

Study of the Title I, Part A Grant Program Mathematical Formulas

Statistical Analysis Report



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Executive Summary

Introduction

In 1965, Congress established Title I, Part A (herein referred to as Title I) as a part of the landmark Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Congress noted two issues that it hoped to address through Title I funding: schools needed additional financial assistance to provide services to children in low-income families, and school districts with large numbers of poor children faced particular challenges compared with wealthier districts. The current law provides financial assistance to districts for children from low-income families to help ensure that all children meet challenging state academic standards.

Title I funds are currently allocated through four grants. Basic Grants are the largest component of Title I funding (\$6.4 billion in fiscal year 2015 [FY 15]) (table 1.A). Concentration Grants, the smallest of the four grants (\$1.3 billion in FY 15), are available to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 or 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population. Targeted Grants (\$3.3 billion in FY 15) are allocated to districts according to a student weighting system benefiting districts with high numbers or percentages of formula-eligible children. Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG) (\$3.3 billion in FY 15) are allocated to states to provide districts with additional funding for low-income and disadvantaged children; the exact amount varies depending on measures of state effort and equity in funding public education.

In contrast to competitive grant processes sometimes used to distribute federal funds, Title I grants rely on a formula grant process. Competitive grant processes use a review system to evaluate proposals and make awards according to specified criteria and budget allotment. Formula grants rely on mathematical logic to make awards based on directives in legislation, generally involving population counts and mathematical criteria. All four Title I grant formulas are primarily based on a district's number of formula-eligible children. Formula-eligible children include 5- to 17-year-old children in families living in poverty, children who receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), neglected and delinquent children, and foster children. The count of children in poverty is estimated at the district level through the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) program of the U.S. Census Bureau and is based on the national poverty measure. The count of formula-eligible children is also used to compute a poverty concentration weight, which is a component of the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas.

In addition to the formula-eligible population, several provisions are applied in the mathematical formulas for each of the four grants. One key factor is the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), which measures the cost of educating a child in a particular state. The range of SPPE values among states is bounded by minimum and maximum thresholds within the formula law. For example, within the Basic Grant formula, the maximum SPPE threshold is capped at 20 percent over the national average. All four grants are affected by the state minimum provision, which is designed to ensure that each state receives enough funding to maintain a program of sufficient size to make the administrative effort worthwhile. The state minimum provision provides that no state may receive less than a stipulated percentage of the national total allocation. All four grants also include a hold harmless provision, which limits the size of a decrease that a district may have in its grant allocation from one year to the next.

While mathematical formulas for all four grants are fundamentally based on the count of formula-eligible children and several shared provisions, each grant has a unique, complex series of algorithms for determining allocations for that grant. The EFIG formula includes both a state effort provision (the measure of state effort to provide financial support compared with its relative wealth) and a state equity provision (the degree to which education expenditures within a state are equalized). Also, the eligibility criteria vary for each grant. For example, districts are eligible for Concentration Grants if the number of formula-eligible children in the district exceeds 6,500 or 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population (regardless of poverty rate). Thus, a large district could be eligible for a Concentration Grant even if the poverty rate for the district is well below the national average. It is important to understand that the Title I allocation is a distribution of a fixed amount of money that all districts share. When funds are shifted to bring districts up to hold harmless levels, they are taken away from other districts that may have had higher initial allocations due to additional formula-eligible children or increasing percentages of formula-eligible children.

It is important to note that there is no direct link between the formula-eligible children upon whom the distribution of funds is based and the children who receive services from Title I. Today, 95 percent of children served by Title I receive services in schoolwide programs that serve all children in the school, regardless of whether they meet one of the specific criteria for eligibility determination

(table I.A). Altogether, about 11.6 million children are counted as formula eligible, while about 25.0 million students in the United States receive Title I services.

About This Study

This study responds to a congressional mandate under the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) (Section 9211) to examine the distribution of Title I funds to understand how the current formulas affect various types of school districts, such as large or small districts, those in poor or rich areas, and those in urban or rural areas. The legislation directed the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) to respond to nine specific analytic tasks in a report. These analytic tasks specifically called for comparisons of districts across the 12 National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) geographic locales, ranging from large cities to remote rural areas. There was also a specific congressional directive to examine high-poverty districts. In addition, there was a specific request to analyze the impact of poverty child counts (number weighting) and percentage weighting in the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas, since these two provisions are important components of those grants.

After reviewing both the research literature and available data, an expert panel was convened to come to a consensus on the analytic approaches needed to respond to the congressional mandate and provide guidance on the structure of the report. Based on the panel's recommendations, the primary analytic metric used in this report is the amount of funding allocated for the designated Title I grant divided by the number of formula-eligible children used in the computation for that specific grant. The data used for the analysis were derived from the final FY 15 allocation. This report also includes a series of analyses comparing the distribution of Title I funds and the distribution of formula-eligible children.

In consultation with the expert panel, it was decided that the best general approach to respond to the congressional mandate was to compare Title I grants per formula-eligible child using comparative allocation formulas. For example, to address the congressional mandate to examine the extent to which number weighting and percentage weighting affected the allocations, these two provisions were compared with independent allocation computations. Similarly, several congressionally mandated tasks requested analyses of whether specific provisions “unduly benefit or unduly disadvantage” certain types of districts. It was decided that formula alternatives provided the best way of analyzing these provisions in the manner intended by Congress.

Another key recommendation from the expert panel was based on its recognition that differences in local cost

structures would affect the actual purchasing value of the allocated funds. The expert panel recommended that NCES adjust the allocations using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) to provide insights on the actual purchasing power of the Title I funds for districts in various parts of the country. The panel also noted that the state minimum provision tends to provide higher allocations per formula-eligible child to districts in states with smaller population sizes, but there are no established criteria to measure the funding needs of small districts to implement effective small-scale programs. The panel thought a deeper understanding of the cost structures and economies of scale for large and small districts could play a role in future conversations about school finance and recommended that NCES include relevant information in the report. In response to this recommendation, this report contains a comparison of education costs across a range of district locales and population sizes (see the Expenditures per Student by School District Locale and Size textbox in the Introduction).

All the analytic results in this report are summarized at the national and state levels by the 12 NCES geographic locales (large city, midsize suburban area, distant town, remote rural area, etc.), district poverty level, and district 5- to 17-year-old population size categories (ranging from populations of less than 300 to populations of 25,000 or more). The data are presented both for formulas existing under current law as well as for a selection of the expert panel's suggested alternative formulas that may be of interest to different policymaking constituencies. Selected results also are presented in locality-based cost-adjusted dollars. In addition to the tables included in this report, there is an online listing of district-level data.

It is anticipated that the differences in allocations per formula-eligible child identified in this report will be further assessed by policymaking groups and research communities for their implications on outcomes for economically disadvantaged children in large and small districts in different areas of the country. This report does not provide recommendations for changes to the Title I formulas, as NCES is prohibited by legislation from making such recommendations. The report is intended to provide a deeper understanding of how the formulas currently work for different types of districts and how the current law affects districts with varying characteristics. The example alternatives provide indicators of the sensitivity of the current formulas to various types of changes to computations. These analyses are not presented as recommendations but rather as examples of how alternative assumptions interact with the funding allocations on a per formula-eligible child basis.

Key Findings

Title I overall

Nationally, 21.4 percent of 5- to 17-year-olds were considered formula eligible for Title I in FY 15 (table 1.C). Puerto Rico (55.9 percent), the District of Columbia (32.5 percent), and Mississippi (32.2 percent) had the highest percentages of formula-eligible children, while New Hampshire (9.9 percent) and North Dakota (11.8 percent) had the lowest percentages. The distribution of formula-eligible children was not directly reflected in the distribution of total Title I allocations, which included funds allocated under Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). For example, 13.1 percent of all formula-eligible children were in California and 5.9 percent of all formula-eligible children were in New York. However, California was allocated 11.8 percent of all Title I funds, 1.3 percentage points less than its percentage of formula-eligible children. In contrast, New York was allocated 7.7 percent of all Title I funds, 1.8 percentage points higher than its percentage of formula-eligible children.

The total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child provides a more direct metric than comparing distributions of formula-eligible children with distributions of funds. The total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child in the United States was \$1,227 but ranged from \$984 in Idaho to \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference of \$1,606¹ (table 1.A). The seven states (and the District of Columbia) that received the highest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child all received the state minimum allocation for one or more of the four Title I grants.

The range in state allocations can be partly attributed to key Title I formula provisions, particularly the state minimum and hold harmless provisions. Removing the state minimum provision from the formula for each grant reduced the difference in the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the highest (\$2,078 in Wyoming) and lowest (\$978 in Idaho) allocations for the first year (since the hold harmless provision restricts the size of a decrease in any one year) to \$1,100 (table 3.A). Removing both the state minimum and hold harmless provisions in combination further reduced the difference in the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child between the jurisdictions with the highest (\$1,746 in the District of Columbia) and lowest (\$982 in Idaho) allocations to \$763.

¹ All calculations within this report are based on unrounded estimates. Therefore, the reader may find that a calculation cited in the text or figure, such as a difference or a percentage change, may not be identical to the calculation obtained by using the rounded values shown in the accompanying tables.

The two states with the highest total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child that did not receive the state minimum allocation under any of the Title I grants were New York (\$1,611) and Maryland (\$1,588). New York, which had the highest allocation for a state not eligible for the state minimum provision, was affected by its high state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) value, which was capped at 120 percent of the U.S. average. Maryland also had a high SPPE value, which was similarly capped, and benefited from having relatively few large districts compared with many other states, which tended to reduce the disparity for the EFIG formula and increase the number of children in districts qualifying for Concentration Grants and Targeted Grants.

The total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child varied among the 12 National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) geographic locales, which were based on a district's population and proximity to an urbanized area. The locales with the highest total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child were the most densely and least densely populated areas: large cities (\$1,466) and remote rural areas (\$1,313) (table 3.B). Districts in fringe rural areas (\$1,070), fringe towns (\$1,088), and small suburban areas (\$1,102) had the lowest total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child. Large cities had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for most formula alternatives involving the removal of single or multiple provisions. For example, when the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed in combination, large cities (\$1,319) had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child and remote rural areas (\$1,292) had the second-highest allocation; small suburban areas had the lowest allocation (\$1,122).

In the final allocation, and in each of the formula alternatives that were analyzed, districts in the highest poverty quarter (i.e., the poorest districts) had the highest total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child, and districts in the lowest poverty quarter (i.e., the least-poor districts) had the lowest total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child. In the final allocation, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,381), and districts in the lowest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation (\$1,023). Similarly, when the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed in combination, for example, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was \$1,395 for the highest poverty quarter, compared with an allocation of \$921 for the lowest poverty quarter.

Districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had the highest total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,442) compared with districts of all other population sizes; districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had the second-highest allocation (\$1,323). The total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child was lowest for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,107).

Basic Grants

Basic Grants are the largest component of Title I funding and serve the largest number of districts. Basic Grants accounted for approximately \$6.4 billion of the total Title I funds in FY 15, or about 45 percent of the \$14.3 billion allocated (table 1.A). The Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$462 in Utah to \$1,121 in Vermont, a difference of \$659 (table 4.A). When the SPPE and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$546 in 39 states and Puerto Rico to \$1,121 in Vermont, a difference of \$575.

The Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child also varied by locale: allocations were highest in remote rural areas (\$583) and small suburban areas (\$563) and lowest in midsize cities (\$532) and fringe rural areas (\$534) (table 4.B). The difference in the Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations was \$52.

Basic Grants are less targeted to the highest poverty districts than other Title I grants because the Basic Grant formula does not include weighting factors for high-poverty districts, and the poverty threshold is lower than for the other Title I grants. Districts in the lowest poverty quarter received a higher Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$604) than districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$558). Also, in most of the analyses where single or multiple provisions were removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter had the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, and the second-highest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation. For example, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter had the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$601), and the second-highest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation (\$521).

Concentration Grants

Concentration Grants, the smallest of the four grants, provide funds to districts with relatively large numbers or percentages of formula-eligible children. They accounted for approximately \$1.3 billion (9 percent) of the total Title I funds in FY 15 (table 1.A). The Concentration Grant final

allocation per formula-eligible child was \$134. Wyoming received the highest or among the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child in the final allocation and for most of the alternatives involving the removal of single or multiple provisions. For example, after removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$110 in Utah and \$111 in Florida and North Carolina to \$590 in North Dakota and \$871 in Wyoming, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$761 or 692 percent (table 5.A).

In all the analyses where single provisions were removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter had the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child and the second-highest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation (table 5.B). For example, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter had the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$200), and second-highest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation (\$125).

Targeted Grants

Targeted Grants provide funding to districts according to a system that allocates proportionately more funds to districts with higher numbers or percentages of formula-eligible children. Targeted Grants accounted for approximately \$3.3 billion (23 percent) of the total Title I funds in FY 15 (table 1.A). The Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child was \$282, but the allocations ranged from \$196 in Idaho and \$198 in Iowa to over \$600 in North Dakota, Wyoming, and Vermont (table 6.A).

The Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child for large cities (\$377) was higher than the allocations for all other locales, which ranged from \$218 in fringe towns and \$219 in fringe rural areas to \$290 in remote rural areas (table 6.B). The Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was also higher for large cities than all other locales in all allocation analyses involving the removal of single or multiple provisions, except when SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed in combination.

The Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child increased as the poverty rate increased. The lowest poverty quarter received a Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child of \$218, compared with an allocation of \$336 for the highest poverty quarter. The pattern of the highest poverty quarter receiving the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child persisted even when both the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination. When removing these provisions, the difference in the Targeted Grant allocations between the

highest and lowest poverty quarters increased to \$131 (the difference for the final allocations was \$119). The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$406) than districts in other poverty quarters and of other population sizes, which ranged from \$178 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$347 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter.

Education Finance Incentive Grants

Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG) are allocated to states to provide districts with additional funding for low-income and disadvantaged children; the amount varies depending on measures of state effort and equity in funding public education. These grants accounted for approximately \$3.3 billion (23 percent) of the total Title I funds in FY 15 (table 1.A). The EFIG final allocation per formula-eligible child was \$282 and ranged from \$219 in Idaho to \$684 in Vermont, a difference of \$465 (table 7.A). The hold harmless and number weighting provisions were only applied at the district level and did not affect state allocations. As with Targeted Grants, large cities (\$395) and remote rural areas (\$309) had the highest EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child (table 7.B). EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child in all other locales ranged from \$207 for fringe towns to \$291 for midsize cities.

The highest poverty quarter received a higher EFIG final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$352) than districts in the lowest poverty quarter (\$209). Like the pattern for Targeted Grants, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was consistently for the highest poverty quarter when single or multiple provisions were removed from the formula. Also, within each poverty quarter, the largest districts had higher EFIG allocations than the smallest districts, except when multiple provisions were removed in combination. For example, removal of the percentage weighting provision resulted in an EFIG

allocation per formula-eligible child of \$428 for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter, compared with an allocation of \$279 for the smallest districts in that poverty quarter.

Summary

This report highlights that changes to the formula do not always provide systematic changes of a similar nature across all states; however, there were some general patterns. The smallest districts tended to have higher allocations per formula-eligible child than the largest districts in Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. However, for Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG), the largest districts tended to have higher allocations per formula-eligible child than the smallest districts. Districts with other population sizes (those with a 5- to 17-year-old population between 300 and 24,999) often had a lower total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child than the largest or smallest districts.

This report contains analytic summaries in an array of statistical tables that display allocations under current provisions of the Title I formulas for various types of districts, as well as a range of examples under alternative funding formulas. The intent was not to provide an exhaustive analysis of potential allocations of alternative formulas but rather to provide examples of tabulations that highlight analytic concepts that researchers and policy analysts may find useful. While an effort was made to look at the purchasing power of the allocations as cost adjusted by the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index, there was no extant methodology to accurately adjust for the relative resource levels required for small and large districts. It is hoped that this study will provide a valuable reference for further analyses of the structure of the formulas for Title I allocations and encourage additional research on the role of Title I funds in supporting the education of disadvantaged children.

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Introduction

Title I, Part A (herein referred to as Title I) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson on April 12, 1965, provides financial assistance to school districts for children from low-income families. Title I is designed to help students reach proficiency on challenging state academic achievement standards by allocating federal funds to be used for education programs and services. The majority of these Title I federal funds are currently allocated at the district level in all states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, based on mathematical formulas involving the number of children eligible for Title I support and the state per pupil cost of education.¹ Districts distribute the Title I funds they receive to schools with the highest percentages of students from low-income families. Schools enrolling at least 40 percent of students from low-income families are eligible to use Title I funds for schoolwide programs designed to upgrade the entire school's education program to improve achievement for all students, particularly the lowest achieving students. Unless a participating school is operating a schoolwide program, the school must focus Title I services on students who are failing, or most at risk of failing, to meet state academic standards.

The allocation of Title I funds is based on complex mathematical formulas that use multiple distribution criteria and multiple thresholds to determine a funding allotment for each of the districts in the United States. The 1965 Title I ESEA formula specified that a state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) factor would be multiplied by the number of children from low-income families (i.e., the number of formula-eligible children) to determine an authorization amount for Title I. Title I is intended to be a supplemental program; thus, districts are authorized to receive 40 additional cents for each SPPE dollar to spend on education services provided to disadvantaged students. Thus, the SPPE is multiplied by 0.40 to arrive at an authorization amount. This authorization amount is adjusted by several other provisions, including the congressional appropriation, to arrive at a final allocation amount (see the Methodology for Allocating Federal Title I Funds section later in this chapter). When additional grants with new formulas were added to the Title I program, the initial program became known as Basic Grants. Although the formula for Basic Grants has changed slightly over the years,² Basic Grants remain the largest component of Title I funding.

¹ Federal Title I funds are allocated to districts but given to states who can reserve funds at the state level. Based on certain criteria, states are also able to make different allocations to their districts than the federal allocation. See <https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/index.html>.

² The formula now includes children who qualify for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).

Concentration Grants were added during the 1970s to provide additional help for districts with more than 6,500 formula-eligible children or where more than 15 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old population was formula eligible. The hold harmless provision was added to Basic Grants in the Education Amendments of 1974. This provision limits the reduction in the allocation to a district to 15 percent compared with the prior year. The Improving America's Schools Act (IASA) of 1994 added the state minimum provision, which ensures that no state receives less than a minimum threshold of funding to maintain a program of sufficient size that makes the administrative effort worthwhile. IASA also added Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG) to more directly target funds to districts with high numbers or high percentages of formula-eligible children. However, funds were not appropriated for Targeted Grants and EFIG until the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2002 was enacted. NCLB appropriated funding for the four current grants: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and EFIG.

These four Title I grants vary with respect to how the funds are allocated to disadvantaged populations. It is important to keep in mind that there is no direct link between the formula-eligible children on whom the distribution of funds is based and the students who actually benefit from the funds. This is because most students served by Title I grants receive services through schoolwide programs that serve both eligible students and noneligible students in a school. Moreover, because each of the federal allocation formulas uses a series of provisions, there is not a direct link between the percentage of formula-eligible children and the percentage of federal funds allocated. Districts often receive funding from more than one grant, and many districts receive some funding from each of the four grants. Key facts about each of the four grants are summarized below (see also table 1.A and figure 1.1).

- **Basic Grants** are the largest component of Title I funding and serve the largest number of districts. Basic Grants accounted for approximately \$6.4 billion of Title I funds distributed in fiscal year 2015 (FY 15), or about 45 percent of the \$14.3 billion allocated. Basic Grants provide funds to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 and exceeds 2 percent of the district's school-age (5- to 17-year-old) population.

- **Concentration Grants** provide additional funds to districts with relatively large populations of low-income and disadvantaged children. They accounted for approximately \$1.3 billion (9 percent) of Title I funds in FY 15. Concentration Grants provide funds to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 or 15 percent of the district's school-age population.
- **Targeted Grants** provide additional funds to districts according to a weighting system. Targeted Grants accounted for approximately \$3.3 billion (23 percent) of Title I funds in FY 15. Targeted Grants are based on the same formula-eligible child counts used for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants, except the data are weighted so that districts with higher numbers or higher percentages of children from low-income families receive proportionately more funds. Targeted Grants provide funds to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 (without application of the formula weights) and at least 5 percent of the district's school-age population.
- **Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG)** differ from the first three types of Title I grants in that they are allocated in two stages: first at the state level, then within each state at the district level. Their purpose is to provide districts with additional funding for low-income and disadvantaged children; the exact amount provided to each state varies depending on measures of state effort and equity in funding public education. These grants accounted for approximately \$3.3 billion (23 percent) of Title I funds in FY 15. The state effort provision is based on states' financial support for education (state per pupil expenditure) compared with their relative wealth as measured by their per capita incomes. The state equity provision is based on the degree to which education expenditures among districts within states are equalized. EFIG provide funds to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 and at least 5 percent of the district's school-age population.

