

THE BUDGET, DIPLOMACY, AND DEVELOPMENT

HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

—————
MARCH 28, 2017
—————

Serial No. 115–18
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/> or
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/>

—————
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

24–830PDF

WASHINGTON : 2017

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, *Chairman*

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
MO BROOKS, Alabama
PAUL COOK, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
RON DeSANTIS, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
TED S. YOHO, Florida
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
Wisconsin
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
BRAD SHERMAN, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
KAREN BASS, California
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
AMI BERA, California
LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DINA TITUS, Nevada
NORMA J. TORRES, California
BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, *Chief of Staff* THOMAS SHEEHY, *Staff Director*
JASON STEINBAUM, *Democratic Staff Director*

CONTENTS

	Page
WITNESSES	
Stephen D. Krasner, Ph.D., senior fellow, Hoover Institution	5
Ms. Danielle Pletka, senior vice president, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute	13
The Honorable R. Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (former Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State)	21
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING	
Stephen D. Krasner, Ph.D.: Prepared statement	7
Ms. Danielle Pletka: Prepared statement	16
The Honorable R. Nicholas Burns: Prepared statement	23
APPENDIX	
Hearing notice	68
Hearing minutes	69
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York:	
Chart submitted for the record	71
Article submitted for the record	72
The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California:	
Article submitted for the record	75
Letter submitted for the record	77
The Honorable Albio Sires, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey: Material submitted for the record	85
The Honorable Theodore E. Deutch, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida: Material submitted for the record	93
The Honorable Robin L. Kelly, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois: Material submitted for the record	99
The Honorable Norma J. Torres, a Representative in Congress from the State of California: Material submitted for the record	106
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement	107
Written response from Ms. Danielle Pletka to question submitted for the record by the Honorable Eliot L. Engel	109
Written responses from the Honorable R. Nicholas Burns and Stephen D. Krasner, Ph.D., to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts	110
Written responses from the witnesses to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Bradley S. Schneider, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois	112

THE BUDGET, DIPLOMACY, AND DEVELOPMENT

TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order.

Two weeks ago the administration presented its budget blueprint—or as they called it, “the skinny budget,” as the press has called it—which proposes significant reductions to the programs and operations of the State Department and the Agency for International Development, and the elimination of several independent agencies. Being “skinny,” this budget raises more questions than it answers, but here is what we do know.

While it proposes an overall cut of some 32 percent, the budget “protects” several programs that enjoy strong congressional support, including for HIV/AIDS, for malaria, and for vaccines. Funding for Embassy security and security assistance for Israel are maintained at current levels. These are good priorities.

But I am concerned about how cuts would impact other priorities, including efforts to combat terrorists, poachers, human traffickers. U.S. leadership was key to stopping Ebola in West Africa, and continued engagement is needed to address future threats before they hit our shores. And many are rightly worried about how proposed cuts will impact humanitarian assistance at a time when more than 65 million people have been displaced around this globe by conflict and at a time, frankly, when famine looms in four countries.

When it comes to development, our top focus should be rule of law. It should be economic growth. Promoting reforms to create environments for growth, as much of Asia did, several decades ago, is really crucial to development success. No amount of aid can overcome corruption. No amount of aid can overcome statist economic policies and weak property rights.

But just as aid can't be an entitlement for those overseas, it shouldn't be an entitlement here at home. This includes food aid, which for too long has been treated as an entitlement for some shippers rather than as a humanitarian program meant to save lives. I am very proud of the bipartisan reforms that this com-

mittee has achieved to make food assistance more effective and more efficient, and I look forward to doing more.

As the budget process advances, and the committee establishes its priorities, we look forward to hearing from Secretary of State Tillerson. His management background will be a real asset as we focus on the Trump administration's attempts to reorganize the State Department.

One thing I would like to see is national security agencies with the flexibility to shape their workforce to meet the challenges of today. Agencies should have the authority to add civilian personnel with needed skills and eliminate positions that are no longer needed. Too many resources and personnel are focused in Washington, not in the field, and that is at every level.

Everyone can agree that our assistance programs should be improved. Yet the State Department has continually failed to develop a meaningful strategic planning process that would align aid and our national security objectives. There have been innumerable studies detailing aid shortcomings, and their countless recommendations, I am afraid to say, have mainly been ignored. Here Congress deserves some blame, by writing foreign aid laws that burden the agencies with too many objectives and too many restrictions. We will do our part to improve this, and I look forward to working with the administration, because many of these programs are frankly very critical to our national security. We shouldn't be cutting to the bone.

And with that I turn to our ranking member, Mr. Eliot Engel, of the Bronx, New York.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got to get you to the Bronx one of these days. Anyway, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To our witnesses, welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee. We are grateful for your time and expertise. I must say that I find myself deeply troubled by the direction American foreign policy is heading. Members of this committee on both sides of the aisle have worked hard to advance American diplomacy and development efforts. We may not always agree 100 percent of the time on the best way forward, but I like to think we all see the value in robust bipartisan support for American international affairs. So I am sure other members were as shocked as I was when the White House released its Fiscal Year 2018 budget calling for a 31 percent cut to American diplomacy and development efforts.

In my view, cutting the international affairs budget by even a fraction of that would be devastating. We haven't seen many details, but a cut that drastic would surely mean that too many efforts and initiatives that do so much good would end up on the chopping block.

And then last night, we learned that the administration is seeking \$2.8 billion in cuts to the international affairs budget, not down the road, but right now. I can just imagine an American diplomat sitting at a negotiating table who gets passed a note saying, sorry, our funding for this meeting just ran out.

But here is the bottom line. Slashing diplomacy and development puts American lives at risk. If we no longer have diplomacy and development as tools to meet international challenges, what does that leave? The answer is simple: The military. Don't get me wrong; I

have always supported a strong national defense, but I also support using military force only as a measure of last resort. We should not send American servicemembers into harm's way unless we have exhausted every other option. If we are not investing in diplomacy and development, we aren't even giving those other options a chance.

We rely on diplomacy to resolve conflicts across negotiating tables, at multilateral gatherings, and in quiet corners so that we don't need to resolve them down the line on the battlefield. Our diplomats work to strengthen old alliances and build new bridges of friendship and shared understanding. Development helps to lift countries and communities up today so they can become strong partners of us on the global stage tomorrow.

A lot of us think we have a moral obligation to help cure disease, improve access to education, and advance human rights. But even if it weren't the right thing to do, it would be the smart thing to do because those efforts lead to greater stability, more responsive governments, stronger rule of law, and populations that share our values and priorities. Poverty and lack of opportunity, on the other hand, provide fertile ground for those who mean us harm.

All these efforts, by the way, cost cents on the dollar compared to military engagement. People think international affairs and foreign aid are a massive chunk of the Federal budget. The chart behind me shows how it actually stacks up: 1.4 percent, less than 2 percent. And if we make that sliver of the pie even smaller, it will come back on us in spades.

The diseases we don't combat will reach our shores. The communities on which we turn our backs may be the next generation of people who mean us harm, and the conflicts we fail to diffuse may well grow into the wars we need to fight later at a much higher cost in terms of American blood and treasure. Just imagine having to tell the parents of a young American soldier that their son or daughter was killed in battle because we weren't willing to spend the tiny sums needed to prevent the conflict.

Fortunately the Congress is a coequal branch of government. We decide how much to invest in our international affairs, not the White House. Congress will devote resources to push back against the Kremlin's efforts to spread disinformation and destabilize our allies, just like they did to the United States during last year's election campaign.

I don't understand this willingness to play footsie with Vladimir Putin. I think that we know him for what he is. So I am hopeful that as we move forward with next year's spending bills, we continue to provide our diplomatic and development efforts the support they need and the support they have received under Republican and Democratic Presidents alike.

However, there are things we cannot control when it comes to foreign policy that I want to briefly mention in closing. As far as I can tell, this administration is doing all it can to sideline the State Department. Aside from Secretary of State, the permanent representative to the U.N., and four ambassadorships, the President has not nominated a single State Department official. The State Department cannot make policy without leaders in place.

It is also clear that our career diplomats' expertise is being ignored. In 2 months we have suffered embarrassments in our relationships with Mexico, Australia, the UK, Germany, and NATO. We handed China what is being viewed as a major diplomatic victory and sent confusing signals to our friends in the Asia Pacific when the Secretary of State used language that aligns with China's world view.

The Secretary of State, and I had a nice conversation with him on the phone, but he has not delivered a major policy address or held a press availability. And on his last trip he took a single journalist, a writer for a right-leaning blog, which is a major departure from the longstanding practice of Secretaries of State travelling with the press corps. The Secretary told her that he is not a big media press access person. He said this on a flight to China.

And last night we learned that the State Department is stopping the daily press briefing. The world's window into American diplomacy and foreign policy is closing. No speeches, no press conferences, no media briefings. Does that sound like the way the United States makes policy or leads on global issues? And then we couple it with this tremendous proposal of kickbacks.

Together, taken with the draconian budget proposal, I feel what message are we sending to the world? The United States is the global standard bearer for freedom, justice, and democracy. If we cede our role as a global leader, make no mistake, someone will step into the void. It could very well be another power that doesn't share our values or our interests. Think Russia, think cozying up to Putin. Frankly I don't understand it. So we cannot allow that to happen. I am committed to ensuring that it doesn't.

And I am interested to hear the views of our witnesses and colleagues on the committee.

Thank you. And I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We are joined this morning by a distinguished panel. We have Dr. Stephen Krasner, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Previously Dr. Krasner served at the State Department, where he focused on foreign assistance reform.

We have Ms. Danielle Pletka, senior vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously Dani was a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where she specialized in the Near East and South Asia.

And we have Ambassador Nick Burns, the Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He served in the United States Foreign Service for 27 years, during which time he served as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and as an Ambassador at multiple posts.

And so without objection, the witnesses' full prepared statements will be made part of the record, and all of the members here will have 5 calendar days to submit any statements or any questions or any extraneous material that they wish to submit into the record.

And, Dr. Krasner, we would ask that you begin and ask our panelists to please summarize your remarks to 5 minutes, and then we

will go to questions back and forth from the members of the committee.

**STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. KRASNER, PH.D., SENIOR
FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION**

Mr. KRASNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Ranking Member Engel.

Chairman ROYCE. And one other thing, Dr. Krasner, make sure all of you hit the red button right there.

Thank you.

Mr. KRASNER. The talk button. Thank you.

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and other distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this morning.

American national security requires that we use all three critical tools in our arsenal: Defense, development, and diplomacy. Losing any one of these instruments of national power would threaten the security of the United States and the global order from which we have benefitted. Poorly governed, failing, or weak malign States pose three threats to the United States and our core allies.

First, failed and badly governed states provide safe havens for radicalized Salafist Islamic groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, places where they can train adherents, propagate their message, and refine their ideology.

Second, and the chairman has already alluded to this, naturally occurring pandemic diseases could kill hundreds of thousands or millions of people. The most well known of these diseases, HIV/AIDS and Ebola, have been difficult to transmit. A disease, however, that was transmissible through the air instead of via bodily fluids could kill hundreds of thousands or millions of Americans. Stopping these diseases when they first break out is our best line of defense.

Third, massive migration threatens liberal and humanitarian values. There are no good policy options to address such movements once they begin. Accepting unlimited numbers of individuals is untenable. Sending refugees back to unsafe countries could bring humanitarian crises. Our best policy option is to prevent such flows in the first place. We ignore badly governed, failed, and maligned states at our peril.

At the same time, it is very difficult to put countries securely on the path to democracy and a market-oriented economy. There is no natural progression from poverty to prosperity, from autocratic rule to democratic rule. Although foreign assistance has been a widely accepted practice for 70 years, its record of accomplishments is thin.

We need to rethink the objectives of foreign assistance to distinguish foreign assistance from humanitarian programs, which save lives, even if they do not change political orders. We need to identify programs that are consistent with our interests and with the interests of political elites in target states.

The fundamental objective of our foreign assistance program should be what I have called SHE: Security, health, and economic growth. These three goals are consistent with our interests and with the interests of elites in target countries, even autocratic

elites. All leaders want effective security. Leaders will welcome programs that improve health, such as PEPFAR. Better health is the big success story of the postwar period. Life expectancies have gone up 20 or 30 years, even in the poorest countries.

All leaders will accept some economic growth if that growth does not threaten their own position. The most effective way to encourage economic growth is to provide incentives for leaders in poorly governed states. One example of such a program is the Millennium Challenge Account, which I worked on when I was at the NSC, and which has not been replicated in any other country.

In addition to security, health, and economic growth, there are two other objectives that American foreign assistance broadly understood can address. First, we can limit the impact of humanitarian crises. USAID has expertise in addressing such crises. Second, we may be able in some special circumstances to stop conflicts before they spread. I have been a member of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace since 2008. The Institute works in very dangerous places in the world, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. It has helped to mitigate conflict in places like Tikrit. The entire budget of USIP is \$35 million a year, about the cost of maintaining one platoon in Afghanistan for a year.

Our foreign assistance should aim then at these three modest objectives: Better security, improved health, some economic growth, and should address humanitarian crises and attempt to mitigate conflict. Diplomacy and development are complements to defense, not rivals.

Effective American leadership requires the three Ds: Defense, diplomacy, and development. Cutting development and diplomacy would make us weaker, not stronger. The United States needs all three instruments of national power, not just one.

Thank you very much for allowing me to share these views.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krasner follows:]

Stephen D. Krasner
Graham H Stuart Professor of International Relations, Senior Fellow Hoover Institution, Senior
Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University

House Committee on Foreign Affairs
The Budget, Diplomacy, and Development, March 28, 2016

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY

Stephen D. Krasner, Freeman Spogli Institute and Hoover Institution, Stanford University

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and other distinguished members of this Committee thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this morning.

The United States has been the leader in the post world war II international order. This order has not been perfect but it has ushered in the longest period of peace among the major powers that the world has ever seen, growing levels of economic prosperity in many parts of the world and the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union itself. The United States has benefitted from this global order and others have as well. Indeed, if the American led order were not generating benefits for many, we would not have had the kind of support that we have enjoyed over the last 60 plus years. The more than 30 countries that fought with the United States in Iraq, and the even larger number that supported us in Afghanistan, are testimony to the support that the United States has received. If the United States withdraws from the global system, there will be a vacuum. The most likely countries to fill that vacuum, China and Russia, do not share our rules, norms or values.

American engagement and our national security require that we use all three critical tools in our arsenal: defense, development, and diplomacy. Losing any one of these instruments of national power would threaten the security of the United States and the global order from which we have benefitted.

Poorly governed, failing, or weak malign states pose three threats to the United States and our core allies. The first is transnational terrorism. The second is a pandemic disease outbreak. The third is massive migration.

Terrorist attacks can arise from anywhere. The husband in the San Bernardino murders, Syed Farook, was raised in the United States and attended California State University Fullerton. But he was inspired by ISIS ideology. Failed and badly governed states provide safe havens for radicalized Salafist Islamic groups such as ISIS and Al Qeda; places where they can train adherents, propagate their message, and refine their ideology. These groups and the individuals they inspire are a direct security threat to the United States. This threat has been amplified by the fact that nuclear or dirty nuclear weapons might be secured from failed, malign, or badly governed states and that biological pathogens can be more easily fabricated by individuals or groups.

Naturally occurring pandemic diseases are a second threat. About 400 diseases have jumped from animals to humans over the last 70 years. Most of these diseases have originated in tropical areas where human populations are impinging on areas that had previously been populated only by animals. Up to now we have been lucky. The most well known of these

diseases, HIV/AIDs and Ebola, have been difficult to transmit. A disease that was however, transmissible through the air instead of via bodily fluids could kill hundreds of thousands or millions of Americans. Stopping these diseases when they first break is our best line of defense.

Finally massive migration threatens liberal and humanitarian values. European states have been most afflicted by the massive displacement of people from wars in the broader Middle East. There are no good policy options to address such movements once they begin: accepting unlimited numbers of individuals is untenable; sending refugees back to unsafe countries could bring a humanitarian catastrophe. Our best policy option is to prevent such flows in the first place.

One half of the dilemma that the American government faces is that we ignore badly governed, failed, and malign states at our peril. If states are reasonably well governed, at least if they have adequate security, terrorism, potential pandemic diseases, and massive migrant flows could be better contained. If states are weak, failing, or governed by malign autocrats our security challenges will be greater.

The second half of the dilemma that the American government faces is that it is very difficult to put countries securely on the path to democracy and a market oriented economy. The rich democratic countries of North America, Western Europe, and East Asia are, historically the exception not the rule. For almost all of human history in all places on this globe government have been rapacious and exploitative. There was no accountability for political rulers. Power flowed from the barrel of a gun or the tip of a spear or the string of a bow. Political rulers fed their cousins and those who commanded the weapons that they needed to stay in power. Governments that occupy the Madison sweet spot, governments that are strong enough to maintain order but accountable enough to not oppress their own people are the exception not the rule.

There is no natural progression from poverty to prosperity, from autocratic rule to democratic rule. For the most part, countries that were relatively poor in the 1950s have remained relatively poor. Countries that were not consolidated or full democracies have, with rare exceptions, not become fully consolidated democracies.

Above all rulers want to stay in power. Losing office in many countries can mean poverty, exile, or even death. In fully democratic societies rulers can stay in power only if they win free and fair elections. In most of the world rulers stay in power because they are able to secure the loyalty of those who control the instruments of violence.

Foreign assistance has become, since the second world war, a conventional practice in the international system. Before the second world war there was no such thing as foreign aid. In absolute terms the United States is the largest official aid donor. As a percentage of GDP, the United States has always been near the bottom of the list of aid donors. According to OECD figures, American foreign assistance was 0.17 of its GDP in 2015. The largest aid donors in percentage terms were Sweden at 1.4 percent of GDP and Norway at 1.04 percent. The most

generous large country donor was Britain, which provided 0.7 percent of its GDP as overseas development assistance in 2015. If the United States were to abandon foreign assistance entirely, it would put our country outside norms that have been widely accepted in the wealthy democratic world.

Although foreign assistance has been a widely accepted practice for the seventy years its record of accomplishments is thin. In the 1950s, the widely held assumption in the United States and elsewhere was that if countries received foreign aid they would be able to close the investment gap; if they were able to invest more, they would grow faster; if they had higher levels of growth, they would have a larger middle class and a larger middle class would be the foundation for a democratic political regime. This very optimistic and straightforward story has, alas, not come to pass. The only country that has substantially changed its place in the international ordering of wealth and democracy, that has gone from being poor and autocratic to rich and democratic is South Korea. The per capita income of South Korea at the end of the Korean War was at the same level as the colonies of West Africa; today South Korea is a member of the OECD with a per capita income of \$25,000. Empirically, it has been very difficult to establish any clear relationship between the amount of foreign assistance that a country has received and its pattern of economic growth.

The classic assumption of foreign assistance is that leaders want to do the right thing; they want to improve the living conditions of their own people. This assumption is wrong. Political leaders want to stay in power. In democracies they must respond to the demands of most of their people. In non-democracies, they only need to satisfy the demands of a small part of their population: those people, most of whom have guns, that they need to keep them in power.

The United States does confront a genuine dilemma. For reasons associated with our own security – especially related to transnational terrorism and pandemic disease – we need to improve governance in badly governed states, but at the same time our traditional aid programs, which assume that political leaders in non-democratic states want to do the right thing for their own people, have not been successful.

We need to re-think the objectives of foreign assistance designed to promote growth and political change and to distinguish foreign assistance from humanitarian programs that save lives, even if they do not change polities. Our fundamental objective should be American national security. We need to identify programs that are consistent with our own interests and with the interests of political elites in target states. We have to find the sweet spot where our interest overlap.

The fundamental objective of our foreign assistance program should be SHE:

- Security,
- Health,
- Economic growth.

These three goals are consistent with our interests and with the interests of elites in target states, even autocratic elites.

All leaders want effective security. They want to be able to effectively control their own territory. If they can effectively control their own territory they can address transnational terrorist threats. If leaders support transnational terrorists, as the Taliban regime did in Afghanistan, we face starker choice. We have no choice but to displace such a regime. The use of American military power is very costly in terms of treasure and more importantly in terms of lives. The more effective our diplomacy and development is, the less we will have to rely on our very impressive but very expensive military. Security assistance, especially strengthening the policing capabilities of poorly governed states, is one primary objective that we should aim for.

Better health is the big success story of the postwar period. In many countries life expectancy has increased by 30 years. Even in some very poor countries like Bangladesh, which now has a per capita income of \$1200, life expectancy increased from 46 years in 1960 to 72 years in 2014. All leaders can reap some benefits from the better provision of health. Better health does not threaten political leaders. Various international programs, such as the elimination of smallpox which was led by the World Health Organization, and national programs such as PEPFAR, which was initiated by the George W. Bush administration have saved lives and highlighted American generosity. Better monitoring, which might be achieved even in states with poor governance, can help to prevent naturally occurring pandemic outbreaks that could spread around the world. Ebola was quickly halted in Nigeria because of a polio-monitoring program that had been put in place by the Gates Foundation.

All leaders will accept some economic growth if that growth does not threaten their own position. Poorer states will not easily become dynamic market economies where economic changes can threaten the political leadership, but political leaders will want to provide more jobs for their populations. No foreign assistance program can guarantee sustained positive growth over the long term, but we can provide some growth, and higher levels of per capita income. More jobs will make countries more stable and make it more likely that they will ultimately transition to democratic regimes. The most effective way to encourage economic growth is to provide incentives for leaders in poorly governed states to introduce growth-enhancing policies. One example of such an effort is the Millennium Challenge Account, a program that I worked on while I was at the National Security Council in 2002. The MCA has received funding of about \$1 billion a year. The MCA is selective. It only provides funding to countries that have passed third party criteria related to governing justly, investing in people, and enhancing economic freedom. Countries on the threshold of receiving passing grades have altered their policies to improve conditions for economic growth.

In addition to SHE (security, health, economic growth) there are two other objectives that American foreign assistance broadly understood can address. First, we can limit the impact of humanitarian crises. There are several countries that are threatened with famine. Civil strife especially in the Middle East and Africa has led to many internally displaced people

and to international refugees. USAID has expertise in addressing these issues. The United States has been a rich and generous country. Abandoning humanitarian assistance would be a violation of American values and would threaten our security by widening the area of ungoverned spaces.

Second, we might be able in some special circumstances to stop conflicts before the spread. I have been a member of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace since 2008. The Institute was established by President Reagan. It works in very dangerous places in the world such as Afghanistan and Iraq. It can hire foreign nationals, who are familiar with the local environment, more easily than other agencies of the American government. It has helped to mitigate conflict in places like Tikrit in Iraq after Saddam's home city was re-conquered by government forces. The entire budget of USIP is about \$35 million a year, about the cost of keeping one U.S. military platoon in Afghanistan for a year.

To enhance our own security we should support regimes in other countries that can effectively control and police their own territory, provide some level of services especially in the area of health, and accept some improvement in economic opportunities. Foreign assistance programs will not work unless the interests of American policy makers and those in target states overlap. This will only happen if American policies do not threaten foreign leaders. We should not try to transform poorer countries but we should not ignore them either because of the dangers of naturally occurring pandemic diseases, manmade biologicals, and transnational terrorism.

Foreign assistance including support for the military and police, better provision of health, and some economic programs can further the security interests of the United States and the interests of political leaders in poorer countries. Our foreign assistance should aim for these more modest objectives -- better security, improved health, some economic growth -- which are in both our interest and those of leaders as well as populations in poorer countries.

To guarantee our security we need a strong military, but it must be a military that we do not have to use very often. Diplomacy and development are complements to defense, not rivals. Effective American leadership requires the three D's: defense, diplomacy, and development. Without American leadership there will be vacuums and these vacuums will be filled by countries that do not share our norms and values. Gutting development and diplomacy would make us weaker not stronger. The United States needs all three instruments of national power, not just one.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you.
Dani.

STATEMENT OF MS. DANIELLE PLETKA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Ms. PLETKA. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me. Anything you disagree with, please blame on the DayQuil that I pounded before I came to sit down at the dais.

We are here to talk about the 2018 budget, and frankly I think a lot of us agree on some of the base issues. We are talking about a 28.7 percent reduction in the 150 account, plus or minus. What worries me most about this budget presentation is that the spirit that seemed to animate it was more a list of budget cuts rather than what is really needed, which is a new vision for our foreign policy.

The Trump administration suggested to the American people that the reason that they were making these cuts was because we want to plus up in the fight against ISIS, which is certainly a worthy goal. But the Defense Department's budget is actually not the 10 percent it was portrayed to be. It is, in fact, a 3 percent increase over the 27 requested number from the Obama administration. So we are not going to be beating ISIS with that extra 3 percent. I hate to say it.

In addition, while the optics of a cut to the State Department and USAID and all related agencies may on the surface appear to prioritize this ISIS/al-Qaeda fight over the soft power activities of the State Department and AID, there is really nothing to suggest that the fight against Islamist extremism is a job for DOD alone. Both of you have said this. I think the three of us agree about that.

In a statement, last week actually, at the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS Conference in Washington, Secretary of State Tillerson said, and I am quoting here, "We must ensure our respective nations' precious and limited resources are devoted to preventing the resurgence of ISIS and equipping war-torn communities to take the lead in rebuilding their institutions and returning to stability." That sounds right. But the military alone cannot, to paraphrase the Secretary, rebuild institutions and return nations to stability. That is really a job for State and USAID and others.

What we have learned, as Dr. Krasner said, in the post-9/11 era is that stable government is really the sine qua non of stopping these groups from moving in and beginning to threaten the local populations and us. Okay. There is the case against it.

On the other hand, I have to say, I am a little thrown off by the complete hysteria that has attended the announcement of the President's proposed budget cuts. First of all, OCO numbers, Overseas Contingency Operation numbers, have plused up the State Department budget to the point where it is actually above where it was. Now, I understand that OCO is not a good way to do business. Nonetheless, we do need to understand that there is extra money there.

