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118TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 3202

To prohibit any official action to recognize or normalize relations with any Government of Syria that is led by Bashar al-Assad, and for other purposes.

### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 11, 2023

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina (for himself, Mr. Vicente Gonzalez of Texas, Mr. McCaul, Mr. Hill, Mr. Boyle of Pennsylvania, Mrs. Radewagen, Mr. Cohen, and Mr. Gimenez) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

## A BILL

To prohibit any official action to recognize or normalize relations with any Government of Syria that is led by Bashar al-Assad, and for other purposes.



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### A BILL

- To prohibit any official action to recognize or normalize relations with any Government of Syria that is led by Bashar al-Assad, and for other purposes.
  - 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
  - tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
  - 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
  - This Act may be cited as the "Assad Regime Anti-4
  - Normalization Act of 2023".

1	SEC. 2. MODIFICATIONS TO THE CAESAR SYRIA CIVILIAN
2	PROTECTION ACT.
3	(a) Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.—
4	Section 7412 of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act
5	of 2019 (title LXXIV of the National Defense Authoriza-
6	tion Act for Fiscal Year 2020; 22 U.S.C. 8791 note) is
7	amended—
8	(1) in subsection (a)—
9	(A) in paragraph (1), by striking "with re-
10	spect to a foreign person if the President deter-
11	mines that the foreign person, on or after such
12	date of enactment, knowingly engages in an ac-
13	tivity described in paragraph (2)." and insert-
14	ing "with respect to a foreign person that the
15	President determines—"
16	"(A) knowingly engages, on or after such
17	date of enactment, in an activity described in
18	paragraph (2);
19	"(B) is an adult family member of a for-
20	eign person described in subparagraph (A); or
21	"(C) is owned or controlled by a foreign
22	person described in subparagraph (A) or (B).";
23	(B) in paragraph (2)—
24	(i) in subparagraph (A)—
25	(I) by amending clause (i) to
26	read as follows:

1	"(i) the Government of Syria (includ-
2	ing any entity owned or controlled by the
3	Government of Syria), a senior political
4	figure of the Government of Syria, a mem-
5	ber of the People's Assembly of Syria, or
6	a senior foreign political figure (as such
7	term is defined in section 101.605 of title
8	31, Code of Federal Regulations) of the
9	Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party of Syria, in-
10	cluding any such senior foreign political
11	figure who is—
12	"(I) a member of the Central
13	Command, Central Committee, or Au-
14	diting and Inspection Committee of
15	such Party; or
16	"(II) a leader of a local branch of
17	such Party;";
18	(II) in clause (ii), by striking ";
19	or" and inserting a semicolon;
20	(III) in clause (iii), by striking
21	the semicolon and inserting "; or";
22	and
23	(IV) by adding at the end the fol-
24	lowing new clause:

1	"(iv) Syria Arab Airlines, Cham
2	Wings, or any foreign person owned or
3	controlled by Syria Arab Airlines or Cham
4	Wings;";
5	(ii) by amending subparagraph (C) to
6	read as follows:
7	"(C) knowingly sells or provides aircraft or
8	spare aircraft parts—
9	"(i) to the Government of Syria; or
10	"(ii) for or on behalf of the Govern-
11	ment of Syria to any foreign person oper-
12	ating in an area directly or indirectly con-
13	trolled by the Government of Syria or for-
14	eign forces associated with the Government
15	of Syria;";
16	(iii) in subparagraph (D), by striking
17	"; or" and inserting a semicolon;
18	(iv) in subparagraph (E)—
19	(I) by striking "construction or
20	engineering services" and inserting
21	"financial, construction, or engineer-
22	ing services"; and
23	(II) by striking the closing period
24	and inserting a semicolon; and

1	(v) by adding at the end the following
2	new subparagraphs:
3	"(F) knowingly engages in or directs—
4	"(i) the diversion of goods (including
5	agricultural commodities, food, medicine,
6	and medical devices), or any international
7	humanitarian assistance, intended for the
8	people of Syria; or
9	"(ii) the dealing in proceeds from the
10	sale or resale of such diverted goods or
11	international humanitarian assistance, as
12	the case may be;
13	"(G) knowingly, directly or indirectly, en-
14	gages in or attempts to engage in, the seizure,
15	confiscation, theft, or expropriation for personal
16	gain or political purposes of property, including
17	real property, in Syria or owned by a citizen of
18	Syria;
19	"(H) knowingly, directly or indirectly, en-
20	gages in or attempts to engage in a transaction
21	or transactions for or with such seized, con-
22	fiscated, stolen, or expropriated property de-
23	scribed in subparagraph (G); or
24	"(I) knowingly provides significant finan-
25	cial, material, or technological support to a for-

