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**U.S. House of Representatives
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe**

“Arms Control, International Security, and U.S. Assistance to Europe: Review and Reforms for the State Department”

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Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee and provide specific recommendations for potential reforms for key bureaus at the U.S. Department of State and our foreign policy system.

Many share the urgency of transforming our policies and government to advance U.S. security and interests, deliver for the American people, and leave the U.S. well-positioned for years to come.

Others consumed with maintaining the status quo and the largesse of the bureaucratic state, appear to have forgotten the fundamental truth that our government derives its “just powers” and authorities from “the consent of the governed” as stated in the Declaration of Independence, and that all who serve the nation are accountable to the American people.

This was my guiding principle during over 20 years of U.S. government service in the Legislative and Executive branches. It also directed my approach to today’s hearing, with my testimony focusing on the Arms Control and International Security (T) family at the Department of State.

Assessment

I firmly believe the work of the T family—where diplomacy, intelligence, and defense converge—is an important tool in the U.S. arsenal of national security instruments of power.

Overarching Questions

Is the T family aligned with an America First approach where their functions advance U.S. national security and maximize the return on U.S. investments, including vis-a-vis programs/funds, overseas missions, and at international organizations under their areas of responsibility? Is there duplication, waste, fraud, or abuse?

Are the T office and current T family of bureaus performing their duties as statutorily prescribed and delivering the highest quality most efficiently?

Does the T family reflect the current threat environment while looking to the future and adapting its structure and programs to identify, deter, and safeguard against emerging threats entirely consistent with statutory requirements and direction?

Given that the T family is at the nexus of several Executive Orders and a National Security Presidential Memorandum, is the T family responsive to, and taking actions following, these Presidential directives?

Context

I was a professional staff member on this Committee during:

- the hearings, debates, negotiations, adoption of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act; the creation of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (T) and bureaus in the T family, specifically the Verification and Compliance Bureau (known as the Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Bureau when I served as Assistant Secretary and now referred to as the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability.) Notably, the formal nominations by the President are for Verification and Compliance, per statute; and
- during three separate reorganization efforts under the administrations of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama.

Conducted oversight of these proposals, the T family, and the Department of State and U.S. assistance writ large throughout, including as Republican Minority and Majority Staff Director, before being nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate to serve at the Department.

Serving in an agency established at the very foundation of our Republic was both an extraordinary privilege and a profoundly fulfilling experience. The role afforded numerous opportunities for meaningful accomplishments and contributions to national security, advancing President Donald Trump's America First agenda.

During my tenure, I was struck not only by the dedication and talent of some but also by the challenges and institutional obstacles that required urgent attention. Here are a few of my general observations:

Observations

- There are brilliant, dedicated, forward thinking professionals and true public servants and patriots– from the scientific experts, such as the nuclear chemist with scores of patents contributing to U.S. security, superiority, deterrence and defense and, some, directly benefiting the American people and humanity; to the military personnel, technical and policy experts who apply their diverse backgrounds and experience to ensuring security, stability and peace via diplomatic means.
- The value of the statutory imprimatur to diplomatic success cannot be overstated. This was crystallized during my bilateral engagements, presentations to the North Atlantic Council and United Nations fora, negotiations, and other efforts on, for example, Russian noncompliance (violations) of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty leading to the U.S. withdrawal. The fact that the post of Assistant Secretary–my authorities and responsibilities–and the Bureau–its mandate, functions, scope, reports– were responsive to needs identified by the Congress and were intertwined with the will of the American people via their representatives, was indispensable to securing allied and partner support and cooperation.
- Similarly, Congressional support and engagement are critical to the dutiful implementation of policy and statutory requirements and any necessary programmatic, fiscal, and management accountability or reforms.
- There were also areas in need of much improvement. Decades after the FARRA Act and creation/inception of the Arms Control and International Security family, there are those pining for a return to the status quo ante and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
- Others have been seized by nativism, losing focus of U.S. interests, priorities, and objectives and, instead, advocating for international organizations and views of foreign interlocutors. This, in turn, influenced policy and funding recommendations and, had it not been corrected, could have had negative consequences.
- The Eurocentrism/Euro dominance stemming from Cold War dynamics, arms treaties, and agreements has led to the usurpation of some T family responsibilities, particularly relating to verification and compliance.

