

118<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

# H. R. 8683

To require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to monitor efforts by the People’s Republic of China to build or buy strategic foreign ports, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 11, 2024

Mr. HUIZENGA introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, and Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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## A BILL

To require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to monitor efforts by the People’s Republic of China to build or buy strategic foreign ports, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. MAPPING AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.**

4 (a) MAPPING.—The Secretary of Defense and the  
5 Secretary of State shall jointly develop and maintain an  
6 updated global mapping of strategic ports identified to be  
7 of importance to the United States, because of a capability

1 to provide military, diplomatic, economic, trade, or re-  
2 source exploration superiority, and any efforts by the Gov-  
3 ernment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to build  
4 or buy such ports.

5 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the  
6 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense  
7 and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to Congress  
8 a strategy to counter the efforts by the PRC described  
9 in subsection (a) and ensure that the strategic ports  
10 mapped pursuant to such subsection are built, owned, con-  
11 trolled, and managed by the United States or by govern-  
12 ments friendly to the United States. Such strategy shall  
13 also include the following—

14 (1) An identification of the commercial, mili-  
15 tary, and dual-use capabilities of ports owned, con-  
16 structed, or operated by Chinese entities.

17 (2) An identification of potential military capa-  
18 bilities, including physical limitations and construc-  
19 tion specifications such as berth, in number and  
20 length, draft, deep-water level, availability of trans-  
21 portation networks and fueling stations, and quay.

22 (3) An identification and analysis of ongoing  
23 PRC port projects, suspended projects, and canceled  
24 projects.

1           (4) An identification and analysis of non-PRC-  
2 owned or -operated ports that use PRC-manufac-  
3 tured, critical port infrastructure.

4           (5) An identification and analysis of non-PRC-  
5 owned or -operated ports that have been the victims  
6 of cyber attacks originating inside or by the direc-  
7 tion of the PRC.

8           (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy  
9 of each relevant Federal department and agency to—

10           (1) identify and encourage ways in which col-  
11 laboration between various development finance op-  
12 tions, such as the Export-Import Bank, the United  
13 States International Development Finance Corpora-  
14 tion, the United States Agency for International De-  
15 velopment, and others, can be used to thwart Chi-  
16 nese investment in—

17                   (A) strategic ports;

18                   (B) countries that have currently have  
19 strategic ports; or

20                   (C) countries that have the capability of  
21 hosting strategic ports; and

22           (2) report to Congress on efforts and progress  
23 made in such collaboration and in successfully  
24 thwarting such investments.

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