about sloped roofs?

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Mr. FALLON. OK. So, why did you act like there was one? Because is it your practice to comment on enormous—events of enormous national implications when you are ignorant of the facts?

That is rhetorical.

So, here is this thing with the slopes. You can go all the way up to, like, 18/12. You can go to a 1/12, which is about as flat as you can get without it being completely flat. And you are saying that there was a danger—a safety concern there, but the problem is, Director, you put your counter-snipers on a 3/12 roof, which is steeper than the 1/12. And, by the way, the 1/12 is ADA-compliant. You can build a ramp for a wheelchair on a 1/12 roof.

So, these are nothing but pathetic excuses, and they make no sense, and they are a bunch of cow dung.

All the law enforcement I have spoken with over the last 9 days are amazed that the AGR rooftop was not secure. And do you want to know why? Because it is dangerous.

I have never had any long-gun training in my life. I own an AR-15, and last time I shot it—I shot it one time in my whole life—it was 6 years ago. That is until Saturday, where we recreated the events in Savoy, Texas; we recreated what happened in Butler.

I was lying prone on a sloped roof at 130 yards at 6:30 at night. And I knew that he had a scope; I did not know what kind, red dot or magnified, so I shot 8 rounds from both.

You know what the result was? Fifteen out of 16 kill shots. And the one I missed would have hit the President's ear. That is a 94-percent success rate. And that shooter was a better shot than me. It is a miracle President Trump was not killed.

Corey Comperatore's life is over because that damn shooter made it on the roof. And it was not the roof that was dangerous; it was the nutjob on top of the roof.

You know what else is dangerous? I believe your horrifying ineptitude and your lack of skilled leadership is a disgrace. Your obfuscating today is shameful. And you should be fired immediately and go back to guarding Doritos.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The Chair recognizes Ms. Lee from Pennsylvania.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the Chair and the Ranking Member for coming together and holding this hearing. But I have to say, I do not think any of our concerns have been addressed today, and what little we have learned has not inspired much confidence.

I will just say that we obviously cannot allow the violence we are seeing in this country to become the norm or commonplace, but that seems to be where we are heading.

On this occasion, it was, you know, very shockingly, a former President and current political candidate at a rally that we all assume is one of the most secured places we can be. But the violence we saw last Saturday is the same culture of violence that makes too many of our kids and our community members feel unsafe to play outside or to go to class or to simply live their lives each day.

But, again, this was a political rally, and it is supposed to be one of the most secured places. So, we do have very specific questions about that.

Director Cheatle, I would like to start by following up on some of my colleagues' questions. My colleagues Mr. Krishnamoorthi and Mr. Frost highlighted a number of points that showed the shooter presenting an active threat.

So, I would like to ask you, Director Cheatle, to clarify the protocol—what the protocol is for postponing or canceling an event based on a threat and how the events on July 13 did not meet those standards.

Ms. CHEATLE. So, again, I think we are talking about the distinction between suspicious behavior and a threat. And at the time that this individual was identified, they were displaying suspicious behavior.

I am still waiting for interviews from the FBI to determine what it was that identified that individual as suspicious and what those behaviors were.

Ms. LEE. To that question, is suspicious behavior—does suspicious behavior vary between different events? For instance, if we have an event with a President, would there not be a heightened standard for suspicious behavior?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that there are a number of ways that someone could be identified as suspicious, and it does not matter whether it is at a rally or an indoor event or who the protectee is. I think it is up to law enforcement or citizens to identify someone as suspicious.

Ms. LEE. OK. Thank you.

According to the Associated Press, at least six different agencies, including two sheriff's offices, local police, state police, as well as fire and emergency rescue officials, were involved in securing the rally in Butler.

When there are so many teams that are collaborating, who takes the lead, and how is that determined?

Ms. CHEATLE. The Secret Service is responsible for the security of the site and the—

Ms. LEE. And—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Coordination.

Ms. LEE. And that was the case on July 13?

Ms. CHEATLE. Correct.

Ms. LEE. OK.

Changing gears, in 2024's appropriations budget, the Secret Service was given a little over \$3 billion, which was about \$78 million above what was requested. For 2025's budget, you have requested yet another increase.

How much of these funds goes toward training and improving protection procedures?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would have to get back to you on the training aspect of it, but about 30 percent of our budget is for protection and facilities and training.

Ms. LEE. But, clearly, the problem cannot be a lack of funding. So, what exactly do you see as the core problem that led to this failure, that led to your agency being outgunned by a 20-year-old using his father's gun and acting on his own without a particularly sophisticated plan or technology?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that we are waiting to determine exactly what those failures or failure was so that we can make sure that the Secret Service is stronger after this.

Ms. LEE. So, we have heard a lot today that you cannot answer because it is an ongoing investigation, that you are still figuring out the details, and that you will not answer basic questions.

You have said 60 days for the investigation, but I simply do not think that is acceptable. Do you really plan to keep avoiding questions and the American people's questions—ours and the American people's questions for the next 60 days?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not avoiding questions. I want to make sure that I am providing factual and accurate information.

Ms. LEE. Certainly. But is there no in between, right, between what is obviously a fact and what you can surmise from the details that you already have?

Ms. CHEATLE. I assure you, when I have a full and complete report of what took place on that day, I will certainly come back and make that available.

Ms. LEE. Certainly.

Studies indicate that the United States is experiencing increasing levels of political violence and tension.

Does the Secret Service see increasing political violence as a threat to its work? And, if so, how is the Secret Service adapting its strategies and protocols to account for increasing political violence?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are constantly evaluating the threats that we receive and monitoring that, and we make adjustments on a daily basis to our protectees based on what those threats are and what actions we need to take.

Ms. LEE. Yes or no, do you believe that stricter controls on the availability of assault weapons would make it easier for the Secret Service to fulfill its mission of protecting public officials?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think the Secret Service is tasked with providing a safe environment, which is why we put into place a number of mitigation factors.

Ms. LEE. Certainly. But do assault weapons make it easier or harder for you to do your job?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that any weapon makes it difficult for us to do our job.

Ms. LEE. OK.

I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Donalds from Florida.

Mr. DONALDS. Thank you, Chairman.

Director, real quick, at what time was Secret Service aware of the active threat against President Trump?

Director, what time?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, the Secret Service was aware that there was an individual who had been identified as suspicious and that that individual was attempting to be tracked down—

Mr. DONALDS. At what time?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have a specific timeline other than to tell you—

Mr. DONALDS. Director, it has been 9 days.

Ms. CHEATLE. I understand.

Mr. DONALDS. At what time?

Ms. CHEATLE. I want to make sure that I give you factual information, sir.

Mr. DONALDS. Director, have you talked to the agents on the ground that day?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I have.

Mr. DONALDS. You have talked to all of them?

Ms. CHEATLE. Uh-huh.

Mr. DONALDS. Your senior team has talked to every agent that was on the ground that day?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, we have.

Mr. DONALDS. Have they all corroborated the same time they identified the shooter or they were made aware of the shooter either by attendees in the crowd or local police department?

Ms. CHEATLE. There are a number of reports of when those times were made, those notifications.

Mr. DONALDS. Was it 5 minutes before the first shot rang out?

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Mr. DONALDS. Generally speaking, was it 10 minutes before the first shot rang out?

Ms. CHEATLE. No. It was less—

Mr. DONALDS. Was it 15 minutes before the first shot rang out?

Ms. CHEATLE. It was less than that timeframe when it was identified as a threat.

Mr. DONALDS. How many days before the shooting took place did Secret Service actually do their advance work to secure the facility that the rally was going to be held at?

Ms. CHEATLE. Five days.

Mr. DONALDS. In the 5 days prior, when the security advance team did their work, did they identify the rooftop as a potential threat?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I am pulling those reports and that information to—

Mr. DONALDS. It has been 9 days, Madam Director.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Conduct those interviews.

Mr. DONALDS. Did they notice a rooftop 150 yards away that was a potential threat, yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am certain that the rooftop was noticed. I am pulling the reports—

Mr. DONALDS. What was the security parameters around securing that rooftop?

Ms. CHEATLE. There was—

Mr. DONALDS. What did they do?



Ms. CHEATLE. There was overwatch provided for that rooftop.

Mr. DONALDS. Did overwatch fail?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am waiting to hear what the results of the investigation were so that I can identify where the failure was.

Mr. DONALDS. Who did you talk to that was on the ground that day that was responsible for overwatch? What are their names?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not going to provide their names in this setting.

Mr. DONALDS. Did you talk to the people that were providing overwatch that day?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have talked to the people that conducted the advance on that day and that were working the shift and were the counter-snipers on that day.

Ms. CHEATLE. So, you talked to the counter-sniper team, you talked to the people who were providing overwatch that day, and you talked to the advance team, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DONALDS. What did they tell you?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are putting together a comprehensive report so that I can identify exactly where the gaps and the failures—

Mr. DONALDS. When the counter-sniper team was on the roof and they identified that there was suspicious activity on the roof in question, what was the chain of command's orders around the person on said roof?

Because I am quite sure somebody saw—under your organization, the Secret Service, I am quite sure somebody saw the shooter on the roof. So, what was the communication through the chain of command to deal with said person?

Ms. CHEATLE. What I can tell you is that when the individual was identified by the counter-sniper, they took one shot and neutralized that individual.

Mr. DONALDS. But that was after the shooter already took a shot. Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is correct.

Mr. DONALDS. So, what you are saying now is that the Secret Service did not see the shooter on the roof until after the shooter took a shot?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have all of those details at this time.

Mr. DONALDS. If you do not have those details after 9 days, Director, then what you are telling me is that you guys did not see it. Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am telling you I do not have all the details of the sequence at this time.

Mr. DONALDS. Director, it has been 9 days. Either you have the information, or you do not. Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are still in the process of conducting interviews and an investigation.

Mr. DONALDS. Some of my colleagues have texted me over the last couple days, bipartisan, about whether you should lose your job, and I have been quiet on that question because I wanted to see what you were going to do today.

In my opinion, you do need to be fired, immediately. And it is because this is gross incompetence.

And the fact that it has been 9 days, and these are simple questions to answer. I am quite sure if I asked any one of my kids, if they got in trouble and I told them to give me the details, I would get more answers from them than I am getting from you right now. And that is what is frustrating, on a bipartisan basis—on a non-partisan basis.

This is a joke. And, Director, you are in charge. And that is why you need to go.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Goldman from New York.

Mr. GOLDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director, I want to followup and just understand a little bit why there is so much information about this out in the public, including some from you and your communications team, and yet you are here, pursuant to a subpoena, under oath in front of Congress and you are unable or unwilling to answer some of those same questions.

Can you just explain why you are answering so many fewer questions here than you have to the media?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am answering the questions that I am able to answer based on the fact that there are multiple ongoing investigations.

Mr. GOLDMAN. But you have answered some of these questions previously, correct, to the public, to the media?

Ms. CHEATLE. Which questions?

Mr. GOLDMAN. Well, for—did you have an interview with ABC News?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I did.

Mr. GOLDMAN. OK. And did you explain the interaction between local law enforcement and the Secret Service and that local law enforcement was responsible for securing the perimeter of the building where the shooter was?

Ms. CHEATLE. I said that the Secret Service is responsible for designing and implementing and executing the security plan and that we rely on the assistance of our local law enforcement partners to assist us with that plan.

Mr. GOLDMAN. Let me ask you something. Were you given any instructions about what you can and cannot answer here today?

Ms. CHEATLE. My ability to answer questions is solely reflective of the fact that there are multiple ongoing investigations, and I want to make sure that I provide accurate information that does not conflict with any of those investigations that are going on.

Mr. GOLDMAN. So, is it your view that you cannot talk about anything that happened that day until those investigations are completed?

Ms. CHEATLE. My view is that I want to make sure that this Committee and the American public gets correct and actual information.

Mr. GOLDMAN. And so, is it your view that that has to—that can only happen after the completion of the investigation?