In addition, and I have to disagree with Dr. Krasner here, as somebody at a nongovernment-funded think tank in Washington, I

have an objection to using my tax dollars and the American people's tax dollars to pay for think tanks all over Washington. There are places where we can cut the budget.

The right reaction here is somewhere between complacency and hysteria. First, the American people may indeed be wrong to think that vast quantities of our GDP are being shipped off to ungrateful foreigners, but they are not wrong in assuming that some of it is wasted. The State Department inspector general testified earlier this month before House Appropriations and said that she identified top five challenges for USAID, and I will just paraphrase some of it: That they were a weak project design, monitoring, lack of internal controls, lack of local capacity and qualified personnel to execute projects, complexity in coordinating and implementing foreign assistance, and leaving vulnerable projects to fraud, waste, and abuse. Now, that is not what any of us want to hear about how AID is operating.

So to expand on that theme, it is totally appropriate for the American people to ask what has happened with the \$20 billion we have spent in Pakistan over the last 15 years or the \$100 billion that we have spent in Egypt. Has it, in fact, served our interests and our values? Much of the irritation has focused on AID, but State has its own issues. It really hasn't evolved, as I think you have said, as an organizational structure since 1945. It has dozens and dozens of special envoys who are workarounds where there need to be genuine reforms.

So the right question to ask here for authorizers and appropriators is not how to restore every single penny back to the 150 account. It is rather where judicious cuts and reforms can be made that will enable effective programs to continue. Because what all of us know is that what the American people will support is effective programs.

As you consider the question, set aside input-oriented programs. Don't ask what they have put in. Ask what we get out. Ask who is doing the contracting. How many people are being hired? How many people are working?

One last bugaboo—and I am going to go 30 seconds over or 20 seconds over my time if you don't get cross with me about it. Isn't it time that Congress ask itself why the State Department's Office of Inspector General has an appropriation of \$66 million last year and employs more than 200 people at main State? It is increasingly a major component of all of our aid programs. If there is that much waste and fraud and abuse built into our assistance programs, shouldn't we be looking at the system itself rather than hiring more auditors and inspectors?

Last, if the foreign policy machinery that has been operating under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for all too long—I know because I was born after 1961, I am happy to say—isn't it time to start to consider whether we need a new authorizing mechanism, something new and something fresh? I know you have amended it tens of thousands of times, but it is time to look at the underlying statute.

Last, a world led by the United States of America really is a better world, and foreign assistance is a wise investment; but even the

best of investments need close supervision, rethinking, reform, and aggressive oversight.

Thank you and especially for the extra time.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka follows:]



Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
On the Budget, Diplomacy, and Development

**Addressing the crisis of confidence
in American foreign policy:
Increasing the effectiveness of our
nation abroad**

Danielle Pletka
Senior Vice President
Foreign and Defense Policy Studies
American Enterprise Institute

March 28, 2017

The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Engel, Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, thank you for your invitation to testify here today on this important topic.

The proximate reason for my appearance before you is to discuss the 2018 budget request and a 28.7 percent reduction in the 150 account. No budget is sacrosanct; however, readers of the Budget justification would be correct to wonder whether the assumptions being made about everything from allied behavior to the possibility of renegotiating international agreements will really work. More troubling still, the spirit that animates this budget is not a new and sorely needed vision for foreign affairs in the 21st century; rather, it is a laundry list of budget cuts—some merited, some less so. But the sine qua non of effective foreign policy is vision, not dollars. And that is the right place for this Committee and the Congress to begin as it assesses how to make do with less in the International Affairs budget.

It has been suggested by the Trump administration and others that the reason for the cuts in State Department and other agencies' funding is to plus up the Defense Department's FY18 budget number. A few points on the wisdom of this framing:

- The Defense Department's budget increase, while portrayed as a 10 percent increase in the Administration's budget request, is in fact more likely to be a three percent increase over the 2017 levels requested by Obama. In other words, it will not send the intended message that we are ensuring our "courageous servicemen and women have the tools they need to deter war, and when called upon to fight, do only one thing: Win."
- The optics of a cut to the budget for the State Department, USAID, and related agencies may, on the surface, appear to prioritize the fight against ISIS over the so-called soft power activities of State and USAID. However, there is little to suggest that the fight against Islamist extremism is a job for DoD alone.
- Indeed, in his statement earlier this month at the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS conference in Washington, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said, "We must ensure that our respective nations' precious and limited resources are devoted to preventing the resurgence of ISIS and equipping the war-torn communities to take the lead in rebuilding their institutions and returning to stability." And while some might suggest that Secretary Tillerson's statement represents solely an allusion to military action and so-called stabilization activities by the military, there is broad consensus in the foreign policy and military communities that the military alone cannot deliver the stability necessary to oust ISIS, al Qaeda, or other groups from the more than two dozen nations in which they are currently active.

This brings me to my next point, which is that the safety and security of the American people, constitutionally the most important role of the President of the United States, does not depend on the military alone. We have learned in the post-9/11 era that investments in stable governments that provide economic, political, and military security to their people go a long way in ensuring that groups such as ISIS, al Qaeda, and others do not exploit the weak and collapsing states that have provided their operating environment for some time. Indeed, I confess it was confusing to me that

the Secretary of State suggested stabilization is an imperative, but “nation building” is not. The two are inextricably intertwined, and a failure to understand the imperative of genuine stabilization suggests that Trump’s counterterrorism policies will look in form and substance much like Obama’s.

I am also flummoxed by the hysteria that has attended the announcement of the President’s proposed cuts to State and USAID. These appear to be deep cuts, but adding in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget number proposed brings the overall number for diplomacy and development right back to where it was, and more. Some have rightly said that OCO is no way to do business, as that plus up is not dependable and therefore precludes planning. Fair enough, but that is a philosophical disagreement that does not affect the bottom line. And while there are organizations and agencies zeroed out, I confess, as a manager at a think tank that takes no government money of any kind, I have little sympathy for our compatriots who have supped at the government trough or received government land handouts in DC and now may see their funding slashed.

The right reaction is somewhere in the middle ground between complacency and hysteria. First, while the American people and our President may be wrong to think that vast quantities of our Gross Domestic Product are being shipped off to ungrateful foreigners, they would not be wrong in assuming that at least some of their money is being wasted with little regard to its impact. Don’t take it from me; here is the inspector general of the State Department in [testimony](#) before House Appropriators earlier this month:

We identified five top management challenges for USAID that need particular attention in fiscal year 2017. These challenges stem largely from weak project design, monitoring, and internal controls; a lack of local capacity and qualified personnel to execute USAID-funded projects; and the complexities in coordinating and implementing foreign assistance efforts jointly with multiple and diverse stakeholders. Weaknesses in these areas can limit the impact of USAID projects or derail them before they begin; leave programs vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse; or both. The magnitude of our investigations related to humanitarian assistance programs in Syria demonstrates the extent to which USAID programs can be vulnerable to exploitation.

To expand on this theme, it is indeed completely appropriate for the American people to ask how their tax dollars are being spent and whether decades of investment in places such as Haiti or Egypt have fertilized those nations to the point where American values and ideals are flowering. Since 1948, and including a major plus up after the signing of the Camp David Accords, the United States has spent more than \$100 billion in Egypt, yet in 2011 the beneficiary of many of those dollars, Hosni Mubarak, was overthrown by an angry, US-funded military that, together with the Egyptian people, believed he was a tyrant and a thief.

What about Tunisia, where the Arab Spring began over the self-immolation of a man furious over economic regulations that were stopping him from earning? Tunisia, we should remember, was one of the early graduates of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which predicated its lending on performance.

What about Pakistan, which has received more than \$20 billion in US military and economic assistance over the past 15 years, only to be discovered as the safe haven for Osama bin Laden?

Much of the ire about inefficiency has focused on the US Agency for International Development, and

to be fair, USAID is an easy target, the agency many love to hate. But State has its own issues; it operates around an organizational structure that has not evolved significantly since 1945. Where things in the world have changed—almost everywhere—State has put in place a series of “special envoys,” who theoretically enjoy authority over the confusing transformation of American diplomatic priorities that has taken place over the decades since World War II.

There are, according to the Department of State website, 18 special envoys:

- Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS
- Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs
- Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs
- Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center
- Special Envoy for Climate Change
- Special Envoy for Closure of the Guantanamo Detention Facility
- Special Envoy for Global Food Security
- Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues
- Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons (also
- Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor)
- Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations
- Special Envoy for Libya
- Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism
- Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
- Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues
- Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks
- US Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan
- US Special Envoy for Syria

Of course, many of these positions are in place because of Congressional mandates, but the origin of Congressional mandates is dissatisfaction with the performance of the State Department and USAID. Indeed, at a recent event discussing these very issues, I asked a colleague from another think tank to name successful foreign assistance programs, and what he could come up with was not any project or initiative of a special envoy or coordinator, but PEPFAR and malaria prevention, both programs put in place by the Bush administration and fully funded under the Trump budget request.

In short, there is much to criticize about the conduct of our diplomacy and our foreign assistance programs. But none of those criticisms should suggest that diplomacy and foreign assistance are without substantial value to the United States, to our allies, and to the people of the world who have rightly come to see the United States as a global leader.

Therefore, the correct question for Congress’ authorizers and appropriators to ask is not how to restore every penny back into the 150 account, but rather where judicious cuts can be made that will enable effective programs to continue and prompt ineffective ones to change. In so doing, the correct barometer is effectiveness. As the bipartisan [AEI American Internationalism Project](#) made clear, the American people are not averse to being engaged in the world, but they are averse to wasting money and being ineffective.

As you consider that question, set aside the input-oriented information too often provided by State and USAID, and consider outputs and their links to State and AID programs.¹ Inputs are not an adequate measure of effectiveness, yet a visit to the many different webpages of State, USAID, and related agencies tells you little about the impact of particular programs and a lot about how many tax dollars were spent.

Rather, consider how programs are being implemented, who is doing the implementing, why the program is in place, how it serves the interests of the United States, and whether we are getting bang for our buck. Programs orientated toward institution-building and fostering pro-freedom, pro-market behaviors should have primacy. Efforts such as those of the MCC, which emphasize buy-in from foreign beneficiaries, are similarly intelligent. Low-cost investments like surrogate broadcasting—such as Radio Free Asia and Radio Free Europe—that provide a window to the outside world for unfree peoples can mean the difference between a country that is pro-American and one that is anti-American.

Who is doing the contracting for US assistance programs? How much cronyism influences grant decisions? How many people are being hired as personal service contractors? How many people are working in embassies? How much duplication is there among personnel? All of these are the questions that should inform decisions about reform. Similarly, it is time that Congress ask itself why it is that State's Office of the Inspector General had an appropriation of \$66 million last year, employs more than 200 people at main State, and is increasingly a major component of all assistance programs. If there is that much fraud and abuse built into the system, isn't it time to look at the system rather than simply hiring more auditors and inspectors?

Finally, the United States' foreign policy machinery has been operating under the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for nearly 56 years. And while there have been thousands of amendments to the act, isn't it time for Congress to consider starting fresh, looking at the bureaucratic structure of the Department of State, considering whether to finally wrap USAID into State itself, and revamping the half-century-old foundations for our foreign policy activities? I recognize this is a monumental task, but we must recognize there is a crisis of confidence in American foreign policy, in the effectiveness of our nation abroad, and in the value of our assistance programs and our alliances.

As someone who believes that a world led by the United States of America is a better world, and who appreciates the incredible work done by so many at State, USAID, OPIC, and many of the other agencies who toil in obscurity funded by the 150 account, I believe the three Ds—defense, diplomacy, and development—are investments that have served the American people well, perhaps better than many recognize. But even the best of investments need close supervision, rethinking, reform, and aggressive oversight.

Thank you.

¹ I recall that USAID boasts of the success of its investments in family planning driving down the birth rate in Egypt by almost 50 percent. Yet over the same period in the Islamic Republic of Iran—presumably a place where we are not providing funding for family planning through USAID—the birth rate fell by the same proportion over the same period.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Pletka. Ambassador Burns.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE R. NICHOLAS BURNS, ROY AND BARBARA GOODMAN FAMILY PROFESSOR OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Engel, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

I just have a couple of points, Mr. Chairman, to summarize my written testimony. And you correctly noted I was a career member of the Foreign Service. I worked in Republican and Democrat administrations in the White House and State Department, and based on that, first, I think that the Trump administration's proposed budget cuts that do total 31 percent for State and AID will put American national security at risk. It will cripple the work of our career diplomats and our AID professionals because these are enormous reductions by historical standards.

I don't think they can be implemented over the next year. I know there is some thought that perhaps they could be implemented over the next 3 or 4 years. I think that would do great damage to the effectiveness of the men and women of the State Department and USAID. There has even been a suggestion that perhaps we are entering a historical period of no foreign conflicts, and therefore the State Department can wind down its work. In my testimony I detail the most complex foreign policy agenda that any American President has faced. That is what President Trump faces now. We are certainly not going to see an end to conflict in Asia or the Middle East.

Second, the budget takes direct aim at essential programs. A 30 percent cut in counternarcotics, that is of direct interest to protect the American people against the drug trade, that program.

You mentioned Mr. Chairman, the fact that there are four famines underway in the world today. We need to be on the front lines with USAID to fight them. You mentioned very correctly Ebola and our necessity of preventing and dealing with pandemics in the world as we have. There is a massive reduction in funding for the very U.N. agencies—the food programs, the public health programs, the development programs—that actually do work that the United States then does not have to do. In zeroing out institutions like the U.S. Institute for Peace, I think it is extremely ill-advised.

Third point, Mr. Chairman, the budget breaks the vital link that every Republican President and Democratic President have always seen to be essential, and both of my colleagues have mentioned it, that defense and diplomacy and development have to coexist together. And that was certainly one of the takeaways of my professional career, that we in the State Department can often not be successful unless we are linked up in terms of budget and mission with the Defense Department, with the U.S. military. And in that sense, you all received a letter from 120 generals and admirals saying they appreciate the link with the State Department and

USAID. This budget ignores that link. It rewards one part of the triangle and it deprives, starves, the other two.

But look right now where our diplomats are leading. Our diplomats are leading on the North Korea nuclear issue right now. Our diplomats are leading on the effort to convince Iran to comply with a nuclear deal, and I hope sanction Iran further over ballistic missiles. Our diplomats are leading in the containment of Putin in Eastern Europe and strengthening NATO. So that is a very important set of values and set of responsibilities for the State Department to undertake.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, these proposed budget cuts are a slap in the face to our Foreign Service professionals. I have never seen morale so low, and I first started in the U.S. Government as an intern in the Carter administration in the summer of 1980. I think we have a good leader at the State Department in Secretary Tillerson. He has succeeded in his business career. I think you are right, Mr. Chairman, there should be a review of the State Department and AID. There should be a new look at some of the programs I have documented in my own testimony, four or five ways that I think we can have cost savings.

But morale is important. And if the message from the President is that somehow the administrative state needs to be deconstructed so that we find ourselves for the first time since well before the second world war without a Deputy Secretary of State, with one Under Secretary of State, with no Assistant Secretary of State. We are nearly into April, no Secretary of State can be successful unless he or she is given the people, both political appointees and career officers, to succeed. This is an extraordinary situation, and it shows a lack of faith in diplomacy by this administration. So I would hope that the Congress would restore the balance between the State Department, USAID, and the military.

I have been very encouraged, Mr. Chairman, by your statements, by the ranking member's statements, and other Members of both parties who say that we can certainly do better than this. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
Robert and Renée Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

R. Nicholas Burns
Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor
of Diplomacy and International Relations



79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
tel (617) 496-3255

Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
The Budget, Diplomacy and Development

Ambassador (ret.) Nicholas Burns
March 28, 2017

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee, thank you for this invitation to testify today on the future of American diplomacy, our development efforts and the 2018 budget. It is an honor to do so in my capacity as a retired member of the United States Foreign Service.

Since the close of the Second World War, the United States has been the strongest global power through its military, economic and diplomatic influence and its vital alliances and partnerships across the world. Our highest strategic ambition should be to sustain that position of power in the decades ahead to ensure a world where democracy, human freedom and free markets are in the ascendancy. To do so, we must remain strong in the three principal pillars of our power—Defense, Diplomacy and Development.

The Trump Administration's fiscal year 2018 budget will put this at risk. The proposed 31 percent reduction in funding for the State Department and USAID will cripple our diplomats in the Foreign and Civil Service and undermine USAID officials who manage our global development programs.

These proposed reductions are unwise, unnecessary and are a danger to our overall national security. I urge members of both parties and both houses of Congress to work with the new Administration to develop a more serious and sensible proposal. Reform is needed and areas of duplication and waste should be addressed. This budget, however, betrays a lack of understanding of the vital importance of Diplomacy and Development in our overall foreign policy.

I fear for the future of the American Foreign and Civil Service if these budget reductions are put into place. In this radical proposal to the Congress, the Trump Administration has sent a signal to career officials of disinterest and disregard for their work as diplomats and development experts. Combined with the unwise, unprecedented and unwarranted forced resignations of several of our most senior career diplomats by the Trump Administration, this budget proposal has brought morale at the State Department to its lowest level in memory.

Our diplomatic corps is the finest in the world. The expertise, high standards and impressive performance of our diplomats overseas and in Washington have been a source of strength for the U.S. in the seven decades of the post-World War Two era. All of it will be at risk—our ability to recruit and retain the best young men and women in America to join a proud and accomplished career service—if we do not give them the respect and resources they deserve.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
 JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
 Robert and Renée Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

R. Nicholas Burns
 Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor
 of Diplomacy and International Relations



79 John F. Kennedy Street
 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
 tel (617) 496-3255

In addition, the idea that the U. S. can now plan for major cuts in diplomacy and development because we are approaching an era of no foreign wars is illusory and ahistorical. I wish that we lived in such a world. But, the short and mid-term trend lines in the Middle East, Afghanistan, East Asia and elsewhere bely such a hope. Instead, we must be realistic about the outright aggression from our adversaries Russia, China, Iran and others that continue to threaten our vital national interests in these regions. Even if we eventually wind down some commitments in the most dangerous war zones, the State Department will be critical in managing that successfully and other challenges will inevitably arise to test our country. We will need a strong, fully-resourced State Department to combine forces with the Pentagon to protect our interests in such a world.

It would be equally mistaken to assume that reductions of this magnitude could be phased in over a three or four-year period. If that is the plan of the current State Department leadership, it would lead to the inexorable decline of a once great diplomatic corps. It would leave future Secretaries of State without the people and resources needed to achieve an effective American foreign policy.

In fact, the Trump Administration and the Congress must face in the immediate future an unprecedented number of threats to America's security. Our career diplomats will need the budgetary support to meet these challenges.

Our European allies in NATO are confronting a multiplicity of crises from Brexit, the rise of anti-democratic populist political parties, the refugee crisis and a tendentious, aggressive Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, challenging their borders and security.

Six years after the start of the Arab Revolutions, the Middle East continues to be afflicted by civil wars, violence, a Sunni-Shia schism and a dangerous Iranian government.

In Asia, the dictatorial North Korean regime threatens our allies South Korea and Japan and may develop the capacity in a few years to threaten the U.S. itself with a nuclear weapon. China is contesting, illegally and unwisely, the sovereignty of its neighbors in the South and East China Seas.

A host of transnational threats—terrorism, climate change, cyber aggression, pandemics and famine in South Sudan—all threaten America's interests and global stability. The world, led by its strongest and most capable leader, the United States, must also address the largest refugee crisis since the close of the Second World War in 1945.

The military will obviously be a critical part of the U.S. response to this agenda. But the State Department will likely take the lead on many of the most urgent challenges—diplomatic efforts to convince China to address the North Korea threat; continued efforts to sanction and contain Iranian power in the Middle East; organizing the international coalition against the Islamic State;

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
 JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
 Robert and Renée Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

R. Nicholas Burns
 Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor
 of Diplomacy and International Relations



79 John F. Kennedy Street
 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
 tel (617) 496-3255

maintaining economic sanctions on Putin for his invasion of Ukraine; strengthening the NATO consensus to rebuild its power in Eastern Europe.

The State Department also leads U.S. efforts at the United Nations, our relations with nearly every major international and regional organization from the European Union to ASEAN, the African Union and the Organization of American States. We cannot strip State of funding and expect it to be able to be the front-line protector of our national security with these important international institutions.

Similarly, USAID is critical to our ability to respond to natural disasters such as the Haiti earthquake, to pandemics such as Zika, Ebola and SARs and to implement our successful global health diplomacy.

With this in mind, the projected reductions by the Trump Administration of U.S. contributions to the United Nations are misguided and destructive of our leadership of this important multilateral institution. Despite the limitations and weaknesses of the UN system, it provides essential support to important American objectives through its development and public health programs, its provision of food aid to countries at risk of famine, its support for refugees and poor children and its stewardship of international efforts to limit the risk of nuclear proliferation. All will remain important to our country and worthy of our continued support.

To state, as OMB Director Mulvaney did, that the Trump Administration has presented to Congress “a hard power budget, not a soft power budget”, betrays a deep misunderstanding of the essential value of diplomacy and development to our security and of our ability to be successful in the world. More than 120 retired senior U.S. Military leaders affirmed their unequivocal support to the State Department and USAID in their recent, open letter to the Congress. Secretary Mattis, Chairman Dunford and many other active duty military leaders have said the same publicly since the alarming State/AID budget cuts were announced.

For decades now, it has been accepted by Presidents of both parties that the U.S. is most successful when we integrate the efforts of the State and Defense Departments in pursuit of our most important goals. I certainly found in my own career that we at the State Department could not often succeed without coordination with the Pentagon. The Congress needs to find the right balance of integrated funding that will allow each to succeed together. To be effective in our foreign policy, we need to continue to achieve close coordination between our Ambassadors and our Generals and Admirals overseas. As President Kennedy said more than a half century ago, “Diplomacy and Defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would fail.” The Trump Administration’s budget fails to make this link between these two essential tools in our national security arsenal.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
 JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
 Robert and Renée Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

R. Nicholas Burns
 Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor
 of Diplomacy and International Relations



79 John F. Kennedy Street
 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
 tel (617) 496-3255

Americans rightly revere the military and its contributions to the security of every citizen. But, the mission of the State Department and USAID is not well understood either in Washington or throughout the country. Both are relatively smaller U.S. government agencies whose work overseas is often invisible to those of us at home. If they are saddled by these budget reductions, it is inevitable that the leadership of both will have to make deep cuts in personnel as they have no large weapons systems or other major expenditures to delay or put into mothballs in order to satisfy budget austerity.

I started my Foreign Service career as a Consular Officer in Cairo. In the following decades, I witnessed up close the vital work of our Consular Officers who are on the front lines in nearly every country of the world interviewing all potential immigrant and non-immigrant visa applicants and refugees. These young men and women also assist thousands of American citizens who need their help overseas—with birth certificates, emergency medical assistance, legal challenges and other problems.

Our Political Officers deploy with our troops as advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are our eyes and ears on point in the most difficult countries such as Pakistan, China, Russia and Cuba. In just the last year, they have helped to negotiate an end to the Civil War in Colombia. They are leading our effort to respond to the North Korean nuclear challenge. They are ensuring Iran is meeting its commitments under the nuclear deal. They will be essential in a future negotiation to end the brutal civil war in Syria.

Our Economic and Commercial Officers help American businesses to identify foreign markets for their goods and services and to compete in a competitive global marketplace. They help to negotiate the trade agreements, bilateral and multilateral, that are critical to our economic health at home.

Our USAID professionals operate our highly successful polio, malaria and HIV/AIDS programs. They take the lead in responding to natural disasters and to head off the threat of pandemics. They help to respond to famine and regional and world food shortages as well as deal with the threat of climate change. They contribute to long-term development projects to help stabilize countries at risk.

The Foreign and Civil Service, along with the U.S. Commercial Service and USAID, in fact, represents the deepest reservoir of area and linguistic expertise in the U. S. government on China, Russia, the Islamic World, Africa, Latin America, Europe and other areas. They are a national treasure. We must not permit radical and ill-advised budget cuts to weaken this current generation of officers and to deprive them of the training and resources they need to succeed.

According to the Global Leadership Council, “The deep cuts to development and diplomacy programs proposed in the Administration’s budget would reduce spending on these programs as a

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
Robert and Renée Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

R. Nicholas Burns
Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor
of Diplomacy and International Relations



79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
tel (617) 496-3255

percentage of GDP to its lowest level since World War II.” The Council also stated that the Trump budget proposal will lead to the “lowest level of funding for these programs since FY-02 in real inflation adjusted terms.”

Specific programs that are essential for our security would suffer radical reductions:

--The proposed cuts of 30 percent for our international narcotics programs would throw into jeopardy our long-standing efforts to protect Americans from the drug trade. It would curtail much of the progress made with countries at the epicenter of the narcotics crisis including Afghanistan, Mexico and others in Central and South America.

--The Trump Administration’s plans to radically reduce funding for the United Nations Peacekeeping would endanger the effectiveness of programs that are clearly in the U.S. interest and often obviate the need for the U.S. military to engage in a regional crisis.

--If the State Department is forced to reduce funding for programs that seek to undermine support for radical Moslem terrorist organizations, it will harm our overall effort to contain and then destroy the Islamic State.

--Reductions in assistance to the 65 million refugees worldwide is particularly unwise. We need to continue support for refugee programs in countries such as Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, as well as others. In this sense, the Trump Administration’s decision to freeze refugee acceptances and to curtail acceptance of immigrants is particularly dangerous.

--Severe budget reductions could also limit our ability to help prevent famine during the next few years in South Sudan and other high-risk countries.

--Reductions of this magnitude will decimate funding for programs that are essential to support failed and fragile states where conflicts often originate—our economic development, democracy promotion and education programs.

Mr. Chairman, you requested ideas to reform the State Department and USAID in a constrained budget environment. In my view, Secretary Tillerson is right to take a new look at where additional reforms would make sense and where to cut programs that are duplicative and wasteful. No government agency should be immune from such an effort. Reform and renewal should be, in fact, an ongoing process within each agency of the Executive Branch.

