

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5300
OFFERED BY MR. MEEKS OF NEW YORK

At the appropriate place, add the following:

1 **SECTION ____.** **SHORT TITLE.**

2 This section may be cited as the “Ukraine Support
3 Act”.

4 **TITLE I—DIPLOMACY AND**
5 **SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE**

6 **SEC. 101. AFFIRMING SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE.**

7 (a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress finds the following:

8 (1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federa-
9 tion launched an unprovoked and brutal full-scale in-
10 vasion of Ukraine, violating Ukraine’s sovereignty
11 and territorial integrity, subjecting the nation to
12 acts of aggression that have threatened its independ-
13 ence and security.

14 (2) For three years, the people of Ukraine have
15 demonstrated extraordinary resilience, courage, and
16 determination in the face of relentless attacks on
17 their homes, communities, sovereignty, and funda-
18 mental freedoms.

1 (3) Since the beginning of the invasion, Russia
2 has engaged in widespread and systematic war
3 crimes, including—

4 (A) deliberate targeting of civilian infra-
5 structure, including residential buildings,
6 schools, hospitals, and evacuation corridors;

7 (B) the forced deportation and kidnapping
8 of at least 19,000 Ukrainian children to Rus-
9 sian-controlled territories in an attempt to erase
10 Ukrainian identity;

11 (C) the destruction of Ukraine's agricul-
12 tural and energy infrastructure to create hu-
13 manitarian crises and disrupt global food sup-
14 ply chains; and

15 (D) the use of torture, extrajudicial
16 killings, and mass graves in occupied Ukrainian
17 territories, as documented by the United Na-
18 tions, the International Criminal Court, and
19 leading human rights organizations.

20 (4) Despite these atrocities, the people of
21 Ukraine remain unyielding, demonstrating that their
22 spirit and commitment to self-determination cannot
23 be extinguished.

24 (5) The Russian Federation, despite its over-
25 whelming use of force, has suffered catastrophic

1 military losses, with estimates exceeding 800,000
2 casualties, illustrating that President Vladimir
3 Putin's war of conquest has become both a strategic
4 failure and a humanitarian disaster for Russia.

5 (6) Ukraine, despite facing an adversary with a
6 far larger population, army, and military arsenal,
7 continues to fight courageously for its sovereignty,
8 demonstrating its resilience and determination.

9 (7) Russia's war has destabilized global secu-
10 rity, undermining the principles of sovereignty and
11 nonaggression and emboldening authoritarian re-
12 gimes seeking to redraw international borders by
13 force.

14 (8) The United States, the North Atlantic
15 Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union,
16 and allied nations have demonstrated historic unity
17 in their support for Ukraine, reaffirming their com-
18 mitment to upholding international law, territorial
19 integrity, and democratic values.

20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
21 gress that the United States—

22 (1) recognizes that discussions surrounding the
23 future of Ukraine must include Ukraine;

24 (2) condemns in the strongest possible terms
25 the Russian Federation's ongoing war crimes, its

1 targeted destruction of Ukrainian society, and its
2 blatant violations of international law;

3 (3) reaffirms its commitment to the people of
4 Ukraine and the principles of sovereignty, independ-
5 ence, and territorial integrity within internationally
6 recognized borders;

7 (4) urges the immediate and unconditional
8 withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukrainian ter-
9 ritory, including Crimea and the Donbas, and af-
10 firms that any negotiations must be based on
11 Ukraine's sovereignty, not dictated by Russian ulti-
12 matums;

13 (5) demands international institutions take de-
14 cisive action to ensure the safe return of at least
15 19,000 kidnaped Ukrainian children, recognizing
16 that their forced deportation is a war crime and an
17 act of genocide under international law;

18 (6) supports the continued prosecution of Vladi-
19 mir Putin and Russian political and military leaders
20 for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and geno-
21 cide, reinforcing that those who orchestrate such
22 atrocities must be held accountable before the world;
23 and

1 (7) stresses that any sustainable peace deal
2 must be built with Ukraine and our European allies
3 at the table.

4 **SEC. 102. REAFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

6 (1) The United States and its democratic allies
7 and partners face unprecedented international chal-
8 lenges and evolving threats to global security.

9 (2) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
10 (NATO) was founded on April 4, 1949, to counter
11 Soviet expansion, prevent further world wars in Eu-
12 rope, and strengthen transatlantic security, and is
13 built on the democratic principles of freedom, secu-
14 rity, and national sovereignty.

15 (3) Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty un-
16 derpins the principle of “collective defense” and has
17 served as a guiding value of United States foreign
18 policy for over 75 years.

19 (4) The United States’ commitment to Article
20 5 enhances deterrence against adversaries such as
21 Russia, China, and Iran that seek to spread their
22 malign influence.

23 (5) The unity of NATO allies strengthens col-
24 lective security and the stability of democratic
25 states.

1 (6) NATO serves as a bulwark against the pro-
2 liferation of malign influence, technologies, and de-
3 stabilizing operations by adversaries.

4 (7) Authoritarian regimes such as Russia,
5 China, Iran, and North Korea have increased col-
6 laboration in political, economic, and security sectors
7 to undermine democratic principles.

8 (8) In the only invocation of Article 5, NATO
9 allies provided military and intelligence support to
10 the United States following the September 11, 2001,
11 attacks, and many NATO allies incurred significant
12 casualties in Afghanistan.

13 (9) NATO has remained steadfast in its sup-
14 port for Ukraine, with member countries providing
15 military and non-security assistance, strengthening
16 Ukraine's defense capabilities, and imposing costs on
17 Russia for its illegal invasion.

18 (10) Finland and Sweden made the sovereign
19 decision to accede to NATO following Russia's inva-
20 sion of Ukraine.

21 (11) NATO continues to address systemic chal-
22 lenges posed by China to Euro-Atlantic interests and
23 security.

24 (12) NATO member states have strengthened
25 their defense and cyber capabilities, including

1 through the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the
2 North Atlantic (DIANA) program.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) the United States reaffirms its full and un-
6 wavering commitment to NATO;

7 (2) NATO remains vital to United States na-
8 tional security interests and the United States re-
9 mains fully committed to defending its allies under
10 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

11 (3) NATO's open-door policy is essential to Eu-
12 ropean security, and every sovereign state has the
13 right to determine its security arrangements, includ-
14 ing Ukraine;

15 (4) the United States remembers and honors
16 the thousands of NATO coalition soldiers who sac-
17 rificed their lives following the invocation of Article
18 5 after the September 11, 2001, attacks;

19 (5) all NATO allies should dedicate at least 2
20 percent of their gross domestic product to national
21 defense or establish concrete plans to meet their 2
22 percent obligations by the Washington Summit; and

23 (6) NATO allies must continue cooperation in
24 advanced defense technologies, counter-intelligence,
25 and cybersecurity programs to counter evolving

1 threats from adversaries such as Russia, China, and
2 Iran.

3 **SEC. 103. CONDEMNING THE KIDNAPPING OF UKRAINIAN**
4 **CHILDREN.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

6 (1) On January 12, 1951, the Convention on
7 the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
8 Genocide (commonly known as the “Genocide Con-
9 vention”) entered into force. The Russian Federa-
10 tion is a party to the Convention and is therefore
11 bound by its obligations.

12 (2) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federa-
13 tion escalated its 8-year occupation of sovereign
14 Ukrainian territory by launching a full-scale,
15 unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

16 (3) Russian armed forces have committed wide-
17 spread and systematic atrocities against Ukrainian
18 civilians, including the targeting of civilian infra-
19 structure and protected sites.

20 (4) On March 9, 2022, Russian forces attacked
21 a maternity hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine, resulting
22 in the deaths of 5 individuals and injuries to 17 oth-
23 ers, in violation of international humanitarian law.

24 (5) On March 22, 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry
25 of Foreign Affairs announced that the Russian mili-

1 tary had illegally abducted and forcibly transferred
2 2,389 Ukrainian children from temporarily occupied
3 areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

4 (6) On June 2, 2022, Ukrainian President
5 Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that an estimated
6 200,000 Ukrainian children had been forcibly trans-
7 ferred to Russia.

8 (7) Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention de-
9 fines “forcibly transferring children of the group to
10 another group” as an act of genocide.

11 (8) Maria Lvova-Belova, Children’s Rights
12 Commissioner for the President of Russia, publicly
13 admitted to overseeing the abduction and forced
14 transfer of Ukrainian children and their adoption by
15 Russian families.

16 (9) Ukrainian authorities have stated that
17 many abducted children have living family members
18 in Ukraine but have been separated due to Russia’s
19 renewed invasion.

20 (10) On June 16, 2022, Russian authorities an-
21 nounced that children born in occupied Ukrainian
22 territories after the February 24, 2022 invasion
23 would automatically be deemed Russian citizens,
24 contributing to the erasure of Ukrainian identity.

1 (11) On June 22, 2022, the United Nations
2 Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner
3 verified that at least 320 children had been killed as
4 a result of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine.

5 (12) On July 11, 2022, United Nations Sec-
6 retary-General António Guterres ordered an inves-
7 tigation into the deaths and injuries of Ukrainian
8 children in the context of the conflict.

9 (13) On July 13, 2022, Secretary of State
10 Antony J. Blinken called on the Russian Federation
11 to “immediately halt its systemic filtration oper-
12 ations in Ukraine”, which have resulted in the dis-
13 appearance, detention, or forcible deportation of be-
14 tween 900,000 and 1,600,000 Ukrainians, including
15 approximately 260,000 children.

16 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
17 gress that—

18 (1) the abduction and forcible transfer of chil-
19 dren and facilitation of illegal adoptions of Ukrain-
20 ian children by the Russian Federation is contrary
21 to Russia’s obligations under the Genocide Conven-
22 tion and constitute acts of genocide;

23 (2) the Russian Federation is deliberately seek-
24 ing to wipe out a generation of Ukrainian children,
25 thereby crippling Ukraine’s ability to nurture the

1 next generation of Ukrainian citizens and leaders
2 and to rebuild their country after Russia’s
3 unprovoked war, with the purpose of demolishing
4 Ukraine’s unique language, culture, history, and
5 identity;

6 (3) the Russian Federation’s unprovoked inva-
7 sion of Ukraine has significantly increased the risks
8 of children being exposed to human trafficking and
9 exploitation, child labor, gender-based violence, hun-
10 ger, injury, trauma, deprivation of education and
11 shelter, and death; and

12 (4) the Government of the Russian Federation,
13 under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, bears full
14 responsibility for the wrongful and illegal abduction
15 and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine, and
16 Congress condemns these actions in the strongest
17 terms.