Congressional Mandate

The Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), passed in December 2015, includes a mandate to study the Title I allocation funding formulas and the formulas' impact on school districts (Section 9211).³ The congressional mandate specified that the report examine whether the four grant formulas that determine Title I allocations "are adequately delivering funds to local educational agencies with the highest districtwide poverty averages" (ESSA 2015). According to the legislation ordering the report, "minimal effort has been made by the Federal Government" to examine the alignment between the funding formulas and increasing funds for students in poverty. The legislation refers to a Congressional Research Service report that found that the four Title I formulas allocate shares of funds in a manner that differs from the shares of students by state or different types of school districts. The legislation directs the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) to respond to nine specific analytic tasks in a report (see the Analytic Tasks for Title I Formula Grant Report as Specified by the Every Student Succeeds Act [ESSA] textbox later in this chapter).

To address tasks A through G of the congressional mandate, this report analyzes the funding allocations for each of the four major Title I grants by various characteristics, such as by state, National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) geographic locale (see the NCES Geographic Locales textbox later in this chapter), poverty status, and district size. Chapters 1 and 2 analyze the distribution of Title I funds under the four formulas (Task A), by the 12 locales (Tasks B and C), poverty status (Task D), district size (Task E), and poverty status and district size (Task E). Chapters 3 through 7 are designed to show sensitivity of the Title I allocations with respect to different formula specifications. The impact of number weighting and percentage weighting of the formula-eligible population (Tasks F and G) also are analyzed in these chapters.

³ The U.S. Department of Education (ED) made the decision to produce the report with the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), drawing on input from the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) and other ED offices.

NCES assembled a panel of independent experts to come to a consensus on the analytic approaches needed to respond to the congressional mandate. The Title I Study Expert Panel (which was convened on three occasions) included experts with both academic research and operational experience on Title I. Panelists shared their Title I expertise and provided feedback on the development of the analytic approaches for the report and on preliminary findings. NCES also conducted a literature review to develop the analytical framework used for this report. Both the expert panel and the literature review respond to Task H, which requires a review of analytic reports or studies that examine Title I.

The specific guidance for the literature review was to focus on the distribution of funds for the four grant formulas. Peer-reviewed journal articles, policy briefs, and government studies have examined the alignment of the Title I formulas to the law's intent from various perspectives. This brief literature review summarizes key points of this research on the alignment of the formulas to the law's purpose of appropriately delivering funds to districts according to their levels of poverty. The analytical framework for this report was based both on this literature review and the recommendations of the expert panel.

Analytic Tasks for Title I Formula Grant Report as Specified by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA)

- (A) An analysis of the distribution of part A of Title I funds under the four formulas;
- (B) An analysis of how part A of Title I funds are distributed among local educational agencies in each of the 12 locales classified by the National Center for Education Statistics;
- (C) The extent to which the four formulas unduly benefit or unduly disadvantage any of the local educational agencies described in subparagraph (B);
- (D) The extent to which the four formulas unduly benefit or unduly disadvantage high-poverty eligible school attendance areas in the local educational agencies described in subparagraph (B);
- (E) The extent to which the four formulas unduly benefit or unduly disadvantage lower population local educational agencies with relatively high percentages of districtwide poverty;
- (F) The impact of number weighting and percentage weighting in the formulas for distributing Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants on each of the local educational agencies described in subparagraph (B);
- (G) The impact of number weighting and percentage weighting on targeting part A of Title I funds to eligible school attendance areas with the highest concentrations of poverty in local educational agencies described in subparagraph (B), and local educational agencies described in subparagraph (B) with higher percentages of districtwide poverty;
- (H) An analysis of other studies and reports produced by public and non-public entities examining the distribution of part A of Title I funds under the four formulas; and
- (I) Recommendations, as appropriate, for amending or consolidating the formulas to better target part A of Title I funds to the most economically disadvantaged communities and most economically disadvantaged eligible school attendance areas.

NCES Geographic Locales

Locales are based on an address' proximity to an urbanized area. This "urban-centric" locale code classification system was introduced in 2006.

- City, Large: Territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city with a population of 250,000 or more.
- City, Midsize: Territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city with a population less than 250,000 and greater than or equal to 100,000.
- City, Small: Territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city with a population less than 100,000.
- Suburb, Large: Territory outside a principal city and inside an urbanized area with a population of 250,000 or more.
- Suburb, Midsize: Territory outside a principal city and inside an urbanized area with a population less than 250,000 and greater than or equal to 100,000.
- Suburb, Small: Territory outside a principal city and inside an urbanized area with a population less than 100,000.
- Town, Fringe: Territory inside an urban cluster that is less than or equal to 10 miles from an urbanized area.
- Town, Distant: Territory inside an urban cluster that is more than 10 miles and less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area.
- Town, Remote: Territory inside an urban cluster that is more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.
- Rural, Fringe: Census-defined rural territory that is less than or equal to 5 miles from an urbanized area, as well as a rural territory that is less than or equal to 2.5 miles from an urban cluster.
- Rural, Distant: Census-defined rural territory that is more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area, as well as a rural territory that is more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster.
- Rural, Remote: Census-defined rural territory that is more than 25 miles from an urbanized area, as well as a rural territory that is more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

For more information, see <https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ruraled/definitions.asp>.

This report does not address Task I of the congressional mandate, which requests that IES make policy recommendations on "amending and consolidating" the Title I formulas. NCES is prohibited by legislation from providing such recommendations for changes to the formulas. This report is intended to provide a deeper understanding of how the four grant formulas currently work for different types of districts and how the current law affects districts with varying characteristics. The example formula analyses presented in later chapters of this report provide indicators of the sensitivity of the current formulas to various types of changes in the computations. To isolate the impact of various assumptions on the formulas as directed by the mandate, NCES conducted analyses that removed single and multiple provisions from each of the four grant formulas. These analyses are not presented as recommendations but rather as examples of how different formula provisions interact with the funding allocations on a per formula-eligible child basis.

There are two primary reasons why analyses of the federal allocations process alone may not fully address the congressional mandate to examine whether Title I

allocations are adequately delivering funds to the most economically disadvantaged communities. First, Title I district allocations do not match the actual district receipts due to state adjustment provisions described later. Second, there is a mismatch between the number of children used to determine Title I eligibility (formula-eligible children) and the number of students who receive Title I services. The discrepancy between the number of eligible children and the number of student recipients is primarily due to (1) noneligible students participating in schoolwide Title I programs; (2) 5- to 17-year-olds who may be formula eligible but are not enrolled in school; (3) students enrolled in private schools; and (4) permitted exceptions for districts to allocate funds within their districts.

The differences in the child counts for funding recipients and formula-eligible populations are not systematically studied in this report. Since this report is designed to look at the allocation formulas and the resultant distributions of funds across states and districts, the focus is on formula-eligible children. It should be noted that many of the research studies on the Title I allocations also focus on funding and formula-eligible children, not on Title I

receipts and Title I student recipients. Some important exceptions to this pattern are the U.S. Department of Education studies cited below that evaluate the impact of the Title I program. The following two sections briefly describe specific Title I financial alignment and participation alignment concerns that NCES considered when designing the analyses to respond to the congressional mandate. These analytic challenges may affect the interpretation of the findings of this report.

Alignment of Title I Allocations and Revenue

The federal Title I funds allocated to districts under the four grant formulas generally do not exactly match the amount that the districts receive in a particular year for a number of reasons:

- States are required to adjust Title I allocations based on district boundaries and eligible charter schools, as well as other purposes, including reserving funds for school improvement and state activities, such as administrative costs (note that the reservation for school improvement may become a more significant factor with the requirement in ESSA that this reservation increases from 4 to 7 percent).
- Several states use alternative data approved by the U.S. Department of Education to redistribute allocations among districts with fewer than 20,000 residents.
- Districts have multiple years to use allocated funds.
- About 70 percent of Title I participating schools operate schoolwide programs and thus use funding to serve nonpoor students as well.⁴

Alignment of Title I Formula-Eligible Population and Recipient Population

After states adjust the federal allocation of aid to their school districts, the districts are then responsible for allocating these designated funds to eligible schools, including private and charter schools. Districts complete this allocation process according to a set of guidelines in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). In general, a district must rank all its school attendance areas according to their poverty rate, and it must serve, in rank order, areas above 75 percent poverty. A school attendance area is the geographic area in which students who are normally assigned to a particular school live. After a district has served all its areas with a poverty rate above 75 percent, the district may serve schools with lower poverty rates. In

short, not every formula-eligible child will be in a school that is allocated Title I funds. For further details about the district allocation of Title I funds to schools, see the Methodology for Allocating Federal Title I Funds section later in this chapter.

Many prior analyses of the Title I funding formulas have been based on counts of formula-eligible children used in the Title I federal allocations process. This count of formula-eligible children is the estimated number of 5- to 17-year-olds in poverty at the district level, along with counts (determined by administrative records) of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) participants, foster children, and neglected and delinquent children. Schools enrolling at least 40 percent of students from low-income families can implement schoolwide programs, benefitting all students at the school, including those who are not poor.⁵ It is important to emphasize that this percentage of low-income students pertains to data on low-income students available to school authorities at the school level. It does not refer to the counts of formula-eligible children, which are available only at the district level and represent a very different statistic. In most cases, states use the percentage of children who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (FRPL) to determine distributions at the school level.

The use of FRPL data to allocate district funds to individual schools has raised some technical difficulties since FRPL data have become less reliable proxies for student poverty rates. At the national level, the percentage of children who are eligible for FRPL is more than double the percentage of 5- to 17-year-olds who are formula eligible. In addition, FRPL participation may vary by school level. Riddle (2011) notes that districts often use FRPL data to determine student poverty rates, despite a disproportionate number of eligible high school students not being enrolled in the program. He found that districts disproportionately allocate Title I funds to elementary schools, at the expense of high school students who could also benefit from additional resources. Riddle explains that this is due to the allocation process for schools as well as districts' autonomy to target the funds to particular school levels, generally favoring elementary schools. The *National Assessment of Title I: Final Report* also found that Title I funds disproportionately go to elementary schools, and nearly three-fourths (72 percent) of Title I participants in 2004–05 were in prekindergarten through grade 6.

⁴ See <https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/legislation.html>.

