COUNTERTERRORISM SCREENING AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2015; IRAN TERROR FINANCE TRANSPARENCY ACT; AND END NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES ACT

MARKUP

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H.R. 4314, H.R. 3662 and H.R. 1797

JANUARY 7, 2016

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COUNTERTERRORISM SCREENING AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2015; IRAN TERROR FINANCE TRANSPARENCY ACT; AND END NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES ACT

THURSDAY, JANUARY 7, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ROYCE. This committee will come to order.

Pursuant to notice, we meet today to mark up three bills. And, without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements for the record and any extraneous material on any of today's business.

As members were notified yesterday, we are going to consider each bill separately. For each item, after the opening remarks by myself and the ranking member, I will recognize any member seeking recognition to speak on the bill.

So, for the purpose of marking up, I now call up H.R. 4314, the Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act. Without objection, it is considered read, and it is open for amendment at any point. And also without objection, as members were notified yesterday, we are going to consider this item en bloc with Royce Amendment 92, a manager's amendment that was provided to your offices. And that amendment is in your packets.

[The information referred to follows:]

(Original Signature of Member)

114TH CONGRESS 2D Session

To require a plan to combat international travel by terrorists and foreign fighters, accelerate the transfer of certain border security systems to foreign partner governments, establish minimum international border security standards, authorize the suspension of foreign assistance to countries not making significant efforts to comply with such minimum standards, and for other purposes.

H.R. 4314

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. ZELDIN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

- To require a plan to combat international travel by terrorists and foreign fighters, accelerate the transfer of certain border security systems to foreign partner governments, establish minimum international border security standards, authorize the suspension of foreign assistance to countries not making significant efforts to comply with such minimum standards, and for other purposes.
 - Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the "Counterterrorism3 Sereening and Assistance Act of 2016".

4 SEC. 2. FOREIGN PARTNER ENGAGEMENT PLAN.

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Consistent with the final report of
6 Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
7 Representatives's bipartisan "Task Force on Combating
8 Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel", Congress makes
9 the following findings:

(1) It is important for the national security of
the United States to assist foreign partners in closing security gaps which may allow terrorists and foreign fighters to travel internationally, avoiding detection.

(2) Building foreign partner capacity to combat
terrorist travel helps extend the United States's security beyond its border to mitigate threats before
they reach the United States.

(3) United States Government departments and
agencies have spent billions of dollars to help foreign
partners improve their security against terrorist
travel since the attacks of September 11, 2001, including through the provision of technical assistance,
equipment, training, and other tools.

25 (4) The lack of a United States Government-26 wide, risk-based approach increases the odds that

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systematic security gaps abroad may persist and
 that United States response efforts will not be maxi mized in order to close these gaps.

4 (5) Failure to effectively coordinate capacity5 building activities also results in greater risk of over6 lap, waste, and unnecessary duplication between the
7 United States and international programs.

8 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-9 gress that the United States Government must ensure ca-10 pacity-building assistance is coordinated both among 11 United States Government departments and agencies as 12 well as with foreign implementing partners, and assistance 13 should be prioritized for the highest-risk countries for 14 travel by terrorists and foreign fighters.

- 15 (c) Plan.—
- 16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 17 after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 18 two years thereafter at the time of the President's 19 budget submission to Congress under section 1105 20 of title 31, United States Code, until 2022, the Sec-21 retary of State shall, in accordance with the protec-22 tion of intelligence sources and methods, submit to 23 the appropriate congressional committees unclassi-24 fied and classified versions of a foreign partner en-25 gagement plan which catalogues existing capacity-

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	4
1	building initiatives abroad to combat travel by ter-
2	rorists and foreign fighters and identifies areas for
3	adjustment to align ongoing efforts with risk-based
4	priorities.
5	(2) COORDINATION.—The plan required under
6	paragraph (1) shall be developed in coordination
7	with all relevant United States Government depart-
8	ments and agencies and in consultation with the
9	Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
10	State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary
11	of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of
12	National Intelligence, and the Director of the Fed-
13	eral Bureau of Investigation.
14	(3) CONTENTS.—The plan required under para-
15	graph (1) shall—
16	(Λ) include an assessment of all countries
17	and whether each country is high-risk, medium-
18	risk, or low-risk for travel by terrorists and for-
19	eign fighters based on the minimum standards
20	described in section 4(b), as well as—
21	(i) the proximity of each country to
22	the United States;
23	(ii) an identification of last points of
24	departure in each country to the United
25	States;

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1	(iii) visa waiver program status or
2	visa application and rejection rates for
3	each country;
4	(iv) recent threats, terrorist and for-
5	eign fighter travel trends, and the overall
6	terror threat environment in each country;
7	and
8	(v) other criteria as determined by the
9	Secretary of State and the Secretary of
10	Homeland Security;
11	(B) detail existing United States Govern-
12	ment programs, projects, and activities which
13	are intended to or have the substantial effect of
14	building the capacity of such countries to com-
15	bat travel by terrorists and foreign fighters, in-
16	cluding estimated spending levels by country
17	where practicable; and
18	(C) outline a plan for prioritizing United
19	States Government resources toward high-risk
20	and medium-risk countries, including—
21	(i) identifying efforts which should be
22	reformed, consolidated, or eliminated; and
23	(ii) detailing new programs, projects,
24	or activities that are requested, being

	6
1	planned, or are undergoing implementation
2	and associated costs.
3	SEC. 3. SHARING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT TO OBSTRUCT
4	TRAVEL BY TERRORISTS AND FOREIGN
5	FIGHTERS.
6	(a) Border Security and Counterterrorism
7	Screening Tools.—
8	(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (d),
9	the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Sec-
10	retary of State shall accelerate the provision of ap-
11	propriate versions of the following systems to foreign
12	governments:
13	(A) U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
14	Automated Targeting System–Global.
15	(B) The Department of State's Personal
16	Identification Secure Comparison and Evalua-
17	tion System.
18	(2) PRIORITIZATION.—The Secretary of Home-
19	land Security and the Secretary of State shall co-
20	ordinate to prioritize the provision of the systems
21	specified in paragraph (1) to countries determined to
22	be high-risk and medium-risk in the foreign partner
23	engagement plan required under section 2.
24	(b) Equipment Transfer.—

	1
1	(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (2)
2	and (3), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in con-
3	sultation with the Secretary of State, is authorized
4	to provide, with or without reimbursement, excess
5	nonlethal equipment and supplies owned by the De-
6	partment of Homeland Security to a foreign govern-
7	ment.
8	(2) DETERMINATION.—The Secretary of Home-
9	land Security is authorized to provide equipment and
10	supplies pursuant to paragraph (1) if the Secretary
11	determines that the provision of such equipment and
12	supplies would—
13	(A) further the homeland security interests
14	of the United States; or
15	(B) enhance the recipient government's ca-
16	pacity to—
17	(i) mitigate the risk or threat of ter-
18	rorism, infectious disease, or natural dis-
19	aster;
20	(ii) protect and expedite lawful trade
21	and travel; or
22	(iii) enforce intellectual property
23	rights.
24	(3) Limitation on transfer.—The Secretary
25	of Homeland Security may not—

	8
1	(A) provide any equipment or supplies that
2	are designated as items on the United States
3	Munitions List pursuant to section 38 of the
4	Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778); or
5	(B) provide any vessel or aircraft pursuant
6	to this subsection.
7	(4) Related training.—In conjunction with a
8	provision of equipment or supplies pursuant to para-
9	graph (1), the Secretary of Homeland Security may
10	provide such equipment-related or supplies-related
11	training and assistance as the Secretary determines
12	to be necessary.
13	(5) MAINTENANCE OF TRANSFERRED EQUIP-
14	MENT.—The Secretary of Homeland Security may
15	provide for the maintenance of transferred equip-
16	ment or supplies through service contracts or other
17	means, with or without reimbursement, as the Sec-
18	retary determines appropriate.
19	(6) Reimbursement of expenses.—The Sec-
20	retary of Homeland Security is authorized to collect
21	payment from the recipient government for the pro-
22	vision of training, shipping costs, supporting mate-
23	rials, maintenance, supplies, or other assistance in
24	support of provided equipment or supplies under this
25	subsection.

	9
1	(7) Receipts credited as offsetting col-
2	LECTIONS.—Notwithstanding section 3302 of title
3	31, any amount collected under this subsection—
4	(A) shall be credited as offsetting collec-
5	tions to the account that finances the activities
6	and services for which the payment is received;
7	and
8	(B) shall remain available until expended
9	for the purpose of providing for the security in-
10	terests of the homeland.
11	(8) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
12	subsection may be construed as affecting, aug-
13	menting, or diminishing the authority of the Sec-
14	retary of State.
15	(9) DEFINITION.—For the purposes of this sec-
16	tion, the term "excess nonlethal equipment and sup-
17	plies" means equipment and supplies the Secretary
18	of Homeland Security has determined is either not
19	required for United States domestic operations, or
20	would be more effective to homeland security if de-
21	ployed for use outside of the United States.
22	(c) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.—
23	(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days be-
24	fore providing any systems or equipment or supplies
25	under this section, the Secretary of Homeland Secu-

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1	rity and Secretary of State shall provide notification
2	to the appropriate congressional committees of such
3	provision.
4	(2) CONTENTS.—A notification required under
5	paragraph (1) shall include the following
6	(A) The specific vulnerability that will be
7	mitigated by the provision of any systems or
8	equipment or supplies under this section.
9	(B) An explanation as to why the recipient
10	is unable or unwilling to independently acquire
11	such systems or equipment or supplies.
12	(C) An evacuation plan for any sensitive
13	technologies in case of emergency or instability
14	in the country to which such systems or equip-
15	ment or supplies is being provided.
16	(D) How the United States Government
17	will ensure that such systems or equipment or
18	supplies are being maintained appropriately and
19	used as intended.
20	(E) The total dollar value of such systems,
21	equipment, and supplies.
22	(d) Rule of Construction.—
23	(1) IN GENERAL.—The authority provided
24	under this section shall be exercised in accordance
25	with applicable provisions of the Arms Export Con-

	11
1	trol Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), the Export Ad-
2	ministration Regulations, or any other similar provi-
3	sion of law.
4	(2) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term
5	"Export Administration Regulations" means—
6	(Λ) the Export Administration Regulations
7	as maintained and amended under the authority
8	of the International Emergency Economic Pow-
9	ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and codified
10	in subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code
11	of Federal Regulations; or
	(\mathbf{D}) 1
12	(B) any successor regulations.
12 13	(B) any successor regulations. SEC. 4. ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
13	SEC. 4. ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
13 14	SEC. 4. ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT FAIL TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS
13 14 15	SEC. 4. ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT FAIL TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SERIOUS AND SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO
13 14 15 16	SEC. 4. ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT FAIL TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SERIOUS AND SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER
13 14 15 16 17	SEC. 4. ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT FAIL TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SERIOUS AND SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL.
 13 14 15 16 17 18 	SEC. 4. ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT FAIL TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SERIOUS AND SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL. (a) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 	 SEC. 4. ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT FAIL TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SERIOUS AND SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL. (a) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 30 of
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 	 SEC. 4. ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT FAIL TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SERIOUS AND SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL. (a) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 30 of each year through 2021, the Secretary of State, in
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 	 SEC. 4. ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT FAIL TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SERIOUS AND SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL. (a) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 30 of each year through 2021, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Secu-

1	foreign fighter travel. The report shall include the
2	following:
3	(A) A list of those foreign countries, if
4	any, to which the minimum standards for seri-
5	ous and sustained efforts to combat terrorist
6	and foreign fighter travel as described in sub-
7	section (b) are applicable and whose govern-
8	ments comply with such standards.
9	(B) A list of those foreign countries, if
10	any, to which the minimum standards for seri-
11	ous and sustained efforts to combat terrorist
12	and fighter travel as described in subsection (b)
13	are applicable and whose governments do not
14	yet fully comply with such standards but are
15	making significant efforts to bring themselves
16	into compliance.
17	(C) A list of those foreign countries, if any,
18	to which the minimum standards for serious
19	and sustained efforts to combat terrorist and
20	foreign fighter travel as described in subsection
21	(b) are applicable and whose governments do
22	not fully comply with such standards and are
23	not making significant efforts to bring them-
24	selves into compliance.