Possible reforms that should be looked at closely include:

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
 JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
 Robert and Renée Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

R. Nicholas Burns
 Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor
 of Diplomacy and International Relations



79 John F. Kennedy Street
 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
 tel (617) 496-3255

--Elimination of the second Deputy Secretary of State position adopted by the Obama Administration. A better approach would be to invest overall authority for management and budget in a single Deputy Secretary and to make the Under Secretary for Management the effective chief operating officer of the State Department;

--Possible reduction of the number of Under Secretaries in order to push authority down to where it is often most efficiently shouldered—with the Assistant Secretaries of the regional and functional bureaus;

--End the proliferation of Special Envoys for single issues and restore authority where it is most effective—in the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries who make up the leadership team for the Secretary of State;

--Fill the majority of senior Department positions with members of the career Foreign and Civil Service. While every President and Secretary of State have a right to select political appointees for senior positions, preference should be given to career officials. Both Secretaries Condoleezza Rice and John Kerry, for example, appointed career officers to the majority of the key regional Assistant Secretary positions, generally considered the most important line leaders in the Department.

Mr. Chairman, it will be essential for President Trump and Secretary Tillerson to move much more quickly to fill the leadership positions at State and USAID that have been vacant since January 20. This is the slowest transition in memory. It is deeply unfortunate that candidates for these leadership positions have not been publicly announced by the end of March, much less confirmed by the Senate.

Secretary Tillerson is not well served by being left without a leadership team. There are simply too many challenges the U.S. needs to face that cannot possibly be managed without a full complement of Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries. If one reason for this slow motion transition is an effort to dismantle “the administrative state”, as White House official Steve Bannon has warned publicly, that would reveal a deep misunderstanding of the critical role the executive branch plays in defense of the United States and the good that government can do with the right leadership and resources in place.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, President Trump needs to invest more in diplomacy and our diplomats in order to be successful in his foreign policy. Since taking office, he has said very little about the usefulness of diplomacy and diplomats. He has not engaged our most senior diplomats. In fact, our career officers seem disconnected from the White House and unappreciated by the President and his senior aides.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
Robert and Renée Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

R. Nicholas Burns
Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor
of Diplomacy and International Relations



79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
tel (617) 496-3255

Those of us who support a strong State Department and USAID have been encouraged by the reaction of senior members of the Congress in both parties to this rash and unwise proposed budget. I urge the Congress to restore funding for the men and women of the State Department and USAID who are experienced and patriotic and whose only desire is to serve our country on the front lines of America's national security.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Burns.

One of the questions I would like to raise here, and maybe, Ms. Pletka, you would like to respond to it. But over the years I think we have learned something about the aid that we have transferred to other governments, and I am thinking specifically about Mobutu and visiting Congo and seeing at that time as he was on his way out, what wasn't done with that aid, and maybe contrasting that, or also we talked about Egypt a little bit.

I know from my observations that it looks like, in North Africa, one of the big problems there is an issue of governance across North Africa. If you look at the self-immolations that occurred across North Africa, in the interviews to family members or survivors afterwards, it seemed as though what sparked it in every case was the fact that those doing business couldn't get a license any longer to even take care of their families. If you are in that kind of an environment and you are trying to start a business and you can't do so without going through months and months worth of, shall we say, fees to some 22 different government agencies to start your bakery—I can think of one student I talked to who had finished pharmacy school, 22 separate fees to go into business as a pharmacist—you don't have that opportunity really to provide for your family.

And as the Peruvian economist Hernando DeSoto made the observation, there is something about how we got the fundamental property rights correct, in Western Europe and the United States, that provided a foundation for economic success. So we could transfer billions into the Congo and not change that environment unless we figure out a way to change the fundamental structure.

I guess one of my frustrations is across North Africa, DeSoto did a lot of work in order to try to look at that informal sector in Cairo, 90 percent private, or 90 percent, shall we say informal—in other words, people didn't have property rights—and try to determine how to convert it over so that people could actually own their property, borrow against it, build, open a bakery if that is what they wanted to do. But instead we are in a system in much of the world where without the approval of the government, you cannot go forward and start an enterprise. You can't unleash that human capital.

I wonder if part of the problem here is that we are not focused enough on getting to what actually creates economic growth in these societies and bringing in the expertise on the ground—I am not talking about in Washington—but putting that expertise on the ground and using that leverage so that the next Mobutu isn't encouraged simply to move that to a foreign bank account, but instead is encouraged to change the fundamental laws so that you have economic growth and opportunity for the children in each of those societies going forward.

But I would like your view on that.

Ms. PLETKA. Thank you very much, sir.

I couldn't agree more. I spent 10 years working for Senator Jessie Helms, who was the chairman the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he used to talk about the fact that we needed an America desk at the State Department, something that often offended our friends in the Foreign Service. But what it really meant

was that we need a spokesman for an aggressive foreign policy that shows American leadership, we need to be able to explain to the American people how this has value for them, and I think that is what has been missing for so long.

So what you are talking about here is fundamentally a lack of vision. It comes down to that. It comes down to programs that start to feel like an entitlement. For whatever reason, whether it is Egypt and Camp David or it is countries in Africa. We are not talking about humanitarian assistance here because there is not a lot of argument about that, although there are questions about efficiency. The argument is about institution building and how much we have succeeded at that.

Chairman ROYCE. Well, to me the frustration, and maybe I can go to one of the other members of our panel here, but even when DeSoto worked out how to transfer over ownership to the people who live on that property in Cairo and how to register that for title transfer, et cetera, it was resisted. Even when he put together a plan on how everybody could be given a right to open a garage to fix automobiles on your own.

Nobody can do it without the approval of the state and it takes years to get the approval of the state, and all of these fees or you could call it corruption or whatever you want to call it, all across North Africa the same problem, Middle East the same problem. How do we fundamentally get engaged in changing, Dr. Krasner, in changing that dynamic?

Mr. KRASNER. So I think your analysis is correct. I mean, one thing I would say is that we should recognize that the kind of liberal open access orders that we live in have been rare in human history. I mean, if you look at human history, I mean in only a few places in the world, North America, Western Europe, East Asia, have you actually had political systems where political leaders acted for the benefit of their own population. So it is not easy to do this.

What I think we need to do is to—and this is why I think we need the State Department. We need people on the ground, we need to be able, in places that are not functioning very well, we need to be able to identify islands of excellence. People for whatever reasons, maybe it is their own personal views or their religious views or their political incentives, actually want to do the right thing. It is no accident that DeSoto failed in Egypt. He failed because the government wanted him to fail. The government wanted him to fail because they needed all these fees to keep themselves in power. So we have to be able to identify and find islands of excellence in these places and build on them.

This is something that I think the MCA has done very well. Days to start a business is one of the indicators that the MCA has used. It actually works because days to start a business is a measure of all of these fees that you are talking about. And if you give people incentives, they may alter their behavior. Simply lecturing them won't work because it is not by accident that they are doing the wrong thing. They are doing the wrong thing because—

Chairman ROYCE. And we should differentiate, this was the former government in Egypt, not the current one. But when the work is done for them and it is handed off to them and they still

turn a blind eye to reforms in that system and then it is followed a year later by the self-immolations of part of the population in frustration, at about that point you realize we have to find a more effective way at leveraging and forcing these changes.

I need to go to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York. My time has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Burns, I would like to throw out a few things and ask you to comment on them.

Obviously I am concerned, all three of you are concerned, about the damaging impact these cuts will have on our national security. So let me ask you these things. Firstly, Vladimir Putin just attacked American democracy and has been undermining our European allies for years. We need to resist the Kremlin's campaign to destabilize the West. How will these cuts impact our ability to help our allies respond to President Putin's dangerous influence in their countries?

Ambassador BURNS. Mr. Engel, if these cuts are instituted, if they are implemented, if the State Department and AID take a 31 percent overall cut over the next couple of years, the only place to cut in the State Department is personnel. We don't have battle-ships. We don't have big bases that we can put into mothballs in the interest of budget austerity.

And I have been through lots of budget cutting, and it always cuts people. We are a very small corps. The Foreign Service is essentially two heavy brigades. So ultimately—you know, Putin is going to be a priority obviously, containing Putin in Eastern Europe. I worry, I think that will be well-served by any administration, but I worry that other necessities will not be. Colombia, for instance, which is just winding up a good period of a peace accord. Are we going to maintain the faith that we have had since the Clinton administration through Republicans and Democrats on aid there? And so you are going to have to make some very cruel choices.

The State Department is not big. As Bob Gates said when he was Secretary of Defense, there are about as many members of the armed forces marching bands as there are American diplomats. That puts it in perspective. So that is one reason I worry about the future of our great Foreign Service. It will be demonstrably smaller, and then we won't have the resources we need to protect our interests.

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you this, Ambassador. ISIS is getting weaker. Its territory has been shrinking. Secretary Tillerson has discussed a three-step plan to defeat ISIS: A military campaign, a transition phase, and a stability program. And Secretary Mattis has made clear that his strategy to defeat ISIS requires a strong partnership with the State Department. So what would these cuts mean for stabilizing Iraq and Syria after the defeat of ISIS?

Ambassador BURNS. It gets to this issue that some people, in justifying these budget cuts, say we are going to withdraw from these conflict zones. Even if there is a ceasefire tomorrow, and there won't be, in Syria, you would really need the State Department to go in. Not as much DOD. We are not going to put major American

forces on the ground to help stabilize, to negotiate a ceasefire, to begin working with some new entity in Syria.

The U.S. Global Leadership Coalition actually pinpoints this question and says that part of what the State Department and AID have been doing, over the long term, is to engage in programs that try to strike at the roots of terrorism and delegitimize the terrorist groups themselves, and those programs are at risk if this budget is put forth.

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you this one. The danger of climate change for the United States is crystal clear, in my view. Unfortunately, President Trump's announced plans today to decimate President Obama's Clean Power Plan. But as we look around the world, we see coastal cities which could be enveloped by the sea in a decade or two, famine deepening in already drought-stricken climates, and populations on the move, destabilizing key countries.

How will steep cuts to American diplomacy and foreign assistance make us less safe by taking away our ability to make regions threatened by climate change more resilient?

Ambassador BURNS. This I think is one of the most worrisome aspects of this budget, because climate is being targeted in the budget, not just the EPA, but also research, and particularly U.S. funding for research through the United Nations, which is a playing a central organizing role. And I certainly accept the science. I think the climate change agreement, the Paris Agreement, was one of President Obama's great achievements and one of the great achievements of American diplomacy over the last many decades.

We now have commitments. If we don't meet those commitments, or as is rumored, if there is a debate in the White House that somehow we might even pull out of the Paris Accords, it is going to fundamentally affect not just the climate science and diplomacy, but it will affect American credibility.

I know you all travel. You go to many parts of the world; climate is the number one issue. When you go to Europe it is the number one issue of the population, not just the politicians. So if the largest economy, second leading carbon emitter, says we are no longer going to be a part of this, there is going to be a dramatic reduction in American credibility.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

And finally let me ask this question of any of the witnesses who might want to comment on it. Last week the New York Times published an op-ed entitled: "The Real Threat to National Security: Deadly Disease." The authors provide just a sampling of the substantial infectious threats we currently face: The H7N9 bird flu spreading in China, a potential Yellow Fever outbreak in Brazil, and the rise of antibiotic-resistant infections that could become a greater threat than cancer within our lifetimes.

So I ask for unanimous consent that the article be included in the record.

In the midst of these threats, the administration intends to slash funding for the State Department, USAID, and the National Institute of Health, all of which defend Americans against diseases before they reach our shores and provide us with the tools needed to protect ourselves if they eventually do.

The question I have for any of you is, would it be fair to say that the cuts included in the President's budget make us more vulnerable to international disease threats? Can you speak broadly as to what the human and economic repercussions of these cuts might be, particularly for the American people?

Mr. KRASNER. I did read the op-ed. I thought it was exactly correct. There have been 400 diseases since 1940 that have jumped from animals to humans. What we need to do is have an effective monitoring system, which, for instance, the Nigerians did have which enabled them to deal with the potential Ebola outbreak effectively. So at a minimum, we need to have budget support to have monitoring in places where these diseases might arise, which are mainly in tropical areas and in less developed countries.

Mr. ENGEL. And this budget would take that support away?

Mr. KRASNER. It would.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We now go to Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida. He is chairman of the Asia Subcommittee and also the chair of the Effective Foreign Assistance Caucus.

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you all being here.

I want to come back to the Ebola discussion if I have enough time. Today America is confronting unprecedented instability and growing humanitarian crises around the world, all of which have a direct impact on our national security and economic interest at home. Completely slashing the 150 account will not address our debt crisis.

Understand I am one of the guys that came up here to get rid of foreign aid. But after 4 years, I have become learned in this area and realize we can't, as much as I would like to get rid of all foreign aid. We have to use it responsibly, and we rely on people like you to direct us and make sure, Ambassador Burns, our foreign aid is used properly.

When you look with 95 percent of the world's consumers living outside of our borders, U.S. global economic leadership and foreign assistance generates significant returns on investments here at home. You know, and I can go on here. Just the investment in foreign aid, when it is targeted and managed correctly, can yield great returns and help increase trade, trade that is vital not only to my State of Florida where it supports over 2½ million jobs, but to the entire United States and the world economy.

And if you look at some of the largest importers of U.S. goods and services, they are countries that have received U.S. foreign assistance. Look at South Korea. It was a donor state that we gave a lot of foreign aid to. Today it is our sixth largest trading partner. My goal, and I hope the goal of this committee, and I hope the goal of the President and the State Department, is to do a paradigm shift of getting away from aid and developing it from aid to trade, and that is what our goal is.

And, Dr. Krasner, you were talking about MCC. I appreciate the work you did in helping develop that. I thank you for the success of that. Along on those lines is OPIC, the Global Food Security Act, and Electrify Africa. And, again, coming from a strong conservative

side, to stand up for the Global Food Security Act and Electrify Africa wasn't real popular in my district. But when you explain the benefits of that, and if you look at this country in the early 1900s, we had very little electricity in the rural areas.

Government came together to form the co-ops and invest in our electrification. If we do that in Africa, as Chairman Royce pointed out, we can keep throwing money in there, but if you don't bring the basic essentials of developing a society, and by bringing electricity and power to the people, you empower the people of Africa, the empowered people of Africa will change the dynamics in that country or any other country. And so for that reason, I am 100 percent behind this. And to cut it I think is a mistake, and as General Mattis said, to cut foreign aid, go ahead and do it, but you are going to need that money to buy more ammunition. I think that is a pretty good dialogue there or description of what would happen if we were to do that.

So knowing the budgetary restraints that we have that are coming down the pike, that are going to get worse in the future if we don't change course in this country, there will be less foreign aid.

Ambassador Burns, you were talking about cuts, the 30 percent cuts, especially into drugs. That is one I think we should cut. Since 1971, under Richard Nixon, the war on drugs, we spent over \$1 trillion, and I would ask anybody on the panel, have we gotten better on this? Is there less drugs or more drugs? They are coming in our southwest borders, our coastlines, any border, they are coming in.

You know, and I look at the poppy fields in Afghanistan. They are still as productive as they have been. Or the Colombian cocoa plantations, they have more hectares planted today than they had before we started this war. So it comes down to effective foreign aid. And that is why I like the MCC model that you guys have developed and OPIC because it is a way of holding those countries accountable. And if they don't, pull out and invest in another country—and so let me get to my questions. I got them right here.

Should we be working in fewer countries or fewer sectors? If so, which ones? Dr. Krasner, if you want to start with that.

Mr. KRASNER. Yeah, so let me just say I think that your basic premise is exactly correct. We need to find incentives. We need to find programs that are incentive compatible with the people we are giving money to. That is trade. Cell phones have been a big success in Africa because they could get around the government. It is OPIC. These are things which people in these countries want, not things we are telling them to do.

So what I would say, I am not sure about the fewer countries or fewer areas. I think what we have to do is find programs which are incentive compatible with the recipients so that we can build islands of excellence, and out of those islands of excellence, you might be able to get governments in countries that are functioning more effectively.

Mr. YOHO. Doc, I would like to finish out here, but I am done, and I am going to be respectful of the committee's time. Thank you all. I appreciate the work you do.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ted.

Now we go to Mr. Brad Sherman of California.

Mr. SHERMAN. The chairman is right. Our foreign operations expenditures deserve review. There are appropriate cuts. Some of that review will take place in this room, but what is most important is that we have a State Department leadership team that is getting the most for the dollars we spend. Unfortunately, as others have said, there are virtually no under secretaries or assistant secretaries at the State Department now.

Now, I always prefer to blame the United States Senate for any problem, but certainly for the failure of officers to be confirmed; but in this case, they haven't been appointed, and we are running into a situation where as we speak, on the one hand we get a skinny budget that says the money is being mismanaged or can't be spent effectively.

And on the other hand, they don't appoint anybody to spend it effectively. This 28 to 31 percent cut is dangerous. It is shortsighted, and without objection, I would like to put into the record a letter signed by 121 3- and 4-star flag officers.

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection.

Mr. SHERMAN. Which states: "The State Department, USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other development agencies are critical to preventing conflict and reducing the need to put our men and women in uniform in harm's way." It goes on to quote now Secretary James Mattis when he was commander of the U.S. Central Command: "If you don't fully fund the State Department, then you need to buy me more ammunition."

So these cuts are a problem. They are dangerous. I am glad the witnesses are here to answer our questions, but the real question is for us. Will members of this committee stand up to these draconian cuts? Will we draw a line in the sand, and will we say we will not as individuals support the increase in defense appropriations bill going through until we are sure that the State Department and foreign operations are going to be adequately funded?

Now, certain functions are protected, such as malaria, AIDS. That means the unprotected functions are going to be cut more than 28, more than 31 percent, such as public diplomacy, broadcasting, social media. But I want to focus on jobs for Americans. Export promotion, other foreign ministries do a lot more work on that than the State Department, but now we are going to cut that probably by well more than 31 percent.

OPIC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, makes \$300 million or \$400 million a year for the Treasury. And that is not a one-time thing. That is year after year for 30 years. Plus, its main function is providing development abroad, and it provides jobs for Americans here. It makes money, yet it is zeroed out in this budget.

But I want to focus on visas, because without foreign investment, without tourists, without international business deals that require face-to-face meeting, we are going to lose an awful lot of money. We grant 10 million visas every year for visitors; business, tourism, investment. They get over 15 million applications. If they screw up on just one application, we may have a terrorist incident. That is why our President has promised extreme vetting. But extreme vetting with extremely few visa officers is extremely stupid. It won't happen.

Ambassador Burns, are we going to be able to quickly evaluate businesspeople that want to come here and do deals and do an extreme vetting of those applications if we have a cut of, say, 31 percent in our State Department visa officers?

Ambassador BURNS. Congressman Sherman, because I think we are going to have to cut people if there is a 30-percent cut, then the answer to your question is, no, we will not have it. It is the State Department officers, and they are generally our first and second-tier officers who interview all the tourist visas, business visas, student visas, refugees. It is a big responsibility. We have very few people to do it.

Mr. SHERMAN. And the President believes we are not doing it intensely enough. And many of us have faced the other side of that where you hear from a local business and they say somebody's going to come in. They are going to invest. The deal has to take place tomorrow or the next day, and they can't get a visa yet because they can't even get an appointment.

So I know you see it from the operations standpoint, the foreign policy standpoint, but the business standpoint of telling businesses, oh, wait another couple of months because we have extremely few people, and we have to do extreme vetting, the effect that will have on jobs in our districts will be significant.

I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. We will go to Scott Perry of Pennsylvania.

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks, folks, for being here.

We are all talking about the priorities, I think, of what money we have and how we are going to spend it and how it is going to be most effective. And as a person who has been privileged to wear the United States Army's uniform, and who has fought to stay on this committee and be on this committee, I think that many of us understand and agree that money spent on diplomacy, as opposed to on uniforms and bullets, is wisely spent if it can reach the intended goals. So we are talking about priorities here.

I just want to tell you a story and get your reaction. I think there is credible evidence that during the last administration USAID used funds to promote foreign policies that seemed to me at least to serve no clear national security interest, and I know you are all students of history. You must be if you are in these positions. And I just think about John Service in the Roosevelt administration and how it ended up with Mao Tse-Tung or Chiang Kai Shek, or how it didn't end up for Chiang Kai Shek, and how it worked out to the United States relationship vis a vis a Communist China. Now, Ambassador Jess Bailey has come under scrutiny over the accusation that he has shown a political bias against the Macedonian Conservative Party, the VMRO, and that he has facilitated coalition negotiations between the main leftist party and ethnic Albanian parties, and I don't think that the main leftist party generally speaking is the same thing tantamount to Republicans and Democrats in the United States, but that is what people might think when they read that.

Now, the Embassy has also selected George Soros' NGO, Open Societies Foundation, as the main implementer of USAID projects in Macedonia. And as of February 7, 2017—so it is just recently,

right—about a month ago USAID announced a \$2.54 million contract with the Open Societies Foundation, which revealed the project included paying for training and civic activism, mobilization, and civic engagement.

Now, in the case of Macedonia, not only has our American Ambassador meddled in their political process, not that we don't and not that others don't meddle in ours, but American taxpayer dollars have been dispersed to a known nonpartisan organization to promote civic activism and mobilization. While civic engagement is an important aspect of every healthy democracy, it is not, in many people's idea, the role of American aid to organize and promote civic activism.

So the question is when the Department of State or USAID is evaluating organizations to receive grants or program money, what role does the organization's political motivations play in such evaluations and is it coordinated with the objectives of the national security strategy and the national military strategy?

Ladies and gentlemen.

Ambassador BURNS. Congressman Perry, I would just say this, I don't know the particulars of this case so I do not want to second guess Ambassador Bailey or say anything critical of him. I don't know the facts. I can just make a general statement, since the fight against communism in the 1980s became an animating feature of our foreign policy, and I served in the Reagan administration, the Bush administration, we did, the State Department, Congress, fund both International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute activities, and we funded a lot of American NGO's to go into Eastern Europe to promote democracy and freedom of the press.

And so I don't see on the face of it, although I don't know the particulars, I have no objection to open society, I think it is a very fine institution, that has done a lot of good in Eastern Europe.

Ms. PLETKA. May I?

Mr. PERRY. Yes, you may.

Ms. PLETKA. With all respect, which is actually genuinely due to Nick.

Of course that happens. I don't know the particulars of the case in Macedonia either. Does the State Department choose sides? You bet. Does AID give grants to people who they think are going to tilt things one way or another? Sure they do, but guess what? That is your job. This is the oversight committee. We ought to be looking at those sorts of things.

Mr. PERRY. So when we are selecting do we also include the objective of the NGOs or their program and how it dovetails or nests with the national security strategy, or the national military strategy, because from my person, as one who's worn the uniform, we are headed one direction and State always seems to be headed in another.

And in this case it seems to be that is the instance and we are picking priorities with short resources. With limited resources, we have got to choose very wisely and make sure that we are all headed in the same direction.

Ms. PLETKA. I don't think it is fair to suggest that the State Department is always headed in the opposite direction from the

United States Congress or the American people. It is their job to make the case, in each instance—in each congressional notification that they send up, that, in fact, what they are doing has a rationale that is in the interests of both the national security strategy and of the American people. That is their job to do that in each and every case and it is the job of the Congress to ask them whether they are doing it or not.

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Well, I am out of time, but for the record, I am asking.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Perry.

We go now to Gregory Meeks of New York.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first make sure the record is clear on my behalf, and I don't think that it is clear on behalf of the budget that is proposed by the 45th President of the United States. What I can speak for is the 720,000 people of the Fifth Congressional District of New York. And I want to say to all of the women and men of the State Department: Thank you. Thank you for your service, your dedication to this great country.

Just as I say thank you to every person that is in the United States military for what you do for our country, those women and men of the State Department are the very best. They make sacrifices on a daily basis on behalf of the United States of America. And this budget does not give them the kind of respect and the kind of credit that they deserve, because they represent our country well.

So I can speak on behalf of the 720,000 people that I represent in the Fifth Congressional District, and I want all of them to know how much we appreciate their service to this great country. We would not be who we are today without your leadership and without your sacrifices.

And so I think that this budget is devastating—devastating—to the leadership of our country and to the service that you have rendered to it. And I wanted to make sure that that first was on the record.

I am just shocked at this budget, to be quite frank with you. And I think that it is a bipartisan and it should be a bipartisan effort, because it always has been, where we have been bringing this together.

This proposed budget envisions a different role for America in the world—that is what it really does—where one does not lead based upon principles or ideas but, rather, an America that is driven by what is our bottom line.

And so what does that mean to those of us and to the world who looks to the United States for leadership? The liberal democratic world order is one that we built to protect our country and everyone else's. It is to protect democratic interests. And that is what the State Department does.

When you look at the protests, the recent protests in Belarus and Russia, places where it is awfully—and the protesters are awfully brave and taking real risk of brutal suppression, I worry about what the new generation of freedom fighters will have in that regard. In an America-first world, these brave freedom fighters are

separate from our interests, whereas I see a free world as one where America does, in fact, benefit. In fact, humankind benefits.

So let me get off my—I have a couple of questions that I do want to get to. And I guess I will go to Mr. Burns, because I know that you stated the State Department's main resource is its personnel, and you have talked about that over and over again.

How might we help attract and retain a committed and dedicated workforce now, after this hiring freeze and going into the future? Because I am concerned about also the future. What kind of message does it send to our men and women of the State Department?

Ambassador BURNS. Congressman Meeks, as I said in my testimony, I have never seen morale so low. I am not blaming Secretary Tillerson, by the way. I think he is doing his best; he just doesn't have any lieutenants around him.

And so there needs to be a message from the White House that—in addition to respecting, as you say, the military, as all of us do—our diplomats are doing vital work for America. And in my written testimony—I won't go into it—I outline some of what diplomats do every day: Commercial work, consular work, political work. We are embedded, our political officers, with our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. And so that is service to the country.

I teach now at a school that produces students who want to go into the Foreign Service and the military. And a lot of our students are wondering, will our work be valued? And that concerns me greatly.

