

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 2504
OFFERED BY MR. KEATING OF MASSACHUSETTS**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “The U.S.-European
3 Nuclear Energy Cooperation Act of 2026”.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federa-
7 tion initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which
8 has severely disrupted international energy markets
9 and threatened energy security in Europe and
10 around the world, with significant impacts in the
11 United States.

12 (2) The security of Ukraine’s energy grid has
13 been vital to Ukraine’s success in its defense of its
14 territory and ensuring the Ukrainian government
15 can effectively provide goods and services to Ukrain-
16 ian citizens.

1 (3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power
2 plants with 15 reactors, primarily Russian-designed
3 water-water energetic reactor (VVER) reactors.

4 (4) Russia, in its war of aggression against
5 Ukraine, has systematically targeted Ukraine's en-
6 ergy infrastructure through heavy shelling and tar-
7 geted attacks, particularly in the winter months
8 when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulner-
9 able.

10 (5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have ille-
11 gally occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Sta-
12 tion, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and
13 Russian forces have surrounded the station with
14 landmines, further threatening regional security.

15 (6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been
16 built across Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria,
17 the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia,
18 Turkey, and Ukraine.

19 (7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs
20 and fuel services to spread malign influence and
21 threaten United States and European energy secu-
22 rity.

23 (8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent
24 of the total uranium conversion infrastructure world-

1 wide and in 2020, had the largest uranium enrich-
2 ment capacity at close to 46 percent.

3 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear
6 power industry, the Department of State should
7 prioritize the utilization of products and services
8 from the United States, and, where appropriate and
9 not directly competing with United States industry,
10 from allied and partner countries, including Canada,
11 Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of
12 Korea. This includes supporting ongoing civil nu-
13 clear cooperation with European allies and partners
14 that advance mutual energy security and strategic
15 objectives;

16 (2) the United States and its allies should en-
17 hance cooperation, including capacity building and
18 early-stage project support, to expand the nuclear
19 industry in Europe in a way that maintains non-
20 proliferation, security, and safety standards and
21 aligns with international obligations and treaties
22 while combating Russia and China's malign influ-
23 ence;

24 (3) the United States should continue to pursue
25 the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use

1 of Small Modular Reactor Technology program,
2 using it as a strategic tool to support partner coun-
3 tries in building safe, secure, and flexible nuclear
4 power programs, including early-stage planning such
5 as Front-End Engineering and Design (FEED)
6 studies;

7 (4) the United States should prioritize the de-
8 velopment of a secure and resilient domestic nuclear
9 fuel supply chain, including uranium conversion, en-
10 richment, and high-assay low-enriched uranium pro-
11 duction, to reduce reliance on foreign state-owned
12 enterprises, strengthen energy security, and advance
13 United States economic competitiveness and national
14 security; and

15 (5) the United States should work with Euro-
16 pean allies and partners that currently rely on nu-
17 clear fuel cycle services or reactor technologies sup-
18 plied by the Russian Federation to diversify supply
19 arrangements, improve energy resilience, and en-
20 hance regional and transatlantic energy security.

21 **SEC. 4. STRATEGY.**

22 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State,
23 in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall develop
24 a strategy to strengthen United States-European nuclear

1 energy cooperation and combat Russian malign influence
2 in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

3 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy re-
4 quired by subsection (a) shall include the following:

5 (1) An overview and assessment of the Sec-
6 retary’s efforts to broaden participation by United
7 States nuclear industry entities in Europe and pro-
8 mote the accessibility and competitiveness of United
9 States, European, and partner technologies and
10 services against public and private technologies from
11 Russia and China in Europe.

12 (2) An overview of different nuclear reactor
13 types that are currently deployed or under regu-
14 latory review in Europe, including large light-water
15 reactors, small modular light-water reactors, and
16 non-light-water reactors, and—

17 (A) what role, if any, each reactor type
18 could have in reducing the Russian Federation’s
19 influence over European energy supply by 2030,
20 2035, 2040, 2045, and 2050;

21 (B) challenges that each reactor type may
22 face with rapid deployment, including costs,
23 market barriers to first-of-a-kind designs, sup-
24 ply chain constraints, and regulatory require-
25 ments;

1 (C) the impacts of each reactor type on
2 maintaining strong nonproliferation standards,
3 including the minimization of weapons-usable
4 nuclear material; and

5 (D) opportunities for the use of United
6 States, European, and partner technologies and
7 services in the deployment or potential deploy-
8 ment of each reactor type.