	13
1	(D) A description for each foreign country
2	identified in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of the
3	areas in which the government of the foreign
4	country does not meet the minimum standards
5	for serious and sustained efforts to combat ter-
6	rorist and foreign fighter travel as described in
7	subsection (b).
8	(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
9	(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
10	contain a classified annex, if necessary.
11	(3) Inclusion in country reports on ter-
12	RORISM.—To the maximum extent practicable, the
13	Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-
14	retary of Homeland Security, should incorporate the
15	report required by paragraph (1) into the annual
16	country reports on terrorism submitted pursuant to
17	section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
18	Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f).
19	(b) MINIMUM STANDARDS DESCRIBED.—The min-
20	imum standards for serious and sustained efforts to com-
21	bat terrorist and foreign fighter travel applicable to the
22	government of a foreign country are the following:
23	(1) The government of the country makes
24	meaningful efforts to identify and monitor terrorists

1 and foreign fighters operating within the territory of 2 the country. 3 (2) The government of the country regularly ex-4 changes substantive counterterrorism information 5 with other foreign governments, including the 6 United States Government, through bilateral or mul-7 tilateral channels and international organizations 8 such as INTERPOL, and cooperates with other for-9 eign governments in the investigation and prosecu-10 tion of terrorists and foreign fighters. 11 (3) The government of the country implements 12 effective border controls or participates in an exist-13 ing border-crossing control regime that has been de-14 termined by the United States Government to em-15 ploy effective border-crossing oversight. 16 (4) The government of the country has controls 17 in place to prevent counterfeiting, forgery, and, 18 fraudulent use or possession of false identity papers 19 and travel documents. 20 (5) The government of the country collects air 21 passenger data and employs evidence-based traveler 22 risk assessment and screening procedures, including 23 collection and analysis of travel data. 24 (6) The government of the country appro-25 priately screens travelers, including vetting of trav-

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	15
1	elers at air, sea, and land ports of entry, against
2	counterterrorism and other criminal databases, as
3	appropriate.
4	(7) The government of the country submits in-
5	formation to INTERPOL databases and screens
6	travelers against INTERPOL databases at ports of
7	entry and exit.
8	(8) The government of the country has estab-
9	lished and implemented domestic laws criminalizing
10	material support to foreign terrorist organizations
11	and has the ability and willingness to prosecute
12	cases involving such material support to foreign ter-
13	rorist organizations.
14	(9) The government of the country takes meas-
15	ures to prevent individuals in its territory from trav-
16	eling abroad to enlist with or provide material sup-
17	port to foreign terrorist organizations.
18	(10) The government of the country takes
19	measures to ensure a minimal level of corruption
20	and likelihood that corruption could impact the ve-
21	racity of security and intelligence reporting from the
22	country, a minimal likelihood that such corruption
23	could adversely affect the legitimacy of national
24	identity papers of the country, and the country does

2 tion. 3 (c) SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Se-4 5 curity, is authorized to suspend nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance to any government of 6 7 a foreign country if the foreign country is identified in 8 subparagraph (C) of subsection (a)(1) in the most-recent report submitted to the appropriate congressional commit-9 10 tees under such subsection.

11 SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

12 In this Act—

1

13 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-14 TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com-15 mittees" means the Committee on Homeland Secu-16 rity and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on 17 Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, 18 and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 19 Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on the Judiciary, 20 21 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 22 of Representatives.

(2) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The
term "foreign terrorist organization" means an organization that is designated as a foreign terrorist

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not shelter suspects from investigation and prosecu-

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1	organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immi-
2	gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
3	(3) Nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related
4	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The term "nonhumani-
5	tarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance" has the
6	meaning given the term in section 103 of the Traf-
7	ficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C.
8	7102).

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4314 Offered by Mr. Royce of California

In section 2(c)(1), insert "develop and" before "submit".

In section 2(c)(2), strike "the Secretary of State,".

In section 2(c)(3)(A), strike clause (i) and redesginate subsequent clauses accordingly.

In clause (i) of section 2(c)(3)(A) (as so redesignated), insert "the number of flights that originate from" after "an identification of".

In clause (ii) of section 2(c)(3)(A) (as so redesignated), strike "rejection rates" and insert "refusal rates".

In section 3(b)(2)(A), strike "or" and insert "and".

Amend paragraph (4) of section 4(b) to read as follows:

(4) The government of the country has controls
 and systems in place to prevent and report upon
 counterfeiting, forgery, and, fraudulent use or possession of false, stolen or lost identity papers and
 travel documents.

2

In section 4(b), add at the end the following:

(11) The government of a country is not deter mined to be a high-risk program country under sec tion 217(c)(12) of the Immigration and Nationality
 Act (8. U.S.C. 1187(c)(12)).

In section 4(c), insert "and the heads of other Fed-

eral agencies, as appropriate" after "the Secretary of Homeland Security".

X

Chairman ROYCE. I now recognize myself to speak.

So I would like to begin by thanking Mr. Zeldin for his work on this legislation. This is the Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act.

Last year, the horrific terrorist attack in Paris, I think, showed us how easy it has become for terrorists and for foreign fighters to move across open borders. This important legislation makes several important changes. It requires the Departments of State and Homeland Security to produce an annual scorecard. That scorecard would assess the border security efforts of countries around the world. This will identify weaknesses and areas for improvement abroad, and it will streamline our own efforts to assist partners overseas with border security programs. The administration will then submit a plan to Congress for prioritizing U.S. assistance. The bill also requires the establishment of minimum standards

The bill also requires the establishment of minimum standards for border security. Countries that fail to meet these minimum standards can have U.S. foreign assistance suspended, employing the same incentive already in place for trafficking and for human rights violations.

This bill reflects the recommendations made by our colleagues on the Committee on Homeland Security's bipartisan Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel, which we have worked together on, by the way. And I again thank Mr. Zeldin for his leadership on this critical

And I again thank Mr. Zeldin for his leadership on this critical issue and recognize Homeland Security Chairman Mike McCaul for his efforts on this legislation as well.

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Eliot Engel, for his remarks on this legislation. Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Happy new year to you, and happy new year to all the members of our committee. I am happy the committee is getting back to work, and I am happy to support our first measure today, Mr. Zeldin's bill, the Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act.

The United States and our partners need to do whatever we can to stop terrorists and foreign fighters from traveling across borders. Here at home, this bill would ramp up coordination among relevant government agencies. Around the world, it would help our partners by speeding up the transfer of the software and technology we use to track international travel, to collect biometric data, and to assess the risk individuals might pose. And this bill would put a particular focus on the countries where the danger of terrorists and foreign fighters is most acute.

The bill is certainly a step in the right direction. I thank Mr. Zeldin for his hard work. I will support the measure.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Lee Zeldin.

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Chairman.

Today, I am asking for everyone's support of the Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act of 2016.

First off, I would like to thank our committee chairman, Ed Royce, and his amazing staff here at the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Their incredible leadership and assistance on this issue and so many others do so much every day to keep Americans safe.

I also wish to thank Chairman McCaul, who sits on this committee and serves as the chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, for his efforts on this very important issue as well.

I also thank the ranking member, Eliot Engel, for his support of this effort.

The Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act of 2016 is so important for resolving the vulnerabilities that currently exist with international security abroad which pose a concerning threat to our homeland.

The horrific terror attacks in Paris, France, that killed over 100 people were largely carried out by European nationals, many of whom traveled to train and fight in Syria and then later returned to Europe through Greece and Turkey. Although local authorities already knew some of the attackers, they were still able to move across borders without detection and, in some cases, use fraudulent passports.

With the rise of terrorism in the U.S. and around the world and with the high number of foreign fighters returning from ISIS strongholds in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, there is a very serious and well-recognized need for improved border security and information-sharing between governments. It is essential that the United States work together with the global community to monitor and stop the movement of terrorists abroad.

The Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act of 2016 would establish a plan to close security gaps that currently exist that allow terrorists and foreign fighters to travel internationally.

The plan would establish international border security standards that would be developed in coordination with all relevant U.S. Government departments and agencies, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence, and Director of the FBI.

Under the plan, U.S. resources would be utilized in the most efficient way possible, with a special focus on high-risk and mediumrisk countries.

Under this legislation, a reporting system would also be established to monitor efforts of foreign governments to combat terrorism and foreign fighter travel and to suspend foreign assistance to countries not making significant efforts to comply.

Furthermore, the legislation would put a monitoring system in place that would screen for infectious diseases to contain and prevent any potential outbreaks.

This is a measure that is long overdue, and I am proud to help lead the effort in the House. I strongly encourage my colleagues in Congress to join in this effort to address a serious national security threat and vote today to pass the Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act of 2016 to keep Americans safe.

Thank you again, Chairman, for your leadership, and I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Zeldin.

Do any other members seek recognition?

Mr. McCaul?

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for your hard work on this bill, and the ranking member.

And, of course, this came out of our Counterterrorism Task Force, spearheaded by the majority leader. And I think it was a great, sort of, concert of work between the Homeland Security Committee and this Committee on Foreign Affairs.

This holiday season provided, I think, further evidence of the high terror threat environment that has become a new norm. Just last week, authorities in the United States and Europe disrupted multiple ISIS plots aimed at innocent civilians celebrating the new year.

Good intelligence, cooperation, and law enforcement vigilance helped prevent these potential massacres, but our enemies are still dead-set on conducting external operations against us, and they are more capable than ever of doing so.

ISIS has now inspired or directed nearly 70 terrorist plots or attacks against Western countries, and, as we saw on the streets of Paris, they are deploying some of their 30,000 foreign fighters to carry out operations across the world. As we all now know, it is too easy for these extremists to get to and from terrorist hotspots undetected. Indeed, the mastermind of the Paris attacks bragged on ISIS' online magazine, and I quote, "I was able to leave and come despite being chased after by so many intelligence services."

As chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, last year I launched a bipartisan Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel to examine this threat. The panel conducted the widest review on the subject since the 9–11 Commission. They uncovered shocking security gaps, especially overseas. For instance, many countries lack effective counterterrorism vetting systems. They fail to screen travelers against key law enforcement databases or do little to stop passport fraud. Make no mistake, these weaknesses overseas put us in danger here at home. Our task force issued more than 50 recommendations to close security loopholes, and this legislation today by Mr. Zeldin implements several of them. It will help our allies put in place effective counterterrorism tools to more quickly ramp up screening of foreign travelers. It will also reduce U.S. Government waste, overlap, and duplication. For example, the bill requires agencies for the first time ever to coordinate and streamline their numerous assistance programs and to focus resources on the highest-risk countries.

I want to commend John Katko, who led the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel, and then also Mr. Zeldin from New York for his hard work on this bill. I would like to thank this committee, also, again, for their close collaboration with my committee.

We have a lot more work to do, but I believe this is a very important step in keeping terrorists and foreign fighters from getting into the United States and from threatening Americans.

And, with that, I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Any other members seeking recognition? Judge Poe.

Mr. POE. I want to thank the chairman.

As chairman of the Terrorism Subcommittee, Ranking Member Keating and I have had numerous hearings on the problem of foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria to fight for ISIS and then going back to home countries. They are coming into Syria by the tens of thousands. It is a pace so high that just as many new fighters are coming in as our strikes are killing. These fighters are dangerous because, unlike local fighters, they easily launch attacks back in their home countries, primarily the West. We know there are dozens of Americans fighting in Iraq and Syria right now. I do want to thank the chairman and ranking member for pass-

I do want to thank the chairman and ranking member for passing out of this committee and on the House floor the Foreign Terrorist Organization Passport Revocation Act, which helps stop the flow of foreign fighters back here into the U.S. by revoking their passports. And hopefully the Senate will take this bill up soon.

I support the Counterterrorism Screening Assistance Act because the foreign-fighter problem is not a problem we can solve by ourselves. We need our partners to have a strong border security. We should not be giving any foreign aid to countries who do not take this threat seriously.

And I will yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Rohrabacher was seeking recognition.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to thank you and Ranking Member Engel for the great leadership that you are providing to our country at this pivotal moment in our history when our people are in danger. And you and Mr. Engel have shown the bipartisan spirit that I think could give confidence to our people that their elected Representatives are united to defeat this threat that would murder our children if they had the chance.

I would also like to congratulate Chairman McCaul for the energetic leadership that he is providing on that half of this operation to protect our people.

But I would like to add one note here on this bill and to our approach. I was somewhat shocked to find out that lie-detector tests

are playing such a small role in trying to help us accomplish our mission.

And all I can say is that I may have an amendment that I would provide on the floor, if it is considered a legally acceptable amendment, that would in some way require us—I mean, when we are talking about screening for terrorism, at the very least anybody coming here should have to go through, like, a 5-minute lie-detector test. We have new lie-detector technologies that are very simple and don't have to have, you know, three or four people there—you have one person—and we can tell if someone is lying to us.

No one—no one—should come into this country, who has any potential of being involved with terrorism, without taking a lie-detector test. That could have stopped—for example, in San Bernardino, all we needed to do was ask that lady who was getting her visa to come in, just ask, "Would you be inclined to commit an act of violence against Americans?" And if the answer is yes, of course we are not going to let that person in. Right now, we do not have that screening.

So, Mr. Chairman, both Mr. Chairmans, I hope that we can work together so that within a very short period of time people who are coming from these terrorist countries, in particular, but perhaps on a global scale—is there any reason why, when they are asking for a visa, we can't just ask two or three questions on a very cheap lie-detector machine? Because they are now available. So that would be my goal. I am looking forward to working with both of you to see if we can implement that.

By the way, just to note, this was Ken Calvert's idea. And when he said that to me, I just said, "That is terrific," and that is why I am running with it.

So thank you.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Any other members seeking recognition?

Hearing none, the question occurs on agreeing to the bill en bloc. All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, no.

In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it, and the en bloc items are agreed to.

Without objection, this legislation, H.R. 4314, is ordered favorably reported, as amended. Staff is directed to make any technical and conforming changes. And the Chair is authorized to seek House consideration under suspension of the rules.

