

THE FUTURE OF U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 16, 2015

Serial No. 114-136

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/> or
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

97-997PDF

WASHINGTON : 2016

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

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THE FUTURE OF U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. There is a vote in progress. So my intention here is to begin the hearing, and then we will suspend for the duration of the votes and allow the other members of the committee to come forward. But in this fashion, myself and Congressman Poe can make our opening statements, and maybe some of the other members will be able to as well.

This hearing is on the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations. The committee has repeatedly urged Pakistan to take meaningful action against key Islamist terrorist groups operating within its territory. Unfortunately, Pakistan, which is now home to the world's fastest growing nuclear weapons program, has remained a fount of radical Islamist thought. It was no surprise that one of the San Bernardino attackers, Tafsheen Malik, studied at a Pakistani school spreading a particularly fundamentalist message.

Looking back, the 9/11 terrorist attacks transformed the U.S.-Pakistan relations overnight. After more than a decade under sanctions for its nuclear proliferation, Pakistan was to be a key ally in combatting Islamist militancy, becoming a leading recipient of U.S. aid in the nearly 15 years since.

But while the U.S. was quick to embrace Pakistan, Pakistan has hardly reciprocated. Pakistani Governments have come and gone, but its northwestern frontier has remained a terrorist haven. With its security services supporting what it considers to be good Islamist terrorist groups, these good groups—under Pakistan's calculus—destabilize Afghanistan and threaten neighboring India while the government simultaneously opposes what it considers the bad Islamist groups.

Today Deobandi schools create an infrastructure of hate. Six-hundred Deobandi madrassas, funded with Gulf state money, teach intolerant, hate-filled rhetoric that inspires the foot soldiers of jihadist terrorism. I have made three trips to Islamabad to press this issue. Pakistan must do the work to register schools and close those creating new generations of radicals, and those are the

schools that are being funded with Gulf state money, the Deobandi schools, and they need to be closed.

Meanwhile, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is on a track to be the third largest. Its addition of small tactical nuclear weapons in recent years is even more troubling. This is a country which spends a fifth of its budget on the military, from long-range missiles to F-16s, but under 2.5 percent on education.

Through all of the double dealing, U.S. policy has essentially stood still. Security assistance—cash and arms—has continued to flow after the occasional temporary delays. Indeed, despite some Department of Defense assistance for Pakistan being held because of inadequate efforts against the Haqqani Network, the State Department is currently seeking more arms for Islamabad.

Pakistan itself has been devastated by terrorism with thousands, over 2,000, of its soldiers killed, thousands and thousands of its citizens killed, in terrorist attacks. Today we recognize the year anniversary of a horrific attack on a school in Peshawar that killed over 100 children. We want a strong partnership with the country, but a new policy is long overdue. One option, as Ranking Member Engel and I proposed earlier this year, would be to target those officials who maintain relationships with designated terrorist groups with travel and financial sanctions. This would make it clear: The U.S. and Pakistan cannot have a true strategic partnership until Pakistan security services cuts ties with terrorist organizations.

Recently, senior U.S. officials—including National Security Adviser Susan Rice and Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken—have traveled to Islamabad reportedly to press on the Pakistani Government. We look forward to hearing from our witness today whether there is reason for hope or if our policy is stuck in the same rut.

And I now will turn to Mr. Ted Poe of Texas and Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California for their opening statements.

Mr. Poe.

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My concern specifically is with our relationship with Pakistan. The United States has given Pakistan \$30 billion since 9/11. I think Pakistan is a Benedict Arnold ally to the United States. Even going back to May the 2nd, 2011, when there was the raid in Pakistan on Osama bin Laden, we didn't tell the Pakistanis we were coming because, frankly, they would snitch us off, and Osama bin Laden would have left. And the near confrontation that took place between the U.S. and Pakistan after the raid—Pakistan scrambled two U.S.-made F-16s and were headed to the area where the raid took place and a possible confrontation with two U.S.-made jets against American helicopters at the raid didn't happen, but it could have happened—pilots that presumably were trained the year before in 2010 in Tucson, Arizona. And I think we need to be very concerned about providing armaments for Pakistan, who seems to play all the sides.

And I would yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROYCE. Okay.

And I now yield time to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. When I was elected 28 years ago, I think most people considered me Pakistan's best friend

in the House of Representatives. And let me just say that over the years, I have been deeply disappointed that those people who I considered to be my friends were betraying the trust of the United States and were committing acts that were only the acts that an enemy would commit, even though we continued to have a facade of friendship.

We have given \$30 billion—\$30 billion—since 9/11, to Pakistan. Yet we realize that since 9/11 that there is ample evidence that Pakistan is still deeply involved with various terrorist networks, including supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan, and radicals who kill Americans. Frankly, our relationship with Pakistan has been a disgrace. We have a government that gave safe haven to Osama bin Laden, the murderer of 3,000 Americans—3,000 Americans slaughtered in front of us. I don't think anybody believes that the high level people in the Pakistan Government didn't know about that. They continue to hold Dr. Afridi, just to rub it in our face. That is the type of relationship they have with us. And to their own people, they are slaughtering people in the Balochistan and the Sindhis and others who are being brutally oppressed by a clique in their government, so it is not all Pakistan, but the clique that runs that country is treating us like suckers. And they should because we are. We are acting foolish, very foolish. Giving people money who have continually involved themselves in activity that is harmful to the United States of America is not going to win their friendship.

So, Mr. Chairman, I hope that we face facts, and if the Pakistani Government wants to be our friend, they can be our friend. But they have not been, and they need to change that if we are to continue on the relationship that we have. I would like to at this point to submit for the record a number of articles showing that, again, Pakistan continues to support various terrorist operations as well as their relationship with China, at the expense of their own people, the Baloch in particular, and I submit that for the record at this point.

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. We have four votes on the floor, so we will recess the hearing and return for witness testimony and questions after those four votes.

And we appreciate the patience of our witness and those in attendance, and for now, we stand in recess.

[Recess.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. I will give him the opportunity to make an opening statement, if Dr. Bera would like to make one, and then I will introduce the Ambassador. He will make his statement, and we will get to the questions and answers.

Dr. Bera is recognized.

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I will keep my comments short so we can hear from the Ambassador.

Obviously, as we look at the South Asian region, we look at India, we look at Pakistan, the relationship is incredibly important, particularly as the changing mission in Afghanistan is—the role of

Pakistan and India in stabilizing the region is incredibly complex and important.

It is an honor to welcome Ambassador Olson to the job. I understand this is your first month on the job, so looking forward to working with you and looking forward to furthering the relationship between the United States and South Asia and stabilizing the region. So thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dr. Bera.

The chairman would like to express his sorrow for not being here, Mr. Ambassador, but he is leading the charge on the House floor on four bills from our committee. And that is why he is not here, and that is why Mr. Engel is not here either.

We are pleased to be joined by Ambassador Richard Olson. Ambassador Olson is a Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Immediately prior to this appointment, Ambassador Olson served as the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, but he has served in many capacities all over the world since joining the State Department in 1982. Ambassador Olson has been recognized several times for his service, including being awarded the Presidential Distinguished Service Award.

Thank you for being with us, Mr. Ambassador.

Without objection, the witness' full prepared statement will be made a part of the record, and members will have 5 calendar days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record.

Ambassador Olson, please summarize your remarks.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD OLSON, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. OLSON. Madam Chair, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the current state of the United States' bilateral relationship with Pakistan. I am honored to testify in front of you for the first time in my capacity as U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, after having served as your Ambassador in Pakistan and previously at our Embassy in Kabul. I am humbled and privileged to be in this new role at such a critical time for the U.S. relationship with both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

It is clear to me that despite many challenges, Pakistan will continue to be an important partner for the United States for the foreseeable future, particularly in light of our enduring presence in Afghanistan. While we do not always see eye to eye on every issue, our relationship with Pakistan is vital to the national security of the United States. Most importantly, we have the opportunity to continue working with Pakistan today on counterterrorism issues along with strategic stability, economic growth, and democratic governance to help shape a future in which Pakistan is more stable, increasingly prosperous, and plays a constructive role in the region.

Pakistan is a complex place, and it is important not to overlook the significant progress made in the last few years. In 2013, Pakistan completed its first democratic transition from one elected civilian government to another. During the past 2 years, we can point

to progress, however imperfect, made across the economic and security sectors. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his team have restored macroeconomic stability to Pakistan and improved economic growth. While structural changes are still needed to set Pakistan's economy on a path to accelerated growth, the reforms to date are a considerable accomplishment.

There has also been substantial changes on the security front. Beginning in June 2014, Pakistan initiated large-scale counterterrorism operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The subsequent Peshawar Army School attack of exactly 1 year ago today was cited by terrorists as retribution for Pakistan's operations. It galvanized public opinion in Pakistan and prompted Pakistan to increase its counterterrorism efforts, not just in tribal areas. Through these operations, Pakistan has rooted out many terrorist safe havens and recovered more than 160 tons of improvised explosive device precursors.

In addition to taking action on internal threats, Pakistan's CT cooperation with the United States on al-Qaeda has been critical in decimating the organization. However, while Pakistan has made significant sacrifices in its fight against terrorism, we believe it can also take more steps to put pressure on all terrorist groups in Pakistan that threaten regional stability.

Pakistan is becoming a more constructive actor in the region. Last July, Pakistan facilitated a direct meeting between Afghan Government and Taliban officials in Murree, Pakistan, a milestone in our ongoing efforts to pursue a political settlement in Afghanistan. Last week Pakistan hosted the Regional Heart of Asia conference, attended by President Ghani, which yielded productive discussions about regional cooperation to advance the peace process and Afghanistan's long-term stability. In addition, India and Pakistan's commitment last week to restart a bilateral dialogue is particularly important.

In describing this progress, it is nonetheless clear that real challenges remain. While we see progress in decreasing the presence of certain terrorists in Pakistan, we continue to press Pakistan to target all militant groups that have safe haven in Pakistan, particularly the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. We have made it clear to the Pakistanis that these organizations threaten Pakistan, the region, and the panoply of our mutual national security interests, and they must be addressed rigorously.

We have also asked Pakistan to do all that it can to help recover U.S. citizens hostages held on Pakistani territory. We continue to press for greater cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, both to stabilize the common border region and to build the constructive relationship necessary for regional stability. It is also critical that Pakistan improve relations with its other neighbor, India. Recent high-level talks between Indian and Pakistani officials and the announcement of the resumption of formal dialogue is welcome. We hope the dialogue will be used to reduce tensions and increase ties between the two nations.

Naturally, as Pakistan seeks to combat violent extremism and pursue counterinsurgency and counterterrorism objectives, we continue to encourage and support Pakistan to strengthen the rule of

law, civil liberties, respect for human rights, accountability, and freedom of speech, which we firmly believe are vital to lasting peace and security.

Our civilian assistance programs help make progress toward these economic governance ends and a developing democracy, and it is essential they are sustained at current levels.

With that, I would like to conclude my statement, Madam Chair, and I am available for your questions and comments.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:]

**Testimony of Richard G. Olson
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Wednesday, December 16, 2015**

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the current state of the United States bilateral relationship with Pakistan. My previous interactions with House members were in my capacity as Ambassador to Pakistan; today, I am honored to testify in front of you for the first time as the United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). I am humbled and privileged to be in this new role at such a critical time for the U.S. relationship with both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I just returned from my first trip to the region as SRAP, where I attended the Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference with Deputy Secretary Tony Blinken. It is clear to me that despite the many challenges, Pakistan will continue to be an important partner for the United States for the foreseeable future, particularly in light of our enduring presence in Afghanistan. While we do not always see eye-to-eye on every issue, our relationship with Pakistan is vital

to the national security of the United States. Most importantly, we have the opportunity to continue working with Pakistan today on counterterrorism issues, along with strategic stability, economic growth, and democratic governance, to help shape a future in which Pakistan is more stable, increasingly prosperous, and plays a constructive role in the region. I strongly believe that working together to create this future is in the best interest of both our countries.

The U.S-Pakistan Bilateral Relationship Today

Since being sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan in October 2012, our bilateral relationship has improved significantly. From a low point in 2011, we have worked hard to build a more stable and forthright relationship that increasingly focuses on shared strategic goals, shaped through the U.S-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue.

Pakistan is a complex place, and it is important not to overlook the significant progress made in the last few years. In 2013, Pakistan completed its first democratic transition from one

elected civilian government to another. During the last two years, we can point to progress, however imperfect, made across the economic and security sectors. First, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his administration have restored macroeconomic stability to Pakistan and improved economic growth. Indeed, Pakistan has continued to make progress implementing its IMF program. These improvements led Moody's to increase Pakistan's credit rating in May of this year. While structural changes are still needed to set Pakistan's economy on a path to accelerated growth, the reforms to date are a considerable accomplishment, and Pakistan presents commercial opportunities for many U.S. companies.

There have also been substantial changes on the security front. Today's hearing is a particularly apt time to review Pakistan's progress in these areas, as it falls on the one-year anniversary of the Peshawar Army School attack, a heinous terrorist attack that killed 141 people, primarily children, and helped shape Pakistan's counterterrorism policies over the last year. Beginning in June 2014, Pakistan initiated large-scale counterterrorism operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); the subsequent Peshawar Army School attack, cited

by terrorists as retribution for Pakistan's operations, galvanized public opinion in Pakistan and prompted Pakistan to increase its counterterrorism efforts, even in settled areas. Pakistan has conducted Operations Khyber I, Khyber II, and Zarb-e-Azb in the FATA, the latter of which is ongoing and Pakistan plans to sustain through 2019. Through these operations, Pakistan has rooted out many terrorist safe havens and recovered more than 160 tons of improvised explosive device (IED) precursors. U.S.-origin equipment, including precision-guided munitions and night vision devices, has allowed Pakistan to successfully target militants at all times of the day and night while minimizing civilian casualties.

These operations and other steps have come at a cost – operations in the FATA caused massive destruction of civilian communities and have displaced over 700,000 individuals. However, we have also concurrently seen improvements to domestic security across the country. The Pakistani National Action Plan (NAP), announced by Prime Minister Sharif after the Peshawar attack and endorsed by all political parties in an effort to address violent extremism holistically, has led to some progress, including a significant improvement in the security of Karachi,

Pakistan's largest city; steps to reform the Madrassa system and root out sectarian violence; and a renewed focus on rooting out corruption.

