

Annex 1: Evidence of the LRA's Presence in Sudan-controlled territory from 2009-present

Enough Project

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The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has been present in Sudan and Sudanese-controlled territory since 2009 and continues to be present in these areas today, particularly the LRA leadership. There has been a significant body of evidence compiled by numerous organization, particularly the Enough Project, Resolve, and Invisible Children of the LRA's presence in Kafia Kingi and South Darfur state. This detailed evidence comes from several years of interviews with ex-LRA combatants, as well as through photographic evidence, from as recent as July 2015.

The LRA's presence in Sudan, in particular of its leader Joseph Kony, creates a critical safe haven for the rebel group and allows it to traffic elephant tusks and resupply its ammunition, food, and other supplies. Simply put, the LRA would not survive if it were not for its safe havens in Sudanese-held territory. Despite this fact, the African Union Regional Task Force of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) has not been allowed by the Sudanese government to operate in Sudan.

- As late as July 2015, there is at least one group of LRA present in Kafia Kingi, according to recent LRA defectors.
- LRA leader Joseph Kony currently has approximately 20 armed men with him in Kafia Kingi. By April 17, 2015, Kony's group was based near Mt Toussoro (geo coordinates 9.06667, 23.23333).
- Kony has rarely left Kafia Kingi since he moved there in early 2011. He moved to CAR in March 2012 for a short period of time but returned to the same area soon after. There are more than a dozen LRA 'positions' (areas where Kony and his group camps for a night or two) in this area that we have documented.
- As of July 2015, former LRA fighters reported that Kony has instructed most fighters to not disclose his presence to anyone outside of the LRA and to tell SAF soldiers that Kony is in CAR.
- For at least the past year, one of Kony's sons, Ali, and a trusted bodyguard have engaged in trading (barter) of ivory for food, ammunition and military uniforms with two Sudanese merchants from the town of Songo. The traders bring food, ammunition and uniforms on motorcycles to prearranged rendezvous points within Kafia Kingi. They meet with one of Kony's sons or trusted bodyguard and agree on number of tusks to be bartered for their goods. Exchanges have happened as frequently as three times a month.

- A group of seven defectors who surrendered to the UPDF in June 2015 (from Kony's groups in Kafia Kingi) came out with more than 350 rounds of ammunition, indications that Kony's group has received fresh supplies of ammo.
- Garamba National Park rangers in Congo reported finding spent ammunition rounds, believed to have been shot by LRA poachers. The rounds had Arabic writings on the casings, possibly rounds issued by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).
- Kony is in possession of an unspecified number of elephant tusks but it is believed to be around 50 pieces with a latest consignment arriving from DRC's Garamba park in early 2015. He then buried between 20-40 pieces alongside other tusks that groups brought before, likely in the third quarter of 2014.

LRA defectors who witnessed Joseph Kony's presence in Kafia Kingi and/or South Darfur or had heard about his presence in those areas from other LRA commanders

1. LRA combatant (Kony bodyguard). Date of defection: May 2015

- Kony spent a brief period in eastern CAR in October 2014, then in November 2014 he returned to Kafia Kingi. His group has been moving frequently around the CAR/Darfur/Kafia Kingi border area, often around the Umbelacha River in Kafia Kingi.
- In March 2015, Kony ordered one of his commanders to trade between 5-10 pieces of ivory with a Songo-based Sudanese merchant. The ivory was traded for food. The ivory had been collected by LRA commander Awila from Garamba National Park in mid-2014.

2. LRA combatant (Kony bodyguard). Date of defection: May 2015

- Was operating in DR Congo and eastern CAR during 2014. In March 2015 his group traveled to Kafia Kingi, where they met with Kony's group, near the Umbelacha and Pipi Rivers. They stayed in that border area until he escaped in May 2015.

3. LRA Commander Dominic Ongwen. Date of defection: January 2015

- "Kony told me that he wanted to take me to Darfur since Odhiambo had died, and because I was the most senior commander after him. But other commanders had told me that he planned to kill me from Darfur after saying the spirit told him I and several officers wanted to defect. But when we reached Darfur, he ordered for my arrest on December 14, 2014. While in prison, I was given 250 strokes of the cane. I was tied on a rope for a week and I could only pass bloody urine. Later some LRA commanders released me."