All right. Moving on to the next bill, this is H.R. 3662, the Iran Terror Finance Transparency Act. Without objection, the bill is considered read and open for amendment at any point.

[The information referred to follows:]

114TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 3662

To enhance congressional oversight over the administration of sanctions against certain Iranian terrorism financiers, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

October 1, 2015

Mr. RUSSELL (for himself, Mr. BRAT, Mr. WESTERMAN, Mrs. BLACK, Mr. HURD of Texas, Mr. ROUZER, Mr. MEEHAN, Mr. YOHO, Mr. GRAVES of Louisiana, Mrs. BROOKS of Indiana, Mr. GRAVES of Missouri, Mr. HARDY, Mr. JODY B. HICE of Georgia, Mr. BURGESS, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. DESJARLAIS, Mr. DESANTIS, Mr. GIBBS, Ms. JENKINS of Kansas, Mr. MESSER, and Mr. LOUDERMILK) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

- To enhance congressional oversight over the administration of sanctions against certain Iranian terrorism financiers, and for other purposes.
- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Iran Terror Finance
- 5 Transparency Act".

I

1	SEC. 2. CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR REMOVAL OF
2	FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUD-
3	ING IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
4	FROM THE LIST OF SPECIALLY DESIGNATED
5	NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—On or after July 19, 2015, the 7 President may not remove a foreign financial institution, including an Iranian financial institution, described in 8 subsection (b) from the list of specially designated nation-9 als and blocked persons maintained by the Office of For-10 eign Asset Control of the Department of the Treasury un-11 less and until the President submits to the appropriate 12 congressional committees a certification described in sub-13 section (c) with respect to the foreign financial institution. 14 15 (b) COVERED INSTITUTIONS.—A foreign financial in-16 stitution, including an Iranian financial institution, described in this subsection is a foreign financial institution 17 18listed in Attachment 3 or Attachment 4 to Annex II of 19 the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

(c) CERTIFICATION.—The President may remove a
foreign financial institution, including an Iranian financial
institution, described in subsection (b) from the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Asset Control of the Department of the Treasury if the President submits to the

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1	appropriate congressional committees a certification that
2	the foreign financial institution—
3	(1) has not knowingly, directly or indirectly, fa-
4	cilitated a significant transaction or transactions or
5	provided significant financial services for or on be-
6	half of—
7	(A) Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or
8	any of its agents or affiliates whose property or
9	interests in property are blocked pursuant to
10	the International Emergency Economic Powers
11	Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.);
12	(B) a foreign terrorist organization for or
13	on behalf of a person whose property or inter-
14	ests in property have been blocked pursuant to
15	Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49079;
16	relating to blocking property and prohibiting
17	transactions with persons who commit, threaten
18	to commit, or support terrorism); and
19	(C) a person whose property or interests in
20	property are blocked pursuant to the Inter-
21	national Emergency Economic Powers Act in
22	connection with Iran's proliferation of weapons
23	of mass destruction or delivery systems for
24	weapons of mass destruction, or to further
25	Iran's development of ballistic missiles and de-

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1	stabilizing types and amounts of conventional
2	weapons; and
3	(2) no longer knowingly engages in illicit or de-
4	ceptive financial transactions or other activities.
5	(d) FORM.—A certification described in subsection
6	(e) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may con-
7	tain a classified annex.
8	(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
9	(1) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The
10	term "foreign financial institution" has the meaning
11	given such term in section 1010.605 of title 31,
12	Code of Federal Regulations.
13	(2) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The
14	term "foreign terrorist organization" means any or-
15	ganization designated by the Secretary of State as a
16	foreign terrorist organization in accordance with sec-
17	tion 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
18	(8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
19	(3) IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The
20	term "Iranian financial institution" has the meaning
21	given the term in section $104A(d)(3)$ of the Com-
22	prehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Di-
23	vestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513b(d)(3)).

1	SEC. 3. CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR REMOVAL OF
2	CERTAIN FOREIGN PERSONS FROM THE LIST
3	OF SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND
4	BLOCKED PERSONS.
5	(a) IN GENERAL.—On or after July 19, 2015, the
6	President may not remove a foreign person described in
7	subsection (b) from the list of specially designated nation-
8	als and blocked persons maintained by the Office of For-
9	eign Asset Control of the Department of the Treasury
10	until the President submits to the appropriate congres-
11	sional committees a certification described in subsection
12	(c) with respect to the foreign person.
13	(b) Covered Persons and Entities.—A foreign
14	person described in this subsection is a foreign person list-
15	ed in Attachment 3 or Attachment 4 to Annex II of the
16	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
17	(c) CERTIFICATION.—The President may remove a
18	foreign person described in subsection (b) from the list
19	of specially designated nationals and blocked persons
20	maintained by the Office of Foreign Asset Control of the
21	Department of the Treasury if the President submits to
22	the appropriate congressional committees a certification
23	that the foreign person—
24	(1) has not knowingly assisted in, sponsored, or

provided financial, material, or technological support

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1	for, or financial or other services to or in support of
2	terrorism or a terrorist organization; and
3	(2) has not knowingly engaged in significant ac-
4	tivities or transactions that have materially contrib-
5	uted to the Government of Iran's proliferation of
6	weapons of mass destruction or their means of deliv-
7	ery (including missiles capable of delivering such
8	weapons), including any efforts to manufacture, ac-
9	quire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use
10	such item.
11	(d) FORM.—A certification described in subsection
12	(c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may con-
13	tain a classified annex.
14	(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
15	(1) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term "foreign per-
16	son"—
17	(A) means—
18	(i) an individual who is not a United
19	States person;
20	(ii) a corporation, partnership, or
21	other nongovernmental entity which is not
22	a United States person; or
23	(iii) any representative, agent or in-
24	strumentality of, or an individual working
25	on behalf of a foreign government; but

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1	(B) does not include a foreign financial in-
2	stitution, including an Iranian financial institu-
3	tion, described in section 2(b).
4	(2) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
5	"United States person" means—
6	(Λ) a United States citizen or an alien law-
7	fully admitted for permanent residence to the
8	United States; or
9	(B) an entity organized under the laws of
10	the United States or of any jurisdiction within
11	the United States, including a foreign branch of
12	such an entity.
13	SEC. 4. CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR REMOVAL OF
13 14	SEC. 4. CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR REMOVAL OF DESIGNATION OF IRAN AS A JURISDICTION
14	DESIGNATION OF IRAN AS A JURISDICTION
14 15	DESIGNATION OF IRAN AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.
14 15 16	DESIGNATION OF IRAN AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN. (a) IN GENERAL.—The President may not remove
14 15 16 17	DESIGNATION OF IRAN AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN. (a) IN GENERAL.—The President may not remove the designation of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money
14 15 16 17 18	DESIGNATION OF IRAN AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN. (a) IN GENERAL.—The President may not remove the designation of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern pursuant to section 5318A of title 31,
14 15 16 17 18 19	DESIGNATION OF IRAN AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN. (a) IN GENERAL.—The President may not remove the designation of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern pursuant to section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, unless the President submits to the
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	DESIGNATION OF IRAN AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN. (a) IN GENERAL.—The President may not remove the designation of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern pursuant to section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, unless the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a certification de-
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	DESIGNATION OF IRAN AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN. (a) IN GENERAL.—The President may not remove the designation of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern pursuant to section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, unless the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a certification de- scribed in subsection (b) with respect to Iran.
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 22 	DESIGNATION OF IRAN AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN. (a) IN GENERAL.—The President may not remove the designation of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern pursuant to section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, unless the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a certification de- scribed in subsection (b) with respect to Iran. (b) CERTIFICATION.—The President may remove the

1 Government of Iran is no longer engaged in support for 2 terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and 3 any illicit and deceptive financial activities. 4 (c) FORM.—The certification described in subsection 5 (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. 6 7 (d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term "appro-8 priate congressional committees" means-9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 10 Committee on Financial Services of the House of 11 Representatives; and 12 (2) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 13 Urban Affairs of the Senate. 14 SEC. 5. APPLICABILITY OF CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF 15 CERTAIN AGENCY RULEMAKING RELATING 16 TO IRAN. 17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any rule to amend or otherwise alter a covered 18 regulatory provision as defined in subsection (c) that is 19 20 published on or after the date of the enactment of this Act shall be deemed to be a rule or major rule (as the 21 case may be) for purposes of chapter 8 of title 5, United 22 23 States Code, and shall be subject to all applicable requirements of chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code. 24

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1	(b) QUARTERLY REPORTS.—Not later than 60 days
2	after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90
3	days thereafter, the head of the applicable department or
4	agency of the Federal Government shall submit to the ap-
5	propriate congressional committees a report on the oper-
6	ation of the licensing system under each covered regu-
7	latory provision as defined in subsection (c) for the pre-
8	ceding 2-year period, including—
9	(1) the number and types of licenses applied
10	for;
11	(2) the number and types of licenses approved;
12	(3) a summary of each license approved;
13	(4) a summary of transactions conducted pur-
14	suant to a general license;
15	(5) the average amount of time elapsed from
16	the date of filing of a license application until the
17	date of its approval;
18	(6) the extent to which the licensing procedures
19	were effectively implemented; and
20	(7) a description of comments received from in-
21	terested parties about the extent to which the licens-
22	ing procedures were effective, after the applicable
23	department or agency holds a public 30-day com-
24	ment period.

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1	(c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term "covered
2	regulatory provision" means any provision of part 535,
3	560, 561, or 1060 of title 31, Code of Federal Regula-
4	tions, as such part was in effect on June 1, 2015.
5	SEC. 6. PROHIBITIONS AND CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO
6	CERTAIN ACCOUNTS HELD BY FOREIGN FI-
7	NANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
8	Section $104(c)(2)(A)(ii)$ of the Comprehensive Iran
9	Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
10	(22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(A)(ii)) is amended by adding at the
11	end before the semicolon the following: ", including
12	Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and any
13	affiliates or successors thereof''.
14	SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.
15	In this Act:
16	(1) Appropriate congressional commit-
17	TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com-
18	mittees" has the meaning given the term in section
19	14(2) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public
20	Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
21	(2) Joint comprehensive plan of action.—
22	The term "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action"
23	means the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
24	signed at Vienna July 14, 2015, by Iran and by the
25	People's Republic of China, France, Germany, the

1 Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the 2 United States, with the High Representative of the 3 European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 4 Policy, and all implementing materials and agree-5 ments related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and transmitted by the President to Con-6 7 gress on July 19, 2015, pursuant to section 135(a) 8 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by 9 the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 10 (Public Law 114-17; 129 Stat. 201). \bigcirc

Chairman ROYCE. And I would recognize myself to speak here. First, I want to recognize Congressman Russell for his work on this legislation.

Since the Obama administration completed the Iran nuclear deal, Iran has taken a series of steps that I think were unanticipated by most of us. It has accelerated its missile program; it has violated the U.N. sanctions in doing so. It has taken an additional American hostage. It has stepped up the slaughter that is going on in Syria. Recently, we watched on television the torching of the Saudi Embassy, with the authorities arriving there too late after that. And we saw the launch of a rocket within 1,500 yards of our carrier, the *Truman*, in the Gulf.

So the situation is such that these violations of U.N. sanctions are coming at the same time when, in a few weeks, Iran is going to receive out of escrow tens of billions in sanctions relief. So the question here is one of pushback, given the violation of U.N. sanctions.

Indeed, reported sanctions on Iran's missile network were just shelved. There was an intention—Congress had been notified or the indication was that this condition was going to be taken, and then a decision was made, after pushback from Iran, not to go forward.

So, as members will recall from Secretary Kerry's testimony before us, it was not supposed to be this way. The administration told us while pursuing a nuclear deal that it would not let up the pressure on Iran's ballistic missile program, nor would it let up the pressure on terrorism that was supported by Iran. And that is the point here of this legislation. And it is an attempt here to hold Iran to this commitment.

Before sanctions on a particular person or institution can be lifted, the President must certify that they have not done business in a way that supported Iran's ballistic missile or conventional weapons programs—after all, it is supposed to be 5 years on the conventional and 8 years on the ballistic missiles before Iran is able to go forward, according to the U.N. sanctions on that—nor that that individual has done business with a terrorist organization—you know, for example, the Quds Force, which Soleimani is responsible, literally, for assassinations outside of Iran. That is his job description. And so connection with that, those individuals should still be on that list.

Unfortunately, we now understand that some of those set for sanctions relief—and we will take an example of one of their banks. Iran's Bank Melli will be given a pass for backing ballistic missile development and also, by the way, backing terrorism. And when the Treasury Department sanctioned Bank Melli back in 2007, it noted that the institution had provided banking services first to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and then to the Quds Force. And, as we all know, the IRGC has committed acts of terrorism, gross human rights violations, and has done the missile tests that we saw very recently, in violation of the U.N. sanctions.

Bank Sepah, one of Iran's largest banks, will be another prime winner of sanctions relief in the coming days. And when that bank was designated, again, January 2007, Treasury Under Secretary Stuart Levey at the time noted, "Bank Sepah is the financial lynchpin of Iran's missile procurement network, and it has actively assisted Iran's pursuit of missiles capable of carrying," in his words, "weapons of mass destruction."