Mr. MEEKS. And, by the way—and I think Mr. Sherman touched on some of this. Because there are Americans that believe that the cuts would not directly impact their lives. But what if I told you the Department of State's role in advancing—and I think Mr. Krasner indicated—U.S. trade policy objectives by opening new exports and job opportunities for American businesses and workers through trade initiatives supported over 315,000 U.S. jobs in 2015 in just my home State of New York?

And what if I told you that more than 1,700 exchange visitors, as indicated, from overseas visited New York and nearly 1,000 New York residents traveled overseas as part of the Department's education and cultural exchange funded programs in 2015 and 2016?

What would happen to American jobs and cultural and education exchange as a result of these drastic cuts? We will be hurt.

I see I am out of time. I just want to make sure I put in for the record that—because I wanted to talk about Colombia—we don't have enough time—and how important it is to continue that. But because of a bipartisan way—former Republican Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole recently made a statement in *The Washington Post* which I would ask to be submitted for the record.

It says:

Eliminating the McGovern-Dole program would have a disastrous effect on the planet's most vulnerable children. Without a reliable source of nutrition, these children face a lifetime of stunted physical and mental development and unrealized opportunity.

This global school meals program remains one of the proudest achievements of my lifetime. It embodies the very

best of America's values. Saving this program means saving lives. It is as simple as that.

And I ask for unanimous consent that the quote from the Washington Post article be submitted into the hearing record.

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection.

We go now to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me note that the bravery of our military is not and should not be used to justify specific military actions or justify, actually, an overall budget that is based on those specific military objectives. Either those objectives are right and they are being handled right, or they are not. The bravery and courage of our military is not what you are deciding.

And it is the same way with the State Department. The State Department has people who are very—these are high-quality people who are working for us, and we are lucky to have them. But it does not justify the policies that we have toward the State Department by saying what good-quality people they are. Yes, they have our thanks, and, yes, they are wonderful people. And I reaffirm that that is in my heart, not just something I am supposed to be saying today.

What we need to be looking at is the policies that we are following and what we demand as a Congress and the level of spending we demand as a Congress.

I say, number one, the President of the United States wants to cut the money that we are spending in this foreign arena, in the foreign affairs, in terms of the State Department and foreign aid. Terrific. Somebody finally got the message from the American people that we are not going to put up with the corruption, with the financing of our enemies that we see over and over again when we look at our foreign aid budget.

How much have we given to the United Nations, and how much of that is being wasted? How much of that is going to people who hate our country and undermine the peace of the world? We are financing the Palestinians, for Pete's sake, after all of these years. Does it make sense that we finance people who will not come to grips and will not go and actually seek a real peace with Israel after all of this time?

We are spending money while those other countries are run by people, such wonderful people like Lumumba, who got billions of dollars from us, and Karzai. How about Karzai, the Karzai family? Oh, how wonderful it is that we are giving foreign aid to them while billions of dollars are being stolen.

And, by the way, where do those billions of dollars end up? Well, they end up in banks, of course. And when these dictators and when the Karzai family finally gets arrested somewhere, who has the money? These big international banks. We need to reform that. We need to make sure that when some dictator is ripping his own people off, that instead of going to the American taxpayers—let's just pour some more money in there—that we take care of the banks and those dictators and cut them off from the flow of money.

By the way, just my note. Karen Bass has a bill that wants to, you know, help the people of South Sudan. We have heard about that today. That is what we should be focusing on, are emergency

situations and situations where you have a natural catastrophe or an emergency is putting people at risk, putting millions of people at risk.

Yes, we can afford to do that. That is our moral obligation. It is not our moral obligation to build the economy of these other countries, especially when there is so much corruption involved that that gets drained away and taken from the American taxpayers.

So I would suggest that, yeah, this administration is going to demand that we take a second look and a close look at what we are financing.

And, yes, that is right, we should not have our State Department people out trying to justify and push certain sexual mores in a country, change their basic values to be like us. That is not the job of the State Department. And that is a way to make enemies, is to go in and tell people that your fundamental beliefs are wrong and we are going to push you on it.

So we need to make sure, when we go in, yes—we also have, of course—we mentioned climate change today. Isn't that wonderful, that all these centuries of mankind we have these climate cycles; now, instead of trying to help people who are in an emergency, no, we are going to try to change the climate. We are going to try to change the climate of the world.

By the way, there are—I know my good friends are going to say, well, there are so many scientists who say that we are causing that climate change. No, there are lots of prominent scientists, as well, who say just the opposite. But we have noted that throughout the history of mankind we have had cycles of drought and famine. And we need to work with our fellow countrymen to help those who are in need when those cycles appear.

In fact, I remember that—I think it was Joseph that went to Egypt and told the pharaoh that, by the way, there is a cycle here. You are fat now, but there is going to be something coming where you are going to need to have your food, and you are going to need to make right policies now to deal with that cycle. And you know what? The pharaoh did that, and it saved the people of Egypt. Of course, I think the people of Israel wanted to get free from that, you know, as payment for trying to save the people of Egypt that way.

But, anyway, with that said, Mr. Chairman, I hear all of these naysayers and criers here about having to reduce the foreign aid budget. Three cheers for President Trump for, at last, getting rid of the waste in our foreign affairs, in our foreign aid that often goes to crooks and enemies of the United States.

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Albio Sires of New Jersey.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Engel. Thank you for holding this hearing in light of President Trump's draconian cuts to the State Department.

I join my colleagues in sharing my deep concerns on how such drastic cuts will impact the government's ability to keep Americans abroad and right here at home safe.

As ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, I have seen firsthand how U.S. engagement is critical in achieving our goals. Without U.S. presence in the region, countries like Russia and China are waiting to take charge in the countries closest

to our borders. Countries like Cuba and Venezuela will no longer have to worry about Western democracies pushing back against their authoritarian leadership. And pulling back on our engagement in Central America would give the green light to human smugglers who bring tens of thousands more children across the northern border to the U.S. border.

Concerns regarding this budget should not be partisan. Since Trump announced his plans to cut nearly 30 percent of the State Department's budget, policy experts, senior military officials, and faith-based groups have all spoken out about the dangerous ramifications.

Over 100 Christian leaders, including the 2017 inauguration speakers Cardinal Timothy Dolan and Reverend Samuel Rodriguez, wrote to congressional leaders on March 16 and stated that "it is our moral responsibility to urge you to support and protect the international affairs budget. We cannot turn our back on those in desperate need."

Mr. Chairman, I ask that the letter be submitted for the record.

Chairman ROYCE. And, without objection.

Mr. SIRES. As we go through this, can you please tell me what would cuts to the efforts in Colombia mean in the near future if we, at this point, step away from helping Colombia continue?

Ambassador Burns?

Ambassador BURNS. Congressman, this has been a bipartisan effort. It was started by President Clinton, continued by President George W. Bush, then President Obama. I hope President Trump will support the extension of our support of Plan Colombia.

Now they are at the critical point where they have a peace agreement. It needs to be implemented fully. It is going to be difficult. American foreign policy most often succeeds when we have a long-term view, when we keep at it. I hope that the Trump administration will keep at this, in the tradition of its predecessors.

Mr. SIRES. Can you comment on that, Dr. Krasner?

Mr. KRASNER. Yeah, the only thing I would say is that we shouldn't expect—I mean, Plan Colombia has been a tremendous success. The country would have fallen to the FARC without Plan Colombia. But we shouldn't hope for too much. I mean, as one of your colleagues pointed out, there is actually more coca being grown in Colombia now than was the case 20 years ago.

So all I would say is don't expect miracles. I think we have a pretty good administration in Colombia. Our help has been effective. It has provided better security in the country. It doesn't mean that the place is going to become nirvana, you know, in the next decade. So, just modest objectives.

Mr. SIRES. I am also concerned about the Northern Triangle countries and our engagement in trying to get the youth involved. I was recently in Guatemala and Honduras, and they were very concerned about these cuts.

Can you talk a little bit about if we pulled away and just did not participate in any of the social programs that we have been implementing lately?

Mr. KRASNER. So I want to be modest here, because I don't know well enough. But it seems to me, you know, this notion that we could somehow export our problems by sending all of the gang

members back to these countries doesn't seem to me like a very wise policy in the long run.

So I think we need to continue to be engaged in these programs, again, without the expectation that they are going to turn into Switzerland or wherever, but where they could be more reasonable places, especially for younger people.

Mr. SIRES. Anybody else?

Ambassador BURNS. I think these are very important programs. I am not an expert on them, but I am familiar with them. And we have to have a commitment that is ongoing to the people of Central America, given the symbiotic relationship we have with them people-to-people across the border.

Ms. PLETKA. I have kept my mouth out of this because I don't know very much about Latin America.

The case that is the right one to make is that people will come and try to immigrate illegally to the United States when the situation in their homeland is untenable. This is something that serves—and not in every case. And you have to make a persuasive case that it serves the American people to ensure that those in Central America are not fleeing or sending their children, worse yet, fleeing from their capitals, from gangs, from terror, to across the border.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you.

And one last question—well, I don't have time.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sires.

We go now to Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have been a Member of this institution for about two decades now, about 20 years. Prior to that, I was for 5 years a county commissioner, and 5 years prior to that, 4 or 5 years, I was a member of Cincinnati City Council. And I know how governments oftentimes work when it comes to having to balance budgets, make cutbacks, and things of that nature.

And, typically, at the city council level, if they have to make cuts—and maybe they are thinking of a tax levy or something along those lines—they have a tendency to put out the things that people just can't do. You know, we are going to have to cut back on police, we are going to have to close the parks. And sometimes, you know, they literally did close the parks to get the public, kind of, incensed to basically support whatever it is they are trying to do, the argument being, at that level, you know, we have cut to the bone, there just isn't any waste.

And I will give the President credit for drawing attention to the fact that, yes, we do have a \$20 trillion debt hanging over our head, and we are going to have to cut in certain places, we are going to have to freeze in certain places, we are going to have to reduce the rate of growth in other places. And there aren't a lot of easy choices here.

And at least with the public's point of view, when it comes to foreign aid, that is one of the things—everybody always says, we are spending way too much on foreign aid. And you would see these surveys, how much should we spend? Well, no more than 10 percent. Well, we are spending less than 1 percent, and that kind of shocks the public. So I understand that.

And these cuts, let's face it, when you look at it—certainly, if I worked in the State Department, you know, a 30-percent cut for State Department, or USAID is a very significant percentage cut. And the odds of that happening ultimately, getting through Congress, is pretty slim, knowing the way these things operate.

But that being said, let me ask the panel this. We do need to save some money somewhere. Okay. And I understand how much good a lot of our State Department, our diplomats do around the world. I have seen them in action. I know how hard most of them work. But, again, that being said, if you have to cut somewhere, where is there waste within either USAID or within the State Department portion of the budget where we could actually make cuts, reductions, without, you know, jeopardizing U.S. security or our posture around the world or whatever?

I see you champing at the bit maybe, Ambassador, so I will let you go first, and then I will ask the other folks.

Ambassador BURNS. I will be very brief.

I put in my testimony: Reform has to be ongoing. Cost-cutting has to be part of the culture. Secretary Tillerson, obviously an impressive manager, has a good opportunity to do this. And people should be open to change and reform.

We are top-heavy. Right now, there are two Deputy Secretary of State positions. I think we can survive with one.

Second, there are too many under secretaries. Push authority down to the line officers, the assistant secretaries. They are the people who run the State Department.

In addition to that, there has been a proliferation of special envoy offices. I think we work better when the Assistant Secretary for Europe or Asia has full authority, not encumbered by lots of different special envoys.

And, last—this may sound like special pleading from a former career Foreign Service officer—an excessive number of political appointees. You have to let career people aspire to positions of responsibility.

That is what I put in my testimony.

Mr. CHABOT. Yeah. And I certainly agree with you on that last point. I think, on both sides, this has been abused for years by both Democrats and Republicans, where people who really aren't qualified are the faces of the American people around the world. They ought to be people who know what they are doing. They ought to know the language. That ought to be a requirement.

Ms. Pletka?

Ms. PLETKA. I fully agree with Nick that the State Department needs to be in a constant process of reform. I don't think they are going to have two deputies in this administration. At least, that is what I understand.

But look, I mean, we listed some of the big targets out there. We provide vast amounts of foreign assistance to countries for political reasons: Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, others. Those programs, including Israel's economic support funds, need to be looked at seriously when we are in the process of budget-cutting. We need to actually make cost-benefit choices with all of them.

And in the case of places like Pakistan and Egypt, we need to ask ourselves whether our programs have been designed in a way that has been effective. And I think the answer is manifestly no.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

And Dr. Krasner? Briefly.

Mr. KRASNER. Yeah, so I don't think this is a question of waste; I think it is a question of policies. And I want to talk about our development assistance, not the State Department, which is a pretty small organization to begin with.

You know, I do think that we need to focus on programs which actually serve our national security. That may mean security assistance. It may mean even giving money to some guys we don't like that much, because they provide security. It means health, which has actually been a big success in the post-war period. And it means some modest economic growth.

But it doesn't mean a set of programs which are attempting to transform these countries. I think, as Congressman Rohrabacher said, telling them what we think our values are and thinking they are going to accept them isn't going to work.

So I think focusing on security, health, modest economic growth is what we ought to do in our development assistance.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

My time has expired.

Chairman ROYCE. Gerry Connolly of Virginia.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do want to begin by saying you don't make America great again by unilaterally withdrawing from the world. Since World War II, we have been and remain the essential nation. Ronald Reagan used to talk about being that shining city upon the hill. I think what he meant was a beacon, a place people could look to for succor, human rights advocacy, and protection. That is who we are. The budget in front of us reflects none of that.

Dr. Krasner, you were quoted as saying the nature of our national security, as well as our ideals, requires a commitment to long-term development. Do you reaffirm that statement?

Mr. KRASNER. I do. And I would say there are clearly challenges we have in the world. Look, I think Russia—since I am not a diplomat, I can say this—is basically a mafia state. But let me say, I wore this tie today. The tie is from China. It is the nicest tie I have. The Chinese are really a challenge to our national values and ideals. And if we simply withdraw from the world and cede areas to them, that is not a good thing for United States security in the long run.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I couldn't agree with you more. And I assume you would agree that both Russia and China, for different reasons and in different ways, are adversaries. Sometimes we cooperate, but in terms of the overall relationship, it is an adversarial relationship. Is that correct?

Mr. KRASNER. Yes, I agree.

Mr. CONNOLLY. So when we withdraw, as you say, they win.

Mr. KRASNER. Vacuums will be filled, as we have seen in Syria.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ambassador Burns, with all due respect, I hardly think talking about whether we have one or two deputy secretaries or how many under secretaries or, for that matter, even political

appointees—I think that begs the question of a 31-percent cut. I mean, you are not going to achieve efficacious savings with those changes, even if every one of them were adopted.

Ambassador BURNS. Well, that is right. We were asked to do two things here: Comment on the budget, but also look at reforms. I submitted my ideas on reforms. I am not as competent as Steve on the aid side. I defer to him.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah.

Ambassador BURNS. But I did say, Congressman Connolly, that, from my perspective, a 31-percent cut is going to cripple the Foreign and Civil Service and USAID. It will not be effective.

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I am going to run through three sets of questions real quickly because of time.

Diplomacy, it is not just a matter of bodies. Obviously, we are going to have to shrink our Foreign Service if this cut is sustained. Is that correct?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. And it isn't just, well, numbers. So we go from 10,000 to 7,000. It is also who those people are, is it not? We are going to lose skilled diplomats, and we are going to have trouble recruiting others to replace them if this budget, in fact, were to be sustained. Is that correct?

Mr. KRASNER. That is right. It takes decades to produce someone like Ryan Crocker, our great Ambassador, area expert in the Middle East. You just can't produce these skill sets.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. I think that is a really good point.

Take North Korea. If we end up having multilateral talks again, not just anybody can represent the United States, or should, at that table. It requires somebody with lots of skill sets. And we may even need to have very specific skill sets. It helped us with the JCPOA, for example, to have Ernest Moniz in that room because he was an expert in the nuclear field.

Humanitarian aid. Mr. Rohrabacher went through a list of failures and a correlation between corruption and foreign aid. But humanitarian aid can be very efficacious and can save lives, can it not?

Ambassador BURNS. Without question, in global public health and development. Think of the Haiti earthquake. Think of the SARS epidemic, Ebola. These things happen; we don't live in a conflict-free world. We have to have the men and women prepped to act the day it happens.

Mr. CONNOLLY. And, finally, the United Nations, a favorite whipping boy for some of my friends on the other side of the aisle. Let's take peacekeeping operations. Do peacekeeping operations serve U.S. interests? And what might happen if we were to defund them? What could go wrong with that?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, when U.N. peacekeepers deploy, it means the United States military does not have to deploy to really difficult places. And the U.N. Development Programme, the World Food Programme, the U.N. efforts to monitor Iran's adherence to the nuclear accords, this all comes out of the United Nations. We created the organization, that is in our interest.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am wearing a Save the Children tie, not a Chinese tie today, Mr. Krasner, to underscore that point, by our in-

vestment in UNICEF and other NGOs who have saved millions of lives in some very simple programs that weren't there before.

Ambassador BURNS. And it is a great organization.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I yield back.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I just thought I would hold this up for a moment. So the vision of me with this gavel in my hand is bound to create repercussions somewhere overseas.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Be afraid. Be very afraid.

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Kinzinger.

Mr. KINZINGER. I can make comments, but I won't.

Thank you all for being here.

I want to briefly piggyback on Mr. Connolly's comments. The United Nations needs a ton of reform. And anybody that argues against that, I think it is a very difficult argument to make.

But I see the U.N. as a force multiplier. First off, we have outsize presence in the United Nations. I went to Liberia a few years ago. That is a U.N. mission. That is a mission that U.S. troops are not doing right now, and you are seeing folks from all over the world brought in to do that. I am sure there is mismanagement and there is waste in that too, but we don't want to throw the baby out with the bathwater in this.

I think one of the unsung things that the State Department does is conflict mitigation. We hear people talk all the time about, you know, for instance, when it comes to security, the security apparatus has to be right all the time, and you never see where the FBI, for instance, successes are in unraveling a potential terrorist attack. I think the same holds for the State Department. When conflict mitigation occurs which stops a war from happening that could ultimately lead to the deaths of either the locals or, in some cases, the U.S. military, we have to go in and fix it, that is something that is never talked about.

One of the things I like to talk about is what I call the next-generational war on terror. And that doesn't mean we are declaring war on terror against the next generation; it means we are trying to prevent having to declare war on terror with the next generation.

I was in Turkey recently and went, as many on this committee have been, to the refugee camps. Seven-, eight-year-old kids there and Turkey is doing their best and host nations—Lebanon, Jordan—are doing their best to educate these children—but it is a very huge strain on their own society. And what we see are kids that are growing up without proper education, that are in an environment where they are the prime recruits for ISIS or the next al-Qaeda or the next Boko Haram or something we haven't even thought of yet, because they are in a position, without having the knowledge and education of what is going on, to believe that it is the West holding them down and the values of radical Islam are what they need to subscribe to.

I think it is completely shortsighted when we talk about just simply cutting the State Department but boosting the military. I will tell you, as a military person myself, I believe in boosting the military. In fact, I would go \$50 billion even beyond what the President has suggested. I think we need a \$100 billion increase just to get us back where we should be.

But I also think cutting the State Department makes our need to use that military far more likely. This is not a world anymore where we can put up walls. I mean, by the way, why would you need a military as big as we are talking about creating if we were just going to use it to defend ourselves? If everything outside of our shores didn't even matter, as what we are saying with this State Department cut, why would we even need a big—we could have a military that is \$100 billion that could defend us against Canada and Mexico pretty easily.

So my question—and I will start with you, Dr. Pletka. When I talk about that next-generational war on terror, when I talk about the fact that we can defeat ISIS but our concern needs to be with the 7- and 8-year-olds in the region right now, can you talk to me—and maybe all three of you if we have time—about what impact a 40-percent cut to the State Department would have on our ability to prevent the next war on terror?

Ms. PLETKA. At the outset, in our statements, I think all of us came out pretty strongly against the wisdom of a 28- to 31-percent cut at the State Department, even understanding that it was going to be plussed up with OCO funding, which it is, very substantially, in fact, beyond the scope of the cut.

Look, this is something that none of us are going to disagree on. We have to invest in the future of the Middle East. We have to ensure that people have places to go back to. You can have an argument until the cows come home about how many refugees we are going to take into the country. We are not going to take 4½ million Syrian refugees. Even I, who advocate taking a lot more than we are now, am not going to take them. They have to have somewhere to go back to. And that place, unfortunately for them right now, is Syria.

That means that we need to invest in the future of these countries. That is why, when I hear people say that our values aren't things we need to talk about and that nation-building isn't something the United States is about, it doesn't make sense to me, even as a realist, because they need to go somewhere. If they don't go somewhere, they turn into exactly what you suggested. They are Al Shabaab; they are Boko Haram.

I will say, since you allowed me the microphone, though, that not every U.N. operation is actually the most important or necessary operation. Nor is it strictly necessary that we pay 28 percent of peacekeeping, when, in fact, the statute suggests we should pay 25 percent.

There are places to get savings. Is that going to pay for everything that we want to do? No. Are these cuts too much? Yes. But they should be a reason to look at rational and reasonable reforms that prioritize the way that you just did.

Mr. KINZINGER. I don't disagree with you.

And, unfortunately, the others, I will have to cut you short.

But I just want to say, you know, look, when you have ½ million dead Syrians, almost 50,000 of which are children, and we sit back and say that doesn't matter to us or the answer is to empower a strongman or Russian regime, and then we wonder why an entire world, in essence, is turning against us, because maybe they don't like to be oppressed, even though maybe we think they do some-

how, which obviously they don't, I think what you see as a result is easily to understand what is happening.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.

Chairman ROYCE. And next is Ms. Karen Bass.

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I wanted to ask several questions related to the President's proposed budget and the cuts and your views on how we might respond.

So, for example, if the cuts were to go through and we had the Ebola crisis, how would we be able to respond to that? One thing Ebola taught us is that the crisis might have been in Africa but it could quickly come to our shores. So if a 30-plus-percent cut did go into effect, how would we be able to respond?

Ambassador Burns? Any of you.

Ambassador BURNS. One of the reasons we were successful in Ebola was the U.S. military and its work with the State Department on the ground in the four countries. In fact, I include Nigeria because there was a near outbreak there.

And this nexus is so important. Every President, when they do their budgets, has always tried to integrate defense and the State Department and USAID. This budget doesn't do it, which I think is one of its main weaknesses.

Ms. BASS. And so I wonder, how is the State Department functioning now? So, for example, you mentioned that there are not assistant secretaries. I worked very closely with the Assistant Secretary for Africa. I know there is not one in place now. I don't understand why the sitting Assistant Secretary wasn't left in place until a new Secretary could be appointed. I don't even know who to call.

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield is one of our great Foreign Service officers.

Ms. BASS. Yes. I agree.

Ambassador BURNS. I have enormous respect for her.

What happened over the last 2 months is that several of our most senior and experienced career diplomats were asked to resign. They weren't asked to leave their current jobs and then perhaps be available to serve elsewhere. Asked to resign. It is an enormous loss. You know the names. We all know the names. And that is a great mistake.

And to be near April and not to have a leadership on the seventh or sixth floor of the State Department, it doesn't make sense for the interests of the Trump administration.

Ms. BASS. Right.

Ambassador BURNS. We want the President to succeed. But he can't succeed—cannot—if he doesn't have a State Department leadership in place.

Ms. BASS. And it is my understanding, too, that some of them just went ahead and resigned before they were asked because they saw the writing on the wall, including her.

So, currently, we are dealing with famine, and I have introduced a bill to respond to the famine that is happening in South Sudan, although it is in other African countries too. How would we respond?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, you know, as the chairman said, there are four countries at risk of famine: Yemen and South Sudan and Nigeria and Somalia. This is unprecedented.

And what you need in an emergency situation—we saw this in the tsunami of 2004, the Haiti earthquake—you need to have trained people who are on the job, who can go into action in 24 hours. That is why the Ebola crisis was contained. That is why, way back in 2004, it was the U.S. and Japan, India, and Australia that led the rescue effort to the people who were victims of the tsunami. You can't just create that on the fly.

And, again, I know I have said this a lot, but I do want to repeat it: The State Department is very different than Homeland Security and the Defense Department. We basically have people. And it takes decades to train a Linda Thomas-Greenfield. You just can't produce somebody and hire someone off the street to do that job.

Ms. BASS. You know, my focus on Africa has been promoting trade. And I know that OPIC is due to be cut. And, I mean, that helps us promote U.S. business involvement, so I don't quite understand the rationale for that.

I am also concerned about the elimination of the African Development Foundation that specifically builds the capacity of Africans to do for themselves, which, to me, is exactly how our foreign aid should be.

And I just wondered if either of you had a comment on that, Dr. Krasner or Ms. Pletka.

Ms. PLETKA. We didn't speak specifically about it, but I think in everybody's testimony we alluded to the fact that there is a lot of support for OPIC. I do think that it is vital, again, to make the case about how OPIC works. What works in development? What works in development is not development dollars from the American taxpayer. It is private business—

Ms. BASS. Exactly. Excuse me. Before my time runs out, have any of you talked to Secretary Tillerson? I mean, because he doesn't speak to the press. So what is he saying? How is he doing his job, or not?

Ambassador BURNS. I have not talked to him since he took office, no.

Ms. BASS. Have either of you spoken to him? Do you know anybody that has?

Then how do they say he is doing his job? Because I also don't understand why he is silent and won't speak to the press. So do you know anybody that has talked to him, and what have they said about how he is doing his job? Isn't he concerned that he doesn't have any staff?

Ms. Pletka, you look like you know.

Ms. PLETKA. I am not the next Sean Spicer. I am not going to speak for anybody in this administration. And I don't know the Secretary or what he thinks, and I would never presume to speak for him. We have many of the same questions.