1	eign person engaging in an activity described in
2	any of subparagraphs (A) through (H)."; and
3	(C) by adding at the end the following new
4	paragraphs:
5	"(4) Transaction defined.—For purposes of
6	the determination required by subparagraph
7	(a)(2)(A), the term 'transaction' includes in-kind
8	transactions.
9	"(5) Significant transaction clarified.—
10	In this section, the term 'significant transaction' in-
11	cludes any natural gas, electricity, or other energy-
12	related transaction, without regard to whether such
13	transaction was authorized by a license or regulation
14	issued prior the date of the enactment of this para-
15	graph pursuant to section 203 of the International
16	Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
17	1702)."; and
18	(2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
19	section:
20	"(c) Congressional Requests.—Not later than 30
21	days after receiving a request from the chairman and
22	ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional
23	committees with respect to whether a foreign person know-
24	ingly engages in an activity described in subsection (a)(2)
25	the President shall—

1	"(1) make the determination specified in sub-
2	section (a)(1) with respect to that foreign person;
3	and
4	"(2) submit to such chairman and ranking
5	member that submitted the request a report with re-
6	spect to such determination that includes a state-
7	ment of whether the President has imposed or in-
8	tends to impose the sanctions described in sub-
9	section (b) with respect to that foreign person.".
10	(b) REMOVAL OF EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPOR-
11	TATION OF GOODS.—The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection
12	Act of 2019, as amended by subsection (a), is further
13	amended—
14	(1) by striking section 7434; and
15	(2) by redesignating sections 7435 through
16	7438 as sections 7434 through 7437, respectively.
17	(c) Determination With Respect to Syria
18	TRUST FOR DEVELOPMENT.—
19	(1) Determination.—Not later than 120 days
20	after the enactment of this Act, the President
21	shall—
22	(A) determine whether the nonprofit orga-
23	nization chaired by Asma Al-Assad, the First
24	Lady of Syria, known as the "Syria Trust for
25	Development" meets the criteria for the imposi-

1	tion of sanctions under section 7412(a) of the
2	Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019,
3	as amended by subsection (a); and
4	(B) submit to the appropriate congres-
5	sional committees such determination, including
6	a justification for the determination.
7	(2) FORM.—The determination under para-
8	graph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
9	but the justification specified in such paragraph may
10	be included in a classified annex. The unclassified
11	determination shall be made available on a publicly
12	available website of the Federal government.
13	(3) Appropriate congressional commit-
14	TEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appro-
15	priate congressional committees" means—
16	(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the
17	Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Com-
18	mittee on Financial Services of the House of
19	Representatives; and
20	(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the
21	Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
22	mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
23	of the Senate.

1	(d) FINDINGS ON APPLICABILITY WITH RESPECT TO
2	SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES, CHAM WINGS AIRLINES, AND
3	RELATED ENTITIES.—Congress finds the following:
4	(1) In 2013, the President identified Syrian
5	Arab Airlines as a blocked instrumentality or con-
6	trolled entity of the Government of Syria and con-
7	currently sanctioned Syrian Arab Airlines pursuant
8	to Executive Order 13224 for acting for or on behalf
9	of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods
10	Force of Iran.
11	(2) In 2016, the President sanctioned Syria-
12	based Cham Wings Airlines pursuant to Executive
13	Order 13582 for having materially assisted, spon-
14	sored, or provided financial, material, or techno-
15	logical support for, or goods or services in support
16	of, the Government of Syria and Syrian Arab Air-
17	lines.
18	(3) Section 7412(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Caesar
19	Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C.
20	8791 note) mandates the application of sanctions
21	against any foreign person that "knowingly provides
22	significant financial, material, or technological sup-
23	port to, or knowingly engages in a significant trans-
24	action witha foreign person subject to sanctions
25	pursuant to the International Emergency Economic