Ms. CHEATLE. It is my view that when the investigations are complete that we will be able to share that information.

Mr. GOLDMAN. And how about before that?

Ms. CHEATLE. If I have factual information that I can share before that, I absolutely will.

Mr. GOLDMAN. I am guessing you have factual information as to when the suspicious photograph—the photograph of the suspicious person was relayed to the Secret Service. There is a timestamp on that text message or whatever it was, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. Sir, I am sure you can understand that, when you are dealing with text messages, emails, and other communications, the timelines do not always match up.

Mr. GOLDMAN. Not really, if they are timestamped.

But let me move on. Because you have acknowledged that this was a major security failure. Is that right?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. GOLDMAN. Do you acknowledge that it was a major security failure not to secure the rooftop of the building that the shooter shot from?

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe at this time that the rooftop was provided overwatch. I acknowledge that we are unaware at this time how the individual was able to access the roof.

Mr. GOLDMAN. Overwatch meaning from other counter-sniper or other higher points?

Ms. CHEATLE. Correct.

Mr. GOLDMAN. And so, was it a failure, then, that when that shooter was on the rooftop, that overwatch did not identify him before he fired his shots?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have the timeline of how the individual accessed the roof, where they accessed the roof, or how long they were on the roof.

Mr. GOLDMAN. Let me ask a couple things quickly.

You have testified here about all the resources that the Secret Service needed to deploy to protect the NATO summit and all of the leaders here. Is that right?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. GOLDMAN. Does—did you have to rely more on local law enforcement because of the NATO summit for this event?

Ms. CHEATLE. The Secret Service routinely works with local law enforcement at every event. It does not matter whether it is a NATO summit, NSSE, the DN—I am sorry—the RNC in Milwaukee—

Mr. GOLDMAN. No, but that is not my question.

Obviously, there is a natural give-and-take as to, I am sure, how many agents you deploy and how much you rely on local law enforcement.

Did you have to rely more on local law enforcement because there were fewer Secret Service assets available because of the NATO summit?

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Mr. GOLDMAN. OK.

I hope we get answers before the completion. I do not like the fact that the media has received far more answers than Congress has. If this is a function of getting your ducks in a row, I assume you have access to a lot of these reports and a lot of this information and you should have come prepared here today.

And I would just want to flag, Mr. Chairman, before I yield back, that—I want to just point out one thing that my colleague from Texas was talking about, when he said he recreated the shooting twice with an AR-15 and he had a 94-percent success rate, 15 out of 16 shots.

I do not know why that does not convince him that we should get rid of AR-15s. But, clearly, we need to do something about the prevalence of AR-15s and weapons of war on our streets.

And I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Perry from Pennsylvania.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Chairman.

Director, I guess 60 days is the time of the investigation. Is that the information that you have put out, or where did that come from, 60 days? Or is that just information that the Committee members are talking about?

Ms. CHEATLE. I stated that earlier today. I have asked my team—

Mr. PERRY. OK, 60 days.

So, are you receiving regular updates—you are in charge of the Secret Service. This is about your organization, what happened 9 days ago. Are you receiving regular updates from the FBI on their investigation?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I am.

Mr. PERRY. So, you know some things are true, some things are probably not true. We want to talk to you about the things that we are hearing about and find out if they are true.

Have you—you have been in contact with the FBI then. You are getting updates on a daily basis, right—

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. Based on what you said? OK.

So—and are you confident that the person in question, Mr. Crooks, was the only person firing that day against the President or the crowd? Is he the only one? I am not asking you yet if he acted alone, but is he the only one? Can you say that with certainty to the American people?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is the information I have at this time, yes.

Mr. PERRY. OK. Did he—does it appear he acted alone?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is the information we have at this time.

Mr. PERRY. OK.

Now, let us talk about the fact that he was noticed as a person of interest, of concern, suspicion, as you say.

Your PI team, how do they stay—there is a sea of people. How does the PI team get to that individual that is in question in the sea of people? How is that individual tracked?

Ms. CHEATLE. Our protective intelligence teams that work at our sites are paired up with a local police counterpart, and so they work in conjunction together—

Mr. PERRY. So, do they just follow them around? Or—

Let me ask you this. Looking at the site, you have multiple perimeters, right? You have the secure—the inside perimeter. You have multiple secure—or multiple perimeters. Was the AGR, so-called, building the highest location affecting the site of the rally? Was it the highest location?

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe the highest location at the site was where our counter-snipers were—

Mr. PERRY. What about the water—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Positioned.

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. Tower adjacent? What about the—how high is the water tower?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have the height on the water tower.

Mr. PERRY. OK. Seems like water towers are pretty high. At least in the photo, it looks like it.

But there might actually be a building right behind the AGR building that is even higher than the building that Crooks fired from.

You are familiar with cover, concealment, and defilade, right? You are familiar with those terms?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. PERRY. So, how would your sniper team or your PI team track the individual and give vectors to Secret Service on the PI team to get to that individual to question him?

And how would you cover the defilade, the cover and concealment of low areas that you cannot see from where your sniper team immediately adjacent to the President were—was sited? How would you do that if you are not up on the high ground?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, when our counter-sniper teams go out and conduct an advance, they have a methodology and provide a grid system that our response teams are able to vector in if they see something that is troubling.

Mr. PERRY. So, when Mr. Jordan asked about the assets that were requested—let me just ask you about assets requested.

Were aerial assets requested for this event from either the Secret Service or state police or anybody else—a drone, manned, otherwise? Aerial assets, were they requested?

Ms. CHEATLE. I cannot speak to what the local police—

Mr. PERRY. I am just asking if they were requested.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. May have—conversations with the local police. But I can tell you that the assets that were requested from the Secret Service for the site that day were all granted.

Mr. PERRY. But were aerial assets—I am just—I did not ask if you used them or what you used. Were they requested?

Ms. CHEATLE. Overwatch was requested, and—

Mr. PERRY. Aerial.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. That was provided.

Mr. PERRY. Is that aerial? Because overwatch could mean on the water tower or not on the water tower. Can you be specific, ma'am? I am running out of daylight here.

Ms. CHEATLE. I understand. If you are asking me about specifics, whether or not there was—

Mr. PERRY. Is it not clear what I am asking you? Were aerial assets requested, by the President, by Secret Service, by anybody? Were they requested?

Ms. CHEATLE. The Secret Service, we felt that we had a good plan in place—

Mr. PERRY. OK. OK. Fair enough.

How about K-9 assets with bomb-sniffing or explosive-sniffing capabilities? Requested? I did not say they were present; were they requested?

Ms. CHEATLE. Those requests were fulfilled.

Mr. PERRY. They were requested and fulfilled.

Ms. CHEATLE. Uh-huh.

Mr. PERRY. So, was the Crooks vehicle inside any of your perimeters?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, it was not.

Mr. PERRY. It was not. How did you—so—OK. So, it was not within the—so what—was there a device located on Mr. Crooks' body to detonate the vehicle?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is the information that I have.

Mr. PERRY. So, what would be the point of detonating the vehicle if it was not inside the perimeter?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have no idea what Mr. Crooks' motivation was.

Mr. PERRY. Ma'am, the fact that you—and I will close with this, Mr. Chairman—have not even visited the site—I understand there are other things going on, but the culture of your organization, the culture, that does not—do you know how tall the President is? How tall is the President? President Trump, how tall is he?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not—he is over 6 feet tall. I do not have the exact—

Mr. PERRY. OK. So, do you assign agents based on their ability to cover physically and carry—and carry, if necessary, the President of the United States? When you assign them to this mission, is that a parameter that is considered?

Ms. CHEATLE. I assign agents to work our protectees that are capable and have been trained by Secret Service—

Mr. PERRY. I understand they are trained, but if you are not tall enough—this has nothing to do with—we are not mad at you, but if somebody is 7 feet tall and you are 5 feet tall, there is going to be a delta there that is problematic in protecting the protectee.

And I am asking, is that a consideration when you—when these agents—not saying you—but when they are assigned to the protectee?

Ms. CHEATLE. The agents that are assigned to our protectees are perfectly capable—

Mr. PERRY. OK, ma'am.

So, the culture—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Of providing protection.

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. Is what I am concerned about, because the primary objective here seems to be something other than securing the site, securing the principal, and securing the people at the site. And that is the concern, based on the answers that you have given today so far.

With that, I yield, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Moskowitz from Florida.

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this hearing. I want to thank your—the subpoena that you sent.

I want to thank Ranking Member Raskin and your work, the letter you sent to the Committee. And I also support the creation of a commission to get to the bottom of what happened.

Director, I just want to give you an honest assessment of how this is going for you today.

Did you happen to catch the hearing many months ago in Education where there were a bunch of university professors—of university presidents and Elise Stefanik asked a very easy question and could not get an answer? Did you see that hearing?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, I do not think I did.

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. OK. Well, let me tell you, it did not go well. And the short end of that story was, those university professors all resigned. They are gone.

That is how this is going for you. This is where this is headed. OK?

This is—I do not know who prepared you for this. I do not know how many times you have testified in front of Congress. But a President was almost assassinated live on television not just for Americans but for the world to see. And this being your first opportunity—I understand there is an ongoing investigation, I understand there is things that you cannot talk about. But the idea that we are getting less than you did on television is something that Democrats, independents, and Republicans are going to find unacceptable.

My high school, Marjory Stoneman Douglas, was on the list of mass shootings that Representative Raskin held up. That very day, the school resource officer, a police officer, did not run into the building. He hid in the stairwell while the shooter was in the building. He stayed outside, never helped. OK?

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. He also directed other officers who showed up on the scene not to go into the building.

When it was determined that the failures in response and training and that the sheriff fired nobody in his agency, Governor DeSantis then removed that sheriff. I supported the removal.

So, here is my question. You said there is going to be accountability. I understand you do not want to give us names. When you say that, are you telling the Committee that once it is concluded you are prepared to fire the people on the ground who made poor decisions that day?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am prepared to take the actions necessary.

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. No, that is nonsense, OK?

Accountability. The failure was human. That does not mean they are bad people. It means they failed that day and a President was almost—a former President was almost assassinated, OK?

Are you prepared to fire the human failure on the ground, yes or no? When you have the names of where those failures were—they are people. It is not like a piece of technology failed. It was people who failed that day. Are you prepared to fire them?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have an answer as to whether people—

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. Well, then how can there be accountability if you are not prepared to fire someone?

And the reason why your name is going to be the person who is held accountable, the reason why Members on this Committee are calling for resignation—and I join in that—or for the President to fire you, is because you are saying there is going to be accountability, but you cannot commit that people are going to get fired.

Let me ask this question a different way.

If Trump had been assassinated that day, if the gunman had succeeded, OK, would you have come and tendered your resignation?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would still be sitting here, because I would want to ensure the integrity of the investigation moving forward.

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. Totally understand. That is a fair answer, that you would have set up that process. But would you have had the honor to come in front of the Committee and say, "A President was assassinated"—"A former President was assassinated on my watch, there should be new leadership"?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that I have admitted that there were grave failures—

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. No, that is not what I am asking. Would you have tendered your resignation if he had been killed?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. That occurred on my watch, and I am accountable for that.

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. OK. But would you have tendered your resignation if he had been killed?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that I have admitted that I have taken accountability and will take responsibility.

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. OK. Well, let me ask a—I want to followup on Representative Connolly's question in which he asked about guns, and you were not willing to commit that that makes your job harder.

This is not about the Second Amendment. There are over 400 million guns on the streets. If all of those guns were machine guns, would that make your job harder to protect people?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I think weapons that are out there—

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. If all of those guns were rocket-propelled grenades, would that make your job harder?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. Yes. OK. Thank you. Perfect. This is not a trick question. Thank you. OK. I will not ask the other 15 things I was going to do. I was going to do drone strikes, but it is OK.

So, that is all we were asking. It creates a challenging environment. It has nothing to do with the Second Amendment or people's rights. But it does make your job harder. So, credit to Representative Connolly for asking that question.