⁵ A state agency may also request a waiver for certain schools to operate a schoolwide program without meeting the 40 percent threshold through (1) the School Improvements Grants (SIG) program in a Tier I or Tier II school that receives SIG funds or (2) ESEA flexibility in a priority school or focus school that implements interventions designed to enhance the entire education program of the school. See <https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/eseatitleiswguidance.pdf>.

In 2014, some 70 percent of Title I schools operated schoolwide programs. A letter from the U.S. Department of Education to chief state school officers on July 3, 2015, highlighted the advantages of and flexibilities in schoolwide programs and identified common misunderstandings about schoolwide programs.⁶ One of the less widely understood features of the Title I program is that for schoolwide programs, funds do not have to be used to serve only low-achieving students. The letter explained that, according to the law, “Title I funds may be used to upgrade an entire education program in a school and, in doing so, all students may benefit from the use of Title I funds. However, consistent with the purpose of Title I, the reason to upgrade the entire education program in a school is to improve the achievement of the lowest achieving students.” The scope of a schoolwide program substantially increases the number of Title I student recipients beyond those designated in the allocation legislation as the formula-eligible population.

The Title I formula-eligible population for FY 15 was 11.6 million (table 1.A). In contrast, the number of Title I student recipients, as reported by *EDFacts*, was more than twice that in school year (SY) 2014–15, at 25.0 million (table 1.A). Nearly half of the nation’s 50.3 million public school students received assistance through Title I in SY 2014–15.⁷ This means that the amount of Title I funds allocated per formula-eligible child is typically more than double the amount of funds received per student recipient. The national average Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was \$1,227 in FY 15 (table 1.A), compared with an average of \$546 in Title I revenues per student recipient in SY 2014–15 (table 1.A).

The differences in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child and Title I revenues per student recipient varied by state. The differences ranged from \$95 in Arizona (the Title I revenues per student recipient were \$95 less than the allocation per formula-eligible child) to \$2,008 in Vermont (the Title I revenues per student recipient were \$2,008 less than the allocation per formula-eligible child (table 1.A and table 1.A). Thus, the scope of the differences between the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child and Title I revenues per student recipient, and the asymmetric nature of these differences, affects the interpretation of the analyses in this report. Most students (95 percent) receiving Title I services do so through schoolwide programs (table 1.A).

Report Overview and Methods

The Executive Summary at the beginning of this report provides a summary of the study methodology, study limitations, and main findings of the study. The Introduction describes Title I allocations and the congressional mandate, and it includes a synopsis of the literature review and expert panel input that were used to develop an analytical framework for responding to the mandate. The Introduction also includes an overview of the four Title I grant formulas and a description of data sources used for the study.

The main body of the report is divided into seven chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 address the first five analytic tasks (tasks A through E) related to Title I allocations, as mandated by Congress (see the Analytic Tasks for Title I Formula Grant Report as Specified by the Every Student Succeeds Act [ESSA] textbox earlier in this chapter). Chapters 3 through 7 examine how provisions, such as number weighting and percentage weighting (tasks F and G), alone and in combination, impact the allocations per formula-eligible child. Since Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG) each have unique formulas, a separate series of tables was produced for each grant type to examine provisions unique to that formula: chapter 3 covers total Title I allocations; chapter 4 covers Basic Grant allocations; chapter 5 covers Concentration Grant allocations; chapter 6 covers Targeted Grant allocations; and chapter 7 covers EFIG allocations.

Formula provisions that are included in each grant’s mathematical formula, such as state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), hold harmless, and state minimum provisions, are analyzed separately in each of the chapters. Provisions that are unique to a grant, such as the 6,500 formula-eligible children or 15 percent formula-eligible children provisions (Concentration Grants), number and percentage weighting provisions (Targeted Grants and EFIG), and state effort and equity provisions (EFIG) are only analyzed in the relevant chapter(s). Since chapter 3 presents total Title I allocations, all provisions relevant to any of the four grants are included in the analysis.

Analyses presented throughout the text, figures, and tables of this report were computed based on unrounded data. Therefore, the reader may find that a calculation cited in the text or figure, such as a difference or a percentage change, may not be identical to the calculation obtained by using the rounded values shown in the accompanying tables. While the data labels on the figures have been rounded to whole numbers, the graphical presentation of these data is based on the unrounded estimates.

⁶ See www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/eseatitleiswguidance.pdf.

⁷ See https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_203.10.asp?current=yes.

To understand the full impact of a formula computation using any of the specific provisions, it was necessary to also remove the hold harmless provision in combination with one or more of the other provisions. The hold harmless provision limits the amount of change a school district may have in its Title I allocation from one year to the next; thus, the hold harmless provision would mask the long-term impact of removing a provision by limiting the impact on some districts. For example, to determine the effect of number weighting and percentage weighting on the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas (chapters 6 and 7), the hold harmless provision was removed in combination with both the number weighting and percentage weighting provisions (see exhibits A and B later in this chapter). Similarly, the state minimum provision may mask the effects of some provision removals on certain districts, particularly small rural districts. This provision was also removed in some formula analyses for illustrative purposes.

The appendixes of the report contain the list of the Title I expert panel members (appendix A), documentation for the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) (appendix B), and the analytic tables (appendix C). In addition to the analytic tables included in appendix C, a district table is available online. The online district table contains 19 different allocation analyses (including the actual Title I FY 15 distribution) as shown in chapters 3 through 7. These analyses show the four Title I grant formulas existing under current law as well as a variety of formulas that may be of interest to different policymaking constituencies. The online district table also includes the locale-based ACS-CWI estimates associated with each district.

The variations on formulas analyzed in this report are based on recommendations from the Title I Study Expert Panel. It should be emphasized that there are many more formula analyses that could have been constructed from the array of potential options. Assuming only the presence or absence of existing formula provisions, there are 254 possible combinations. Moreover, different SPPE percentages (e.g., 50 percent instead of 40 percent or an 85 percent minimum instead of an 80 percent minimum) could have been considered. There are additional formula criteria, such as eligibility thresholds for Basic Grants, Targeted Grants, and EFIG, that were not explored as formula analyses in this report but could have been considered. In addition, there are other weights that could have been considered in both the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas, and the minimums and maximums for the state effort provision in EFIG could have been adjusted. Thus, it is important to emphasize that the formulas analyzed in this report were

intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. It is anticipated that the differences in allocations per formula-eligible child identified in this report will be further assessed by policymaking groups and research communities to determine the implications for education adequacy for economically disadvantaged children in large and small school districts in different areas of the country.

Review of Studies on Title I Allocations

Much of the academic research on Title I has focused on how various features of the formulas affect an equitable distribution of funds. The literature on whether the federal funding formulas align with the law's intent have focused on how (1) weighted eligibility favors large school districts; (2) state adjustments, primarily the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision, favor wealthier states; and (3) various other adjustments, such as the state minimum and hold harmless provisions, diffuse the focus of the funding on children in poverty. Literature on the receipt of funds is more limited than literature on the allocations. To some extent, this may be because counts of Title I recipients at the school district level have only become available in national databases in recent years.

U.S. Department of Education (ED) studies on Title I have primarily focused on the implementation of Title I, such as evaluation studies of program effectiveness, rather than on the actual formulas. One of ED's major Title I studies was the *National Assessment of Title I: Final Report* (2007), which was designed to evaluate the implementation and impact of the program. This report examined such topics as state implementation of accountability and teacher quality; private school student participation in federal programs; closing the reading gap for 3rd and 5th graders; reading comprehension of 5th graders; and early elementary mathematics curricula. The study found that most Title I funds were used for instruction (73 percent) and instructional support (16 percent) in 2004–05. Also, the study found that high-poverty schools received a higher percentage of Title I funds than other schools. For example, 38 percent of funding went to schools with over 75 percent of students living in poverty (as measured by free and reduced-price lunch data), and 76 percent went to schools with over 50 percent of students living in poverty. The study also found that the targeting of Title I funds to high-poverty districts changed little between 1997–98 and 2004–05, despite legislation to target more funds to high-poverty districts by increasing the share of the funds through Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG).⁸

⁸ See https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pdf/20084012_rev.pdf.

Title I Accountability and School Improvement From 2001 to 2004 (2006) examined the implementation of accountability and school improvement requirements under Title I of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) from 2001–02 through 2003–04. The report included findings on identification of schools for improvement, interventions implemented at schools identified for improvement, and public school choice and supplemental education services under Title I.⁹ A more recent study of implementation, *State and Local Implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act, Volume IX—Accountability Under NCLB: Final Report* (2010), provided information on state, district, and school implementation of the NCLB provisions concerning accountability and school improvement. This study was based on data collected in 2004–05 and 2006–07, with a specific focus on the implementation of these programs in Title I schools.¹⁰

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) prepares a regular series of reports on the Title I grants. Some of the reports primarily focus on highlights of the most recent state allocations, such as *FY2016 State Grants Under Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)* (2017).¹¹ Other studies look at the formula provisions in a more detailed way, such as *Allocation of Funds Under Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act* (2016).¹² This study also included a discussion of how districts allocate funds to their schools. Another recent CRS report, *History of the ESEA Title I-A Formulas* (2017), reviewed changes in the allocation formulas over time, with a detailed description of revisions to the formulas and some background on the legislative debate regarding formula changes.¹³

Some academic and private research studies have had a strong focus on the formula itself, frequently providing critical perspectives on the equity of the formula process. Most of the key Title I features, such as the SPPE, state minimum, number and percentage weighting, and state effort provisions have been subject to detailed analyses. All four grant formulas multiply the eligible child count by the adjusted SPPE. The initial intent of the SPPE provision was to provide an estimate of the cost of education in a state. However, some research has noted that rather than representing the cost of providing an education, the use of the SPPE provision tends to provide more money to states that are already wealthy (Miller 2009; Liu 2008; Roza,

Miller, and Hill 2005), further exacerbating inequities (Hanna 2015).

The state effort provision in the EFIG formula is based on the ratio of a state's relative share of national education expenditures to its relative share of national personal income. Some research on this provision has found that it rewarded states that already spend a larger percentage of income on education (Baker et al. 2013; Liu 2008). The EFIG formula does limit the state effort provision to a range of 10 percentage points (0.95 to 1.05) to constrain the potential impact. Based on the FY 15 data analyzed for this report, if this provision were unconstrained, the range would vary from 0.72 (in Utah) to 1.53 (in New York). However, Baker et al. (2013) found that after fully adjusting for regional differences, Title I funding patterns disproportionately favor rural school districts in low-cost-of-living states.