With Iran's ballistic missile program accelerating, including a December rocket launch, again, that came within 1,500 yards of our carrier, is anyone comfortable giving what Treasury called the "financial lynchpin" here a jackpot?

To be clear, those Iranian banks and individuals not supporting terrorism, not supporting ICBMs, they can be delisted. That is the agreement. They should be delisted. But not so for those threatening our national security. That is what this legislation does.

And it is the policy the administration explained to this committee as the way that the agreement was structured, the way that our conduct was supposed to be structured going forward that, frankly, this legislation attempts to implement here.

So I now recognize the ranking member for his remarks on the bill.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As I have said many, many times, I am so proud of this committee and its members on both sides of the aisle. We are really an exception to the typical partisan fighting the American people so often unfortunately associate with Congress. And under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, we have taken up bill after bill with bipartisan backing; we have carried out oversight on key national security objectives; we haven't wasted our times on political targets, as so many other committees have done; and we have embodied the spirit that politics should end at the water's edge. I have used that phrase many, many times. And, as you know, Mr. Chairman, I profoundly value our personal friendship and our excellent working relationship.

I must say, though, that I have to oppose this bill. This bill is an exception, I think, to bipartisanship, in that no Democrats were consulted in terms of the drafting of the bill. I know the bill is wellintended, but it isn't done the way things should be done, where we put our heads together in a bipartisan fashion, we come up with a bill, and we go back and forth and eliminate some things, add some things, and move forward in a bipartisan way.

This measure really has no chance of becoming law. And what bothers me—you know, yesterday, we had a vote on the Affordable Care Act to repeal it 62 times. Now this is the second time we have tried to overturn the JCPOA agreement.

Everyone in this room knows how I feel about Iran. I thought we were wrong to allow Iran to continue enriching during the talks. I voted against the nuclear deal, and I continue to believe that the agreement is deeply flawed. I see Iran for what it is: The world's leading state sponsor of terrorism and a destabilizing force across the Middle East.

But Congress had an opportunity to vote on the deal, and we lost. There weren't enough votes to override a veto or even send a resolution of disapproval to the President, and the agreement has now gone into effect. I believe it doesn't serve any purpose to have bills like this that are designed to kill the deal.

I don't want to vote 62 or 63 times on killing the Iran agreement. We already had had one several months ago, and this is now the second one, and I am afraid we are following the same path that we are following with the Affordable Care Act. Congress has spoken, and it is done.

And I think that we have to work together on bipartisan legislation that will hold Iran's feet to the fire on its nuclear program and hold the regime accountable for its support of terrorism and other nefarious activities and also to help our ally Israel with her legitimate security needs.

So I don't think it serves any purpose to take up a partisan bill like this that is designed to kill the deal. We know it is not going to go anywhere. We know that if it passes both Houses the President will veto it.

I would rather put our heads together, as we have done so many times in the past 3 years, to work together to have a bipartisan bill that achieves what we all want on both sides of the aisle. We want to hold Iran's feet to the fire. We want to make sure that they are sanctioned again for other things than the nuclear capabilities, that they are sanctioned for their support of terrorism, and that we have to continue to hold their feet to the fire.

I was disappointed that the administration this week mentioned that it was going to impose some sanctions on Iran and then seemed to pull it back. We have to hold Iran's feet to the fire.

But the only way we can effectively do that is in a bipartisan way. So we have been working; my staff has been working. We are trying to come up with legislation. We have gone a long way. And I would hope that, ultimately, we can introduce this legislation with you, Mr. Chairman, with me, working together in one bill, with other members of this committee working together with one bill.

I would like to do what we did in this committee, where we have repeated so many times—and it almost sounds unbelievable. If people had listened to Chairman Royce and myself back in 2013 when this committee unanimously, with not one negative vote, passed an additional Iran sanctions bill, which we were proud of, and then it passed on the floor with 400 "yes" votes. That is the kind of bipartisan bill I would like to see us do now to hold Iran's feet to the fire.

So there is no shortage of good ideas as to how to achieve these goals, and we can do this. So I am going to oppose this bill. I hope that we can, again, get together and come up with a bill that does what this bill does. But a bill like this, which has sponsors only from one of the political parties—all the sponsors are Republicans. And to be fair to Mr. Russell, he did ask me about going on the bill, but Democrats had no part in drafting the bill, no part in formulating the bill. And if we are going to have something that moves forward and makes sense, we have to do it in a bipartisan way. And, unfortunately, I don't believe this is the way to go about it.

So I am going to oppose it. I hope we can pick up the pieces because, again, the President will surely veto this if it pass both houses. And I am hoping to come up with a bill that the administration can understand that we in the Congress feel very strongly about holding Iran's feet to the fire.

Mr. Chairman, everything you said, I agree. Everything you mentioned, I agree. Everything you talked about, with the threat to Iran, I agree. I just don't believe this is the way to go about doing it.

Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We have mainly produced bipartisan legislation on this committee. That is my preference. It is the preference of the ranking member, I know.

Any additional members seek recognition?

Judge Ted Poe.

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was one who voted against the Iranian deal. I thought it was a bad deal. But Mr. Engel is right; it is a deal that is made with America and Iran.

But the situation is getting worse under the deal. The administration is bending over backwards and conceding even more than what is required in that deal. It may be hard to believe, but, as bad as the deal was, the administration is, it seems to me, making it worse. And I think Congress has an obligation to speak out because it is a national security issue.

The President promised that the non-nuclear-related sanctions on Iran would still be in place. And after Iran violated a U.N. resolution restricting ballistic missiles, the Treasury Department told Congress it would levy new sanctions on Iran for these violations. But then the State Department came swooping in at the last minute and stopped those sanctions from being implemented. So it seems that the administration continues to give in to Iranian pressure. I support H.R. 3662 because it prohibits the President from lifting sanctions on those who are involved in terrorism. Iran is the world's leader of state sponsors of terrorism. The nuclear deal was a bad deal, and we don't need to make this deal worse by lifting sanctions in unrelated matters.

And I will yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Other members seeking recognition?

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, you have seen me on this committee for almost 20 years. I have always voted for every Iran sanctions bill—big ones and small ones, those that were the product of great drafting, those that were the product of mediocre drafting and I asked only why we couldn't make the bill stronger. This committee should craft good legislation to impose additional sanctions on Iran.

First, the question was, do sanctions work? Well, we just concluded a deal in which this House and this Government was incredibly divided. The only thing we agreed on was one thing, and that is sanctions worked. President Obama came to us and said, sanctions have worked, and he had secured for us a very good deal. Those on the other side said, sanctions are working, keep them in place, you will get a better deal. Those sound like diametrically opposed positions except they both indicate that Iranian sanctions worked.

Secretary Kerry was here. President Obama talked to us in so many ways. And they said they left out of these negotiations missiles, terrorism, and then four—today it is five—American hostages because we could use sanctions to achieve those goals separately. That is why we ought to be adopting new sanctions. So the question is, do we do it through this bill at this time?

Now, I think Mr. Russell has some good ideas. And if we do not pass this bill, we ought to incorporate the best of those in a bipartisan piece of legislation and thank him for his effort.

This bill has some flaws. As the ranking member points out, it is the product of a uni-party rather than bipartisan process. We will do better if we work together.

Second, it is my understanding that this bill focuses on the 400 entities listed in the JCPOA, this Iran deal, that are supposed to have their sanctions lifted but does not deal with 300 others, roughly 300 others, that were not specifically listed. So we are using the power of Congress to go after those Iranian entities that our negotiators thought should be given a lifting of at least the nuclear sanctions, and we are not going after the perhaps even worse roughly 300 entities.

In addition, we are asking the President to certify that entities have not engaged in various activities since the beginning of time. This bill would be more reasonable if it was crafted to say has not engaged in such activities for the last 10 years or the last 15 years.

So I look forward to better Iran sanctions legislation. Although I will point out one thing about the timing of this bill. Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium has now been shipped out of the country, virtually all that they promised to ship out.

So we have already gotten the good parts of this deal. If Mr. Machiavelli were advising us, he would say now is the precise time to pull out of the deal, since we have gotten the good parts delivered to us already. I don't think that is the process America will take. I do not think that this is a—that this is like a spectacularly well-timed bait-and-switch program with the Iranians.

So I look forward to a better process. I look forward to a better deal. I will reluctantly oppose this bill. And I think in the future we need sanctions designed, as the President promised we would have, to change Iran's behavior in supporting terrorism, in seizing hostages, and in developing missiles in violation of U.N. sanctions.

And let me say that if Iran never had a nuclear program but engaged in violating U.N. sanctions on missiles, seized American hostages, and killed tens of thousands of people in Yemen and Syria, we would be imposing sanctions. We shouldn't fail to do so simply because a deal strictly designed to focus on their nuclear program was signed by the President but not endorsed by Congress.

I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Do any other members seek recognition? Hearing none—Mr. Deutch.

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, I deeply appreciate the commitment that you and the ranking member share to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This committee has been vigilant in its oversight and has worked in a bipartisan fashion to move numerous pieces of legislation that have had significant impact on Iran's nuclear activities.

But, unfortunately, today's legislation doesn't advance our shared goal of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or halting Iran's dangerous and destabilizing regional activities.

I opposed the nuclear deal, and, in doing so, I laid out my express concern that sanctions relief would only further Iran's unyielding support for terrorism and its regional belligerence. And those concerns haven't changed. Iran's bellicosity continues. In the last 3 months, Iran has launched two ballistic missile tests in blatant violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and it has done so with impunity from the international community.

And if the U.N. Security Council fails to punish Iran for its violations, the United States must act. In fact, Representative Kennedy and I wrote to the President more than a month ago, asking him to take appropriate action to punish Iran for these missile tests. And based on this week's public statements from the White House, I am confident the administration will do so.

I also expressed directly to the administration the need to ensure that any entity that is subject to sanctions removal under the nuclear deal be carefully investigated and resanctioned if they are found to be engaging in support for terrorism or human rights abuses.

This bill, unfortunately, doesn't give us the tools to do that. Instead, it halts the removal of sanctions on those specific 400 entities named for sanctions relief in the JCPOA until the President can certify that these entities have never engaged in activities related to terrorism or the development of weapons of mass destruction.

This standard will result only in the administration devoting significant time and resources to a certification that can never be met, while preventing the implementation of the JCPOA. I believe that we should instead be ensuring that the Treasury Department has the resources it needs to build rock-solid cases against those entities that must be redesignated for terrorism and human rights abuses.

Let's devote the necessary resources to sanctioning individuals and entities who support terrorism and violate human rights, rather than spreading them out in a way that is going to make that more difficult. Going forward, we should be giving this and future administrations all the resources needed to ensure that those subject to sanctions under U.S. law pay the price for bad behavior. I have also, Mr. Chairman, repeatedly made the case for eco-

I have also, Mr. Chairman, repeatedly made the case for economic sanctions against Iran and its terror allies. As one of the original sponsors of the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act, which was signed into law by President Obama last month, we aimed to cut off Iran's terror proxy from the international financial system.

This bill purports to prevent banks from financing Iran's terror agenda by amending one of the most important economic sanctions laws on the books, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.

I was proud to be a member of this committee when we passed CISADA, and, under that legislation, banks facilitating transactions that supported Iran's efforts to acquire WMDs, finance terror, launder money, support the IRGC, et cetera, will be denied access to U.S. financial markets. In fact, section 104 of that bill specifically refers to entities that provide support for organizations designated as foreign terrorist organizations under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The bill before us today adds the Iranian terror proxies Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to CISADA. Now, of course, we want to stop banks from facilitating transactions to these terrorism organizations, but, unfortunately, some of our European friends distinguish between the military and political wings of terrorist groups. They shouldn't, and I have spoken out against this artificial distinction. But whether we agree with that policy or not—and I have taken numerous actions over the years to convince our European friends that there is no distinction between a political wing and a military wing of a terror group—they are following EU law. And because of this discrepancy, by naming these specific groups in CISADA, as this bill does, it would have the potential to cut off European banks from the U.S. financial system.

And even as we continue to urge them to recognize that a terrorist group is a terrorist group, we also ought to be working with our allies to craft the toughest sanctions to crack down on Iran's dangerous activities, and let's not lose that necessary focus on Iran.

Finally, whether you supported the nuclear deal or not—and, again, I didn't—it is going forward. So instead of looking for partisan ways to try to stop the deal, we should be looking for bipartisan ways to try to ensure that it is enforced with vigor and with the most stringent verification and compliance and, if a violation occurs, that we have the tools and the teeth behind those tools to enact punishing new sanctions, hopefully with the support of our international partners, but, if not, then certainly with the full weight of the United States Government, and, finally, to be certain that sanctions arising from terrorism and human rights abuses that were never a part of the nuclear deal are fully enforced.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, this committee continues to live up to its reputation as the most bipartisan committee in Congress and that we work together to craft legislation that honors our most solemn duty: To protect the national security interests of this country.

And I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Deutch.

Mr. Trott. Mr. TROTT. I want to thank Representative Russell and Chairman Royce for scheduling this markup.