The Committee report accompanying the relevant legislation enacted into law underscores the supremacy of this T bureau over *“policy and resources for verification and compliance regarding not only various treaties, but also executive agreements and commitments, including those falling within the purview of regional bureaus when such agreements or commitments pertain to arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament.”*

I further observed:

- Ignorance of statutes and contempt for Congress.
- The utilization by the Intelligence Community of findings and assessments by international organizations, instead of providing policymakers and decision makers, such as myself as Assistant Secretary, with U.S. intelligence and assessments to evaluate and consider in making determinations pursuant to statutory authorities and mandates.
- Hiding of intelligence, despite clearances, and of individual IC views, particularly in the Compliance Report.
- State/INR and certain other components of the IC are acting as policymakers, providing biased and politically charged information instead of objective and honest assessments to the decision makers. This places the nation at risk as delays in documenting and appropriately and effectively addressing noncompliance can perpetuate and compound the dangers to U.S. security.
- Manipulation of clearance processes to usurp statutory roles and authorities of decision makers and advance personal or ideological agendas. Examples include scope, content, determinations relating to the Compliance Report; personnel in the Office of the Legal Advisor reversing previously cleared determinations and approved language on such matters as Iranian violations of UNSC Resolutions; Assistant Secretary-level clearances changed before they reached the Secretary's desk.
- Undue influence of and interference from NGOs. There is a revolving door from and to the T family and NGOs; funding decisions based on past/ future employment ties/opportunities; NGO fundraising off of USG association and programs.
- A few documented conflicts of interests and wasteful spending by Bureau personnel. One example involved a member of the team responsible for the Verification Fund. Upon immediate review, I reversed the individual's approval of and funding for dubious projects and removed the individual involved from the Verification Fund team. The individual proceeded to engage in rampant and overt insubordination in executing his other responsibilities, and any attempts at reasoning, accountability, or reassignment were met with threats of administrative or other retaliatory action against me. Rather than support accountability measures in this and other instances, administrative offices and leadership above me empowered and promoted the individual.

Regrettably, some of the same dynamics may still be at play at the Department as Secretary of State Rubio leads the optimization and reorganization process ordered by President Trump.

Recommendations

The origin of my review and recommendations is statute, combined with Congressional intent and views delineated in Committee reports and Member statements accompanying legislative history. Recommendations are focused on delivering tangible results that will have immediate and durable impact. Some apply to both the T family and EUR.

Overarching

To succeed in reforming, realigning, streamlining, downsizing, there must be:

1. Clear guidance and leadership on the agenda, priorities, scope, and metrics to justify: personnel needs, programs, and funding that effectively and verifiably make the U.S. safer and stronger.
2. Clear lines of demarcation.
3. A clear understanding of the role of international organizations, treaties, agreements, and alliances as valuable tools in the U.S. diplomatic arsenal. However, they are not ends in themselves nor should be viewed in isolation from the application of other elements of U.S. power and global leadership.
4. Burden sharing must be a statutory requirement for all State Department bureaus with international organizations in their areas of jurisdiction.
5. End the practice of rewarding mediocrity and insubordination by promoting poor performers and problematic personnel out of existing roles. Authorities are needed to effectively address insubordination and unauthorized engagement with outside actors, including leaks to the media, which undermine U.S. security and policy priorities.

Transparency/Honesty in Reporting

If a review has not already taken place, there should be an immediate halt of all activities pertaining to reports until a T and respective bureau leaders appointed by the President, working with Presidential appointees at the National Security Council and at relevant agencies, have reviewed the intelligence and the draft reports to ensure fulsome, accurate, honest reporting and that the information and determinations meet statutory requirements. If such a review process may delay submission to Congress, notification and justification would be required for Congressional support

Going forward:

1. Stop overclassification to hide information from Congress and the American people.

2. Return to Unclassified reports with classified TS/SCI Annex as mandated by statute.
3. No versions of intermediate classification.
4. Classified versions shall not contain unclassified information that was not included in the unclassified report.
5. T family leadership should be provided access to intelligence pre-distillation and assessments with dissenting views.
6. Reports shall no longer be mere updates from prior years.
7. Dramatically increase the scope of the Compliance Report in terms of the subject matter covered and the information used to inform the judgments in the document. The Compliance Report must be expanded to include treaties and agreements of new global domains and must be consistent in the inclusion of Chapter VII UNSCRs the U.S. supports. While ISN is the lead for the Department of State on 123 Agreements, with the technical assistance and concurrence of DOE/NNSA and in consultation with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Bureau tasked with verification and compliance must be integrated into the process to ensure compliance can be effectively verified. Consideration should also be given to the inclusion of compliance or noncompliance for nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign governments already covered in other sections of the Compliance Report.

