

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 2658
OFFERED BY MR. ENGEL OF NEW YORK**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

2 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the
3 “Venezuela Humanitarian Assistance and Defense of
4 Democratic Governance Act of 2017”.

5 (b) **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**—The table of contents for
6 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 4. Humanitarian assistance for the people of Venezuela.
- Sec. 5. Requirement for strategy to coordinate international humanitarian assistance.
- Sec. 6. Support for efforts at the United Nations on the humanitarian and political crisis in Venezuela.
- Sec. 7. Support for Organization of American States Inter-American Democratic Charter.
- Sec. 8. Support for international election observation missions and democratic civil society in Venezuela.
- Sec. 9. Concerns and report on the involvement of Venezuelan officials in corruption and illicit narcotics trafficking.
- Sec. 10. Sanctions on persons responsible for public corruption and undermining democratic governance in Venezuela.
- Sec. 11. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft.
- Sec. 12. Report on activities of certain governments in Venezuela.

7 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

8 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) The deterioration of democratic governance
2 and the economic crisis in Venezuela have led to an
3 unprecedented humanitarian situation in which peo-
4 ple are suffering from severe shortages of essential
5 medicines and basic food products.

6 (2) According to the World Health Organiza-
7 tion, Venezuela had a shortage of necessary medica-
8 tions and medical supplies of—

9 (A) 55 percent in 2014;

10 (B) 67 percent in 2015; and

11 (C) 75 percent in 2016.

12 (3) According to a Human Rights Watch 2016
13 report, it is increasingly difficult for many Ven-
14 ezuelans, particularly those in lower- or middle-in-
15 come families, to obtain adequate nutrition and
16 there are reports of symptoms of malnutrition, par-
17 ticularly in children.

18 (4) Maternal deaths in Venezuela increased by
19 66 percent from 2015 to 2016 while infant deaths
20 increased by 30 percent.

21 (5) There were 240,000 confirmed malaria
22 cases in Venezuela in 2016—a 76 percent increase
23 over 2015.

24 (6) A survey—conducted jointly by the Central
25 University of Venezuela, the Andrés Bello Catholic

1 University, and the Simón Bolívar University—
2 found that almost 75 percent of Venezuelans lost an
3 average of at least 19 pounds in 2016 as a result
4 of a lack of proper nutrition amidst the country's
5 economic crisis.

6 (7) Despite massive shortages of basic food-
7 stuffs and essential medicines, Nicolás Maduro has
8 rejected repeated requests from the Venezuelan Na-
9 tional Assembly and civil society organizations to
10 bring humanitarian aid into the country.

11 (8) The International Monetary Fund has esti-
12 mated that in Venezuela in 2016 the country's gross
13 domestic product contracted by 12 percent and infla-
14 tion rate reached 720 percent, and has stated that
15 Venezuela had the worst growth and inflation per-
16 formance in the world.

17 (9) The International Monetary Fund has not
18 convened an Article IV Executive Board consultation
19 for Venezuela since September 13, 2004, which
20 greatly limits the extent of information available to
21 the international community about the severity of
22 the Venezuelan economic crisis.

23 (10) Venezuela's political, economic, and hu-
24 manitarian crisis is fueling social tensions that are
25 resulting in growing incidents of public unrest,

1 looting, violence among citizens, and an exodus of
2 Venezuelans abroad.

3 (11) These social distortions are taking place
4 amidst an alarming climate of criminal violence. Ac-
5 cording to the United Nations Office on Drug and
6 Crime, Caracas, Venezuela had the highest per cap-
7 ita homicide rate of any capital city in the world in
8 2015 at 120 murders per 100,000 citizens.

9 (12) In 2016, 18,155 Venezuelans submitted
10 asylum requests in the United States, which was the
11 greatest number of requests by any nationality, ac-
12 cording to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv-
13 ices.

14 (13) International and domestic human rights
15 groups, such as Foro Penal Venezolano, recognize
16 more than 600 political prisoners in Venezuela, in-
17 cluding opposition leader and former Chacao mayor
18 Leopoldo López, Judge María Lourdes Afiumi, Cara-
19 cas Mayor Antonio José Ledezma Díaz, National
20 Assembly Deputy Gilber Caro, and former San Cris-
21 tobal mayor Daniel Ceballos.

22 (14) According to media accounts, over 125
23 people lost their lives as the result of public dem-
24 onstrations and protests in Venezuela since April
25 2017.