18 **SEC. 104. SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE UNDER TITLE II OF THE**
19 **BUILD ACT OF 2018.**

20 Section 1412(c) of the Better Utilization of Invest-
21 ments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C.
22 9612(c)) is amended—

23 (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting “in Ukraine
24 and” after “the provision of support under title II”;
25 and

1 (2) in paragraph (2)—

2 (A) by striking “The Corporation” and in-
3 serting the following:

4 “(A) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation”;

5 (B) by striking “(A) the President” and
6 inserting the following:

7 “(i) the President”;

8 (C) by striking “(B) such support” and in-
9 serting the following:

10 “(ii) such support”; and

11 (D) by adding at the end the following:

12 “(B) NON-APPLICABILITY TO UKRAINE.—

13 The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not
14 apply with respect to Ukraine.”.

15 **SEC. 105. VESSEL WAR RISK INSURANCE.**

16 (a) ELIGIBILITY.—Notwithstanding section 53902 of
17 title 46, United States Code, for the period beginning on
18 the date of enactment of this section, and ending 5 years
19 after such date, a covered vessel shall be deemed to be
20 eligible for insurance or reinsurance under chapter 539 of
21 title 46, United States Code, if such vessel is engaged in
22 transportation in waterborne commerce importing cargo
23 to, or exporting cargo from, Ukraine.

24 (b) EXPANSION OF CARGO.—Subparagraphs (B)
25 through (D) of section 53903(a)(3) of title 46, United

1 States Code, shall not apply to cargo imported or exported
2 to or from Ukraine.

3 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

4 (1) COVERED VESSEL.—The term “covered ves-
5 sel” means a vessel that is owned by a citizen of—

6 (A) a member country of the North Atlan-
7 tic Treaty Organization;

8 (B) Ukraine; or

9 (C) any other country the Secretary of
10 State, in consultation with the Secretary of
11 Transportation, determines, in the interest of
12 national security, shall be considered eligible for
13 insurance or reinsurance under chapter 539 of
14 title 46, United States Code.

15 (2) OWNED BY A CITIZEN.—The term “owned
16 by a citizen” means ownership by an entity that is
17 considered to be a citizen of a country in the same
18 manner as an entity is deemed to be a citizen of the
19 United States under section 50501 of title 46,
20 United States Code.

21 **SEC. 106. INSURANCE FOR UKRAINE INITIATIVE.**

22 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the
23 Department of State an entity to be known as the “Insur-
24 ance for Ukraine Initiative”.

1 (b) OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the Insurance
2 for Ukraine Initiative are the following:

3 (1) Bolster confidence in Ukraine’s eventual
4 economic recovery from Russia’s full-scale invasion
5 through the provision of war risk insurance.

6 (2) Encourage European allies and partners to
7 finance and invest in Ukraine’s economic recovery,
8 including through the provision of war risk insur-
9 ance.

10 (3) Promote closer economic integration be-
11 tween Ukraine and other countries in Europe as well
12 as the United States and further Ukraine’s acces-
13 sion to the European Union.

14 (4) Coordinate dialogue and fora for extensive
15 outreach with private sector insurance companies re-
16 lating to the provision of war risk insurance to
17 Ukraine.

18 (5) Work with Ukraine, international organiza-
19 tions, and Middle Eastern and African allies and
20 partners to ensure the bountiful and affordable ship-
21 ment of grain and other food commodities from
22 Ukraine.

23 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date
24 of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter
25 for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State shall sub-

1 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
2 that includes assessments of—

- 3 (1) progress towards the achievement of each of
4 the objectives set forth in subsection (b); and
5 (2) legislative proposals that would further the
6 objectives set forth in subsection (b).

7 (d) DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT.—The
8 Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other
9 relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall seek to
10 provide diplomatic and political support to countries that
11 provide or provide support for war risk insurance for
12 Ukraine, including by using the diplomatic and political
13 influence and expertise of the Department of State to
14 build the capacity of such countries.

15 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
16 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
17 sional committees” means—

- 18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
19 House of Representatives; and
20 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
21 Senate.

1 **SEC. 107. CODIFICATION OF A SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR**
2 **UKRAINIAN RECONSTRUCTION.**

3 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—There is established within the
4 Department of State a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian
5 Reconstruction.

6 (b) **SELECTION.**—The Special Coordinator shall be
7 chosen by the Secretary of State and shall report directly
8 to the Secretary.

9 (c) **QUALIFICATIONS.**—The Special Coordinator shall
10 be an individual with—

11 (1) private sector experience; and

12 (2) knowledge of Ukraine and foreign policy
13 pertaining thereto.

14 (d) **DUTIES.**—The Special Coordinator shall assist
15 in—

16 (1) harnessing the tools of different agencies of
17 the United States government to promote the recon-
18 struction of Ukraine;

19 (2) coordinate cooperation amongst different
20 agencies and bureaus of the United States govern-
21 ment to aid the recovery of Ukraine following its
22 war to protect its sovereignty; and

23 (3) work with the United States Development
24 Finance Corporation to mobilize private capital for
25 the reconstruction of Ukraine.

1 **SEC. 108. SUPPORT FOR RADIO FREE EUROPE.**

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
3 gress that—

4 (1) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty shall be
5 immediately restored to its full capacity and oper-
6 ational position prior to Executive order attempting
7 to shutter the agency;

8 (2) Radio Free Europe provides reliable, uncen-
9 sored, and accessible news and reporting in Ukraine
10 and other countries where media freedom is re-
11 stricted;

12 (3) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is one of
13 the most critical sources of unrestricted, independent
14 news and reporting for audiences on the periphery of
15 the Russian Federation;

16 (4) the Government of the Russian Federation
17 has engaged in systematic targeting of Radio Free
18 Europe/Radio Liberty reporters inside the Russian
19 Federation, which has negatively impacted the orga-
20 nization's ability to provide timely, reliable, and ac-
21 curate news from inside the country; and

22 (5) despite pressure from the Government of
23 the Russian Federation, Radio Free Europe/Radio
24 Liberty's audience continues to grow inside the Rus-
25 sian Federation and surrounding countries.

1 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
2 authorized to be appropriated \$250,000,000 for Radio
3 Free Europe/Radio Liberty for fiscal year 2026.

4 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF NEW BUREAUS.—Radio Free
5 Europe/Radio Liberty may explore opening new bureaus
6 to help expand its ability to reach audiences on the periph-
7 ery of the Russian Federation.

8 (d) INITIATIVES TO BOLSTER RADIO FREE EUROPE/
9 RADIO LIBERTY BUREAUS AROUND RUSSIAN FEDERA-
10 TION’S PERIPHERY.—To help expand its reach to Rus-
11 sian-speaking audiences and increase its reach to audi-
12 ences through digital media, Radio Free Europe/Radio
13 Liberty should—

14 (1) evaluate where Russian disinformation is
15 most deeply pervasive in the Eurasia region;

16 (2) develop strategies to better communicate
17 with predominately Russian-speaking regions;

18 (3) build on efforts to increase capacity and
19 programming to counter disinformation in real time;

20 (4) expand Russian language investigative jour-
21 nalism;

22 (5) improve the technical capacity of the
23 Ukraine bureau; and

24 (6) continue efforts to increase digital news
25 services.

1 (e) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days
2 after the date of the enactment of this section, the Presi-
3 dent shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
4 mittees a report that includes—

5 (1) recommendations of locations to open new
6 bureaus to help reach new audiences in the broader
7 Eurasia region;

8 (2) an assessment of current staffing and an-
9 ticipated staffing needs in order to effectively reach
10 audiences in the broader Eurasia region; and

11 (3) an assessment of the impact of the Govern-
12 ment of the Russian Federation closing down Radio
13 Free Europe/Radio Liberty within the Russian Fed-
14 eration.

15 (f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
16 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
17 sional committees” means—

18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
19 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
20 resentatives; and

21 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
22 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

1 **SEC. 109. AUTHORIZING PROGRAMS TO COUNTER AND**
2 **COMBAT RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION ACTIVI-**
3 **TIES.**

4 (a) COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND.—The
5 Secretary of State should use funds available for obliga-
6 tion in the Countering Russian Influence Fund—

7 (1) to prioritize assisting Ukraine to detect and
8 combat disinformation from the Russian Federation
9 and its proxies; and

10 (2) to assist the Government of Ukraine in de-
11 veloping new defense strategies and technologies.

12 (b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after
14 the date of the enactment of this section, the Sec-
15 retary of State shall submit to the Committee on
16 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and
17 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
18 a plan for countering and combating disinformation
19 by the Russian Federation and supporting free and
20 independent media in Ukraine that includes—

21 (A) a plan to assist the Government of
22 Ukraine in combating and responding to malign
23 influence operations of the Russian Federation
24 aimed at inflaming tensions and dividing
25 Ukrainian society;

1 (B) an assessment of effective efforts and
2 programs to improve media literacy in Ukraine
3 and recommendations for how the United
4 States can assist in supporting and expanding
5 those programs;

6 (C) a plan to assist the Government of
7 Ukraine improve efforts to detect and remove
8 content originating from Russian troll farms,
9 bots, and other sources aimed at sowing divi-
10 sion and disseminating disinformation in
11 Ukraine or targeting Ukrainian audiences;

12 (D) recommendations to increase support
13 for independent media outlets, including Radio
14 Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and

15 (E) recommendations to increase support
16 for independent media outlets catering to Rus-
17 sian-speaking populations residing in Russian-
18 occupied Crimea, the Donbas region of Ukraine,
19 and throughout Ukraine.

20 (2) FORM.—The strategy required by para-
21 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
22 but may include a classified annex if necessary.