One last thing, Mr. Chairman, and I will conclude.

You know, there was a question asked, is an Iranian assassin more capable than a 20-year-old? And I have been tough on Iran. I probably have more resolutions on Iran than almost anyone in Congress.

But I can tell you it is not Iranians walking into schools and grocery stores and movie theaters and churches. It is 20-year-olds, right? And some of them are mentally unstable, and they have access to guns. And they are domestic terrorists. Someone talked about Christopher Wray. Christopher Wray has talked about domestic terrorism.

And so, yes, we collectively come together on foreign threats. And I am not at all debasing the fact that there are foreign threats here and abroad.

But there are domestic threats. And we have to get to the bottom of how we stop domestic terrorism, because it was a 20-year-old



who walked into my high school and killed 17 people. He was plenty capable and he was not Iranian.

Thank you.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Timmons from South Carolina.

Mr. TIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Cheatle, we have asked you a lot of questions and have not really got a lot of straight answers. I have intentionally created a line of questioning that I think that you can answer.

So, the first question is, do you agree that the allocation of Secret Service resources should correspond with the risk profile of any given event? A higher degree of risk at one event should get more resources. Is that fair?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is fair.

Mr. TIMMONS. OK. And when two events occur at the same time in the same geographic vicinity, that the risk profile of each event should be taken into account and whichever event is greater risk should receive greater resources?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is correct.

Mr. TIMMONS. OK.

So, I am going to go over the Trump event. So, this was publicly announced July 3, Butler, Pennsylvania. The venue is an outdoor fairground, open air, no existing security. The crowd size was expected to be tens of thousands. It ended up being over 20,000.

There were general and specific threats from foreign adversaries. As the Chairman of Intelligence remarked, Iran has said they want revenge, as well as when President Trump was in office he made a lot of people mad, terrorists to be included, all over the world.

And, you know, President Trump is the former President and the future President.

So, I would say that that is a fairly high-risk event. Would you agree?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. TIMMONS. OK.

Let us conversely, the First Lady had an event at a casino in Pittsburgh just a few dozen miles away. It was a dinner for the Italian Sons and Daughters of America. It was publicly announced on July 10.

What is interesting is that the casino is actually extremely secure. They already have magnetometers existing prior to this event even being announced. It was in a ballroom and the size of the crowd a mere 400. There were no specific threats. There may have been general threats. And the asset is the First Lady.

Those seem like there is a huge disparity relative to risk. Would you agree?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. TIMMONS. OK. Thank you.

Multiple whistleblowers and various media outlets have reported that the Pittsburgh field office of the Secret Service allocated 12 additional post-standers to the First Lady's event and 3 additional post-standers to the Trump rally. Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. There were no assets that were diverted from the First Lady's visit.

Mr. TIMMONS. No, no, no. This is a very simple question. I am not asking if anyone was diverted.

Did the First Lady's event, that was relatively secure, especially compared to Trump's rally, get 12 assets and the First—did the First Lady's event get 12 assets and Trump's get 3 from the Pittsburgh field office? That is a yes or no.

Ms. CHEATLE. The number—

Mr. TIMMONS. If you do not know, do not answer it. I mean, if you do not know, do not answer.

Ms. CHEATLE. The number of personnel that were allocated to both of those events were comparable to the risk at both of those events.

Mr. TIMMONS. Wow. Really? So, you think that the Pittsburgh casino 400-person ballroom with ingress/egress through probably a very well-guarded parking garage was four times more dangerous than a 20,000-person rally in an open field with the former President and future President? You think that that is four times more dangerous the casino event?

Ms. CHEATLE. I did not say that at all.

Mr. TIMMONS. Well, they got four times the resources from the Pittsburgh field office, who was likely in charge of the final walk-through for both events.

I mean, we have continually highlighted the failures of the Secret Service at the Trump rally. And, you know, you have the former and future President getting shot. You have multiple injuries, one fatality.

And I would have to think that if we had nine more post-standers, nine more individuals that have the training and the integration into the Secret Service defense of Trump at that rally, that I have a feeling that Crooks would have had somebody come say hello to him before he fired a bunch of shots. Do you think that is possibly true?

Ms. CHEATLE. There were significantly more assets and resources available at the former President's event than there were at the First Lady's event.

Mr. TIMMONS. Who made the decision to deploy 12 post-standers to the casino where the First Lady was having a 400-person dinner and only 3 people from the Pittsburgh field office to the 20,000-person-plus Trump rally? Who made that decision?

Ms. CHEATLE. There were additional Secret Service resources available at the former President Trump's event that day.

Mr. TIMMONS. Who made the decision to deploy 12 to the First Lady's event and 3 to the Trump event?

Ms. CHEATLE. The allocation of resources is decided based on the availability of personnel and their location and where they are, but there were sufficient resources—

Mr. TIMMONS. What did you just say?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. That were given to the former President's event that day.

Mr. TIMMONS. Did you just say there were sufficient resources? President Trump got shot. Someone got killed. There were not sufficient resources, clearly.

Ms. CHEATLE. There was a gap.

Mr. TIMMONS. It does not take 27 years of experience to know that. And whoever made that decision—it probably was not you—needs to be fired, and then you need to resign, because this is absolutely unacceptable. You have lost the trust of the American people.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The gentleman yields back.

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Tlaib from Michigan.

Ms. TLAIB. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Director, for being here.

You know, when we hear the headline of 20-year-old young man with access to an assault weapon commits a mass, you know, act of mass violence, I mean, we have heard this before over and over again.

But the unfortunate thing is that my residents do not get a Committee hearing. We have not had one Committee hearing about the over 260 mass shootings that we have had, killing hundreds of people, injuring hundreds, changing their lives forever.

And do not get me wrong, too many of my colleagues, I mean, I watched. And even the pool of blood, the screams, it was horrific. But it made me think about the images I saw after mass shootings at schools, grocery stores.

I mean, I think of Buffalo, New York, at a supermarket where a racist gunman killed ten shoppers with an AR. In El Paso, AK-47 style assault rifle killed 22. In Florida, in Parkland, Florida, 17 students and teachers murdered, again, with an AR. In Pittsburgh, at a place of faith, Tree of Life Synagogue, 11 murdered. And do not get me about Newtown, Connecticut, which still breaks my heart, 26 murdered, including 20 elementary school children.

This year in Michigan we have had, Mr. Chair, two mass shootings, 21 shot in Detroit, one of the most horrific shootings we have seen, two killed at a splash pad in Rochester Hills, Michigan, eight shot there, again, an assault weapon used.

But the difference here is the former President gets a hearing in his attempted assassination, but our residents do not get a hearing about mass shootings, about gun violence in our country.

You know, Mr. Chair, I ask this wholeheartedly. You know, they do not have Secret Service to protect them. They do not. I do not have these mass agencies protecting our kids in the schools or the supermarket, movie theaters. They are going to a block party in Detroit. I do not have that. We do not have that.

But I cannot believe we are just going to focus on that and not the fact that we are hearing yet again in the headlines a 20-year-old young man having access to an assault weapon, a weapon of war many of my veterans say they have to be trained to use. But he can get it, was not safely stored by the parent, grabbing that gun, and innocent lives are lost.

Director, I know you got asked about this and I think it is important, though, you know, for us to hear this. But how difficult is your job when there is such easy access to assault weapons in the streets?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think the job of a Secret Service agent, an officer, is incredibly difficult. I think the environment we deal with every

day and the dynamics of the threat environment is incredibly difficult.

These are brave men and women who put their lives on the line. And a day like we had on July 13 is a day that no one in my agency ever wants to have as their responsibility. It is an incredibly difficult job.

Ms. TLAIB. Yes, I immediately thought of the children in the audience. I mean, when you think about going to a rally with your family. Again, their lives are forever changed.

The incident was not—are never isolated. I really believe these incidents are never isolated. And I know Detroit Free Press had reported that the 20-year-old Pennsylvania shooter looked up the 2021 Oxford High School shooting in Michigan.

Can you comment on what information the shooter was looking up regarding the tragedy of Oxford High School where it took four of our high school youth there?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am sorry, I am not able to. The FBI has those details.

Ms. TLAIB. So, you cannot even tell us, I mean, was he looking at the type of weapon, how many—

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes. Unfortunately, I do not have those details.

Ms. TLAIB. Do you have—I mean, did they share that with you, though?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have the full content of what his searches were. I think that they are still in the process of examining all of his devices.

Ms. TLAIB. OK. Again—you know, again, the impact—I want to be really serious about this—the impact on our families is more than just this political rally, Mr. Chair.

We have to talk about this. Even if we are in disagreement, let us talk about it. Because I have seen statistics that show that we could be saving lives now if we ban these weapons of war from our—from being able to buy it at the local store down the street. I mean, we just cannot continue to allow this to happen.

And, unfortunately, my colleague—my residents are not former Presidents of the United States. They do not get a hearing, they do not get Secret Service protection, any of that. And even among those that are expressing that failed in the system, they just deserve better, they truly do.

Thank you, and I yield.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Burchett from Tennessee.

Mr. BURCHETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Cheatle, the shooter was set up on the roof of the AGR International building, as we know. Was the roof identified as a potential vulnerability days before the rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. To my knowledge, yes, it was.

Mr. BURCHETT. Were agents or officers inside the building? If so, what floor were they on?

Ms. CHEATLE. We had local police officers inside the building.

Mr. BURCHETT. The roof looks like it is a tin roof. How did no one inside that building hear someone moving on the top of a metal roof?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have the details of all of the interviews that have been conducted yet.

Mr. BURCHETT. When will you have those?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have been asking, and I want to have that information as soon as you do as well.

Mr. BURCHETT. OK.

Why did Secret Service fail to block the line of sight from that roof?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that the Secret Service put together a plan where they were counting that roof in as part of their overwatch, and that was the plan that they had put in place that day.

Mr. BURCHETT. If you were not going to put a security personnel on the roof, why not at least use drone technology or aerial surveillance to monitor the rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. There are a number of times that we do use drone technology. I am not speaking specifically to this event and what was utilized or not. There are times when drone technology is available and helpful at events, and there are times when it is not appropriate.

Mr. BURCHETT. OK. Do you all use Signal—do you use—personally use Signal to communicate with any official from the White House? Signal on your phone?

Ms. CHEATLE. Oh. On occasion I am sure that there are people that use Signal, yes.

Mr. BURCHETT. OK. Do you use it to speak with the White House, use Signal?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, I do not.

Mr. BURCHETT. OK.

When was Thomas Crooks first identified as a person of interest?

Let me help you. At 5:10. He was spotted with a range finder at 5:51. And when did Secret Service notice him?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I do not have those specific timelines, but it was a relatively short period of time.

Mr. BURCHETT. Let me help you. 5:52.

Ms. Cheatle, why was President Trump allowed on stage 10 minutes after the Secret Service spotted a suspicious individual?

That seems to me to be the worst thing of all. Of all the breakdown in all this communication, all the BS you have been feeding us here today or not feeding us, that seems to be the question.

Ms. CHEATLE. So, as I have stated before, there are a number of events where suspicious people may be identified. That does not necessarily—

Mr. BURCHETT. Ma'am, I submit to you, you got a guy who is going to be the next President of the United States. He is on the stage. I have been to these events. We have all been to these events. A car backfires and there is a 15-minute dadgum wait. That is not acceptable.

Did the Secret Service tell President Trump they had spotted a suspicious individual before he was shot?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am unclear as to what the communication was with the former President at that time.

Mr. BURCHETT. OK. I will take that as a no.

Did you all deny President Trump's request for more security, yes or no? And when was the most recent request for additional security?

Ms. CHEATLE. The rally request for security, all of those requests were fulfilled.

Mr. BURCHETT. And were there any personnel redirected to Jill Biden's rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Mr. BURCHETT. Who made the decision on the direction of agents at either one of those rallies?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am unclear as to your question on the direction of the agents.