1 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

2 It is the sense of Congress that—

3 (1) Nicolás Maduro should permit the delivery
4 of international humanitarian assistance to address
5 the widespread and deeply concerning shortages of
6 essential medicines and basic food products faced by
7 the people of Venezuela;

8 (2) it is in the best interest of the Venezuelan
9 people for the Government of Venezuela to engage
10 with multilateral institutions to ameliorate the ef-
11 fects of the country's ongoing economic, social, and
12 humanitarian crisis;

13 (3) Nicolás Maduro should immediately release
14 all political prisoners and respect internationally rec-
15 ognized human rights in order to facilitate the con-
16 ditions for political negotiations and dialogue in
17 Venezuela;

18 (4) Nicolás Maduro and the Supreme Tribunal
19 of Justice of Venezuela should take steps to rein-
20 state the full powers and authorities of the National
21 Assembly of Venezuela in accordance with the Con-
22 stitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;

23 (5) Venezuela's National Electoral Council
24 should establish a specific timeline to hold national,
25 regional, and municipal elections in accordance with
26 the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Ven-

1 ezuela and allow supervision of credible international
2 electoral observers; and

3 (6) the United States should support meaning-
4 ful efforts towards a substantive dialogue through
5 which all parties uphold their commitments and
6 agree to specific deadlines to restore respect for Ven-
7 ezuela's constitutional mechanisms and resolve the
8 country's political, economic, and humanitarian cri-
9 sis.

10 **SEC. 4. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE PEOPLE OF**
11 **VENEZUELA.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
13 nation with the Administrator of the United States Agen-
14 cy for International Development, subject to the avail-
15 ability of appropriations, shall work through credible and
16 independent nongovernmental organizations operating in
17 Venezuela or in neighboring countries to alleviate the suf-
18 fering of the Venezuelan people in order to provide—

19 (1) public health commodities to Venezuelan
20 health facilities and services, including medicines on
21 the World Health Organization's List of Essential
22 Medicines and basic medical supplies and equipment;

23 (2) the basic food commodities and nutritional
24 supplements needed to address growing malnutrition
25 and improve food security for the people of Ven-

1 ezuela, with a specific emphasis on the most vulner-
2 able populations; and

3 (3) technical assistance to ensure health and
4 food commodities are appropriately selected, pro-
5 cured, and distributed, predominantly through local
6 nongovernmental organizations.

7 (b) PLAN REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days
8 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
9 of State shall submit a plan for carrying out the activities
10 described in subsection (a) which also identifies United
11 States Agency for International Development best prac-
12 tices in delivering humanitarian assistance and how they
13 are being utilized in the Venezuela context to—

14 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
15 Senate;

16 (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the
17 Senate;

18 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
19 House of Representatives; and

20 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the
21 House of Representatives.

1 **SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGY TO COORDINATE**
2 **INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSIST-**
3 **ANCE.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that the appropriate United Nations humanitarian
6 agencies should conduct and publish an independent as-
7 sessment on—

8 (1) the extent and impact of the shortages of
9 food and medicine in Venezuela; and

10 (2) the efforts needed to resolve such shortages.

11 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the
12 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
13 in consultation with the Administrator of the United
14 States Agency for International Development, shall submit
15 a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
16 tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
17 of the House of Representatives that—

18 (1) describes how the United States will secure
19 support from international donors, including re-
20 gional partners in Latin America and the Caribbean,
21 for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the
22 people of Venezuela; and

23 (2) identifies governments that are willing to
24 provide financial and technical assistance for the
25 provision of such humanitarian assistance to the

1 people of Venezuela and a description of such assist-
2 ance.

3 **SEC. 6. SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS**
4 **ON THE HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL CRI-**
5 **SIS IN VENEZUELA.**

6 (a) INITIAL EFFORTS.—The President shall instruct
7 the Permanent Representative of the United States to the
8 United Nations to use the voice and vote of the United
9 States to secure the necessary votes—

10 (1) to place the humanitarian and political cri-
11 sis in Venezuela on the agenda at the United Na-
12 tions; and

13 (2) to secure a Presidential Statement from the
14 United Nations urging the Government of Venezuela
15 to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief and to
16 lift bureaucratic impediments or any other obstacles
17 so that independent nongovernmental organizations
18 can provide the proper assistance to the people of
19 Venezuela without any interference by such govern-
20 ment.

21 (b) ADDITIONAL EFFORTS.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—If the Government of Ven-
23 ezuela refuses to allow the delivery of humanitarian
24 relief and lift bureaucratic impediments and any
25 other obstacles described in subsection (a)(2), then

1 beginning not later than 30 days after the conclu-
2 sion of the efforts of the United Nations described
3 in such subsection, the President shall instruct the
4 Permanent Representative of the United States to
5 the United Nations to use the voice and vote of the
6 United States to secure the adoption of a resolution
7 described in paragraph (2).