Both Targeted Grants and EFIG use weighted counts of eligible children (the number and percentage weighting provisions) to provide more money on a per child basis to districts with higher student poverty counts or rates. Riddle (2015) and Gordon (2016) have argued that these weights seem to favor large districts, since weighting is currently based on the maximum count obtained from both a number exceeding certain absolute counts and an eligibility percentage exceeding certain intervals. Thus, certain large districts get larger allocations per formula-eligible child due to their relatively large numbers of formula-eligible children, despite having district-level poverty rates that may be below the national average (Liu 2008). Meanwhile, districts with larger concentrations of poverty but lower counts of formula-eligible children may receive less funding per child (Liu 2008).

Certain features of the Title I formulas potentially affect the distribution of funds by focusing on factors not strictly related to eligible children. These features include the state minimum and hold harmless provisions and differences between total authorization and total allocations. The state minimum provision is designed to ensure that each state receives enough funding to maintain a program of sufficient size to make the administrative effort worthwhile. Some research has argued that the state minimum provision leads to misalignment of the law's intent and the funding allocation (Miller 2009). Other research has noted that since smaller states have smaller concentrations of children in poverty, the state minimum provision reduces "targeting of funds to concentrations of children in poverty" (Miller 2009, p. 11). Another factor that affects the alignment of the funding to formula-eligible children is the hold harmless provision. This provision limits the reduction of funding

⁹ See <https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/tassie3/tassie3.pdf>.

¹⁰ See <https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/nclb-accountability/nclb-accountability-highlights.pdf>.

¹¹ See <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44486.pdf>.

¹² See <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44461.html>.

¹³ See <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44898.html>.

levels from year to year and protects the status quo (Gordon 2016). The outcomes of both provisions of the formula may contribute to the disparities in allocations per formula-eligible child across both districts and states (Gordon 2016; Liu 2008). Also, Congress has not appropriated a level of funding that meets the authorization funding level, which would be the sum of all statutory formula allocations plus the state minimums and hold harmless amounts. The final allocation requires that these authorization amounts be reduced through the ratable reduction rules to meet the appropriated funds available.¹⁴ Minimums and hold harmless amounts are allocated first and then the ratable reduction rules apply to the remaining districts' allocations.

Integration of Expert Panel Recommendations Into Report Design

Although a review of the literature provided valuable input during the initial development of the report, it became apparent that more targeted advice was needed due to the complexities of the Title I funding formulas, the range of potential responses to the mandate, and the impact of state adjustments to school district and school allocations. To obtain external guidance on how to best respond to the congressional mandate, NCES convened a panel of recognized experts on school finances and Title I to review the framework of this study, including the datasets and analytic approaches (see the list of panelists in appendix A). The Title I expert panel met three times, which was supplemented by additional informal communications and written recommendations. After the final meeting, the panel was given the opportunity to review the proposed structure of the report and a draft of preliminary findings. Finally, the panel was asked to provide oral and written feedback on the main analytic points and the most effective way to communicate these findings.

The panel reached consensus that

- The Title I allocations data should be the primary focus of the report and the receipts data should be presented only as a comparison;
- The report should analyze the Title I formula based on the formula-eligible population;
- The four Title I grant formulas should be examined separately, showing the impact of key components of the formulas (e.g., state minimum and hold harmless provisions);

- Allocations using different specifications should be presented for each major aspect of the Title I formulas, such as the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, and hold harmless provisions;
- The American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) cost of living adjustment should be used to compare purchasing power of funding across states and geographic locales;
- The U.S. Census Bureau's Supplemental Poverty Measure should be described in the report, but the current Official Poverty Measure should be used in the analysis;
- State-level data should be analyzed both within and across states;
- Select data on the largest districts should appear in the report;
- Districts should be the lowest level of analysis;
- The report should demonstrate how districts of varying sizes, including the largest and smallest, are impacted by the formulas;
- A data file with all districts should be prepared as a web-based supplement;
- The report should include an executive summary; and
- Graphs should be used extensively in the report to emphasize the findings.

Among the key outcomes from the panel was a recommendation to review the potential analytic impact of adjusting the funding for differences in local costs of living. The panel recognized that a given level of funding would purchase less goods and services in a high-cost area than a low-cost area. Although this concept is not a part of the current formulas, the panel felt that this type of analysis could provide useful insight into the relative importance of Title I funds for districts in various parts of the country. After further analysis in conjunction with additional data development by the Census Bureau, the ACS-CWI was selected for use in this report, per the panel's recommendation. The ACS-CWI is a measure of the systematic regional variations in the salaries of college graduates who are not educators. It can be used by researchers to adjust district-level finance data at different levels to make better comparisons across geographic areas. Appendix B of this report contains a more complete description of the ACS-CWI and how it is constructed. Analyses of the cost-adjusted allocations (using the ACS-CWI) are discussed in each of the chapters of the report.

¹⁴ The amount each state/district receives (or the final allocation) is based on the proportion of the total authorized Title I funds that are appropriated by Congress. This proportioning process, known as "ratable reduction," guarantees each district receives the same share of the appropriation as it has of the authorization, unless some other provision (state minimum, hold harmless, etc.) provides for a larger allocation to some jurisdictions, which take precedence over ratable reduction rules.

The panel recognized the need to approach the congressional mandate by presenting a select number of models of the Title I allocations using a range of formula specifications. Because of the large number of possible formula computations, the panel agreed that certain key adjustments would best address the congressional mandate. The panel conducted detailed discussions and multiple rounds of review to select the formula specifications that would provide relevant information for policymakers. There was consensus on the selection of formula specifications presented in this report, including the removal of the hold harmless provision. Retaining the hold harmless provision mitigates reductions in the allocations for a particular year and thus makes the long-term results of the formula analyses difficult to interpret. The panel also made recommendations on the types of breakdowns to be featured throughout the report, including state, district locale, district poverty quarter, and district population size.

Several panel experts noted the importance of clarifying the lack of a specific connection between the formula-eligible child count and the students who actually receive funds. The experts stressed that, although the Title I allocation process is intended to target funds to high-poverty schools, not all poor students receive Title I funds. For example, high-achieving low-income students may not receive Title I services, or some schools with poor students may not receive funding at all. The panel noted the potential confusion over the fact that the Title I formula-eligible counts are a mechanism for distributing funds to high-need districts rather than a determination of individual eligibility. The panel also noted the importance of emphasizing that local discretion affects the receipt of funding at the school level. This information was incorporated into the report.

Several experts discussed the need for an economy of scale factor for adjusting expenditures per student, which is separate from a geographic cost adjustment. The economy of scale factor would adjust for the fact that districts with fewer students may be relatively more expensive to operate. One expert recommended utilizing a threshold of districts below a certain size to show different education costs. Although there was general acceptance of the relevance of the economy of scale issue, there was no consensus on how to assemble such an index within the context of this study. The economy of scale issue can be considered relevant to the interpretation of the results for small states and districts; however, such a factor was not analyzed in this report due to the lack of a suitable methodology. (See the Expenditures per Student by School District Locale and Size textbox later in this chapter for more information about education costs in smaller and larger districts.)

Methodology for Allocating Federal Title I Funds

In contrast to competitive grant processes used to distribute funds in many federal education programs, each of the four Title I grants uses a formula grant process. In a formula grant process, the grants are calculated through a mathematical formula based on a set of criteria determined by legislation and regulation. This methodology section is designed to introduce the Title I allocation process so that the different formulas analyzed in this report may be better interpreted and evaluated. A more complete discussion beyond this overview is contained in *Allocating Grants for Title I* (2016).¹⁵ In addition, this methodology section contains a review of the data used in the allocations and a summary of the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI).

Overview of Title I funding formulas

The federal allocation of Title I funds for Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG) involves a series of distinct steps (figure I.1). First, the number of formula-eligible children must be computed to determine whether school districts are eligible for Title I funds. These child counts serve as a basis for subsequent computations. The next step of the process is to determine the authorization amounts for eligible districts, which are the amounts determined under each of the four grants by the formulas in the Title I legislation. Then, the authorization amounts for districts are adjusted proportionately to match the actual amount of funding appropriated by Congress. The result of this computation is the federal final allocation.

The federal government sums the amount of Title I funds allocated to each district within a state and provides this amount to the state education agency. States are given some latitude to adjust the district Title I allocations. Finally, districts allocate the funds to the schools within their district using guidance based on regulations. This report analyzes federal allocations to districts, not district receipts of Title I funds from their state. It is important to note that the amount of Title I funds used by a district in a given year will typically not match its allocation for that fiscal year (see the Alignment of Title I Allocations and Revenue section earlier in this chapter).

¹⁵ See <https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/AnnualReports/pdf/titleI20160111.pdf>.

Figure I.1. The Title I Funding Process**Formula-Eligibility Count**

A school district's Title I allocation is based on the number of formula-eligible children living within the geographic boundary of the district. In 2015, there were 13,584 districts in the United States. For each district, the number of formula-eligible children is calculated as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Number of formula-eligible children} = & \text{Number of 5- to 17-year-olds living in families} \\ & \text{with incomes below the national poverty level} \\ & + \\ & \text{Number of children in families above the} \\ & \text{federal poverty level who receive Temporary} \\ & \text{Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)} \\ & + \\ & \text{Number of neglected and delinquent} \\ & \text{children in locally funded institutions} \\ & + \\ & \text{Number of foster children} \end{aligned}$$


Adjustment by State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE)

The cost of educating a child differs from state to state. This cost is reflected in the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE). An SPPE is calculated for each state as:

$$\text{SPPE} = \frac{\text{Current expenditure on education, excluding designated federal revenues}}{\text{Number of students enrolled in education in that state}}$$

Congress has determined that school districts should receive no more than 40 additional cents on the dollar for the education services they provide to disadvantaged children. Therefore, each state's SPPE is multiplied by 0.40.

Some states' SPPEs vary substantially from the U.S. average. Districts in these states have disproportionately high or low SPPEs relative to the U.S. average. To compensate for this variation, Title I legislation bounds the SPPE value.



Adjustment of SPPEs is an iterative process and is not complete until all states have an SPPE that falls within the legislated bounds of the U.S. average.

Figure I.1 continued on the next page.

Figure I.1. The Title I Funding Process—Continued

Authorization Amount for Each Grant Type

Title I funds are distributed through four grant types. School districts are eligible to receive each grant type for which they meet the eligibility criteria:

- **Basic Grant:** must have at least 10 formula-eligible children, and that number must be at least 2 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population
- **Concentration Grant:** must meet the Basic Grant eligibility requirements and have more than 6,500 formula-eligible children or more than 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population must be formula eligible
- **Targeted Grant:** must have at least 10 formula-eligible children, and that number must be at least 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population
- **Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG):** must have at least 10 formula-eligible children, and that number must be at least 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population

For Basic and Concentration Grants, an authorization amount is calculated for each district as follows:

Authorization amount for Basic or Concentration Grants (district level)

=

Number of formula-eligible children in the district

x

Adjusted state per pupil expenditure

For Targeted Grants, the number of formula-eligible children is weighted by the **number** or **percentage** of formula-eligible children. The district receives the larger of these two computations.