4. Sam Ouandja, CAR: FACA/UFDR/Gendarmarie joint meeting, 24/10/12

- When Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) forces pursued an LRA group in late 2010, the LRA were trying to cross the border into the Kafia Kingi enclave. UFDR

clashed with them at the border, allowing abductees to escape, but LRA combatants went across the border.

- People from Dafak in KK enclave (Note: Interviewees clearly distinguished Dafak from Um Dafok) cross the border and come to Sam Ouandja. Some of them have said that the LRA is cultivating fields south of Dafak.
- LRA abducted some Mbororo children in April 2012 and Mbororo followed them to the Ngi River (which they placed somewhere near the Kafia Kingi/CAR border) to rescue abducted children. LRA crossed into Kafia Kingi enclave after Mbororo attacked them.

5. Sam Ouandja, CAR. Dafak “refugee” camp, 25/10/12

- LRA have a camp 2 kilometers south of Dafak. Sudanese government gave them tools and land where they could cultivate. LRA have had a presence there for three years. People travel from Dafak to Sam Ouandja in the dry season, and have seen them there.
- Collaboration between LRA and SAF is like the collaboration between the FACA and UFDR.
- LRA camp south of Dafak is at a place called Garmadora, which was actually the village that many of the interviewed people present were from.... “The LRA is living in our home village.”
- LRA cultivates fields at a place called Shara-Jil, which is several km from Garmadora.
- They mentioned the LRA camp as being near the Bahar Arab River (more commonly known as Ambalacha), which they identified as the river that makes up part of the northern boundary of the Kafia Kingi enclave.
- Wives of the LRA come to the market to sell produce from their fields. They are armed and have shaved heads.

6. Raga, South Sudan. SPLA Military Intelligence

- In October/November 2011, Kony arrives in Dafak. Somewhere in this time period, SAF moves LRA camp closer to their Dafak barracks, about 8-10 kilometers southeast of the barracks. The area is very swampy and wet, with the barracks occupying a strategic high ground. A small stream divides the SAF barracks from the LRA camp. The SAF contingent is commanded by a Capt. Ali and contains 180-200 total troops.
- On 13 January 2012, LRA Lance Corporal Okot Robert Palabek is captured by SPLA southwest of Boro Madina after defecting from an LRA group in Kafia Kingi. Palabek states that SAF has given LRA uniforms and food.
- Since early 2012, LRA officers go on a “weekly” basis to Songo market with SAF escorts. Sometimes other LRA go as far as Dimbeshara and wait there. LRA presence in Songo market confirmed by human intelligence. LRA hasn’t gone to market as much during rainy season.

7. Testimony of Central African male, escaped from the LRA near Nzako, CAR. He was abducted by the LRA in February 2014.

- On the last mission he participated in to retrieve ivory, they returned to a location called Pipi in CAR around late April 2015 and delivered 20 tusks to Lamola. Lamola then sent the tusks to Sudan with an escort of 30 people.
- The Séléka gave the LRA some food for free between town of Sam Ouandja and Sudan, goods like sugar and rice.
- In Sudan the LRA is happy as they have everything they need and if there is something they just ask their partners or other LRA groups to go get it.

8. Testimony of Central African male, November 2014

- Martin said that when he escaped in November 2014, his group had mostly been in CAR and DRC, however, his group was on its way to Darfur when he escaped. According to Martin, they were going to Darfur to meet Kony.

9. Testimony of 25-year-old ex-combatant from South Sudan. Escaped late October 2014.

- In September 2014, two (2) LRA groups met and he was transferred to Owela's group, which was on its way to Darfur to meet Kony and get new orders/assignments for the group.
- Aligac's group: 7 officers, 9 soldiers, 20 women
- Owela's group: 9 officers, 8 soldiers, and 12 women

10. Central African traders based in Sam Ouandja

We have received credible reports from Central African traders that indicate traders in the Sam Ouandja and Kafia Kingi region are regularly meeting with LRA groups and trading food and supplies for ivory.