1	Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with respect to
2	Syria or any other provision of law that imposes
3	sanctions with respect to Syria,", which applies to
4	airport service providers outside of Syria.
5	(e) SEVERABILITY.—If any provision of this Act, or
6	the application of such provision to any person or cir-
7	cumstance, is found to be unconstitutional, the remainder
8	of this Act, or the application of that provision to other
9	persons or circumstances, shall not be affected.
10	SEC. 3. PROHIBITION OF RECOGNITION OF ASSAD REGIME.
11	(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
12	United States—
13	(1) not to recognize or normalize relations with
14	any Government of Syria that is led by Bashar al-
15	Assad due to the Assad regime's ongoing crimes
16	against the Syrian people, including failure to meet
17	the criteria outlined in section 7431(a) of the Caesar
18	Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019;
19	(2) to actively oppose recognition or normaliza-
20	tion of relations by other governments with any Gov-
21	ernment of Syria that is led by Bashar Al-Assad, in-
22	cluding by fully implementing the mandatory pri-
23	mary and secondary sanctions in the Caesar Syria
24	Civilian Protection Act of 2019 and Executive Order
25	13894; and

1	(3) to use the full range of authorities, includ-
2	ing those provided under the Caesar Syria Civilian
3	Protection Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13894,
4	to deter reconstruction activities in areas under the
5	control of Bashar al-Assad.
6	(b) Prohibition.—In accordance with subsection
7	(a), no Federal official or employee may take any action,
8	and no Federal funds may be made available, to recognize
9	or otherwise imply, in any manner, United States recogni-
10	tion of Bashar al-Assad or any Government in Syria that
11	is led by Bashar al-Assad.
12	SEC. 4. INTERAGENCY STRATEGY TO COUNTER NORMAL-
13	IZATION WITH ASSAD REGIME.
14	(a) REPORT AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.—
14 15	<ul><li>(a) Report and Strategy Required.—</li><li>(1) Submission.—Not later than 180 days</li></ul>
15	(1) Submission.—Not later than 180 days
15 16	(1) Submission.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
15 16 17	(1) Submission.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period not to exceed 5 years,
15 16 17 18	(1) Submission.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period not to exceed 5 years, the Secretary of State (in consultation with the Sec-
15 16 17 18	(1) Submission.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period not to exceed 5 years, the Secretary of State (in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the
115 116 117 118 119 220	(1) Submission.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period not to exceed 5 years, the Secretary of State (in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the heads of
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	(1) Submission.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period not to exceed 5 years, the Secretary of State (in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agen-
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	(1) Submission.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period not to exceed 5 years, the Secretary of State (in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies) shall submit to the appropriate congressional

1	ical, diplomatic, or economic ties with the regime led
2	by Bashar al-Assad in Syria (in this section referred
3	to as the "Assad regime").
4	(2) Elements.—The elements of the report
5	under paragraph (1) shall include—
6	(A) a description of violations of inter-
7	national law and human rights abuses com-
8	mitted by Bashar al-Assad, the Government of
9	the Russian Federation, or the Government of
10	Iran and progress towards justice and account-
11	ability for the Syrian people;
12	(B) a full list of diplomatic meetings at the
13	Ambassador level or above, between the Syrian
14	regime and any representative of the Govern-
15	ments of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates,
16	Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait,
17	the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria,
18	Morocco, Libya, or Lebanon, respectively;
19	(C) a full list of transactions, including in-
20	vestments, grants, contracts, or donations (in-
21	cluding loans or other extension of credit), ex-
22	ceeding \$50,000 in areas of Syria held by the
23	Assad regime by any persons from Turkey, the
24	United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq,
25	Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi

1	Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, or
2	Lebanon;
3	(D) for each item on the list identified in
4	subparagraph (C), a determination of whether
5	such transaction subjects any of the parties to
6	the transaction to sanctions under the Caesar
7	Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, as
8	amended by section 2;
9	(E) a description of the steps the United
10	States is taking to actively deter recognition or
11	normalization of relations by other governments
12	with the Assad regime, including specific diplo-
13	matic engagements and use of economic sanc-
14	tions authorized by statutes or implemented
15	through Executive Orders, including—
16	(i) the Caesar Syria Civilian Protec-
17	tion Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 8791 note);
18	(ii) the Syria Accountability and Leb-
19	anese Sovereignty Restoration Act (22
20	U.S.C. 2151 note);
21	(iii) the Comprehensive Iran Sanc-
22	tions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
23	of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.);
24	(iv) Executive Order 13894 (84 Fed.
25	Reg. 55851; relating to blocking property