In addition to taking action on internal threats, Pakistan's counterterrorism cooperation with the United States on al-Qa'ida has been critical in decimating the organization. However, while Pakistan has made significant sacrifices in its fight against terrorism, we believe it can also take more steps to put pressure on all terrorist groups in Pakistan that threaten regional stability.

More broadly, Pakistan has taken important steps to support regional stability. Last July, Pakistan facilitated a direct meeting between Afghan government and Taliban officials in Murree, Pakistan, a milestone in our ongoing efforts to pursue a political settlement in Afghanistan. Pakistan hosted the regional Heart of Asia conference last week, attended by President Ghani, which yielded productive discussions about regional cooperation to advance the peace process and Afghanistan's long-term stability. On the margins of the conference, Pakistani, Afghan, Chinese, and U.S. leaders affirmed their commitment to resuming direct talks

between the Afghan government and the Taliban. We believe Pakistan will be key to facilitating a peace process with the Taliban, and we hope Pakistan will follow through on its stated commitment to Afghan-owned, Afghan-led reconciliation.

With generous support from Congress, U.S. assistance to Pakistan has helped enable progress in many of these areas of mutual interest, and it continues to help Pakistan make incremental improvements. Our security assistance has helped Pakistan develop critical counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities that it has used to great effect in ongoing operations. The Department of Defense Coalition Support Fund reimbursements have also helped Pakistan sustain its operations. Civilian assistance is already helping the Government of Pakistan facilitate post-operation reconstruction and expand civilian governance in the tribal areas, including the gradual return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes in the FATA. U.S. civilian assistance also helps Pakistan find and implement long-term solutions to its major energy, economic, and demographic challenges, including by helping Pakistan reform its energy sector, adding sources of clean energy generation capacity

to Pakistan's overburdened power grid, building ties through education improvements, and fostering trade ties with the U.S. private sector. Importantly, our assistance also continues to strengthen democracy and tolerance across Pakistan.

A constructive development over the past year, today, the United States and Pakistan can discuss the most difficult challenges to our bilateral relationship with increasing candor. While we sometimes have differences of opinion, we are able to communicate frankly on the things that are most important to us and find opportunities to make incremental progress. My personal experience has shown me that sustained, consistent engagement with Pakistan – its government, its military, and its people – is the best way to address challenges and advance our core interests and to shape Pakistan's long-term future. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif's recent visits to the United States provided such opportunities to engage on critical issues at the most senior levels.

In describing this progress, it is nonetheless clear that real challenges remain. While we see progress in decreasing the

presence of certain terrorists in Pakistan, we continue to press Pakistan to target all militant groups that have safe haven in Pakistan, particularly the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. We have made it clear to the Pakistanis that these organizations threaten Pakistan, the region, and the panoply of our mutual national security interests, and they must be addressed rigorously. We have also asked Pakistan to do all that it can to help recover U.S. citizen hostages held in Pakistani territory.

Pakistan is well aware of the extremist and insurgent threats to the security of its nuclear weapons and has a professional and dedicated security force. As with all nuclear-capable states, we have urged Pakistan to restrain its nuclear weapons and missile development and stressed the importance of avoiding any developments that might invite increased risk to nuclear safety, security, or strategic stability. We continue to press for greater cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, both to stabilize the common border region and to build the constructive relationship necessary for regional stability. We will not be able to eradicate militant groups until both sides of the border are effectively secured. President Ghani and Prime Minister Sharif have shown impressive leadership, and while the cooperation

between Pakistan and Afghanistan on reconciliation is certainly an important first step, we continue to press for increased coordination on security issues between the two countries.

It is also critical that Pakistan improve relations with its other neighbor, India. We hope the recent high-level talks between Indian and Pakistani officials and the announcement of the resumption of formal dialogue will be used to reduce tensions and increase ties between the two nations. More broadly, the entire region stands to benefit substantially from increased economic integration.

Lastly, as Pakistan seeks to combat violent extremism and pursue counterinsurgency and counterterrorism objectives, we continue to encourage and support Pakistan to strengthen the rule of law, civil liberties, respect for human rights, accountability, and freedom of speech, which we firmly believe are vital to lasting peace and security. Our civilian assistance programs help make progress toward these economic and governance ends in a developing democracy, and it is essential they are sustained at current levels.

A Look Ahead

As we look toward 2016, there are a number of upcoming milestones that will mark Pakistani progress in some of these key areas and allow us to strengthen and deepen our bilateral relationship. Pakistan's current IMF program will end in the summer of 2016, and Pakistan has begun important steps in privatization and other structural reforms. We plan to continue working with Pakistan to foster economic growth, particularly by strengthening private sector ties. Prime Minister Sharif's visit reaffirmed additional areas for cooperation, including education, women's empowerment, clean energy development, and combatting climate change.

In addition, particularly in light of the public statements at the Heart of Asia dialogue, there is a significant opportunity for progress on Afghan reconciliation. A second round of Pakistani-facilitated talks between the Taliban and Afghan Government could help to build momentum for a nascent peace process.

We expect the next Strategic Dialogue Ministerial to be scheduled in the early part of next year, which will allow us to continue frank and open conversations on all of these issues.

In my new role as SRAP, I look forward to working with Congress and this Committee, the exceptional team in the SRAP office, and our top-notch staffs in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. With that, I again thank you for your attention and look forward to your questions.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador.

Last month, I led a congressional delegation trip to Afghanistan and was joined by my friend and colleague from this committee, Dr. Yoho. And while obviously this hearing is on the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations, we all know that we can't really address the future of our bilateral relationship without also discussing Afghanistan. When our delegation met with President Ghani, he told us that he has reached out his hand to Pakistan only to be rebuffed. We all know that in order for Pakistan—for Afghanistan to be stable and secure, Pakistan will have to play a key role there. Some argue that Pakistan's ultimate goal is to use Afghanistan as a sort of strategic depth against India and that Pakistan prefers an insecure Afghanistan and is using its proxies and ties to insurgent groups to exert control in Afghanistan. I wanted to hear your perspective on that.

In fact, in its report to Congress on the progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, the DOD openly stated that Pakistan uses these proxy forces to hedge against the loss of influence in Afghanistan and to counter India's superior military. Do you know if it is true that Ghani is being rebuffed by Pakistan? And what is Pakistan's strategic objective with regard to Afghanistan?

And then I wanted to ask about the terrorist safe havens inside of Pakistan's borders.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. With regard to President Ghani, as I mentioned in my opening statement, he did travel to the Heart of Asia conference last week. And, of course, we have applauded President Ghani's outreach to Pakistan, which has been one of the notable characteristics of his time in office. And we believe that Pakistan has been wanting to reciprocate this outreach. Pakistan has taken several steps that are important in this regard. The first is that they hosted the Murree talks with the Taliban in July between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, the first time that the Taliban had sat down with the Government of Afghanistan. And at the Heart of Asia Conference last week, they reaffirmed, President Nawaz Sharif reaffirmed, his support for the sovereignty of Afghanistan, the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, the legitimacy of its government and its constitution, all of which were, I think important points for President Ghani.

So we will continue to work with Pakistan to encourage them to bring the Taliban to the table to resume a peace and reconciliation process that is led by the Afghans and owned by the Afghans.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So although the countries have had a rocky relationship, you believe that with the new government, there will be brighter days ahead, and the level of cooperation will be higher and that there will be more trust and partnerships evolving from this?

Mr. OLSON. Yes, ma'am. We think there are, of course, many challenges in the Afghanistan and Pakistan relationship, but we think that the interests of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan are best served by having a positive relationship with Pakistan, which I think is the strategic vision of both President Ghani and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We hope so. What is Pakistan doing to help eliminate the terrorist safe havens inside of its borders? We hear so much about that. And I believe that the U.S. isn't effectively using our leverage in Afghanistan to convince the Pakistanis to do more with us and our Afghan partners on the counterterrorism front to work with them rather than against the Afghan Government and against its security forces.

We have a pending military package before us on this committee, and I believe we need to use that as leverage. Have we made progress in getting buy-in from Pakistan on our counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan in eliminating terrorist safe havens inside Pakistan? And why should Congress approve arms sales to Pakistan when our own Defense Department is telling us that Pakistan is openly working against our objectives when it comes to Afghanistan, safe havens, and counterterrorism?

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Madam Chair.

With regard to Pakistan's own counterterrorism operations, in June 2014, Pakistan launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb against militant strongholds in North Waziristan tribal agency. This is something that the United States has wanted for a number of years because there were a number of groups located in North Waziristan, specifically in Miramshah, that threatened U.S.-Afghanistan, as well as others.

During the course of this operation over the course of more than a year and a half, the Pakistanis have lost nearly 500 troops, 488, it was just announced. At the same time, they have carried out terrorism operations throughout the settled areas of Pakistan, that is to say the non-tribal areas, the rest of Pakistan. And despite the terrible incident at the Peshawar Army School a year ago, there has been less blow-back than might have been expected from the terrorists.

As I said at the outset in my statement, most of the action has been—we think there is more that can be done in terms of targeting groups that don't just target Pakistan internally but are threats to their neighbors, and we continue to have an active dialogue with them. I had a very active dialogue during my 3 years in Pakistan on the question of the Haqqanis and also the question of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba; although Pakistan has taken steps to ban Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and I will leave the questions to another member.

We are going to move on to Dr. Bera.

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

As an Indian American, and the only Indian American Member of Congress, the stability of the region is incredibly important to me and it is one that I have spent a lot of time thinking about and very much interconnected when you think about India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Again, it is not easy.

On the counterterrorism side, you know, I think post-Mumbai in 2008, India demonstrated incredible restraint in its approach to Pakistan. Pakistan, as, Ambassador Olson, you mentioned, it is the 1-year anniversary of the horrific Peshawar school shooting. The fact that I would have expected Pakistan to have a much more robust crackdown on the terrorist threats, on the LET and the

Haqqani Network and others. From our perspective, I think from the perspective of the Indians, there is almost this side-by-side relationship in Pakistan with some of these terrorist networks that, you know, almost symbiotic. They live side-by-side. From your perspective, what are the steps that Pakistan's Government, its military, needs to do to reduce the terrorist threats? Because, again, in some ways, it is almost as though they allow these networks to exist in Pakistan to destabilize the region or to have this constant threat on India.

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Congressman. I agree with you that there continues to be challenges in this area. It is important to note that Pakistan has really had a shift over the course of the last year and a half. They have suffered enormously from terrorism. Over 2,000 soldiers or servicemembers killed, and many thousands of individual Pakistani citizens have died as a result of terrorist outrages. And the government has a stated commitment, articulated both by the Prime Minister and the army chief, to go after all terrorists without distinction. And we believe there is more that can be done with regard to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the Taliban, including particularly the Haqqani Network. And that is a very active element of our dialogue. I think it is safe to say that we have almost no meeting with the appropriate officials in which those topics are not raised in very vigorous, very vigorous, terms.

I think it is safe to say that the attacks that, that the clearing of North Waziristan has resulted in disruption, if not elimination, of the Haqqani Network's operational ability. And as I mentioned before, they have banned Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, but there is still work to be done in this area.

Mr. BERA. And it does still appear from my perspective that there is this coexistence, that they tolerate some of these terrorist networks. Looking at kind of projecting out, as India undergoes this dramatic growth in its economy and GDP, I do worry that Pakistan seems to be stagnating, and as you see the ways of life change in these two countries that have a tense relationship, it does worry me a little bit that Pakistan doesn't seem to be developing its economy, doesn't seem to be building those institutions that would create stability. And in many ways, the civilian institutions that you would want to create a more stable Pakistan, those investments certainly aren't occurring.

I know we have over the years tried to create schools, tried to create civilian institutions that would, you know, create some stability. From your perspective, Ambassador Olson, where should the United States focus? I would say that I am critical that much of our focus has been on military sales, which I don't think stabilize the region. In fact, I think they destabilize the region. If we were to focus on civilian institutions, where would you suggest that we place our focus?

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Congressman.

First of all, let me just say a quick word since you began talking about India, about the recent upturn in relations between India and Pakistan, which I think is quite significant. As you know, the National Security Advisers met in Bangkok, and then Foreign Minister Swaraj attended the Heart of Asia conference and extended the hand of friendship to Pakistan, and that was very well re-

ceived. And they have agreed to launch a comprehensive dialogue, which will, I think, hopefully improve the relationship.

One of the emphases that we have placed in our assistance programs has been to build regional connectivity. So the relaunch of a comprehensive dialogue will hopefully, exactly as you say, lead to the possibility of increased trade, for instance, between India and Pakistan, which we think would be beneficial to both sides and particularly help Pakistan. It could do more, frankly, in some ways than our assistance programs to raise the level of prosperity.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Dr. Bera.

Judge Poe is recognized.

Mr. POE. I thank the chair.

Ambassador, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I want to be very specific about what I am concerned about, and that is the sale of American fighter jets to Pakistan or the giving of American fighter jets to Pakistan through military aid. That military aid is then used in the United States to buy those jets. And I used the example of Osama bin Laden. The Pakistanis, the military, hid him out, in my opinion. The United States didn't tell Pakistan we were going after him because they would have moved him. We sent helicopters over there. The raid was successful. Pakistan scrambled two American-made F-16s to intercept the helicopters. Americans were able to get away, and there could have been a confrontation. How ironic that would have been, American-made jets used by Pakistan in a confrontation with American-made helicopters in a raid against Osama bin Laden?

Now we are again in this issue of more military aid to Pakistan. I understand that there is \$660 million in aid going to Pakistan proposed. Some of that is going to be military aid. Supposedly the eight fighter jets, F-16s—America makes the best fighter jets in the world—is in this package. And it is supposed to be used for humanitarian aid. Now, I don't know how an F-16 with all of its hardware on there for combat can be used for humanitarian aid. If they were buying C-130s—which I used to be in a squadron of C-130s back in Texas—I can see those being used for humanitarian aid. F-16s, it is not really humanitarian aid that they are built for or used for. And are we going to be in the same situation with the sale of fighter jets for humanitarian aid where we were in the raid with Osama bin Laden that these jets will be used for other purposes?

I don't trust Pakistan. Maybe you do. I don't. We had the former Ambassador of Pakistan, Mr. Haqqani, here and testified before my subcommittee and said that Pakistan still ends up supporting terrorists.