This deal was a bad deal in September; it was a bad deal in October when we considered it. The deal is predicated on Iran becoming a productive member of the world community. We are about 2 months into the deal, and, as has been duly noted by both sides of this committee, Iran's behavior has gotten worse.

It is also clear that the President-probably because if he took any action with respect to this deal he would be admitting failure and be admitting that he made a mistake—it is clear the President will not take action to enforce the terms of the deal. So we in Congress have to do something.

I am supporting H.R. 3662 because we in Congress have to take advantage of every opportunity we can to remind the President and remind the world you cannot do a good deal with a bad guy. And so if Ranking Member Engel is correct and the President vetoes this bill, then I look forward to working on any and all bipartisan legislation that can protect us and the world from Iran.

I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I simply want to add my voice to that of Mr. Engel, Mr. Deutch, Mr. Sherman. I also share concerns about Iranian behavior and want to find efficacious and bipartisan ways to address that.

This is not one of those. This is an attempt to embarrass and to undermine. And that is not how we ought to be doing business in this committee, and it is not how the Congress, as a legislative entity, a branch of government, ought to be contributing to American foreign policy.

Whatever happened to the Arthur Vandenberg standard that our differences end at the water's edge? That was a good standard that helped create a much more stable foreign policy for decades.

So we can yield to this temptation today and make a point, but at what expense?

The gentleman indicated that the President will veto this bill and then he looks-then-he looks forward to working in a bipartisan basis to find solutions. How about now? How about, just once, resisting the temptation to engage in partisan activity, especially when it comes to foreign policy?

That is not the standard we have set on this committee. I applaud the chairman and the ranking member for setting a much more civil and thoughtful standard on this committee. Unfortunately, this bill is an exception to that otherwise commendable approach to a very important subject.

I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.

Do any other members seek recognition to speak on the bill?

Hearing no further requests for recognition on the underlying bill, are there any amendments?

Hearing no further requests and seeing that a quorum is present, the Chair now moves that H.R. 3662 be favorably reported to the House.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, no.

In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it, and H.R. 3662 is ordered favorably reported to the House.

I have been notified that some of our members may wish to file additional minority or dissenting views regarding this bill as part of the committee report, as allowed by the House and committee rules. If at all possible, I would ask that you transmit any such views to the committee clerk by 4 p.m. on Friday. And I want to remind members that such views should be personally signed by the member in order to be included in the report.

I now call up our third bill, last bill, H.R. 1797, the End Neglected Tropical Diseases Act. Without objection, it is considered read. It is open for amendment at any point.

And also without objection, as members were notified yesterday, we will consider it en bloc with Smith Amendment 73, which was provided to your offices on Tuesday.

[The information referred to follows:]

114TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H.R. 1797

To facilitate effective research on and treatment of neglected tropical diseases, including Ebola, through coordinated domestic and international efforts.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 15, 2015

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. FATTAH, Mr. SALMON, Mr. JOHN-SON of Georgia, Mr. MEADOWS, Mr. RANGEL, and Mr. WALBERG) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

- To facilitate effective research on and treatment of neglected tropical diseases, including Ebola, through coordinated domestic and international efforts.
- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

- 4 This Act may be cited as the "End Neglected Trop-
- 5 ical Diseases Act".

6 SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

7 The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

I

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Sec. 1. Short title.

Sec. 2. Table of contents.

See. 3. Statement of policy.

See. 4. Findings.

See. 5. Definition.

See. 6. Rule of construction.

TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Sec. 101. Expansion of USAID NTDs Program.

Sec. 102. Actions by Department of State.

Sec. 103. Multilateral development and health institutions.

TITLE II-DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

See. 201. Promoting efforts through interagency working groups and international forums.

Sec. 202. Report on neglected tropical diseases in the United States.

Sec. 203. Centers of excellence.

Sec. 204. Panel on worm infection solutions.

1 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

2 It is the policy of the United States to support a 3 broad range of implementation and research and develop-4 ment activities that work toward the achievement of cost-5 effective and sustainable treatment, control and, where possible, elimination of neglected tropical diseases, includ-6 7 ing Ebola, for the economic and social well-being for all 8 people. 9 SEC. 4. FINDINGS. 10 Congress finds the following: 11(1) The World Health Organization (WHO) has 12 identified 17 neglected tropical diseases (NTDs). 13 Approximately two billion people-almost one-third

14 of the world's population—are at risk of contracting

15 an NTD, and more than 1.4 billion people are cur-

16 rently afflicted with one or more NTDs.

1 (2) In 2013, WHO adopted a comprehensive 2 resolution on NTDs recognizing that increased na-3 tional and international investments in prevention 4 and control of neglected tropical diseases have suc-5 ceeded in improving health and social well-being in 6 many countries. 7 (3) NTDs have an enormous impact in terms of 8 disease burden and quality of life. NTDs cause the 9 loss of up to 534,000 lives and 57 million disability-10 adjusted life years each year. NTDs surpass both 11 malaria and tuberculosis in causing greater loss of 12 life-years to disability and premature death. Many 13 NTDs cause disfigurement and disability, leading to 14 stigma, social discrimination, societal and 15 marginalization. 16 (4) NTDs create an economic burden of billions 17 of dollars through the loss of productivity and high 18 costs of health care required for treatment. People 19 afflicted by NTDs are less productive than their

20 healthy counterparts. NTDs jeopardize the ability of 21 people to attend work and school, or to produce at 22 full capacity. For example, controlling one NTD, 23 hookworm, in children can result in a 43-percent in-24 crease in future wage earnings.

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1 (5) The social, economic, and health burden of 2 NTDs falls primarily on low- and middle-income 3 countries, where access to safe water, sanitation, 4 and health care is limited. At least 100 countries 5 face two endemic NTD burdens, and 30 countries 6 carry six or more endemic NTDs. 7 (6) NTDs are not confined to the developing 8 world, however. Several NTD outbreaks have been 9 reported in the United States and other developed 10 countries, especially among the poor. In the United 11 States, NTDs disproportionately affect people living 12 in poverty, and especially minorities, including up to 13 2.8 million African-Americans with toxocariasis and 14 300,000 or more people, mostly Hispanic-Americans, 15 with Chagas disease. 16 (7) In 2014, an outbreak of Ebola Virus Dis-17 eases (Ebola) caused a pandemic that infected more 18 than 20,000 people, including more than 8,000 19 deaths. Although not listed as an NTD by the World 20 Health Organization, Ebola shares the same charac-21 teristics as other NTDs by affecting people living 22 "under conditions of poverty" and is "concentrated 23 almost exclusively in impoverished populations in the 24 developing world". Even when the disease had

spread to the United States and other developed

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1	countries, it was contained and controlled by the
2	well-equipped health systems in those areas.
3	(8) Many NTDs can be controlled, prevented,
4	and even eliminated using low-cost, effective, and
5	feasible solutions. Understanding the economic bur-
6	den of NTDs on productivity and health care costs
7	can help to assure governments and donors that the
8	resources directed toward NTDs represent a good
9	investment.
10	(9) Research and development efforts are imme-
11	diately needed for all NTDs, especially those for
12	which limited or no treatment currently exists.
13	(10) Critical to developing robust NTD control
14	strategies are epidemiological data that identify at-
15	risk populations, ensure appropriate treatment fre-
16	quency, and inform decisions about when treatment
17	can be reduced or stopped.
18	(11) Of the 14 most common NTDs, roughly
19	80 percent of infections are caused by soil-trans-
20	mitted helminths (STH) and schistosomiasis. STH
21	are a group of three parasitic worms (roundworms,
22	whipworms, and hookworms) that afflict more than
23	one billion people worldwide, including 600 million
24	school-age children, of whom more than 300 million
25	suffer from severe morbidity. Schistosomiasis is an-

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other helminth infection affecting at least 200 million people in developing countries, but some estimates indicate that the true number of people affected may be double or even triple that number.

5 (12) The main health problems caused by STH 6 are related to their negative effect on childhood nu-7 tritional status, which can cause stunting and wast-8 ing. For example, STH infection may lead to ane-9 mia, malabsorption of nutrients, loss of appetite, 10 nausea, abdominal pain, diarrhea, and reduced food 11 intake. When such health problems are experienced 12 in early childhood, a peak growth and development 13 period, the mental and physical damage—and loss of 14 future productivity and wage-earning potential-will 15 likely be irreversible. Schistosomiasis causes end-16 organ damage to the urinary tract, female genital 17 tract, liver and intestines. It also results in chronic 18 health conditions in children.

(13) STII and schistosomiasis are also particularly detrimental to the health of women of reproductive age and pregnant women. Their underlying
poor iron status makes these women most susceptible to developing anemia. Iron deficiency anemia
resulting from hookworm infection during pregnancy
has been linked to poor pregnancy outcomes such as

1 prematurity, low birth weight, and impaired lacta-2 tion. Female genital schistosmiasis may be one of 3 the most common gynecologic conditions in Africa 4 leading to genital pain, itching, and bleeding and 5 markedly increased susceptibility to HIV/AIDS. 6 (14) Fortunately, there is a simple, cost-effec-7 tive solution to STH and schistosomiasis infections: 8 single-dose deworming pills that can be safely ad-9 ministered once or twice annually to those at risk. 10 Pharmaceutical companies have committed to donate 11 the drugs needed to treat all at-risk, school-age chil-12 dren in developing countries. Regular administration 13 of deworming pills reduces morbidity associated with 14 STH and schistosomiasis infections by reducing 15 prevalence and transmission rates. 16 (15) Improved access to water, sanitation, and 17 hygiene (WASII) can also reduce the transmission of 18 NTDs, particularly intestinal worms. 19 (16) The benefits of deworming are immediate 20 and enduring. A rigorous randomized controlled trial 21 has shown school-based deworming treatment to re-22 duce school absenteeism by 25 percent. School-based 23 deworming also benefits young siblings and other 24 children who live nearby but are too young to be

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1	treated, leading to large cognitive improvements
2	equivalent to half a year of schooling.
3	SEC. 5. DEFINITION.
4	In this Act, the term "neglected tropical diseases" or
5	"NTDs"—
6	(1) means infections caused by pathogens, in-
7	cluding viruses, bacteria, protozoa, and helminths
8	that disproportionately impact individuals living in
9	extreme poverty, especially in developing countries;
10	and
11	(2) includes—
12	(A) Buruli ulcer (Mycobacterium Ulcerans
13	infection);
14	(B) Chagas disease;
15	(C) dengue or severe dengue fever;
16	(D) dracunculiasis (Guinea worm disease);
17	(E) echinococcosis;
18	(F) foodborne trematodiases;
19	(G) human African trypanosomiasis (sleep-
20	ing sickness);
21	(H) leishmaniasis;
22	(I) leprosy;
23	(J) lymphatic filariasis (elephantiasis);
24	(K) onchocerciasis (river blindness);
25	(L) rabies;

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1	(M) schistosomiasis;
2	(N) soil-transmitted helminthiases (STH)
3	(round worm, whip worm, and hook worm);
4	(O) taeniasis/cysticercosis;
5	(P) trachoma; and
6	(Q) yaws (endemic treponematoses).
7	SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
8	Nothing in this Act shall be construed to increase au-
9	thorizations of appropriations for the United States Agen-
10	ey for International Development or authorizations of ap-
11	propriations for the Department of Health and Human
12	Services.
12 13	Services. TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS
13	TITLE I-FOREIGN AFFAIRS
13 14	TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS SEC. 101. EXPANSION OF USAID NTDS PROGRAM.
13 14 15	TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS SEC. 101. EXPANSION OF USAID NTDS PROGRAM. (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
13 14 15 16	TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS SEC. 101. EXPANSION OF USAID NTDS PROGRAM. (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: (1) Since fiscal year 2006, the United States
13 14 15 16 17	TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS SEC. 101. EXPANSION OF USAID NTDS PROGRAM. (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: (1) Since fiscal year 2006, the United States Government has been an essential leading partner in
 13 14 15 16 17 18 	TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS SEC. 101. EXPANSION OF USAID NTDS PROGRAM. (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: (1) Since fiscal year 2006, the United States Government has been an essential leading partner in advancing control and elimination efforts for seven
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 	TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS SEC. 101. EXPANSION OF USAID NTDS PROGRAM. (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: (1) Since fiscal year 2006, the United States Government has been an essential leading partner in advancing control and elimination efforts for seven targeted neglected tropical diseases: lymphatic fila-
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 	TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS SEC. 101. EXPANSION OF USAID NTDS PROGRAM. (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: (1) Since fiscal year 2006, the United States Government has been an essential leading partner in advancing control and elimination efforts for seven targeted neglected tropical diseases: lymphatic fila- riasis (elephantiasis), onchocerciasis (river blind-
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 	TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS SEC. 101. EXPANSION OF USAID NTDS PROGRAM. (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: (1) Since fiscal year 2006, the United States Government has been an essential leading partner in advancing control and elimination efforts for seven targeted neglected tropical diseases: lymphatic fila- riasis (elephantiasis), onchocerciasis (river blind- ness), schistosomiasis, soil-transmitted helminthiases