Authorization amount for Targeted Grants (district level)

=

Weighted number or percentage of formula-eligible children in the district

x

Adjusted state per pupil expenditure

EFIG allocations differ from the first three grant types in that they are allocated in two stages: first at the state level and then, within each state, at the district level. Funds are then distributed to schools in each state in proportion with the district's weighted count of formula-eligible students. Additional adjustments are made through the effort and equity factors. The effort factor benefits districts in states that spend a greater percentage of per capita income on education. The equity factor benefits districts in states that have a low disparity between high-spending and low-spending districts.

Authorization amount for EFIG (state level)

=

Number of formula-eligible children in the state

x

Adjusted state per pupil expenditure

x

State effort

x

State equity

Ratable Reduction to Determine Federal Allocation

Every year, Congress appropriates Title I funds. In 2015, the federal appropriation for the four Title I grants (\$14.3 billion) was less than the sum of the authorization amounts for the four grants (\$181.7 billion). Thus, as in previous years, districts' authorization amounts were reduced in proportion to the federal appropriation.




The result of this process is an initial allocation amount for each school district.

Figure 1.1 continued on the next page.

Figure I.1. The Title I Funding Process—Continued**Hold Harmless Provision**

Congress has determined that each school district cannot incur a loss of more than 15 percent of the preceding year's funds. This is referred to as the hold harmless provision. Each district's allocations are adjusted using the following process until all districts meet the hold harmless provision.



The same process is used for Basic, Concentration, and Targeted Grants.

State Minimum Provision

The school district allocation amount for a specific grant type is summed at the state level.

If the total allocation for a state is less than the state minimum allocation, the state receives the state minimum allocation. The state minimum provision is applied separately for each of the four grant types. In 2015, 13 states received the state minimum allocation for some or all grant types.

Since EFIG allocations are done at the state level, allocations are adjusted until all states have an allocation amount that is above the state minimum allocation. In some cases, a state may not receive enough funds to satisfy the hold harmless provision for all districts.

Expenditures per Student by School District Locale and Size

The Title I expert panel noted that smaller school districts tended to have higher cost structures than larger districts due to some economies of scale that were presumed to result in lower per student costs for larger districts (figure I.2). It was suggested that larger districts would be able to spread the costs for instructional, student, and operational support services over a larger group of students. On average, smaller schools have lower pupil to teacher ratios than larger schools.¹⁶ Also, small buildings may be more expensive to maintain on a per student basis. Additionally, the panel noted that schools in rural areas may need more extensive student transportation services, and other school-related infrastructure may be more expensive in rural areas. The panel concluded that there was no economy of scale index for schools that was sufficiently developed to be considered for this Title I allocation study; however, the panel encouraged the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to make any relevant information accessible.

NCES was able to produce a tabulation of the expenditures per student by district locale and size to provide some context on the relative current and instruction costs for districts (table I.B). Current expenditures include expenditures for instruction, student support, administration, operation and maintenance, school transportation, food services, and other services. In 2014–15, the total current expenditure per student was \$11,121, but this expenditure varied among the district locales. The lowest expenditure per student was in remote towns (\$9,919), while the highest expenditures were in large cities (\$12,149) and remote rural areas (\$12,251). Even though the current expenditure per student was higher for remote rural areas than for large cities, the instruction expenditure per student in remote rural areas (\$7,083) was lower than for large cities (\$7,692), due to the relatively larger amounts spent by rural areas on noninstruction costs (such as student support services or transportation). The lowest instruction expenditure per student was for remote towns (\$5,924).

After adjustment by the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI), the current expenditure per student for large cities (\$11,642) was lower than the expenditures for distant towns (\$11,884), remote towns (\$11,989), fringe rural areas (\$11,866), distant rural areas (\$12,575), and remote rural areas (\$14,986). The cost-adjusted current expenditure per student for remote rural areas was about 29 percent higher than the cost-adjusted current expenditure for large cities; the cost-adjusted instruction expenditure per student for remote rural areas was about 18 percent higher than the cost-adjusted instruction expenditure for large cities.

Districts that served a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had a higher current expenditure per student than larger districts. In 2014–15, the current expenditure per student for districts with a population of less than 300 was \$12,844, compared with an expenditure of \$10,750 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts). Districts of other population sizes had current expenditures per student ranging from \$10,449 for districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 to \$12,030 for districts with a population of 300 to 599. The range in instruction expenditures per student was smaller because districts with a population of less than 300 spent a higher percentage of current expenditures on noninstruction items. The instruction expenditures per student ranged from \$6,307 for districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 to \$7,395 for districts with a population of less than 300.

Adjusting the current expenditures per student using the ACS-CWI increased the value for districts with a population of less than 300 (\$15,297) compared with districts of other sizes, which ranged from \$10,722 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more to \$14,072 for districts with a population of 300 to 599. The cost-adjusted current expenditure per student for districts with a population of less than 300 was 43 percent higher than for districts with a population of 25,000 or more. Due to the relatively higher noninstruction costs for small districts, the cost-adjusted instruction expenditure per student for districts with a population of less than 300 was 33 percent higher than the cost-adjusted expenditure for districts with a population of 25,000 or more. Districts with a population of 300 to 599 and districts with a population of 600 to 999 also had cost-adjusted instruction expenditures per student that were more than 20 percent higher than the cost-adjusted expenditure for districts with a population of 25,000 or more.

While more research is needed to better understand the cost structures for various types of districts, this expenditure per student information, particularly after adjustment for local costs using the ACS-CWI, supports the consensus of the expert panel that current and instruction expenditures per student were higher in remote rural areas and in smaller districts.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, *Digest of Education Statistics, 2017*, table 208.10, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_208.10.asp?current=yes.

Formula-eligibility count

To qualify for a Title I grant, districts must meet a minimum Title I formula-eligible population count or percentage (i.e., a certain number or percentage of their 5- to 17-year-olds must be considered eligible for Title I grant funds). To determine the number of Title I formula-eligible children for a district, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) adds (1) the number of children ages 5–17 who live in families with incomes below the national poverty level; (2) the number of children who receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF); (3) the number of neglected and delinquent children in locally funded institutions;¹⁷ and (4) the number of foster children. Although children may be included in more than one of these categories, the count of formula-eligible children for allocation purposes is the sum of these four categories (i.e., some children may be counted in more than one qualifying group).¹⁸

The count of children ages 5–17 in poverty is estimated at the district level through the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) program of the U.S. Census Bureau. These estimates combine data from administrative records, postcensal population estimates, and the decennial census with direct estimates from the American Community Survey to provide consistent single-year estimates.¹⁹ The official poverty definition is determined by the U.S. Census Bureau's Official Poverty Measure, which is explained in the Official Poverty Measure and Supplemental Poverty Measure textbox later in this chapter.

Qualifying for specific Title I grants

Basic Grants

To qualify for a Basic Grant, a district must have at least 10 formula-eligible children ages 5–17 (each meeting at least one of the four eligibility criteria previously listed), and that number must exceed 2 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population.

Concentration Grants

To qualify for a Concentration Grant, a district must have more than 6,500 formula-eligible children ages 5–17 (each meeting at least one of the four eligibility criteria previously listed), or more than 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population must be formula eligible.

Targeted Grants

To qualify for a Targeted Grant, a district must have at least 10 formula-eligible children ages 5–17 (each meeting

at least one of the four eligibility criteria previously listed), and that number must represent at least 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population. For a district that is qualified to receive a Targeted Grant, its formula-eligible child count is adjusted using weights that increase as the number or percentage of formula-eligible children increases. The formula-eligible child count is multiplied by the weight for the district based on either its number-based or percentage-based group. For example, to qualify for the largest proportion of funds under the Targeted Grant weighting system, a district must have at least 35,515 formula-eligible children, or at least 38.24 percent of its 5- to 17-year-old population must be formula eligible (see exhibits A and B later in this chapter). In this step, both the number weighting and the percentage weighting amounts for each eligible district are computed. The district receives the larger of these two computations. It is important to note that this weighting system is incremental—that is, a district with 35,515 formula-eligible children, for example, does not multiply each child by a weighting factor of 3.0. Rather, the number of formula-eligible children above 35,514 (the threshold for the fifth category) are weighted by 3.0, the number of formula-eligible children from 7,852 and 35,514 (the threshold for the fourth category) are weighted by 2.5, and so on.

Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG)

To qualify for an EFIG, a district must have at least 10 formula-eligible children ages 5–17 (each meeting at least one of the four eligibility criteria previously listed), and that number must represent at least 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population. Weighted eligibility for EFIG is calculated in the same manner as it is for Targeted Grants.

Note that Puerto Rico is treated as a state under all Title I grants.

Exhibit A. Number weighting Targeted Grant eligibility criteria

Weighting factor	Number of Targeted Grant formula-eligible children ages 5–17
1.00	10 to 691
1.50	692 to 2,262
2.00	2,263 to 7,851
2.50	7,852 to 35,514
3.00	> 35,514

Exhibit B. Percentage weighting Targeted Grant eligibility criteria


Weighting factor	Percentage of the 5- to 17-year-old population who are Targeted Grant formula eligible
1.00	5 percent to less than 15.58 percent
1.75	>= 15.58 percent to less than 22.11 percent
2.50	>= 22.11 percent to less than 30.16 percent
3.25	>= 30.16 percent to less than 38.24 percent
4.00	>= 38.24 percent

¹⁷ Although the number of delinquent children is reported at the district level, for Title I purposes, these children are summed to a state total and receive a Title I allocation as a group, rather than in their respective districts.

¹⁸ Districts that do not meet the minimum threshold for eligibility may still receive a percentage of the prior year's allocation due to the hold harmless provision.

¹⁹ See <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/saipe.html>.

Figure I.2. Current and instruction expenditures per student in public elementary and secondary schools, by school district characteristics: 2014–15



¹ Population size is based on the number of 5- to 17-year-old children in a district.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency (School District) Finance Survey (F33)," 2014–15.

