

STATEMENT OF MR. KENNETH A. MYERS
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY AT
PAE NATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

ON

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW START TREATY

BEFORE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 5, 2019

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to testify on the future of the New START Treaty. The views I will express here today are my own and not necessarily those of PAE.

I believe the New START Treaty should be extended before it expires in 2021. I reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, while the New START Treaty is not perfect, it limits Russia's ability to deploy nuclear weapons and as long as Russia remains in compliance, it's in US national interests to prevent Russian expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Second, the five-year extension can and should be used to address recent technological developments and include China in expanded negotiations and commitments. The Russians are testing nuclear delivery systems not captured by the New START Treaty and the Chinese are making significant investments to expand and modernize their nuclear weapons capabilities. As a result, I believe it is necessary to EXTEND in order to EXPAND!

On a personal note, I would like to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for naming their bill supporting the New START Treaty in honor of Senator Richard Lugar and Representative Ellen Tauscher. I had the privilege to serve on Senator Lugar's staff for 15 years. I am thankful to have worked for a true American statesman who made the United States more secure and the world a safer place. I also had the opportunity to work closely with Ms. Tauscher in the House and during her time in the State Department. You couldn't have picked two better Americans to name your bill after.

Mr. Chairman, treaties will never be perfect and they are not panaceas. By their very nature they are compromises between governments. As a result, they alone cannot ensure American security.

During my time in the Senate, I participated in the consideration of many treaties. The concern heard most often is the level of US certainty to detect cheating through a rigorous verification regime. President Reagan's famous dictum of "trust but verify" is heard regularly and rightfully so.

In large part, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency or DTRA, is the entity charged with responding to President Reagan's challenge. DTRA conducts on-site inspections in Russia as well as escort Russian inspectors during inspections in the US. The treaty and technical weapons experts at DTRA are the best in the world. They train and exercise regularly to maximize the verification opportunities under New START and other treaties. These experts were ready when the treaty came into force and I am confident they will be ready when the treaty is extended and expanded.

After leaving the Senate, I had the pleasure to serve as the Director of the DTRA for seven years and testified in support of New START in 2010. The agency supported the New START Treaty negotiations by providing analytical, technical and linguistic support to then Under Secretary Gottemoeller and her team of negotiators; to then Chairman Mullen and the DOD; and the US inter-agency. Of the 56 members of Dr. Gottemoeller's negotiating team in Geneva, 18 were DTRA personnel. The DTRA team provided decades of experience and expertise to the delegation and played a critical role in the development of the treaty.

During Senate debate some expressed concern that the types of inspections under the New START Treaty were reduced to two as opposed to previous treaties. Under the treaty each side has the right to conduct ten Type One inspections and eight Type Two inspections per year. Type One inspections focus on sites with deployed and non-deployed strategic systems, for instance operational ICBM, submarine, and bomber bases; and Type Two inspections focus on sites with nondeployed

strategic systems such as storage and training facilities and can also be used to confirm conversions or eliminations of items subject to the Treaty. DTRA inspectors were confident in and ready to make full use of the treaty provisions because they helped develop them. The reduction in the types of inspections did not have any material impact on our ability to verify Russian compliance. I believe this continues to be the case today and I have full confidence that DTRA inspectors are the most capable in the world and this should give US leaders confidence in their ability to detect cheating.

DTRA inspectors and escorts are responsible for observing, documenting, and reporting the findings of their inspection activities to the interagency policy community responsible for making judgments concerning verification and compliance. Let me be clear, DTRA personnel are technical experts they are not policy-makers. They report their findings but ultimately actions in response to their findings are the work of our political leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I believe a rigorous verification regime is crucial to a treaty's success. I have no doubt that as a part of any negotiation to expand the New START Treaty the Russians will seek to ensure weapons such as the boost-glide missile system remain outside the treaty's verification regime and include other provisions to make it harder for the US to verify compliance. I will defer to my colleagues as to the best negotiating strategy but the technical skills of DTRA will be required to successfully capture the necessary delivery systems and avert loopholes that could be utilized by Russia and China.

Engaging China will also complicate negotiations but I believe their inclusion is necessary. Beijing's nuclear modernization and expansion cannot be ignored. The US must not allow Moscow and Beijing to negotiate us into a corner or leverage gaps into the treaty's verification regime. While Beijing has engaged in multilateral arms control negotiations in the past, negotiating with them on a bilateral or trilateral level will be a very different experience for US diplomats.

Expanding the New START Treaty will be difficult diplomatic work but I'm confident that with the right strategy and technical expertise it can be done. US national security will benefit from an expanded treaty that includes newly developed delivery systems, a growing nuclear capable China, and a verification regime that ensures our ability to determine compliance. Reasonable people can disagree on where and what compromises need to be struck to achieve an agreement but I believe the overall value of an agreement that limits the threats to the US to be inherently in our interests.

Mr. Chairman, I fully support the ongoing nuclear modernization process here in the US. But we must also understand that Russia and China are doing the same. Our modernization efforts coupled with continued investment in missile defense makes it clear that reducing the number of threats facing the US makes our deterrence and defense strategies more effective.

It is time that the US get to work to EXTEND New START in order to EXPAND it. I believe this is in the best interests of the US and our allies. I want to thank the committee once again for the invitation to appear today. I applaud your leadership and I stand ready to support the committee in the future.