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## Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

### October 22, 2015

### Introduction

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today, along with my colleague Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Batjer Johnson, to testify about the global security threat posed by North Korea. North Korea's destabilizing, provocative, and repressive policies and actions around the world constitute one of the most difficult and complicated challenges the United States faces. We appreciate the interest and attention you and the subcommittee have given to this issue.

### **DPRK Behavior**

Mr. Chairman, we share your concerns about the grave threat posed by North Korea's illicit weapons programs and its proliferation activities.

Multiple UN Security Council resolutions require North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and prohibit countries from engaging with the DPRK to buy or sell weapons and related items and technologies. North Korea itself committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. Yet North Korea continues to violate these obligations and prior commitments through its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and its illicit proliferation of weapons and technologies abroad. This conduct poses a growing threat to the United States, our friends and allies in the region, and the global nonproliferation regime.

# **U.S. Policy**

We are committed to using the full range of tools – deterrence, diplomacy, and pressure – to counter that threat and to make clear North Korea will not achieve security or prosperity while the regime pursues nuclear weapons, abuses its own people, and flouts its longstanding obligations and commitments.

We have refused to respond to North Korean provocations with concessions. Instead, since 2009 we have tightened sanctions and consistently underscored to the DPRK that the path to a brighter future begins with authentic and credible negotiations that produce concrete denuclearization steps.

### **Deterrence**

Part of our effort to change North Korea's strategic calculus is maintaining the strongest possible deterrent capabilities. The DPRK should have no doubt that the United States stands ready to defend our interests and our allies. In this, we could have no better partners than our allies and friends in Seoul and Tokyo. We have made it a priority to strengthen and modernize these alliances for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. This important goal was reaffirmed during the recent visits to Washington by President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Abe.

### **Pressure**

By maintaining credible deterrence and by applying sustained sanctions pressure on the regime, both multilaterally and unilaterally, we increase the costs to the DPRK of its destructive policy choices.

Vigorous sanctions enforcement is also the key to cracking down on North Korea's proliferation activities which finance and facilitate North Korea's proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Strong sanctions implementation also helps prevent North Korea's dangerous weapons and technologies from spreading around the world, potentially destabilizing other global hot spots or reaching groups that would seek to harm the United States and our allies. At the State Department and throughout the U.S. government, we work every day to monitor intelligence on North Korea's global arms trade. And we take action, together with our partners around the world, to mitigate those transactions, and to impose consequences on those responsible.

In January, President Obama issued a new Executive Order giving us an important, powerful, and broad new sanctions tool. From the day it was issued, we began using this Executive Order to apply additional pressure on wrongdoers in the DPRK regime, imposing sanctions against the DPRK's primary intelligence agency known to be responsible for its cyber operations, as well as its main arms trade agency and several of its overseas arms dealers. And we will continue to use this new tool, along with our other sanctions authorities against the DPRK. In July, the Treasury Department released new sanctions designations and updated our

listings for previous North Korean sanctions targets to make it harder for them to hide behind aliases and front companies. We are committed to continuing to enforce these sanctions.

But our financial sanctions are always more effective when supported by our partners, and so we've also focused on strengthening multilateral sanctions against North Korea. The sanctions we have successfully pushed for in the UN Security Council give countries around the world the authorities they need to crack down on North Korea's proliferation networks.

When North Korea's major global shipping firm was involved in an illegal weapons shipment, we led efforts at the UN to sanction the firm, and we stepped up coordination with partners to ensure the sanction was enforced. Since then, the company's ships have been denied port entry, scrapped, impounded, or confined to their home ports in North Korea, and the shipping firm has lost its contracts with many foreign-owned ships. This means the DPRK pays a cost for its maritime proliferation.

We have engaged countries across Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East that have been targeted by North Korea for proliferation-related transport and sales, reminding them of their obligation to implement UN sanctions and strengthening their capacity to do so.

Thanks to our outreach – as well as North Korea's continued bad behavior – key countries like China have reemphasized their commitment to UN Security Council sanctions, and have taken some positive steps on enforcement.

We also continually review the available intelligence to determine whether North Korea is subject to additional measures. Naturally, this includes reviewing available information to determine whether the facts indicate the DPRK should be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Deputy Coordinator Batjer Johnson will speak more about this process.

# **Diplomacy**

Equally important is North Korea's political isolation, driven by the overwhelming international consensus that North Korea cannot fully participate in the international community until it abides by its international obligations and commitments. We have built and maintained that consensus through our active, principled diplomacy.

That diplomacy begins with our partners in the Six-Party Talks: South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Our coordination ensures that wherever Pyongyang turns, it hears a strong, unwavering message that it must live up to its international obligations.

At the same time, we have made clear to North Korea that the path of engagement and credible negotiations remains open. Unfortunately, as North Korea continues to reject meaningful engagement, we and our partners must remain focused on enhancing pressure to lead North Korea toward a different choice.

### Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, holding North Korea accountable to its commitments and obligations and combatting its proliferation around the world require a sustained, international effort. We and our partners will continue to deploy the full range of tools – deterrence, pressure, and diplomacy – to counter the threat posed by North Korea and to lead Pyongyang to different choices.

I thank the Committee for the opportunity to appear today. I am happy to answer your questions.