11. LRA Defector, October 2014

"Kony knows that everyone is aware that he is in Darfur [Kafia Kingi] now, so he is trying to confuse the enemy. He might leave some fighters there, but most will move into DRC to take attention away from him."

12. Community representatives in Sam Ouandja, eastern CAR, November 2014

"We know it's LRA from the way they do their "business," how they kill and abduct people. We don't know anyone else who does [it] like this. They came from the direction of southern Darfur, and the people in the group spoke different languages. Some spoke Arabic, and some spoke languages that we did not understand and had never heard before. [...] The group returned back towards Sudan."


APPENDIX A. MAP AND DETAILED TIMELINE OF REPORTED LRA ACTIVITY IN AND AROUND THE KAFIA KINGI ENCLAVE, 2009-2013



Description of the following images:

- “Index of images: • Figure 1: This satellite image from March 2012 shows where the LRA likely developed an encampment on the banks of the Umbelasha River, approximately seventeen kilometers southwest of a Sudanese military garrison within the Kafia Kingi enclave. © DigitalGlobe 2013 • Figure 2: This image, also from March 2012, zooms in on the rectangular area highlighted in Figure 1 and shows semi-permanent structures being built, presumably to shelter LRA members. © DigitalGlobe 2013 • Figure 3: The camp reached peak activity in December 2012 during harvest season. There are four separate areas with structures; only one central encampment features tukuls while the surrounding camps feature tents and other makeshift structures. © DigitalGlobe 2013 • Figure 4: The tukuls measure 6 meters in diameter, while the smaller tent-like structures measure approximately 1.5 meters by 4 meters. © DigitalGlobe 2013 • Figure 5: Side-by-side imagery from December 2012 and March 2013 shows that the camp was abandoned by March 2013.”¹


¹ Enough Project, Invisible Children, and The Resolve, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013” (April 2013), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/HiddeninPlainSight_Sudans_SupporttotheLRA_April2013.pdf.



² Enough Project, Invisible Children, and The Resolve, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013” (April 2013), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/HiddeninPlainSight_Sudans_SupporttotheLRA_April2013.pdf.



³ Enough Project, Invisible Children, and The Resolve, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013” (April 2013), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/HiddeninPlainSight_Sudans_SupporttotheLRA_April2013.pdf.




⁴ Enough Project, Invisible Children, and The Resolve, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013” (April 2013), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/HiddeninPlainSight_Sudans_SupporttotheLRA_April2013.pdf.



⁵ Enough Project, Invisible Children, and The Resolve, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013” (April 2013), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/HiddeninPlainSight_Sudans_SupporttotheLRA_April2013.pdf.

Figure 5: Side-by-side imagery from December 2012 and March 2013 shows that the camp was abandoned by March 2013. © DigitalGlobe 2013



December 1, 2012, 9 27 34 N, 23 55 18 E | © DigitalGlobe 2013

March 17, 2013, 9 27 34 N, 23 55 18 E | © DigitalGlobe 2013

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⁶ Enough Project, Invisible Children, and The Resolve, "Hidden in Plain Sight: Sudan's Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013" (April 2013), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/HiddeninPlainSight_Sudans_SupporttotheLRA_April2013.pdf.