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1	at least three other NTDs: foodborne trematodiases,
2	rabies, and yaws (endemic treponematoses).
3	(2) The United States Agency for International
4	Development (USAID) Neglected Tropical Diseases
5	Program has made important and substantial con-
6	tributions to the global fight to control and eliminate
7	the seven most common NTDs. Leveraging more
8	than 6.7 billion in donated medicines, USAID has
9	supported the distribution of more than one billion
10	treatments in 25 countries across Africa, Asia, and
11	Latin America and the Caribbean.
12	(3) United States Government leadership has
13	been instrumental in maintaining the global fight
14	against NTDs and is a partner in the 2012 London
15	Declaration on NTDs, which represents a new, co-
16	ordinated push to accelerate progress toward elimi-
17	nating or controlling 10 neglected tropical diseases
18	by 2020.
19	(4) The USAID NTDs Program is a clear ex-
20	ample of a successful public-private partnership be-
21	tween the Government and the private sector and
22	should be judiciously expanded.
23	(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
24	gress that the USAID NTDs Program (as in effect on

	11
1	the date of the enactment of this Act) should be modified
2	as follows:
3	(1) Provide rapid impact package treatments to
4	as many individuals suffering from NTDs or at risk
5	of acquiring NTDs as logistically feasible.
6	(2) Better integrate rapid impact package
7	treatments with programs to control and eliminate
8	HIV/AIDS and malaria, as well as improved access
9	to water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASII) pro-
10	grams, including—
11	(A) by coordinating HIV/AIDS programs
12	with the control of female genital schistoso-
13	miasis, now revealed as one of Africa's most im-
14	portant co-factors in its AIDS epidemic; and
15	(B) by coordinating malaria programs with
16	programs to control schistosomiasis and hook
17	worm—together these diseases produce pro-
18	found and severe anemia.
19	(3) Establish school-based NTD programs to
20	provide an opportunity to reach large numbers of
21	school-age children who require treatments for
22	NTDs, including rapid impact package treatments
23	as feasible and at very low cost.
24	(4) For other NTDs, such as human African
25	trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), Chagas disease,

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1	leishmaniasis, and dengue fever, develop new ap-
2	proaches to reach the goals relating to the elimi-
3	nation of NTDs as set forth in the World Health
4	Organization (WHO) NTD Roadmap.
5	(c) EXPANSION OF PROGRAM.—The Administrator of
6	USAID shall expand the USAID NTDs Program (as in
7	effect on the date of the enactment of this Act) as follows:
8	(1) Carry out monitoring and evaluation to pro-
9	vide accurate measurements to inform future NTD
10	control and elimination strategies.
11	(2) Coordinate with USAID development sec-
12	tors, such as sectors relating to water and sanita-
13	tion, hygiene, food security and nutrition, and edu-
14	cation (both primary and preprimary), to establish
15	programs that address NTDs and advance the goals
16	of the 2012 London Declaration on NTDs.
17	(3) Include morbidity management in treatment
18	plans for high-burden NTDs, such as lymphatic fila-
19	riasis (elephantiasis).
20	(4) Include NTDs that are recognized as high-
21	burden diseases in the Global Burden of Disease
22	Study 2010, including foodborne trematodiases,
23	human African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness),
24	Chagas disease, leishmaniasis, and dengue fever and
25	related arbovirus infections.

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1	(5) Include research and development, con-
2	sistent with other USAID disease prevention pro-
3	grams, to ensure the tools required for elimination
4	of these diseases are available, such as drugs,
5	diagnostics, vaccines.
6	(d) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.—
7	(1) Establishment.—The Administrator of
8	USAID shall establish a research and development
9	program within the USAID NTDs Program (as in
10	effect on the date of the enactment of this Λ et).
11	(2) PRIORITY.—The research and development
12	program shall focus on the prevention and control of
13	those diseases with the highest need for new treat-
14	ments, diagnostics, and vaccines, including soil
15	transmitted helminthiases (STH) (round worm, whip
16	worm, and hook worm), schistosomiasis, Chagas dis-
17	ease, human African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sick-
18	ness), leishmaniasis, Ebola, and dengue fever and
19	other arbovirus infections.
20	SEC. 102. ACTIONS BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
21	(a) Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator.—
22	Section $1(f)(2)(B)(ii)$ of the State Department Basic Au-
23	thorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. $2651a(f)(2)(B)(ii)$) is

24 amended by adding at the end the following:

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1	"(XIV) NEGLECTED TROPICAL
2	DISEASES.—
3	"(aa) IN GENERAL.—Ensur-
4	ing coordination of activities of
5	the United States (including
6	funding) relating to combatting
7	HIV/AIDS with activities of the
8	United States (including funding)
9	relating to combatting neglected
10	tropical diseases to include the
11	control and elimination of ne-
12	glected tropical diseases, particu-
13	larly in countries and regions
14	that are highly endemic for fe-
15	male genital schistosomiasis.
16	"(bb) Definition.—In this
17	subclause, the term 'neglected
18	tropical diseases' has the mean-
19	ing given the term in section 5 of
20	the End Neglected Tropical Dis-
21	eases Act.".
22	(b) GLOBAL FUND.—
23	(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State
24	should seek to engage the Global Fund in discus-
25	sions on whether to expand the authority of the

	15
1	Global Fund for the control and elimination of ne-
2	glected tropical diseases.
3	(2) GLOBAL FUND.—In this subsection, the
4	term "Global Fund" means the public-private part-
5	nership known as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
6	Tuberculosis and Malaria established pursuant to
7	Article 80 of the Swiss Civil Code.
8	(c) G-20 Countries.—The Secretary of State, act-
9	ing through the Office of Global Health Diplomacy, should
10	engage G–20 countries to significantly increase their role
11	in the control and elimination of neglected tropical dis-
12	eases, particularly Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indo-
13	nesia, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, and
13 14	nesia, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.
14	South Africa.
14 15	South Africa. SEC. 103. MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH IN-
14 15 16	South Africa. SEC. 103. MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH IN- STITUTIONS.
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 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 	South Africa. SEC. 103. MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH IN- STITUTIONS. (a) CONGRESSIONAL FINDING.—Congress finds that the treatment of high burden neglected tropical diseases, including school-based deworming programs, has proven to be a highly cost-effective education intervention and schools can serve as the best delivery mechanism for reaching large numbers of children with safe treatment for

1 (b) UNITED NATIONS.—The President shall direct 2 the United States permanent representative to the United 3 Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 4 States to urge the World Health Organization, the United 5 Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the United Nations Development Programme to 6 7 take the actions described in subsection (d). 8 (c) WORLD BANK INSTITUTE.—The President shall 9 direct the United States Executive Director at the Inter-10 national Bank for Reconstruction and Development to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge 11 12 the World Bank Institute to take the actions described in subsection (d). 13 14 (d) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—The actions described in 15 this subsection are the following: 16 (1) Ensure the dissemination of best practices 17 and programming on NTDs to governments and 18 make data accessible to practitioners in an open and 19 timely fashion. 20 (2)Highlight impacts ofschool-based 21 deworming programs on children's health and edu-22 cation, emphasizing the cost-effectiveness of such 23 programs. 24 (3) Encourage governments to implement 25 deworming campaigns at the national level.

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	17
1	(4) Designate a portion of grant funds of the
2	institutions to deworming initiatives and cross-sec-
3	toral collaboration with water and sanitation and hy-
4	giene efforts and nutrition or education program-
5	ming.
6	(5) Encourage accurate monitoring and evalua-
7	tion of NTD programs, including deworming pro-
8	grams.
9	(6) Engage governments in cross-border initia-
10	tives for the treatment, control, prevention, and
11	elimination of NTDs, and assist in developing
12	transnational agreements, when necessary.
13	TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF
14	HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
15	SEC. 201. PROMOTING EFFORTS THROUGH INTERAGENCY
16	WORKING GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL FO-
17	RUMS.
18	The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
19	continue to promote the need for robust programs and ac-
20	tivities to diagnose, prevent, control, and treat neglected
21	tropical diseases—
22	(1) through interagency working groups on
23	health; and

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1	(2) through relevant international forums on
2	behalf of the United States, including the post-2015
3	United Nations development agenda.
4	SEC. 202. REPORT ON NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES IN
5	THE UNITED STATES.
6	(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 12 months after
7	the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health
8	and Human Services, acting through the Director of the
9	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, shall submit
10	to the Congress a report on neglected tropical diseases in
11	the United States.
12	(b) CONTENTS.—The report required by this section
13	shall—
14	(1) assess the epidemiology of, impact of, and
15	appropriate funding required to address neglected
16	tropical diseases in the United States; and
17	(2) include the information necessary—
18	(Δ) to guide future health policy with re-
19	spect to such diseases;
20	(B) to accurately evaluate the current
21	state of knowledge concerning such diseases;
22	and
23	(C) to define gaps in such knowledge.

	19
1	SEC. 203. CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE.
2	Part P of title III of the Public Health Service Act
3	is amended by inserting after section 399V–5 of such Act
4	(42 U.S.C. 280g–16) the following:
5	"SEC. 399V-6. NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASE CENTERS OF
6	EXCELLENCE.
7	"(a) Cooperative Agreements and Grants.—
8	"(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, acting
9	through the Director of the National Institute of Al-
10	lergy and Infectious Diseases or the Administrator
11	of the Health Resources and Services Administra-
12	tion, as appropriate, may enter into cooperative
13	agreements with, and make grants to, public or pri-
14	vate nonprofit entities to pay all or part of the cost
15	of planning, establishing, or strengthening, and pro-
16	viding basic operating support for, one or more cen-
17	ters of excellence for research into, training in, and
18	development of diagnosis, prevention, control, and
19	treatment methods for neglected tropical diseases.
20	"(2) ELIGIBILITY.—To be eligible for a cooper-
21	ative agreement or grant under this section, an enti-
22	ty must—
23	"(A) have demonstrated expertise in re-
24	search on, and the epidemiology and surveil-
25	lance of, the major neglected tropical diseases
26	that are endemic to the United States, such as

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1	Chagas disease, dengue, leishmaniasis, and
2	West Nile virus infection, and helminth infec-
3	tions; and
4	"(B) participate in one or more not-for-
5	profit product development partnerships.
6	"(b) Policies.—A cooperative agreement or grant
7	under paragraph (1) shall be entered into or awarded in
8	accordance with policies established by the Director of the
9	National Institutes of Health or the Health Resources and
10	Services Administration, as applicable.
11	"(c) Coordination With Other Institutes.—
12	The Secretary shall coordinate the activities under this
13	section with similar activities conducted by other national
14	research institutes, centers, and agencies of the National
15	Institutes of Health to the extent that such institutes, cen-
16	ters, and agencies have responsibilities that are related to
17	neglected tropical diseases.
18	"(d) USES OF FUNDS.—A cooperative agreement or
19	grant under subsection (a) may be used for—
20	((1)) staffing, administrative, and other basic
21	operating costs, including such patient care costs as
22	are required for research;
23	"(2) clinical training, including training for al-
24	lied health professionals, continuing education for
25	health professionals and allied health professions

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1	personnel, and information programs for the public
2	with respect to neglected tropical diseases; and
3	"(3) research and development programs.
4	"(e) Period of Support; Additional Periods.—
5	"(1) IN GENERAL.—Support of a center of ex-
6	cellence under this section may be for a period of
7	not more than 5 years.
8	"(2) EXTENSIONS.—The period specified in
9	paragraph (1) may be extended by the Secretary for
10	additional periods of not more than 5 years if—
11	"(A) the operations of the center of excel-
12	lence involved have been reviewed by an appro-
13	priate technical and scientific peer review
14	group; and
15	"(B) such group has recommended to the
16	Secretary that such period should be extended.
17	"(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
18	$\ensuremath{^{\prime\prime}}(1)$ The term 'neglected tropical disease' has
19	the meaning given to that term in section 5 of the
20	End Neglected Tropical Diseases Act.
21	((2) The term 'product development partner-
22	ship' means a partnership to bring together public
23	and private sector researchers to develop new, or im-
24	prove on current, global health tools, such as drugs,

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1	diagnostics, insecticides, vaccines, and vector man-
2	agement strategies—
3	"(A) that are for neglected tropical dis-
4	eases, including Ebola; and
5	"(B) for which there is generally no profit-
6	able market.
7	"(g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—To
8	carry out this section, there are authorized to be appro-
9	priated such sums as may be necessary for each of the
10	fiscal years 2016 through 2020.".
11	SEC. 204. PANEL ON WORM INFECTION SOLUTIONS.
12	(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Director of the National
13	Institutes of Health, in consultation with the Adminis-
14	trator of the United States Agency for International De-
15	velopment, shall establish a panel to conduct an evaluation
16	of issues relating to worm infections, including potential
17	solutions such as deworming medicines (in this section re-
18	ferred to as the "panel").
19	(b) STRATEGIES.—The panel shall develop rec-
20	ommendations for strategies for solutions with respect
21	to—
22	(1) repeat infections;
23	(2) vector control;
24	(3) clean water solutions;

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1	(4) identifying incentives to encourage basic re-
2	search for less toxic, more effective medicines; and
3	(5) improving the success and cost efficiency of
4	current programs in these areas, based on a thor-
5	ough scan of initiatives already underway in both
6	the public and private sectors.
7	(c) APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS.—The Director of
8	the National Institutes of Health shall appoint as mem-
9	bers of the panel individuals from the public and private
10	sectors who are knowledgeable about or affected by worm
11	infections, including—
12	(1) at least 2 representatives of nongovern-
13	mental organizations;
14	(2) at least 2 representatives of private industry
15	involved in the development of de-worming medica-
16	tions;
17	(3) at least 2 representatives from academia;
18	and
19	(4) representatives of industries relating to
20	sanitation, clean water, and vector control.
21	(d) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date
22	of the enactment of this Act, the panel shall submit to
23	Congress and the Director of the National Institutes of
24	Health a report on its findings and recommended strate-
25	gies, including recommendations for such administrative

action and legislation as the panel determines to be appro priate.
 (e) TERMINATION.—The panel shall terminate not
 later than 6 months after submitting the report required
 by subsection (d).