Ms. BASS. I wasn't asking you to speak for him. I was just saying if anybody has a clue. This is a mystery.

Ms. PLETKA. I don't know. I don't know.

Ms. BASS. Dr. Krasner, do you mind?

Mr. KRASNER. This is an advantage and disadvantage of living in California. It is a long way from Washington.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much.

And let me remind our colleagues that one of our witnesses, Dr. Krasner, has to leave at noon.

And you have 5 minutes; it is yours. But if you could use a little less time, it would be easier for the rest of your colleagues to get a chance to ask the whole panel their questions.

And now I go to Mr. Donovan.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And in respect for my colleagues, I am going to just ask one question of all of you.

Waste, lack of metrics and results, bureaucracy, lack of transparency, duplication—these are all major concerns about foreign assistance which these proposed cuts claim to address, in part through the elimination of some of the agencies.

It is some of our leanest, most efficient agencies, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Inter-American Foundation. My friend Karen Bass talked about the U.S. African Development Foundation. They systematically evaluate. They have clear results. They have access to long-term impact, leverage outside resources, and reach a level of needs where others cannot—are on the chopping block for elimination, to be either cut totally or subsumed by a larger agency like USAID.

When we look to prioritize our cuts, shouldn't we first protect the agencies or the efforts that are working? And why would we sacrifice or fold in some of the most cost-efficient models, like those that I just mentioned, that encourage competition and local ownership, while keeping intact some of the agencies that have exhibited some of the gravest examples of waste, intractable inefficiencies, and weak results?

I would just like your comments on how we are choosing these agencies or these organizations that will either be eliminated in total or consumed by some larger agencies like USAID.

Mr. KRASNER. I agree entirely with what you have said. I think the MCA was really a—

Chairman ROYCE. Is your microphone on?

Mr. KRASNER. Yeah, it is on. Okay.

I mean, it was really a leader in developing metrics and measurement. But I think that challenge has actually been taken up by other aspects of the assistance community, including USAID, as I said. I have been on the board of directors of the United States Institute of Peace, and I know there that they have systematically introduced measures that are designed to assess programs.

So I think, looking at cutbacks, it would make much more sense to look at agencies which are evaluating their programs rather than what looks to me like a blanket cut.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you.

Anyone else?

Ms. PLETKA. You know, the right question to ask is not how much you want to cut, it is what you want to achieve.

Ambassador BURNS. And I would just add—I agree with you as well. I would just add the Trump budget cuts don't appear to be embedded in a strategy. And I would agree with you, we have to

be demanding about transparency, about metrics. And there are a lot of these institutions that you mentioned that are going to be cut, perhaps, that meet those criteria. So I just don't see the strategy here.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Ambassador.

I yield the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you. And I would hope that our colleagues might use you as an example.

Next, Mr. Cicilline.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the witnesses.

The proposed cuts that President Trump has submitted to Congress are disproportionate, shortsighted, and would be devastating for U.S. national security interests around the world. As already mentioned here today, a wide range of diplomats, security experts, Members of Congress, and other experts have condemned these cuts and described the devastating consequences they would have to our national security interests.

I would like to submit for the record and ask unanimous consent that an op-ed written by former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist that explains that these proposed cuts would have severe moral, national security, and economic impacts that would negatively affect U.S. interests and U.S. leadership in the world be made part of the record.

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection, so ordered.

And let me remind my colleagues that you can also put questions into the record for our witnesses, and they will answer and give you a response at the same time.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Frankly, it is sort of shocking to me that it is the responsibility of the Foreign Affairs Committee to educate the President of the United States on the value of investing in diplomacy. It would seem like everyone would understand the consequences of this kind of massive disinvestment, but apparently not.

So I would like to ask you, Ambassador Burns: If the United States were to reduce our assistance efforts around the world in the kind of magnitude that the President has suggested, are there other governments that would seek to fill that space? And what might increased assistance from foreign governments with differing strategic aims than the United States have on our long-term national security interests?

Ambassador BURNS. Congressman Cicilline, I would just echo what Steve Krasner said a little while ago. Every vacuum is filled.

Certainly, the Russian Government, adversary of the United States, wants to take the place of the United States in Eastern Europe. The Chinese Government pushing out in the South China Sea. As the Trump administration said no to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which I thought was a great strategic mistake, China will now set the trade agenda.

So, over and over again, we have been the liberal world order leader since Harry Truman's administration. Both parties have invested in that. And I think these budget cuts, they worry a lot of people that they could be indicative of a larger retreat by the United States from its global responsibilities.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Ambassador.

I would like to now turn to the United Nations.

As you know, the Security Council has adopted sanctions targeting terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda and rogue regimes like North Korea in recent years. These include legally binding arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes, and other measures designed to increase pressure on these groups, undercut their ability to carry out nefarious activities, and hold countries, businesses, and individuals that do business with them to account.

U.S. dues payments to the U.N. regular budget help finance efforts to monitor international compliance with these measures so that we can assure they are being implemented effectively and adjust accordingly. For example, in late November, the Security Council adopted new sanctions against North Korea which are expected to lead to a decline in North Korean coal exports, a major source of revenue for the regime, by as much as 60 percent.

Do you think it is important for the United States to continue to engage with the U.N. on these types of efforts? And how would cutting U.S. funding to the U.N. negatively impact our ability to push for full implementation of these sanction measures and to be sure that they are, in fact, followed through with consistency?

Ambassador BURNS. I think we have to stay with the U.N. It is a deeply flawed institution. It needs major managerial change. Every administration has to fight that battle. But as you were asking your question, I thought: On food aid and famine, on global public health, on nuclear proliferation, and on peacekeeping, we turn to the U.N. because that saves American effort and American dollars and American participation.

It is the institution that we created, so we have to stand by it, but we do have to be concerned about U.N. reform. And there are aspects of the U.N.—I think Danielle mentioned one of them—that are objectionable to us, and I think Ambassador Haley has been a very vigorous, positive defender of American interests there.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Ambassador.

And I will yield back the remaining 47 seconds, in the spirit of making sure Mr. Deutch has enough time.

Mr. DONOVAN [presiding]. The gentleman yields.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutch.

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thanks to the chairman and ranking member for holding this important hearing.

Every priority of this committee, every priority of our committee is threatened under the President's proposed budget. But I am encouraged by what I have heard today from members on both side who remain committed to defending a robust foreign policy and all pillars of that foreign policy.

In that vein, Mr. Chairman, I would like to request permission to enter into the record a statement from Madeleine Albright and Stephen Hadley on America's role in the world, which serves as a good bipartisan reminder of what is at stake in this discussion.

Mr. DONOVAN. Without objection.

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Simply put, Mr. Chairman, the President's budget is an attack on the security of this country. And there should never be a debate between diplomacy and military strength, a debate between hard

power and soft power. Everyone in this room knows that those priorities are all essential parts of a unified whole. Our development work makes the world more prosperous. Our humanitarian efforts create stability and goodwill. And our diplomats ensure that, when the United States acts, it need never do so alone.

All of this reduces the ranks of our enemies while creating a safer world for our allies and for our citizens. When the United States is engaged abroad, it is less likely that we will need to fight costly wars overseas, and it is harder for terrorist organizations to recruit individuals to attack us at home.

All of this was true when President Reagan argued that international assistance would, and I quote, “enable the United States to continue its contribution to the achievement of a secure and stable international environment.” It was also true when President George W. Bush said, and, again, I quote, “that no national security strategy is complete in the long run without promoting global health, political freedom, and economic progress.” And it is true today.

Despite decades of bipartisan support for diplomacy and development, President Trump has decided to slash this funding with a staggering one-third cut. If these cuts are not motivated by partisan politics, then we are left to wonder what is motivating them.

It cannot be the pursuit of national security, because that has been ignored, and the appeals of his own Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, 121 retired generals and admirals that we have spoken of already today, who have argued that diplomacy and development are essential complements to a strong military.

It can't be a desire to make government more efficient, because the President is trying to eliminate the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency and a host of other initiatives that generate massive returns for taxpayers while advancing our interests abroad.

And it cannot even be an attempt to tackle our deficit, because the President is proposing to spend every dollar that he cuts from the international affairs budget on other government programs.

If partisanship and national security and fiscal concerns aren't motivating the President to slash the foreign affairs budget, the only thing that can remain is ideology. And the President is a newcomer to foreign policy, but his closest advisers have pushed for years to see the United States retreat from the world, even as they have celebrated the rising influence of countries like Russia.

Put simply, the President's budget undercuts U.S. prestige and influence abroad. And I look forward to joining with my colleagues to defend America's leadership role in the world now and every time that the President and his team challenge it. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I have a feeling that we will have plenty of opportunities to do just that.

Ambassador Burns, if you could just speak to the long-term effects of how the President's positions in this budget are likely to affect our national security, long-term effects on the readiness at State, at AID, and other foreign policy agencies if these cuts go through. My concern is that it is not just a question of this year's budget, but that it would take years to undo the damage.

Ambassador BURNS. I agree with your statement, Congressman Deutch. The State Department, the men and women are trained over the course of a lifetime, and so you have to continually invest in them. It is good value.

I worry about the trade policies of this administration that are giving an undue advantage to China in the Far East. And I certainly worry about the inattention to the Russia problem, both Russia's interference in our election but also Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. And Angela Merkel has stood up to Putin; I don't see President Trump doing that.

So I think it is a problem with ideology. And I would just add something that was mentioned before. If some in the White House want to dismantle the Federal Government, the executive branch, and hollow it out, it is going to make their foreign policy, our foreign policy, ineffective. That is the only explanation, now that we are March 28, that I can figure out for why we have no appointees in the State Department. This has never happened before.

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate it. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DONOVAN. The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the witnesses.

You know, General Mattis—and you may have heard this prior to me saying this many times, but—before the NSC meeting, stated that “if you don't fully fund State Department, then I need to buy more bullets.” And, you know, I have seen the combination of hard power and soft power play its role, and I think he is absolutely right about this.

I have been a student of terror for many years, dating back to being a Federal prosecutor doing counterterrorism. And it always seems to breed and this ideology seems to spread in areas that are underdeveloped, where there are poverty situations, where we have governments in chaos, or where there is no government, where we have basically failed states that become safe havens, and then the terrorists go there, breed, out of which external operations can be conducted. I think that is the biggest threat that we face as I look at the homeland.

So these cuts concern me because of the impact it will have on our diplomats' ability on our soft power to change that part of the world. And, quite frankly, the counternarrative is so important here. We can kill 50,000 ISIS fighters, as we have, in the caliphate, but we need to kill the ideology. And that is, I think, within the purview of the State Department to do that.

So my question is very simple. How will these cuts, in your view—both of you—how will they impact our efforts in this conflict that we have against Islamist-based terror?

Ms. PLETKA. I don't think the cuts are going to be helpful. I think we established at the outset that soft power is a key element to any strategy to defeat ISIS and to defeat Islamist extremism.

I also think we need to look back over the last 15 years and recognize that the strategies that the State Department has employed to defeat Islamist extremism have not been a huge success.

And that is why, while we have all stood up, jumped up and down and said that 30 percent is not an appropriate cut to the Department of State given the vitality of its role in fighting terrorism, nonetheless it is an opportunity to sit down and go back and see what is effective, what should be done, what works and what doesn't, and get rid of what doesn't in favor of what might work in the future, with an honest look at all of our programs.

Mr. McCAUL. Yeah. I think that is a great point. We need to reform the State Department's efforts in this area. And you are right, it has not worked very well. We haven't had a countermessage that has worked effectively against the jihadists. I think you are absolutely right on point.

Ambassador?

Ambassador BURNS. Mr. Chairman, when I worked for Secretary Powell, former military man, he felt very strongly—this was in the wake of 9/11—that we had to have a counterterror policy that was focused exactly as you said. There is a military component; there is an intelligence; judiciary; but there is a diplomatic.

And I think the answer to your question, I would suggest, would be there are programs to combat the ideology and defeat it, and that takes a long time. That is State's responsibility, in conjunction with the military.

And, second, State is a coalition-builder for the military. So you saw Secretary Tillerson convene 58 countries last week at the State Department against the Islamic State. So we are in this with the military. And the budget that has been presented by the Trump administration cuts the State Department out. I favor an increase in military spending, but you have to have a balance here, and that is what is lacking.

Mr. McCAUL. Well, I think diplomatic power, and particularly the Sunni-Shia world, we have—Syria, basically, as you know, is the civil war that created this mess that has led to the creation of ISIS, the hundreds of thousands of refugees, millions. And without the ability to resolve that political conflict, again, we can fire as many bullets as we want in that area, but we are not going to get to a resolution of the underlying problem.

And would you both agree with that?

Ms. PLETKA. I don't think either of us are going to disagree with you. That is the key. But I think that it is vital that we understand how it is that we are going to combat this ideology effectively. Because, as you said, so far, we have not had great success.

We started 10 years ago with ISIS and al-Qaeda, ISIS not existing and al-Qaeda in fewer than a dozen countries. We now have both in more than two dozen countries, expanding as we speak. And so we absolutely need to focus on how it is that we are going to effectively combat them.

Mr. McCAUL. In closing, Mr. Chairman, if I could just add, because my time has expired, for both of you, I would love to get your suggestions on how we can counter this narrative and this ideology effectively. Because we haven't done it, and now it is a global internet phenomenon that is not just to the caliphate; it is a global extremism issue.

I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. Thank you.

Dr. Ami Bera of California.

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think we all agree this is a dangerous budget. You know, I believe America is a great Nation, but this is not the budget of a great Nation. You know, great nations don't withdraw from the world. And if we just look at our history post-World War II and the second half of the 20th century, you know, the three pillars that you talked about—defense, diplomacy, and development—you know, created a better world.

And, Ms. Pletka, in your opening comments, you said a world led by the United States is a better world. I absolutely agree with that. And I think most of the world would agree with that. But the problem with this budget is it is not a budget that shows American leadership. And the problem is, if we withdraw from the world, other nations are going to fill that void, and they won't necessarily share the values that we share.

Again, this is a dangerous budget. You know, on both sides of the aisle, we understand the vacuum that this would create. You know, listening to our defense experts, you know, our Secretary of Defense, our retired generals, they think this would be a mistake. And, again, that is the danger of this budget.

It disturbs me that—you know, this is my fifth year in Congress, and it is my fifth year on the Foreign Affairs Committee. When we discuss the State Department budget, we have the Secretary of State doing the courtesy of sitting there and defending that budget. The fact that we don't have any State Department employee, let alone the Secretary of State, willing to defend this budget—I hope he does come before this committee so we can ask him questions directly—I think we, as Members of Congress, ought to be offended by that.

Look, we want to work with the administration. We want to maintain the strength of the United States. We are a great Nation, but we need a budget that reflects who we are, not just soft power, but the moral power of who we are as the United States. And that is not this budget, and that is the danger here.

You know, yes, every department across this government could use evaluation, and they should on an ongoing basis evaluate each program, look for efficiencies, look for ways to return money to the taxpayer, or outdated programs should be phased out. Nobody is going to argue with that. That should be an ongoing responsibility of Congress but also the heads of those departments.

But, again, you know, doing things in a haphazard way—as Secretary Mattis said, if we don't fund the State Department, then you are going to have to fund the military. And that is exactly what this budget does, and I think that is a dangerous mistake.

Ambassador Burns, you looked at this—and I will continue with Mr. McCaul's line of questioning. We have had multiple hearings on ISIS and how best to combat it. Yes, we have to fight them over there, but there clearly is a role of the State Department in countering some of the propaganda, in using our broadcasting powers, working to use the internet and social media in different ways, and, you know, working hand-in-hand with our diplomacy. And I believe this budget makes us more susceptible to threats in the homeland, makes us more susceptible to not defeating ISIS.

And I would be curious about your thoughts there.

Ambassador BURNS. I would just say, I agree with Danielle Pletka when she said that the terrorism problem is worse than it was 10 or 15 years ago. And so, as we look ahead—and we have to plan budgets with policy—we are facing another generation of a struggle against Islamic terrorist groups, Muslim terrorist groups, in the Middle East and in Africa.

And you also inferred this; we are competing with China for influence in East Asia. We are competing with Russia in Eastern Europe. We are the great power, and we don't want China and Russia to be in the ascendancy. And we want to be effective and successful in the war against these groups. You need to be active and in fifth gear. And that means fully funding State and AID, as well as the military.

Mr. BERA. And I believe the rest of the world would prefer a world led by American values, as opposed to the other ideologies.

You know, Ambassador Burns, you were a career diplomat. I don't know if you were at the State post, the Afghanistan conflict, initially, you know, when we defeated the Russians, but what did we do? Did we stay there? Did we help rebuild Afghanistan? And what filled that vacuum?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, way back, we actually left Afghanistan.

Mr. BERA. And what happened in the aftermath?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, then al-Qaeda took root, and the Taliban made a partnership with al-Qaeda. So that was the big strategic mistake of the 1980s and 1990s leading up to 9/11: We left.

Mr. BERA. Well, let's make sure we don't make that same mistake.

Chairman ROYCE. Lois Frankel of Florida.

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for very good testimony today. I would have liked to have Mr. Tillerson join you.

Maybe another time, Mr. Chairman.

I think that if the Secretary of Defense, General Mattis, was here, he probably would have agreed with a lot of the testimony today—the need for diplomacy, development, and defense. We are living in a world with a lot more danger and terror, and decimating the State Department is, I will say it respectfully, not smart—dumb, not smart. We should evaluate, I agree with that; refine, possibly; but trash, no.

But I have another concern. We have heard today criticism about vacancies. As a Member of Congress who happens to represent Palm Beach County, it has become obvious to me and maybe to many of you that the White House is running the State Department out of Mar-a-Lago.

The President, in my opinion, sees himself as schmoozer-in-chief. He thinks playing golf at the Trump golf course or dining the Prime Minister of Japan at the club at Mar-a-Lago is a substitute for, let's say, helping Japan after their earthquake.

And what really bothers me is that the President actually profits from each visit to Mar-a-Lago. It is a private club. Since he has become President, the cost of joining this club has gone from

\$150,000 to \$300,000. People are paying money to dine in the ambience of world leaders.

And I think it was said here today a number of times that corruption, corruption at the very top, around the world, in governments, has been the underpinning of a lot of these governments.

And I ask the question, how does our President have the moral authority when he is profiting off of every foreign visit—and he has the Chinese delegation coming next week. The Chinese delegation is coming to Mar-a-Lago next week. How does he have the moral authority to sit across the table from a world leader and say, “You’ve got to keep it clean. You’ve got to count the votes?”

So I have a question, and here is my question to you. Could you just give me some examples of what you think, how corruption has led to instability in this world? From your experience, maybe give some examples.

Ambassador BURNS. I think we have all said today that corruption is endemic in parts of the world. We have seen it in Afghanistan. We have seen it in Pakistan. We see it in China. We see it in Russia, in abundance in Russia. And so our country, however flawed we are—and we are not perfect—we have to be immune from charges of corruption, certainly, in our leadership.

You also made an earlier point—I just wanted to say quickly, we want the President to be fundamentally involved in foreign policy. If the White House is strongly involved, it is not necessarily a bad thing.

But the most effective administration, most people would say, in the last 40 years, was George H. W. Bush. He delegated to his Secretary of State, James A. Baker III. They were a team. You want delegation to your major Cabinet agencies. Right now, it looks like the State Department is not plugged in to the White House. I would hope that that could be fixed and that Secretary Tillerson could be given broad authority.

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chair, I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Norma Torres of California.

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding this hearing.

Before I begin with my questions, I would like for unanimous consent to be included in the record a letter from the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Council of American Ambassadors, stating, “We believe the proposed magnitude of the cuts to the State Department budget poses serious risks to American security.”

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection.

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I think that we pretty much all agree that diplomacy and development are essential to advancing our national interests and protecting our national security.

As the co-chair of the Central America Caucus, I have been particularly involved in the Northern Triangle of Central America. Many Members of Congress, both sides of the aisle, have recognized that we have a strong national interest in security, development, and the rule of law in the Northern Triangle. There has been bipartisan commitment to provide assistance to the region in support of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle.

Over the past 2 years, these countries have begun to see real progress in key areas. The United States has been a catalyst for change and has stood behind the efforts of Hondurans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorians who are working to improve conditions for their constituents. Especially the attorney generals of all three countries have had excellent international partners as well, especially the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala and now the Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras.

Ambassador Burns, what kind of negative effects could we see if assistance to this region was sharply reduced?

Ambassador BURNS. Oh, I think it would be a great mistake. We have an integrated life with the countries of Central America and Mexico, as well as Canada. And these programs in the Northern Triangle, especially the fight against corruption and the activities of our American Ambassadors in trying to work with the Governments of Guatemala and Honduras and other places, they are critical to us and critical to our security.

I think a larger point here, too, is we cannot afford to have a troubled relationship with Mexico, and we have to straighten that out as well. But a key part of American power in the world is stability in Central America and North America.

Mrs. TORRES. I have been specifically impressed with the work of all three Ambassadors and the work that they have done to empower the people, you know, to work to ensure that future generations have an opportunity to see a future for themselves in their own home country and not have to travel 1,000 miles to get to our southern border to ask for refuge because their country is just too dangerous to see them grow into successful adults.

Ambassador Burns, you also mentioned that possible 30-percent cut to our counternarcotic efforts abroad. How could drastically reducing the budget for international narcotics control and law enforcement impact our efforts to combat corruption and strengthen rule of law?

Specifically, I want to hear, also, how would it impact regional security, whether in the Caribbean or in Central America or at the border.

Ambassador BURNS. Congresswoman, one of my responsibilities when I was Under Secretary of State for Condoleeza Rice was to oversee the bureau, INL, that conducts our counternarcotics programs.

I would be the first to say that the United States has not always been successful in these programs—a lot of problems over many decades. But it doesn't make sense to me to say, since we have had problems, we should quit. We can't. We can't afford that. We can't afford it for the stability of the countries, Colombia or Central America. And we can't afford it for our kids, who are victims of drug abuse.

Mrs. TORRES. Right.

Ambassador BURNS. And so I think they are very important to continue. We have a very fine leader, Ambassador Bill Brownfield, in INL right now. He is one of our best Foreign Service officers. And the proposed 30-percent cut to that program is deeply concerning to me and many other people.

Mrs. TORRES. I am very concerned about what is happening in Costa Rica and Panama and what they are seeing within the Atlantic Ocean, with the increase of narcotics that are there from Colombia.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you.

We go to Robin Kelly of Illinois.

Ms. KELLY. Thank you to the witnesses.

And thank you, Mr. Chair.

I join my colleagues in expressing concern about the President's proposed skinny budget. Maintaining a robust diplomatic presence around the world is vital to U.S. national interests, as you know.

The new budget represents a total reduction of roughly \$17.3 billion, or 31½ percent, from last year's budget. This reckless slashing of the State Department and USAID limits America's influence and leadership in the world.

In the complex global world that we are currently living in, we cannot afford to retreat into isolationism. Cutting foreign aid is not only bad policy; it is also dangerous, as you have heard.

Military leaders always talk about tackling problems left of boom. This is exactly what foreign aid accomplishes. Secretary Mattis has made clear that his strategy to defeat ISIS involves a strong partnership with the State Department. And, as you know, he has said in the past, if you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition. We have said it over and over.

Research has also proven the importance of aid in combating terrorism. According to the RAND Corporation, the evidence since 1968 around how terrorism ends indicates that terrorist groups are almost never defeated as the result of a military campaign. Rather, most groups end because of operations carried out by local police or intelligence agencies or because they join the political process.

So, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that this report be submitted into the hearing record.

Our international affairs budget funds global diplomacy, development, and governance programming, all of which work together to increase State's capacity to negotiate peace processes. Increase the capacity of states' police and justice systems and build healthy communities and civil society organizations that can sustainably build peace in their communities.

My question: Ambassador Burns, terrorist organizations like ISIS have established footholds in Iraq, Syria, and Northern Africa. How would cutting international aid affect U.S. efforts to combat terrorism? And, in your view, how do the State Department and USAID complement the military's efforts to counter ISIS and extremists around the world?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Congresswoman.

We need a full U.S. Government effort. Our intelligence community, our military, obviously, are on the front lines of this. But as I suggested earlier, the State Department is the organizer of our coalitions against terrorist groups. Secretary Tillerson did that last week when he hosted the summit against the Islamic State. And we also have these programs to try to combat the ideology of these

terrorist groups. That takes time to work, and I don't think you can expect instant results. And so we have to stick with this.

And I suggested earlier, I just want to say, Secretary Powell had this universal view that every part of our Government had to be involved. So we shouldn't take one part of the government out of the fight.

Ms. KELLY. And then just as an aside, what do you think is the effect that the Secretary is not going to NATO or didn't go to NATO? I didn't know if someone asked you that.

Ambassador BURNS. My understanding is that there has now been an attempt to work out a different date so that Secretary Tillerson, as he should, can be at the meeting with Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago, and he obviously should be there, but that he can also then attend the NATO foreign ministers meeting. I think that is a very good result, and I am very pleased, congratulate Secretary Tillerson on that.

Ms. KELLY. Right. I am glad to hear that also.

And the other thing as my colleague mentioned is that when he came here he wanted to take away all foreign aid. And I was glad to hear what he said, but—I also agree with what he said, but, also, I think that we do need to take a close look at evaluating how we are spending the money and making sure we are not wasting any money. Because I think that, no matter Democrat or Republican, that is everyone's concern. We want to make sure the money we are putting forth is used very effectively.

And I yield back the rest of my time.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Robin.

We go to Mr. Espallat of New York.

Mr. ESPALLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this committee, because in the short time I have been here, this is perhaps the most important effort that I see to speak in a way that we can reach a consensus. And I think that members from both sides of the aisle have expressed their interest in having a real budget for State Department and for our men and women of the State Department to do the work that is so important to our Nation.

And I think it is important, also, for the American people to hear the negative impacts the cutting of the State Department would have on our obligations abroad. As my colleagues and I have stated throughout this hearing and time and time again, Trump's budget is a threat to national security and is a threat to the interests of the American people.