- According to LRA defectors and other sources, LRA leader Joseph Kony himself first traveled to the Kafia Kingi enclave in 2010. He returned to Kafia Kingi in 2011 and was present there throughout parts of 2012. Along with other senior LRA commanders, he found safe harbor in a series of semi-permanent encampments on the banks of the Umbelasha River near the SAF barracks in Dafak. During that time, Kony continued to direct LRA attacks against civilians in neighboring countries and issue new orders for LRA fighters. The LRA abandoned the camps in early 2013 but may remain active in the enclave. Sudan's harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi enclave was the latest upswing in a cycle of opportunistic collaboration between the two parties that dates back to 1994.⁷
- Ugandan military troops, authorized as part of a regional African Union mission since November 2011, have continued counter-LRA operations with US support since the launch of Operation Lightning Thunder. Deployed primarily in CAR, they have reduced the LRA's numbers and succeeded in capturing or killing several senior commanders. However, the LRA has retained its capacity to terrorize civilians in Congo and CAR, abducting 517 people and committing 275 attacks in 2012 alone."⁸
- Perhaps the most effective adaptation the LRA has made since 2009 has been to quietly establish a periodic presence in the Kafia Kingi enclave. LRA fighters first entered the enclave and reestablished contact with the SAF in October 2009. The LRA then steadily expanded its presence in the enclave at least until early 2013, often using encampments there to shelter Joseph Kony and other senior LRA commanders. The areas of Kafia Kingi where the LRA established itself lie very close to Sudan's South Darfur state, and LRA forces have reportedly entered that region as well.
- At the very least, Kafia Kingi serves the LRA as a periodic safe haven from Ugandan forces authorized by the AU RCI-LRA. Some former LRA combatants even testify that Kony seeks to establish a more permanent presence in Kafia Kingi where LRA forces can seek asylum and even cultivate crops. Though the LRA had abandoned their established encampments in Kafia Kingi by March 2013, the area remains a potential safe haven for LRA groups to exploit.⁹
- In July 2009, the LRA made one of its initial attempts to travel to Kafia Kingi. This LRA group made it into Western Bahr el-Ghazal in South Sudan, which borders Kafia Kingi, but turned back towards CAR after clashing with SPLA forces. By this time, senior LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Bok Abudema, had fled to southeastern CAR from Congo's Garamba Park. In September 2009, Otto Agweng led another LRA delegation composed of about 30 combatants who left CAR in an attempt to reestablish contact with the SAF in Kafia Kingi. In October 2009, Agweng's group

⁷ Enough Project, Invisible Children, and The Resolve, "Hidden in Plain Sight: Sudan's Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013" (April 2013), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/HiddeninPlainSight_Sudans_SupporttotheLRA_April2013.pdf.

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succeeded in reaching Kafia Kingi. They made contact with the SAF garrison at Dafak, in northern Kafia Kingi, and established a temporary camp east of the garrison. Two LRA officers succeeded in establishing contact and delivering a letter from senior LRA commanders to the SAF. Representatives from the SAF garrison in Dafak and Sudanese military intelligence then met with the larger LRA delegation near their temporary camp. According to eyewitness testimony from two former LRA members, the SAF supplied the LRA with limited food as well as basic medical supplies for injured LRA fighters.”¹⁰

- In late 2010, an LRA delegation led by Joseph Kony arrived in Kafia Kingi and made contact with the SAF garrison at Dafak. Kony himself did not meet with the SAF representatives but stayed nearby as LRA Capt. Otim Ferry coordinated the LRA’s interaction. The delegation split into several small groups upon leaving Kafia Kingi, while Kony tasked Ferry with remaining there and establishing a more permanent presence near Dafak. Ferry was left with a force of about 20 fighters. Kony’s trip into Kafia Kingi coincided with a period of intensified LRA attacks near the enclave. He reportedly ordered LRA fighters to get food from CAR to supply the delegation during its stay in Kafia Kingi. Between September 3 and October 26, 2010, LRA forces committed eight attacks in the adjacent Vakaga prefecture of CAR, abducting dozens of people and looting food and other supplies. During these raids, LRA groups clashed with several CAR rebel groups active in the area, which pursued the LRA attackers on several occasions. One of these groups, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), pursued an LRA raiding party until it crossed the border from CAR back into Kafia Kingi. Some attacks, such as an October 2010 raid on Birao, in which the LRA abducted 23 people, may have been committed by splinter LRA groups returning from Kafia Kingi to CAR. Kony left Kafia Kingi to return to CAR in November or December 2010.”¹¹
- Kony and other senior LRA commanders reportedly remained at their encampments in Kafia Kingi throughout much of 2012, though Kony may have also spent significant time in neighboring areas of northeastern CAR.¹²

¹⁰ Enough Project, Invisible Children, and The Resolve, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013” (April 2013), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/HiddeninPlainSight_Sudans_SupporttotheLRA_April2013.pdf.

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