9 (3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are
10 currently deployed or under consideration in Europe,
11 including use of low enriched uranium, including
12 high assay low enriched uranium, and spent fuel re-
13 processing, along with an analysis of the implica-
14 tions of each fuel cycle on—

15 (A) reducing and eliminating Russia's
16 market share in Europe for uranium, conver-
17 sion, enrichment, and reactor fuel between now
18 and 2030;

19 (B) achieving long-term energy security
20 free of Russian influence; and

21 (C) maintaining strong nonproliferation
22 standards, including the minimization of weap-
23 ons-usable material as well as high nuclear safe-
24 ty and security standards.

1 (4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and
2 fuel cycle infrastructure that the United States Gov-
3 ernment is currently funding the development of,
4 and—

5 (A) the potential, if any, that each of these
6 technologies have to decrease or eliminate Rus-
7 sia's market share in the United States and
8 Europe for nuclear power reactors, uranium
9 mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel
10 fabrication, deconversion, and spent nuclear
11 fuel reprocessing in the short, medium, and
12 long term;

13 (B) the impact of these technologies on the
14 minimization of weapons-usable nuclear mate-
15 rial, including the use of highly enriched ura-
16 nium or plutonium fuels; and

17 (C) an assessment of the use cases for
18 each of these designs and fuel cycles.

19 (5) An overview of the United States Govern-
20 ment's diplomatic engagements regarding the nu-
21 clear energy sector in Europe.

22 (6) A list of countries in Europe with active nu-
23 clear power programs, and—

1 (A) an analysis of each country's nuclear
2 energy policy and capacity for nuclear waste
3 management and storage;

4 (B) an overview of existing areas of co-
5 operation with regards to nuclear energy be-
6 tween each country and—

7 (i) the United States;

8 (ii) other European and friendly coun-
9 tries; and

10 (iii) adversarial countries including
11 China and Russia;

12 (C) an overview of potential areas for fu-
13 ture cooperation between each country and the
14 United States with regards to nuclear energy;
15 and

16 (D) a summary of fuel types used in each
17 country's nuclear power programs.

18 (7) An overview of Russian Federation and
19 People's Republic of China influence in the Euro-
20 pean nuclear energy sector.

21 (8) An overview of how the United States Gov-
22 ernment is working with allies and partners to
23 counter Russian malign influence within the Euro-
24 pean energy sector to include steps taken to counter
25 Russian influence in the mining and milling, conver-

1 sion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as
2 well as in reactor construction.

3 (9) An overview of how the United States Gov-
4 ernment balances the urgent strategic need for col-
5 laboration with allies and partners on countering
6 Russia's influence on nuclear energy in Europe, with
7 commercial competitiveness issues that may arise be-
8 tween United States companies and companies in
9 Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

10 (10) An assessment of Rosatom's role in Rus-
11 sia's energy sector, to include an overview of
12 strengths and vulnerabilities of the conglomerate.

13 (c) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 180 days after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
15 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
16 the strategy required by subsection (a).

17 (d) FORM.—The strategy required by subsection (a)
18 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
19 a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided sepa-
20 rately from the unclassified strategy.

21 **SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.**

22 In this Act:

23 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
24 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
25 mittees” means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
2 the House of Representatives;

3 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
4 the Senate;

5 (C) the Committee on Energy and Com-
6 merce of the House of the Representatives; and

7 (D) the Committee on Energy and Natural
8 Resources of the Senate.

9 (2) HIGH ASSAY LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—

10 The term “high assay low enriched uranium” means
11 uranium enriched so that the concentration of the
12 fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is between 5
13 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.

14 (3) LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—The term “low
15 enriched uranium” means fuel in which the weight
16 percent of U-235 in the uranium is less than 20 per-
17 cent.