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1797 Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey

Page 2, beginning on line 6, strike ", including Ebola,".

Page 2, beginning on line 7, strike "for all people" and insert "of all people".

Page 8, line 25, strike "rabies" and insert "scabies".

Strike title I (page 9, line 13, through page 17, line 12) and insert the following:

TITLE I—FOREIGN AFFAIRS

2 SEC. 101. USAID NTDS PROGRAM.

1

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 4 (1) Since fiscal year 2006, the United States 5 Government has been an essential leading partner in 6 advancing control and elimination efforts for seven 7 targeted neglected tropical diseases: lymphatic fila-8 riasis (elephantiasis), onchocerciasis (river blind-9 ness), schistosomiasis, soil-transmitted helminthiases 10 (STH) (round worm, whip worm, and hook worm), 11 and trachoma. Additional information suggests that

	2
1	such efforts could also produce collateral benefits for
2	at least three other NTDs: foodborne trematodiases,
3	scabies, and yaws (endemic treponematoses).
4	(2) The United States Agency for International
5	Development (USAID) Neglected Tropical Diseases
6	Program has made important and substantial con-
7	tributions to the global fight to control and eliminate
8	the seven most common NTDs. Leveraging more
9	than \$6.7 billion in donated medicines, USAID has
10	supported the distribution of more than one billion
11	treatments in 25 countries across Africa, Asia, and
12	Latin America and the Caribbean.
13	(3) United States Government leadership has
14	been instrumental in maintaining the global fight
15	against NTDs and is a partner in the 2012 London
16	Declaration on NTDs, which represents a new, co-
17	ordinated international push to accelerate progress
18	toward eliminating or controlling 10 neglected trop-
19	ical diseases by 2020.
20	(4) The USAID NTDs Program is a clear ex-
21	ample of a successful public-private partnership be-
22	tween the Government and the private sector and
23	should be judiciously expanded, as practicable and
24	appropriate.

	3
1	(5) While many of the most common NTDs
2	have treatments that are safe, easy to use, and effec-
3	tive, treatment options for NTDs with the highest
4	death rates, including human African
5	trypanosomiasis, visceral leishmaniasis, and Chagas
6	disease, are extremely limited.
7	(6) Since 2014, the USAID NTDs Program
8	has been investing in research and development for
9	certain NTDs to ensure that promising new break-
10	through medicines can be rapidly evaluated, reg-
11	istered, and made available to patients.
12	(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13	gress that the USAID NTDs Program (as in effect on
14	the date of the enactment of this Act) should—
15	(1) provide integrated drug treatment packages
16	to as many individuals suffering from NTDs or at
17	risk of acquiring NTDs as logistically feasible;
18	(2) better integrate NTD control and treatment
19	tools and approaches into complementary develop-
20	ment and global health programs by coordinating
21	across multiple sectors, including HIV/AIDS, ma-
22	laria, tuberculosis, education, nutrition, other infec-
23	tious diseases, maternal and child health, and water,
20	tious diseases, maternar and emild nearth, and water,
23	sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), as practicable and

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1	(3) establish low-cost, high-impact community
2	and school-based NTD programs to reach large at-
3	risk populations, including school-age children who
4	require treatments for NTDs, with integrated drug
5	treatment packages as feasible;
6	(4) for other NTDs, such as human African
7	trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), Chagas disease,
8	leishmaniasis, and dengue fever, engage in research
9	and development of new tools and approaches to
10	reach the goals relating to the elimination of NTDs
11	as set forth in the World Health Organization
12	(WHO) NTD Roadmap, as opportunities emerge
13	and resources allow; and
14	(5) monitor the research on and developments
15	in the prevention and treatment of other NTDs so
16	they can be incorporated into the program, as prac-
17	ticable and appropriate.
18	(c) PROGRAM PRIORITIES.—The Administrator of
19	USAID should incorporate the following priorities into the
20	USAID NTDs Program (as in effect on the date of the
21	enactment of this Act):
22	(1) Planning for and conducting robust moni-
23	toring and evaluation of program investments in
24	order to accurately measure impact, identify and

	5
1	share lessons learned, and inform future NTD con-
2	trol and elimination strategies.
3	(2) Coordinating program activities with
4	USAID development and global health sectors, in-
5	cluding WASII, food and nutrition security, and
6	education (both primary and preprimary), in order
7	to advance the goals of the 2012 London Declara-
8	tion on NTDs.
9	(3) Including morbidity management in treat-
10	ment plans for high-burden NTDs.
11	(4) Incorporating NTDs that are recognized as
12	high-burden diseases in the Global Burden of Dis-
13	ease Study 2010 into the program as opportunities
14	emerge, to the extent practicable and appropriate.
15	(5) Continue investments in research and devel-
16	opment for NTDs that complement existing research
17	investments and ensure that new discoveries make it
18	through the pipeline and become available to people
19	who need them most.
20	SEC. 102. ACTIONS BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
21	(a) Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator.—
22	It is the sense of Congress that the Office of the Global
23	$\Lambda \mathrm{IDS}$ Coordinator should fully consider evolving research
24	on the impact of NTDs on efforts to control HIV/AIDS

2 and appropriate. 3 (b) GLOBAL PROGRAMMING.— 4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 5 should encourage the Global Fund to take into con-6 sideration evolving research on the impact of NTDs 7 on efforts to control HIV/AIDS when making pro-8 gramming decisions, particularly with regard to fe-9 male genital schistosomiasis, which studies suggest 10 may be one of the most significant co-factors in the 11 AIDS epidemic in Africa, as necessary and appro-12 priate.

(2) GLOBAL FUND.—In this subsection, the
term "Global Fund" means the public-private partnership known as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria established pursuant to
Article 80 of the Swiss Civil Code.
(c) G-20 COUNTRIES.—The Secretary of State, act-

(c) G-20 COUNTRIES.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Office of Global Health Diplomacy, should
encourage G-20 countries to significantly increase their
role in the control and elimination of neglected tropical
diseases.

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6 1 when making future programming decisions, as necessary

1 SEC. 103. MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH IN-

STITUTIONS.

2

3 (a) CONGRESSIONAL FINDING.—Congress finds that 4 the treatment of high burden neglected tropical diseases, 5 including community and school-based deworming pro-6 grams, can be a highly cost-effective education interven-7 tion and schools can serve as an effective delivery mecha-8 nism for reaching large numbers of children with safe treatment for soil-transmitted helminthiases (STH) 9 10 (round worm, whip worm, and hook worm) in particular. 11 (b) UNITED NATIONS.—The President should direct 12 the United States permanent representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 13 14 States to urge the World Health Organization and the United Nations Development Programme to take the ac-15 16 tions described in subsection (d).

(c) WORLD BANK INSTITUTE.—The President shall
direct the United States Executive Director at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge
the World Bank Institute to take the actions described
in subsection (d).

23 (d) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—The actions described in24 this subsection are the following:

25 (1) Ensure the dissemination of best practices26 and programming on NTDs to governments and

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	8
1	make data accessible to practitioners in an open and
2	timely fashion.
3	(2) Highlight impacts of community and school-
4	based deworming programs on children's health and
5	education, emphasizing the cost-effectiveness of such
6	programs.
7	(3) Encourage governments to implement
8	deworming campaigns at the national level.
9	(4) Consider designating a portion of grant
10	funds of the institutions to deworming initiatives
11	and cross-sectoral collaboration with water and sani-
12	tation and hygiene efforts and nutrition or education
13	programming, as practicable and appropriate.
14	(5) Encourage accurate monitoring and evalua-
15	tion of NTD programs, including deworming pro-
16	grams.
17	(6) Engage governments in cross-border initia-
18	tives for the treatment, control, prevention, and
19	elimination of NTDs, and assist in developing
20	transnational agreements, when necessary.
	In section 2 (relating to the table of contents), strike
th	e item relating to section 101, and insert the following:

Sec. 101. USAID NTDs Program.

Amend the title so as to read: "A bill to facilitate effective research on and treatment of neglected tropical

diseases through coordinated domestic and international efforts".

Х

Chairman ROYCE. And I will now recognize myself.

This bill is the End Neglected Tropical Diseases Act. It will better target and coordinate our ongoing efforts to treat and control and eliminate neglected tropical diseases, which affect 1 billion people on this planet. It exacts a devastating human and economic toll.

And these tropical diseases tend to prey on the world's most vulnerable, on people living in extreme poverty in developing countries, but they also pose a public health threat here in the United States. As we speak, Hawaii is enduring an outbreak of dengue fever. And that was introduced through international travel.

So the bill contains two titles. Title I falls under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee and is what we are considering today. And we look forward to working with the Energy and Commerce Committee on Title II.

We really, all of us, I think, want to thank Mr. Smith for his work on this important bill.

And I now recognize the ranking member to speak on the bill.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I want to also, as you just did, thank Mr. Chris Smith for offering the End Neglected Tropical Diseases Act.

When we use this term, "neglected tropical diseases," we are talking about infectious diseases that thrive in tropical and subtropical areas. They are spread not just by humans but through animals and also through infected soil or water. These diseases take a particularly high toll on poor populations in developing countries.

Diseases like these stifle growth and progress even when we know how to treat them. That is why, a decade ago, President Bush launched the Neglected Tropical Diseases Program at USAID. The Obama administration carried this work forward, and, by 2014, this effort has led to 1 billion treatments worldwide. So, again, talk about bipartisan cooperation.

Now we need to stay focused on this work. Mr. Smith's bill would make sure our existing efforts to deal with these diseases are working to get treatments where they are needed most and as quickly as possible. It also supports continued research and development at USAID so that we can stay on the cutting edge of diagnostic methods and treatment options.

Let me also note that the challenges posed by neglected tropical diseases intersect with our other global health priorities—priorities such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria relief. It is important not to focus our energies on one challenge at the expense of another but instead recognize opportunities for collaboration across health and development programs. Only when programs work efficiently and in concert can they bring timely and complete relief to patients.

So I believe we should all support this bill and build on our record of success in this area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your strong support for this legislation, and Ranking Member Engel, for Joan Condon's wonderful work, Catherine Barnao, and Greg Simpkins on my staff.

This is a truly bipartisan piece of legislation attacking a terrible pandemic that has cost the lives of millions of people and made people extremely ill—the morbidity rate is very, very high—and susceptible to a great number of opportunistic diseases that hit when people carry worms and parasites.

And the numbers are off the charts, in terms of people who have neglected tropical diseases. One-point-four billion people is the estimation by the World Health Organization, and about 2 billion people, mostly very poor, are at risk.

Although we are finding that tropical diseases know no borders. And they have found their way big time, as you pointed out, in Hawaii with dengue fever, but a large number of other tropical diseases have made their way particularly into the southern parts of the United States-Chikungunya, as well as Ebola, although a very, very limited amount there, of course.

These diseases need to be attacked in the greatest way possible. My subcommittee has had five hearings on tropical diseases. One of our star witnesses was Dr. Peter Hotez, who literally wrote the book, from Baylor, and has done wonderful work in terms of delineating the challenges as well as the huge gaps that remain.

So, again, we are going to do everything we can with this legislation to try to be an all-of-Government effort-from CDC, HHS. And, as you pointed out, Title II of the bill has been referred to the Energy and Commerce Committee. And one of the provisions there is to establish a center or centers of excellence devoted to researching, preventing, and hopefully treating these NTDs, because they are taking the lives of so many people. So I thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

Without objection, I would ask that my statement be made a part of the record.

This is a bipartisan bill, as I pointed out. And I do want to thank Chaka Fattah, the chief Democrat cosponsor; Matt Salmon, who has done yeoman's work on this issue and cares deeply about it; Mr. Johnson, Mr. Meadows, Rangel, and Walberg; my ranking member, who is also a cosponsor, for her support for it.

And, again, we need to move this forward. And I think it will literally save many lives, not around the world only, but in this country as well.

I vield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Any other members seeking recognition?

Hearing no further requests, are there any additional amendments?

Hearing none, the question occurs on agreeing to H.R. 1797 en bloc.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, no.