Official Poverty Measure and Supplemental Poverty Measure

The current Title I legislation specifies the use of the Official Poverty Measure, and U.S. Census Bureau publications recommend the use of the Official Poverty Measure for allocation purposes. The U.S. Census Bureau uses a set of money income thresholds that vary by family size and composition to set the poverty levels. A family, along with each individual in it, is considered poor if the family's total income is less than the family's threshold. The poverty thresholds do not vary geographically and are adjusted annually for inflation using the Consumer Price Index. The official poverty definition counts money income before taxes and does not include capital gains and noncash benefits (such as public housing, Medicaid, and food stamps). New metrics, however, have become available. In 2011, the U.S. Census Bureau started releasing the Supplemental Poverty Measure, which, unlike the Official Poverty Measure, does take into account many of the noncash government programs designed to assist low-income families and individuals.²⁰ Moreover, the Supplemental Poverty Measure contains geographical cost-of-living-based income thresholds.

Although there appears to be consensus within the policymaking community to retain the use of the Official Poverty Measure, the expert panel convened for this report recommended that a description of the two metrics be included in the report. Overall, the Supplemental Poverty Measure (14.0 percent) was 1.3 percentage points higher than the Official Poverty Measure (12.7 percent) in 2015; however, this pattern was not consistent across age and other groups. For children under 18, the Supplemental Poverty Measure (15.2 percent) was 2.8 percentage points lower than the Official Poverty Measure (18.0 percent). The differences in the two measures varied across states. For example, in 2014–16, California's Supplemental Poverty Measure (20.4 percent) was 5.9 percentage points higher than its Official Poverty Measure (14.5 percent). In contrast, West Virginia's Supplemental Poverty Measure (14.1 percent) was 3.7 points lower than its Official Poverty Measure (17.7 percent).²¹

While a detailed analysis comparing each poverty index is beyond the scope of this report, using the Supplemental Poverty Measure to determine the child counts for Title I allocations would mean that fewer districts would qualify for grants, since the poverty rates for children under age 18 based on the Supplemental Poverty Measure are lower than those based on the Official Poverty Measure. Also, higher cost states (determined by the geographic cost index used in the Supplemental Poverty Measure) would typically show more relative poverty, while lower cost states would show less relative poverty.

²⁰ See <https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-261.pdf>.

²¹ See <https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-261.pdf>.

Adjusted state per pupil expenditure (SPPE)

The per pupil costs of education differ from state to state, so the federal government does not give every state the same amount of money per formula-eligible child. Instead, it provides a distribution of Title I funds based on the state's average per pupil expenditure (SPPE), under the assumption that the SPPE is an appropriate measure of the cost of educating a child in that state. The SPPE for each district within a state is the state average. To refine the SPPE calculation to reflect only the state and local education costs, several federal revenue items from the current expenditure numerator are removed before calculating the SPPE. While not all federal revenues are removed, key large items such as Title I and the Department of Agriculture's National School Lunch Program amounts are removed—that is,

federal revenues that may have a substantive effect on current expenditures are removed. The denominator of the SPPE calculation is the number of public school students in attendance (average daily attendance) as defined by state law. Table I.C shows the SPPE by state overall and for each of the four grants.

Since Title I is a supplemental program, Congress specifies that districts should receive 40 additional cents on the dollar for the additional education services they provide to disadvantaged children. Thus, the SPPE is multiplied by 0.40 to determine the amount a district is entitled to receive per formula-eligible child. This amount is the adjusted SPPE for the district. However, some states' SPPEs vary substantially from the U.S. average SPPE, resulting in districts in those states having disproportionately high

or low adjusted SPPEs relative to the U.S. average SPPE. To compensate for this, Title I legislation provides the following rules for Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, and Targeted Grants:

- Minimum SPPE: A state’s adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent (i.e., 80 percent of 40 percent) of the U.S. average SPPE.
- Maximum SPPE: A state’s adjusted SPPE cannot be more than 48 percent (i.e., 120 percent of 40 percent) of the U.S. average SPPE.

For EFIG, the formula is the same except that 34 percent (i.e., 85 percent of 40 percent) of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the minimum and 46 percent (i.e., 115 percent of 40 percent) of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the maximum. Figure I.3 and table I.D show the states that receive the minimum and maximum SPPE values for allocations.

Calculating the authorization amount for grants

The authorization amount is the amount that a district (or state, for EFIG) is eligible to receive based on the formula for that grant. Each grant has a different formula for the authorization amount.


Basic Grant authorization

The authorization amount for a qualifying district is its Basic Grant eligibility count multiplied by the adjusted SPPE for the state in which the district is located.

Concentration Grant authorization

The authorization amount for a qualifying district is its Concentration Grant eligibility count multiplied by the adjusted SPPE for the state in which the district is located.

Figure I.3. States receiving various state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) values in Title I, Part A allocations, by grant type: 2015



NOTE: EFIG stands for Education Finance Incentive Grants.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Targeted Grant authorization

The authorization amount for a qualifying district is its Targeted Grant weighted eligibility count multiplied by the adjusted SPPE for the state in which the district is located.

Weighted eligibility count

The weighted eligibility count is designed to provide larger proportions of Targeted Grant funding to districts with the greatest needs and costs—that is, districts with large numbers or large proportions of formula-eligible children. The weighting system segments a district’s “need” (as measured either by the number of formula-eligible children ages 5–17 or by the percentage of its 5- to 17-year-old population that is formula eligible) into five categories and assigns a different weighting factor to each segment (see exhibits A and B earlier in this chapter).

EFIG authorization

Authorization amounts for EFIG are calculated differently than for Basic, Concentration, and Targeted Grants. The authorization amount for an EFIG to a state is the sum of that state’s weighted count of formula-eligible children (see exhibits A and B earlier in this chapter) multiplied by its EFIG-adjusted SPPE, which is multiplied by its effort factor and its equity factor. Then, each district in a state receives a portion of its state’s EFIG allocation. The district amount is calculated based on the district’s weighted eligibility after the state’s allocation amount is determined.

Effort factor

EFIG are designed to benefit districts in states that spend a greater percentage of per capita income (PCI) on elementary and secondary education.²² This ratio is subsequently compared with the ratio of the SPPE to the national per pupil expenditure. Title I refers to this comparison as the effort factor by dividing SPPE by PCI. If a state has more income than the national average income but spends a smaller share of its money on education than the national average, its final effort factor will be smaller than 1. On the other hand, if a state has less income than the national average but spends a larger share of its money on education than the national average, its effort factor will be greater than 1. States that spend a larger percentage of their resources on education receive more EFIG funding than states that spend a smaller percentage (even if these states are spending larger amounts per student). According to legislation, the effort factor must be between 0.95 and 1.05.²³

²² PCI at the state level comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. EFIG use an average of the most recent 3 years of state PCI divided by the same 3-year average of the national PCI.

²³ For more details on the formula used for the effort factor in the EFIG formula, see <https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/AnnualReports/pdf/titleI20160111.pdf>.

Equity factor

EFIG funding is also designed to benefit districts in states that have less disparity between high-spending and low-spending districts. Instead of using the SPPE, the equity factor measures the average difference within a state between each district’s current expenditure per pupil (CEPP) and the state average CEPP. This district-level expenditure is based on a different survey with different definitions than those used for the SPPE. The CEPP includes all current expenditures, including instruction, support services, food services, and enterprise operations. In contrast to the SPPE, there are no exclusions for federal programs. For further information on the current expenditure definition used for this measure, see the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2013 Annual Survey of School System Finances [F-33]. The equity factor is based on a pupil-weighted coefficient of variation (CV)²⁴ between the state average CEPP and the CEPPs for all districts within the state that enroll more than 200 students. Prior to calculating the CEPP and CV, the denominator is increased by adding 40 percent of EFIG eligibility.

The formula is 1.3 minus the CV, which is designed to benefit states with low CVs (low disparity) of CEPP.²⁵ In FY 15, the state CVs ranged from a minimum of 0.06 to a maximum of 0.23. The CVs of 32 states are altered by excluding those school districts with less than or equal to 200 students from the CV computations, as determined by regulation.

Allocation and authorization amounts

The amount of funding that is allocated to a district for Basic, Concentration, and Targeted Grants, or allocated to a state for EFIG, is its allocation amount. This amount is different than the authorization amount (i.e., the amount that the district is authorized to receive) because Congress does not appropriate funds equal to the total of all local and state authorized amounts. The total congressional appropriation for each of the four grants has always been less than the total authorization amount.

²⁴ The coefficient of variation (CV) is the ratio of the standard deviation of a group of observations to the mean of the group. Thus, the CV can be used to describe the relative level of variation within a population. In the Title I allocations context, a state with a larger CV has greater variation in spending per student among its districts than a state with a lower CV.

²⁵ For more information on the formula used for the equity factor in the EFIG formula, see <https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/AnnualReports/pdf/titleI20160111.pdf>. The legislation specifies that the equity factor for the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico—jurisdictions that have only one school district—is 1.3. The legislation further specifies that the equity factor for Alaska, Kansas, and New Mexico is 1.2.

Table I.1. Calculation of the state minimum for Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants

Steps	Basic Grants	Concentration Grants	Targeted Grants	Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG)		
Step 1	Calculate current year total U.S. appropriations (Year 2001) Calculate prior year total U.S. appropriations (Year Y)					
Step 2	If Year 2001 < Year Y then Sum (0.25 percent of Year 2001) + (0.35 percent of Year 1 - Year Y). If Year 2001 >= Year Y then calculate 0.25 percent of Year 2001.		0.35 percent of Year Y			
Step 3	Calculate 150 percent of the national per pupil payment (NAPP) in Year Y times the state total number of formula-eligible children (For Concentration Grants, 150% of NAPP cannot be less than \$340,000)					
Step 4	Average steps 2 and 3					
Final state minimum	The state receives the lesser of either step 2 or 4					

The amount each state/district receives (or the final allocation) is based on the proportion of the total authorized Title I funds that are appropriated by Congress. This proportioning process, known as “ratable reduction,” guarantees each district will receive the same share of the appropriation as it has of the authorization; however, other provisions (hold harmless, state minimum, etc.) that provide for a larger allocation to some jurisdictions take precedence over ratable reduction rules.

Additional legislative provisions: State minimum and hold harmless²⁶

A district’s allocation amount is its share of the authorization amount multiplied by the appropriation amount, unless state minimum and/or hold harmless provisions apply.