Mr. BURCHETT. I said, who directed those agents to be at Ms. Biden's rally or President Trump's rally, those specific agents?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, there is a methodology in which agents are available for assignments, and they are assigned based on either geographic location or logistics or flight—

Mr. BURCHETT. Ma'am, I appreciate all that, but that methodology about got President Trump killed.

Was the security detail guarding President Trump a temporary detail?

Ms. CHEATLE. The personnel who are assigned to the former President's detail are assigned to him.

Mr. BURCHETT. Why was there a different detail on the opening night of the convention than the detail that was guarding him in Pennsylvania?

Ms. CHEATLE. The President has a very large permanent protective detail assigned to him. They work shift work. And so it could be that the people you saw at the rally were not working the same shift the day that he was—

Mr. BURCHETT. I can assure you, ma'am, somebody that is a lot shorter than the President was not at the convention, and the people that were cowering down behind the mass of agents that were on top of the President were not in the convention hall, at least I did not see them.

You cannot answer—seem to answer—a single question about an ongoing investigation, ma'am, and you do not know when the information will be released publicly.

Are you waiting for the Administration to sign off?

Ms. CHEATLE. No. I am waiting for the results of the investigation, at which time I will—

Mr. BURCHETT. OK. Let me ask you one more question.

You found explosives in the shooter's possession. Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. The FBI found explosives.

Mr. BURCHETT. Do we know how—who directed this young man how to make those explosives?

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe that the FBI is still looking into that on their investigation.

Mr. BURCHETT. Ms. Cheatle, you said that "The buck stops with me," and I agree. I do not think you should resign. I think you should have been fired. Ma'am, you are a DEI horror story.

I have told my daughter multiple times, my wife and my daughter, we talk with her all the time about how she is going to succeed in life. She will succeed in life by achieving.

Ma'am, you have not achieved today. You have let the American public down. If it was up to me, you would be gone.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Crockett from Texas.

Ms. CROCKETT. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

And let me just pick up where my colleague from Tennessee left off.

Director Cheatle, was the incident on July 13 due to DEI or rather systemic failures in communication and potentially safety protocols?

Ms. CHEATLE. The incident on the 13th has nothing to do with DEI. The incident on the 13th has to do with a failure or a gap either in planning or communication.

Ms. CROCKETT. Thank you so much.

In fact, I have a few articles that I will enter into the record once I wrap up that actually acknowledge a number of women specifically for their valor and their service, whether it has been in various levels of law enforcement.

But, you know, I want to stay here for just a second, because earlier you had a conversation in which there was a discussion about training.

And I want to talk about training and I want to talk about the fact that there has been a little bit of dancing around as it relates to this being a suspicious person and this being a situation that was perceived to be a threat, and it seems as if there is a different analysis that takes place.

One of my questions has to do with if you have any bias training that your officers undergo. And the reason I ask that, because, as a civil rights lawyer, I have learned so many times in having to deal with law enforcement that there usually is not a perception of a threat when it is a young White male, even if they are carrying a long gun. Yet, a lot of times, at least in this country, when it comes to law enforcement, there is a perceived threat just by somebody having a little bit more melanin in their skin.

So, I am curious to know, because a lot of times one of the things that we have consistently pushed for on my side of things—and when I say my side is once we are looking at a tragedy in which law enforcement made an error—is the bias training and whether or not our officers are getting it.

So, I am curious to know, in some of the training that you talk about that is part of your budget, has bias training been part of that?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, it is.

Ms. CROCKETT. OK. Thank you.

I know that today is a rough day and on that day in Pennsylvania it was a rough day. And the reality is that I understand it, and you may or may not know the answer to this question.

In the space in which this event took place, it was an open carry space. Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is correct.

Ms. CROCKETT. OK.

So, I hail from the state of Texas, and interestingly enough, I was serving in the state house right after there was a mass shoot-

ing in El Paso. We had an opportunity to do right by our citizens in Texas, but we did not. Instead, they passed permitless carry.

And what my colleagues kept trying to get you to answer, because we want to come up with solutions, we do not want to keep pointing the finger, and right now you have got a bunch of fingers that are pointed at you. But our job is to solve problems for the American people.

And to be perfectly honest, the numbers are clear. I had I think almost every major law enforcement agency come forward and say that they were against permitless carry, because they said that their jobs would be made more difficult.

Unfortunately, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle in the state of Texas decided that they would ignore those warnings, and they passed the law instead.

And right after they passed that law, we ended up with Uvalde. And we heard the stories of those officers that were scared to go in and save those babies because of the firearm in which that in that case 18-year-old had in his hands.

They also were given an opportunity to say, "Hey, raise the age and make it to where at least you have to be 21 before you can possess this type of weapon," and they chose not to.

And we have the facts. It shows—and I will enter this into the record as well if there is no objection—"Deaths from Firearms Keep Climbing in Texas Decades After Lawmakers Began Weakening Gun Regulations." That is from the Texas Tribune.

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Ms. CROCKETT. Thank you so much.

The last thing that I am just going to make a point of saying is that we all care about this issue because we know that there has been a spike in violence, political violence, in this country.

Are you aware of the fact that the numbers are higher right now?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Ms. CROCKETT. OK.

In addition to that—and I am going to point a little blame at ourselves, because right now you got all the fingers pointed at you. But the reality is that we have a number of congressional Members that are consistently engaging in violent rhetoric, and it needs to be toned down.

The reality is that people are listening and they are paying attention. But, unfortunately, another thing that is happening, because we are not getting answers from you today, is the conspiracy theories. They have already began.

Have you heard of any of the conspiracies?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Ms. CROCKETT. OK.

The problem with these conspiracies is that when people believe that, say, the President of the United States ordered a hit, or they believe it was an inside job, or whatever conspiracies they believe because they do not have any facts in front of them, that potentially incites the next level of violence at the next event in retaliation for this.

So, we are only begging for your job as it relates to being the Director as well as the men and women that you are protecting as



their Director that you keep them safe by making sure that the American people have the information that they need so that they can feel as if Secret Service is on the side of the American people.

And, ma'am, I do not doubt that Secret Service is on the side of the American people. But right now, so long as these conspiracy theories continue to fester, it is going to make your job that much harder.

Thank you so much. And I yield.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene from Georgia.

Ms. GREENE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Cheatle, I would like to remind you that you are under oath.

The site team has a senior supervisor, an advance team, a protective intelligence team, a counter-sniper element and detail.

Who was the agent in charge? How long has she been the agent in charge? And what is her Secret Service background?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, I am not going to provide a name of—

Ms. GREENE. Why not? You are here to answer our questions.

Ms. CHEATLE. In this forum, I am not going to provide names of—

Ms. GREENE. You stated in your testimony, you said, "I am here today to answer your questions."

Ms. CHEATLE. That is correct.

Ms. GREENE. Answer the question.

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not going to provide names of our personnel to the Committee today.

Ms. GREENE. Why not? The American people are demanding these answers from you today, Ms. Cheatle.

Ms. CHEATLE. I will do the best to provide you accurate information based on the facts that I have at this time.

Ms. GREENE. You are not answering our questions.

The advance element coordinates with other intel or law enforcement partners, identifies threats and weaknesses at the sites and movements.

We would like a copy of the advance report. Have you brought it here with you today?

Ms. CHEATLE. We will comply with the request for the documentation that has been requested.

Ms. GREENE. When will that be, Ms. Cheatle, because you should have brought it today?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am certain that our personnel are working on obtaining all of that documentation.

Ms. GREENE. I do not believe you, and neither do the people watching this hearing. You are not doing well, as Mr. Moskowitz informed you. You have been sitting here for over 3 hours, and I will have you know the entire country is demanding you resign and demanding that you be fired if you do not resign. Things are not going well for you. You need to answer the questions.

Was there a protective intelligence team and what technical resources were utilized for that event, specifically drone or helicopter assets?

Ms. CHEATLE. There were a number of technical assets that were deployed for that event, and there was a protective intelligence team that was assigned to that event.

Ms. GREENE. Why was Crooks able to fly a drone over the entire area the day of the rally and the day of his assassination attempt?

Ms. CHEATLE. To my knowledge, he did not fly the drone over the entire area.

Ms. GREENE. How did he fly a drone over the area, period, any part of the area?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I would have to go back and check the timeline of when that took place and when the event—

Ms. GREENE. Why did you not bring the timeline with you today to answer our questions?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have all of the answers on the timelines, based on the criminal investigation.

Ms. GREENE. Were you not prepared today to answer our questions?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am prepared to answer the questions, based on the information, and wanted to be able to provide—

Ms. GREENE. Do you have a timeline that you—do you have a timeline at all from any of the day?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have a timeline that does not have specifics.

Ms. GREENE. That is shocking. That is absolutely unacceptable. That means you are a failure at your job.

Let us talk about things that are prohibited in Trump rallies. And I have been to a lot of Trump rallies. Backpacks and bags, bicycles, firearms, any type of weapon, or any other item determined to be a potential safety hazard, like a range finder would be one.

At 5:10, Crooks is first observed by one of the snipers, AGR sniper 1, at the building. 5:10. 5:10. President shot, President Trump was shot in the face at 6:11 p.m.; 5:28, AGR Sniper 1 takes a picture of a bicycle and two bags. Those belonged to Crooks; 5:32, AGR Sniper 1 spots Crooks looking at his phone and using a range finder; 5:55, Butler ESU Command confirms receipt of photos and states they have been relayed on; 6:05 p.m., AGR Sniper 1 later communicates that Crooks is seen moving northeast in direction of Sheetz and that Crooks has a backpack.

Two minutes before the shooting, while President Trump has been allowed to take the stage, people see Crooks laying on his stomach in a sniper position on the roof and they are yelling, “He has a gun,” and they are trying to alert law enforcement and Secret Service.

Why was Crooks not shot by the snipers? Why was he allowed to be there?

Ms. CHEATLE. As soon as the individual was identified as a threat, they were—

Ms. GREENE. No, no, no, no, no, no. What do you consider to be a threat? A man with a gun laying in a sniper position, a man that had a backpack, a man that had a bicycle, a man that had a range finder, at what point is he determined a threat?

Ms. CHEATLE. An individual with a backpack is not a threat. An individual with a range finder is not a threat.

Ms. GREENE. What about a man laying on a building that has direct line of sight of President Trump with a gun that people are screaming and pointing out, is that a threat, Ms. Cheatle?

Ms. CHEATLE. Once that individual was identified, they were neutralized.

Ms. GREENE. No. They were neutralized, Crooks was neutralized after he shot President Trump in the face, Ms. Cheatle. Is he only a threat once he fires the weapon?

Ms. CHEATLE. As soon as the counter-sniper identified that individual, they were able to neutralize them.

Ms. GREENE. How were people in the crowd—OK. Then let us just take it this way.

People under your command did not consider him to be a threat, yet people in the crowd knew he had a gun and considered him to be a threat.

That means that you are a complete failure as the Director of the Secret Service, that people under your command do not perceive a man laying on a roof with direct line to the President with a gun, they do not perceive that to be a threat, yet the people in the crowd do. How is that possible?

Chairman COMER. That is the last question, but please answer the question, Director.

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not certain at this time how the information from the people in the crowd was relayed to any law enforcement personnel.

Ms. GREENE. No. You knew. Everyone knew. The people there knew that there was a danger. They knew there was a threat to President Trump and it was allowed to happen.

Was there a stand-down order, Ms. Cheatle?

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Ms. GREENE. Was there a conspiracy to kill President Trump?

Ms. CHEATLE. Absolutely not.

Ms. GREENE. Then how did this happen, and why are you still sitting here not turning in your letter of resignation?

Chairman COMER. Last question, but please answer, and then I will recognize Ms. Pressley. Please answer the question, Director.

Ms. CHEATLE. That is what we are investigating to determine.

Ms. GREENE. We are waiting for your letter. We are waiting for your letter of resignation. And you really need to consider doing that before you leave today.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Pressley from Massachusetts.

Ms. PRESSLEY. Thank you.