Do they support them in any way? Does Pakistan support terrorist groups in any way? Not just a little, not just a much, but do they support them? Or are they free from doing that now? Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Judge Poe.

With regard to, Pakistan does have a fleet of F-16s, and they have been developing a precision strike capability with those F-16s, which they have used to considerable effect in North Waziristan and in the tribal areas generally. This is within a

framework of our security assistance to Pakistan, which has six objectives basically centered around counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. It is our belief that the F-16s have been used very effectively, the precision strike capability to take out terrorist targets, including safe havens that threaten our forces in Afghanistan.

Mr. POE. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Ambassador, my question is very specific.

Mr. OLSON. Yes.

Mr. POE. Does Pakistan, the military, the government, do they still give a safe haven or support directly or indirectly to terrorist groups? I mean, they may go after some terrorist groups, but do they still give them a safe haven or a pass or whatever words you want to use, or are they after all the terrorist groups? Do we have any assurance one way or the other?

Mr. OLSON. Well, Congressman, with regard to these groups, we have had a very active dialogue with them where we have pressed them repeatedly to take action against those groups that have a presence on Pakistani soil, including the Haqqani Network and the Taliban in general and also Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. They have—their operations in North Waziristan have had a disruptive effect. They, for instance, uncovered arms caches that belonged to the Haqqanis and were associated with the Haqqani mosque in Miramshah. I have been to Miramshah and seen some of the results of these efforts. But we do believe that there is more that can be done, and we continue to press them very hard on that matter.

I yield back.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Judge Poe.

Ms. Kelly of Illinois is recognized.

Ms. KELLY. When you consider the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations, what do you see as the key aims and drivers of our Pakistan policy?

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much, Congresswoman.

We believe that the best way forward with Pakistan is continued engagement, developing Pakistan's civilian economy, its ability to be a stable and prosperous country. It is a country that faces many challenges, some of which we have already identified. It faces challenges from terrorism, from violent extremism. It faces a large demographic challenge as the youth bulge comes into what should be their most productive years. We believe it is in our interests to continue engagement with Pakistan so that Pakistan is able to effectively harness the youth, having them be educated and prepared for the job market, so that Pakistan plays a more constructive role in the region as a whole.

Ms. KELLY. Where do you think our policies have been most successful? And in looking back, if there was something you could change, what would that be?

Mr. OLSON. Well, I think that our assistance programs over the past 5 years, our civilian assistance programs, have made a real impact on the life of ordinary Pakistanis. We have, through the so-called Kerry-Lugar-Berman authorization, added—it has been focused in five areas: Energy, economic growth, stabilization, health, and education. Some of the accomplishments that we can point to include adding 1,750 megawatts to Pakistan's electricity grid. Electricity is a huge problem for ordinary Pakistanis. We have added

1,000 kilometers of roads, many of those in the western part of the country connecting to Afghanistan so that there is greater regional connectivity and farmers can get produce to market. Committed over \$250 million to returning refugees from the North Waziristan operation to their homes. We have extensive exchange programs. We bring many Pakistanis to the United States for study, which we think will shape their future attitudes to the United States. We have the largest, most extensively funded Fulbright Program in the world in Pakistan, and we have built 1,000 schools and funded 15,000 domestic scholarships and 23 U.S.-Pakistan university partnerships.

Finally, in health, I would just say that we have launched a hospital in Jacobabad and rehabilitated a major OB/GYN center at the Jinnah Post Graduate Medical Centre in Karachi, so we are addressing and focusing on maternal health care, which is a very important issue in terms of the overall health of the population.

Ms. KELLY. Is there something that you think should be altered, or what would that be?

Mr. OLSON. Well, I think that it is important for us to continue engagement with Pakistan. Despite the challenges of the relationship, which are many, we believe that it is in our national interests not to allow Pakistan to become disengaged from us. And I think we can draw on the lessons of history there, especially the period in the 1990s and late 1980s, when we did somewhat disengage from the region, and we paid, I think, a significant price as a country for that at the beginning of the last decade. I think that with all of the challenges of the relationship, I think it is most important for the U.S. to be engaged and to build a partnership with Pakistan.

Ms. KELLY. Thank you.

I yield back.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Kelly.

And now we will move to Mr. Rohrabacher of California.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.

Well, Mr. Ambassador, you have a mighty tough job. We have to respect you for that, and thank you for trying to do your best.

Unfortunately, what I am about to say does not reflect on your commitment, but on the feasibility of you succeeding in what you are trying to do. The fact is that Pakistan has from its very beginning been plagued with corruption and oppression by its own government. The brutality and corruption in Pakistan was so bad that early on, in 1971, the people of Bangladesh couldn't take it anymore. And their uprising was, of course, answered not by trying to reform their government but instead by brutal suppression, which led to the independence of Bangladesh.

Mr. Ambassador, feel free to correct me if I am wrong, but I see a similar type of sentiments and a situation arising with the people of Balochistan. There are now these F-16s that the judge was talking about. Those F-16s and the military equipment that we are providing Pakistan are being used against their own people, just like they did against the people over there in Bangladesh. So am I mistaken in that we are using weapons that are provided—that they are using weapons provided by us against their own people in Balochistan and elsewhere?

Mr. OLSON. First of all, thank you, Congressman, very much for your support and your kind words. I appreciate it greatly.

Let me say, with regard to corruption, there have been, as part of the national action plan that Pakistan adopted after the horrific attack on the Army School, there is an element of improving governance and going after corruption, and that has been particularly notable lately in some of the operations that have taken place in Karachi. There has been an anticorruption element to the government's action there.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, Mr. Ambassador, I am going to have to tell you that this is about the third time over the last 25 years that I have heard this. It is always, "They are now moving forward with the anticorruption drive." I will just—I won't count on it, but if it happens, I will be very happy about that, and the American people will rejoice with the people of Pakistan that the crooks finally got displaced up in Islamabad.

The ISI has been—and the judge made this point, and I think that your answer suggests what is really going on—the ISI is still engaged in terrorism as a strategy for what they believe is going to defend their country or give their country leverage. And we saw that in attacks on India, and attacks and the efforts, of course, supporting the Taliban, et cetera. Until that changes, until the people of Balochistan, for example, don't have to suffer, where people are being grabbed and their bodies are dumped in large numbers, this is a travesty. And for the United States to provide weapons to a government like Islamabad which then is used against them. But even worse, Pakistan and these people who run that country, their approach to the United States—the judge was right—if we were thwarted in trying to bring to justice Osama bin Laden, it would have been because the Pakistanis were using American jets to shoot our people down. We calculated on that. That was not out of the realm of possibility, and the fact that that is the reality of it, and we end up giving them billions of dollars of military equipment, no wonder they don't respect us.

And one last thing, Dr. Afridi—we know now Osama bin Laden was given safe haven in that country. The man who slaughtered 3,000 Americans was given safe haven. The one guy that helped us to make sure we could bring back that monster to justice is now lingering in a dungeon in Pakistan. This is their answer to us. That is a message to the people of the United States. They are thumbing their nose at us and taking our money, and they are saying: Here is the guy, yeah, we will tell those Americans; the guy helped bring Osama bin Laden to justice, we are just going to throw him in that dungeon. And that is the message to the American people.

It is time for us to quit taking that and stand up for truth, and if we do—and justice—we will be siding with the Pakistani people and not their corrupt, brutal government.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. Higgins of New York.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Ambassador, a few minutes ago, you spoke of the hopeful signs of the relationship between Pakistan and India. I want to focus on the more troubling signs of the relationship with India but

also with that of the United States. Pakistan—let's be truthful about this—plays a double game. They are our military partner, but they are the protector and the patron of our enemies, and this has been going on for 15 years. Since 2002, United States aid to Pakistan, economic and military, has averaged about \$2 billion a year. Pakistan's annual defense budget is only about \$5 billion a year. So we, the United States, finance a major portion of their economic and defense military budget. Yet by every measure, terrorism has become worse in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2010, the most generous U.S. aid package to Pakistan of \$4.5 billion—\$4.5 billion—the United States suffered the highest level of casualties in Afghanistan, almost 500 soldiers.

Also, Pakistan is involved in an arms race against what it believes is its existential threat with India. In fact, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Pakistan could have 350 nuclear warheads in the next decade, becoming the world's third biggest nuclear power, outpacing India, France, China, and the United Kingdom. There is no positive sign of any improved relations with India because Pakistan justifies its nuclear proliferation as a deterrent against aggression from the outside. So the United States has to get tougher with Pakistan, and we have to call them out on this double game that they have been playing, not this year, not last year, not 5 years, but for the past 15 years.

I can appreciate, and you in your capacity must try to, I guess, deal with these issues as diplomatically as possible, but when you really look at the cold, hard facts, when you really look at the cold, hard facts, Pakistan is not an ally to the United States. They have facilitated; they have encouraged; they have been a protector of the very enemies. So there are these two conversations going. There is one when the Americans are in the room and the other conversation when we are not in the room. And the one that is most detrimental to us, the American people, our American soldiers, is the one that is going on when we are not in the room.

I would ask you to comment.

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Congressman.

And I want to say that we do share your concern, particularly about the development of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. We are concerned both by the pace and the scope of Pakistan's nuclear and missile program, including its pursuit of short-range nuclear systems. We are concerned that a conventional conflict in South Asia could escalate to include nuclear use as well as the increased security challenges that accompany growing stockpiles. I can tell you, sir, that we have had a very active dialogue at the highest levels with the Pakistanis in which we have made clear the nature of our very specific concerns.

Mr. HIGGINS. Mr. Ambassador, with all due respect, we have heard this for the past 15 years. You know, here is my concern—and I apologize for cutting you off, but I only have a minute. If Pakistan falls apart or if Islamic extremists take over, it is a nightmare scenario for us. It is a big country, about 180 million people. It has a lot of Islamic extremists, and it has nuclear weapons. And to have Islamic extremists with nuclear weapons is a primary goal, a primary goal of al-Qaeda. And it would be a major victory for

them and the outgrowth of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and a major defeat for us, the United States.

I yield back.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.

And we will turn to Mr. Cook of California.

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Many of the questions or comments are things that I was going to address, and I just want to follow through on that. I think Mr. Higgins made some great comments about that. I think we are all concerned because of the size of the nuclear weapons and everything else, and there is a part of me that wants to say, you know, in all fairness, Pakistan has been a great ally of ours, particularly from the military standpoint, and we never would have gotten that equipment out of Iraq because there was only one way to go, and that was through Pakistan. We kind of overlooked that, and, of course, I still think the only country that is going to control Afghanistan's destiny is Pakistan. Whether you hate them, like them or not, that to me—and I see you are shaking your head, and you agree with that—all those things considered, I am going to throw something which really, really scares me. And there has been talk that in light of the Iranian deal and the nuclear weapons in a Persian country, in a Shiite country, in your opinion, is there any possibility that Pakistan would not just give the technology but actually sell nuclear weapons to the Sunni states with money—particularly, and I won't name them, but I think we all know who they are—that this proliferation would start on a scale that would just change the whole calculus of the region?

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Congressman, and thank you for flagging the role Pakistan had with the JLOCs and other forms of support for our operations in Afghanistan. I would say with regard to nuclear weapons, first of all, I want to assure you that we do agree that nuclear security is a key issue. We have confidence in the capabilities of the security forces, the Pakistani security forces, to control and secure their nuclear weapons. We want to make sure that that continues to be the case.

With regard to proliferation concerns, Pakistan has made an effort over the past few years, and we have worked very closely with them to tighten export controls and to make sure that they are not in a position of proliferating nuclear materials. This has involved, of course, a cleanup from a previous situation that existed a decade ago. Our assessment is that they have made considerable progress in this area.

Mr. COOK. Thank you.

Switching gears a little bit, just like everybody on this committee, I am afraid that there is one agency in Pakistan that I think the vast majority of us are afraid of, and that is because of their past history, and that is ISI, and their corruption, their agenda, and everything else, and more than that, the amount of influence that they have on the Pakistani Government in terms of intrigue—I can go on and on and on—but just in terms of certain decisions. Can you give me any warm and fuzzy feeling about an organization I think most of us are very, very nervous about? I am from San Bernardino. I am worried about the madrassas again. One of the terrorists came from there. And I just—that more than

anything else in terms of one of the power factors in Pakistan, I am very, very, very nervous and cynical about. Thank you.

Mr. OLSON. Yes. Thank you very much, Congressman. Let me just mention a couple of things on ISI. First of all, we do have a very robust engagement with ISI. I met with the ISI chief regularly during my tenure in Pakistan and made the points that I described earlier about terrorism directly to him. ISI does have a role to play with regard to Afghan reconciliation, and we think that the role that Pakistan at large played in bringing the Taliban to the table last summer was quite important, and they need to do that again, in our view, following up on the positive statements out of the Heart of Asia conference.

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. I know they are going to cut me off, but thank you for answering my questions.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cook.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ms. GABBARD of Hawaii.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Just following up on my colleague Mr. Cook's questions, you know, the concern is you are talking about robust engagement with ISI. But there has been evidence time and time again of their direct and indirect connections with the Haqqani Network. In 2011, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, called the Haqqani Network a veritable arm of the ISI. So as you are having these discussions, you talked a lot about how more must be done; discussions are taking place. But I am wondering what action, what change in U.S. policy has occurred that would actually bring about a consequential shift?

Mr. OLSON. Well, we continue to press at every point for action on the Haqqanis. We have done this at the highest levels of our Government.

Ms. GABBARD. Has there been any change in the aid packages of the funding we are providing?

Mr. OLSON. Well, as you know, Congresswoman, there was a decrement of \$300 million from the coalition support funds I believe under last year's National Defense Authorization Act. I would have to refer you to the Department of Defense for how that is being implemented. The \$300 million was subject to a certification of cooperation from the Haqqanis. So I would have to refer you to the Department of Defense on that.

Ms. GABBARD. Well, I think the concern is that there, to say there are serious doubts is an understatement on Pakistan's credibility when we talk about fighting these Islamic extremist elements, these terrorist elements and even with nuclear cooperation. I think one of the greatest concerns, as we look at how closely connected the Haqqani Network and others are to Pakistan, is the safety of the nuclear weapons that they have and preventing misuse. You have just said that you have confidence in the Pakistani security forces. But when you have these insider threats, when you have the Haqqani Network being an arm of the ISI, how can you have confidence that they would not in any case gain access to these nuclear weapons or traffic them or get them into the wrong hands?