In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it, and the en bloc items are agreed to. And, without objection, 1797 is ordered favor-ably reported, as amended. And staff is directed to make any tech-

nical and conforming changes. So that concludes our business for today. And I want to thank Ranking Member Engel and I want to thank all of you on the committee and our staff for the work that went into today's markup. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP NOTICE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman

January 7, 2015

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at <u>http://www.ForeignAffairs.house.gov</u>):

DATE:	Thursday, January 7, 2016
TIME:	10:00 a.m.
MARKUP OF:	H.R. 1797, End Neglected Tropical Diseases Act;
	H.R. 3662, Iran Terror Finance Transparency Act; and
	H.R, Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act of 2015.

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP

Day <u>Thursday</u> Date <u>1/7/201</u>	7 <u>6 Roo</u>	m2172	?	
Starting Time Ending Time	e10:57			
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Presiding Member(s)				- Antul
Chairman Edward R. Royce				
Check all of the following that apply:				
Open Session 🔽 Executive (closed) Session 🗌 Televised 🔽		ronically Record graphic Record		
BILLS FOR MARKUP: (Include hill number	(s) and title(s) o	f legislation.)		
See attached.				
COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: See attached.				
NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESEN	ľ:	-		
STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List	any statements s	ubmitted for the	record.)	
IFR - Rep. Chris Smith SFR - Rep. Chris Smith				
ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKU	J P: (Attach copi	es of legislation	and amendment.	s.)
See markup summary.				
RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARI	(IP)- (Attach f	nal vote tally sk	ant listing anch a	nambur)
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<u>Subject</u>	<u>Yeas</u>	<u>Navs</u>	Present_	Not Voting

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE

or TIME ADJOURNED <u>10:57</u>

<u>Mufue Anulu</u> Doug Anderson, General Counsel

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Full Committee Markup

PRESENT	Member
Х	Edward R. Royce, CA
Х	Christopher H. Smith, NJ
Х	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL
Х	Dana Rohrabacher, CA
Х	Steve Chabot, OH
	Joe Wilson, SC
Х	Michael T. McCaul, TX
Х	Ted Poe, TX
Х	Matt Salmon, AZ
Х	Darrell Issa, CA
Х	Tom Marino, PA
	Jeff Duncan, SC
Х	Mo Brooks, AL
Х	Paul Cook, CA
Х	Randy Weber, TX
Х	Scott Perry, PA
Х	Ron DeSantis, FL
	Mark Meadows, NC
Х	Ted Yoho, FL
Х	Curt Clawson, FL
Х	Scott DesJarlais, TN
Х	Reid Ribble, WI
Х	Dave Trott, MI
Х	Lee Zeldin, NY
Х	Dan Donovan, NY

Present	MEMBER
Х	Eliot L. Engel, NY
Х	Brad Sherman, CA
	Gregory W. Meeks, NY
Х	Albio Sires, NJ
Х	Gerald E. Connolly, VA
Х	Theodore E. Deutch, FL
Х	Brian Higgins, NY
Х	Karen Bass, CA
Х	William Keating, MA
Х	David Cicilline, RI
Х	Alan Grayson, FL
Х	Ami Bera, CA
Х	Alan S. Lowenthal, CA
Х	Grace Meng, NY
Х	Lois Frankel, FL
Х	Tulsi Gabbard, HI
Х	Joaquin Castro, TX
Х	Robin Kelly, IL
Х	Brendan Boyle, PA

1/7/16 Foreign Affairs Committee Markup Summary

The Chair called the markup to order.

- 1) H.R. 4314 (Zeldin), Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act of 2015
 - a. Royce 92, a manager's amendment to H.R. 4314

By unanimous consent, H.R. 4314 and Royce 92 were considered *en bloc* and agreed to by voice vote.

By unanimous consent, H.R. 4314, as amended, was ordered favorably reported to the House, and the Chair was authorized to seek consideration of the measure under suspension of the rules.

- 2) <u>H.R. 3662 (Russell)</u>, Iran Terror Finance Transparency Act was ordered favorably reported to the House by voice vote, a reporting quorum being present.
- 3) H.R. 1797 (Smith), End Neglected Tropical Diseases Act

a. Smith 73, an amendment to Title I of H.R. 1797

By unanimous consent, H.R. 1797 and Smith 73 were considered *en bloc* and agreed to by voice vote.

By unanimous consent, H.R. 1797, as amended, was ordered favorably reported.

The Committee adjourned.

HCFA Mark-Up Statement on HR 1797 January 7, 2016 Rep. Chris Smith

Tropical diseases, some of them tragically neglected in terms of research and treatments, pose a critical threat to global health. The World Health Organization has identified 17 neglected tropical diseases (NTDs). Approximately two billion people—almost one-third of the world's population—are at risk of contracting an NTD, and more than 1.4 billion people are currently afflicted with one or more NTDs.

Over the past two years, my subcommittee has held five hearings on tropical diseases. Some of these tropical diseases impact health beyond the immediate effect on its victims. Some are widely believed to be co-factors in the spread of HIV-AIDS; others, particularly intestinal worms, rob pregnant women and their babies of nutrients and can cause excessive bleeding during birth that is life-threatening.

Ebola is a tropical disease, but is not considered neglected because of all the resources the international community has devoted to end the outbreak that threatened not only Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, as well as their neighbors in West Africa and even Europe and the United States. While the epidemic has been brought under control, this disease has broken out in different countries since 1976, and if we don't continue surveillance and efforts to control and eliminate such diseases, we will see them return and pose new threats to the global community.

For example, we have a new tropical disease threat – the Zika virus – that spread over more than half a century from Uganda to other areas of Africa to Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands and now Latin America, where Brazil is in the midst of a Zika influx believed to be causing an epidemic of babies born with diminished brains. Just as dengue fever and chikangunya have appeared in the United States, so could Zika or some new tropical disease.

This is what HR 1797 aims to address. HR 1797 establishes that the policy of the United States is to support a broad range of research and development activities that work to achieve cost-effective and sustainable treatment, control and, where possible, elimination of neglected tropical diseases. The improved program coordination and integration will make US health programming more efficient and successful.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Neglected Tropical Diseases Program has made important and substantial contributions to the global fight to control and eliminate the seven most common NTDs. Leveraging more than \$6.7 billion in donated medicines from pharmaceutical companies, USAID has supported the distribution of more than one billion treatments in 25 countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

USAID officials believe HR 1797 will reinforce this public-private partnership by demonstrating congressional support for the agency's programs.

I want to thank Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel for their support and assistance and particularly note the work of Joan Condon and Catherine Barnao from the committee and Gregory Simpkins from my staff who worked through the holidays to make today's mark-up of HR 1797 possible.

I ask my colleagues to not only vote for this important piece of legislation, but to also co-sponsor it to send the message that this is an important part of U.S. global health strategy.

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Spreading Virus Adds to Brazil's Woes

Some health officials link outbreak of mosquito-borne pathogen to rising instances of infant deaths from rare disease

By Reed Johnson, Rogerio Jelmayer and Betsy McKay The Wall Street Journal Dec. 22, 2015 7:31 p.m. ET

SÃO PAULO—Brazil is in the grips of yet another crisis: a fast-spreading virus some health officials are linking to thousands of cases of infant brain damage and 40 related deaths this year.

Health authorities have declared a national emergency as they battle the Zika virus, a mosquitoborne pathogen that has been detected across much of South America's largest country.

Symptoms include fever, rashes, headaches, joint aches and vomiting, lasting from a few days to about a week. The virus is rarely lethal, and it is usually treated with bed rest and liquids.

Health officials believe the virus this year alone is responsible in Brazil for an explosion of cases of microcephaly, an extremely rare condition in which babies are born with shrunken skulls because their brains aren't growing properly. But they say microcephaly hasn't been linked to Zika virus outbreaks before.

On Tuesday, Brazil's Health Ministry released figures showing that as of Saturday, the number of suspected Zika-related microcephaly cases had climbed to 2,782, a surge of nearly 16% from the previous week. The number of confirmed deaths shot up to 40 from 29 over the period.

By comparison, Brazil had 147 cases of microcephaly for all of 2014.

"This is probably the largest outbreak of Zika ever recorded," said Ann Powers, acting chief of the arboviral diseases branch at the Atlanta-based Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "There's a lot of concern about what it means, what the implications are, and what we can potentially do for containment and control."

There are multiple potential causes of microcephaly in gestating babies, including genetic abnormalities, exposure to toxins and maternal alcohol abuse. Dr. Powers said there is a "suggestive" link between microcephaly and Zika, but said the connection couldn't be confirmed until additional studies have been performed.

No vaccine exists to combat the Zika virus. Alarmed health and government officials are mobilizing communities nationwide to battle mosquitoes and have enlisted the help of international health agencies, including the World Health Organization and the CDC. Brazilian government officials are dispatching army troops and other crews to drain water-logged areas and search out and eradicate larvae-filled water supplies. The state of São Paulo, Brazil's most populous, has assembled a medical task force to coordinate diagnosis and treatment efforts.

With its introduction into Brazil and other countries in the Americas, including Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico, Zika is following a pattern similar to other mosquito-borne viruses that are riding speedily to new parts of the world.

The virus is carried by the Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus species, the same mosquitoes that transmit dengue and a similar disease, chikungunya. Those mosquitoes populate the southern U.S., Caribbean, Central and South America, Dr. Powers said.

The size of the Brazilian outbreak may be the reason health authorities are finding unusual neurological symptoms and disorders for the first time, she said.

Another reason may be a mutation in the virus, she said, adding that scientists are studying genetic sequences to look at whether changes have occurred that could lead to these disorders.

Still, chikingunya isn't circulating widely on its own in the U.S. and any Zika outbreaks in the U.S. would be limited, Dr. Powers said, because the mosquitoes that carry it aren't present year-round.

"This is a very good example of how something found in the past in one location can really turn out to be a problem in another," she said.

Chikungunya, an infection that causes fever and severe, lasting joint pain, has long circulated in Africa, Asia and parts of Europe, but didn't reach the Americas until 2013, when public health authorities found evidence of transmission in the Caribbean.

Since then, chikungunya has swept through the Americas.

"It does seem to be following a pattern similar to chikungunya," Dr. Powers said of Zika. With the Southern Hemisphere's summer vacation season now under way and the nation gearing up for an influx of tourists for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, some Brazilian officials say they fear the infection rate could surge in coming months.

The Zika virus first surfaced in Africa in the late 1940s, and has hopscotched to Southeast Asia, the Western Pacific and more recently to Latin America. Exactly how it reached Brazil, why it is spreading so fast and how it became such a threat to developing fetuses isn't yet understood. Brazilian health officials don't know the exact number of adults infected with the Zika virus because the vast majority of them don't receive hospital treatment.

What is clear is that Brazil's mosquito population has surged over the past few years, paradoxically, as a result of a record drought that has hit the nation's northeast and southeast. As water supplies dried up, anxious residents began storing emergency water supplies in swimming pools, plastic jugs and other containers, creating a huge stock of mosquito-breeding areas.

The Brazilian government's infectious-disease officials are well-regarded throughout the region. But with the country mired in its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression and the nation's capital transfixed by a massive corruption scandal and impeachment proceeding against President Dilma Rousseff, some worry that the nation isn't mobilizing fast enough to battle the quick-moving epidemic.

Osmar Terra, a medical doctor, former state health secretary and current federal legislator from the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, said he believes Brazil could have as many as 100,000 cases of infection in 2016 if emergency measures aren't taken soon.

"This is an unprecedented human tragedy," said Dr. Terra, who based his projections on his handling of the outbreak of the H1N1 virus in 2009. "We need a crisis cabinet" to deal with the situation.

Dr. Terra favors using drones to detect pools and hidden water supplies, allowing authorities to enter private homes without permission to search for stored water, and even urging women to delay pregnancy.

Other health professionals are giving some of the same advice. Experts say the Zika virus can be passed through a pregnant woman's placenta to her fetus, with the greatest danger occurring during the first trimester.

Thomaz Gollop, a professor of genetic medicine at the University of São Paulo, is recommending his female patients under the age of 35 to wait a few more months this year before getting pregnant.

"Having a child is a lifelong commitment," Dr. Gollop said.

Microcephaly cases with suspected links to the Zika virus have been reported in 19 of Brazil's 26 states as well as the federal district of Brasilia, the nation's capital. But its effects are being felt most keenly in poor, northeastern states including Pernambuco, Paraíba, Ceará and Bahia.

Jussara Araujo, health secretary of Itapetim, in Pernambuco, said in a phone interview that the town had recorded 11 suspected cases of Zika-related microcephaly since October. But because the municipality of 13,800 lacks adequate medical infrastructure, pregnant mothers suspected of being infected had to be taken to the state capital of Recife, about 220 miles away.

"We are very saddened," Ms. Araujo said. "We have no experts to handle it."

One of those expectant mothers is Jackeline Palmeira de Araujo, a 26-year-old farmer who is 39 weeks' pregnant. She said she is avoiding stagnant water, covering up with extra clothing and getting regular ultrasounds to check on her gestating daughter.

So far, everything is normal. But, "I am very scared," Ms. Palmeira de Araujo said. —Luciana Magalhaes ontributed to this article.