No one, absolutely no one should fear for their life at a political rally, in a classroom, in a faith house, or in their home. We must do something about political violence in all its forms and gun violence in all of its forms.

Now, Director Cheatle, you have noted that numerous investigations are ongoing related to the Secret Service response and that we can expect a report in the next 60 days. With the election nearly 100 days away, that is an unacceptable timeline, and it makes people less safe.

It also allows my colleagues across the aisle, Republicans, additional time to spread dangerous misinformation, which also puts people in harm's way.

Some Republicans have exploited this moment to continue to attack progress toward racial justice and gender equity in America, disappointing but not surprising.

I hesitate to repeat their racist and sexist tropes, but, in summary, Republicans have wrongfully and shamefully stated that hiring women and people of color hindered the response to the shooting.

Now, this is part and parcel of the Republican strategy to constantly attack necessary diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts, to undermine the contributions that women, people of color, the disability community, and others make to this country each and every day, and it is disgraceful.

In the wake of gun violence and tragic loss of life, Republicans are ignoring solutions like gun safety reform and instead trotting out sexist tropes. Cannot say I am surprised.

I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record reporting from CNN titled "Right-wing media figures blame women in Secret Service and DEI for security failure in Trump shooting."

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Ms. PRESSLEY. This article quotes Members of Congress and others that plainly accuse DEI and the hiring of women as a liability for the Secret Service.

Women have been an integral part of the agency since 1971 and are held to the same standards as their male counterparts. To use them as a scapegoat during a time of crisis is shameful, and it is dangerously divisive. In fact, based on recent publicly available demographic data of the agency, the largest demographic groups among special agents are White and male.

But to right-wing extremists the truth does not matter. The lies they tell to advance their anti-diversity agenda, which is a key theme throughout Project 2025, will only make the American public less safe and more divided.

And every day, Director Cheatle, that you fail to give us answers they are given more oxygen to make their baseless claims that women and people of color are responsible for tragic events, and that is dangerous too.

Thank you. And I yield my remaining time to Ranking Member Raskin.

Mr. RASKIN. Thank you to the distinguished gentlelady from Massachusetts and thank you for those trenchant insights.

I wanted to make the point that you are making and several other Members were making to bring it into sharp relief here.

The very same day that Donald Trump narrowly escaped an assassination attempt, but an honored firefighter was gunned down and killed and other people were injured, there was another mass shooting that day just several hours later in Birmingham, Alabama, four people killed and ten wounded in a nightclub shooting.

And you might think, "Oh, that is some kind of freakish coincidence." Not at all. We have more than one mass shooting a day in America. They are so commonplace now that they are barely reported in the national news. It is, of course, local news in Birmingham, Alabama, that four people were killed and ten other people were shot and seriously wounded, being treated at the hospital.

These things are a nightmare for the families of the victims who have been killed, for the families who have to take care of people who have been seriously injured and wounded. They are a major financial drain publicly and privately. And yet we allow AR-15s to

be purchased with abandon promiscuously all over the country. People can just go out and get an assault weapon.

And the distinguished gentlelady from Michigan was right. We have a hearing when it affects the President of the United States, but on all the other days of the year we do not have a hearing about it.

And I think it is because in an honest disagreement we have about the Second Amendment there are some people who think the Second Amendment means you have got the right to arm yourself with whatever weaponry you need to overthrow the Government of the United States, and we reject that as a false interpretation of the Second Amendment and a false interpretation of the Constitution.

We can ban assault weapons. We did it back in 1994. It dramatically reduced these mass shootings. And when that ban was lifted, the mass shootings went up through the roof again, and we have shown it.

And so just like we are demanding real answers and real action from the Secret Service, let us demand real action and real answers from ourselves about the nightmare of mass gun violence which puts America into a category all its own when you compare us to the countries in the European Union or Canada or other similarly situated countries. There is nothing like what we are going through.

So, we have got to act on the Secret Service to protect ourselves against political violence, and we have got to act as a Congress to protect ourselves against AR-15 violence in America.

Chairman COMER. The Chair recognizes Mrs. McClain from Michigan.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And first of all, I want to thank the Secret Service agents, those who work tirelessly to protect our Presidents, and specifically those agents who did not hesitate to jump in front of President Trump.

And my heart goes out to the family, the Comperatore family, and the people at the rally who are still recovering.

On the other hand, the Secret Service has a leadership problem, and it falls on you. And although I appreciate your hollow words that the buck stops here, I was actually hoping for some answers.

Director Cheatle, you must answer to the American people if you want to stay in charge. It is really, really simple.

You want to keep your job, right?

Ms. CHEATLE. Absolutely.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. OK.

The best way to keep your job is to answer the questions, not play this shell game, not sing the Slim Shady song "It Wasn't Me." I mean, come on.

How long did you prepare for this hearing?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have been preparing for this hearing over the weekend and into last week.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. OK. Five days? Six days?

Ms. CHEATLE. As soon as I was notified—

Mrs. MCCLAIN. And how long was that?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. About this hearing—

Mrs. MCCLAIN. OK. Four days?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. I began preparing.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Four days? Three days?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not sure the date that I got the letter asking me to be here.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. What are you sure of? Are you sure of the color of your hair? Are you sure of the color of your suit? Like, tell the American people, what are you sure of?

You do not even know when you started preparing for the hearing? I mean, the biggest hearing of your life and you have no clue, you cannot remember when you started preparing for this hearing?

Can you understand why those words seem hollow to the American people who are supposed to entrust their faith in you?

Ms. CHEATLE. I assure you, the moment I received notification of this hearing.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. But you cannot remember it. You got a little Alzheimer's, dementia going? I mean, you cannot remember?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have several active investigations going on and an operational agency to run.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. OK. All right. But you want to take accountability, right? The buck stops with you, right?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am taking accountability.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Super. Then let us start with trying to answer some questions.

You keep referring to the FBI. When asked how many shell casings were on the roof, you referred to the FBI. When asked if there were explosives in the car, you referred to the FBI. When asked if Crooks was acting alone, you referred to the FBI. See a common theme here? I can go on and on.

My question is, who at the FBI should I speak with? Wait for it. Wait for it.

Ms. CHEATLE. The FBI is responsible for the criminal investigation.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Is there a name?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not certain who at the FBI is running the investigation.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. "I am not certain." All right, here we go. "I am not certain. I do not know."

Let me ask a different question. Have you been in communication with the FBI?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I have.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. With whom?

Ms. CHEATLE. I speak with the Director and the Deputy Director.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. OK. And what have they shared with you about this investigation? So, I will give you an opportunity to answer again.

Did they share with you how many shell casings were on the roof?

Ms. CHEATLE. They have shared with me the evidence that they have collected.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Did they share with you how many shell casings were on the roof?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. OK. How many were there?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would refer to the FBI for their investigation—

Mrs. MCCLAIN. How many were there?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. And their information that they need to share in their investigation.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. So, they have shared the information with you. You just do not want to share the information with us, correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. We have concurrent investigations that are going on.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. So, they have shared this information with you. You know the answer to the question. You just refer—refuse to answer the question from the Member of Congress who has subpoenaed you to be here.

Is there a different answer to that question?

Ms. CHEATLE. I was always willing to come here and testify before this oversight hearing. A subpoena was not necessary.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Beautiful. Then let us do that. Let us for once have your actions match your words.

So, you have been in communication with the FBI. You know the answers and you refuse to tell us the answers.

So, I will ask you again. You know how many shell casings were on that roof. What is the answer to that question?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think it is pertinent to talk—

Mrs. MCCLAIN. What is the answer to that question?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think it is pertinent to talk to you about the information that the Secret Service has and that the Secret Service knows related to the events on that day.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. I am asking you an answer to the question. If you are supposed to be in charge, if the buck stops with you, how come you cannot share the answers? What are you covering up? What are you hiding, my friend?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not covering anything up.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Then why can you not answer a simple question?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would leave it to the criminal investigation to answer questions related to that.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. When you talk to the FBI and you ask them how many explosives—well, let me ask you. Did you ask them how many explosives were on the roof? Did they answer that question? Or in the car, excuse me. Did they answer that question for you?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Yes. So, you know the answer to that question that my colleagues have asked you, but, again, you refuse to give us the answers. You are playing, “This was not me.”

Well, I submit to you, if you cannot—and it is not a “cannot.” It is a “will not.” It is not a “cannot.” It is not an “I do not know.” It is an “I choose not to answer the question.”

Well, let me tell you, Ms. Cheatle, if you are going to lead, you need to lead. If you want to be in charge, then answer the question or step aside and have someone with the courage and the guts to answer to the American people the questions that they deserve answers to.

And with that, I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Boebert from Colorado.

Ms. BOEBERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to continue down that vein.

You have been here sitting today, Director Cheatle, definitively able to dismiss erroneous information and speculation. However, you are refusing to answer questions that we now know that you have the information for.

You are saying that you are wanting to answer questions that the Secret Service has information to. Well, ma'am, you are the Secret Service. You are the Director. You have said that you are the best for the job.

So, I am going to ask you some questions now, now knowing that you do have answers from the FBI whom you have been passing the buck to this entire day.

And I will start with something that, you know, maybe the FBI does not know, because it has to deal with you personally.

You said you spoke with President Trump after the assassination attempt, and I want to know, did you apologize to him directly for nearly having President Trump killed?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I did.

Ms. BOEBERT. I appreciate that. I appreciate that you recognize that this was your failure.

Now, since the assassination attempt—you are under oath, reminding you—have you communicated with anyone at the White House on an encrypted messaging app like Signal, yes or no?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, I have not.

Ms. BOEBERT. Are you willing to surrender your personal phone for analysis?

Ms. CHEATLE. If I am required to do so.

Ms. BOEBERT. OK. I will look into making that request, because I would like to see your personal phone to see if you are communicating over encrypted messaging apps.

Have you ever turned down enhanced security requests from Donald Trump's detail, his special agent in charge, Sean Curran? Have you ever turned that down?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, I have not.

Ms. BOEBERT. Have there been—has your team? Has the Secret Service? Maybe not you personally.

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe, as I mentioned earlier, there are times when requests are made for assets—

Ms. BOEBERT. And you have denied them. They have been denied.

Ms. CHEATLE. And a denial does not necessarily mean—

Ms. BOEBERT. Has the Trump campaign made requests for additional assets that have been denied?

Ms. CHEATLE. Denial does not mean vulnerability.

Ms. BOEBERT. Have there been additional requests for enhanced security at Mar-a-Lago?

Ms. CHEATLE. We have made a number of enhancements to security.

Ms. BOEBERT. You confirmed that there were bomb-sniffing dogs that were provided. You failed to confirm if there were aerial security surveillance assets that were provided. So, yes or no, was that provided?

Ms. CHEATLE. At the rally?

Ms. BOEBERT. At the rally, yes, ma'am.

Ms. CHEATLE. We had overwatch provided at the rally.



Ms. BOEBERT. You have confirmed that the assassin was identified as suspicious 57 minutes prior to the shooting. Was the suspicious individual ever approached by an agent? Was any contact ever made with him?

Ms. CHEATLE. Not to my knowledge.

Ms. BOEBERT. Is that the standard protocol for someone who is identified as suspicious?

Ms. CHEATLE. The protocol would be to locate the individual and conduct an interview.

Ms. BOEBERT. And you said that he was located two to five times, approximately?

Ms. CHEATLE. No. I said that the information was passed potentially somewhere between 2 to 5 minutes—

Ms. BOEBERT. And he was never located by an agent?

Ms. CHEATLE. To my knowledge, that individual was not located by an agent.

Ms. BOEBERT. We have dozens of rally goers who have identified him, and not one agent on the ground. There are many, many, many agents on the ground, local law enforcement, Secret Service. No one was able to identify him and have sight on—and see him.

Ms. CHEATLE. What I am saying is that the agents that were on the ground at the time, I have no knowledge that they were able to interview him or—

Ms. BOEBERT. Was—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Locate him.

Ms. BOEBERT. Thank you.