1 **SEC. 110. ESTABLISHMENT OF UKRAINE RECONSTRUCTION**
2 **TRUST FUND.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter A of chapter 98 of the
4 Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at
5 the end the following new section:

6 **“SEC. 9512. UKRAINE RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND.**

7 “(a) CREATION OF TRUST FUND.—There is estab-
8 lished in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund
9 to be known as the ‘Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund’,
10 consisting of such amounts as may be appropriated to
11 such fund as provided in this section.

12 “(b) TRANSFERS TO TRUST FUND.—There are here-
13 by appropriated to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust
14 Fund amounts equivalent to the net revenues received in
15 the Treasury from the taxes imposed under section 892A.

16 “(c) EXPENDITURES FROM TRUST FUND.—Amounts
17 in the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund shall be avail-
18 able, as provided in appropriations Acts, only to the Sec-
19 retary of State for purposes of—

20 “(1) reconstruction and rebuilding efforts in
21 Ukraine,

22 “(2) humanitarian assistance to the people of
23 Ukraine,

24 “(3) fostering long-term economic growth and
25 private sector development in Ukraine, and

1 “(4) bolstering transparent and accountable
2 governance of the Ukrainian economy.

3 “(d) TRUST FUND NOT INTEREST-BEARING.—Sec-
4 tion 9602(b) shall not apply to the Ukraine Reconstruc-
5 tion Trust Fund.

6 “(e) REQUIREMENTS UNDER FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
7 ACT OF 1961.—Any assistance made available from
8 amounts in the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund shall
9 be subject to all applicable requirements for the provision
10 of such assistance for the same or similar purpose author-
11 ized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
12 2151 et seq.), including requirements under such Act re-
13 lating to administrative authorities, congressional notifica-
14 tions, and reporting.”.

15 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections
16 for subchapter A of chapter 98 of such Code is amended
17 by adding at the end the following new item:

 “Sec. 9512. Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund.”.

18 (c) REPORT.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after
20 the date of the enactment of this section, and annu-
21 ally thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of State
22 shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
23 mittees a report detailing the use of any funds made
24 available from the Ukrainian Reconstruction Trust
25 Fund.

1 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
3 propriate congressional committees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
5 Committee on Ways and Means, and the Com-
6 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
7 resentatives; and

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
9 the Committee on Finance, and the Committee
10 on Appropriations of the Senate.

11 **SEC. 111. UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN NUCLEAR ENERGY**
12 **COOPERATION.**

13 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

14 (1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federa-
15 tion initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which
16 has severely threatened energy security in the
17 United States, Europe, and around the world.

18 (2) The security of Ukraine’s energy grid has
19 been vital to Ukraine’s success in its defense of its
20 territory and ensuring the Ukrainian government
21 can effectively provide goods and services to Ukrain-
22 ian citizens.

23 (3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power
24 plants with 15 reactors, primarily Russian-designed
25 water-water energetic reactor (VVER) reactors.

1 (4) Russia, in its war of aggression against
2 Ukraine, has systematically targeted Ukraine's en-
3 ergy infrastructure through heavy shelling and tar-
4 geted attacks, particularly in the winter months
5 when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulner-
6 able.

7 (5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have ille-
8 gally occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Sta-
9 tion, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and
10 Russian forces have surrounded the station with
11 landmines, further threatening regional security.

12 (6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been
13 built across Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria,
14 the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary,
15 Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

16 (7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs
17 and fuel services to spread malign influence and
18 threaten United States and European energy secu-
19 rity.

20 (8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent
21 of the total uranium conversion infrastructure world-
22 wide and in 2020, had the largest uranium enrich-
23 ment capacity at close to 46 percent.

24 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that—

1 (1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear
2 power industry, the Department of State should
3 prioritize the utilization of products and services
4 from the United States, and then prioritize products
5 and services from Europe and other allied or partner
6 countries, including Canada, Japan, the United
7 Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not di-
8 rectly competing with the United States;

9 (2) the United States and its allies must focus
10 on cooperation, including capacity building and
11 early-stage project support, to expand the nuclear
12 industry in Europe in a way that maintains non-
13 proliferation, security, and safety standards and
14 aligns with international obligations and treaties
15 while combating Russian and Chinese malign influ-
16 ence; and

17 (3) the United States should continue to pursue
18 the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use
19 of Small Modular Reactor Technology program as a
20 means of helping partner countries meet their clean
21 energy needs with scalable, flexible, secure, and safe
22 nuclear power programs.

23 (c) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State,
24 in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the
25 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies,

1 shall develop a strategy to strengthen United States-Euro-
2 pean nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian ma-
3 lign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

4 (d) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection
5 (c) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:

6 (1) An overview and assessment of the Sec-
7 retary of State’s efforts to broaden participation by
8 United States nuclear industry entities in Europe
9 and promote the accessibility and competitiveness of
10 United States, European, and partner technologies
11 and services against Russian and Chinese tech-
12 nologies in Europe.

13 (2) An overview of different nuclear reactor
14 types that are currently deployed or under regu-
15 latory review in Europe, including large light-water
16 reactors, small modular light-water reactors, and
17 non-light-water reactors, and—

18 (A) what role, if any, each reactor type
19 could have in reducing Russia’s influence over
20 European energy supply by 2030, 2035, 2040,
21 2045, and 2050;

22 (B) challenges that each reactor type may
23 face with rapid deployment, including costs,
24 market barriers to first-of-a-kind designs, sup-

1 ply chain constraints, and regulatory require-
2 ments;

3 (C) the impacts of each reactor type on
4 maintaining strong nonproliferation standards,
5 including the minimization of weapons-usable
6 nuclear material; and

7 (D) opportunities for the use of United
8 States, European, and partner technologies and
9 services in the deployment or potential deploy-
10 ment of each reactor type.

11 (3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are
12 currently deployed or under consideration in Europe,
13 including use of low enriched uranium, including
14 high assay low enriched uranium, and spent fuel re-
15 processing, along with an analysis of the implica-
16 tions of each fuel cycle on—

17 (A) reducing and eliminating Russia's
18 market share in Europe for uranium, conver-
19 sion, enrichment, and reactor fuel between now
20 and 2030;

21 (B) achieving long-term energy security
22 free of Russian influence; and

23 (C) maintaining strong nonproliferation
24 standards, including the minimization of weap-

1 ons-usable material as well as high nuclear safe-
2 ty and security standards.

3 (4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and
4 fuel cycle infrastructure that the United States Gov-
5 ernment is currently funding the development of,
6 and—

7 (A) the potential, if any, that each of these
8 technologies have to decrease or eliminate Rus-
9 sia's market share in the United States and
10 Europe for nuclear power reactors, uranium
11 mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel
12 fabrication, deconversion, and spent nuclear
13 fuel reprocessing in the short, medium, and
14 long term;

15 (B) the impact of these technologies on the
16 minimization of weapons-usable nuclear mate-
17 rial, including the use of highly enriched ura-
18 nium or plutonium fuels; and

19 (C) an assessment of the use cases for
20 each of these designs and fuel cycles.

21 (5) An overview of the United States Govern-
22 ment's diplomatic engagements regarding the nu-
23 clear energy sector in Europe.

24 (6) A list of countries in Europe with active nu-
25 clear power programs, and—

1 (A) an analysis of each country's nuclear
2 energy policy;

3 (B) an overview of existing areas of co-
4 operation with regards to nuclear energy be-
5 tween each country and—

6 (i) the United States;

7 (ii) other European and friendly coun-
8 tries; and

9 (iii) adversarial countries including
10 China and Russia;

11 (C) an overview of potential areas for fu-
12 ture cooperation between each country and the
13 United States with regards to nuclear energy;
14 and

15 (D) a summary of fuel types used in each
16 country's nuclear power programs.

17 (7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influ-
18 ence in the European nuclear energy sector.

19 (8) An overview of how the United States Gov-
20 ernment is working with allies and partners to
21 counter Russian malign influence within the Euro-
22 pean energy sector to include steps taken to counter
23 Russian influence in the mining and milling, conver-
24 sion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as
25 well as in reactor construction.

1 (9) An overview of how the United States Gov-
2 ernment balances the urgent strategic need for col-
3 laboration with allies and partners on countering
4 Russia's influence on nuclear energy in Europe, with
5 commercial competitiveness issues that may arise be-
6 tween United States companies and companies in
7 Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

8 (10) An assessment of Rosatom's role in Rus-
9 sia's energy sector, to include an overview of
10 strengths and vulnerabilities of the conglomerate.

11 (e) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after the
12 date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of
13 State shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
14 mittees the strategy required by subsection (c).

15 (f) FORM.—The strategy required by subsection (c)
16 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
17 a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided sepa-
18 rately from the unclassified strategy.

19 (g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
20 authorized to be appropriated \$30,000,000 for each of fis-
21 cal years 2025 through 2029 to support critically needed
22 engagement in Europe consistent with the strategy re-
23 quired by subsection (c) on countering Russian malign in-
24 fluence and with a particular focus on responsible nuclear
25 power program capacity building, early stage nuclear

1 power project support, and countering Russian
2 disinformation campaigns.

3 (h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

4 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
5 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
6 mittees” means—

7 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
8 the House of Representatives;

9 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
10 the Senate;

11 (C) the Committee on Energy and Com-
12 merce of the House of the Representatives; and

13 (D) the Committee on Energy and Natural
14 Resources of the Senate.

15 (2) HIGH ASSAY LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—
16 The term “high assay low enriched uranium” means
17 uranium enriched so that the concentration of the
18 fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is between 5
19 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.

20 (3) LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—The term “low
21 enriched uranium” means fuel in which the weight
22 percent of U-235 in the uranium is less than 20 per-
23 cent.

1 **TITLE II—SECURITY**
2 **ASSISTANCE**

3 **SEC. 201. LEND-LEASE AUTHORITY.**

4 Section 2 of the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-
5 Lease Act of 2022 (Public Law 117–118; 136 Stat. 1184)
6 is amended—

7 (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking “fiscal
8 years 2022 and 2023” and inserting “fiscal years
9 2022 through 2028”;

10 (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as sub-
11 section (d); and

12 (3) by inserting after subsection (b) the fol-
13 lowing new subsection:

14 “(c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after any use
15 of the authority provided by subsection (a), the Secretary
16 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
17 shall submit to Congress a report that includes—

18 “(1) a description of the defense articles loaned
19 or leased to the Government of Ukraine, or to the
20 government of an Eastern European country im-
21 pacted by the Russian Federation’s invasion of
22 Ukraine, under such authority; and

23 “(2) a strategy and timeline for recovery and
24 return of such defense articles.”.