8 (2) RESOLUTION DESCRIBED.—The resolution
9 of the United Nations described in paragraph (1) is
10 a resolution—

11 (A) directing the Government of Venezuela
12 to promptly allow safe and unhindered access
13 for humanitarian agencies and their imple-
14 menting partners, including possible support
15 from neighboring countries; and

16 (B) calling on the Government of Ven-
17 ezuela to—

18 (i) allow the delivery of food and med-
19 icine;

20 (ii) end human rights violations;

21 (iii) agree to free, fair and trans-
22 parent elections with credible international
23 observers;

24 (iv) cease violence; and

25 (v) release all political prisoners.

1 **SEC. 7. SUPPORT FOR ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN**
2 **STATES INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC**
3 **CHARTER.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
5 ings:

6 (1) Article 1 of the Inter-American Democratic
7 Charter, adopted by the Organization of American
8 States in Lima on September 11, 2001, affirms,
9 “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democ-
10 racy and their governments have an obligation to
11 promote and defend it.”.

12 (2) Article 19 of the Inter-American Demo-
13 cratic Charter states “an unconstitutional interrup-
14 tion of the democratic order or an unconstitutional
15 alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously
16 impairs the democratic order in a member state,
17 constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable ob-
18 stacle to its government’s participation in sessions of
19 the General Assembly . . . and other bodies of the
20 Organization.”.

21 (3) Article 20 of the Inter-American Demo-
22 cratic Charter provides—

23 (A) “In the event of an unconstitutional al-
24 teration of the constitutional regime that seri-
25 ously impairs the democratic order in a member
26 state, any member state or the Secretary Gen-

1 eral may request the immediate convocation of
2 the Permanent Council to undertake a collective
3 assessment of the situation and to take such de-
4 cisions as it deems appropriate.”; and

5 (B) “The Permanent Council, depending
6 on the situation, may undertake the necessary
7 diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to
8 foster the restoration of democracy.”.

9 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that—

11 (1) Nicolás Maduro, the National Electoral
12 Council of Venezuela, and the Supreme Tribunal of
13 Justice of Venezuela have carried out systematic ef-
14 forts to undermine, block, and circumvent the au-
15 thorities and responsibilities of the Venezuelan Na-
16 tional Assembly as mandated in the Constitution of
17 the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;

18 (2) such efforts by Nicolás Maduro and the Su-
19 preme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela amount to
20 an unconstitutional alternation of the constitutional
21 regime that seriously impairs the democratic order
22 in Venezuela; and

23 (3) the Secretary of State, working through the
24 United States Permanent Mission to the Organiza-
25 tion of American States, should take additional steps

1 to support ongoing efforts by the Secretary General
2 of the Organization of American States—

3 (A) to invoke the Inter-American Demo-
4 cratic Charter;

5 (B) to advance a collective assessment of
6 the situation in Venezuela; and

7 (C) to promote diplomatic initiatives to
8 foster the restoration of Venezuelan democracy.

9 **SEC. 8. SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSER-**
10 **VATION MISSIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CIVIL**
11 **SOCIETY IN VENEZUELA.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of ap-
13 propriations, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
14 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
15 national Development, shall work—

16 (1) with the Organization of American States
17 and other entities to ensure credible international
18 observation that contributes to free, fair, and trans-
19 parent democratic electoral processes in Venezuela;
20 and

21 (2) directly, or through independent nongovern-
22 mental organizations—

23 (A) to defend internationally recognized
24 human rights for the people of Venezuela;

1 (B) to support the efforts of independent
2 media outlets to broadcast, distribute, and
3 share information beyond the limited channels
4 made available by the Government of Ven-
5 ezuela;

6 (C) to facilitate open and uncensored ac-
7 cess to the Internet for the people of Venezuela;
8 and

9 (D) to combat corruption and improve the
10 transparency and accountability of institutions
11 that are part of the Government of Venezuela.

12 (b) VOICE AND VOTE AT THE OAS.—The Secretary
13 of State, acting through the United States Permanent
14 Representative to the Organization of American States,
15 should advocate and build diplomatic support for sending
16 an election observation mission to Venezuela to ensure
17 that democratic electoral processes are organized and car-
18 ried out in a free, fair, and transparent manner.

19 **SEC. 9. CONCERNS AND REPORT ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF**
20 **VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS IN CORRUPTION**
21 **AND ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.**

22 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
23 ings:

24 (1) The deterioration of governance in Ven-
25 ezuela has been exacerbated by the involvement of

1 senior officials of the Government of Venezuela, in-
2 cluding members of the National Electoral Council,
3 the judicial system, and the Venezuelan security
4 forces, in acts of corruption and illicit narcotics traf-
5 ficking and related money laundering.

