

U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Sub-committee Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations

---

## Hearing on “Elections in Africa”

*March 2, 2021*

*Testimony submitted by*

**Aude Darnal**

*Associate Director*

*New American Engagement Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security*

**Atlantic Council**

Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the topic of elections in Africa.

The topic of today’s hearing is a broad one. I would like to share my views by focusing on my experience working in Conakry, Guinea from 2018-19 during the onset of the crisis that marked the 2020 president and parliamentary elections. While there, I witnessed how international donors and the NGO community – international and local – tried and failed to prevent electoral violence. I also saw first-hand how unfair, unfree and non-transparent elections, combined with security forces’ abuses, can severely destabilize a country. I would like to highlight some of Guinea’s main electoral challenges, and share recommendations that I believe can be applied to other countries in Africa.

The views expressed in this testimony are my own and do not represent the official position of the Atlantic Council.

### **Between progress and backsliding**

Over the past 20 years, there has been both democratic progress and backsliding across the continent. Countries like the Gambia and Liberia saw new presidents democratically elected following years of authoritarianism and political instability, while others such as Guinea and Ivory Coast, continued to fluctuate between “partly free” and “not free” according to Freedom House’s global index, because their leaders took steps to retain power.<sup>i</sup> Other states, like Benin, veered from their democratic path as newly elected presidents became more authoritarian. Finally, conflict-torn countries like Somalia have continued to struggle, despite repeated stabilization efforts and support for elections. In short, Africa is not one single country. It is important to underscore this fact when analyzing elections and the state of democracy on the continent.

### **Why it matters**

To many Africans, the United States and its international allies focus too much on security and particularly counter-terrorism. Yet, greater and sustained attention should also be given to more stable parts of the continent, whose value as a regional partner will only grow. Africa represents a vast economic

market, which by 2050 will be composed of “1 billion people, half of whom will be under 25 years old.”<sup>ii</sup> Countries such as China – which is now the continent’s leading economic partner – Russia and India continue to increase their economic and political engagement with African countries. As the Biden administration reviews its engagement strategy with the world, it should carefully consider what role the United States can play as a partner for African countries and what strategy it should favor in the promotion of democracy, human rights, and development, while moving away from policies often regarded as overly militarized.<sup>iii</sup> Assisting African partners in that way will consolidate the foundations for durable economic cooperation benefiting all parties, strengthen international security by contributing to stabilization across the continent, and reinforce diplomatic ties that the United States and African countries can use to advance their interests and values.

### **Challenges tainting electoral processes in Africa: the case of Guinea**

Guinea held parliamentary and presidential elections in 2020. The parliamentary elections, initially planned for September 2018, were held on March 22, 2020,<sup>iv</sup> alongside a constitutional referendum, and the presidential election was held on October 18, 2020. All three polls were marred by irregularities, disinformation, voter suppression, and coercion, among other issues. The president’s party won the majority of the Parliament seats, a new constitution that allowed President Alpha Condé to run again was passed, and subsequently he was re-elected for a third term.

The March 2020 referendum on the new constitution, which extended the presidential term from five to six years and impose a two-term limit, was controversial because it reset presidential term limits and would allow President Condé to run for a third term. The constitution allegedly was approved by 90 percent of votes cast, but the referendum and the parliamentary election was boycotted by the opposition and tainted by violence against civilians.<sup>v</sup> International observers also “raised concerns about the electoral register,”<sup>vi</sup> noting that a third of the names were unverified.<sup>vii</sup> The parliamentary and presidential elections occurred within the same context.<sup>viii</sup> The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF) initially refused to deploy observation missions during the parliamentary elections, then planned for March 1. The OIF stated that it was “difficult to continue to support an electoral process in Guinea given the confusion surrounding it.”<sup>ix</sup> The supposedly Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI)’s conducted an opaque review of the electoral register, which the opposition and international observers said was not credible.<sup>x</sup>

Moreover, with a growing use of smartphone and mobile internet penetration – 22% more mobile internet users in 2019 compared to 2018 – and limited web literacy, disinformation campaigns were a major challenge in Guinea.<sup>xi</sup> Political parties and their supporters spread mis/disinformation through social media, often fueling tensions and violence between security forces and civilians opposing the ruling party, and between ethnic and religious communities, in a context of political polarization.<sup>xii</sup> A Stanford study reveals that the ruling party – Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) – paid “volunteer communicators”, RPG-employed public relation staff members, to engage in extensive coordinated promotion of President Condé’s policies through a network of 94 Facebook pages, which did not clearly disclose their paid relationship with the party. The study also notes that such campaigns have become an “essential part of the political game” in Guinea.<sup>xiii</sup> Disinformation campaigns even affected ECOWAS, which issued a disclaimer following the presidential poll, warning against the spread on social media of fake posters with ECOWAS’ commission president alongside a fake quote confirming that the electoral protocol had been respected.<sup>xiv</sup> The phenomenon is not unique to Guinea and has been documented across the continent by scholars.<sup>xv</sup>