1	and suspending entry of certain persons
2	contributing to the situation in Syria);
3	(v) the Global Magnitsky Human
4	Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C.
5	10101 et seq.);
6	(vi) the Countering American Adver-
7	saries through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C.
8	9401 et seq.); and
9	(vii) the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
10	Designation Act; and
11	(F) an assessment of how recognition or
12	normalization of relations by other governments
13	with the Assad regime impacts the national se-
14	curity of the United States, prospects for imple-
15	mentation of the United Nations Security
16	Council Resolution 2254, prospects for justice
17	and accountability for war crimes in Syria, and
18	the benefits derived by the Government of the
19	Russian Federation or the Government of Iran.
20	(b) Scope.—The initial report required by subsection
21	(a) shall address the period beginning on January 1, 2021,
22	and ending on the date of the enactment of this Act, and
23	each subsequent report shall address the one-year period
24	following the conclusion of the scope of the prior report.

1	(e) FORM.—Each report under subsection (a) shall
2	be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a
3	classified annex. The unclassified section of such a report
4	shall be made publicly available on a website of the United
5	States Federal Government.
6	(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees.—
7	In this section, the term "appropriate congressional com-
8	mittees" means—
9	(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
10	Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Fi-
11	nancial Services, the Committee on Appropriations,
12	and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
13	of the House of Representatives; and
14	(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
15	Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on
16	Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
17	mittee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee
18	on Intelligence of the Senate.
19	SEC. 5. REPORTS ON MANIPULATION OF UNITED NATIONS
20	BY ASSAD REGIME IN SYRIA.
21	Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
22	ment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period not
23	to exceed 5 years, the Secretary of State, shall submit to
24	the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
25	resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of

1	the Senate a report on the manipulation of the United
2	Nations by the regime led by Bashar al-Assad in Syria
3	(in this section referred to as the "Assad regime"), includ-
4	ing—
5	(1) a description of conditions, both explicit and
6	implicit, set by the Assad regime with respect to
7	United Nations operations in Syria including with
8	respect to implementing partners, hiring practices,
9	allocation of grants and contracts, and procurement
10	of goods and services;
11	(2) a description of the extent to which the
12	United Nations has rejected or otherwise opposed
13	any of the conditions described in paragraph (1);
14	(3) an identification of officials or employees of
15	the United Nations (including funds, programs and
16	specialized agencies of the United Nations) with ties
17	to the Assad regime, including family ties, or per-
18	sons designated for sanctions by United Nations
19	donor countries;
20	(4) a full account of access restrictions imposed
21	by the Assad regime and the overall impact on the
22	ability of the United Nations to deliver internationa
23	assistance to target beneficiaries in areas outside re
24	gime control;

1	(5) a description of ways in which United Na-
2	tions aid improperly benefits the Assad regime and
3	its associates in defiance of basic humanitarian prin-
4	ciples;
5	(6) a description of the due diligence mecha-
6	nisms and vetting procedures in place to ensure enti-
7	ties contracted by the United Nations to ensure
8	goods, supplies, or services provided Syria do not
9	have links to the Assad regime, known human rights
10	abusers, or persons designated for sanctions by
11	United Nations donor countries;
12	(7) an identification of entities affiliated with
13	the Assad regime, including the Syria Trust for De-
14	velopment and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, for-
15	eign government ministries, and private corporations
16	owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
17	Assad regime, that have received United Nations
18	funding, contracts, or grants or have otherwise en-
19	tered into a formalized partnership with the United
20	Nations;
21	(8) an assessment of how the Assad regime sets
22	arbitrary or punitive exchange rates to extract fund-
23	ing from the United Nations, as well as the total
24	amount extracted by such means;

1	(9) an assessment of the degree to which the
2	various forms of manipulation described in this sec-
3	tion has resulted in compromises of the humani-
4	tarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impar-
. 5	tiality, and independence of the United Nations; and
6	(10) a strategy to reduce the ability of the
7	Assad regime to manipulate or otherwise influence
8	the United Nations and other aid operations in
9	Syria and ensure United States and international
10	aid is delivered in a neutral and impartial manner
11	consistent with basic humanitarian principles.