1 **SEC. 202. DIRECT LOANS AND FOREIGN MILITARY FINANC-**
2 **ING.**

3 (a) DIRECT LOANS.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Through fiscal year 2026,
5 direct loans under section 23 of the Arms Export
6 Control Act may be made available for Ukraine and
7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, notwith-
8 standing section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export Con-
9 trol Act, gross obligations for the principal amounts
10 of which shall not exceed \$8,000,000,000.

11 (2) OTHER UNOBLIGATED BALANCES.—The un-
12 obligated balances of amounts made available by any
13 Act making appropriations for the Department of
14 State, foreign operations, and related programs,
15 under the heading “International Security Assist-
16 ance—Funds Appropriated to the President—For-
17 eign Military Financing” shall also be made avail-
18 able for the cost of loans and loan guarantees as au-
19 thorized by this section.

20 (b) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The terms and condi-
21 tions described in section 2606 of the Ukraine Supple-
22 mental Appropriations Act of 2022 (division N of Public
23 Law 117–103) shall apply to amounts made available by
24 this section in the same manner and to the same extent
25 as amounts made available by such section except that

1 subsection (b) of such section shall be applied by striking
2 “\$4,000,000,000” and inserting “\$8,000,000,000”.

3 (c) EMERGENCY DESIGNATION.—Amounts
4 repurposed pursuant to this section that were previously
5 designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement
6 pursuant to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the
7 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
8 1985, are designated by the Congress as being for an
9 emergency requirement pursuant to section
10 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
11 Deficit Control Act of 1985: *Provided*, That such amounts
12 shall be available only if the President designates such
13 amounts as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
14 251(b)(2)(A)(i).

15 **SEC. 203. SUPPORT FOR BALTIC COUNTRIES.**

16 (a) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—The Secretary of
17 State shall carry out programs, projects, and activities to
18 build the capacity of the national militaries and border
19 guard forces of Baltic countries, pursuant to the 2024 Bi-
20 lateral Defense Cooperation Roadmaps for 2024-2028,
21 which provide for the promotion of “defense cooperation
22 in integrated air and missile defense, maritime domain
23 awareness, cyber, irregular warfare, participation in inter-
24 national military operations and exercises, infrastructure
25 development, and training”.

1 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
2 authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State,
3 for each of the fiscal years 2026, 2027, and 2028, in addi-
4 tion to amounts already authorized to be appropriated for
5 such purposes to carry out the assistance described in sub-
6 section (a)—

7 (1) \$30,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing
8 grants authorized under section 23 of the Arms Ex-
9 port Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) for each Baltic
10 country; and

11 (2) \$4,000,000 for Nonproliferation, Anti-ter-
12 rorism, Demining, and Related programs, including
13 as authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act (22
14 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) for each Baltic country.

15 (c) BRIEFING.—Not later than 120 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of
17 State shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of
18 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
19 House of Representatives regarding—

20 (1) the most pressing security needs of Baltic
21 countries;

22 (2) a plan for the disbursement of funds so ob-
23 ligated; and

24 (3) an analysis of European and other allied
25 country support for Baltic countries.

1 **SEC. 204. EXTENSION OF UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE**
2 **INITIATIVE.**

3 Section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization
4 Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat.
5 1068) is amended—

6 (1) in subsection (f), by adding at the end the
7 following:

8 “(11) For fiscal year 2026, \$300,000,000.

9 “(12) For fiscal year 2027, \$300,000,000.”;

10 and

11 (2) in subsection (h), by striking “December
12 31, 2026” and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

13 **SEC. 205. REPORT ON ALLIED AND PARTNER MILITARY**
14 **CONTRIBUTIONS.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
16 date of enactment of this section, and every 90 days there-
17 after, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Sec-
18 retary of Defense, shall submit to the Committee on For-
19 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-
20 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report in-
21 cluding—

22 (1) a detailed description of all military con-
23 tributions made or planned by allied and partner
24 countries, disaggregated by country, including de-
25 tails of types and quantities of platforms and sys-
26 tems provided;

1 (2) a description and analysis of military capa-
2 bilities identified as current Ukrainian operational
3 needs; and

4 (3) a description of United States efforts to
5 meet identified Ukrainian operational needs through
6 transfers of United States arms and military equip-
7 ment or through support and facilitation of allied
8 and partner transfer of arms and military equip-
9 ment.

10 (b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
11 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
12 a classified annex that is submitted separately from the
13 unclassified portion.

14 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
15 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
16 sional committees” means—

17 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
18 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
19 House of Representatives; and

20 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
21 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

22 **SEC. 206. REPORT ON UNITED STATES-UKRAINE INTEL-**
23 **LIGENCE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the
25 date of enactment of this section, and every 90 days there-

1 after, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
2 with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, shall
3 submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a re-
4 port including—

5 (1) a detailed description of current United
6 States intelligence support and cooperation to and
7 with Ukrainian military and intelligence services;

8 (2) a description and analysis of the con-
9 sequences of ceasing such intelligence support and
10 cooperation to Ukraine, including as related to tar-
11 geting, battlefield effectiveness, early warning capa-
12 bilities, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity; and

13 (3) a description of United States efforts and
14 initiatives currently underway or planned to increase
15 Ukrainian intelligence, counterintelligence, and cy-
16 bersecurity capabilities.

17 (b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
18 shall be submitted in classified form.

19 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
20 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
21 sional committees” means—

22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
23 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
24 House of Representatives; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
2 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

3 **TITLE III—SANCTIONS AND**
4 **EXPORT CONTROLS**

5 **SEC. 301. SANCTIONS TRIGGER DETERMINATION.**

6 Not later than 15 days after the date of enactment
7 of this section, and at minimum every 90 days thereafter,
8 the President shall make a determination as to whether
9 the Russian Federation or any proxy thereof, is engaged
10 in—

11 (1) conducting a war of aggression against
12 Ukraine; or

13 (2) refusing to sincerely and actually negotiate
14 a peace agreement with Ukraine; or

15 (3) acting in violation of a negotiated peace
16 agreement with Ukraine.

17 **SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
18 **RUSSIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.**

19 (a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative
21 determination under section 301 and not later than
22 15 days following such a determination, the Presi-
23 dent shall impose the sanctions described in section
24 317 with respect to 3 or more of the following finan-
25 cial institutions:

- 1 (A) Sberbank.
- 2 (B) VTB
- 3 (C) Gazprombank.
- 4 (D) VEB.RF.
- 5 (E) The Russian Direct Investment Fund.
- 6 (F) Credit Bank of Moscow.
- 7 (G) Alfa Bank.
- 8 (H) Rosselkhozbank.
- 9 (I) FC Bank Otkritie.
- 10 (J) Promsvyazbank.
- 11 (K) Sovcombank.
- 12 (L) Transkapitalbank.
- 13 (M) The Central Bank of the Russian Fed-
- 14 eration.

15 (2) SUBSIDIARIES AND SUCCESSOR ENTITIES.—

16 The President may impose the sanctions described
17 in section 310(a)(1) with respect to any subsidiary
18 of, or successor entity to, a financial institution
19 specified in paragraph (1).

20 (b) ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN FINANCIAL INSTITU-
21 TIONS.—

22 (1) LIST REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days
23 after making an affirmative determination under
24 section 301, and every 90 days thereafter, the Presi-
25 dent shall submit to the appropriate committees of

1 Congress a list of foreign persons that the President
2 determines—

3 (A) are significant financial institutions
4 owned or operated by the Government of the
5 Russian Federation; and

6 (B) should be sanctioned in the interest of
7 United States national security.

8 (2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Upon the sub-
9 mission of each list required by paragraph (1), the
10 President shall impose the sanctions described in
11 section 310(a)(1) with respect to each foreign person
12 identified on the list.

13 **SEC. 303. IMPOSITIONS OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
14 **RUSSIAN OIL AND MINING INDUSTRY.**

15 Upon making an affirmative determination under
16 section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
17 determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
18 described in section 317 with respect to all Russian com-
19 panies operating primarily in any of the following sectors:

20 (1) Oil and gas extraction, refinement, or pro-
21 duction.

22 (2) Coal extraction mining, refinement, or pro-
23 duction.

24 (3) Mineral extraction and processing.

1 **SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PER-**
2 **SONS AFFILIATED WITH OR SUPPORTING**
3 **THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FED-**
4 **ERATION.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
6 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
7 following such a determination, the President shall impose
8 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all
9 individuals listed under subsection (b) or included in the
10 additional lists under subsection (c).

11 (b) OFFICIALS SPECIFIED.—The officials specified in
12 this subsection are the following:

13 (1) The President of the Russian Federation.

14 (2) The Prime Minister of the Russian Federa-
15 tion.

16 (3) The Foreign Minister of the Russian Fed-
17 eration.

18 (4) The Minister of Defense of the Russian
19 Federation.

20 (5) The Minister of Transport of the Russian
21 Federation

22 (6) The Minister of Energy of the Russian Fed-
23 eration

24 (7) The Minister of Finance of the Russian
25 Federation

1 (8) The Minister of Energy and Trade of the
2 Russian Federation

3 (9) The Deputy Minister of Defense of the Rus-
4 sian Federation

5 (10) The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Rus-
6 sian Federation

7 (11) The Deputy Minister of Transport of the
8 Russian Federation

9 (12) The Deputy Energy Minister of the Rus-
10 sian Federation

11 (13) The Deputy Finance Minister of the Rus-
12 sian Federation

13 (14) The Deputy Minister of Industry and
14 Trade of the Russian Federation

15 (15) The Chief of the General Staff of the
16 Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

17 (16) The Commander-in-Chief of the Land
18 Forces of the Russian Federation.

19 (17) The Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace
20 Forces of the Russian Federation.

21 (18) The Commander of the Airborne Forces of
22 the Russian Federation.

23 (19) The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of
24 the Russian Federation.