In parallel to disinformation, there have been multiple reports of restrictions on freedom of expression and on the opposition, including unlawful arrest of civil society members.<sup>xvi</sup> According to Amnesty International, several members of Guinean pro-democracy NGOs were arrested over the past two years for their participation in civilian protests against the amendment of the constitution.<sup>xvii</sup> Arrests of journalists were also reported<sup>xviii</sup> and the Internet and social media were disrupted in March and October 2020, likely to disadvantage opponents of the ruling party.<sup>xix</sup>

Voter suppression was another major issue. A census, launched fifteen days before the October presidential election,<sup>xx</sup> was marred by fraud and voter exclusion.<sup>xxi</sup> The largest Guinean diaspora in neighboring Senegal was disenfranchised as the CENI failed to register them ahead of the presidential election.<sup>xxii</sup> Guinea also inexplicably closed its borders on September 27, 2020, which prevented many in the Guinean diaspora from voting.<sup>xxiii</sup>

Perhaps most importantly, political violence and excessive use of force by security forces was widespread before, during, and following the 2020 elections. Electoral violence is common in Guinea,<sup>xxiv</sup> whether it occurs between civilians and security forces, or between communities.<sup>xxv</sup> According to Amnesty International, “between October 2019 and February 2020, more than 30 people were killed during demonstrations”<sup>xxvi</sup> against the proposed constitutional reform. NGOs<sup>xxvii</sup> and the media<sup>xxviii</sup> documented politically-motivated abuses by the military, police and gendarmerie during the entire electoral period.

### **Recommendations for US engagement**

Local actors are the best placed to demand democracy. Helping them to be better equipped to do so from the grassroots to the national level is most effective. Efforts to empower a particularly political leader or party, often not only fail, but also alienate local populations who consider this type of interference to be illegal, illegitimate, and imperialistic.

#### What works

If the United States hopes to support democracy in Africa, it is crucial that its policies focus on strengthening institutions, empowering civil society, promoting the political participation of marginalized actors such as women and the youth, and developing journalists’ capacities, among other examples. Strengthening the civil society and journalists’ capacities<sup>xxix</sup> and roles, and promoting the inclusion<sup>xxx</sup> of traditionally marginalized and under-represented<sup>xxxi</sup> female and youth actors, means providing them with the tools to efficiently voice the populations’ needs and concerns, hold political leaders accountable, denounce fraud, tackle disinformation and spread awareness on electoral processes amongst the population.

It should reinforce electoral institutions, such as the CENI in Guinea. This means promoting their independence and neutrality during elections and strengthening their capacities to ensure that voting processes are free, inclusive, fair and transparent.

In Guinea, local networks of women, youth, and religious and community leaders have had a positive impact on preventing election violence by monitoring signs of tension and using mediation mechanisms.<sup>xxxii</sup> However, these community-level institutions often lack coordination and generally operate outside any formal accountability framework. International actors have made efforts to strengthen those networks. For instance, in 2020, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund started funding a project to support the implementation of the Guinean government’s National Strategy for Conflict Prevention and Citizenship Strengthening.<sup>xxxiii</sup> This project seeks to develop synergy across these mechanisms – “social infrastructures for peace” – in two regions of the country to better coordinate violence-prevention efforts, in particular during election periods.

The United States should reinforce its efforts to ensure that programs are developed and implemented with and by local actors. In addition to supporting local ownership, this also helps ensure that programs rely on sound analysis and deep understanding of the grassroots issues at stake. International partners should not anticipate and guess populations' needs, but rather listen and support them in voicing and addressing them.

I have witnessed in Guinea the determination of young local NGOs to prevent electoral violence, by capitalizing on the power of social media and new technologies to conduct civic education and tackle disinformation, for instance. However, these efforts can only be sustained and successful if they receive appropriate support across a wide spectrum of actors, from local governments to international partners. The reduction of aid to Africa initiated under the Trump administration– which requested for its FY2021 budget \$5.1 billion, a “28% drop from FY2019 allocations”<sup>xxxiv</sup> – raises concerns for the future of the US engagement on the continent. In Guinea, the competition among international NGOs is fierce, and is likely to increase as local NGOs rightfully claim greater inclusion in funding initiatives.