This so-called skinny budget, which I call an anemic budget, prioritizes building border walls over diplomacy. If Trump is serious about curbing "illegal immigration," then we need to invest in the root causes of child and family migration from Central America, particularly from the Triangle. If Trump is serious about keeping Americans safe, then we need to listen to more than 120 retired U.S. generals and admirals who have warned us that elevating and strengthening diplomacy and development, alongside the fence, are critical to keeping Americans safe.

If Trump is serious about draining the swamp, then the President needs to release his tax returns so the American people can

rest assured that his proposed budget does not conflict with investment abroad. The American people deserve to know who the President's overseas partners are, who his creditors are, and where he has invested.

If Trump is serious about stopping the illegal drug flow, then we need to be investing more and more, not cutting back, on programs like the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.

And, finally, if Trump is serious about making America great again, than I urge all of my colleagues to reject this anemic budget. This budget gambles with American lives and makes Americans last. As members of this committee, we have seen that making an investment abroad is not about charity; it is about keeping violence and hatred from America's shore.

I hope the committee rejects this budget and will, instead, prioritize our commitments abroad, including investing, for example, in emergency preparedness in the Caribbean, the U.S. strategic engagement in Central America, funding for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, investing in energy potential in many places throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, and increasing funding for the United States Agency for International Development.

My questions are to you, Mr. Ambassador. I mentioned the issue of the tax returns, Mr. Trump's tax returns. And, obviously, if we adopt this budget, our diplomats will not have the necessary tools to be able to do their job efficiently and be able to determine whether, in fact, they are advocating for our diplomatic goals and objectives or, in fact, may be pushing or looking to advance Trump's profits abroad.

Do you think it is important that the tax returns are released so that we were able to have a diplomatic corps that is more transparent in the way they do business, the way they conduct diplomacy across the globe, and ensure that there are no conflicts of interest with the Trump profit-making machine?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Congressman, I am a foreign policy person. I normally don't express views on domestic issues. But, as a citizen, I would hope the President would emulate all of his predecessors for many decades and release his tax returns.

I would also hope that there would be a full investigation of Russia's interference in our election. It seems to me there should be a bipartisan commission to do that now because of the breakdown of trust, apparently, in the House Intelligence Committee.

The last thing I would like to say is that the most disturbing part of the budget, to me, as a former career official, is the explicit lack of faith in government. And I will be the first to say that government is not perfect. We do have to pay attention to reform. But trying to deconstruct the government and hollow it out, it belies the truth that government can do an enormous amount of good in the world. And look at all of our great Secretaries of States and Presidents, Republicans and Democrats, who built the liberal world order. They didn't fail, and we are not failing as a country.

I think that is the most disturbing part of this, is that this is a slap in the face to our diplomats, this 30-percent cut.

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I have exhausted all my time.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you Mr. Espailat.

We now go to Tom Suozzi from New York.

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to everyone for sticking around. I appreciate it very much. And I appreciate your testimony and your expertise and the lives that you have devoted to this very important work that you do.

I think that we have heard so many people talk about why this cut is just so absurd. I don't think that there is any—there is very little disagreement that this just doesn't make any sense. We have heard it from people in the military. We have heard it from the diplomatic corps. We have heard it from experts like yourselves, from policy experts, from Republicans, from Democrats. No one really thinks this makes much sense, to cut this amount of money.

But I do want to ask the question. In every large organization, there is waste, fraud, and abuse. There are things that don't work well. What would be your two best suggestions to save money in this area of the budget? And it has to be worth—you know, it can't be six people or five people. It has to be something big.

Ambassador BURNS. Well, I am biased. I serve in the Foreign Service. I think we are so small that to somehow think you can downsize the number of people in the civil and Foreign Service and be successful, I don't think it will work.

So where can you look? If you are looking at the State Department and USAID, I think you have to look at the aid budget and make sure that its conditional, make sure that we are tough-minded. We can't be all things to all people. I don't think we should have an aid budget in every country in the world. We should be very selective, as I think Dr. Krasner was suggesting. And if that is the question—

Mr. SUOZZI. That is the question.

Ambassador BURNS [continuing]. Err on the—

Mr. SUOZZI. So was there a particular area of aid that you think would be a good place to cut? You are an expert; I am not.

Ambassador BURNS. Well, I think that we have to look hard at some of the U.N. funding. I support many of the U.N. programs but not all of them—

Mr. SUOZZI. As do I, but there is inefficiency and need for reform there.

Ambassador BURNS [continuing]. But not all of them. And there have been some problems in the conduct of some of the peacekeeping missions—in Congo, for instance.

And so we have to be a very tough internal critic of those programs. That might save money but, more importantly, might do some good as well.

Mr. SUOZZI. You didn't think you were going to get that question from me, did you?

Ms. PLETKA. No. I am delighted. I am delighted to answer it and to not to have to hear about bullets again.

The United Nations, we should reduce our assessment in peacekeeping. We should try and use our leverage within the United Nations to end some of the peacekeeping operations that have existed for longer than most of us have been alive and are highly ineffective—UNMOGIP, UNIFIL, UNTSO, I could go on. I think that we should reduce our assessment to the United Nations and withdraw

from some of the suborganizations of the U.N. that don't serve our interests and are, in fact, created solely to attack the state of Israel.

I think we should look at assistance programs, economic support funds that go to—and budgetary support, which is basically cash handouts, that go to places like Pakistan, that go to Egypt, and, yes, economic support funds to Israel as well. Those are big chunks of money. They should be reassessed every single year.

Mr. SUOZZI. So you think we should be looking at the U.N., Pakistan, Egypt, and Israel? Those are the main places that you would—

Ms. PLETKA. Those are the main recipients of our foreign assistance programs. Jordan is in there, as well, but I think there is a much stronger case to be made that Jordan stands on the front lines and is very supportive in a variety of ways.

I think our military assistance, our FMF, to Israel should continue. It is the vast bulk of our assistance to Israel, and it serves us as well as the state of Israel. But I think our economic support funds provided to Israel, given that the per capita income of the state of Israel is higher than in certain sectors of the United States, is something that we could revisit. I think that the Israeli Government would be amenable to that.

Mr. SUOZZI. I just want to say very strongly that, when you look at the front lines, I think Israel is really on the front lines.

Ms. PLETKA. That is why I said the FMF should continue. But do they need our economic support funds?

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. Well, thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Tom.

I just would say in closing, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today.

These are critical issues. I think Congress needs to be fully engaged. I look forward to continuing to work with the members here as we seek to ensure that the international affairs budget is efficient and effective and that budget reductions do not have unintended consequences for the security interests, the economic interests, and the humanitarian interests of the United States.

So thank you very much to our panel.

We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman

March 28, 2017

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at <http://www.ForeignAffairs.house.gov>):

DATE: Tuesday, March 28, 2017

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: The Budget, Diplomacy, and Development

WITNESSES: Stephen D. Krasner, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Hoover Institution

Ms. Danielle Pletka
Senior Vice President
Foreign and Defense Policy Studies
American Enterprise Institute

The Honorable R. Nicholas Burns
Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
(Former Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State)

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day Thursday Date 3/28/2017 Room 2172

Starting Time 10:10 Ending Time 12:35

Recesses 0 (to) (to) (to) (to) (to) (to)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairman Edward R. Royce, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, Rep. Dan Donovan

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session

Executive (closed) Session

Televised

Electronically Recorded (taped)

Stenographic Record

TITLE OF HEARING:

The Budget, Diplomacy, and Development

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

See attached.

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

none

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

IFR - Rep. Eliot Engel

IFR - Rep. Brad Sherman

IFR - Rep. Albio Sires

IFR - Rep. Ted Deutch

IFR - Rep. Robin Kelly

IFR - Rep. Norma Torres

SFR - Rep. Gerald Connolly

QFR - Rep. Eliot Engel


QFR - Rep. William Keating

QFR - Rep. Bradley Schneider

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 12:35



Full Committee Hearing Coordinator


HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Edward R. Royce, CA
X	Christopher H. Smith, NJ
	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL
X	Dana Rohrabacher, CA
X	Steve Chabot, OH
X	Joe Wilson, SC
X	Michael T. McCaul, TX
X	Ted Poe, TX
	Darrell Issa, CA
	Tom Marino, PA
	Jeff Duncan, SC
X	Mo Brooks, AL
	Paul Cook, CA
X	Scott Perry, PA
	Ron DeSantis, FL
	Mark Meadows, NC
X	Ted Yoho, FL
X	Adam Kinzinger, IL
X	Lee Zeldin, NY
X	Dan Donovan, NY
	James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr., WI
	Ann Wagner, MO
X	Brian J. Mast, FL
X	Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA
	Francis Rooney, FL
X	Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., VA

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Eliot L. Engel, NY
X	Brad Sherman, CA
X	Gregory W. Meeks, NY
X	Albio Sires, NJ
X	Gerald E. Connolly, VA
X	Theodore E. Deutch, FL
X	Karen Bass, CA
X	William Keating, MA
X	David Cicilline, RI
X	Ami Bera, CA
X	Lois Frankel, FL
	Tulsi Gabbard, HI
X	Joaquin Castro, TX
X	Robin Kelly, IL
	Brendan Boyle, PA
X	Dina Titus, NV
X	Norma Torres, CA
X	Brad Schneider, IL
X	Tom Suozzi, NY
X	Adriano Espaillat, NY
X	Ted Lieu, CA

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK



US Global Leadership
Coalition Chart
Demonstrating
International Affairs
Spending as a
Percentage of the
Federal Budget

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

3/28/2017

The Real Threat to National Security: Deadly Disease - The New York Times

The New York Times <https://nyti.ms/2nO1RMj>

The Opinion Pages | OP-ED CONTRIBUTORS

The Real Threat to National Security: Deadly Disease

By MICHAEL T. OSTERHOLM and MARK OLSHAKER MARCH 24, 2017

While the Trump administration is proposing significantly increased military spending to enhance our national security, it seems to have lost sight of the greatest national security threat of all: our fight against infectious disease.

We already spend far more on our military than any other country in the world. To help pay for the increases, President Trump wants to cut back many federal programs, including those that prepare us to wage war against microbes, the greatest and most lethal enemy we are ever likely to face. This is where “defense spending” needs to increase, significantly.

President Trump’s budget would cut funding for the National Institutes of Health by 18 percent. It would cut the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development, a key vehicle for preventing and responding to outbreaks before they reach our shores, by 28 percent. And the repeal of the Affordable Care Act would kill the billion-dollar Prevention and Public Health Fund, which provides funding for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to fight outbreaks of infectious disease. (While the budget also calls for the creation of an emergency fund to respond to outbreaks, there is no indication that it would offset the other cuts, or where the money would come from.)

Those cuts will not protect American citizens. They will diminish research and vaccine development and our ability to respond to the growing threats of antibiotic resistance and new infectious diseases.

Those agencies are already falling short, as we saw last year, when they couldn't effectively respond to the Zika threat. What will they do when we face a real pandemic? With 7.4 billion people, 20 billion chickens and 400 million pigs now sharing the earth, we have created the ideal scenario for creating and spreading dangerous microbes. Trade and travel have connected most points on the globe in a matter of hours. More and more people are living in the microbe-rich megacity slums of the developing world.

By some estimates, the 1918-19 "Spanish" influenza killed more people than all the wars of the 20th century combined. Today, an influenza pandemic could be more devastating than an atom bomb. We are already witnessing an outbreak of influenza in birds — the H7N9 strain, in China — that could be the source for the next human pandemic. Since October, over 500 people have been infected; more than 34 percent have died. Most victims had contact with infected poultry, yet three recent clusters appear to be from person-to-person transmission. Will H7N9 mutate to become easily transmitted between humans? We don't know. But without sufficient supplies of a vaccine, we are not prepared to stop it.

The spread of antibiotic-resistant microbes also continues at an ever faster rate. Last year a comprehensive review predicted that, if left unchecked, drug-resistant infections will kill more people worldwide by 2050 than cancer and diabetes combined. Without a global effort led by the United States to halt the spread of this resistance and support for development of new antibiotics, we are in danger of returning to a pre-antibiotic world in which a cut could prove deadly and surgery would not be worth the risk of infection.

Yellow fever, a mosquito-borne disease that can kill up to 50 percent of those who get seriously sick, is on the cusp of a major outbreak in some of Brazil's largest cities, while MERS — Middle East Respiratory Syndrome — continues to infect people on the Arabian Peninsula. If an effective vaccine is not developed, it will continue to be transmitted around the world and cause fatal outbreaks like the one

that closed Samsung Medical Center in Seoul to new patients for weeks. A similar outbreak could occur at the Mayo Clinic or Johns Hopkins Hospital.

And three years after the 2014 Ebola crisis, we still have no licensed vaccine or a plan for how to deploy one to prevent future outbreaks.

Finally, there is the danger of diseases deliberately spread by terrorists. Bill Gates, who has put much of his sizable financial resources as well as his brainpower into public health, wrote in the *New England Journal of Medicine* in 2015: “Of all the things that could kill more than 10 million people around the world, the most likely is an epidemic stemming from either natural causes or bioterrorism.” More recently, at this year’s Munich Security Conference, on the possibility of terrorist-engineered viruses he noted: “They are probably the only thing that can kill a billion.” For example, the science exists to reconstruct the smallpox genome from readily available lab materials, with the added possibility of altering the virus just enough that our existing vaccine would be ineffective.

The military has figured out how to convince congressional funders that the only way to maintain defense is to appropriate money before a crisis. You don’t start building the weapons and training all the soldiers after the first shot has been fired. The only way we can win the inevitable microbe wars is to do the same — to have new vaccines and antibiotics and trained personnel ready before the crisis hits. We cannot rely on pharmaceutical companies to create drugs and vaccines for markets that do not yet exist. Only the government can do this. The additional expenditures would be truly economical in terms of lives saved.

We are talking about national security on the most existential level.

Michael T. Osterholm is an epidemiologist and director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota. Mark Olshaker is a documentary filmmaker. They are the authors of “Deadliest Enemy: Our War Against Killer Germs.”

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook and Twitter (@NYTOpinion), and sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter.

A version of this op-ed appears in print on March 25, 2017, on Page A21 of the New York edition with the headline: The Microbe Wars.

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE BRAD SHERMAN, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Trump's cuts would cripple the country's diplomats when we need them most

By Nicholas Burns

Washington Post, March 3, 2017

Nicholas Burns, a professor at Harvard University, was U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs from 2005 to 2008. He advised Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign.

No federal Cabinet agency risks a greater financial hit in President Trump's first budget than the oldest, the most senior and one of the most vital to our national security: the State Department.

The White House this week signaled that it will seek a massive \$20 billion reduction in funding for State and the Agency for International Development, out of a budget of over \$50 billion — the highest proportional cuts proposed for any department. If enacted, this proposal would cripple the department's career foreign and civil service when we need them most.

It would also endanger Trump's ability to confront the most complex national security agenda in decades. Europe is weaker than at any time since the end of the Cold War, facing Brexit, the refugee crisis, the rise of right-wing populism and an aggressive Vladimir Putin on its borders. The Middle East is in turmoil, with failed states in Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria, a still-menacing Islamic State and dangerous Sunni-Shiite tensions dividing the region. China is pushing out in the South and East China Seas. Allies and foes alike are questioning U.S. leadership of the liberal world order. Trump will surely need our diplomats, as well as our warriors, to meet these challenges.

The State Department, however, has had a rough transition from President Barack Obama to Trump. Several of its most senior diplomats have been involuntarily retired by the Trump team. No deputy secretary or undersecretaries of state have been appointed. The seventh floor in Foggy Bottom, where the secretary of state and senior leaders sit, normally pulsates with energy. On a visit this week, it felt like a ghost ship. State needs greater attention, understanding and love from the White House.

State is much smaller than the Pentagon or Homeland Security. It has few large installations and no costly weapons systems that can be delayed or canceled in service to austerity. Its main resource is its personnel. Reductions of the magnitude under consideration would confront Secretary of State Rex Tillerson with an impossible task — cutting deep into the muscle and bone of a foreign and civil service already stretched to the limits. This is simply not a wise path.

The irony is that the State Department is central to what Trump wishes to accomplish overseas. U.S. diplomats interview all would-be immigrants, those applying for U.S. tourist visas and refugees. They assist the thousands of U.S. citizens who find themselves in medical, financial and legal trouble abroad. They deploy as political advisers with our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and run our highly successful HIV, polio and malaria programs in sub-Saharan Africa. They work directly with U.S. companies to find foreign markets. They negotiate our energy, trade and climate agreements and manage our leadership of the NATO and East Asian Alliance systems so fundamental to the United States' global power.

As a former Foreign Service officer myself, I admit to a clear bias. But, the men and women of the State Department are a national treasure of language, political and economic experts on places critical to our future — China, Russia, the Islamic world, Latin America and beyond. They comprise the finest diplomatic corps in the world.

Trump's budget thus illuminates a larger dilemma in the early, chaotic weeks of his presidency. He rarely mentions diplomacy and has given no indication that he values it. If he continues in this vein, it will be a significant barrier to his success. He is right to argue for greater military spending. But he should shift from an exclusive focus on the military and homeland security and join diplomacy to them in pursuit of the stronger America he seeks. President John F. Kennedy recognized this vital link a half-century ago when he said: "Diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would fail."

Trump selected an impressive person in Tillerson, whose life and business experience should translate effectively to diplomacy. The Foreign Service is filled with experienced and capable officers. Given the chance to lead, they will serve Trump with skill, trust and patriotism. But the administration must give them the resources to succeed and plug them into the White House itself. Fortunately, experienced leaders in Congress have already joined the battle on State's side.

After more than a decade of war, Trump needs to let the State Department rank and file know he believes in them. And he needs to turn to diplomacy to cope with the extraordinary global challenges ahead of him. It could well spell the difference between the success or failure of his presidency.

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE BRAD SHERMAN, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

February 27, 2017

The Honorable Paul Ryan
Speaker of the House
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Majority Leader
U.S. Senate

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Minority Leader
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Chuck Schumer
Minority Leader
U.S. Senate

Dear Speaker Ryan, Minority Leader Pelosi, Majority Leader McConnell, and Minority Leader Schumer:

As you and your colleagues address the federal budget for Fiscal Year 2018, we write as retired three and four star flag and general officers from all branches of the armed services to share our strong conviction that elevating and strengthening diplomacy and development alongside defense are critical to keeping America safe.

We know from our service in uniform that many of the crises our nation faces do not have military solutions alone – from confronting violent extremist groups like ISIS in the Middle East and North Africa to preventing pandemics like Ebola and stabilizing weak and fragile states that can lead to greater instability. There are 65 million displaced people today, the most since World War II, with consequences including refugee flows that are threatening America’s strategic allies in Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Europe.

The State Department, USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps and other development agencies are critical to preventing conflict and reducing the need to put our men and women in uniform in harm’s way. As Secretary James Mattis said while Commander of U.S. Central Command, “If you don’t fully fund the State Department, then I need to buy more ammunition.” The military will lead the fight against terrorism on the battlefield, but it needs strong civilian partners in the battle against the drivers of extremism– lack of opportunity, insecurity, injustice, and hopelessness.

We recognize that America’s strategic investments in diplomacy and development – like all of U.S. investments – must be effective and accountable. Significant reforms have been undertaken since 9/11, many of which have been embodied in recent legislation in Congress with strong bipartisan support – on human trafficking, the rights of women and girls, trade and energy in Africa, wildlife trafficking, water, food security, and transparency and accountability.

We urge you to ensure that resources for the International Affairs Budget keep pace with the growing global threats and opportunities we face. Now is not the time to retreat.

cc: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
cc: Secretary of Defense James Mattis
cc: National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster

Sincerely,

1. General Keith B. Alexander, USA (Ret.)
Director, National Security Agency ('05-'14)
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command ('10-'14)
2. General John R. Allen, USMC (Ret.)
Commander, NATO International Security Force ('11-'13)
Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan ('11-'13)
3. Lt. General Edward G. Anderson III, USA (Ret.)
Vice Commander, U.S. Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command/Deputy
Commander, U.S. Northern Command ('02-'04)
4. Lt. General Thomas L. Baptiste, USAF (Ret.)
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee ('04-'07)
5. Lt. General Ronald R. Blanck, USA (Ret.)
Surgeon General of the United States Army ('96-'00)
6. Lt. General H. Steven Blum, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Commander, U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern
Command ('09-'10)
7. Lt. General Steven W. Boutelle, USA (Ret.)
Chief Information Officer and G6, United States Army ('03-'07)
8. Admiral Frank L. Bowman, USN (Ret.)
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion ('96-'04)
9. General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.)
Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command ('92-'95)
10. General Bryan Doug Brown, USA (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command ('03-'07)
11. General Arthur E. Brown, Jr., USA (Ret.)
Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army ('87-'89)
12. Vice Admiral Michael Bucchi, USN (Ret.)
Commander of the United States Third Fleet ('00-'03)
13. Lt. General John H. Campbell, USAF (Ret.)
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency
('00-'03)
14. General Bruce Carlson, USAF (Ret.)
Director, National Reconnaissance Office ('09-'12)
15. General George W. Casey, Jr., USA (Ret.)
Chief of Staff of the United States Army ('07-'11)
16. Lt. General John G. Castellaw, USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources ('07-'08)

17. Lt. General Dennis D. Cavin, USA (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Army Accessions Command ('02-'04)
18. General Peter W. Chiarelli, USA (Ret.)
Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ('08-'12)
19. Lt. General Daniel W. Christman, USA (Ret.)
Superintendent, United States Military Academy ('96-'01)
20. Lt. General George R. Christmas, USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs ('94-'96)
21. Admiral Vern Clark, USN (Ret.)
Chief of Naval Operations ('00-'05)
22. Admiral Archie R. Clemins, USN (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet ('96-'99)
23. General Richard A. "Dick" Cody, USA (Ret.)
Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army ('04-'08)
24. Lt. General John B. Conaway, USAF (Ret.)
Chief, National Guard Bureau ('90-'93)
25. General James T. Conway, USMC (Ret.)
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ('06-'10)
26. General John D.W. Corley, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Air Combat Command ('07-'09)
27. General Bantz J. Craddock, USA (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe ('06-'09)
28. Vice Admiral Lewis W. Crenshaw, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments ('04-'07)
29. Lt. General John "Mark" M. Curran, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Commanding General Futures, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command ('03-'07)
30. General Terrence R. Dake, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ('98-'00)
31. Lt. General Robert R. Dierker, USAF (Ret.)
Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ('02-'04)
32. Admiral Kirkland H. Donald, USN (Ret.)
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion ('04-'12)
33. Lt. General James M. Dubik, USA (Ret.)
Commander, Multi National Security Transition Command and NATO Training Mission-Iraq ('07-'08)
34. Lt. General Kenneth E. Eickmann, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, U.S. Air Force ('96-'98)

35. Admiral William J. Fallon, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Central Command ('07-'08)
36. Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ('02-'05)
37. Admiral Mark P. Fitzgerald, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe ('07-'10) and U.S. Naval Forces Africa ('09-'10)
38. General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF (Ret.)
Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force ('94-'97)
39. Lt. General Benjamin C. Freakley, USA (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Army Accessions Command ('07-'12)
40. Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr., USA (Ret.)
President, National Defense University ('77-'81)
41. Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, USN (Ret.)
Chief of Naval Operations ('11-'15)
42. Lt. General Arthur J. Gregg, USA (Ret.)
Army Deputy Chief of Staff ('79-'81)
43. Lt. General Wallace C. Gregson, USMC (Ret.)
Commanding General, Marine Corps Forces Pacific and Marine Corps Forces Central Command ('03-'05)
44. Vice Admiral Lee F. Gunn, USN (Ret.)
Inspector General, U.S. Navy ('97-'00)
45. General Michael W. Hagee, USMC (Ret.)
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ('03-'06)
46. Lt. General Michael A. Hamel, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center ('05-'08)
47. General John W. Handy, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command and Commander, Air Mobility Command ('01-'05)
48. Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command ('09-'12)
49. General Richard E. Hawley, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Air Combat Command ('96-'99)
50. General Michael V. Hayden, USAF (Ret.)
Director, Central Intelligence Agency ('06-'09)
51. General Paul V. Hester, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Air Component Commander for the U.S. Pacific Command
Commander ('04-'07)
52. General James T. Hill, USA (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Southern Command ('02-'04)

53. Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.)
U.S. Military Representative, NATO Military Committee ('88-'91)
54. Lt. General Walter S. Hogle Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Commander, 15th Air Force ('00-'01)
55. Lt. General Steven A. Hummer, USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Commander for Military Operations, U.S. Africa Command ('13-'15)
56. Lt. General William E. Ingram, Jr., USA (Ret.)
Director, U.S. Army National Guard ('11-'14)
57. General James L. Jamerson, USAF (Ret.)
Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command ('95-'98)
58. Lt. General Arlen D. Jameson, USAF (Ret.)
Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command ('93-'96)
59. Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe ('01-'04)
60. Admiral Jerome L. Johnson, USN (Ret.)
Vice Chief of Naval Operations ('90-'92)
61. Lt. General P. K. "Ken" Keen, USA (Ret.)
Chief, Office of the U.S. Defense Representative to Pakistan ('11-'13)
62. Lt. General Richard L. Kelly, USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics ('02-'05)
63. Lt. General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence ('97-'00)
64. General Paul J. Kern, USA (Ret.)
Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command ('01-'04)
65. General William F. Kernan, USA (Ret.)
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic/Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command ('00-'02)
66. Lt. General Donald L. Kerrick, USA (Ret.)
Deputy National Security Advisor to The President of the United States ('00-'01)
67. Lt. General Bruce B. Knutson, USMC (Ret.)
Commanding General, Marine Corp Combat Command ('00-'01)
68. Vice Admiral Albert H. Konetzn, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Deputy Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet ('01-'04)
69. General Charles Chandler Krulak, USMC (Ret.)
Commandant of the Marine Corps ('95-'99)
70. Lt. General William J. Lennox, Jr., USA (Ret.)
Superintendent, United States Military Academy ('01-'06)