1 (20) The Commander of the Strategic Rocket
2 Forces of the Russian Federation.

3 (21) The Commander of the Special Operations
4 Forces of the Russian Federation.

5 (22) The Commander of Logistical Support of
6 the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

7 (c) ADDITIONAL OFFICIALS.—

8 (1) LIST REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days
9 after making an affirmative determination under
10 section 301 and every 90 days thereafter, the Presi-
11 dent shall submit to the appropriate committees of
12 Congress a list of foreign persons that the President
13 determines—

14 (A) are—

15 (i) senior officials of any branch of
16 the armed forces of the Russian Federa-
17 tion leading any of the operations de-
18 scribed in section 302; or

19 (ii) senior officials of the Government
20 of the Russian Federation, including any
21 intelligence agencies or security services of
22 the Russian Federation, with significant
23 roles in planning or implementing such op-
24 erations; and

1 (B) with respect to which sanctions should
2 be imposed in the interest of the national secu-
3 rity of the United States.

4 (2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Upon the sub-
5 mission of each list required by paragraph (1), the
6 President shall impose the sanctions described in
7 section 310 with respect to each foreign person on
8 the list.

9 **SEC. 305. CRIMEA TUNNEL SANCTIONS.**

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
11 ings:

12 (1) In February and March 2014, the Russian
13 Federation invaded the Crimean peninsula and an-
14 nexed Crimea, internationally recognized as Ukrain-
15 ian territory.

16 (2) Following its annexation of Crimea, the
17 Russian Federation constructed the Kerch Strait
18 Bridge to connect the Russian mainland with the
19 Crimean peninsula.

20 (3) On February 24, 2022, the Government of
21 the Russian Federation, led by Vladimir Putin,
22 launched an unprovoked, full-scale invasion of
23 Ukraine.

24 (4) The Russian Federation has used Crimea as
25 an integral part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine,

1 including to house Russian troops, store ammunition
2 and weapons, and host the Black Sea Fleet.

3 (5) In October 2023, it was publicly reported
4 that Russian and Chinese business officials met and
5 exchanged emails to discuss building a tunnel from
6 the Russian mainland to illegally occupied Crimea.

7 (b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Upon making an
8 affirmative determination under section 301 and not later
9 than 15 days following such a determination, the Presi-
10 dent shall impose the sanctions described in section 317
11 with respect to all foreign persons that knowingly partici-
12 pate in the construction, maintenance, or repair of a tun-
13 nel or bridge that connects the Russian mainland with the
14 Crimean peninsula.

15 **SEC. 306. ZAPORIZHZHIA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SANC-**
16 **TIONS.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
18 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
19 following such a determination, the President shall impose
20 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all
21 foreign persons that have endangered the integrity, safety,
22 or undermined Ukrainian operational control of the
23 Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station located in south-
24 eastern Ukraine since the Russian Federation launched an
25 unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

1 (b) EXCEPTION RELATED TO UKRAINIAN OPER-
2 ATIONAL CONTROL.—Sanctions under this section shall
3 not apply to any foreign person seeking to reestablish
4 Ukrainian operational control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear
5 Power Station or the surrounding region.

6 **SEC. 307. ROSATOM SANCTIONS.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
8 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
9 following such a determination, the President shall impose
10 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to—

11 (1) Rosatom;

12 (2) Rosatom subsidiaries; and

13 (3) a foreign person that knowingly directly or
14 indirectly engages in any significant transaction for
15 nuclear reactor construction and related services
16 with Rosatom.

17 (b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-
18 tion of sanctions for a transaction or transactions with
19 a United States person, a foreign person, or a foreign fi-
20 nancial institution (as the case may be) described under
21 this section if—

22 (1) the President determines that the trans-
23 action relates to activities necessary to the produc-
24 tion of medical isotopes or industrial isotopes; and

1 (2) the President certifies to the appropriate
2 congressional committees that—

3 (A) domestic medical isotope or industrial
4 isotope production is insufficient to meet
5 United States patient and industry require-
6 ments; and

7 (B) the United States is taking measurable
8 steps to establish medical isotope or industrial
9 isotope supply chains that are not reliant on
10 Rosatom or other Russian source material.

11 **SEC. 308. IMPOSITION OF PRICE CAP VESSEL SANCTIONS.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
13 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
14 following such a determination, the President shall impose
15 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to any
16 foreign vessel that knowingly transports Russian oil in
17 contravention of the Russian oil price cap policy.

18 (b) EXCEPTION FOR SAFETY OF VESSELS AND
19 CREW.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply with
20 respect to a person providing provisions to a vessel other-
21 wise subject to sanctions under this section if such provi-
22 sions are intended for the safety and care of the crew
23 aboard the vessel, the protection of human life aboard the
24 vessel, or the maintenance of the vessel to avoid any envi-
25 ronmental or other significant damage.

1 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 60 days after the
2 date of enactment of this section, the Secretary of State
3 and the Secretary of the Treasury shall jointly submit to
4 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
5 resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
6 the Senate a strategy to enhance international compliance
7 with the Russian oil price cap policy.

8 (d) MATTERS.—The strategy under subsection (a)
9 shall include—

10 (1) an overview of general international compli-
11 ance with the Russian oil price cap policy;

12 (2) a list of the countries known to have pur-
13 chased significant quantities of Russian oil at prices
14 above the price agreed to in the Russian oil price
15 cap policy set forth by the Group of Seven (“G7”)
16 nations;

17 (3) any known methods used by such countries
18 to avoid detection of their purchases of Russian oil
19 at prices above the price agreed to in the Russian
20 oil price cap policy;

21 (4) an assessment of possible incentives the
22 United States could provide to countries listed pur-
23 suant to paragraph (2) to encourage compliance
24 with the Russian oil price cap policy;

1 (5) an assessment of whether the imposition of
2 additional sanctions, including possible secondary
3 sanctions, would enhance international compliance
4 with the Russian oil price cap policy;

5 (6) a description of the views of the government
6 of each country participating in the Russian oil price
7 cap policy regarding whether the price cap under
8 such policy should be lowered or not; and

9 (7) a description of the United States diplo-
10 matic engagement with the government of each
11 country participating in the Russian oil price cap
12 policy regarding the appropriateness of the current
13 cap, including any diplomatic engagement intended
14 to encourage support for the lowering of the price
15 cap.

16 **SEC. 309. SWIFT SANCTIONS.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
18 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
19 following such a determination, the President shall impose
20 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to any
21 global communication financial service that does not cease
22 the provision of financial communication messaging serv-
23 ices to any financial institution listed under section 302
24 of this section.

1 (b) ENABLING OR FACILITATION OF ACCESS TO SPE-
2 CIALIZED FINANCIAL MESSAGING SERVICES THROUGH
3 INTERMEDIARY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—For purposes
4 of this section, enabling or facilitating direct or indirect
5 access to specialized financial messaging services includes
6 doing so by serving as an intermediary financial institu-
7 tion with access to such messaging services.

8 **SEC. 310. RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN DEBT SANCTIONS.**

9 Upon making an affirmative determination under
10 section 302 and not later than 30 days following such a
11 determination, the President shall prohibit all transactions
12 by United States persons involving the sovereign debt of
13 the Government of the Russian Federation issued on or
14 after the date of the enactment of this section, including
15 governmental bonds.

16 **SEC. 311. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA-NORTH**
17 **KOREA COOPERATION.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
19 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
20 following such a determination, the President shall impose
21 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to the
22 following:

23 (1) Any foreign person that is responsible for or
24 facilitates the transfer or sale of arms or material

1 support from North Korea to be used in Russia's il-
2 legal war in Ukraine.

3 (2) Any foreign person that knowingly, directly
4 or indirectly, imports, exports, or reexports to, into,
5 or from North Korea any goods services or tech-
6 nology for weapons that may be used by Russian
7 forces or their proxies in Russia's illegal war in
8 Ukraine.

9 (3) Any foreign financial institution that know-
10 ingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides
11 significant financial services for a foreign person de-
12 scribed in paragraph (1) or (2).

13 (4) Any foreign person that engages in a sig-
14 nificant transaction related to the transfer or sale of
15 arms or material support with a foreign person de-
16 scribed in paragraph (1) or (2) or foreign financial
17 institution described in paragraph (3).

18 (5) Any foreign person assisting in the logistical
19 supply and movement of North Korean personnel,
20 arms or material support to be used in Russia's ille-
21 gal war in Ukraine.

22 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
23 of the enactment of this section, and every 180 days there-
24 after, the President shall submit to the appropriate con-
25 gressional committees a report that describes significant

1 activities by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
2 to support the Russian Federation and its proxies in Rus-
3 sia's illegal war in Ukraine.

4 (c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
5 quired by this section shall include the following:

6 (1) The number of North Korean troops that
7 have been sent to fight Ukraine, casualties inflicted
8 on these troops, and the impact on the battlefield of
9 having North Korean military personnel on the
10 frontlines.

11 (2) The identity and nationality of foreign per-
12 sons and foreign financial institutions that are sub-
13 ject to sanctions under section 317.

14 (3) A description of the conduct engaged in by
15 such persons and institutions.

16 (4) An assessment of the extent to which a for-
17 eign government has provided material support to
18 the Government of North Korea or any person act-
19 ing for or on behalf of that government to conduct
20 significant activities to materially support Russia's
21 illegal war in Ukraine.

22 (5) A United States strategy to counter North
23 Korea's efforts to conduct significant activities to
24 support Russia's war in Ukraine, that includes ef-
25 forts to engage foreign governments to halt the ca-

1 pability of the Government of North Korea and per-
2 sons acting for or on behalf of that government to
3 conduct significant activities supporting Russia's il-
4 legal war in Ukraine.

(d) FORM.—The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

8 SEC. 312. SANCTIONS FOR KIDNAPPING UKRAINIAN CHIL-
9 DREN.

10 Upon making an affirmative determination under
11 section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
12 determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
13 described in section 317 with respect to all foreign persons
14 that have directed or in anyway participated in the kid-
15 napping and wrongful patriation of Ukrainian children.