Along the same line, there is a need to diversify assistance, which is primarily oriented towards health challenges.<sup>xxxv</sup> While programs advancing the health sector are critical, there needs to be more and sustained efforts in strengthening other areas of need – education and other social services, peace, environment, sustainable business practices, economic growth. This does not mean drastically reducing health funding, but rather means a rethink of priorities and better strategies to also include sectors that ultimately contribute to human development, democracy strengthening, and the reduction of risks of violence, while laying down the foundations for peaceful and inclusive elections. Such wider scope of assistance further emphasizes why aid reduction engaged under the Trump administration is counter-productive.

#### What may impede democracy and credible elections

The United States has been militarily involved across the continent for years, with an estimated presence of 9,000 troops carrying out joint operations and training in some 40 countries.<sup>xxxvi</sup> The United States also provides weapons and materiel to its African partners.<sup>xxxvii</sup> Such a security strategy should be carefully analyzed in light of its potential impact on democracy and human rights.

In 2010, Amnesty International raised concerns that members from military and security units, who had been implicated in violence against civilians during the brutal crackdown on an opposition rally on September 28, 2009, had received training from the United States, France, and China.<sup>xxxviii</sup> The violent event – commonly referred to as the Stadium Massacre – occurred less than a year following a military coup led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara and a junta called the National Council for Democracy and Development on December 23, 2008. Amidst growing criticism from citizens and the opposition against the junta, the political opposition organized a peaceful demonstration which gathered an estimated 50,000 people at Conakry's stadium on September 28, 2009. During the event, officers from the military, the presidential guard, the gendarme, and the police and militias members encircled the stadium to prevent demonstrators from escaping, fired tear gas into the stadium and subsequently shot into the crowd, killing more than 150 civilians, and injuring more than 1,500.<sup>xxxix</sup> Human rights groups also reported more than 40 cases of widespread and collective rape and sexual violence.<sup>xl</sup>

Given reports that military personnel, gendarmes and police officers were involved in violence against civilians protesting against the ruling party during the 2020 electoral process,<sup>xli</sup> the United States should reinforce existing monitoring procedures, and regularly assess the repercussions, even unintended,<sup>xlii</sup> of its support to security forces on human rights. When gross misconduct by recipients of security assistance is identified, the United States should revisit its strategy. This can go from the review of its

curricula to address areas of need, to the suspension of its support in most extreme cases. In Guinea, US support to security forces seeks on the one hand to promote the reform of the security sector through the professionalization of non-military security forces to improve accountability, ensure the respect of civilians' rights and improve police-community relations and build mutual trust.<sup>xliii</sup>

US policy also focuses on assisting defense forces in preventing and countering security threats (violent extremism, maritime security, support to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINSUMA)). For instance, the United States provides the Guinean military with training of trainers, and supports the participation of officers in United Nations sensitization programs on the respect of human rights.<sup>xliv</sup> Selected Guinean battalions also participate in the Flintlock exercise to reinforce their capacities in countering violent-extremism as part of their engagement in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.<sup>xlv</sup>

A well-balanced policy, which supports both the rule of law and more traditional security components, is important to improve the performance of the security sector while also promoting respect for human rights. However, while there were no reports that Guinean officers involved in human rights violation in the 2020 elections had received training by the United States, US policy makers should continue paying close attention to the impact of its assistance to security forces in light of their continued gross misconduct. As past events have demonstrated, support to security forces can either be an enabler for peace or a catalyzer of destabilization, and greater emphasis on the rule of law should be favored by the United States to avoid the latter.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States should review its rhetoric on democracy both abroad and at home. The United States has been far from consistent in promoting free, fair, inclusive and transparent elections. It has often given free passes to authoritarian leaders when it served its interests. While the issue of values *versus* interests in the promotion of democracy merits its own debate, it is important to underline how such inconsistent communication can impede the United States' credibility and legitimacy as an advocate of democracy and a reliable partner for foreign countries and populations demanding democracy. In August 2020, following the military coup that deposed former President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in Mali, the United States rapidly expressed its concerns and announced the suspension of US military support in the country.<sup>xlvi</sup> However, in 2018, it "congratulate[d] the people of Cameroon for largely peaceful elections,"<sup>xlvii</sup> which saw President Biya elected for a seventh term, after 36 years in power. Similarly, the US recently voiced its support to President Moïse in Haiti,<sup>xlviii</sup> despite protests from right groups, legal scholars, and the Superior Council of the Judiciary, that his presidential term ended in February 2021. The judiciary institution stated in a Resolution signed on February 6 that it was "highly concerned by the grave threats resulting for the lack of political agreement in response to the expiration of the constitutional term of the President of the Republic, his excellency Mr. Jovenel Moïse, on February 7, 2021."<sup>xlix</sup>