Was there a local law enforcement officer who approached the roof and saw the shooter and saw that he was present on the roof?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is the information that has been shared with me.

Ms. BOEBERT. Have you spoke to that local law enforcement officer?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, I have not.

Ms. BOEBERT. Are you going to?

Ms. CHEATLE. It is part of a criminal investigation that the FBI—

Ms. BOEBERT. Are you going—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Is interviewing those individuals.

Ms. BOEBERT. Were agents stationed on the water tower?

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Ms. BOEBERT. Why?

Ms. CHEATLE. That would not be something that would be included in a security plan.

Ms. BOEBERT. Has the man who is reported to have been present wearing a gray suit who allegedly requested a photo of the dead body of the assassin on top of the AGR roof been identified?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have that information.

Ms. BOEBERT. Is that something that you have heard of?

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Ms. BOEBERT. Were ATF agents present at the rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. To attend or to work?

Ms. BOEBERT. To work.

Ms. CHEATLE. Not to my knowledge.

Ms. BOEBERT. How long did the counter-sniper have Crooks in his sights before the shooter opened fire on President Trump?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have that specific timeline.

Ms. BOEBERT. Will you be able to tell us if he communicated with other agents on what he was seeing through his sights?

Ms. CHEATLE. Once I have that information, absolutely.

Ms. BOEBERT. Because we need to know why he waited for multiple rounds to be fired at President Trump before the threat was neutralized. We need to know if he was given an order to hold fire.

Now, it is—you have excused the roof of being unmanned because of the slope of the roof. Do you continue to assert the slope of the roof as a credible reason for leaving this position undefended?

Ms. CHEATLE. First, I will go back and correct that there was no order to hold fire. Our agents and officers have the ability to neutralize a threat at the time—

Ms. BOEBERT. So, you do not know—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. They see it.

Ms. BOEBERT. I am sorry. You do not know the communication that was taking place or how long he had him in his sights because you have not spoke to him, but you do know that there was no order to hold fire.

Ms. CHEATLE. I can tell you the way that our personnel are trained, they are trained on the use-of-force scale that when they see a threat they are authorized to neutralize that threat. There is no—they do not have to ask for permission.

Ms. BOEBERT. You excused the roof being unmanned because of a slope. Do you stand by that assertion?

Ms. CHEATLE. The roof was not covered with an individual on it because there was overwatch provided.

Ms. BOEBERT. Apparently not. No, there was no overwatch provided. This is very evident. President Trump was shot. A man died. There was no oversight provided.

I find this rather maddening, especially now knowing that you do have answers from the FBI, who you have been passing the buck to this entire hearing, not answering a congressional hearing, Members of Congress, while you are under oath and under a subpoena.

I find it maddening that the Director, that our country has come centimeters away from oblivion under your watch, you have answers, you are refusing to give those to us, directing us to the FBI. And this entire thing is a waste of time.

You are responsible for the loss of a life and the shooting that took place on President Trump. You do need to resign. This is bipartisan. You need to be fired. You do not need to hold this position. You are not the best for this job.

I am over my time. But I cannot tolerate your watch any longer and I am going to continue to call daily for you to be removed from your position, ma'am.

Chairman COMER. The Chair recognizes Mr. Fry from South Carolina.

Mr. FRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Cheatle, how long have you been with the Secret Service? Twenty-nine years, right?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is correct.

Mr. FRY. And how long have you been Director of the Secret Service?

Ms. CHEATLE. Just under 2 years.

Mr. FRY. During your tenure as Director under the Secret Service, I know we are here today to talk about the assassination attempt on President Trump, but how many other security lapses have occurred with protectees under your watch?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have a specific number, but there have been some lapses.

Mr. FRY. There have been other lapses. Was one of them Jake Sullivan?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRY. What happened there?

Ms. CHEATLE. There was an individual who was able to access Mr. Sullivan's residence.

Mr. FRY. His residence? A protectee, somebody was able to break into his house. And what happened? Did anyone get fired because of that?

Ms. CHEATLE. There were individuals who have been reassigned.

Mr. FRY. Reassigned.

What other steps have taken—what I am seeing—what other—excuse me.

What other incidents have occurred other than Jake Sullivan? Was there an issue with a Secret Service agent and Vice President Harris?

Ms. CHEATLE. I would not call that a security incident.

Mr. FRY. Well, it seems to me—I mean, you have security lapses with President Trump. You have security lapses with Jake Sullivan. You have issues with your personnel related to Vice President Kamala Harris.

There seems to be a repeated theme here. Would you not agree with that?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think that we are talking about separate categories of incidents.

Mr. FRY. Well, I would disagree with that. I mean, I think there is a repeated theme when you have got protectees and you are not upholding your core mission.

Let me ask you something else. Does the Secret Service routinely record communications between and amongst detail?

Ms. CHEATLE. Radio communication?

Mr. FRY. Any communication.

Ms. CHEATLE. Email communications are captured as well as text messages. And then, depending on the detail, radio communications are recorded.

Mr. FRY. Does the Secret Service have recorded communications from the July 13 event?

Ms. CHEATLE. We do not have radio communications from that day.

Mr. FRY. But you have text messages?

Ms. CHEATLE. We do have emails and text messages.

Mr. FRY. Emails. OK, great.

Does the head of the Trump detail or someone else embedded in this detail have command decisionmaking authority, or do they need to seek authorization from someone outside that detail?

Ms. CHEATLE. The head of the detail has the decisionmaking authority for things that are necessary for that detail.

Mr. FRY. Is that standard for protection details?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, it is.

Mr. FRY. OK.

Let me ask you something. During campaign events, is it common for the Secret Service to utilize other agencies?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, it is.

Mr. FRY. What other agencies would be providing assistance to the Secret Service?

Ms. CHEATLE. There are a number of other agencies that provide assistance to the Secret Service during campaigns. We utilize personnel from the Department of Homeland Security, we utilize personnel from the Department of Defense, and we utilize local law enforcement partners.

Mr. FRY. Are you on the same radios? Do you provide the radios to all the assets that are taking part in protection of an event?

Ms. CHEATLE. We provide radios to the personnel from the Department of Homeland Security that are assisting us.

Mr. FRY. But not local law enforcement?

Ms. CHEATLE. Local law enforcement is working on their own radios.

Mr. FRY. Are you on the same frequency?

Ms. CHEATLE. We ensure that we have counterparts in the security room. And so, the local law enforcement will place one of their personnel in the security room with our personnel so that we have interoperability communications.

Mr. FRY. Let me ask you something just about the timeline, because I think this is really interesting that we cannot nail that down. I mean, I think there are laypeople out there with more knowledge about the timeline than you seem to come before a subpoena in front of Congress.

Was Mr. Crooks observed at the AGR building prior to the shooting?

Ms. CHEATLE. He was observed on the grounds outside of our perimeter prior to the shooting.

Mr. FRY. And approximately what time was that? You do not have to give me the specific minute, but at approximately what time was that?

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe it was about 45 minutes or so prior to.

Mr. FRY. Did the sniper—the sniper team—take a photo of Mr. Crooks?

Ms. CHEATLE. The local team did, yes.

Mr. FRY. So, it was a local team and not a Secret Service sniper?

Ms. CHEATLE. That took the photo.

Mr. FRY. OK. And did he relay that photo to Central Command?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, it is an active ongoing investigation, so we—I want to make sure that I am factual with the route that that photo took and who that was disseminated to and when.

Mr. FRY. What time did the—did Mr.—when did Mr. Crooks' status go from a suspicion, a person that was under suspicion, to a threat? When did that happen?

Ms. CHEATLE. For—

Mr. FRY. And maybe not even a specific time, Director Cheatle, maybe a certain event that happened that transformed him from a person of suspicion to a threat. When did that happen?

Ms. CHEATLE. To the best of my knowledge, based on what I have been told thus far, it is approximately 5 minutes to where individuals relayed that there was an incident being—or an issue, I am sorry—being worked at the 3 o'clock of the President—former President.

Mr. FRY. So, that was—but it was before the shots were fired?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is correct. But, again, it was not phrased as a threat. It was just that something was being worked.

Mr. FRY. Yes, but my question is, when did he become—when did he transform from suspicion to threat? Because they are treated very differently. People can be suspicious, but they are not a threat until a certain point in time. So, when did that happen?

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe that it was seconds before the gunfire started.

Mr. FRY. Seconds. My gosh, we actually have a few questions that we got answered today.

Listen, I am going to wrap up here, Mr. Chairman.

But here is the frustration that people have. The buck stops with you. You have said that yourself. But the problem in Washington, DC, it is the only town in America that you can be so bad at your job that you actually get a promotion or do not get fired.

You have not been able to answer the number of agents, whether or not requests were denied on additional security, whether or not law enforcements were able to engage before the shooting with the assassin, how he got on the roof, how the rifle got on the roof.

You cannot tell us how many shots he fired, whether the casings were recovered. You cannot tell us anything about his cell phone. You cannot tell us whether the rally was supposed to be postponed, given the intelligence that you were receiving. You cannot tell us whether the car had a bomb. You cannot even tell us his motive.

And the American people are incredibly distrustful, because it has taken 9 days to even get a scintilla of evidence out of you. Maybe if I was CNN or ABC or NBC, I would have gotten much more thorough and accurate information, but we have not received that in a subpoenaed hearing in front of this Congress.

That is why the American people are frustrated. And I echo the bipartisan calls on this Committee and all across this country that you should resign, or maybe when the President wakes up from his nap he can fire you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Luna from Florida.

Mrs. LUNA. Director Cheatle, can you please give me the names of the individuals who were in charge of your CONOP for the rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not going to release names—

Mrs. LUNA. Can you give me the titles—

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Mrs. LUNA [continuing]. And how many individuals?

Ms. CHEATLE. No.

Mrs. LUNA. Nothing?

Ms. CHEATLE. We had a full advance team that was responsible—

Mrs. LUNA. Who were the—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. For advancing the site.

Mrs. LUNA. How many people had the final approval authority?

Ms. CHEATLE. There are a number of people that are—

Mrs. LUNA. Can you give me a number?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Engaged in approving the plan.

Mrs. LUNA. Can you give me a number?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, I do not—

Mrs. LUNA. OK.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Have a firm number.

Mrs. LUNA. Can you just confirm whether or not—I understand this is an open investigation, but in order to dispel conspiracy theorists, have you guys been able to subpoena the shooter's Discord records, or has the FBI, to your knowledge?

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe that the FBI is working on those.

Mrs. LUNA. OK.

Is it factual to say that you have not ruled out that the shooter was working with other people or persons?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, the FBI is conducting the criminal investigation into the shooter.

Mrs. LUNA. Can you—at least in an effort to dispel conspiracy theories, can you confirm or deny that?

Ms. CHEATLE. At this time, we do not have that there were any other people engaged.

Mrs. LUNA. So, you believe he was acting alone?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do.

Mrs. LUNA. OK.

Have you been made aware of multiple eyewitness reporting that there was a second shooter on a water tower?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have any information related to any second shooter.

Mrs. LUNA. OK. The reason I ask that is because, according to testimony from multiple witnesses, they did report that.

And, again, to my understanding, there were over 40 sniper teams that were briefed by the Butler ESU. And I want to make sure that people are aware, if you are saying that there was not another shooter, that we are able to clear that information. Because, from this whole entire briefing, it does not seem like much information has been able to get out to the American people, so I am trying to dispel rumors, as I am sure you understand.

Was it true that Secret Service was present at the Butler ESU briefing?

Ms. CHEATLE. There was a briefing between the counter-sniper teams that were working on the ground.

Mrs. LUNA. Was Secret Service present?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, to my knowledge.

Mrs. LUNA. OK.

I want to read you a report from people that seemed to be throwing you under the bus and stated that they were in attendance and

that Secret Service was not in attendance at the security briefing, according to individuals with knowledge; to also include that the AGR building where the shooter, Thomas Matthew Crooks, was located was actually not a part of their security perimeter for that.