16 SEC. 313. IMPOSITION OF DUAL-USE EXPORT CONTROLS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301, a foreign-produced item shall be subject to the Export Administration Regulations (pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.)) if the item—

22 (1) meets—

(A) the product scope requirements described in subsection (b); and

1 (B) the destination scope requirements de-
2 scribed in subsection (c); and

3 (2) is exported, reexported, or in-country trans-
4 ferred to the Russia Federation from abroad or in-
5 volves the Government of the Russian Federation.

6 (b) PRODUCT SCOPE REQUIREMENTS.—A foreign-
7 produced item meets the product scope requirements of
8 this subsection if the item—

9 (1) is a direct product of United States-origin
10 technology or software subject to the Export Admin-
11 istration Regulations that is specified in a covered
12 Export Control Classification Number; or

13 (2) is produced by any plant or major compo-
14 nent of a plant that is located outside the United
15 States, if the plant or major component of a plant,
16 whether made in the United States or a foreign
17 country, itself is a direct product of United States-
18 origin technology or software subject to the Export
19 Administration Regulations that is specified in a
20 covered Export Control Classification Number.

21 (c) DESTINATION SCOPE REQUIREMENTS.—A for-
22 eign-produced item meets the destination scope require-
23 ments of this subsection if there is knowledge that the for-
24 eign-produced item is destined to the Russian Federation
25 or will be incorporated into or used in the production or

1 development of any part, component, or equipment subject
2 to the Export Administration Regulations and produced
3 in or destined to the Russian Federation.

4 (d) LICENSING POLICY.—In carrying out this section,
5 the Secretary of Commerce shall apply a presumption that
6 an export, reexport, release, or in-country transfer of
7 items meets the product scope requirements set forth in
8 subsection (b) and the destination scope requirements set
9 forth in subsection (c).

10 (e) EXCEPTIONS.—The license requirements set forth
11 in this section shall not apply to—

12 (1) food, medicine, or medical devices that
13 are—

14 (A) designated as EAR99; or

15 (B) not designated under or listed on the
16 Commerce Control List; or

17 (2) services, software, or hardware (other than
18 services, software, or hardware for end-users owned
19 or controlled by the Government of Iran) that are—

20 (A) necessarily and ordinarily incident to
21 communications; or

22 (B) designated as—

23 (i) EAR99; or

24 (ii) Export Control Classification
25 Number 5A992.c or 5D992.c, and classi-

1 fied in accordance with section 740.17 of
2 title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; and
3 (C) subject to a general license issued by
4 the Department of Commerce or Department of
5 Treasury.

6 (f) DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE STRATEGY.—

7 (1) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 60
8 days after the date of the enactment of this section,
9 the Secretary of Commerce (in consultation with the
10 Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and
11 the Director of National Intelligence) shall develop a
12 strategy to prevent the illegal export to Iran by
13 United States persons regarding technologies used
14 or that may be used in the design, development, pro-
15 duction, or operational employment of unmanned
16 aircraft systems by Iran, including the following
17 microelectronics:

18 (A) Microcontrollers.

19 (B) Voltage regulators.

20 (C) Digital signal controllers.

21 (D) GPS modules.

22 (E) Microprocessors.

23 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy under paragraph
24 (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following ele-
25 ments:

1 (A) A process for the Secretary of Com-
2 merce (in coordination with the Secretaries and
3 heads specified in paragraph (1)) to proactively
4 identify—

5 (i) current and emerging technologies
6 used or that may be used by Iran in the
7 design, development, production, or oper-
8 ational employment of unmanned aircraft
9 systems (including critical components
10 thereof);

11 (ii) United States manufacturers of
12 such technologies; and

13 (iii) foreign manufacturers and
14 proliferators of such technologies.

15 (B) A process for the Secretary of Com-
16 merce (in coordination with the Secretaries and
17 heads specified in paragraph (1)) to proactively
18 identify third-party distributors and resellers of
19 the technologies specified in subparagraph
20 (A)(i) that, through the use of intermediaries
21 with no or nominal operations or assets, or
22 through other mechanisms, contrive to cir-
23 cumvent export controls for such items with re-
24 spect to Iran.

1 (C) A methodology for the Secretary of
2 Commerce to proactively engage the United
3 States manufacturers identified pursuant to the
4 process under subparagraph (A)(ii), to provide
5 such manufacturers with timely updates to the
6 list of third-party distributors and resellers
7 identified pursuant to the process under sub-
8 paragraph (B).

9 (3) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 60 days after
10 the date of the enactment of this section, the Sec-
11 retary of Commerce shall submit to the appropriate
12 congressional committees the strategy under para-
13 graph (1).

14 (4) FORM.—The report required by subsection
15 (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
16 portions of the report described in paragraphs (1)
17 and (2) may contain a classified annex, so long as
18 such annex is provided separately from the unclassi-
19 fied report.

20 (g) DEPARTMENT OF STATE STRATEGY.—

21 (1) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of
22 State (in coordination with the Secretary of Com-
23 merce, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of
24 National Intelligence) shall develop a strategy to
25 prevent the export to Iran of technologies from the

1 United States and allied and partner countries
2 which are used, or may be used, by Iran in the de-
3 sign, development, production, or operational em-
4 ployment of unmanned aircraft systems (including
5 the microelectronics listed in subparagraphs (A)
6 through (F) of subsection (a)(1)).

7 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy under paragraph
8 (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following ele-
9 ments:

10 (A) A process for the Secretary of State
11 (in consultation with the relevant Secretaries
12 and heads specified in paragraph (1)) to
13 proactively identify foreign manufacturers of
14 the technologies referred to in such paragraph.

15 (B) A process for the Secretary of State to
16 engage with any ally or partner of the United
17 States regarding technologies which have been
18 incorporated into an unmanned aircraft system
19 produced by Iran, for the purpose of synchro-
20 nizing the export control regime of such ally or
21 partner with the United States export controls
22 developed by the Secretary of Commerce pursu-
23 ant to the strategy under subsection (a) with
24 respect to such technology.

1 (3) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 90 days after
2 the date of the enactment of this section, the Sec-
3 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
4 gressional committees the strategy under paragraph
5 (1).

6 (4) FORM.—The report required by subsection
7 (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
8 portions of the report described in paragraphs (1)
9 and (2) may contain a classified annex, so long as
10 such annex is provided separately from the unclassi-
11 fied report.

12 (h) REQUIREMENT FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO
13 DEVELOP RANGE OF OPTIONS.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after
15 the date of the enactment of this section, the Sec-
16 retary of Defense (in coordination with the Secretary
17 of State and the Director of National Intelligence)
18 shall develop a range of options that may be em-
19 ployed by the Armed Forces of the United States to
20 counter or otherwise deny Iran the ability to acquire
21 technologies used, or that may be used, in the de-
22 sign, development, production, or operational em-
23 ployment of unmanned aircraft systems by Iran, in-
24 cluding the following technologies:

25 (A) Microcontrollers.

1 (B) Voltage regulators.

2 (C) Digital signal controllers.

3 (D) GPS modules.

4 (E) Microprocessors.

5 (F) Computer Aided Design (CAD) soft-
6 ware.

7 (G) Computer numerical control machines.

8 (2) BRIEFING.—Not later than 45 days after
9 the date of the enactment of this section, the Sec-
10 retary of Defense shall provide to the appropriate
11 congressional committees a briefing on the options
12 developed under paragraph (1).

13 **SEC. 314. DUTIES ON THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after mak-
15 ing an affirmative determination under section 301, the
16 President shall, notwithstanding any other provision of
17 law, increase the rate of duty for all goods and services
18 imported into the United States from the Russian Federa-
19 tion to a rate of not less 500 percent ad valorem.

20 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after making
21 an affirmative determination under section 301, the Presi-
22 dent shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means
23 of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
24 Finance of the Senate, a report indicating the impact of
25 these ad valorem tariffs on exports to the United States.

1 **SEC. 315. ENDING RUSSIAN OIL IMPORT LOOPHOLE.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Ending Importation of Rus-
3 sian Oil Act (Public Law 117–109; 136 Stat. 1154) is
4 amended—

5 (1) by redesignating section 3 as section 4; and

6 (2) by inserting after section 2 the following:

7 **“SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF ENERGY PROD-**
8 **UCTS PRODUCED AT REFINERIES OUTSIDE**
9 **THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

10 “All products classified under chapter 27 of the Har-
11 monized Tariff Schedule that were produced at any refin-
12 ery that uses crude oil originating in the Russian Federa-
13 tion shall be banned from importation into the United
14 States.”.

15 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 4 of the
16 Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act (Public Law 117–
17 109; 136 Stat. 1154), as redesignated by subsection
18 (a)(1), is amended—

19 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting “or 3” after
20 “section 2”; and

21 (2) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting “or 3”
22 after “section 2”.

23 **SEC. 316. TAXING CAPITAL GAINS ON RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN**
24 **ASSETS.**

25 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after mak-
26 ing an affirmative determination under section 301, not-

1 withstanding any other provision of law, there is hereby
2 imposed for each taxable year on the disqualified income
3 of any specified foreign government a tax equal to 100
4 percent thereof.

5 (b) WITHHOLDING.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 203
7 of the International Emergency Economic Powers
8 Act (or any other provision of law), any person hav-
9 ing control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of
10 disqualified income with respect to which tax is im-
11 posed under subsection (a) shall deduct and withhold
12 from such income a tax equal to 100 percent there-
13 of.

14 (2) APPLICATION OF CERTAIN RULES.—For
15 purposes of subchapter B of chapter 3, section 33,
16 and such other provisions as the Secretary may pro-
17 vide, paragraph (1) shall be treated as part of sub-
18 chapter A of chapter 3.

19 (c) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

20 (1) DISQUALIFIED INCOME.—The term “dis-
21 qualified income” means any interest or dividends
22 payable with respect to assets which are blocked
23 using the authorities provided by section 203 of the
24 International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

1 (2) SPECIFIED FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.—The
2 term “specified foreign government” means the for-
3 eign governments (within the meaning of section 892
4 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the regu-
5 lations issued thereunder) of Russia and Belarus.

6 (d) OVERRIDE OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS.—Notwith-
7 standing any other provision of law, this section (and the
8 amendments made by this section) shall apply without re-
9 gard to any treaty obligation of the United States.

10 (e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
11 this section shall apply to interest and dividends received
12 after the date of the enactment of this section.