Free passes to selected democratic backsliding across the world do not play in favor of US engagement abroad. As one expert I talked to said: "You should be able to be honest with your friends and not have to sacrifice your values because of potential repercussions on that friendship." When struggling to align values and interests, in particular when operating with backsliding or authoritarian regimes on sensitive issues such as democratic elections, the United States and its leaders should question the nature of their relations. US leaders should also set boundaries that would prevent needlessly sacrificing the country's values in favor of its interests, and that would empower them to deliver strong messages and hold their partners accountable. Addressing this issue implies that the United States should strive to respect its commitment to democracy abroad, but also at home – and in fact probably at home, first,<sup>1</sup> in order to lead by example.

The double standard often seen by the United States – and the international community – with respect to elections also calls into question the role of elections, and their actual impact on peace, security, and democracy. The voting process has become the democratic hymn for pro-democracy and peacebuilding actors, who showcase them as a proof of the success of foreign intervention, in particular in post-conflict contexts. Yet, empirical analysis demonstrates that rushing to organize elections in unstable conflict or post-conflict contexts may create further chaos, as the settings to ensure credible elections are often not laid down.<sup>li</sup>

Consider the case of the Central African Republic. The country received massive financial aid from the European Union (EU) for its 2020 president election – celebrated as a success by the government and the international community<sup>liii</sup> – even though the process was tainted by intimidation from armed groups, violence, voter exclusion,<sup>liiii</sup> and reports of other election irregularities.<sup>liv</sup> The appraisal of non-democratic elections by international actors, which ultimately “fail to bring out a political alternative,”<sup>lv</sup> raises concerns about the international community’s real interests. The debate around elections features some arguments that “repeated elections—regardless of their relative freeness or fairness—appear to have a positive impact on human freedom and democratic values.”<sup>lvi</sup> Others maintain that elections are a prerequisite for democracy development, through the legitimacy it offers to leaders,<sup>lvii</sup> while still others argue that without democratic institutions, peaceful credible elections are likely to fail.<sup>lviii</sup>

This testimony does not claim to offer a solution to this conundrum. After decades of aid from international actors, faux elections in countries such as Uganda and Cameroon, delayed elections such as in Guinea or Ethiopia, coupled with significant lack of human development and human rights violations, demonstrate the complexity of realities across the continent.

In short, elections should not be seen as a magic tool of democratization, as they can become undermine democracy when they are mere “hollow” processes. They need to be accompanied by efforts in all sectors – electoral institutions, civil society, political parties, and security forces – in order to have sustainable results and positive impact.<sup>lix</sup>

### Regional cooperation, a way forward to push forward

Foreign support for democracy often faces skepticism from local populations, due to the lack of understanding of foreign support, misperceptions, and disinformation. Greater efforts should be made to address these challenges by being more transparent in strategy-development, funding, and partnerships. Moreover, supporting African solutions and engagement from regional institutions, such as ECOWAS and the AU, foster intra-Africa cooperation and diplomacy that may also be conducive to greater acceptance of efforts aiming to advance credible and peaceful electoral processes.

ECOWAS’ Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance encapsulates the promotion of democracy and fair, free, credible, inclusive and transparent elections through the outlining of state members’ responsibilities to respect their constitution, ensure peaceful transitions of power, and enable civilian participation in decision-making, among other principles.<sup>lx</sup> However, despite ECOWAS efforts to adhere to them, the institution is regularly accused of passivity, bias, and double standards due to the lack of consistency “when democratic practices were threatened”<sup>lxi</sup> and its failure to have effective impact during electoral crises.<sup>lxii</sup>

Along the same lines, the AU’s Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa sets the framework for regional efforts in supporting countries across the continent to implement conducive settings for democratic elections.<sup>lxiii</sup> Yet, similar to ECOWAS, AU’s success in “the effective implementation of democratic ideals depends on the actions of the AU’s Member States.”<sup>lxiv</sup>

These challenges offer opportunities for greater collaboration between the United States and these regional institutions, and an opening for the United States to advance democracy through diverse strategies and approaches.