6 (2) In March 2015, the Department of the
7 Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
8 determined that approximately \$2,000,000,000 had
9 been siphoned from Venezuela's public oil company,
10 Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., in conjunction with its
11 designation of the Banca Privada d'Andorra as a
12 Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money
13 Laundering Concern.

14 (3) On August 1, 2016, General Nestor
15 Reverol, Venezuela's current Minister of Interior and
16 former National Guard commander, was indicted in
17 a United States district court for participating in an
18 international cocaine trafficking conspiracy.

19 (4) On November 18, 2016, Franqui Francisco
20 Flores de Freitas and Efrain Antonio Campo Flores,
21 nephews of Nicolás Maduro and Venezuelan First
22 Lady Cilia Flores, were convicted in a United States
23 district court on charges of conspiring to import co-
24 caine into the United States.

1 (5) On February 13, 2017, the Department of
2 the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control des-
3 ignated Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah for his
4 involvement in illicit narcotics trafficking, pursuant
5 to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act
6 (21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.; title VIII of Public Law
7 106–120).

8 (6) The Department of the Treasury's Office of
9 Foreign Assets Control has designated additional in-
10 dividuals and senior Venezuelan officials for their in-
11 volvement in illicit narcotics trafficking, pursuant to
12 such Act, including—

13 (A) Venezuelan national Samark Jose
14 Lopez Bello, who is the primary front man and
15 money launderer for Tareck Zaidan El Aissami
16 Maddah;

17 (B) Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, who
18 is the current National Assembly Deputy and
19 the former Director of Venezuela's Military In-
20 telligence Directorate;

21 (C) Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, who is
22 the current Governor of Trujillo State and the
23 former Director of Venezuela's Directorate of
24 Intelligence and Prevention Services;

1 (D) Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin, who
2 previously served as the Minister of Interior;
3 and

4 (E) Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales, who pre-
5 viously served as the Mayor of the Libertador
6 municipality of Caracas.

7 (7) On September 12, 2017, Ambassador Wil-
8 liam Brownfield testified before the Senate Caucus
9 on International Narcotics Control that drug traf-
10 ficking organizations in Venezuela have “completely
11 penetrated virtually every security, law enforcement,
12 and justice-related institution” and that “there will
13 be no long-term, democratic, prosperous and secure
14 solution in Venezuela until there is a solution to the
15 drug trafficking organization presence”.

16 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

17 (1) CORRUPTION.—The term “corruption”
18 means the extent to which public power is exercised
19 for private gain, including by bribery, nepotism,
20 fraud, or embezzlement.

21 (2) GRAND CORRUPTION.—The term “grand
22 corruption” means corruption committed at a high
23 level of government that—

24 (A) distorts policies or the central func-
25 tioning of the country; and

1 (B) enables leaders to benefit at the ex-
2 pense of the public good.

3 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
6 retary of State, acting through the Bureau of Intel-
7 ligence and Research, and in consultation with the
8 intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of
9 the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
10 3003(4))), shall submit a report to Congress that
11 describes the involvement of senior officials of the
12 Government of Venezuela, including members of the
13 National Electoral Council, the judicial system, and
14 the Venezuelan security forces, in acts of corruption
15 in Venezuela, with a specific emphasis on acts of
16 grand corruption.

17 (2) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The report sub-
18 mitted under paragraph (1) shall—

19 (A) describe how the acts of corruption de-
20 scribed in the report pose direct challenges for
21 United States national security and inter-
22 national security;

23 (B) identify individuals that frustrate the
24 ability of the United States to combat illicit
25 narcotics trafficking; and

1 (C) include input from the Drug Enforce-
2 ment Administration, the Office of Foreign As-
3 sets Control, and the Financial Crimes Enforce-
4 ment Network.

5 (3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1)
6 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
7 clude a classified annex. The unclassified portion of
8 the report shall be made available to the public.

9 **SEC. 10. SANCTIONS ON PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR PUB-**
10 **LIC CORRUPTION AND UNDERMINING DEMO-**
11 **CRATIC GOVERNANCE IN VENEZUELA.**

12 (a) FINDING.—Executive Order 13692 (50 U.S.C.
13 1701 note), which was signed on March 8, 2015, estab-
14 lished sanctions against individuals responsible for under-
15 mining democratic processes and institutions and involved
16 in acts of public corruption that were not included in the
17 Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act
18 of 2014 (Public Law 113–278).