13 **SEC. 317. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**

14 The sanctions described in this section are the fol-
15 lowing:

16 (1) PROPERTY BLOCKING.—The President shall
17 exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-
18 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
19 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
20 and prohibit all transactions in all property and in-
21 terests in property of the foreign person if such
22 property and interests in property are in the United
23 States, come within the United States, or are or
24 come within the possession or control of a United
25 States person.

1 (2) ALIENS INADMISSIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMIS-
2 SION, OR PAROLE.—

3 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—In
4 the case of an alien, the alien is—

5 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

6 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
7 documentation to enter the United States;
8 and

9 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
10 or paroled into the United States or to re-
11 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-
12 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et
13 seq.).

14 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

15 (i) IN GENERAL.—The visa or other
16 entry documentation of an alien described
17 in subparagraph (A) shall be revoked, re-
18 gardless of when such visa or other entry
19 documentation is or was issued.

20 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-
21 tion under clause (i) shall—

22 (I) take effect immediately; and

23 (II) automatically cancel any
24 other valid visa or entry documenta-
25 tion that is in the alien's possession.

1 (3) LOANS FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
2 INSTITUTIONS.—The President shall direct the
3 United States Executive Director of each inter-
4 national financial institution to use the voice, vote,
5 and influence of the United States to oppose any
6 loan, loan guarantee, or equity investment from the
7 international financial institution that would directly
8 or indirectly benefit the sanctioned foreign person.

9 **SEC. 318. IMPLEMENTATION; REGULATIONS; PENALTIES.**

10 (a) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise
11 all authorities provided to the President under sections
12 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
13 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this
14 title.

15 (b) REGULATIONS.—The President shall issue such
16 regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry
17 out this title.

18 (c) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to
19 violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
20 section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
21 out this title shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
22 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
23 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(b) and
24 1705(c)).

1 **SEC. 319. EXCEPTIONS; WAIVER.**

2 (a) EXCEPTIONS.—

3 (1) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER-
4 NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions described in
5 section 317(2) shall not apply with respect to the
6 admission of an alien if admitting or paroling the
7 alien into the United States is necessary to permit
8 the United States to comply with the Agreement re-
9 garding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
10 signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered
11 into force November 21, 1947, between the United
12 Nations and the United States, or other applicable
13 international obligations.

14 (2) EXCEPTION RELATING TO THE PROVISION
15 OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—Sanctions under
16 this title may not be imposed with respect to trans-
17 actions or the facilitation of transactions for—

18 (A) the sale of agricultural commodities,
19 food, medicine, or medical devices; or

20 (B) the provision of humanitarian assist-
21 ance; or

22 (C) financial transactions relating to hu-
23 manitarian assistance;

24 (3) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE, LAW EN-
25 FORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVI-
26 TIES.—Sanctions under this title shall not apply to

1 any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or na-
2 tional security activities of the United States.

3 (b) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—The President
4 may waive the imposition of sanctions under this title with
5 respect to a person if the President—

6 (1) determines that such a waiver is in the ex-
7 traordinarily vital to national security of the United
8 States; and

9 (2) submits to the appropriate committees of
10 Congress a notification of the waiver and the rea-
11 sons for the waiver no less than 15 days before the
12 use of the waiver.

13 **SEC. 320. TERMINATION.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President may terminate the
15 application of sanctions, export controls, duties, prohibi-
16 tions, or penalties under this title if the President certifies
17 to Congress that the Russian Federation has ceased con-
18 ducting a war of aggression against Ukraine or act in vio-
19 lation of a negotiated peace agreement with Ukraine.

20 (b) REIMPOSITION.—The President shall immediately
21 reimpose all previous terminated sanctions, export con-
22 trols, duties, prohibitions, and penalties imposed under
23 this title should the Russian Federation restart a war of
24 aggression against Ukraine or act in violation of a nego-
25 tiated peace agreement with Ukraine.

1 **SEC. 321. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF RUSSIA SANCTIONS.**

2 (a) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED AC-
3 TION.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other
5 provision of law, before taking any action described
6 in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the
7 appropriate congressional committees and leadership
8 a report that describes the proposed action and the
9 reasons for that action.

10 (2) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—

11 (A) IN GENERAL.—An action described in
12 this paragraph is—

13 (i) an action to terminate the applica-
14 tion of any sanction, export control, duty,
15 or prohibition described in subparagraph
16 (B);

17 (ii) with respect to sanctions, export
18 controls, duties, or prohibitions described
19 in subparagraph (B) imposed by the Presi-
20 dent with respect to a person, an action to
21 waive the application of those sanctions
22 with respect to that person; or

23 (iii) a licensing action that signifi-
24 cantly alters United States foreign policy
25 with respect to Russia.

1 (B) SANCTIONS, EXPORT CONTROLS, DU-
2 TIES, AND PROHIBITIONS DESCRIBED.—The
3 sanctions, export controls, duties, and prohibi-
4 tions described in this subparagraph are sanc-
5 tions, export controls, duties, and prohibitions
6 with respect to Russia provided for under—

7 (i) this section;

8 (ii) Executive Order 13849 (22 U.S.C.
9 9521 note; relating to authorizing the im-
10 plementation of certain sanctions set forth
11 in the Countering America's Adversaries
12 Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et
13 seq.));

14 (iii) Executive Order 13883 (22
15 U.S.C. 5605 note; relating to administra-
16 tion of proliferation sanctions and amend-
17 ment of Executive Order 12851 (22 U.S.C.
18 2797 note; relating to the administration
19 of proliferation sanctions, Middle East
20 arms control, and related congressional re-
21 porting responsibilities));

22 (iv) Executive Order 14024 (50
23 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking
24 property with respect to specified harmful

1 foreign activities of the Government of the
2 Russian Federation);

3 (v) Executive Order 14039 (22 U.S.C.
4 9526 note; relating to blocking property
5 with respect to certain Russian energy ex-
6 port pipelines);

7 (vi) Executive Order 14065 (50
8 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking
9 property of certain persons and prohibiting
10 certain transactions with respect to contin-
11 ued Russian efforts to undermine the sov-
12 ereignty and territorial integrity of
13 Ukraine);

14 (vii) Executive Order 14066 (50
15 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting
16 certain imports and new investments with
17 respect to continued Russian Federation
18 efforts to undermine the sovereignty and
19 territorial integrity of Ukraine);

20 (viii) Executive Order 14068 (50
21 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting
22 certain imports, exports, and new invest-
23 ment with respect to continued Russian
24 Federation aggression);

1 (ix) Executive Order 14071 (50
2 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting
3 new investment in and certain services to
4 the Russian Federation in response to con-
5 tinued Russian Federation aggression);
6 and

7 (x) Executive Order 14114 (88 Fed.
8 Reg. 89271; relating to taking additional
9 steps with respect to the Russian Federa-
10 tion's harmful activities).

11 (3) DESCRIPTION OF TYPE OF ACTION.—Each
12 report submitted under paragraph (1) with respect
13 to an action described in paragraph (2) shall include
14 a description of whether the action—

15 (A) is not intended to significantly alter
16 United States foreign policy with respect to
17 Russia; or

18 (B) is intended to significantly alter
19 United States foreign policy with respect to
20 Russia.

21 (4) INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL MATTER.—

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—Each report submitted
23 under paragraph (1) that relates to an action
24 that is intended to significantly alter United

1 States foreign policy with respect to Russia
2 shall include a description of—

3 (i) the significant alteration to United
4 States foreign policy with respect to Rus-
5 sia;

6 (ii) the anticipated effect of the action
7 on the national security interests of the
8 United States; and

9 (iii) the policy objectives for which the
10 sanctions affected by the action were ini-
11 tially imposed.

12 (B) REQUESTS FROM BANKING AND FI-
13 NANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEES.—The Com-
14 mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
15 of the Senate or the Committee on Financial
16 Services of the House of Representatives may
17 request the submission to the Committee of the
18 matter described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of sub-
19 paragraph (A) with respect to a report sub-
20 mitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an
21 action that is not intended to significantly alter
22 United States foreign policy with respect to
23 Russia.

24 (5) CONFIDENTIALITY OF PROPRIETARY INFOR-
25 MATION.—Proprietary information that can be asso-

1 ciated with a particular person with respect to an
2 action described in paragraph (2) may be included
3 in a report submitted under paragraph (1) only if
4 the appropriate congressional committees and lead-
5 ership provide assurances of confidentiality, unless
6 that person otherwise consents in writing to such
7 disclosure.

8 (6) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Paragraph
9 (2)(A)(iii) shall not be construed to require the sub-
10 mission of a report under paragraph (1) with respect
11 to the routine issuance of a license that does not sig-
12 nificantly alter United States foreign policy with re-
13 spect to Russia.

14 (b) PERIOD FOR REVIEW BY CONGRESS.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—During the period of 30 cal-
16 endar days beginning on the date on which the
17 President submits a report under subsection
18 (a)(1)—

19 (A) in the case of a report that relates to
20 an action that is not intended to significantly
21 alter United States foreign policy with respect
22 to Russia, the Committee on Banking, Housing,
23 and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Com-
24 mittee on Financial Services of the House of
25 Representatives should, as appropriate, hold

1 hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain in-
2 formation in order to fully review the report;
3 and

4 (B) in the case of a report that relates to
5 an action that is intended to significantly alter
6 United States foreign policy with respect to
7 Russia, the Committee on Foreign Relations of
8 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
9 fairs of the House of Representatives should, as
10 appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and
11 otherwise obtain information in order to fully
12 review the report.

13 (2) EXCEPTION.—The period for congressional
14 review under paragraph (1) of a report required to
15 be submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 cal-
16 endar days if the report is submitted on or after
17 July 10 and on or before September 7 in any cal-
18 endar year.

19 (3) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING INITIAL
20 CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PERIOD.—Notwithstanding
21 any other provision of law, during the period for
22 congressional review provided for under paragraph
23 (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
24 proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2),
25 including any additional period for such review as

1 applicable under the exception provided in paragraph
2 (2), the President may not take that action unless
3 a joint resolution of approval with respect to that ac-
4 tion is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).