Mr. OLSON. Well, I think that Pakistan has taken a lot of steps over the last years to tighten up its control of nuclear security. They are well aware of their responsibilities with regard to protecting. And I think they have specifically taken into account the insider threat as well.

Ms. GABBARD. Can you speak with some specificity?

Mr. OLSON. Ma'am, honestly, candidly, I would not be able to address these issues in this forum. But in another forum, it might be possible to do so. Thank you.

Ms. GABBARD. Can you speak specifically to what Pakistan and the government has done to crack down on the Haqqani Network or these other terrorist elements that have been and are directly linked to them?

Mr. OLSON. Yes, ma'am. The launching of operation of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan in June 2014 was something that the United States had actually wanted to see for quite some time. North Waziristan was where many of these militants, including the Haqqani Network, were based in Miramshah. Miramshah was completely cleared, including the Haqqani Network facilities, and armaments, tunnels, bunkers were uncovered, destroyed, and arms caches taken away, including 160 tons of precursors for improvised explosive devices. And this has had a disruptive effect not only on the Pakistani Taliban but also on the Haqqani Network and, by the way, al-Qaeda, which probably had some presence there as well. And the Pakistanis, including ISI, have cooperated with us in taking down al-Qaeda cells, including Adnan Shukrijumah, who was wanted for his plotting of attacks on the New York subway, and one other American citizen individual who was extradited from Pakistan in April of this year. So there has been quite a bit of counterterrorism cooperation between ISI and the Pakistan Government at large and the United States. And we believe that has been to our national interest.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. My time has expired. But I think as we look at U.S. policy toward Pakistan, this is something that we need to carefully consider. Thank you.

Mr. PERRY [presiding]. The Chair thanks the gentlelady.

The Chair now recognizes himself.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being here. I had the privilege of traveling to Islamabad and then to South Waziristan. We couldn't go to North Waziristan because it was too dangerous. So we understand and appreciate the difficulty of your position and the tenuous circumstances of the relationship with Pakistan. That having been said, do we, as a Department of State, as the United States Government, have a time-related series of metrics to determine success or failure of our relationship and the money that the American taxpayer is spending regarding that relationship? Can you tell me of any?

Mr. OLSON. Mr. Chair, thank you very much. And let me say it is a great pleasure to see you again after seeing you in Islamabad. For the assistance programs, that, of course, is the responsibility of our colleagues in USAID by and large. And they do have an extensive program of metrics and tracking their development assistance.

Mr. PERRY. So let me cut to—I don't mean to cut you off. But I am trying to get to the terror situation, which is what we are really concerned about. We know we spend billions of dollars on military assistance, on humanitarian assistance. But what we are really getting to is this relationship where Pakistan seems to be kind of walking the line somewhere between terrorism and somewhere between the support of the United States Government. And with all due respect, as long as we allow them to continue to walk the line, they are going to continue to walk the line because it is in their interest to do that.

And I will give you some of my metrics. But are there any metrics regarding terrorism that are time-related, where the American people can see they are getting some value out of the billions of dollars we spend?

Mr. OLSON. Well, I think that there has been a shift in Pakistan. During the time I was there, the 3 years that I was there, I definitely saw a shift in the public discourse on the terrorism issue. I think there is now a very broad consensus in Pakistani politics that it is necessary to go after these extremist groups. There was a period I think of doubt about the efficacy of going after the Pakistani Taliban. And that ended with the operation in North Waziristan in June 2014. There was a broad consensus. And it certainly was reinforced by the horrific incident of a year ago at the Peshawar Army School.

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Ambassador, what is the cost of the F-16 deal to the American taxpayer? Do you know what that price is?

Mr. OLSON. Well, Mr. Chair, as a matter of policy, we do not discuss prospective arms sales until they have been—

Mr. PERRY. We know it is not cheap, right? Let me just give you some of my metrics because my time is short here, and I want to make a couple points. In Pakistan, you have al-Qaeda; you have the Afghan Taliban; the Haqqani Network; the TTP; and the LET operating, which are all terrorist organizations. Meanwhile, at the same time, over the past 14, 15 years, the American people have spent \$30 billion in our relationship with Pakistan. Meanwhile, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center last year found only 14 percent—only 14 percent—of Pakistanis expressed a positive view of the United States. Pakistan seems neither particularly democratic nor tolerant regarding their governance or their religious tolerance. And then you look at, you know, we talk about this individual, Mr. Afridi, who allegedly helped the United States get the number one terrorist on our list. And, meanwhile, the backdrop is that this terrorist organization, just for instance, the LET has been active in Pakistan, as I already stated, Afghanistan, and Kashmir since the 1990s, so it is not new. And Pakistan funded the group. And the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, the ISI, agency helped establish the organization's military structure and almost all LET members are Pakistani madrassa students or Afghan veterans. In November 2008, 10 LET members conducted a coordinated terrorist attack on targets in Mumbai, India, killing 160 people, including 4 Americans.

In December 2008, Pakistan arrested Zaki-ur-Rehman, whatever his last name is, the LET leader who organized the Mumbai attacks. They arrested him. However, in April 2015, this guy was re-

leased from jail on \$2,300 bond. And there has been no trial scheduled for this guy. Meanwhile, the doctor, the good Dr. Afridi, remains in a jail. And we are going to sell or make some deal with Pakistan for F-16s. And we have neighbors that are much better allies. We understand the tenuous circumstance. But when are we going to equate our relationship, our financial relationship with results about terrorism? Do you see that happening any time, quantifiable results, where the American people can see the value of this relationship? Sir?

Mr. OLSON. Well, if I could respond to a couple points, Mr. Chair. First, on Dr. Afridi, we fully agree with you that he has been unjustly imprisoned. And we have communicated this at the highest level to—

Mr. PERRY. Why don't we tie it to our actions? Why don't we tie his release, why don't we tie the trial of this other individual who attacked our ally to the sale of these weapons systems and to our aid? Why don't we—who is negotiating these deals on our behalf?

Mr. OLSON. Well, Mr. Chair, we believe that, and, again, I can't talk about the details of a prospective notification, but let me say that we believe that the F-16s that we have already sold to Pakistan or provided under security assistance have been used to advance our national interests. They have been used against terrorists in North Waziristan and in the tribal areas. The precision strike capability of the F-16s and our programs are focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism—

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate it. I understand the value of the weapon system and what it can do. We appreciate that. We understand that. We are very frustrated that for the American people's involvement, we don't see a whole lot coming on the other side of the ledger. But that is my personal perception.

With that, my time has expired.

I would like to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Lowenthal.

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to follow up—I think you have probably touched on some of these answers already, but I really want to kind of deal with my own concerns. Like Congressman Higgins and Cook and others, I am troubled about the reports of Pakistan's development of what I consider destabilizing tactical nuclear weapons at a faster rate than most other countries, if not than any other country. I really want to understand, again, a little bit more clearly your assessment of Pakistan's progress in cooperating with the international community on nuclear proliferation concerns. And also the second part of that question has to do with some recent media reports suggesting that our administration is considering some kind of nuclear arrangement with Pakistan. I don't know. I am not really clear; what is a nuclear arrangement? And if we are considering it, is Pakistan really a trustworthy partner, again, in that? Again, like other members, the nuclear proliferation treaty concerns are very troubling.

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Congressman.

And we share your concern about the scope and pace of Pakistan's nuclear program. We do have an active dialogue on non-proliferation issues. We have a security—

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Has Pakistan increased the rate of development, the production of tactical nuclear weapons?

Mr. OLSON. We continue to have concerns about the scope and pace, sir. I think that is probably all I can say in this particular venue. But I did want to address one other issue that you raised. I can assure you, despite some press reports to the contrary, that we are not negotiating a 123 agreement, so-called 123 agreement, a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, with Pakistan.

Mr. LOWENTHAL. In any way. Are we setting any preconditions or any conditions—this goes back to—about or talking to Pakistan about the reduction of its nuclear weapons?

Mr. OLSON. We have had a very candid discussion with the Pakistanis about some of the concerns that we have, including about shorter range nuclear systems. And Pakistan has been prepared to engage with us in those discussions.

Mr. LOWENTHAL. And I gather over, since, for the last 60 years, we have provided over \$75 billion in assistance, primarily in military and economic assistance. Going back to the question asked by the chair, is any of our assistance that you know tied to changes in Pakistan's behavior?

Mr. OLSON. There are some very specific metrics and conditions that we use in all of our assistance programs, I mean, specific to the nature of the program, particularly in civilian assistance. With regard to security assistance, what we have done is negotiated a framework with the Pakistanis in which our security assistance is focused on the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions. And I think it is also particularly worth noting that two additional provisions, obviously, all of our assistance is subject to the Leahy Amendment, and we have a very rigorous Leahy process. This addresses the question of human rights. And in addition to that, we have very stringent end-use monitoring requirements on the Pakistanis, especially with regard to high-technology security assistance. And I can say that we are very strict on those. And the results have been satisfactory.

Mr. LOWENTHAL. What does that mean, "the results have been satisfactory"?

Mr. OLSON. That we believe that the end-use monitoring systems have been effective.

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you.

And I yield back.

Mr. PERRY. The Chairman thanks the gentleman from California.

The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho.

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate it. I was fortunate to go over to Afghanistan with Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and we had an informative trip. Just to rehash, you know, we have given \$30 billion since 2001 to Pakistan. You know, when you look through the list here, there is at least five terrorist networks that he know that are operating in the FATA area, along with ISIS is in area. And we have heard over and over again it is a no-man's-land. There is no rule. And in order to get peace in that area, there can't be the threat of terrorism. And Pakistan, is their goal to get rid of terrorism? I mean, how serious are they? Because I am not seeing it.

Mr. OLSON. Sir, thank you. We have agreed for many years that the threat from the tribal areas was significant. In that regard—

Mr. YOHO. How serious is Pakistan about bringing this to an end? It is like my mom; she was—I told her I wanted to play piano, but I wasn't real serious about it. And I never learned how to play it. So if you are serious about it, you will do it. And if you are not, you are not going to do it. With \$30 billion of the American taxpayers' money going into that area, and we rewarded Pakistan by giving them, selling the initial F-16s as them helping us after 9/11, and then we suspended that because we have seen them complicit, working against us in Afghanistan. But, yet, we hear they want to have peace in that area; they want to have talks and have the concurrent resolutions and talks with India. But if you are not willing to stand up and stomp out terrorism, you are not real serious about it. Just yes or no, am I right or wrong on that?

Mr. OLSON. Well, Congressman, Pakistan has launched operations in North Waziristan. They have reasserted their sovereign authority over—

Mr. YOHO. What kind of attacks have they done? I mean, we did sorties against ISIS in the summer a year and a half ago, but they weren't really meaningful. I mean, we were doing 5 to 10 maybe a month. If you are serious, you go in and annihilate that.

Mr. OLSON. Well, they have completely cleared the city of Miramshah, which was the headquarters of, amongst others, the Haqqani Network and the Pakistan Taliban, completely cleared it. I have been to downtown Miramshah. There is no one there. So they cleared the city and cleared all of the networks. They have taken 488 casualties, deaths amongst their soldiers just in Operation Zarb-e-Azb. So I think their commitment is serious to fighting terrorism.

But the concern that we have, sir—and I have flagged this—is we think that more needs to be done against the Haqqani Network and some of the groups that threaten Pakistan's neighbors, not just the ones that threaten them internally.

Mr. YOHO. Well, if you look at the recent attack in California, Tashfeen Malik studied at an all-women's Islamic religious school in Pakistan. So it is still working against us. It is still creating terrorism. And then the debate largely borders on these F-16s. Efforts by Congress to place conditional requirements upon aid to Pakistan due to the country's support for terror have consistently been waived by administrations which argue that the U.S. assistance is essential to build Pakistan's counterterrorism capabilities. Let me ask you, in general, what specific contributions have Pakistan's F-16s that they have had from us made to U.S. counterterrorism objectives in South and Central America? What can you say they have done definitively that I can go back to the people that I represent and say, "No, no, this is a good thing; we want to keep it because it is going to give us peace down the road"? We have said this for 30 years. And we are not seeing it. In fact, we are going backwards in this. So what benefits have these F-16s done? And I have got a followup question if you can—

Mr. OLSON. Yes, sir. I mean, they have used the F-16 for precision strikes in the tribal areas. I don't have the specific metrics with me here today on the numbers of strikes they have conducted.

But they are a regular feature of their operations. And we believe they have been effective in taking out terrorists that are of concern to us as well as to them.

Mr. YOHO. The administration has no real idea what policies Pakistan will be pursuing against militants in the tribal area when any new aircraft will be delivered, each of which will generally take 3 years to produce and deliver. Would you recommend giving them more, selling them more airplanes with the results we have gotten so far? And the \$30 billion—because you read off an impressive list of schools, education, Fulbright Scholarships. I am not seeing the return on investment here to bring this to an end. And you know where we are in America with the American sentiment; they want this to end.

Mr. OLSON. Sir, with regard to the F-16s, let me say that we believe that they have been a very effective instrument of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. As I said, out of respect for congressional prerogatives, we do not discuss prospective sales until they have been formally notified.

Mr. YOHO. But, yet, they protected Osama bin Laden all those years. I mean, there is no way they didn't know about that. I mean, nobody can convince me of anything different. And so, yet, they are effective over here hitting a beehive. They are treating a tumor, a malignant, metastatic tumor over here. But the main tumor is over here. And we need to go after the main root cause of our problems before I can support any sales of those. Thank you.

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. On November 18, Anwar Laghari, the brother of the Sindh activist who is the chief advocate here in Washington, Munawar Laghari, was killed. There is an ongoing investigation. I want to thank you and the State Department for the counsel general's focus on this. And it raises the bigger issue as to whether there are forces in Pakistan that are simply hostile to any region of the country other than Punjab. What percentage of the general officers of the military are Punjabi? I don't know if you have that available.

Mr. OLSON. I do not have that available, Congressman. And we can take that back and see if we have that information.

I can tell you anecdotally from my personal experience, it is a high proportion, but it is not an exclusive proportion.