71. Vice Admiral Stephen F. Loftus, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics ('90-'94)
72. General Lance W. Lord, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Air Force Space Command ('02-'06)
73. Admiral James M. Loy, USCG (Ret.)
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard ('98-'02)
74. Vice Admiral Joseph Maguire, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Director for Strategic Operational Planning, National Counterterrorism Center ('07-'10)
75. Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet ('92-'94)
76. Vice Admiral Justin D. McCarthy, SC, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness, and Logistics ('04-'07)
77. Lt. General Dennis McCarthy, USMC (Ret.)
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve ('01-'05)
78. Vice Admiral John "Mike" M. McConnell, USN (Ret.)
Director of the National Security Agency ('92-'96)
79. General David D. McKiernan, USA (Ret.)
Commander, International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan ('08-'09)
80. General Dan K. McNeill, USA, (Ret.)
Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan ('07-'08)
81. General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (Ret.)
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force ('90-'94)
82. Lt. General Paul T. Mikolashek, USA (Ret.)
Inspector General, U.S. Army/Commanding General of the Third U.S. Army Forces Central Command ('00-'02)
83. Vice Admiral Joseph S. Mobley, USN (Ret.)
Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet ('98-'01)
84. General Thomas R. Morgan, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps ('86-'88)
85. Lt. General Carol A. Mutter, USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Marine Corps ('96-'98)
86. Admiral Robert J. Natter, USN (Ret.)
Commander, Fleet Forces Command/Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet ('00-'03)
87. General William L. Nyland, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ('02-'05)
88. Lt. General Tad J. Oelstrom, USAF (Ret.)
Superintendent, U.S. Air Force Academy ('97-'00)

89. Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Special Operation Command ('07-'11)
90. Lt. General H. P. "Pete" Osman, USMC (Ret.)
Commanding General II MEF ('02-'04)
91. Lt. General Jeffrey W. Oster, USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq ('04),
Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Headquarters Marine Corps ('98)
92. Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Ret.)
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ('94-'96)
93. Lt. General Frank A. Panter, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics ('09-'12)
94. Vice Admiral David Pekoške, USCG (Ret.)
Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard ('09-'10)
95. General David H. Petraeus, USA (Ret.)
Director, Central Intelligence Agency ('11-'12);
Commander, Coalition Forces in Afghanistan ('10-'11) and Iraq ('07-'08)
96. Vice Admiral Carol M. Pottenger, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Capability Development, NATO Allied Command Transformation
(10-'13)
97. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command ('96-'99)
98. Lt. General Harry D. Raduege, Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Director, Defense Information Systems Agency/Commander, Joint Task Force for Global
Network Operations/Deputy Commander, Global Network Operations and Defense,
U.S. Strategic Command Joint Forces Headquarters, Information Operations ('00-'05)
99. Vice Admiral Norman W. Ray, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee ('92-'95)
100. Lt. General John F. Regni, USAF (Ret.)
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy ('05-'09)
101. General Victor "Gene" E. Renuart, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command
(07-'10)
102. General Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Commander in Chief, Republic of Korea/U.S.
Combined Forces Command ('90-'93)
103. Lt. General Norman R. Scip, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, 12th Air Force /Air Forces Southern ('06-'09)
104. General Henry H. Shelton, USA (Ret.)
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ('97-'01)

105. Admiral William D. Smith, USN (Ret.)
U.S. Military Representative, NATO Military Committee ('91-'93)
106. Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe ('94-'96)
107. Lt. General James N. Soligan, USAF (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Transformation, Allied Command Transformation ('06-'10)
108. Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe ('09-'13)
109. Lt. General Martin R. Steele, USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps ('97-'99)
110. General Carl W. Stiner, USA (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command ('90-'93)
111. Vice Admiral Edward M. Straw, USN (Ret.)
Director, Defense Logistics Agency ('92-'96)
112. Vice Admiral William D. Sullivan, USN (Ret.)
U.S. Military Representative to NATO Military Committee ('06-'09)
113. Lt. General William J. Troy, USA (Ret.)
Director, Army Staff ('10-'13)
114. Admiral Henry G. Ulrich, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander, Joint Forces Command Naples ('05-'08)
115. General Charles F. Wald, USAF (Ret.)
Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command ('02-'06)
116. General William S. Wallace, USA (Ret.)
Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command ('05-'08)
117. Lt. General William "Kip" E. Ward, USA (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Africa Command ('07-'11)
118. General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Southern Command ('97-'00)
119. General Michael J. Williams, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ('00-'02)
120. General Ronald W. Yates, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command ('92-'95)
121. General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command ('97-'00)

###



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ALBIO SIRES, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

**106 Faith Leaders Sign Letter to Congressional Leadership
Supporting U.S. International Affairs Budget**

March 16, 2017

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Senate Majority Leader
The Capitol S-230
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Chuck Schumer
Senate Minority Leader
The Capitol S-221
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Paul Ryan
Speaker of the House of Representatives
The Capitol H-232
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
House Minority Leader
The Capitol H-204
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Majority Leader McConnell, Minority Leader Schumer, Speaker Ryan, and Minority Leader Pelosi,

As Christian leaders, it's an honor to represent dedicated and faithful citizens living in every congressional district in this country. We're writing to share our support for the International Affairs Budget that every day brings hope to poor, hungry, vulnerable and displaced men, women and children around the world.

America is blessed with fertile land, abundant natural resources, a strong economy, and faithful citizens who value religious freedom. But beyond our borders, many countries experience unparalleled suffering and loss of life due to extreme poverty, disease, natural disasters, and conflict. Today, there are 65 million displaced people, the most since World War II, and 795 million people still go to bed hungry every night.

Matthew 25 tells us when we serve the least of these, we are serving the Lord. As people of faith, we cannot turn our back on those in desperate need. We are grateful for America's global development and diplomacy programs that have been instrumental in saving lives, safeguarding religious liberties, and keeping America safe and secure. Both Republican and Democratic administrations have strong legacies of supporting humanitarian and development programs that enable countless people to pull themselves out of poverty and live life with dignity. It is through these diplomatic and development tools that we've seen countries and communities build peaceful, productive societies that do not turn to violence or terrorism.

At a time when we're especially security conscious, the International Affairs Budget is crucial to demonstrating our values to the world, building friendships with other nations, and lowering security risks around the world.

With just 1 percent of our nation's budget, the International Affairs Budget has helped alleviate the suffering of millions; drastically cutting the number of people living in extreme poverty in half, stopping the spread of infectious diseases like HIV/AIDs and Ebola, and nearly eliminating polio. Additionally, it promotes freedom and human rights, protecting religious freedom for millions around the world.

As followers of Christ, it is our moral responsibility to urge you to support and protect the International Affairs Budget, and avoid disproportionate cuts to these vital programs that ensure that our country continues to be the “shining city upon a hill.”

Thank you for your consideration.

Timothy Cardinal Dolan
Archbishop of New York

Rev. Dr. Samuel Rodriguez, President
National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference

Leith Anderson, President
National Association of Evangelicals

Rich Stearns, President
World Vision USA

Bishop Gregory J. Mansour, Chairman of the Board
Catholic Relief Services

Michael W. Smith
Singer/Songwriter

Dr. George O. Wood, General Superintendent
Assemblies of God

Dr. Ronnie Floyd, Immediate Past President
Southern Baptist Convention

Amy Grant
Singer/Songwriter

Shirley V. Hoogstra, J.D., President
Council for Christian Colleges & Universities

Tom Lin, President & CEO
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship

Third Day
Christian Rock Band

Jonathan Reckford, CEO
Habitat for Humanity

Mark Labberton, President
Fuller Theological Seminary

Jo Anne Lyon, General Superintendent Emerita
The Wesleyan Church

Most Reverend Jerome E. Listecki
Archdiocese of Milwaukee

Most Reverend Salvatore J. Cordileone
Archbishop of San Francisco

David Wilson, General Secretary
Church of the Nazarene

Rev. Gabriel Salguero, President
National Latino Evangelical Coalition

Most Reverend Joseph E. Kurtz, D.D.
Archbishop of Louisville

Santiago "Jimmy" Mellado, President & CEO
Compassion International

John Crosby, Senior Pastor
Christ Presbyterian Church

Rev. Johnnie Moore
Author

Bob Bouwer, Reverend
Faith Church (8 locations)

John K. Jenkins Sr., Senior Pastor
First Baptist Church of Glenarden

Keith Stewart, Senior Pastor
Springcreek Church

Alec Hill, President Emeritus
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship

Scott Arbeiter, President
World Relief Corporation

Martha Newsome, President & CEO
Medical Teams International

J. Ron Byler, Executive Director
Mennonite Central Committee

Mike Mantel, President & CEO
Living Water International

Carol Bremer-Bennett, Executive Director
World Renew

Gary Edmonds, President & CEO
Food for the Hungry

Anita Smith, President
Children's AIDS Fund

Shepherd Smith, President
Institute for Youth Development

Bruce Wilkinson, President & CEO
Catholic Medical Mission Board

Steve Stirling, President & CEO
MAP International

Peter Vander Meulen, Coordinator in Office of Social Justice
Christian Reformed Church in North America

Joel K. Johnson, Pastor
Westwood Community Church

James H. Barnes III, President
Bethel University

Steve Moore, Board Chair
World Relief

Deborah Smith Pegues, Board of Directors
World Vision USA

Rev. Jonathan Odom, Pastor
Asbury UMC

Dr. Mark Wilbanks, Senior Pastor
Wieuca Road Baptist Church

Dr. Stephen Treash, Senior Pastor
Black Rock Church

Laura Truax, Senior Pastor
LaSalle Street Church

Jeffrey Moes, Senior Pastor
Sunnybrook Community Church

Gino Grunberg, Co-Pastor
Harbor Christian Center

Rev. Jay Madden, Pastor for Mission
Peachtree Presbyterian Church

Chris Cramer, Pastor
Orchard Grove Community Church

Chad Hayward, Executive Director
Accord Network

Galen Carey, Vice President of Government Relations
National Association of Evangelicals

Scott Garber, Author

Ken Wytsma, Senior Pastor
Antioch Church

William Minchin, Pastor of Business Administration
Grace Fellowship Church

Rev. Eugene Cho, Lead Pastor & Founder
Quest Church/One Day's Wages

Bishop Horace E. Smith, M.D, Senior Pastor
Apostolic Faith Church

Ted Esler, President
Missio Nexus

Rev. Dr. Michael L. Henderson, Senior Pastor
New Beginnings Church

Dr. G. Craig Williford, President
Multnomah University

Carmen Fowler Laberge, President
Presbyterian Lay Committee

Colin P. Watson, Sr., Director of Ministries and Administration
Christian Reformed Church in North America

Dr. Don Argue, Ambassador at Large
Convoy of Hope

Scott Ridout, President
Converge

Rev. Dr. Liz Mosbo VerHage, Associate Pastor
Quest Church

Gregory Loewer, Pastor for Missions,
Columbia Baptist Church

Jim Lyon, General Director
Church of God Ministries

Constantine M. Triantafilou, Executive Director & CEO
International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC)

Alan Robinson, National Director
Brethren in Christ, U. S.

Mark S. Young, President
Denver Seminary

M. Craig Barnes, President
Princeton Theological Seminary

Adam Pray, Minister
theChurch.at

Dennis Hollinger, Ph.D., President
Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary

Alan Cureton, President
University of Northwestern

Jon Middendorf, Pastor
OKC First Church of the Nazarene

Rev. Bobby Griffith, Jr., Pastor
City Presbyterian Church

Rev. David Cassidy, Pastor
Christ Community Church

Dr. Timothy J. Brooks, Lead Pastor
South Portland Church of the Nazarene

Rev. Doug Serven, Pastor
City Presbyterian Church

Rev. Dan Claire, Rector
Church of the Resurrection

Rev. Joel St. Clair, Pastor
Mosaic Community Church

Dr. O. Alan Noble, Assistant Professor of English
Oklahoma Baptist University

Rev. Dr. Irwyn Ince Jr., Pastor
City of Hope Presbyterian Church

Rev. Russ Whitfield, Pastor
Grace Mosaic Church

The Right Rev. Dr. Steven A. Breedlove, Diocese
Christ our Hope, Anglican Church in North America

Rev. Alan Cross, Executive Director
Community Development Initiatives
Montgomery Baptist Association

Rev. Dr. James C. Howell, Senior Pastor
Myers Park United Methodist Church

Rev. Don Flowers, Jr., Senior Pastor
Providence Baptist Church

The Most Rev. Dr. Foley Beach, Archbishop
Anglican Church in North America

Dr. Chris Ellis, Minister of Mission and Outreach
Second Baptist Church

Dr. Stephen Cook, Senior Pastor
Second Baptist Church

Dr. Christopher Pollock, Lead Pastor
Midtown Church

Peter Greer, CEO
HOPE International

David W. Kendall, Bishop
Free Methodist Church, USA

David T. Roller, Bishop
Free Methodist Church, USA

Matthew A. Thomas, Bishop
Free Methodist Church, USA

Justin B. Fung, Pastor of Teaching & Formation
The District Church

Jason Surratt, Pastor of Stewardship and Global Missions
Seacoast Church

Dr. Gregg Okkesson, Dean
Asbury Theological Seminary

Stephanie Summers, CEO
Center for Public Justice

Ruth Anne Reese, Ph.D., Professor of New Testament
Asbury Theological Seminary

Brandon Heath
Singer/Songwriter

Dr. Stephen Offutt, Assistant Professor of Development Studies
Asbury Theological Seminary

Matt Maher
Singer/Songwriter

Jonathan Martin
Writer and Speaker

Aaron Graham, Lead Pastor
The District Church

cc:
President Donald Trump
Vice President Mike Pence
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE THEODORE E. DEUTCH,
A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

EMBARGOED UNTIL HEARING

**Submitted Statement of Madeleine K. Albright and Stephen J. Hadley
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Tuesday, March 21, 2017**

Thank you Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and other distinguished members of the committee.

We are grateful for the opportunity to testify before you this morning on America's role in the world. In our testimony, we would like to offer our perspective on the current challenges to the international system, share some insights relevant to this topic from our *Middle East Strategy Task Force*, and suggest some ways in which Congress might be able to help forge a new bipartisan consensus on American foreign policy.

America's Role in the World

This hearing comes at a time of deep political divisions at home and heightened instability abroad. At this pivotal moment, we believe there needs to be a national debate about how and why America engages in the world. We also believe that Congress has a vital role to play in convening this debate, given its representative nature and the responsibilities given to it by the Constitution.

Over the past seventy years, Democratic and Republican administrations alike have understood that American security and prosperity at home are linked to economic and political health abroad, and that America does better when other countries have the incentive and the capacity to work alongside us in tackling global challenges. This is why we constructed a system of international institutions and security alliances after World War II. They provided a framework for advancing economic openness and political freedom in the years that followed.

The international order America built and led has not been perfect, but it has coincided with a period of security and prosperity unmatched in human history. And while many nations benefited from the investments America made in global security and prosperity, none benefited more than the United States.

Yet today, the value of America's global engagement is under question. A substantial number of Americans feel that their lives and livelihoods have been threatened rather than enhanced by it. They view international trade as having shuttered the factories at which they worked, immigrants as threatening their standard of living or safety, and globalization as undermining American culture.

This popular dissatisfaction needs to be understood and acknowledged. Washington needs to ensure that the benefits of America's international engagement are shared by all of our citizens. But we also need to be clear about the consequences of disengagement. For while it is comforting to believe that we can wall ourselves off from the ailments of the world, history teaches us that whenever problems abroad are allowed to fester and grow, sooner or later, they come home to America.

EMBARGOED UNTIL HEARING

Isolationism and retreat do not work; we know because we have tried them before.

We also know, from recent experience, that if America recedes from the global stage, people in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East will increasingly look elsewhere for inspiration and guidance – whether to authoritarianism or extremist ideology.

In our opinion, such a shift would be harmful to the interests of those populations, but it would be harmful above all to the interests of the United States, because our security and our prosperity depend on having friends abroad that share our values – including our belief in the rule of law, freedom of movement, and access to markets.

Neither Russia nor China proclaim the same loyalty to those principles as we do. Were they to fill a vacuum left by the United States, it could very well mark a return to a balance of power system, where the world's major powers competed militarily for territory and spheres of influence at great human and financial cost. This is a world to which none of us should want to return.

America's continued global leadership cannot be taken for granted, but a retreat into isolationism is not preordained. We have an opportunity – and, in our view, an obligation – to defend those aspects of the international system that work in the twenty-first century, and to adapt those that do not.

In doing so, we should acknowledge that the existing order is in need of revision and refurbishment. The international system was designed for a different era, and it requires a renewal of purpose and a reform of its structures. Its mission should more clearly extend beyond preventing war in Europe to include stabilizing other strategic regions that affect our well-being. Its approach should reflect the fact that long-term stability depends on well-governed states whose leaders are seen as legitimate by their people. And its structure must be adapted to the realities of a world in which power is more diffuse, so other countries can take on a greater role commensurate with the contributions they make and the responsibilities they assume.

China, Russia, and other countries should understand that there is a larger place for them at the decision-making table, provided they are constructive and respect the interests of other nations. And they need to understand that there will be costs if they do not.

For this and other reasons, U.S. military power will remain vital in a renewed international order. We appreciate this committee's efforts to ensure that our military remains the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led force on earth. Given the variety of threats facing our country, it makes sense to continue upgrading and enhancing our country's military capabilities and deterrent power. But we strongly believe that it would be a mistake to increase defense spending at the expense of other critical investments in national security – especially those in diplomacy, development, democracy, and peacebuilding.

We know from experience that force, and the credible possibility of its use, are essential to defend our vital interests and keep America safe. But as one of us has said in the past, force alone can be a blunt instrument, and there are many problems it cannot solve. The military leaders who so frequently testify before this committee would be the first to tell you that they cannot succeed in their missions without the vital capabilities that our civilian agencies bring to the table. Gutting these capabilities will put an unacceptable burden on our men and women in

EMBARGOED UNTIL HEARING

uniform, and would make America less safe. We need to fund these other civilian elements of American power as robustly as we do the military element.

We recognize that government can always be made more efficient and effective, but the best way to accomplish that goal is to build a budget based on a sound strategy. This administration first needs to take the time to staff the Departments and agencies, and to develop a national security strategy. As members of the legislative branch, it is your responsibility to ensure that every dollar is spent wisely, but it also your responsibility to protect our national security institutions from arbitrary and senseless cuts.

The Middle East Strategy Task Force

No region has seen more death and suffering or presented more challenges to the international order than the Middle East, with outcomes that have frustrated both Democratic and Republican administrations. The Middle East is likely to be an important test case in the coming years – the region in which the international order gets rejuvenated for a new era or ceases to function entirely.

From 2015 to 2016, we served as Co-Chairs of the Atlantic Council's *Middle East Strategy Task Force*, which sought to understand better the underlying challenges in the region and to articulate a long-term strategy for meeting them. Our goal was not to develop a new U.S. strategy, but to understand the role that the U.S. can play in supporting a larger international effort led by the region itself.

One of our initial insights was that we face not just a crisis *in* the Middle East, but *from* the Middle East having global impact. The roots of this crisis lie in a long history of poor governance in many states in the region. The Arab Spring was a consequence of the dissatisfaction of increasingly connected and empowered citizens with a number of political leaders who ruled ineptly and often corruptly. Where leaders sought to quash these popular protests by force, the result in most cases was civil war.

The four civil wars raging in the Middle East – in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen – have had destabilizing consequences for the region and beyond. They have produced the ungoverned spaces and grievances that have allowed terrorist groups to direct or inspire attacks in the West. They have also created the greatest worldwide refugee crisis since the Second World War, the devastating human cost of which has been coupled with profound effects on our own domestic politics and those of Europe.

The challenges we face in the Middle East bear some resemblance to those of post-war Europe. Countries torn apart by war will need to determine the new shape of their governments, and how those governments interact with their people. The entire state system will need to be shored up so that countries are less prone to subversion, supported by effective regional institutions to mediate conflicts and prevent them from spiraling into all-out war.

But there are also important differences between the modern Middle East and post-war Europe. There is no magnanimous victor in the mold of the Allies, with the will and capability to reshape the region from the outside. New global and political realities mean that no Marshall Plan is in the offing for the rebuilding of the Middle East. The American people have no appetite

EMBARGOED UNTIL HEARING

for this, and the people of the region, too, are tired of being beholden to outside powers. The Middle East must chart its own vision for the future.

There is reason for hope. The fact is that now, more than any time in the Middle East's modern history, the region has significant capabilities and resources of its own to define and work toward this vision and secure better opportunities for its people. And more than ever, there are also indications that people and some governments in the Middle East have the will to take on the region's hard challenges.

Although not always evident at first glance, there are promising developments happening in the Middle East, even in the most unexpected places. In Saudi Arabia, female entrepreneurs are founding startup companies at a rate three times that of women in Silicon Valley, as they begin to claim their rightful place in Saudi civic life. In Egypt, the social enterprise Nafham is using technological solutions to address the problem of overcrowding in Egyptian schools. And in Jordan, Syrian refugees are using innovative 3D printing technology to help develop more affordable prosthetic limb components for friends and neighbors who bear the physical scars of Bashar Assad's war on his own people. The region's vast population of educated youth, commonly understood to be a liability, can in fact be a tremendous asset.

Some governments are beginning to understand that their future depends on promoting these efforts and partnering with their people to build a common future. Tunisia is showing that revolution need not result in either chaos or authoritarianism, but can begin a transition to an inclusive, democratic future. The UAE has led the way for positive economic and social reforms and Saudi Arabia has now adopted its own vision for the future. Jordan is making its own efforts. These can be examples for other countries in the region.

Renewed and enhanced American leadership is needed in the Middle East. But not to impose our will militarily or otherwise. Instead, America has a clear interest in supporting and accelerating the positive changes that are already happening. The goal of our strategy in the region should be to help the Middle East move from the current vicious cycle in which it finds itself to a more virtuous one -- one in which the Middle East no longer spawns violence and refugees, is not a drain on international resources, and does not through its instability and political vacuums aggravate great power competition.

With this goal in mind, US foreign policy toward the Middle East should be informed by a set of guiding principles that represent the new reality of the region since 2011.

First, the old order is gone and is not coming back. Stability will not be achieved until a new regional order takes shape. The region should assume the principal responsibility for defining this new order, which should offer the people of the region the prospect of a stable and prosperous future free from both terrorist violence and government oppression.

Second, disengagement is not a practical solution for the West. Disengagement will only allow the region's problems to spread and deepen unchecked, creating further threats. Instead, it is in the interest of the United States and others to help the Middle East achieve a more peaceful vision. But their role must be different from what it has been in the past. Rather than dictating from the outside how countries should behave, they should support and facilitate the positive efforts that some people and governments in the region are beginning to take.

EMBARGOED UNTIL HEARING

Third, a strategy for the region should focus on more than counterterrorism. Pernicious as they are, groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda are not the sole cause of the current crises. Even if these groups disappeared tomorrow, others would arise in their place so long as the underlying grievances that led to the Arab Spring remain unresolved.

Fourth, sectarian and ethnic rivalries are not as entrenched or inevitable in the Middle East as many assume. Instead, they wax and wane with broader tensions in the region. Achieving political solutions to the civil wars would go far in stanching these communal tensions. To this end, empowered local governance will be essential going forward, so as to allow people the freedom to shape their own communities.

Finally, the Middle East cannot build a better future without the active participation of the people of the region—including women, youth, minorities, and those displaced by conflict. If enabled and empowered, they can be the engines of job creation, help motivate the broader population, and innovate solutions to the region's economic and social problems. It is high time for all of us to bet on the people of the region, not just on the states.

With these guiding principles in mind, we have, in our Middle East Strategy Task Force report, proposed a two-pronged strategy that we think will be able, over time, to change the trajectory of the region in a more positive direction, to the benefit of people in the region and the United States.

The first prong involves outside actors helping partner countries in the region to wind down the violence, starting with the four civil wars. This means containing the spread of the current conflicts and accelerating diplomatic efforts to resolve them, while addressing the staggering humanitarian crises that they have generated.

The most immediate priorities must be 1) mitigating the current human suffering in Syria and 2) recapturing the territory that ISIS now controls. A third, longer-term priority is to contain Iran's aggressive foreign policy behavior while still exploring opportunities to engage with it. Achieving these priorities will require a limited but greater degree of American and allied engagement in the region, diplomatic as well as military. This greater engagement and the kind of concrete steps we recommend in our report, taken together, will rally and reassure America's friends and allies in the region, send a message of strength to its adversaries, and provide additional leverage for the United States to work with all internal and external players to end these destabilizing wars.

The second prong of the strategy, which must be pursued simultaneously with the first prong, seeks to support **now** those bottom-up efforts that will create the social basis for stability and prosperity. This means supporting the citizen-based entrepreneurial and civic activity occurring throughout the region. It also means encouraging regional governments to facilitate these efforts, to invest in the education and empowerment of their people, and to address the societal, economic, and governance issues that are key to future peace and success.

Ultimately, this prong seeks to unlock the significant human potential in the Middle East. Governments in the region need to create the enabling environment for individuals to deploy fully their talents, whether as innovators, entrepreneurs, or just engaged citizens. This means better and fairer legal and regulatory frameworks, but also more inclusive, effective, transparent, and accountable governance more generally.

EMBARGOED UNTIL HEARING

The United States should support those governments that are trying to create such an enabling environment. The idea is to create a “more-for-more” relationship with countries in the region that are trying to do right by their people. The more ambitious the efforts for change in the region, the more support countries should expect from the United States—not as charity or aid, but because it is a good investment of resources likely to yield solid returns on our security. By the same token, where countries are not taking steps for change, they should not expect support—not because we wish to punish them, but because it would be a waste of our own limited resources.