5 (4) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESI-
6 DENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION
7 OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
8 vision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval re-
9 lating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
10 proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2)
11 passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with
12 subsection (c), the President may not take that ac-
13 tion for a period of 12 calendar days after the date
14 of passage of the joint resolution of disapproval.

15 (5) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRES-
16 SIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION
17 OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
18 vision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval re-
19 lating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
20 proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2)
21 passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with
22 subsection (c), and the President vetoes the joint
23 resolution, the President may not take that action
24 for a period of 10 calendar days after the date of
25 the President's veto.

1 (6) EFFECT OF ENACTMENT OF A JOINT RESO-
2 LUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any
3 other provision of law, if a joint resolution of dis-
4 approval relating to a report submitted under sub-
5 section (a)(1) proposing an action described in sub-
6 section (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with sub-
7 section (c), the President may not take that action.

8 (c) JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OR AP-
9 PROVAL.—

10 (1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

11 (A) JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL.—

12 The term “joint resolution of approval” means
13 only a joint resolution of either House of Con-
14 gress—

15 (i) the title of which is as follows: “A
16 joint resolution approving the President’s
17 proposal to take an action relating to the
18 application of certain sanctions with re-
19 spect to Russia.”; and

20 (ii) the sole matter after the resolving
21 clause of which is the following: “Congress
22 approves of the action relating to the appli-
23 cation of sanctions imposed with respect to
24 Russia proposed by the President in the
25 report submitted to Congress under this

1 section of the Ukraine Support Act with
2 the first blank space being filled with the
3 appropriate date and the second blank
4 space being filled with a short description
5 of the proposed action.”.

6 (B) JOINT RESOLUTION OF DIS-
7 APPROVAL.—The term “joint resolution of dis-
8 approval” means only a joint resolution of ei-
9 ther House of Congress—

10 (i) the title of which is as follows: “A
11 joint resolution disapproving the Presi-
12 dent’s proposal to take an action relating
13 to the application of certain sanctions with
14 respect to Russia.”; and

15 (ii) the sole matter after the resolving
16 clause of which is the following: “Congress
17 disapproves of the action relating to the
18 application of sanctions imposed with re-
19 spect to Russia proposed by the President
20 in the report submitted to Congress under
21 this section of the Ukraine Support Act
22 with the first blank space being filled with
23 the appropriate date and the second blank
24 space being filled with a short description
25 of the proposed action.”.

1 (2) INTRODUCTION.—During the period of 30
2 calendar days provided for under subsection (b)(1),
3 including any additional period as applicable under
4 the exception provided in subsection (b)(2), a joint
5 resolution of approval or joint resolution of dis-
6 approval may be introduced—

7 (A) in the House of Representatives, by
8 the majority leader or the minority leader; and

9 (B) in the Senate, by the majority leader
10 (or the majority leader’s designee) or the mi-
11 nority leader (or the minority leader’s des-
12 ignee).

13 (3) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REP-
14 RESENTATIVES.—If a committee of the House of
15 Representatives to which a joint resolution of ap-
16 proval or joint resolution of disapproval has been re-
17 ferred has not reported the joint resolution within
18 10 calendar days after the date of referral, that
19 committee shall be discharged from further consider-
20 ation of the joint resolution.

21 (4) CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.—

22 (A) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.—A joint reso-
23 lution of approval or joint resolution of dis-
24 approval introduced in the Senate shall be—

1 (i) referred to the Committee on
2 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
3 the Senate if the joint resolution relates to
4 a report under subsection (a)(3)(A) that
5 relates to an action that is not intended to
6 significantly alter United States foreign
7 policy with respect to Russia; and

8 (ii) referred to the Committee on For-
9 eign Relations of the Senate if the joint
10 resolution relates to a report under sub-
11 section (a)(3)(B) that relates to an action
12 that is intended to significantly alter
13 United States foreign policy with respect
14 to Russia.

15 (B) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If the
16 committee to which a joint resolution of ap-
17 proval or joint resolution of disapproval was re-
18 ferred has not reported the joint resolution
19 within 10 calendar days after the date of refer-
20 ral of the joint resolution, that committee shall
21 be discharged from further consideration of the
22 joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be
23 placed on the appropriate calendar.

24 (C) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—
25 Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing

1 Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time
2 after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
3 Urban Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Re-
4 lations of the Senate, as the case may be, re-
5 ports a joint resolution of approval or joint res-
6 olution of disapproval to the Senate or has been
7 discharged from consideration of such a joint
8 resolution (even though a previous motion to
9 the same effect has been disagreed to) to move
10 to proceed to the consideration of the joint reso-
11 lution, and all points of order against the joint
12 resolution (and against consideration of the
13 joint resolution) are waived. The motion to pro-
14 ceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject
15 to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider
16 the vote by which the motion is agreed to or
17 disagreed to shall not be in order.

18 (D) RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCE-
19 DURE.—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair
20 relating to the application of the rules of the
21 Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure re-
22 lating to a joint resolution of approval or joint
23 resolution of disapproval shall be decided with-
24 out debate.

1 (E) CONSIDERATION OF VETO MES-
2 SAGES.—Debate in the Senate of any veto mes-
3 sage with respect to a joint resolution of ap-
4 proval or joint resolution of disapproval, includ-
5 ing all debatable motions and appeals in con-
6 nection with the joint resolution, shall be lim-
7 ited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between,
8 and controlled by, the majority leader and the
9 minority leader or their designees.

10 (5) RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE
11 OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

12 (A) TREATMENT OF SENATE JOINT RESO-
13 LUTION IN HOUSE.—In the House of Rep-
14 resentatives, the following procedures shall
15 apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint
16 resolution of disapproval received from the Sen-
17 ate (unless the House has already passed a
18 joint resolution relating to the same proposed
19 action):

20 (i) The joint resolution shall be re-
21 ferred to the appropriate committees.

22 (ii) If a committee to which a joint
23 resolution has been referred has not re-
24 ported the joint resolution within 2 cal-
25 endar days after the date of referral, that

1 committee shall be discharged from further
2 consideration of the joint resolution.

3 (iii) Beginning on the third legislative
4 day after each committee to which a joint
5 resolution has been referred reports the
6 joint resolution to the House or has been
7 discharged from further consideration
8 thereof, it shall be in order to move to pro-
9 ceed to consider the joint resolution in the
10 House of Representatives. All points of
11 order against the motion are waived. Such
12 a motion shall not be in order after the
13 House of Representatives has disposed of a
14 motion to proceed on the joint resolution.
15 The previous question shall be considered
16 as ordered on the motion to its adoption
17 without intervening motion. The motion
18 shall not be debatable. A motion to recon-
19 sider the vote by which the motion is dis-
20 posed of shall not be in order.

21 (iv) The joint resolution shall be con-
22 sidered as read. All points of order against
23 the joint resolution and against its consid-
24 eration are waived. The previous question
25 shall be considered as ordered on the joint

1 resolution to final passage without inter-
2 vening motion except 2 hours of debate
3 equally divided and controlled by the spon-
4 sor of the joint resolution (or a designee)
5 and an opponent. A motion to reconsider
6 the vote on passage of the joint resolution
7 shall not be in order.

8 (B) TREATMENT OF HOUSE JOINT RESO-
9 LUTION IN SENATE.—

10 (i) RECEIPT BEFORE PASSAGE.—If,
11 before the passage by the Senate of a joint
12 resolution of approval or joint resolution of
13 disapproval, the Senate receives an iden-
14 tical joint resolution from the House of
15 Representatives, the following procedures
16 shall apply:

17 (I) That joint resolution shall not
18 be referred to a committee.

19 (II) With respect to that joint
20 resolution—

21 (aa) the procedure in the
22 Senate shall be the same as if no
23 joint resolution had been received
24 from the House of Representa-
25 tives; but

1 (bb) the vote on passage
2 shall be on the joint resolution
3 from the House of Representa-
4 tives.

5 (ii) RECEIPT AFTER PASSAGE.—If,
6 following passage of a joint resolution of
7 approval or joint resolution of disapproval
8 in the Senate, the Senate receives an iden-
9 tical joint resolution from the House of
10 Representatives, that joint resolution shall
11 be placed on the appropriate Senate cal-
12 endar.

13 (iii) NO COMPANION MEASURE.—If a
14 joint resolution of approval or a joint reso-
15 lution of disapproval is received from the
16 House, and no companion joint resolution
17 has been introduced in the Senate, the
18 Senate procedures under this subsection
19 shall apply to the House joint resolution.

20 (C) APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEAS-
21 URES.—The provisions of this paragraph shall
22 not apply in the House of Representatives to a
23 joint resolution of approval or joint resolution
24 of disapproval that is a revenue measure.

1 (d) TOLLING.—The requirements of this section may
2 not be tolled by either the House of Representatives or
3 the Senate.

4 **SEC. 322. DEFINITIONS.**

5 In this title:

6 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms
7 “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the
8 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
9 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

10 (2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
11 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
12 gress” means—

13 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
14 and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
15 Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

16 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
17 the Committee on Financial Services of the
18 House of Representatives.

19 (3) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “fi-
20 nancial institution” means a financial institution
21 specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E),
22 (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (M), or (Y) of section
23 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code.

24 (4) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The
25 term “foreign financial institution” has the meaning

1 given that term in regulations prescribed by the Sec-
2 retary of the Treasury.

3 (5) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
4 son” means an individual or entity that is not a
5 United States person.

6 (6) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” with
7 respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,
8 means that a person had actual knowledge, or
9 should have known, of the conduct, the cir-
10 cumstance, or the result.

11 (7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
12 “United States person” means—

13 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
14 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
15 United States; or

16 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
17 the United States or any jurisdiction within the
18 United States, including a foreign branch of
19 such an entity.

20 (8) WAR OF AGGRESSION.—The term “war of
21 aggression” is implicated when any of the following
22 have occurred in the 30 days prior to a sanctions
23 trigger determination—

24 (A) a ground, amphibious, or airborne as-
25 sault;

- 1 (B) any naval, aerial, or terrestrial block-
2 ade;
3 (C) any drone or missile attack; and
4 (D) any cyber attack that has any physical
5 repercussion in the sovereign territory of
6 Ukraine.