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Zero-based budgeting, most people I represent feel that the roughly \$2 billion we give Pakistan could be better spent in the San Fernando Valley. If we are not willing to talk about simply a zero figure for aid to Pakistan, we have no leverage. The doctor that helped us get Osama bin Laden will be rotting in prison. Do we have a plan, as one of several options, to go to zero? And what would we expect the Pakistani response to be? Is it considered an act of war to fail to give another country money?

Mr. OLSON. Sir, we believe that engagement with Pakistan is in our national—

Mr. SHERMAN. Other countries don't give them money, and they still talk. I am not saying we close our Embassy. Are you saying the Pakistanis would refuse to talk to us? Does every other country have to give them money as like a party gift to go have a conversation?

Mr. OLSON. Well, we think that our assistance programs, whether we are talking about civilian or military, have actually done a lot to improve the conditions in the case of civilians and the lives of ordinary Pakistanis. And Pakistan is facing an enormous demographic challenge. I mean, it is a country of 190 million people. It has a youth bulge. The youth are about to come into the most productive years of their lives. Either they are going to have jobs or not have jobs. We think the—

Mr. SHERMAN. Look, I know that we do some good for Pakistanis. If we spent that money in India or in Congo, we would do an equal amount of good. What is the Pakistani response if we simply say “zero”?

Mr. OLSON. Well, I really can't say what the Government of Pakistan would—

Mr. SHERMAN. So we are spending \$2 billion, much of it military. And if we eliminated the military aid, it is clear that the Pakistani military does some good. It is also clear that the Pakistani military and the ISI do some harm. Have we discussed with the Pakistanis that perhaps Congress would simply specify zero, particularly if we didn't see some changes in policies, starting with the release of the doctor who helped us get Osama bin Laden? Have you talked to the Pakistanis that there is sentiment in the Congress to go to zero?

Mr. OLSON. I will be happy to convey that sentiment, Congressman. And I think that is a point that we can make. The administration's position is that we believe that the assistance programs that we have are in our national interest. They are in our national—it is in our national interest to have Pakistan be stable and prosperous, rather than the alternative. And it is in our national interest to have Pakistan conducting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the western part of the country.

Mr. SHERMAN. Do we have assurance that the money we give them is not used for oppression and terrorism rather than prosperity and counterterrorism? Money is fungible. They may be confronting the Haqqani Network or not. Or they may be funding the organizations that kill people in Mumbai. How do we know which of those two activities our money is funding?

Mr. OLSON. Well, sir, we are very careful about how we spend our money and what we spend it on. With regard to the military assistance, it is subjected to a very extensive Leahy Amendment vetting process. And there is no question that we continue to raise these issues that you flagged. The question of the Haqqanis, we need to do more on the Haqqanis and on Lashkar-e-Tayyiba with the Pakistani Government at every occasion.

Mr. SHERMAN. Unless they think that you are willing under some circumstances to recommend zero to the United States Congress, you will not achieve our objectives. And the biggest weathervane is the physician that helped us get Osama bin Laden. For us to ignore that they were harboring him in one of their safest and most military towns and then say we should ignore the fact that they have that doctor in prison, it begs the question of whether the aid we give them is warranted.

I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. I am going to return to points that I made in my opening statement. I was absent for a while. We had

three bills debated on the House floor that our committee put out, including the legislation authored by myself and Eliot Engel on targeting Hezbollah, and several other cosponsors here, like Mr. Sherman, that we will be voting on this afternoon. But if I could return to some of the points that I made. I opened with this observation about the Deobandi schools in Pakistan. Now, there are 600 of these specifically that I am concerned with that over the years we have tried to convince the government to shutter, shut them down. They are funded primarily by the Gulf states, by individuals, by families in the Gulf states who make these charitable contributions as they are called. But the problem is that the graduates out of these schools basically have a foundation in radical ideology. So we have the National Action Plan that has been set up by the government. I asked the Congressional Research Service about that particular plan. And they say nearly 1 year later, there remains limited evidence that the government's National Action Plan has brought major policy changes. So I wanted to ask you about that, ask you, Ambassador, about your dialogue with the government about shutting these down so that we shut down the foundation from which this radicalization is occurring. Many of those young people that come out of that experience will go on to become clerics either in Pakistan or elsewhere. And they will continue to expand on this radical jihadist ideology that is advanced in, that comes out of the Gulf states that is now being taught.

Mr. OLSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say that we share your concern about the madrassas. We think it is a serious issue. We thought it was significant that it was for the first time addressed as an issue nationally in the National Action Plan that was put out last year. Our understanding is that the government is in the process of putting together a greater regulatory framework for the madrassas. It is presently mapping—

Chairman ROYCE. But this isn't rocket science. We are not talking about all madrassas. We are talking about the Deobandi schools. As the Dawn editorial, the newspaper Dawn, said: Branding all madrassas as incubators of hate and violence is wrong. But there is little doubt that there still exists across Pakistan religious centers that continue to spew hate. And unless that infrastructure of hate is shut down, Pakistan will never win its struggle for internal peace. That is the issue. We have the list of the 600 schools. I have made three trips, as I have indicated, to try to convince the government to shut those down. We have had little success in convincing families in the Gulf states not to send their money there or convincing those governments in the Gulf states not to fund this. This is a phenomenon that, frankly, is so frustrating because what we see is the failure of the government time and time again to address issues that are in that government's own best interest. And this, to me, given the knowledge about what goes on in those 600 schools, is the most obvious and vexing problem that is right in front of us. What do people in the government say about that issue?

Mr. OLSON. Well, I have had some discussions about this, Mr. Chairman. And I agree that there is a huge challenge with the madrassas. The reason in a way that they exist and have become

popular in Pakistan, if that is the word, is because they do provide a free education. And this has to do with the fact—

Chairman ROYCE. We are talking past each other. I am not talking about all the madrassas that provide a free education. I am talking about the 600 that you and I know are in this particular line of ideological radicalization. And on that issue, clearly, given the amount of money that is spent toward education in the budget, which is about 2.4 percent that actually goes toward education, I understand, I mean, this is one of the debates here in terms of the F-16s and other military hardware is, wouldn't Pakistan be better served addressing this issue of shutting down these 600 schools? And if they do it, you know, funding public education there for individuals, for families as an alternative for their sons to go to those schools in this case instead of the lads going to schools where you and I suspect the final outcome is going to be like a lot of others that were radicalized in those Deobandi schools.

Mr. OLSON. I would agree with that analysis, Mr. Chairman. We think that what has to be done is there has to be a further reform of the public education system, that the public education system is not delivering in Pakistan. And there has to be a viable alternative for parents who otherwise have no choice but to send their children to schools that are free and, indeed, where not only are they free, but the food is provided. So there is a real draw factor in all of this. We also think that it is important that the Government of Pakistan—and we are working with them in this area, in the counter and violence extremism area—to try to reform these, the curriculum, so that at least in the religiously oriented schools, there are marketable skills; there is standardized curricula; and there are attempts to address a more modern perspective.

Chairman ROYCE. My time has expired.

But without objection, I am going to ask unanimous consent that Representative Sheila Jackson Lee be next in terms of asking any questions. She is not on the committee, but she wanted to participate today.

So, without objection, we will go to Representative Sheila Jackson Lee from Texas.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your kindness. It is much appreciated—along with the ranking member, thank you so very much.

I chair the Congressional Pakistan Caucus with my colleague and have done so for more than a decade. So thank you very much for your presence here. I am going to go pointedly to a question dealing with an American doctor of some years back. In 2014, Dr. Mehdi Ali Qamar, out of Chicago I believe, who came on a mission to serve, and, of course, he had a different religious background, Ahmadiyya. And I am just wondering did we ever solve his killing? And was there any response to that very tragic incident? From Chicago, I believe.

Mr. OLSON. Yes, Congresswoman, it is a pleasure to see you again.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you so very much.

Mr. OLSON. I am afraid I do not have any details on that particular case. So if I can get back to you with a response, I would do so of course.

Mr. OLSON. We continue to have concern about, in general, the treatment of religious minorities in Pakistan. And it is a key area of our engagement.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So let me just follow up. You just made a key area. I happen to think it is an important issue. And I am just wondering how are we pursuing this whole issue of religious tolerance?

Mr. OLSON. Well, I think that there have been some developments over time in Pakistan that give us a little bit of space. We are trying to advance this. One of them certainly was the decision by the Supreme Court under Justice Jillani in June 2014 to extend greater protection to religious minorities. We, you know, think that is a positive step that needs to be followed up on with the government. We have an ongoing dialogue about the rights of religious minorities. And we have a particular concern about blasphemy laws, not just in Pakistan but everywhere in the world, because of the possibility of their being subject to abuse. And that has been the case in certain instances in Pakistan. We think it is—within the context of having, you know, concerns about the framework, the legal framework in which Pakistan conducts antiblasphemy laws—we think it is positive the case of Asia Bibi has moved to the Supreme Court. And we will continue to press the Government of Pakistan for proper treatment of religious minorities.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you. And, first of all, let me say it is very good to see you. And thank you for your service both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I am probably going to focus on Pakistan and then maybe a slight question within the timeframe that I have left. I know that you have answered the question about Dr. Afridi and his status. When President Sharif was here, I questioned him. It seems as if he was trying to suggest that there are other issues. Do you have any update? You may have given it already in other testimony. But if I can get that quickly.

And let me just follow up with my other question which is when the Prime Minister was here, there was certainly an impression given—Pakistan—that he was attempting to continue to build on democratic principles, focus on economic development, education, issues that we would be concerned about and, certainly, existence, if you will, with India. And so I am wondering what your assessment is. But if you would start with the status of the doctor.

And then, lastly, if you could give me just a little bit about Afghanistan, I am concerned in terms of whether or not the frontier land or the areas are even embraced by the central government and whether or not we actually have a functioning, tranquil, growing government in Afghanistan.

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Congresswoman.

With regard to Dr. Afridi, we do believe there is no reason for his continued detention. We have been assured by the Pakistanis that he is in good health. But we continue to press his case absolutely at the highest levels of our Government and seek his release.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And you see no other accounts or charges, which has been represented to me that there are some other charges, you see no reason for him to continue to be incarcerated?

Mr. OLSON. Well, we just believe inherently that he should not be in a position of detention for helping out in the capture or the

Osama bin Laden raid. So that has been our position from the outset.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And you continue at the United Nations level and other levels to be able to secure his release?

Mr. OLSON. Yes. We continue to work every avenue that is open to us and continue to press hard on it.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And the other questions?

Mr. OLSON. With regard to Afghanistan, the government actually does face some challenges. That is not surprising. But on the other hand, the government of national unity has held together for over a year. The government of national unity, any government of national unity, coalition government anywhere, there are challenges associated with it. When I was in Kabul last week, I got a sense of renewed determination from the government to improve its governance, particularly after the security challenges that it has faced over the last year. It is drawing lessons learned from the experiences of the past year and is making more government appointments. And there is a particular provincial focus to the government's reform efforts right now.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If the chairman would be kind enough, if you could just, under Prime Minister Sharif, who came to the United States, do you see the country moving toward more democratic principles, economic development? You are in and out of the country; do we have a line or a measuring stick that moves Pakistan with all of its population, all of its desire for education, to a level where you are empowering the many young people that are there in the country?

Mr. OLSON. Yes. Congresswoman, thank you.

There was an important transition in Pakistan, as you know, in June 2013 when the first civilian-elected government took over from a civilian-elected government, the first successful civilian transition in Pakistan's 65-year history at that point. And I think that after facing some domestic political challenges, the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has, I think, largely settled those political issues. And I think the political situation is stable. And the government has indeed focused on several key areas of stabilizing the economy. Pakistan was—the coffers were quite empty at the time that the Nawaz government took over. And there was the potential at that point of a balance of payments crisis. Pakistan is now on an IMF program. It has been through eight tranches. And that is longer than any previous IMF program in history.

There is still some important structural reforms that need to be undertaken, especially in the energy sector. But, on the other hand, they have moved to diversify their energy supply. They are importing liquefied natural gas with a company from Houston helping out in that process, which we were very happy to try to promote successfully. And they have also focused on infrastructure.

The Prime Minister has also committed to increasing the proportion of spending on education. And in that regard, I think it is worth noting that the Prime Minister's daughter, Maryam Sharif, signed on with the First Lady, Mrs. Obama, for the Let Girls Learn initiative during the Prime Minister's visit. And in that regard, Pakistan has expressed its seriousness about addressing issues of

education, particularly for adolescent girls. And we encourage them to continue to spend, to increase their funding on education.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you for your service.

And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for your courtesies. I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We now go to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, Ambassador Olson, it is good to see you. We had a good meeting yesterday in my office. I was just debating a bill on the House floor and also a New York delegation. So I apologize for missing the first part of the hearing. But we discussed many of the issues. And I am delighted with your appointment. What I am going to do is make a statement and then ask you to comment on it. This week, we marked 5 years since the passing of Ambassador Holbrooke, who was our first Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. And we still feel his loss. He left a remarkable legacy. And his final effort was laying the groundwork for resolving the long conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I hope we are able to take advantage of that work. As I mentioned before, Ambassador Olson, I am confident that with your previous experience in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, this important task is in the right hands.

When President Obama took office, I was encouraged by the bipartisan commitment to support our military forces, diplomats, and development workers in Afghanistan, and to renew our partnership with the civilian leadership of Pakistan. This focus on Pakistan was reflected in the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill passed by Congress in 2009. But that authorization recently expired. And now is a good time to take stock of the status of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. We are used to hearing some bad news about Pakistan. But the Pakistani people have achieved some noteworthy accomplishments in recent years. Pakistan has seen its first peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another. I think this was a historic moment for the country.

Thanks to collaboration with our own USAID, today Pakistan has added 1750 megawatts of electricity to its energy grid, 30,000 new jobs, nearly 1,000 new or refurbished schools, and the more than 18,000 newly trained teachers. And let me commend our development experts for their hard work in a very challenging environment.

On the security side, we have seen much more modest progress. Terrorist groups based in Pakistan continue to pose a serious threat to Americans, Pakistanis, and our partners throughout South Asia and the world. Moreover, Pakistan has provided some extremist groups safe haven and a permissive environment that allows extremist ideology to spread. The result is terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, India, in the U.K., and here in the United States. But the hardest hit have been the Pakistani people. Terrorism inside Pakistan has killed more than 50,000 people since 2003. That is 50,000 people.