19 (b) SANCTIONS.—Section 5 of the Venezuela Defense
20 of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public
21 Law 113–278) is amended—

22 (1) in subsection (a)—

23 (A) in paragraph (2), by striking “or” at
24 the end;

1 (B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as
2 paragraph (5);

3 (C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the
4 following:

5 “(3) is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering,
6 controlling, or otherwise directing, significant actions
7 or policies that undermine democratic processes or
8 institutions;

9 “(4) is a government official, or a senior asso-
10 ciate of such an official, that is responsible for, or
11 complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise di-
12 recting, acts of significant corruption, including the
13 expropriation of private or public assets for personal
14 gain, corruption related to government contracts or
15 the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the
16 facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption
17 to foreign jurisdictions; or”; and

18 (D) in paragraph (5) (as redesignated), by
19 striking “paragraph (1) or (2)” and inserting
20 “paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)”; and

21 (2) in subsection (e), by striking “December 31,
22 2019” and inserting “December 31, 2022”.

23 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
24 gress that the President and Secretary of State should
25 seek to encourage partner countries of the Organization

1 of American States, the European Union, and the United
2 Nations to impose sanctions with respect to Venezuelan
3 individuals that are similar to sanctions imposed by the
4 United States with respect to such Venezuelan individuals.

5 **SEC. 11. CONCERNS OVER PDVSA TRANSACTIONS WITH**
6 **ROSNEFT.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
8 ings:

9 (1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil
10 company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in
11 this section as “PDVSA”), through a no-compete
12 transaction, secured a loan from Russian govern-
13 ment-controlled oil company Rosneft, using 49.9 per-
14 cent of PDVSA’s American subsidiary, CITGO Pe-
15 troleum Corporation, including its assets in the
16 United States, as collateral. As a result of this
17 transaction, 100 percent of CITGO is held as collat-
18 eral by PDVSA’s creditors.

19 (2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of
20 PDVSA, is engaged in interstate commerce and
21 owns and controls critical energy infrastructure in
22 19 States in the United States, including an exten-
23 sive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refin-
24 eries, with a combined oil refining capacity of
25 749,000 barrels per day. CITGO’s refinery in Lake

1 Charles, Louisiana is the sixth largest refinery in the
2 United States.

3 (3) The Department of the Treasury imposed
4 sanctions on Rosneft, which is controlled by the Rus-
5 sian Government, and its Executive Chairman, Igor
6 Sechin, following Russia's military invasion of
7 Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in
8 2014.

9 (4) The Department of Homeland Security has
10 designated the energy sector as critical to United
11 States infrastructure.

12 (5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela
13 raises the probability that the Government of Ven-
14 ezuela and PDVSA will default on their inter-
15 national debt obligations, resulting in a scenario in
16 which Rosneft could come into control of CITGO's
17 United States energy infrastructure holdings.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that—

20 (1) control of critical United States energy in-
21 frastructure by Rosneft, a Russian government-con-
22 trolled entity currently under United States sanc-
23 tions, would pose a significant risk to United States
24 national security and energy security;

1 (2) the President should take all necessary
2 steps to prevent Rosneft from gaining control of
3 critical United States interstate energy infrastruc-
4 ture;

5 (3) a default by PDVSA on its loan from
6 Rosneft, resulting in Rosneft coming into possession
7 of PDVSA's United States CITGO assets, would
8 warrant careful consideration by the Committee on
9 Foreign Investment in the United States;

10 (4) if PDVSA defaults on its debt obligations,
11 the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
12 Asset Control should review CITGO's transactions
13 with United States persons to assess and ensure
14 compliance with United States sanctions policies and
15 regulations; and

16 (5) the Department of Homeland Security
17 should conduct an assessment of the security risks
18 posed by foreign control of CITGO's United States
19 energy infrastructure holdings and keep the relevant
20 committees of Congress fully informed of its findings
21 and any subsequent strategy to address
22 vulnerabilities to United States energy security as a
23 result.

1 **SEC. 12. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN GOVERN-**
2 **MENTS IN VENEZUELA.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
5 acting through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
6 of the Department of State and in consultation with the
7 intelligence community, shall submit to Congress a report
8 that describes the full extent of cooperation by the Govern-
9 ments of the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic
10 of China, Cuba, and Iran with the Government of Ven-
11 ezuela and the Venezuelan armed forces.

12 (b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be
13 submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classi-
14 fied annex. The unclassified portion of the report shall be
15 made available to the public.

16 (c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “intel-
17 ligence community” has the meaning given such term in
18 section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
19 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