Most importantly, the American approach toward the Middle East needs to be colored with a good deal of humility. This is the most difficult problem that either of us has seen in our careers, and it won’t be solved overnight. We all should be steeled for the long term, and prepared to weather setbacks when they come—and they will. But the good news is that our country has succeeded at long-term foreign policy challenges such as this before, not least the rebuilding of Europe after World War II and ending the Cold War. America’s efforts were strengthened by a bipartisan national consensus regarding the importance of these missions and the soundness of the principles upon which they were based. It is time to forge a similar national consensus on our approach to the Middle East and, more broadly, the world.

Conclusion: The Role of Congress

Congress has an incredibly important role to play in forging such a consensus. It is our belief that Congress should:

- 1) Help start a national debate regarding America’s role in the world;
- 2) On the basis of that debate, forge a bipartisan strategy for American leadership to build a revised and revitalized international order for the 21st century;
- 3) Insist that American efforts to defeat ISIS and al Qaeda are embedded within a larger strategy to make the Middle East over time more stable and prosperous;
- 4) Ensure that U.S. efforts at diplomacy, peacebuilding, advancing democracy and development do not get shortchanged as we increase our expenditures on defense; and
- 5) Through its legislative actions, provide reassurances to our friends and allies regarding America’s continued commitment to their defense and to a rules-based international system.

We thank you again for this opportunity to testify before you and look forward to your questions.

###

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ROBIN L. KELLY, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END

Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida

SETH G. JONES • MARTIN C. LIBICKI



Summary

All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? Answers to this question have enormous implications for counterterrorism efforts. The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qaeda and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-September 11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

The ending of most terrorist groups requires a range of policy instruments, such as careful police and intelligence work, military force, political negotiations, and economic sanctions. Yet policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. Following an examination of 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, we found that a transition to the political process is the most common way in which terrorist groups ended (43 percent). The possibility of a political solution is inversely linked to the breadth of terrorist goals. Most terrorist groups that end because of politics seek narrow policy goals. The narrower the goals of a terrorist organization, the more likely it can achieve them without violent action—and the more likely the government and terrorist group may be able to reach a negotiated settlement.

Against terrorist groups that cannot or will not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is likely to be the most effective strategy (40 percent). Police and intelligence services have better training and

information to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations than do such institutions as the military. They are the primary arm of the government focused on internal security matters. Local police and intelligence agencies usually have a permanent presence in cities, towns, and villages; a better understanding of the threat environment in these areas; and better human intelligence.

Other reasons are less common. For example, in 10 percent of the cases, terrorist groups ended because their goals were achieved, and military force led to the end of terrorist groups in 7 percent of the cases. Militaries tended to be most effective when used against terrorist groups engaged in an insurgency in which the groups were large, well armed, and well organized. Insurgent groups have been among the most capable and lethal terrorist groups, and military force has usually been a necessary component in such cases. Against most terrorist groups, however, military force is usually too blunt an instrument. Military tools have increased in precision and lethality, especially with the growing use of precision standoff weapons and imagery to monitor terrorist movement. But even precision weapons have been of limited use against terrorist groups. The use of substantial U.S. military power against terrorist groups also runs a significant risk of turning the local population against the government by killing civilians.

Our quantitative analysis looked at groups that have ended since 1968 or are still active. It yielded several other interesting findings:

- Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups. Approximately 62 percent of all terrorist groups have ended since 1968, but only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have ended.
- Religious groups rarely achieve their objectives. No religious group that has ended achieved victory since 1968.
- Size is a significant determinant of a group's fate. Big groups of more than 10,000 members have been victorious more than 25 percent of the time, while victory is rare when groups are smaller than 1,000 members.
- There is no statistical correlation between the duration of a terrorist group and ideological motivation, economic conditions,

regime type, or the breadth of terrorist goals. But there appears to be some correlation between the size of a terrorist group and duration: Larger groups tend to last longer than smaller groups.

- When a terrorist group becomes involved in an insurgency, it does not end easily. Nearly 50 percent of the time, groups ended by negotiating a settlement with the government; 25 percent of the time, they achieved victory; and 19 percent of the time, military forces defeated them.
- Terrorist groups from upper-income countries are much more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and much less likely to be motivated by religion.

Implications for al Qa'ida

What does this mean for counterterrorism efforts against al Qa'ida? After September 11, 2001, the U.S. strategy against al Qa'ida centered on the use of military force. Indeed, U.S. policymakers and key national-security documents referred to operations against al Qa'ida as *the war on terrorism*. Other instruments were also used, such as cutting off terrorist financing, providing foreign assistance, engaging in diplomacy, and sharing information with foreign governments. But military force was the primary instrument.

The evidence by 2008 suggested that the U.S. strategy was not successful in undermining al Qa'ida's capabilities. Our assessment concludes that al Qa'ida remained a strong and competent organization. Its goals were the same: uniting Muslims to fight the United States and its allies (the far enemy) and overthrowing western-friendly regimes in the Middle East (the near enemy) to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate. Al Qa'ida has been involved in more terrorist attacks since September 11, 2001, than it was during its prior history. These attacks spanned Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Al Qa'ida's modus operandi also evolved and included a repertoire of more-sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and a growing use of suicide attacks. Its organizational structure evolved, making it a more dangerous enemy. This included a bottom-up approach (encouraging independent action

from low-level operatives) and a top-down one (issuing strategy and operations from a central hub in Pakistan).¹

Ending the "War" on Terror

Al Qa'ida's resurgence should trigger a fundamental rethinking of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Based on our analysis of how terrorist groups end, a political solution is not possible. Since al Qa'ida's goal remains the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, there is little reason to expect that a negotiated settlement with governments in the Middle East is possible. A more effective approach would be adopting a two-front strategy.

First, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts. In Europe, North America, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, al Qa'ida consists of a network of individuals who need to be tracked and arrested. This would require careful work abroad from such organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as their cooperation with foreign police and intelligence agencies. Second, military force, though not necessarily U.S. soldiers, may be a necessary instrument when al Qa'ida is involved in an insurgency. Local military forces frequently have more legitimacy to operate than the United States has, and they have a better understanding of the operating environment, even if they need to develop the capacity to deal with insurgent groups over the long run. This means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all. The U.S. military can play a critical role in building indigenous capacity but should generally resist being drawn into combat operations in Muslim societies, since its presence is likely to increase terrorist recruitment.

A key part of this strategy should include ending the notion of a war on terrorism and replacing it with such concepts as *counterterrorism*, which most governments with significant terrorist threats use. The Brit-

¹ Bruce Hoffman, "Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat: Al Qaeda on the Run or on the March?" written testimony submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, February 14, 2007, p. 3.

ish government, among others, has already taken this step and abjured the phrase *war on terror*. The phrase raises public expectations—both in the United States and elsewhere—that there is a battlefield solution to the problem of terrorism. It also encourages others abroad to respond by conducting a jihad (or holy war) against the United States and elevates them to the status of holy warriors. Terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy warriors. Our analysis suggests that there is no battlefield solution to terrorism. Military force usually has the opposite effect from what is intended: It is often overused, alienates the local population by its heavy-handed nature, and provides a window of opportunity for terrorist-group recruitment. This strategy should also include rebalancing U.S. resources and attention on police and intelligence work. It also means increasing budgets at the CIA, U.S. Department of Justice, and U.S. Department of State and scaling back the U.S. Department of Defense's focus and resources on counterterrorism. U.S. special operations forces will remain critical, as will U.S. military operations to counter terrorist groups involved in insurgencies.

There is reason to be hopeful. Our analysis concludes that al Qa'ida's probability of success in actually overthrowing any government is close to zero. Out of all the religious groups that ended since 1968, none ended by achieving victory. Al Qa'ida has virtually unachievable objectives in trying to overthrow multiple regimes in the Middle East. To make matters worse, virtually all governments across Europe, North America, South America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa consider al Qa'ida an enemy. As al Qa'ida expert Peter Bergen has noted, "Making a world of enemies is never a winning strategy."²

² Peter Bergen, "Al Qaeda Status," written testimony submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 9, 2008.

Please find the full RAND report on "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE NORMA J. TORRES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



The American Academy of Diplomacy
Council of American Ambassadors



Chairman
THOMAS R. PICKERING
Vice Chairman
MARC THAKSMAN
President
ROSALE E. NEUMANN
Treasurer
NICHOLAS A. VILJEFFS
Secretary
MAGUIE WILLIAMSON
Program Director
ISAAC DE PASQUO
Board of Directors
THOMAS BRACKETT
KENDRICK BELL
KATE CASAVAN
FRANCES COOK
LAWRENCE COOPER
RUTH DAVIS
PAULA DOMIGANSEK
SHAWN DONNELLY
NANCY DUN-RAPHAEL
CHARLES FORD
ALONZO FULGHAM
JAMES GARDNER
ROBERT GALELLET
HARRY GIBSON
WILLIAM HARBOE
SCOTT HENRIETT
DEBORAH MCCARTHY
LANGHORNE A. MORTLEY
TERRY NAGEY
JIMIN NARRAPUNTE
NANCY PINWELL
CHARLES RAY
ARLENE RENDLER
MARCUS RICH
PETER ROBBIO
EDWARD ROWELL
HOWARD R. SCHAFER
PATRICK THIBBS
MIKE VAN DUSEN
FRANK WISNER

COUNCIL OF AMERICAN AMBASSADORS

Chairman
BRECK S. GILB
Chairman Emeritus
ODDIE REID
Vice Chairman
WILLIAM J. VANDEN HEUVEL
President
JOSPH B. CHANDLER
GLORIA HILDEN
JERRY L. LEE, JR.
President Emeritus
GREGGORY L. VALDEZ
Directors
GEORGE L. ARGYROS
EDUARDO F. FIGUEROA
STEPHEN A. HUNTER
DENNIS HUNTER
DONALD T. BLES
JULIA GRAY BLOCH
ANNE COX CHAMBERS
CHARLES L. COHR, JR.
DEAN LAPP DORSON
EDWARD E. ELSER
MARK W. FORD
BRIAN L. JOHNSON
C. DONALD JOHNSON
JONAS B. KORN
ROBERT M. ORL
MARY M. OURESMAN
FRANçoISE PERRIERE
SILVIA S. ROSSINIET
JAMES C. ROSAPPEE
PAUL A. RUSSO
ARTHUR L. SCHECHTER
J. THOMAS SCHLEPPER
THEODORE R. SCHOMER
CLIFFORD M. SOBIE
CARL SPIELHAGEN
ALDONA G. WIER, M.D.

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
SR - 317 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510 - 1702

Dear Senator McConnell,

On behalf of the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD) and the Council of American Ambassadors (CAA), we believe the proposed magnitude of the cuts to the State Department budget pose serious risks to American security. After the military defeat of the Islamic State, intensive diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Syria will be essential to stabilization, without which the radical movements that we now contest will reappear. Afghanistan requires the same attention. As a general principle, diplomacy is far less costly than war to achieve our national purposes.

Diplomacy is most often the first line of America's defense. When the Islamic State suddenly appeared in Mali, it was our Embassy that was able to recommend action based on knowing the difference between terrorists and local political actors who needed support. When Ebola in West Africa threatened a worldwide pandemic, it was our Foreign Service that remained in place to establish the bases for and support the multi-agency health efforts deployed to stop the disease outbreak. It is to our embassies that American citizens turn for security and evacuation abroad. Our embassies' commercial work supports US companies and citizen entrepreneurs in selling abroad. This creates thousands of American jobs. Every dollar spent on this work returns hundreds in sales.

Peacekeeping and political missions are mandated by the Security Council where our veto power can ensure when, where, how many, and what kind of peacekeepers used in a mission support US interests. Peacekeeping forces are deployed in fragile, sometimes prolonged, circumstances, where the US would not want to use US forces. UN organized troops cost the US taxpayer only about one-eighth the cost of sending US troops. Our contributions to refugees and development are critical to avoid humanitarian crises from spiraling into conflicts that would draw in the United States and promote violent extremism. Budget cuts of the amounts contemplated endanger basic US security interests.

US public diplomacy fights radicalism. Educational exchanges over the years have enabled hundreds of thousands of foreign students truly to understand Americans and American culture. This is far more effective in countering radical propaganda than social media. The American Immigration Law Foundation estimates that 46 current and 165 former heads of government are US graduates.

These few examples should show why so many American military leaders are deeply opposed to the current budget proposals. They recognize that when diplomacy is not permitted to do its job the chances of Americans dying in war increase. When the number of employees in military commissaries or military bands exceeds the number of US diplomats, the current budget proposal is indeed not a cost-effective way to protect America and its interests.

The Academy, representing the most experienced and distinguished former American diplomats, both career and non-career, and the Council have never opposed all cuts to the State Department budget. The Academy's detailed study *American Diplomacy at Risk* (2015) proposed many reductions. We believe streamlining is possible, and we can make proposals to that end. However, the current budget proposals will damage American national security and should be rejected.

Sincerely,


Thomas R. Pickering
AAD Chairman


Ronald E. Neumann
AAD President


Bruce S. Gelb
CAA Chairman


William J. vanden Heuvel
CAA Chairman Emeritus

Statement for the Record
Submitted by Mr. Connolly of Virginia

President Trump's budget would starve our nation's diplomacy and development efforts at a time of increased challenges to global security and stability. He proposes to finance a sizeable defense spending increase with a draconian 31 percent cut to the international affairs budget, which funds the State Department, USAID, MCC, Peace Corps, and other critical international programs. This is a critical moment in our country's diplomatic history, and it demonstrates that this administration prioritizes producing radical political documents over sound national security solutions.

Strategic investments in development and diplomacy, alongside a strong defense, are essential to fight terrorism, support our allies, and uphold America's leadership role in the world. For just one percent of the federal budget, U.S. diplomacy and development efforts keep us safe, promote growth, and project our values. If the United States retreats from our global commitments, then we cede ground to countries that do not share American interests and pose a risk to American values.

You do not make America great again by unilaterally withdrawing from the world. Since World War II, we have been and we remain the essential nation. Ronald Reagan used to talk about making America that shining city upon a hill. What he meant was a beacon, a place people could look to for succor, human rights advocacy, and protection. That is who we are.

Throughout U.S. development operations, we are planting the seeds of future societies that are hopefully reflective of our own principles and aspirations. U.S. foreign assistance has long fostered American values through support for civil society, free markets, independent media, and democratic institutions. At a time when countries like Russia and China are undermining democratic institutions and the post-WWII international order, we need robust diplomatic and development operations more than ever.

We turn to diplomacy to solve our most intractable national security challenges. It is a political solution we seek in Syria, not a military one. It is the JCPOA, a multilateral diplomatic effort, that has effectively reversed the Iranian nuclear threat. It is our aid and reconstruction efforts that will eliminate terrorists' sanctuaries in Afghanistan, not a permanent U.S. military presence.

Pulling out the rug beneath our nation's diplomats not only makes their efforts less effective, but it also further exposes our military by shifting the entire burden to them. The investments that we make now will save money and lives. More than 120 retired generals and admirals recently wrote a letter to Congress on this very point. They wrote, "the State Department, USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps and other development agencies are critical to preventing conflict and reducing the need to put our men and women in uniform in harm's way."

We cannot starve our foreign aid and diplomacy missions and expect that increased defense spending alone will keep America safe. Secretary of Defense James Mattis himself has said: "If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition." His words say it all: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

Foreign assistance is not just a nice thing to do. It opens foreign markets for American businesses and creates enduring partnerships abroad. For example, what began as a donor-recipient relationship between the United States and South Korea in the wake of the Korean War has since blossomed into an unbreakable alliance bound by shared military, diplomatic, cultural, and economic ties. South Korea is now our sixth largest trading partner. The Marshall Plan for Europe, Plan Colombia, and PEPFAR in Africa are examples of investments in the world that have helped define the United States as the essential nation.

This is no longer a battle about numbers or budget. This is a battle about who we are as a people and what role we will play in shaping the world we hand over to our children and grandchildren. There are people who benefit from the United States' diplomatic and foreign aid efforts, who are fighting for democracy as we speak, putting their lives on the line counting on us to have their backs when almost no one else would help. From Burma to Ukraine, this is not the time to retreat. But that is what this budget does. We must fight this budget for the sake of that shining city upon a hill.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding the critical role that our international affairs budget plays in reaching U.S. foreign policy goals, and the impact such a drastic 31 percent cut would have on U.S. global leadership.

**Question for the Record from Ranking Member Eliot L. Engel
For Danielle Pletka (American Enterprise Institute)
Hearing on “The Budget, Diplomacy and Development” – March 28, 2017**

Thank you very much for testifying at our recent hearing on “The Budget, Diplomacy and Development.”

In your written statement, you said, “I am also flummoxed by the hysteria that has attended the announcement of the President’s proposed cuts to State and USAID. These appear to be deep cuts, but adding in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget number proposed brings the overall number for diplomacy and development right back to where it was, and more.”

I am informed that this statement is incorrect.

For FY 2018, President Trump has proposed a total of \$37.6 billion for the State Department and USAID – this total includes both base and OCO funding. The total funding level (base and OCO) approved in the FY 2017 Continuing Resolution is \$54.9 billion. You would have to go back a number of years to get even close to the levels proposed by President Trump for FY 2018.

Can you please clarify the above statement from your written testimony?

Answer:

The President’s FY18 Budget requests¹ “\$25.6 billion in base funding for the Department of State and USAID, a \$10.1 billion or 28 percent reduction from the 2017 annualized CR level. The Budget also requests \$12.0 billion as Overseas Contingency Operations funding for extraordinary costs, primarily in war areas like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, for an agency total of \$37.6 billion. The 2018 Budget also requests \$1.5 billion for Treasury International Programs, an \$803 million or 35 percent reduction from the 2017 annualized CR level.”

So, the DOS, Aid, OCO, and Treasury International programs add up to \$39.1 billion in this budget (without TI, you get the \$37.6 number mentioned above).

Looking at President Obama’s FY17 budget², the FY17 base budget request was \$39.37. Therefore, Trump’s 150 account budget (including OCO) is comparable.

¹ https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf.

² <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/252179.pdf>.

Rep. William R. Keating
House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing – March 28, 2017

Ambassador Burns:

1. Please elaborate on the vacuum created by eliminating this funding for State Department programming, and in particular in terms of any economic effects, effects on American jobs, and opportunities for other countries to fill this void.

Answer: I fear that a 31 percent budget reduction for the State Department and USAID would lead, inevitably, to the loss of personnel positions for the Foreign and Civil Service, whether by outright mandated reductions in force or through attrition. If the State Department is not fully funded, its ability to fill our Economic and Commercial positions at our embassies and consulates could be affected negatively. The Department would then not be in a position to advocate as effectively on behalf of American businesses and exports.

2. How are these cuts likely to impact global efforts to empower women and promote the inclusion of women in initiatives to improve security? Furthermore, to what extent will these cuts disproportionately affect the safety and security of women?

Answer: The proposed budget reductions by the Trump Administration are so severe that they would force the State Department leadership to look for cuts in many programs. The new Administration has not made promotion of human rights and women's rights a priority in the policy statements of its senior officials. I fear that the impressive programs built up by both Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush to promote women's rights could then be in jeopardy. This would be a significant loss for American foreign policy.

3. Please elaborate on the proposed cuts to funding for counter-narcotics programs.

Answer: The State Department's counter-narcotics programs are essential, in my view, to the security of our country. These programs are expensive and require consistency of effort over many years to be effective. A 31 percent budget reduction for the State Department would likely affect these programs negatively. I believe that would be a serious mistake by the Trump Administration.

4. How could the proposed cuts affect funding to respond to epidemics which present a significant risk to human life as well as to national security?

Answer: I hope the Trump Administration will protect funding for global public health programs in the budget discussions with the Congress. PEPFAR and other programs have had a significant and beneficial impact in the fight against polio, malaria, HIV/AIDs and other deadly public health threats. It is a national security imperative to fund these programs.

5. Please comment on the importance of defense and diplomacy working in tandem to address the many complex threats and conflicts we face today. How would the interplay between defense and diplomacy work be impacted by the proposed funding cuts to the State Department?

Answer: Based on my career in the U.S. Foreign Service, I believe the United States is often most successful when we integrate effectively diplomacy and the military. That is why it is so important that the State and Defense Departments work together on our global strategy. It is no surprise that some of the strongest supporters of the State Department and USAID budgets have been active duty and retired military leaders.

Dr. Krasner:

6. Please elaborate on the vacuum created by eliminating this funding for State Department programming, and in particular in terms of any economic effects, effects on American jobs, and opportunities for other countries to fill this void.

Answer: Representative Keating, thank you for your questions. Since I have not seen the details of the administration's proposed budget changes my responses may be too general to be useful.

With respect to your first question it is evident that China will step into some voids that might be created by a reduction in American foreign assistance especially in countries from which China might secure raw materials. The Chinese have had little interest in improving governance in poorly governed states. They are willing to provide resources for autocratic rulers who would be happy to receive them. Making it easier for China to increase its influence in the world is not a good thing for the United States

7. How are these cuts likely to impact global efforts to empower women and promote the inclusion of women in initiatives to improve security? Furthermore, to what extent will these cuts disproportionately affect the safety and security of women?

Answer: Improving opportunities and safety for women has been a priority for the United States. As opposed to some foreign assistance programs there is a built in constituency, women. Reducing programs that improve the safety and economic opportunities for women would not be a good thing.



HFAC Full Committee Hearing
“The Budget, Diplomacy and Development”
March 28, 2017
Rep. Brad Schneider
Question for the Record for all Witnesses

1. If you look around the world--at Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Central and South America--it's clear that over the last decade, in every region, our diplomatic challenges have increased, not decreased. In fact, not only have the number of challenges grown, but these challenges are today significantly more complex and more inter-connected.
 - a. First, please respond to this assessment.
 - b. Second, do you believe that any of the global challenges confronting the United States now, or in the next ten years, can be solved with a pure military solution? If so, please provide an example.
 - c. Lastly, what are likely to be the implications for solving the challenges of dramatically shifting our national investment from diplomacy and development to defense?

Krasner: Representative Schneider thank you for your questions. I do agree with your assessment. The challenges posed by other major powers, especially China and Russia are knowable. The challenges posed by other threats are black swans, unknown unknowns. Poorly governed states can threaten the United States and its allies in three ways:

First, transnational terrorism. The great danger here is that there is a disconnect between underlying capabilities and the ability to do harm. In the past an individual or a group or a weak state could only kill a limited number of people. Now a group or a weak state using biological weapons (naturally occurring pathogens or artificially produced pathogens), or a dirty or a real nuclear weapon could kill hundreds of thousands of people or even millions.

Second, pandemic disease. Up to now we have been lucky in that the most well known disease vectors have been hard to transmit (HIV/AIDs and Ebola) but a disease that was transmissible through the air could kill millions. Most new diseases are one where naturally occurring pathogens have jumped from animals to humans. Such jumps are becoming more frequent, especially in tropical areas, where humans are impinging on what had previously been animal habitats. Our best defense against such pandemics would be better governance or at least better monitoring mechanisms in what are now areas of limited statehood.

Third, mass migration. Civil wars and ungoverned spaces have generated unprecedented migration flows. There are not good options for dealing with these flows which have primarily affected Europe. Europe cannot absorb all of the people that would like to move to Europe. Sending refugees back may put their lives in danger. Not good options.

Most of the major challenges that we face come from badly governed and weak states. These challenges cannot be addressed by defense measures alone. Securing partners and improving conditions in badly governed states is essential for American national security.

Pletka: In response to your overall assessment, I couldn't agree more. There should be no doubt that there are problems confronting us that require a military approach (think: Syria). But the military's job is to provide an environment for long term political and economic solutions. In other words, the problems that confront us require a multifaceted military, diplomatic and economic strategy – underscore strategy – that addresses the drivers of conflict.

It is important not to characterize the shift in resources in the proposed Trump administration budget as a shift from diplomacy and development to defense. The defense budget only increased over the Obama request by three percent, far from enough to plug the hole that has grown over the last decade plus. In addition, in terms of numbers, it is fair to count the OCO request that takes the 150 well above the suggested dramatic cuts. All that said, when we survey the challenges that confront us (see question a), the correct response is to develop a diplomatic, economic and military strategy and resource that appropriately. Lastly, money does no good if it not spent wisely, and there are legitimate questions about the efficiency of U.S. national security expenditures that I am certain will preoccupy this committee.

Burns:

1a. I agree that the United States is facing an extraordinary number of national security challenges in each major region of the world. Some of these crises are transnational and threaten all states such as Climate Change, the full range of cyber threats, pandemics and international narcotics and crime cartels. U.S. vital interests are being challenged in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Civil wars and famine require us to pay more attention to Africa. And the challenge to democracy in countries like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba require us to be fully engaged in Latin America. These challenges and many others require us to have a State Department that is fully funded and prepared to defend us overseas and to help resolve the many critical problems that threaten to undercut American interests and values around the world.

1b. I do not believe that the vast majority of challenges we face can be resolved through the use of military force alone. In fact, the majority of threats require the State Department to lead on behalf of the United States. In other cases, State and DOD must work together by integrating diplomacy and force in pursuit of an effective and successful American Foreign Policy. For example, the Syrian Civil War will ultimately be ended at the negotiating table. The Trump Administration will need a fully staffed Near East Bureau in the State Department to provide the policy advice and regional, cultural and linguistic expertise to permit the U.S. to be successful in working to bring the war eventually to an end.

1c. I support a strong U.S. military and budget increase for DOD at this time of challenge and danger. But, it makes no sense to strengthen the military and, at the same time, to implement a 31 percent budget reduction for the State Department and USAID. Some of the crises where the State Department must lead for the U.S. include the four famines in Africa and the Middle East, the Syrian Civil War diplomacy, the North Korea Nuclear Threat and our continued efforts to strengthen international support for the embattled Afghan government.

The American people need the State Department and USAID to be fully staffed and functioning to help Americans in distress overseas, to run our non-immigrant and immigrant visa programs, to adjudicate refugee admission into the U.S., to work on behalf of American exports to sustain jobs in our communities and to participate in the global effort in every country of the world to represent America's many and diverse interests through our embassies and consulates. It makes no sense to weaken the State Department and American diplomacy as we are the leading global power and must be fully capable of representing our interests and contributing to the pursuit of global peace and justice.