### Some final thoughts

Many of the recommendations above to support democratic elections in Africa allude to financial aid. However, amidst human rights and humanitarian crises affecting countries such as Ethiopia – whose president launched a military crackdown against Tigray People's Liberation Front in the Tigray region that resulted in gross human rights violation by the military against local populations<sup>lxv</sup> – the debate surrounding the provision of financial aid to authoritarian regimes has been renewed. One of the main arguments is that supporting authoritarian regimes might not necessarily push them towards democracy. Some critics promote the reduction of budget support in favor of initiatives targeting democracy strengthening, alongside the diversion of funding “from authoritarian states that show no progress on protecting civil liberties and political rights to countries that are improving in these areas.”<sup>lxvi</sup> For instance, the EU has recently announced the suspension of its budget support to Ethiopia over the Tigray conflict, as the government moved forward to restrain humanitarian access.<sup>lxvii</sup>

To evaluate the impact of its engagement and strategy to promote democracy and security on the continent, the United States should regularly and critically evaluate whether all of its aid programs are inadvertently providing support to authoritarian regimes or failing government,<sup>lxviii</sup> and carefully think about how to leverage aid. The question of funding versus aid cuts to pressure authoritarian regimes or support democratic efforts is complex, and this testimony does not claim to provide a clear answer. It rather proposes bringing sensitive issues to the forefront of the debate and generate further thinking around them. In this exercise, however, it is critical to keep in mind how decisions to either increase or decrease aid primarily affect civilian populations, and how to strategically balance their needs, democracy promotion, and US interests and values.

--

Thank you again, Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith and members of the sub-committee for inviting me to testify before you today. It was a great honor and pleasure. I am looking forward to answer any questions you may have.

---

<sup>i</sup> Freedom House. ‘Global Freedom Status’. Accessed 25 February 2021. <https://freedomhouse.org/explore-the-map?type=fiw&year=2020>.

<sup>ii</sup> World Bank. ‘Africa Overview’, 22 October 2020. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview>.

<sup>iii</sup> Elizabeth Shackelford. ‘U.S. Engagement in Africa Should Be Led by Civilians, Not the Military’. *Responsible Statecraft* (blog), 16 June 2020. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/06/16/u-s-engagement-in-africa-should-be-led-by-civilians-not-the-military/>.

<sup>iv</sup> The deputies’ mandate expired in January 2019. However, amidst fear among the opposition that President Condé would seek to change the Constitution thanks to a parliamentary majority, and in the absence of consensus about the electoral protocol between the majority and the opposition, the elections were delayed until March 2020. RFI. ‘Guinée: 16 février 2020, nouvelle date annoncée pour les législatives’. *RFI*, 10 November 2019. <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20191110-guinee-conakry-16-fevrier-2020-nouvelle-date-legislatives-ceni-salif-kebe>.

<sup>v</sup> ‘Guinea Holds Controversial Referendum Marred by Violence, Boycott’. *Al Jazeera*, 23 March 2020. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/23/guinea-holds-controversial-referendum-marred-by-violence-boycott>.

<sup>vi</sup> Reuters Staff. ‘Guinea Referendum Backs Constitutional Changes That May Extend President’s Rule’. *Reuters*, 27 March 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guinea-election-idUSKBN21E390>.