A year ago today, terrorists affiliated with the Pakistani Taliban, also known as TTP, massacred more than 140 teachers and students at the Army Public School in Peshawar. Absolutely horrific.

After years of prodding and far too many lives lost, the Pakistani Government finally took military action against TTP in North Waziristan. Along with many others, I had high hopes for those efforts. I was also hopeful when Pakistan's Parliament took a leading role in establishing a National Action Plan to comprehensively address terrorism in the aftermath of the Peshawar attacks.

When Pakistan's Government decided it would no longer differentiate between good and bad terrorists, that suggested a real change in Pakistan's approach, a positive change, to addressing terrorism in the country. But, yet again, we have seen little evidence that the Government of Pakistan has followed through on these commitments. And so some violent groups continue to operate in Pakistan with impunity, including the Haqqani Network, responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans in Afghanistan, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, also called LET, the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which also cost American lives. There are some in Pakistan who believe they can manage these groups. Yet Lashkar terrorists end up fighting our troops in Afghanistan. And Haqqani Network terrorists have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. It is clear that Pakistan is a long way from solving these problems.

So, Ambassador Olson, as we discuss these issues, I hope we can focus on a few key areas. First of all, what is it going to take for Pakistan to stop differentiating between good and bad terrorists and start treating all terrorists as bad and all terrorists as the threat that they are? Does our own policy effectively convey to Pakistan that the harm from these relationships outweigh any perceived benefit?

Next, I am curious about how Pakistani acquiescence in or support for terrorist groups is affecting its neighbors. Can Afghanistan stabilize while Pakistan continues to host groups like the Haqqani Network? Can Pakistan and India have a normal relationship when Pakistan continues to support LET?

And, lastly, I am concerned about the messages we are sending when we continue to provide Pakistan security assistance, despite Pakistan's ongoing relationships with the Haqqani Network and LET. We need to be clear-eyed about Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts.

Now, I believe in the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. I believe that the United States and Pakistan should be allies and continue to work together. But I think the question about terrorism is a very important question. And it really has not been satisfactorily, in my opinion, met by the Pakistani Government. Also, I hope we can soon see a country strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan from USAID so that we can maximize the remaining foreign assistance to both countries. In my view, we need to include incentives that encourage Pakistan to make much needed energy sector and tax reforms. We all want to see a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Pakistan that is an integrated part of a larger, more connected Central and South Asia. This simply cannot happen with the continued instability that exists in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

So I am wondering, Ambassador, if you could answer some of these questions I made. If you have already done it, then we can do it in writing afterwards. But if you can answer, I would be grateful. Thank you.

And I wish you good luck. And as I said before, I think you are the right man for the job.

Mr. OLSON. Well, thank you very much, Ranking Member Engel. That means a great deal to me that I enjoy your confidence. And thank you for your support. You started by mentioning it is 5 years since the death of Richard Holbrooke. I was actually in his outer office waiting to see him on the day that he collapsed. And I think all of us who are working on this account greatly, greatly miss him to this day. And I am well aware that I am filling very big shoes.

And thank you for your very comprehensive and balanced statement. Let me say with regard particularly to the issue of terrorism, we appreciate the statements that Pakistan has made at the level of the Prime Minister and the army chief of not differentiating between good and bad terrorists. We think there is still work to be done in this area. We think that Pakistan has moved decisively against any terrorists that threaten Pakistan internally but still needs to devote attention to those that represent a threat to their neighbors. You asked about particularly the effect on Afghanistan. I would just note that we had a very constructive week last week with the Heart of Asia conference, at which President Ghani attended and which Pakistan committed in its public statements to uphold the sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimacy of the Afghanistan Government and its constitution, which was important for the Afghanistan side. And they committed to renewing and reinvigorating a peace process.

Pakistan did host talks at Murree between the Taliban and the Afghanistan Government, the first such talks, last summer in July. And I think we are all agreed that it is important to get a political settlement process going with a sense of urgency. And we look to Pakistan to bring—help to bring the Taliban to the table. At the same time, we continue to raise our concerns about the threat that specifically the Haqqani Network represent to us and our forces and our Embassy and civilians in Afghanistan, as well as the Taliban more generally.

And, finally, we certainly have the same view with regard to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the need to not just ban Lashkar-e-Tayyiba but to take action with regard to prosecuting the perpetrators of Mumbai.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

And I look forward to continuing to working with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROYCE. And I believe Mr. Higgins had an additional question or two.

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just, you know, I just keep going back to the double game that is being played by Pakistan. And, you know, you had said that Pakistan expressed a seriousness in addressing the education needs of its country. Pakistan spends 3 percent of its budget on education, 3 percent. It spends 3 percent of its budget on infrastructure. According to the World Economic Forum, countries that spend less than 15 percent on education, health care, and infrastructure are countries that are very susceptible to collapse. So when Pakistan says or expresses a seriousness in addressing its

educational needs, one only needs to look at the amount of budgetary resources its addressing for that need.

Additionally, Pakistan, I think, inflates the amount it spends on counterterrorism operations so it can receive more money, particularly from us. And as has been stated here throughout this hearing, some \$30 billion over the past 15 years has been spent, both military and economic development aid for Pakistan. According to U.S. military officials, the legitimate costs are only about 30 percent. So my question is, where is the rest of that money going? And it is very, very significant, and I suspect for nefarious purpose.

And are we winning the hearts and minds of Pakistanis given the extraordinary aid that we have provided? Well, I would refer you to the Pew Research Center, which says that the majority of Pakistanis view the United States as the enemy. The majority say that U.S. assistance has a negative or no impact at all. And Pakistan is one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

So I think by any measure, when you look at the extraordinary aid that we have provided, at the very least, we have not used that aid package as a basis from which to force very, very reasonable reforms with respect to helping the Pakistanis help their own people. Because if you are not making a commitment to education, if you are not making a commitment to health care, if you are not building the roads and bridges of your community, why are we? We spent \$87 billion rebuilding the roads and bridges of Afghanistan. We spent \$73 billion rebuilding the roads and bridges of Iraq, roads and bridges they blow up to kill our people. So, you know, I think, if anything, you know, we look at this exercise today, this hearing, as underscoring, I think, the urgency of better utilizing the leverage that we have with Pakistan so to ensure that not only that money is more wisely spent, but we, you know, the benefactors of huge amounts of foreign aid to Pakistan aren't viewed by the vast majority of the Pakistani people as the enemy and the money that we give them as ineffective.

Mr. OLSON. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman.

And I appreciate the very thoughtful comments that you have offered here. And we agree with you on the need for Pakistan to be investing more in education, in health, in its own people. I think there is really no doubt about that. And we support Prime Minister Nawaz' stated commitment to devoting 4 percent to education, 4 percent of GDP. And we would like to see that. We would like to see that happen.

I think it does have to be said that Pakistan faces a huge number of challenges right now. It faces huge security challenges. And we could have a very long discussion about how that happened. And I think, you know, there are domestic—there are certainly large domestic factors at play. And I think Pakistan is attempting to turn that security situation around. But that does consume, I think, a significant amount of their budget in doing so.

On the question of hearts and minds and views of Americans, it is not—it is not a happy story. And I agree with you. On the other hand, it is something that is somewhat improving. The numbers have gradually improved on Pakistan's perceptions—Pakistanis' perceptions of Americans. I can tell you from personal experience, I think there is less of an impression now amongst the political

elite that the United States is playing some kind of nefarious role with regard to Pakistani domestic politics. In other words, we are perceived as not intervening in Pakistani politics. And that is because we haven't. We have been very careful not to do that. So I think that this is something that is not going to change overnight. But the trends are, albeit modest, they are in a positive direction. And I think we need to keep working away at that.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you.

Chairman ROYCE. Well, Ambassador, let me—I am going to yield time to Mr. Brad Sherman of California for an additional question.

Mr. SHERMAN. Pakistan is the only schizophrenic nuclear power. Winning over the people of Pakistan is one of the most important things we can do. Voice of America spends a lot of money around the world. I hope that you would be an advocate for making sure that we have a robust program not just in Urdu but also in the Sindhi and other languages. Please do not be fooled by them saying: Well, a lot of people have some working knowledge of Urdu. You are in the marketing business. People in my town spend billions of dollars advertising in Spanish to people who prefer to listen in Spanish. They don't say: Well, you know, we are going to test those people and see, what is their working knowledge?

You reach people in the language they want to listen in. And the fact that we are talking about \$2 billion a year and we are not spending \$1 million a year to reach people in the Sindhi language is something I hope you will do something about. I have been trying. I have not been successful. I am counting on you.

I want to second just about everything Mr. Higgins said. I was an advocate in my first 5 minutes, or a devil's advocate, for a zero-based budget for Pakistan. That is obviously not what we are going to do. I do hope that you will confer to the Pakistanis, though, that if there ever was a vote on the floor of the House to say not one penny can be disbursed until Dr. Afridi and his family are safe here, it would pose a danger to the U.S. Congress because we would be stampeding to vote yes. And that would be a danger to some of our colleagues.

As to—yes, everybody would stampede; those voting first would be stampeded by those trying to be first.

Focusing on that aid, obviously, schools are important. USAID dedicated more than \$155 million to building and improving schools in Sindh. A 2014 USAID inspector general report found that 3 years in, the program was not achieving its goals; it had unrealistic expectations; that no schools had been built; that there was little improvement in early grade reading.

That was a report in 2014. Has anything been done to make sure that education aid in Sindh is more effectively spent? And if you don't have that information, you can respond for the record.

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much, Congressman Sherman.

Let me say with regard to Sindhi, I hope that you are aware that our Consulate General in Karachi has started putting out all of its social media work in Sindhi, and it has received a very positive reaction. So Facebook—

Mr. SHERMAN. That idea may have come from Congress. Go on.

Mr. OLSON. We are happy to implement it, and I will take back the message on Voice of America. I don't have specific detailed in-

formation on the schools in Sindh, but I can tell you that I have participated in the inauguration of schools, so they are being built. They are going up. But I will have to get you a detailed status report.

Mr. SHERMAN. I look forward to that. I would also like you to explore with USAID the idea that a good chunk of our aid should go there in the form of providing free textbooks. That would allow us to make sure that the content of those textbooks, perhaps not passing a politically correct test in the Democratic Club in the San Fernando Valley, would be consistent with, if not reflective, of American values.

Second, every student sees on the front page, "Provided by the people of the United States," every day.

Third, it is very hard to steal a textbook because if the United States is providing free textbooks, who are you going to sell the textbooks to? Everybody who wants textbooks got them for free.

And, fourth, one of the advantages of the madrassa is they got free textbooks; we ought to have free textbooks.

Finally, what would it take to get Pakistan to be a status quo power? That is to say, generally accepting a Kashmir situation. Is there any amount of development aid the world could provide to the Kashmiri people? Is there any change in the level of local autonomy that India could provide? I realize everybody wants to get a Nobel Prize for solving the Israeli-Palestinian question. There might be a prize in it for you. Is there anything—not so that Pakistan would formally accept the situation, but so that they could calm down, agree to live for a decade or so without Kashmir being at the top of their list?

Chairman ROYCE. If I might interject here, I am aware that Ambassador Olson has to appear on the Senate side, and I am aware that—

Mr. SHERMAN. That is not important.

Chairman ROYCE. Regardless of our feelings on this, he might interpret it differently, and so maybe that is a longer discussion that we might have either in writing or sit down with him.

Mr. SHERMAN. And we were supposed to meet in my office. They closed every school in my district. I look forward to meeting with you.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you.

And just in closing, I did want to bring up the remarks that Mr. Engel made about your predecessor, Ambassador Olson, in your job, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. He was a personal friend to myself and Eliot Engel, and I know certainly from the day that he began engaging with this committee, I remember the Dayton Peace Accords and the work he did on Bosnia and Kosovo with Eliot Engel and others, with those of us here. We counted him as someone who had very wise counsel on a lot of issues. We miss him. I can't help but feel when I reflect upon your predecessor that the stress of the job may have had something to do with his heart giving out.

We wish you, Ambassador, well in your responsibilities here, and we appreciate your time and patience today. I know that you are on your way to the Senate, so I will just say what you have heard are some deep concerns from both sides of the aisle here today

about the direction, this issue about getting more money into public education in Pakistan. It is clear to us that this has got to be a priority. Members are frustrated.

You have a difficult job, but you have the full backing from us to weigh in forcefully with the responsibilities you have in your position.

So, with that said, we thank you again, and we stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

**FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128**

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman

December 16, 2015

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at <http://www.ForeignAffairs.house.gov>):

DATE: Wednesday, December 16, 2015
TIME: 10:00 a.m.
SUBJECT: The Future of U.S.-Pakistan Relations
WITNESS: The Honorable Richard Olson
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
U.S. Department of State

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5621 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day Wednesday Date 12/16/2015 Room 2172

Starting Time 10:01 Ending Time 12:58

Recesses: 1 (10:10 to 11:00) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairman Edward R. Royce, Rep. Heana Ros-Lehtinen, Rep. Scott Perry

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session

Executive (closed) Session

Televised

Electronically Recorded (tapcd)

Stenographic Record

TITLE OF HEARING:

The Future of U.S.-Pakistan Relations

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

See attached.

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

IFR - Rep. Dana Rohrabacher

SFR - Rep. Gerald Connolly

QFR - Rep. Michael McCaul


QFR - Rep. Brad Sherman

QFR - David Trott

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 12:58



Jean Marter, Director of Committee Operations

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Edward R. Royce, CA
	Christopher H. Smith, NJ
X	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL
X	Dana Rohrabacher, CA
X	Steve Chabot, OH
	Joe Wilson, SC
	Michael T. McCaul, TX
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X	Robin Kelly, IL
	Brendan Boyle, PA
X	Sheila Jackson-Lee, TX (non-committee member)

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DANA ROHRBACHER, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

National Interest: *How China Could Become a Two-Ocean Power (Thanks to Pakistan)*

Claude Rakisits

June 12, 2015

In the last few months Pakistan's Government has made a number of decisions that have drawn the country even further into China's geostrategic orbit. And although China and Pakistan have had a long and fruitful relationship for well over 50 years, it was the launch of the 2,900 km China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) during a visit to Pakistan by Chinese President Xi Jinping in April that qualitatively changed the relationship. This \$46 billion CPEC project, which involves the construction of roads, railroads and power plants over a 15-year period, comes on top of other previous important Pakistan-China agreements in the military, energy and infrastructure fields.