Optimization

1. T has to be fully integrated. No more marginalization or subordination to regional bureaus.
2. T should reflect the current landscape, including messaging. Consider changing the name and scope to Undersecretary for Global Security and Strategic Domains.
3. ADS—statutorily Verification and Compliance— should be renamed Security, Verification and Compliance and its jurisdiction expanded as described below.
4. Eliminate Congressional and Public Affairs offices and personnel within bureaus. All these requests should go through the Department’s respective bureaus and offices to ensure maximum coordination and message cohesion. **One Nation. One Message.**
5. Eliminate all fellowships for State Department personnel in Congress until Congressional staff are afforded reciprocal access to the State Department.
6. Eliminate the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) and make T part of the Defense Science Board, Space Council, and other such entities relevant to the work of the T family.
7. Eliminate the Political Military Affairs Bureau (PM) in T and place functions in regional bureaus. In principle, other policy considerations are to be considered and Congressional holds are to ensure PM activities are balanced against other priorities and equities. In practice, arms sales are viewed primarily as U.S. job creators, justified as necessary to offset the activities of other countries or to retain U.S. comparative advantage, and/or vital

to U.S. defense priorities and needs, including interoperability. Other equities cannot compete and the process is on autopilot.

8. Eliminate or reduce/reform the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) and bring matters pertaining to the Antarctic Treaty, Arctic Affairs, Artemis Accords (given based on Outer Space Treaty), Space Traffic Management (already handled by the ESC office in ADS) to a revamped and renamed ADS Bureau.
9. No more Foreign Service Officers in the T family. Their skill set is better suited elsewhere. FSOs can remain eligible to compete for OPCW, CD, IAEA CoM (if available). As the Assistant Secretary overseeing these missions, I was responsible for the selection, after vetting, and presentation to the D Committee, of candidates to serve as Permanent Representatives to the OPCW and CD. Both were, ultimately, FSOs.
10. Afford greater opportunities for promotion to technical/scientific talent and greater flexibility in accessing the same from other agencies and, as practicable, from the private sector.
11. All matters relating to the Biological Weapons Convention portfolio, compliance with the NPT and Safeguards Agreements, among others, should be moved to respective ADS (proposed to be renamed SVC) offices. (There is too much overlap, and the 2014/15 OIG Report recognized that.)
12. Merge SVC (currently ADS) Regional Security Cooperation office and Multilateral and Nuclear Affairs office into Multilateral Security and Cooperation
13. Eliminate ISN's Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, Office of Policy Coordination, and Office of the Biological Policy Staff; consolidate the nuclear offices; and consolidate AORs and functions of other offices for a maximum number of six (6) offices, accompanied by a reduction of personnel to eliminate duplication, for a total comparable to other T bureaus.
14. Funds and assistance programs should be consolidated into one dedicated office—similar to regional bureaus—with an oversight mandate.
15. While maintaining flexibility in adjustments/changes to AORs within bureaus, Congress should consider whether it is necessary to statutorily cap the number of offices to ensure reduction of personnel (FTEs) to reflect such reorganization. Congress should consider changing the Congressional notification process for any future AOR or structural change to require active, rather than passive, approval by the committees of jurisdiction.

These recommendations aim to assist the Members of this Committee in their oversight and authorization responsibilities, as reviews are concluded and reforms are instituted pursuant to the President's directives, guidance from Cabinet Secretaries, the Office of Management and Budget, and Office of Personnel Management.

Conclusion

The T family—the European and Eurasian Affairs bureau, other bureaus and the Department, and foreign policy and programs—can become more efficient and make the U.S. safer, stronger, and more prosperous, ushering in a new era of American leadership and greatness while advancing security and peace.