- vii Le Monde avec AFP. 'Guinée : le référendum constitutionnel et les législatives troublés par des violences'. *Le Monde*, 22 March 2020. [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/03/22/guinee-le-referendum-constitutionnel-et-les-legislatives-troubles-par-des-violences\\_6034026\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/03/22/guinee-le-referendum-constitutionnel-et-les-legislatives-troubles-par-des-violences_6034026_3212.html).
- viii Le Monde avec AFP. 'En Guinée, le parti du président, Alpha Condé, obtient une très large majorité parlementaire'. *Le Monde*, 2 April 2020. [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/04/02/en-guinee-le-parti-du-president-alpha-conde-obtient-une-tres-large-majorite-parlementaire\\_6035243\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/04/02/en-guinee-le-parti-du-president-alpha-conde-obtient-une-tres-large-majorite-parlementaire_6035243_3212.html).
- ix Jeune Afrique. 'Double scrutin en Guinée : l'OIF maintient son retrait du processus électoral, l'UA rappelle sa mission'. 28 February 2020. <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/903254/politique/double-scrutin-en-guinee-loif-maintien-son-retrait-du-processus-electoral-lua-rappelle-sa-mission/>.
- x Christophe Châtelot. 'Elections en Guinée : quand le coronavirus fait les affaires d'Alpha Condé'. *Le Monde*, 19 March 2020. [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/03/19/elections-en-guinee-quand-le-coronavirus-fait-les-affaires-d-alpha-conde\\_6033734\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/03/19/elections-en-guinee-quand-le-coronavirus-fait-les-affaires-d-alpha-conde_6033734_3212.html).
- xi 'Observatoire Statistiques 2019'. Observatoire Statistiques. Autorité de Régulation des Postes et Télécommunication, 3 March 2019. [https://www.arpt.gov.gn/sites/default/files/Documentation/observatoire\\_annuel\\_2019\\_0.pdf](https://www.arpt.gov.gn/sites/default/files/Documentation/observatoire_annuel_2019_0.pdf).
- xii Agnès Faivre. 'Élections en Guinée : bilan sanglant à Nzérékoré, capitale forestière'. *Le Point*, 26 March 2020. [https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/guinee-bilan-sanglant-a-nzerekore-capitale-forestiere-26-03-2020-2368885\\_3826.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/guinee-bilan-sanglant-a-nzerekore-capitale-forestiere-26-03-2020-2368885_3826.php).
- xiii Jack Cable, Zoe Huczok, and W.E. 'Who Are the President of Guinea's Facebook Trolls? The Blurry Line Between Modern Campaigning and Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior'. *Stanford Cyber Policy Center Internet Observatory* (blog), 21 September 2020. <https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/who-are-president-guineas-facebook-trolls-0>.
- xiv Directorate of Communication. 'Disclaimer Concerning a False Statement on Guinea Ascribed to the President of the ECOWAS Commission'. Economic Community of West African States, 11 February 2020. <https://www.ecowas.int/disclaimer-concerning-a-false-statement-on-guinea-ascribed-to-the-president-of-the-ecowas-commission/>.
- xv Dwyer, Maggie, and Tom Molony. *Social Media and Politics in Africa: Democracy, Censorship and Security*, 2019.
- xvi 'Guinea: Post-Election Violence, Repression'. *Human Rights Watch*, 19 November 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/19/guinea-post-election-violence-repression>.
- xvii 'Urgent Action: Five Activists in Detention'. Amnesty International, 28 November 2019. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR2914722019ENGLISH.pdf>.
- xviii Ibrahima Sory Diallo. 'Liberté de La Presse : Mis Aux Arrêts Plusieurs Fois, Le Journaliste Tidiane Diallo s'adresse Aux Autorités'. *Guinee Matin*, 3 May 2020. <https://guineematin.com/2020/05/03/liberte-de-la-presse-mis-aux-arrets-plusieurs-fois-le-journaliste-tidiane-diallo-sadresse-aux-autorites/>.
- xix NetBlocks. 'Internet Disrupted in Guinea Ahead of Presidential Election Result Announcement', 23 October 2020. <https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-guinea-ahead-of-presidential-election-result-announcement-DA3IQ3BW>.
- xx La Tribune Afrique. 2020. 'Présidentielle En Guinée : Lancement Des Opérations de Révision Exceptionnelle Des Listes Électorales'. *La Tribune*. 21 July 2020. <https://afrique.latribune.fr/politique/2020-07-21/presidentielle-en-guinee-lancement-des-operations-de-revision-exceptionnelle-des-listes-electorales-853215.html>.
- xxi Bob Barry. 'Forts soupçons sur le fichier électoral en Guinée'. DW, 20 February 2020. <https://www.dw.com/fr/forts-soup%C3%A7ons-sur-le-fichier-%C3%A9lectoral-en-guin%C3%A9e/a-52449557>.
- xxii Téa Bazdarevic. 'Elections En Guinée : La Diaspora Guinéenne Au Sénégal s'inquiète'. *Le Journal Afrique*. TV5 Monde, 24 October 2020. <https://information.tv5monde.com/video/elections-en-guinee-la-diaspora-guineenne-au-senegal-s-inquiete>.
- xxiii Jeune Afrique. 'Guinée : pourquoi Alpha Condé a fermé les frontières avec trois de ses six voisins'. *Jeune Afrique*, 4 October 2020, sec. News (General). <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1053041/politique/guinee-pourquoi-alpha-conde-a-ferme-les-frontieres-avec-trois-de-ses-six-voisins/>.
- xxiv 'Guinea: Deaths, Criminality in Post-Election Violence'. *Human Rights Watch*, 24 July 2018. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/24/guinea-deaths-criminality-post-election-violence>.
- xxv Agnès Faivre. Élections en Guinée.
- xxvi 'Marching to their deaths: urgent needs of justice for the victims of Guinea's crackdown on demonstrations'. AFR 29/2937/2020. Amnesty International, 1 October 2020, 18. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR2929372020ENGLISH.PDF>.
- xxvii 'Guinea: Post-Election Violence, Repression'. *Human Rights Watch*, 19 November 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/19/guinea-post-election-violence-repression>.
- xxviii Le Monde avec AFP. 'Guinée : le bilan officiel des violences s'alourdit, la médiation piétine'. *Le Monde*, 27 October 2020. [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/10/27/guinee-le-bilan-officiel-des-violences-s-alourdit-la-mediation-pietine\\_6057454\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/10/27/guinee-le-bilan-officiel-des-violences-s-alourdit-la-mediation-pietine_6057454_3212.html).
- xxix Cazabat, Christelle. 'Les stratégies de renforcement des organisations de la société civile en Afrique subsaharienne, nouvel éléphant blanc de l'aide au développement? L'exemple du Cameroun'. *Mondes en développement* n° 173, no. 1 (2016): 79. <https://doi.org/10.3917/med.173.0079>.