The geostrategic importance of CPEC is bolstered by some earlier bilateral agreements. First, in April China was granted 40-year operation rights to the port of Gwadar on the Indian Ocean, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Beijing is expected to invest \$1.62 billion in Gwadar. Gwadar will be where the CPEC begins and eventually makes its way to Kashgar in western China. Eventually when the port is fully operational and CPEC is completed, China will be able to transship some of its oil needs from that port, thus saving billions and precious time and most importantly avoiding the potentially vulnerable Malacca Strait. Gwadar will play a critical part in China's land and maritime silk routes, linking it to Central Asia and beyond. Importantly, while Gwadar is being built as a commercial port and not as a naval facility for China's navy—at least for the time being, it could potentially be developed as one in the future. Such a development would certainly up the ante in Sino-Indian maritime competition in the Indian Ocean.

Another little-publicized aspect of the CPEC agreement, still apparently under negotiation, is Pakistan's purchase of eight diesel-powered attack submarines which would be conventionally armed. This would be one of Pakistan's biggest weapons purchases ever, at about \$6 billion. Pakistan's possession of such submarines would seriously complicate any Indian attempt to blockade Karachi or Gwadar. The sale would further entrench China as Pakistan's principal arms provider. In 2010 alone, Pakistan was the destination for 60% of China's total arms sales to the world.

China's interest in deepening its involvement in Pakistan is nothing new. What has changed and has enabled the Chinese to intensify their focus on Pakistan, is the effective end of the West's, and in particular the United States', military operations in Afghanistan in 2015. Accordingly, NATO's departure from Afghanistan has had two consequences: it has created a regional power vacuum and it has diminished America's interest in Pakistan. And China has quickly jumped into the breach.

China has used this opportunity to bolster its long-term economic and strategic interests in Pakistan, the critical land bridge in the development of China's Silk Road. Accordingly, the Chinese leaders have been willing to invest substantially in the development of Pakistan's decrepit infrastructure, particularly in its roads and the energy sector. In absolute and relative terms, CPEC is huge compared to Washington's last big economic package of \$7.5 billion (2009–14). The completion of the CPEC would also enable China to link up with its significant economic interests in neighboring Afghanistan, particularly in copper and oil. Significantly, the first capital that the new president of Afghanistan visited was Beijing, not Washington, let alone New Delhi.

However, for China's ambitious projects in Pakistan to come to fruition, the restive frontier area in western Pakistan, notably the provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the tribal areas, will need to be pacified. Chinese leaders have pressured Pakistan to ruthlessly pursue the Afghan Taliban and their fellow ideological travellers, including the Uighur militants of the al-Qaeda-linked separatist East Turkestan Islamic

Movement (ETIM), who are hiding in those areas. ETIM fighters have launched raids into Xinjiang province from those lawless areas in the past. Accordingly, partly prompted by Beijing, the Pakistan military has been engaged in a year-long operation in North Waziristan hunting down the terrorists, including the members of the ETIM. Unfortunately, many of these have fled across the border into Afghanistan. China also recently hosted peace talks between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan, with the Pakistan army intelligence present as well. Baluchistan also remains a serious problem for China, with Chinese workers having been killed by Baluch separatists in the past. In order to avoid such a reoccurrence, the Pakistan government will be assigning a division of Pakistan's special security forces to protect Chinese workers in the future.

Notwithstanding the difficulties discussed above, if the CPEC does become a reality—and this is a big if—this would be very good news for Pakistan, as it would help address some of the country's major developmental and economic issues. Put differently, it would prevent Pakistan from collapsing as a functioning state, a distinct possibility down the road and something China would not want to see happen given the knock-on effects this would have in the region. However, in geostrategic terms the success of CPEC would not be good news for the U.S.: it would displace the US as Pakistan's major external patron in favor of China. Most importantly, it would provide China with a firm and reliable long-term beachhead in the Indian Ocean close to the Persian Gulf, effectively making China a two-ocean power. This would be a red rag to India. So no wonder India has been complaining loudly about the CPEC. But the even more important question for policymakers in Washington is how this mega-Chinese project will affect America's own pivot to Asia in the longer-term.

Dr Shakil Afridi languishes in prison as appeal lingers

10 September, 2015

PESHAWAR, Pakistan, Sept 10, 2015 (AFP) - The lawyer for Dr Shakil Afridi who was jailed after helping the CIA find Osama bin Laden accused the government Thursday of deliberately delaying his appeal after the case was adjourned for the sixteenth time.

Shakil Afridi, who ran a fake hepatitis vaccination programme as cover for an operation to find the 9/11 mastermind, was in 2012 found guilty by a tribal court of having ties to militants and jailed for 33 years.

Last year a tribunal cut 10 years off his sentence, but he filed an appeal in March seeking bail and a fresh trial.

But Afridi's lawyer, Qamar Nadeem Afridi, said that since March, 16 sessions had passed without any proceedings because the administration of Khyber tribal district had failed to submit documents for the case to the tribunal.

"Yesterday (Wednesday) the judge again asked for the record and the Khyber administration did not submit it," Qamar Afridi, adding that a new hearing had now been set for October 16.

In his appeal Shakil Afridi had asked the tribunal to review the entire case and acquit him or grant him bail until it was heard.

"We are of the view that either Khyber administration is using delaying tactics so that Dr Afridi continues to languish in prison or they have lost the record," his lawyer said.

An official of the Khyber administration told AFP on condition of anonymity that for some "legal complications" they could not submit the case file, but now it would be done as soon as possible.

The Guardian: *Pakistan intelligence services 'aided Mumbai terror attacks'*

Monday 18 October 2010

Pakistan's powerful intelligence services were heavily involved in preparations for the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008, according to classified Indian government documents obtained by the Guardian.

A 109-page report into the interrogation of key suspect David Headley, a Pakistani-American militant arrested last year and detained in the US, makes detailed claims of ISI support for the bombings.

Under questioning, Headley described dozens of meetings between officers of the main Pakistani military intelligence service, the ISI, and senior militants from the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) group responsible for the Mumbai attacks.

He claims a key motivation for the ISI in aiding the attacks was to bolster militant organisations with strong links to the Pakistani state and security establishment who were being marginalised by more extreme radical groups.

Headley, who undertook surveillance of the targets in Mumbai for the operation, claims that at least two of his missions were partly paid for by the ISI and that he regularly reported to the spy agency. However, the documents suggest that supervision of the militants by the ISI was often chaotic and that the most senior officers of the agency may have been unaware at least of the scale and ambition of the operation before it was launched.

More than 160 people were killed by militants from LeT who arrived by sea to attack luxury hotels, a Jewish centre, a café, a hospital and the main railway station in Mumbai, the Indian commercial capital. Casualties included citizens from 25 countries, including four Americans killed and seven Britons injured. The attacks dominated media for days and badly damaged already poor Indian-Pakistan relations.

European and American security services now fear that LeT, which has thousands of militants, runs dozens of training camps and has extensive logistic networks overseas, is moving from what has been a largely regional agenda – focused on the disputed Himalayan former princely state of Kashmir – to a global agenda involving strikes against the west or western interests. The documents suggest the fierce internal argument within the organisation over its strategic direction is being won by hardliners.

Headley, interviewed over 34 hours by Indian investigators in America in June, described how "a debate had begun among the terrorist outfits" and "a clash of ideology" leading to "splits".

"The aggression and commitment to jihad shown by several splinter groups in Afghanistan influenced many committed fighters to leave [LeT]," Headley said. "I understand this compelled the LeT to consider a spectacular terrorist strike in India."

Headley, who changed his name from Daood Gilani, told the investigators that the ISI hoped the Mumbai attack would slow or stop growing "integration" between groups active in Kashmir, with whom the agency had maintained a long relationship, and "Taliban-based outfits" in Pakistan and Afghanistan which were a threat to the Pakistani state.

"The ISI ... had no ambiguity in understanding the necessity to strike India," Headley is reported to have said. The aim of the agency was "controlling further split in the Kashmir-based outfits, providing them a sense of achievement and shifting ... the theatre of violence from the domestic soil of Pakistan to India."

Headley describes meeting once with a "Colonel Kamran" from the military intelligence service and having a series of meetings with a "Major Iqbal" and a "Major Sameer Ali". A fellow conspirator was handled by a Colonel Shah, he claims. Headley also alleges that he was given \$25,000 by his ISI handler to finance one of eight surveillance missions in India.

However, Headley describes the ISI director general, Lt General Shuja Pasha, visiting a key senior militant from LeT in prison after the attacks in a bid "to understand" the operation, implying that, as many western security agencies suspect, the top ranks of the agency were unaware of at least the scale of the planned strike.

The Pakistani government has repeatedly denied any involvement of any security official in the Mumbai attacks. Last night, an ISI spokesman told the Guardian the accusations of the agency's involvement in the Mumbai attacks were "baseless".

LeT was banned in Pakistan in 2002. Jamat-ud Dawa, the social welfare wing of LeT, has been blacklisted in the wake of the Mumbai attacks although it continues to function.

The revelations could prove embarrassing to the US government as well as to the Pakistanis. Reports in American newspapers over the weekend claimed that Headley's wife had tried to alert American authorities to her husband's activities but had been ignored.

International Business Times: *Balochistan: 'Hundreds of people abducted and murdered by Pakistan army' activists warn*

March 11, 2015

Baloch activists are urging rights groups and the international community to pay attention to the situation of people living in the Balochistan province, western Pakistan.

According to some members of the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) – a democratic and secular organisation that aims to repel Pakistani occupation and regain sovereignty in Balochistan – Baloch people are persecuted, abducted and systematically killed by Pakistani security agencies and the Pakistani Army.

Ashraf Sherjan, president of the BRP Germany Chapter, has warned that Balochs are haunted by what he calls "Pakistani kill-and-dump-policy intelligence agencies and armed forces."

Speaking to **IBTimes UK**, he said: "Since Balochistan was forcefully occupied by Pakistan, Baloch people have been living as guests of death.

"It has never been considered, even outside Pakistan, that Balochistan belongs to the Baloch people who are now haunted. Baloch leaders are being deliberately assassinated by the occupying state of Pakistan for demanding rights to their own land."

Sherjan then cited the case of Baloch leader Shaheed Nawab Akbar Bugti, who was attacked and killed along with his tribesmen in 2006.

Balochistan history

Balochistan, a large area bordering with Afghanistan to the north and Iran and the Arabian Sea to the south, is inhabited mainly by Baloch, Pashtuns and Brahuis, and smaller communities and tribes such as Iranian Baloch, Hazaras, Marri and Bugti.

Balochistan was invaded by Britain in 1839. As a result of the invasion hundreds of people, along with the then Baloch ruler Mir Mehrab Khan, died.

Balochistan was then divided into three parts: Northern Balochistan and Western Balochistan were given to Persia and Afghanistan respectively, and Eastern Balochistan was under British rule until 1947.

After the British left, Balochistan was annexed to Pakistan. According to some, the then ruler Khan of Kalat was forced to sign accession documents despite a previous document recognising the independence of the Baloch people which had been signed by the British, Balochistan and the upcoming Pakistan administration.

Since then, separatist groups demanding independence have engaged in armed struggles with the Pakistani government.

During an armed struggle erupted in 2004, Balochistan's leader Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed by the Pakistani government, which accused him of being a warlord and using the Balochistan Liberation Army as a facade to run his own militia.

His murder prompted unrest in the area with thousands of students from Balochistan University and other locals rioting, sparking fears that the then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf would be targeted with attacks in retaliation.

"It would take days to mention the names of the thousands of Baloch political activists, leaders and students who were killed," Sherjan said.

Black month

Baloch activists refer to March as a "black month" for Balochistan history as in two separate occasions during the month, Balochistan was first invaded and then bombarded.

"On 27 March 1948 Pakistan invaded Balochistan and coerced the Baloch ruler to sign a so-called 'accession treaty' after the Baloch Parliament had rejected the offer to join Pakistan on the basis of shared religion," Sherjan said.

"On 17 March 2005, Pakistani paramilitary forces bombarded the entire city of Dera Bugti. More than 70 people, the majority of whom were women and children, were killed and nearly 200 were injured."

People abducted and killed

In 2011, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting rights abuses committed by the Pakistani government against people in Balochistan.

The group urged Pakistan to end "widespread disappearances of suspected militants and activists by the military, intelligence agencies, and the paramilitary Frontier Corps in the south-western province of Balochistan".

The report detailed 45 alleged cases of enforced disappearances – the majority occurred in 2009 and 2010 – and warned that some of the people who were abducted were also executed.

According to Sherjan, the policy of abducting and killing Baloch people still continues today.

"Many bodies have been found with amputated limbs in various areas across Balochistan and in Karachi. This inhumane practice continues to date and families of enforced-disappeared Balochs report that more than 20,000 Balochs have disappeared since current Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf took power in 1999," he said.

"In January 2014 three mass graves were discovered in the Tootak area of Khuzdar district in Balochistan. The graves contained at least 169 bodies. Only three of the persons have been identified as previously abducted persons who were picked up from their homes by Pakistani paramilitary forces.

"The rest of the bodies could not be identified because they were mutilated beyond recognition. The military quickly cut off all access to the graves and took control of the remaining bodies so no further forensic identification work was possible."

Sherjan also urged the Norway government and the international community to shed light on the fate of Ehsan Arjemandi, a Norway national allegedly abducted in 2009, while he was on his way to Karachi from Balochistan.

"He has not been heard from or seen in public since then. The Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, is believed to be responsible for the abduction. I urge the human rights organisation including the European Union and United Nations to take notice of Balochistan's situation and play their moral role in ending human rights violations before it's too late."

Al Jazeera: Abdullah: Taliban are receiving support within Pakistan

Afghan leader Abdullah Abdullah talks about refugees in Europe, security in the country, and dealing with the Taliban.

10 Oct 2015

Afghanistan was supposed to get a new start one year ago. After 13 years in power, President Hamid Karzai, who had led the country since the Taliban government was defeated after the 9/11 attacks, finally stood down.