So, there was not Secret Service present.

It seems as though that when you were asked earlier from Rep. Krishnamoorthi about whether or not Secret Service was aware of a threat, you had said, no, they were unaware of a threat, and yet, according to communications, again, from law enforcement that were in some of these group chats, they actually had reported that Secret Service was made aware of a threat at around 5:59 p.m. as a part of the command, including Secret Service—aware of messages and requests about information about the suspect's location.

Can you please tell me if you have knowledge of that at all?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I think we are conflating the difference between the term "threat" and "suspicious."

Mrs. LUNA. But you guys did have knowledge at 5:59 p.m., according to those group chats, did you not?

Ms. CHEATLE. Of a suspicious individual.

Mrs. LUNA. OK.

Chairman—in my opinion, according to some of the testimony today, I feel that you have perjured yourself in some instances. And so, I am going to ask for a full review of the transcripts by staff, and if you find that to be the case, I do ask that you bring perjury charges against the Director.

I will say this. It is very frustrating—and I have talked to my colleagues, and we have said it to your face—that you have been up here basically stonewalling our ability to get the answers to the American people.

And what I will also say is that every single Member of Congress does not feel safe with you in charge. You have heard that. And I think that we are all sitting ducks, with you directing the Secret Service currently.

But, more importantly, it sends a message to our adversaries that we are not protected. And we are one of the strongest countries in the world, so you have essentially made us a less safe country because of it.

As a result of that, I am asking you to formally step down. I share my same opinions as my Democrat colleagues.

And I also think that your efforts to bring forward a full investigation and report in 60 days is unacceptable. And, as a result of that, I am going to do everything in my legislative toolkit to ensure that that happens sooner rather than later.

And I am sure that you know that we brought a vote on inherent contempt against Garland for essentially blocking a congressional investigation, and I do not think that you should be any different.

So, I will say that I am just completely disgusted by your performance today. And I understand that you are probably in a position where you are being told not to testify, which is why we had to subpoena you. I think that goes back to Garland. But, again, that is part of the flushing that we need to get out of Washington, and I would be happy to assist in that process.

Chairman, I yield the rest of my time.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langworthy from New York.

Mr. LANGWORTHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate you bringing this hearing forward with the subpoena.

Director, yesterday, I made the decision to get in my car and drive to Butler, Pennsylvania, in preparation for this moment and asking you questions about the events of the assassination attempt on President Trump's life.

I have done several Presidential advance events prior in my career, and I wanted to see this site with my own two eyes, because I do not believe the video footage tells the whole story or looking at things on a diagram.

And I was absolutely appalled when I went to the site when I saw the fact that I could have stood on the roof of that building, the AGR building, and hit that podium with a 9 iron, and I am a lousy golfer. And the fact that that was not included in the perimeter is a complete dereliction of the duty of the U.S. Secret Service.

I mean, there are very few rooftops that needed to be secured, and the fact that the Secret Service, as they were putting a site plan in place, did not think it was necessary to man those rooftops, you have completely walked away from your duties.

You had one job, and that was to protect the future President of the United States or to protect all of the other protectees. And President Trump is only here today by God's grace, because he had just something in him that made him turn his head just slightly, or we would be in a national period of mourning right now.

And you have done nothing here today—I have rewritten these questions, like, four times during your hearing, and you have not answered a damn one of them. You have not given any information. You have hidden behind this FBI investigation.

And I think you should be ashamed of yourself, because you have brought more shame to your agency than I think the assassination attempt has at this point. This is literally the worst performance I have ever seen in front of a congressional hearing. You have offered no reason for this Committee, this body, or the American people to trust you or the Secret Service today. And you should resign.

You have said that you have put new security measures in place after the assassination attempt. Can you tell us what those are?

Because the American people want to know that you are taking real, corrective measures, but today you pointed to an investigation. An investigation or not, you still have a job to do with a zero-fail mission. But so far there has been absolutely no accountability, and you have admitted that here today. Not one person has been suspended. Not one person has been put on a desk.

Meanwhile, we have got the most contentious of elections in our Nation's history, and protectees are in danger because of incompetent leadership—not the agents. The agents piled on President Trump to protect his life. Those are heroes. But the administrators running your agency, they are not right now. They are not doing their jobs, and you certainly are not doing.

The most appalling part of Saturday's events is the countless opportunities that Secret Service had to stop Crooks before he even got on the roof. At 3 o'clock, Crooks raised suspicion by entering the rally with a rangefinder. At 5:45, a cop with a Beaver County



Emergency Services Unit saw Crooks eyeballing the roof at the AGR International building. And then at 5:55, Secret Service was warned of a suspicious person and identifies Crooks as a threat. This was all before shots were fired 15 minutes later.

Director, yes or no, did local law enforcement alert the Secret Service about Crooks' presence at the rally?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, they did.

Mr. LANGWORTHY. The shooter came to attention of law enforcement almost an hour before President Trump went on stage. Law enforcement alerted the Secret Service to the shooter.

Over and over, you have said there is a difference between a suspicious individual and a threatening individual. Can you explain what the shooter needed to exemplify to be called a threat?

Ms. CHEATLE. So, I am not clear as to what identified him as suspicious to the individuals who originally clarified him that way.

For the Secret Service, for an individual to be determined to be a threat, that individual would have to be seen with a weapon or capable of doing some sort of harm to our protectees.

Mr. LANGWORTHY. I mean, Director, an individual walking into a rally with a rangefinder, scoping out an unprotected rooftop—and he reportedly flew a drone over hours before—it sounds like a lot more than suspicious, especially at a Presidential rally.

Your operational lapses, your resource management, and poor judgment nearly resulted in the assassination of President Trump. I mean, the dereliction of duty here is just appalling. The fact that you have not visited Butler is just maddening to me, that you are not taking this job seriously.

You know, many people here have called for your resignation. I have introduced a resolution here into this body that hopefully will get a vote this week calling on the President to fire you, ma'am.

You have not done your job, you have put a—two black eyes on your agency, and you need to go.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman COMER. The gentleman yields back.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Burlison from Missouri.

Mr. BURLISON. Director Cheatle, I just want to kind of get an idea of what you can answer. Because, outside of what the FBI is responsible for, you have full responsibility for the Department of Secret Service.

So, the question is, what is the mission? What is your—and who defines the mission?

Ms. CHEATLE. Our mission of the Secret Service is to protect the President, the Vice President, their immediate families, Presidential candidates, the former Presidents, and those by executive order. And we also have an investigative mission.

Mr. BURLISON. And those are well-defined?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. BURLISON. Everyone within the agency understands the mission?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, they do.

Mr. BURLISON. What about protocols and standards? Who defines the protocols and standards?

Ms. CHEATLE. We have a number of protocols and policies in place for the various missions that we have.

Mr. BURLISON. So, would it be safe to say that you failed the mission, the ultimate mission?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have stated repeatedly here today that there was a failure.

Mr. BURLISON. What about specific failures within protocols and guidelines within the agency?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, I am certain that the investigation that is being conducted internally as well as the external investigation—

Mr. BURLISON. You said earlier in the hearing that there was either a communication—there was a—there was errors in communication or in operations. Could it be both, both errors in operational decisions and errors in communications?

Ms. CHEATLE. I think the investigation potentially could identify both.

Mr. BURLISON. So, I want to talk about communications. Representative Boebert asked earlier about using encrypted apps that you said you have not used, I guess Signal. Have you used any encrypted app to communicate from your personal device?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do, on occasion, use encrypted apps to communicate.

Mr. BURLISON. So, you use some form of an encrypted app to communicate with people—within the Federal Government? With local law enforcement? Whom are you communicating with using encrypted apps?

Ms. CHEATLE. Many times it is with colleagues and associates.

Mr. BURLISON. So, you are communicating with colleagues on a personal device?

Ms. CHEATLE. There are times that the Secret Service, when we work internationally with some of our partners, that they do not have the same texting capability.

Mr. BURLISON. And you are not able to do that with your government-issued device?

Ms. CHEATLE. Recently, we have been able to install some of those apps on government devices.

Mr. BURLISON. OK.

Let us talk about some of the things that we can get access to.

I am actually shocked that you are using your personal device and encrypted communication tools. I think that that might be the most shocking thing that I have heard today. I did not expect for you to say that.

We have requested—this Committee has requested multiple documents. And this is not, you know, under the purview of the FBI; this is under your purview. We requested a complete list of all law enforcement personnel, including Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, local law enforcement with the roles in protecting the President, and we requested that to be—for us to receive that by July 18.

Did you provide that?

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe that our agency is in the process of collecting all documents—

Mr. BURLISON. So, you did not—you have not provided it. How long does it take to determine who the personnel were that were onsite?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are collecting a comprehensive list of all the documents that have been requested.

Mr. BURLISON. We also requested all the audio and video recordings that your agency—not the FBI, but your agency—has in possession related to the event.

Did we receive those? Have you provided those at all?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are in the process of collecting all documentation requested.

Mr. BURLISON. You are in the process, but you have not.

Any memorandums or any internal communications related to the event? We requested that you provide that. Have you provided any of that?

Ms. CHEATLE. We are in the process of collecting the information that has been requested.

Mr. BURLISON. OK.

So, when can we expect to receive these documents? How long does it take to determine who was onsite, who was being employed to be there to protect the former President? When can we expect that? How many days does it take to provide that information?

Ms. CHEATLE. We want to make sure that we have a comprehensive accounting of all of the documents that were engaged in that day, and we will make them available as soon as possible.

Mr. BURLISON. I think transparency is the key here. It is shocking to me that we are communicating in an encrypted app to colleagues. I am almost certain that violates some Federal laws.

Ms. CHEATLE. I would like to clarify. You did not ask me whether my communications were government/work-related or whether they were personally related. I do not—

Mr. BURLISON. You are communicating with colleagues.

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Communicate government business with colleagues on a personal device. I communicate on my work device.

Mr. BURLISON. Are you using an encrypted device on your work device?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not.

Mr. BURLISON. No encrypted apps?

Ms. CHEATLE. No, I do not.

Mr. BURLISON. OK.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COMER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Waltz from Florida.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Director, please, I would like to direct your attention to this video.

Can you turn up the volume, staff?

[Video played.]

Mr. WALTZ. Director Cheatle, did you speak with your boss, Secretary Mayorkas? You fall under DHS. Did you speak with him on the 14th, the day after?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes, I did.

Mr. WALTZ. So, you spoke with him before he made that statement?

Ms. CHEATLE. I spoke with him immediately following—

Mr. WALTZ. Did you—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. The incident.

Mr. WALTZ. Did you inform him that all requests for additional resources for President Trump had been fulfilled—

Ms. CHEATLE. I—

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. Or—or that it was false to say they had been denied?

Ms. CHEATLE. I informed him that the request for that rally that day had been fulfilled.

Mr. WALTZ. OK. You continue to answer that very carefully. Because I made a broader statement, the agents that came to me made a broader statement, that his permanent protective detail for years now have been asking for more. Is that correct?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not have specific incidents of those requests.

Mr. WALTZ. Is it correct that they have been asking for more?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have heard the same reports that you have. Without having them in front of me, I am unable—

Mr. WALTZ. Those requests were made in writing. I mean, the agents were telling me they make them in writing. This is not a verbal agency; things are made in writing.

Ms. CHEATLE. I understand what you are saying. I do not have those requests in front of me here to—

Mr. WALTZ. I am not asking if you have them in front of you. Are you aware that they were made?

Ms. CHEATLE. As I said earlier, there are times when requests are made, and depending on the availability of assets or if there is a way that that—

Mr. WALTZ. So, there were times when they were denied?

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. If there is a way that that vulnerability can be mitigated in a different way, then that is why Secret Service—

Mr. WALTZ. So, there are times when they were denied—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Has—

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. For a variety of reasons?

Ms. CHEATLE. That is why the Secret Service has a multilayered and multifaceted security plan, so that we can pivot if we need to.