- 
- xxx Alpha Makanera and Goureissy Diallo. 'Dialogues communautaires à Conakry pour la prévention des conflits et la consolidation de la paix'. *UNICEF* (blog), 7 January 2021. <https://www.unicef.org/guinea/recits/dialogues-communautaires-%C3%A0-conakry-pour-la-pr%C3%A9vention-des-conflits-et-la-consolidation-de-la>.
- xxxii Bangaly Condé. 'Les femmes sous-représentées en politique en Guinée'. *DW*, 14 October 2020. <https://www.dw.com/fr/les-femmes-sous-repr%C3%A9sent%C3%A9es-en-politique-en-guin%C3%A9e/a-55276213>.
- xxxiii ACORD Guinée. 'Appui au renforcement des initiatives locales des jeunes pour la consolidation de la paix en Guinée'. Accessed 25 February 2021. <https://acord-guinee.org/cases/appui-au-renforcement-des-initiatives-locales-des-jeunes-pour-la-consolidation-de-la-paix-en-guinee/>.
- xxxiiii UNDP. 'Lancement Officiel Du Projet d'appui à La Participation Des Jeunes à La Prévention Des Conflits, En Période Électorale et La Pérennisation Des Synergies Locales Des Acteurs de Paix à Conakry et En Guinée Forestière', 17 September 2020. <https://www.gn.undp.org/content/guinea/fr/home/presscenter/articles/2020/lancement-officiel-du-projet-dappui-a-la-participation-des-jeune.html>.
- xxxv Tomas F. Husted, Alexis Arieff, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Nicolas Cook. 'U.S. Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview'. Congressional Research Service, 20 May 2020, 2. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46368.pdf>.
- xxxvi Ibid.
- xxxvii Daniel Mumbere. 'Turkey Joins United States, France on List of Countries with Troops in Africa'. *Africa News*, 14 January 2020. <https://www.africanews.com/2020/01/14/turkey-joins-united-states-france-on-list-of-countries-with-troops-in-africa/>.
- xxxviii Tokpanan Doré. 'Coopération militaire: le ministre Diané réceptionne des blindés américains pour l'armée guinéenne'. *Guinée News*, 16 August 2018. <https://www.guineenews.org/cooperation-militaire-le-ministre-diane-receptionne-des-blindes-americains-pour-larmee-guineenne/>.
- xxxix 'Guinea: "You Did Not Want the Military, so Now We Are Going to Teach You a Lesson". The Events of 28 September 2009 and Their Aftermath'. AFR 29/001/2010. Amnesty International, 29 January 2010. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/36000/afr290012010en.pdf>.
- xl 'Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated'. *Human Rights Watch*, 27 October 2009. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/27/guinea-september-28-massacre-was-premeditated>.
- xli Amnesty International, Guinea, 5.
- xlii Amnesty International, Marching to their death.
- xliii Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan Caverley. 'Training the Man on Horseback: The Connection between U.S. Training and Military Coups'. *War On The Rocks* (blog), 08 2017. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/training-the-man-on-horseback-the-connection-between-u-s-training-and-military-coups/>.
- xliiii United States Department of State. 'Guinea'. Accessed 25 February 2021. <https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/guinea/>.
- xliiii Kenya James. 'Formation et Partage d'information : Le Département de La Défense Des États-Unis En Guinée / Training and Information Sharing: U.S. Department of Defense in Guinea by The Drinking Gourd'. The Drinking Gourd. Accessed 26 February 2021. <https://anchor.fm/usembassyconakry/episodes/Formation-et-partage-dinformation--le-dpartement-de-la-Dfense-des-tats-Unis-en-Guine--Training-and-Information-Sharing-U-S--Department-of-Defense-in-Guinea-ecthcc>.
- xliiii Ambassade des Etats-Unis en Guinée. 'Le Groupement des Forces Spéciales (GFS) de l'Armée Guinéenne en route pour la Mauritanie', 12 February 2020. <https://gn.usembassy.gov/fr/le-groupement-des-forces-speciales-gfs-de-larmee-guineenne-en-route-pour-la-mauritanie/>.
- xliiii Tiemoko Diallo and Aaron Ross. 'U.S. Halts Military Cooperation with Mali as Coup Supporters Celebrate'. *Reuters*, 22 August 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-security-idUSKBN25H190>.
- xliiii U.S. Embassy in Cameroon. 'Cameroon's Presidential Election Results', 22 October 2018. <https://cm.usembassy.gov/camerouns-presidential-election-results/>.
- xliiii Amy Mackinnon and Robbie Gramer. 'Political Crisis in Haiti Poses Challenge for Biden's Democracy Push'. *Foreign Policy*, 10 February 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/10/haiti-political-crisis-biden-state-department-challenge/>.
- xliiii Haïti Standard. 'Le Conseil supérieur du pouvoir judiciaire confirme la fin du mandat du Président Jovenel Moïse'. Haïti Standard, 7 February 2021. <https://haitistandard.com/le-conseil-superieur-du-pouvoir-judiciaire-confirme-la-fin-du-mandat-du-president-jovenel-moise/>.
- <sup>1</sup> Emma Ashford. 'America Can't Promote Democracy Abroad. It Can't Even Protect It at Home.' *Foreign Policy* (blog), 7 January 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/07/america-cant-promote-protect-democracy-abroad/>.
- <sup>2</sup> Flores, Thomas Edward, and Irfan Nooruddin. 'The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction'. *The Journal of Politics* 74, no. 2 (April 2012): 558–70. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611001733>.
- <sup>3</sup> 'Central African Republic: Respect Final Results of the Election, UN and Partners Urge'. *UN News*, 5 January 2021. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081362>.