The biggest mistake [in the past 14 years] Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan. From one side, being in the frontline of the 'war against terror' ... from the other side allowing Taliban to regroup, reestablish themselves. And on top of this, the international community's focus on Afghanistan was shifted towards Iraq soon after... Had that focus maintained in Afghanistan at that time... that would have made a big change.

Abdullah Abdullah, Afghan chief executive

After a contentious election in 2014, with widespread claims of ballot rigging, the two main candidates were persuaded to share power. Dr Ashraf Ghani became president and his opponent, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, the chief executive.

All this happened to coincide with the departure of many of the international forces in the country, leaving the Afghan army and police in charge of security.

At the peak of the US-led Afghanistan combat mission there had been about 130,000 US and NATO troops in the country. Now there are about 16,000.

This has led to an increase in insecurity and a very negative effect on the country's economy. Corruption is rife and jobs are few and far between.

Civilian casualties have soared to a record high in the first half of 2015 according to a UN report, and many Afghans are leaving the country to escape increasing violence. Afghans are the second-largest group of refugees seeking asylum in Europe.

"The current security situation is challenging. Perhaps people don't have confidence in the future of security. That is the main issue [why people are leaving Afghanistan] and it is something we have to address.... It has turned into a crisis for Europe," says Abdullah Abdullah.

So how are the two rivals managing working together? How will they cope with the country's deteriorating security situation? How do they deal with the Taliban? And what is Pakistan's role in Afghanistan?

Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah joins *Talk to Al Jazeera* to discuss the political and economic challenges facing Afghanistan; the threat of ISIL and the Taliban; and why so many Afghans are fleeing to Europe.

Newsweek: Pakistan Is Not Stopping Terrorists Who Threaten the U.S.

By Lisa Curtis 8/26/15

The U.S. is reportedly set to block a military aid tranche to Pakistan because of its failure to crack down on the Haqqani network, a designated terrorist organization with ties to the Taliban that attacks U.S. and Afghan forces on a regular basis.

It's about time.

According to Pakistani media, U.S. officials have told their Pakistani counterparts that they will not certify to the U.S. Congress that Pakistani counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan have damaged the Haqqani network.

Pakistan launched an offensive against the bases of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban is an organization that has ties to Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, but which focuses mainly on attacking Pakistani targets) in North Waziristan over a year ago after they attacked Karachi airport. Pakistani efforts against the TTP intensified following the group's horrific massacre at a military school in Peshawar last December that killed over 130 children.

But the decision not to certify a new tranche of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) aimed at reimbursing Pakistan for its counterterrorism operations in the region signals U.S. patience with escalating violence in Afghanistan is wearing thin.

The U.S. has provided around \$13 billion in CSF funding to Pakistan since 2001, in addition to the nearly \$14 billion in other economic and security aid the U.S. has transferred to the country. The U.S. has long conditioned its aid to Pakistan on the country meeting certain benchmarks, including "demonstrating a sustained commitment to combating terrorist groups on Pakistani soil."

However, over the last few years, the U.S. secretary of state has waived these conditions on grounds that it was in the U.S. national security interest to transfer the funding even though the legislative conditions had not been met.

Last year Congress added a new requirement to the CSF program that the U.S. defense secretary certify that military operations in North Waziristan have significantly disrupted the safe haven and freedom of movement of the Haqqani network. If the defense secretary is unable to make this certification, funds in the amount of \$300 million will not be available for Pakistan, even if the administration chooses to exercise its waiver authority.

Despite Pakistani proclamations that they no longer distinguished between “good” and “bad” Taliban, most observers assessed that Haqqani camps were spared during the military operation dubbed “*Zarb-e-Azb*” (sharp strike).

In a Heritage backgrounder published last month, I argued that the U.S. must stop using national security waiver authority to provide security-related assistance to Pakistan, given its failure to crack down on the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, another terrorist group.

I argued that unless the U.S. follows through on withholding military aid to Pakistan on the basis of its support to terrorist groups, Pakistan will continue to serve as a base of operations for groups that both threaten regional stability and are responsible for attacks against the U.S.

While Pakistan has suffered massively from terrorist attacks over the last eight years and the U.S. should partner with Pakistan in its fight against terrorism, Washington can no longer skirt around the fact that Pakistan has failed to crack down on certain terrorist groups that continue to conduct attacks and undermine critical U.S. national security interests in the region.



Statement for the Record
Submitted by Mr. Connolly of Virginia

The U.S. faces immense difficulties in our bilateral relationship with Pakistan that are inextricably linked to our interests in regional stability in South Asia. Pakistan maintains a porous 1,650 mile-long border with Afghanistan that terrorist groups routinely exploit in an effort to undermine the government in Kabul – a government put in place with the sacrifice of more than 2,300 U.S. soldiers in our country's longest war and more than \$100 billion in relief and reconstruction funding. In the category of what could go wrong there, Pakistan and India – two nuclear armed countries – remain locked in a violent territorial dispute over the Kashmir region and routinely trade accusations of subversion. Finally, the U.S. has a stated commitment to bring democratic reforms and human rights protections to the more than 180 million people who reside in Pakistan, but countervailing domestic forces make even incremental gains difficult.

The U.S. has provided Pakistan with \$18 billion in economic and security assistance and \$13 billion in military reimbursements since the 9/11 attacks focused greater U.S. security and foreign assistance attention on the region. For more than 14 years, cooperation with Pakistan on counter-terrorism initiatives and domestic reform efforts have been predicated on the fact that doing so is in the vital national interest of the U.S.

However, there are some aspects of Pakistan's behavior that make it exceedingly difficult to demonstrate to the American public the value of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

Chief among them is the discovery in 2011 of Osama bin Laden hiding in a family compound outside of Abbottabad, Pakistan just miles away from Pakistan's National Military Academy. The fact that the U.S. conducted the raid that killed bin Laden without coordinating with the Pakistani military is proof positive for many that, when push comes to shove, U.S. and Pakistani interests are irreparably misaligned.

Pakistan's military has long been suspected of half-hearted prosecution of, if not outright collusion with, insurgent groups. To this day, it is suspected that the leaders of Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Haqqani Network are residing in Pakistan, and the Pentagon has certified that some insurgent groups are used as assets of the Pakistani military for subversive activities abroad, namely in Afghanistan. For the first time since 2001, conditions placed on military reimbursements to Pakistan could prevent \$300 million in Coalition Support Funds from transferring to Pakistan if the Secretary of Defense does not certify that Pakistan is actively pursuing the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan (FY 2015 NDAA). This could be a helpful signal to Pakistan that the U.S. has metrics for cooperation against what should be shared enemies.

The recent effort by Pakistan to gain some control of terrorist activities in the tribal areas is a welcome development. Similar efforts in urban theaters are also welcome. Especially, in light of the revelation that one of the San Bernardino attackers, Tashfeen Malik, frequented known radical institutions in the cities of Multan and Islamabad.

There are some concerns current security initiatives in and around Karachi are politically motivated and rife with human rights abuses. Pakistan should be careful to maintain a balance between security and the preservation of political space for the peaceful opposition. Infringement of the latter is likely to exacerbate problems with insurgents and could lead to a backlash worse than the original threat.

Encouragingly, there have been welcome developments in Pakistan on other fronts important to the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. In 2013, the country witnessed its first peaceful transition from one democratically elected government to another when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League-N won 176 seats in the lower house of parliament, and on December 9, 2015, India and Pakistan announced the resumption of their Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue.

To realize further victories in the bilateral relationship, it is clear the U.S. must continue to set guideposts for our long term goals – both incentives and punitive measures that clearly communicate that the U.S. will not make great sacrifices for narrow shared interests. I look forward to hearing from the Administration on how it plans to set those guideposts and where they might lead.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Richard Olson
by Representative Michael Mc Caul
House Foreign Affairs Committee
December 16, 2015**

Question:

What pressure can the U.S. place on Pakistan to provide better oversight of its institutions to ensure what is being taught in its institutions is not an extremist interpretation of Islam that undermines and threatens the U.S.?

Answer:

We share your concern that educational institutions not be used to promote violent extremism in Pakistan, as elsewhere. We have consistently engaged the Government of Pakistan on the importance of improved oversight of all educational institutions operating in the country, and Pakistan has acknowledged that poorly regulated schools can be exploited by violent extremists. As part of its National Action Plan, the Government of Pakistan has taken steps to map (“geotag”) the location of thousands of religious schools around the country and assess their funding sources, while working with religious leaders to reform and standardize curricula and shut down schools with ties to violent extremist groups. This is a challenge Pakistan has recognized, and one that Pakistan must address consistently and forthrightly.

In addition to our diplomatic engagement with the Government of Pakistan on the issue, the Department of State and USAID counter violent extremism through programs that foster economic and social development, and public diplomacy that leverages narratives of Pakistani culture and identity to raise awareness of the costs of extremist violence. Our public diplomacy programs seek to amplify credible voices within Pakistan and partner with a variety of local stakeholders such as academics, professionals working in creative media, women’s organizations, and religious leaders, including teachers in religious schools and local clerics. We also help Pakistan address gaps in its public education system and social services that lead some Pakistanis to seek out education at tuition-free institutions that may be less regulated. The Department also consistently encourages the Government of Pakistan to promote countering violent extremism through its own programming.

Question:

Do you see any connection between those who attend [the Al-Huda Centre] and radicalization? And if so, should this pattern of radicalization amongst those who attend this institution raise concerns?

Answer:

While the Al-Huda center is generally associated with a conservative interpretation of Islam, we have not seen any information to date that indicates a pattern of radicalization of individuals who have studied at that institution, which strongly condemned the San Bernadino shooting. We regularly engage with the Government of Pakistan on the importance of

identifying and shutting down institutions associated with extremist groups, and it has taken some steps to do so as part of its National Action Plan to fight terrorism.

Question:

The U.S. has claimed that the sale of the F-16 to Pakistan is to help bolster their counterterrorism capabilities. In fact, the U.S. government has plans to sell an additional 8 F-16's to the Pakistani government once Congress signs off on the sale. While I am not against the sale of these aircraft to Pakistan, I am concerned with the optics and how this may be perceived by India and Afghanistan, both countries that are more concerned with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and support for terrorism groups than fighter jets. What implications, if any, will this sale of this complex platform have on our broader foreign policy strategy in the region?

Answer:

As a matter of policy, the State Department does not comment on foreign military sales until they are formally notified to Congress, but all U.S. security assistance to Pakistan is focused on improving Pakistan's counterterrorism (CT) and counter insurgency (COIN) capabilities. Pakistan uses U.S.-funded equipment and U.S.-provided technology to significant effect in their counterterrorism efforts. These operations support U.S. counterterrorism objectives and contribute directly to regional stability and security, which are in the interest of the United States, Pakistan, and our partners in the region.

The United States does not view its security cooperation in the region in zero sum terms – our security relationships with Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan are distinct, but each advances U.S. interests. All arms transfers are subject to the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, which requires an assessment of regional power to ensure that U.S. equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

Pakistan's existing F-16 fleet demonstrates how U.S. support has improved Pakistan's ability to combat terrorist elements throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), particularly in North Waziristan, by the addition of a precision strike capability. U.S.-provided equipment – such as air-to-ground munitions, reconnaissance equipment, and targeting pods – has enabled the Pakistani military to more effectively conduct operations against militants in its tribal regions at all hours while minimizing collateral damage. These operations reduce the ability of militants to use Pakistani territory as a safe haven for terrorism and a base of support for the insurgency in Afghanistan. It is in the national security interests of the United States to support Pakistan's ongoing counterterrorism operations in the FATA.

**Question for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Richard G. Olson by
Representative Brad Sherman
House Foreign Affairs Committee
December 16, 2015**

Question:

USAID dedicated more than \$155 million to building schools and improving education in Sindh. A 2014 USAID inspector general's report found that three years in "the program was not achieving its goal. It had built no schools and made very little, if any, improvement in early-grade reading, community mobilization, or technical assistance to the Department of Education." What has been done to improve the use of USAID funds and ensure that a better education system is built in Sindh?

Answer:

Changes have been made in response to the OIG's 2014 audit. The mid-program review showed that the program faced implementation capacity challenges and bureaucratic hurdles, which led to substantial delays. It also had unrealistically calibrated targets. We have made adjustments to overcome these problems and USAID funds are being used to good effect.

While the delay was problematic, we believe that a focus on proper implementation has helped avoid wasteful spending. For example, seven months into the program, USAID terminated and re-procured one reading project due to lack of progress. The termination and time to find a new implementing partner had an effect on USAID's ability to meet the goals and timelines set, but it also ensured the funds were being spent effectively. Pakistan remains a challenging environment in which to implement assistance programs, particularly in sectors like education where authority has been devolved to the provincial level.

In response to the cost overruns in construction, USAID has increased the number of pre-qualified construction contractors and worked with the construction industry to specify the standards needed to construct the schools. These changes have resulted in an increase in competitive bids and an overall decrease in construction costs to the taxpayer.

This program is now making excellent progress, and is on track to meet the newly calibrated targets. Construction has begun on 58 schools of the 110 planned. More than 5,000 teachers have completed training focused on improving reading skills in early grade children. A report on the impact of the newly trained teachers is expected in February 2016. A reading curriculum has been finished for 30,000 non-formal education centers catered to adolescent girls; the initial cohort of such centers are expected to open in the first half of 2016. More than 420 "school management committees" (similar to the Parent Teacher Association in the U.S.) have been established and will help ensure the schools improve operations and responsiveness to the community.

Once the bureaucratic and capacity issues were resolved, the program has made significant progress. Given that program did not adhere to its original expected timelines the program has been extended through September 2018, as recommended in the audit.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Richard Olson by
Representative Dave Trott
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
December 16, 2015**

Question:

We understand that Pakistan strives to conduct full, free and fair elections. But my understanding is that a large population of Ahmadis, who have been declared non-Muslim by constitutional amendment, cannot vote in those elections without disavowing their Muslim identity. Executive Order No 15 from 2002 creates a form of political apartheid for Ahmadis. How is Pakistan addressing this issue?

Answer:

Standing government policies and discriminatory laws marginalize the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan. The status of Pakistan's Ahmadiyya community is documented at length in the Department's International Religious Freedom Report for Pakistan.

We regularly engage with Pakistani government officials at every level on the importance of promoting religious freedom, countering violent extremism, and protecting religious minorities, including full citizenship rights for Ahmadis. We stay in regular contact with Ahmadi civil society groups to keep updated on their situation.