Mr. WALTZ. So, in the wake—I mean, in the immediate 48 hours of an assassination attempt on a former President, could be the next leader of the free world—almost had his head blown off—your boss says, that is irresponsible and false to say things or deny. And you had talked to him.

So, did he just make that on his own—make that up on his own, or did you tell him that?

Ms. CHEATLE. We were speaking about the requests made at the rally.

Mr. WALTZ. Staff, can we show the next slide, please?

Then we have your spokesman. Did you sign off on this statement, that there is an assertion that a member of the former President's team requested additional security resources and those were rebuffed? "This is absolutely false. In fact, we added protective resources and technology and capability as part of the increased campaign travel tempo."

But—next slide, please. Next slide, please, staff—we have the *Washington Post* article that then says, we now have senior Secret

Service officials saying there were in times—at times when it was denied.

So, which is it?

Ms. CHEATLE. Again, there have been a number of conversations going on here—

Mr. WALTZ. Did you sign off on that spokesman's statement?

Ms. CHEATLE. The spokesman's statement, I believe, was related to requests that were made for the rally.

Mr. WALTZ. Did you sign off on it?

Ms. CHEATLE. For the requests that were made at the rally—

Mr. WALTZ. Did you—

Ms. CHEATLE [continuing]. Yes.

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. Sign off on the statement before it went out? I sign off on my press spokesman's statements before they go out. I would hope you would in the wake of an assassination attempt.

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. WALTZ. You did?

Ms. CHEATLE. Uh-huh.

Mr. WALTZ. Categorically false that any requests were made. You signed off on it. Thank you for that—thank you for that clarity.

Madam Director, how many press conferences have you held since the assassination attempt?

Ms. CHEATLE. We have put out press releases—

Mr. WALTZ. How many press conferences have you held? Gone to the mic, taken questions from the public, from the media. How many?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have not held any.

Mr. WALTZ. How many has your—how many has Secretary Mayorkas held?

Ms. CHEATLE. I do not—

Mr. WALTZ. Zero.

How many has the FBI held? Zero.

How many has the Department of Justice held? I know you know the answer.

Ms. CHEATLE. I believe there was a press conference in Butler after the incident occurred.

Mr. WALTZ. By local law enforcement, not by you and not by the Department of Homeland Security.

So, this is how misinformation flies, I mean, in the darkness, in the absence of information. Now we have, 9 days later, before a congressional Committee—we all represent almost a million people, and you still do not have answers.

Are you aware that national news anchors are saying this was a hoax? On national television, they are saying, no, the President was not shot, it was flying glass. Are you aware of that?

Ms. CHEATLE. I have not heard those reports.

Mr. WALTZ. Are you aware that, I mean, there are rumors rampant online that there were multiple shooters?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. WALTZ. Are you aware that because the shooter had overseas encrypted platforms in Belgium and New Zealand and Germany that a lot of people are speculating there could have been foreign involvement, logically? Are you aware of that?

Ms. CHEATLE. Yes.

Mr. WALTZ. And have you done anything to disabuse any of these notions today? No, you have not.

Madam Director, I would fire you—regardless of the failure, I would fire you, just how you have handled it since.

You should have been the first to the mics to say, “America, world, I want to assure you, we are going to get to the bottom of this. I want to assure you, full transparency. Our agency clearly had major gaps here, and I want to personally take responsibility and accountability.” You should have been the first, standing alongside Secretary Mayorkas, and I would even go so far as to say, have daily press conferences updating everyone on what we know.

But you have not had any of that. What are you hiding behind?

Ms. CHEATLE. I am not hiding—

Mr. WALTZ. Because you are making the situation worse. I think you have heard that on a bipartisan basis here. You are making this situation far worse in the absence of information.

Let us move on. This is truly astounding.

I want to be clear, because you keep dodging the issue. Has President Trump’s permanent protective detail requested additional assets over the last few years?

He is clearly not your average former President. He is not Jimmy Carter in an old folks’ home. He is not President Bush painting out in his barn. He has multiple residences, a lot of rallies. He is very publicly engaged. And he has a foreign threat in addition to domestic threats.

Have they requested additional resources?

Chairman COMER. That is the last question, but please feel free to answer, Director.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you.

Ms. CHEATLE. Thank you.

We have continued, as I stated earlier, to increase over the past year the assets that are at the former President’s residence and supplied to his detail.

Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask for one more indulgence.

It is clear you have not been to Butler, Pennsylvania. Leaders lead and should be on the ground. You have not been there.

Instead, you went to the RNC. But you were not originally even going to go there. Where were you originally scheduled to go besides the RNC, a national special security event?

Ms. CHEATLE. I was always scheduled to go to the RNC—

Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record that the Director was scheduled to go to Aspen, hobnobbing around with—I do not know who—what liberal elites go to Aspen.

That was where you were originally scheduled—

Chairman COMER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. To go to speak at a forum.

Ms. CHEATLE. I was scheduled to go to the RNC. I was going to leave the RNC for 24 hours and return back to the RNC.

Mr. WALTZ. I hope, as your predecessor Julia Pierson, with a security incident on the White House under the Obama Administration, and Reagan’s Secret Service detail lead, I will hope you would have the dignity for the sake of the agents in the Service to resign.

Chairman COMER. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you.

Chairman COMER. I would like to enter a few things into the record.

First of all, the remaining articles that Mr. Biggs was wanting to enter into the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

Chairman COMER. Next, I have a written statement from Representative Mike Kelly of Pennsylvania. His district includes Butler. And he has a written statement that we would like to enter into the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

Chairman COMER. A bipartisan 114th congressional report titled, "United States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis." This was prepared by former Oversight Committee Chairman Jason Chaffetz and former Ranking Member Elijah Cummings.

Chairman COMER. And, last, the issued subpoena compelling Director Cheatle's appearance at today's hearing.

Without objection, so ordered.

Chairman COMER. That concludes our question segment.

I want to thank the Director for your testimony today.

I now yield to the Ranking Member for closing remarks.

Mr. RASKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, Director Cheatle, I also want to thank you for your patience over the course of what must have been a very long and trying hearing for you.

It has been an unusually encouraging hearing and an unusually depressing hearing.

And what is encouraging, Mr. Chairman, is that we came together to issue a strong statement deploring and categorically denouncing political violence in America. And I also did not see any daylight between the members of the two parties today at the hearing in terms of our bafflement and outrage about the shocking operational failures that led to disaster and near catastrophe on July 13, 2024.

What is depressing is the extraordinary communications gap between the Director of the Secret Service and Congress.

And I do not want to add to the Director's terrible, horrible, no good, very bad day, but I will be joining the Chairman in calling for the resignation of the Director just because I think that this relationship is irretrievable at this point, and I think that the Director has lost the confidence of Congress at a very urgent and tender moment in the history of the country, and we need to very quickly move beyond this.

But what I will say, Mr. Chairman, is that I took this hearing to be about two major policy failures. And one policy failure is the one that got the vast majority of the attention, which was the failure of the Secret Service to effectively respond to a gunman on a roof within 150 yards of a Presidential visit and speech.

But the other failure is on the part of Congress. Because the mass shooting that took place in Butler, Pennsylvania, is replicated all over the country every day. And, in fact, as I said, Mr. Chairman, it happened that evening in Alabama, in Birmingham, Alabama, where there was a mass shooting where more people even

were killed and wounded than were killed and wounded in Butler, Pennsylvania.

So, it is true, the President, the former President, and a handful of people who get the Secret Service protection are the only people in America we thought were safe from an AR-15 attack. It is clear that they are not safe either, and we have got to get to the bottom of that.

But we also have to get to the bottom of the larger problem, which is that the whole country is living like this, in fear and in terror of assault-weapon attacks in movie theaters, churches, synagogues, mosques, supermarkets, Walmarts, you know, anyplace where an audience or a public gathers. And the worst was in Las Vegas, where a gunman got up on a roof and then just mowed down 60 people below him and wounded hundreds and hundreds of other people.

So, we have got to deal with that problem. Yes, we have got to move as swiftly as we can to deal with the problems at the Secret Service, but the broader problem is still there.

And I just wish to the heavens that our colleagues that could get together on the question of Presidential security against an AR-15 attack could get together on the question of public security against an AR-15 attack. Because all of us are vulnerable. All of our families are in danger by this.

And the rest of the world does not live this way. And we have to look to see how uniquely strange it is that we allow 20-year-olds to access AR-15s, weapons of mass destruction, and show up in public places to endanger other people.

And I hope, Mr. Chairman, we can work together on that with the same spirit of bipartisan commitment to the public safety that was exemplified here today.

And I yield back to you.

Chairman COMER. The Ranking Member yields back.

I will deliver my closing remarks.

Director Cheatle, I subpoenaed you to appear today to get answers for the American people about the failures that led to the assassination attempt to President Donald J. Trump. Unfortunately, you refused to answer today.

And this Committee is not known for its bipartisan—its model of bipartisanship, but I think today we came together unanimously in our disappointment for your lack of answers.

You have stated that the FBI will investigate and give a report in, you estimate, 60 days. We have been waiting for months and months for lots of different bits of information from the FBI. We have no confidence in the FBI. The majority of this Committee has no confidence in the FBI.

I sincerely hoped that the hearing today would give not just Congress confidence in the Secret Service, but the American people would have confidence in the Secret Service. We do not have confidence, not just in Congress, but I do not believe the American people tonight when they go to bed are going to have confidence that the Secret Service is the best it can be at protecting President Biden, at protecting the First Lady, at protecting President Trump, at protecting their families. That is what the primary role for the Secret Service should be.



And some people have said and speculated, well, there needs to be more money and more employees. As I stated early on, a \$3.1 billion—I believe next year it is going to be a \$3.2 billion budget; over 8,000 employees.

If the Secret Service is spread too thin in doing things like inspecting counterfeit—which is what the Secret Service was created to do, was to inspect counterfeit money and things like that with the Treasury. If it is spread too thin, then we need to come together in Congress—and I think we can do that in a bipartisan way—to narrow the focus of the Secret Service to protect the leaders of our country, to protect our elections by protecting our candidates. And I do not believe we have any confidence that you can do that, as the leader of the FBI [sic].

I sincerely hoped that we would adjourn this Committee hearing and have confidence not just in the Secret Service but in you as Director of the Secret Service. But we do not.

Taking responsibility requires a lot of things. It means providing transparency. It means answering simple questions. It means providing a specific timeline of July 13 to this Committee and the American people.

I mean, it has been 9 days. There were people that were demanding that we have a hearing the next day or 2 days following the shooting, and I said, no, we need to give the Secret Service ample time to be able to answer those questions. Nine days. Nine days. And I do not think we answered very many questions that the American people have.

I do not think there was a—I have never said this before, and I have presided over a lot of hearings. I do not think there was one question asked by anyone that the average American has not already asked at a diner or at church or at a ball game.

The American people have questions. They deserve answers. Congress deserves answers. You were subpoenaed today to provide answers, and, ma'am, you did not do that.

So, as Ranking Member Raskin stated, he and I will be sending a letter requesting that you submit your resignation as a step toward accountability in what happened.

And one of the biggest frustrations that many of us have, especially on this side of the aisle, is that there is never accountability in this Administration. And when you look at the debacles prior to July 13, I mean, it would be hard to beat the withdrawal in Afghanistan, the debacle there. And no one was held accountable. To this day, no one has been held accountable for that.

But here we have, clearly, video showing people notifying the police. And the police are blaming the Secret Service. The Secret Service are blaming the police. Homeland Security is blaming everybody.

But at the end of the day, after this hearing, and after our requests for information, we do not have any answers for the American people, and we do not have that confidence that you can lead the Secret Service to restore the confidence. And, again, I commend the ranking member for joining with me in the letter asking your resignation. And we certainly hope that you will take that to heart.

With that and without objection, all members have 5 legislative days within which to submit materials and additional written questions for the witness, which will be forwarded to the witness.

Chairman COMER. If there is no further business, without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:38 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