- 
- liii Julie Gacon. 'Centrafrique : comment s'organisent des élections dans un Etat failli ?' Les enjeux internationaux. Accessed 25 February 2021. <https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/les-enjeux-internationaux/les-enjeux-internationaux-emission-du-mardi-15-decembre-2020>.
- liiv Paul-Simon Handy. 'CAR Elections Expose the Depth of the Country's Crisis'. *ISS Africa* (blog), 13 January 2021. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/car-elections-expose-the-depth-of-the-countrys-crisis>.
- li v Thierry Vircoulon. 'Conflits : Derrière l'échec Des Interventions Internationales, La Crise Du Multilatéralisme'. *ID4D* (blog), 8 January 2021. <https://ideas4development.org/conflits-urgence-inventer-nouveau-modele/>.
- li vi Lindberg, Staffan I. 'The Surprising Significance of African Elections'. *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 1 (2006): 139–51, 139. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2006.0011>.
- li vii *Elections in Post-Conflict States: The Best Way to Legitimacy?* ODI, 2014. <https://www.odi.org/events/3971-elections-post-conflict-states-best-way-legitimacy>.
- li viii Flores, Thomas Edward, and Irfan Nooruddin. 'The Effect of Elections'.
- li ix *Elections in Post-Conflict States*.
- li x OHCHR. 'Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (A/SP1/12/01)', December 2001. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/ECOWASProtocol.aspx>.
- li xi Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 'ECOWAS Risks Its Hard-Won Reputation', 6 March 2020. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/ecowas-risks-its-hard-won-reputation/>.
- li xii Reuters Staff. 'Mali Opposition Rejects ECOWAS Proposals on Ending Political Crisis'. *Reuters*, 19 July 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-politics-idUSKCN24K0PG>.
- li xiii OHCHR. 'African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVIII), 2002', 2002. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/AHG.aspx>.
- li xiv 'Promoting Democracy and Peace in Africa: The Role of the African Union'. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, January 2016. <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/promoting-democracy-and-peace-in-africa-the-role-of-the-african-union.pdf>.
- li xv Michelle Gavin. 'The Conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray Region: What to Know'. *Council on Foreign Relations*, 10 February 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/conflict-ethiopia-tigray-region-what-know>.
- li xvi Nic Cheeseman. 'The Conflict in Ethiopia Calls Into Question Authoritarian Aid'. *Carnegie Europe*, 22 December 2020. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/12/22/conflict-in-ethiopia-calls-into-question-authoritarian-aid-pub-83515>.
- li xvii Maria Gerth-Niculescu. 'Ethiopia: EU Suspends Budget Support over Tigray Conflict'. *DW*, 16 December 2020. <https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-eu-suspends-budget-support-over-tigray-conflict/a-55944784>.
- li xviii Thierry Vircoulon. 'Repenser l'aide aux États faillis'. *The Conversation*, 30 January 2020. <http://theconversation.com/repenser-laide-aux-etats-faillis-130399>.