State minimum provision

The state minimum provision specifies that no state should receive less than a minimum threshold of funding for each of the four grants. This provision is sometimes referred to as the small-state minimum provision, as smaller states typically receive the minimum allocation. Since there is no accepted way of determining the minimum threshold of funding to operate a Title I program, the state minimum allocation is based on legislatively determined factors (see figure I.4 and table I.1). The state minimum determination relates to population size rather than geographic size (e.g., Alaska receives the state minimum allocation for three of the four grant formulas, and Connecticut does not receive the state minimum allocation for any of the grant formulas).

If the sum of district allocations for a state is less than the state minimum allocation for a specific grant, that state

receives the state minimum allocation. When this occurs, the entire schedule of allocations for all districts must be recalculated, since the total allocation is fixed and some states are receiving more than their initial allotment. For this recalculation, the allocation amounts for districts in states qualifying for the state minimum allocation are calculated before the allocation amounts for districts in states not eligible for the state minimum allocation.

For Basic, Concentration, and Targeted Grants, the allocation amounts for districts in states not eligible for the state minimum allocation are determined by ratably reducing the total appropriation amounts to the amounts of funds remaining from the original appropriation after setting aside both (a) the amount required for state minimum allocations and (b) the amount to cover all district hold harmless entitlements. The process may be iterative when setting aside state minimum or hold harmless allocation amounts because other states may reach state minimums or other districts may fall below hold harmless amounts due to ratable reductions in each iteration. States that fall to minimum values during this process are calculated separately from further iterative computations.

All district allocations for EFIG, regardless of whether they are in states receiving the minimum allocation, are determined within states using a district ratable reduction process. After the Department of Education (ED) has reviewed the allocations, the allocation distributions are made available to the states for their use. Although states may choose to redistribute their small-district (i.e., districts with fewer than 20,000 total residents) allocations, they must use an ED-approved poverty-related measure (such as free and reduced-price lunch) for this redistribution. Many states do not choose to make such adjustments. States must use ED’s allocations for all districts with a resident population of more than 20,000.

²⁶ For more information on the formulas used for the state minimum and hold harmless provisions, see <https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/AnnualReports/pdf/tide120160111.pdf>.

Figure I.4. States receiving state minimum allocation under Title I, Part A, by grant type: 2015

State	Grant type			
	Basic Grant	Concentration Grant	Targeted Grant	Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG)
North Dakota	✓	✓	✓	✓
South Dakota	✓	✓	✓	✓
Vermont	✓	✓	✓	✓
Alaska	✓		✓	✓
District of Columbia	✓		✓	✓
New Hampshire	✓		✓	✓
Wyoming	✓		✓	✓
Delaware			✓	✓
Maine			✓	✓
Montana			✓	✓
Hawaii			✓	
Idaho			✓	
Rhode Island			✓	

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Hold harmless provision

The hold harmless provision ensures that a district does not incur a loss of more than 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding fiscal year because of a decline in its count of formula-eligible children.

Data description

The datasets used for this study are the actual data used to allocate federal funds for Title I in FY 15, the most recent fiscal year at the time of the congressional mandate. Similar to the process used in other years, the FY 15 Title I district allocations were based on several data files from various organizations:

- FY 13 school district finance data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013 Annual Survey of School System Finances [F-33])
- FY 13 state per pupil expenditure data (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], National Public Education Financial Survey)
- 2011, 2012, and 2013 per capita income data (Bureau of Economic Analysis)

In addition to these finance data, the allocation formulas use a count of the Title I formula-eligible children. This

count of formula-eligible children is derived from a total of the following: (1) estimates of district poverty counts (for children ages 5–17); (2) TANF participants; (3) foster child counts; and (4) neglected and delinquent child counts.

The district poverty counts are from the U.S. Census Bureau's SAIPE program. The other child counts used in the formula-eligible population are collected at the district level by ED's Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and based on data compiled by state education agencies. When possible, the counts at the district level were matched to the SAIPE data. However, for states where data cannot be matched to the SAIPE data, county-level datasets were compiled. When the TANF participant, foster child, and neglected or delinquent child counts were provided at the county level, NCES prorated the county counts to districts using percentage distributions from the SAIPE data.

The school district finance data (F-33) are only used for districts that are included in the SAIPE dataset. Title I legislation requires that New York City and Hawaii each receive funding as five separate counties rather than as one large school district. As a result, their five counties are summed to one subtotal and then merged with F-33. State CVs for current expenditures per pupil are then calculated.

Example of the Impact of the State Minimum and Hold Harmless Provisions

The FY 15 Title I funding allocation process provides an example of how the Basic Grant allocations were affected by the iterative process of providing for the state minimum and hold harmless provisions. Of the 13,618 districts in FY 15, some 12,986 were eligible for Basic Grants. The first round of allocations found that 2,683 districts were allocated Basic Grants under the hold harmless provision. In addressing these hold harmless limits in the second round of allocations, an additional 517 districts became subject to the hold harmless provision. The third round added an additional 22 districts. Six states (Alaska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) and the District of Columbia were affected by the state minimum provision for Basic Grants. Each state was then allocated funding as determined by the state minimum provision. That left 12,716 districts in states not receiving the state minimum allocation. The hold harmless provision was recalculated for districts in those states. In this round of hold harmless allocations, 1,127 districts were given hold harmless funding. The second round of hold harmless allocations added an additional 551 districts, the third round added 22 districts, and the fourth round added 68 districts.

It is important to understand that the Title I allocation is a distribution of a fixed amount of money that all districts share. When funds are added to bring districts up to hold harmless levels, funds need to be taken away from other districts that may have had higher initial allocations due to additional formula-eligible children or increasing percentages of formula-eligible children.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015.

Geographic cost index: American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI)

In response to the recommendations of the expert panel, the analyses of the grant allocations per formula-eligible child were examined in the context of a local cost adjustment. The cost adjustment was intended to enable a comparison of the differences in the purchasing power of the federal allocations in relatively low- and high-cost areas. The geographic cost index adjusts for differences in the purchasing power of education funding among districts so that funding comparisons among districts can be based on real education resources. Even when allocations are similar, districts with high local costs are unable to purchase as many real resources for each expenditure dollar as districts where local costs are lower. The geographic cost index is designed to provide a cost adjustment that considers how much higher or lower the local costs are in one jurisdiction compared with another.

The American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) is the geographic cost index used in this report. The ACS-CWI is designed to identify geographic

variation in wages for college-educated workers outside of the education field after controlling for job-related and demographic characteristics. The underlying concept of the ACS-CWI is that highly skilled workers demand higher wages in areas where the cost of living is high or where desirable local amenities are available. This methodology assumes that it is possible to measure most of the geographic variation in the cost of hiring teachers and other educators by observing systematic regional variations in the earnings of comparable workers who are not educators.²⁷

The ACS-CWI was developed based on a special tabulation of restricted-use data from the three most recent waves of the ACS. The ACS, which is compiled annually by the U.S. Census Bureau, has replaced the decennial census as the primary source of detailed demographic information about the U.S. population. For more information about the ACS-CWI, including the strengths and weaknesses, see appendix B.

²⁷ See Rothstein and Smith (1997), Guthrie and Rothstein (1999), Goldhaber (1999), Alexander et al. (2000), Taylor et al. (2002), Stoddard (2005), Taylor (2006), and Taylor (2015).

Key Concepts and Definitions

The **allocated amount** is the amount of funding that is allocated to a district for Basic, Concentration, and Targeted Grants or allocated to a state for Education Finance Incentive Grants.

The **authorized amount** is the amount that the district is authorized by Congress to receive. Congress does not appropriate funds equal to the total of all local and state authorized amounts. The total congressional appropriation for each of the four grants has always been less than the total authorization amount.

Basic Grants are the largest component of Title I funding (\$6.4 billion in fiscal year 2015 [FY 15]) and serve the largest number of districts. Basic Grants provide funds to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 and exceeds 2 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population.

Concentration Grants are the smallest of the four grants (\$1.3 billion in FY 15). They provide additional funds to districts with relatively large populations of low-income and disadvantaged children and are available to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 or 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population.

Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG) (\$3.3 billion in FY 15) are allocated to states to provide districts with additional funding for low-income and disadvantaged children. The EFIG formula includes both a state effort provision (the measure of state effort to provide financial support compared with its relative wealth) and a state equity provision (the degree to which education expenditures within a state are equalized). EFIG provide funds to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 and at least 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population.

The **final allocation** is the amount each state/district receives based on the proportion of the total authorized Title I funds that are appropriated by Congress in that year. This is the distribution of Title I funds based on the current formulas.

Formula-eligible children are 5- to 17-year-old children in families living in poverty, children who receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), neglected and delinquent children, and foster children.

Formula-eligibility criteria refer to legislative requirements that districts have a minimum number or minimum percentage of formula-eligible children within their district to be eligible for a specific grant. Note that districts can receive grants through the hold harmless provision even if they do not meet the formula-eligibility criteria.

The **hold harmless provision** limits the size of a decrease that a district may have in its grant allocation from one year to the next. The hold harmless provision ensures that a district does not incur a loss of more than 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding fiscal year because of a decline in its count of formula-eligible children.

Ratable reduction is the proportioning process that guarantees each district will receive the same share of the congressional appropriation as it has of the authorized amount, unless some other provision (state minimum, hold harmless, etc.) provides a larger allocation.

The **state minimum provision** is applied to all four grants; it is designed to ensure that each state receives enough funding to maintain a program of sufficient size to make the administrative effort worthwhile. The state minimum provision provides that no state may receive less than a stipulated percentage of the national total allocation.

The **state per pupil expenditure (SPPE)** provision measures the cost of educating a child in a particular state. The range of SPPE values among states is bounded by minimum and maximum thresholds within the formula law.

Targeted Grants (\$3.3 billion in FY 15) are based on the same formula-eligible child counts used for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants, except the counts are weighted so that districts with higher numbers or higher percentages of children from low-income families receive proportionately more funds. Targeted Grants provide funds to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 (without application of the formula weights) and at least 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population.

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Fiscal Year 2015 Final Allocations for Title I

This chapter presents an overview of fiscal year 2015 (FY 15) Title I allocations per formula-eligible child under current law. The analyses compare the average total (overall) Title I allocations per formula-eligible child, as well as the average allocations per formula-eligible child for each of the four individual grants (all allocations herein are averages). These analyses include comparisons of the allocations

by National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) geographic locale, poverty quarter, and population size. The allocations are also adjusted to reflect local variations in purchasing power (using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index), and these data are compared with the allocations without the adjustment (in current dollars).

Highlights

- The total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$984 in Idaho and \$996 in Utah to \$2,579 in Wyoming and \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference from the lowest to the highest of \$1,606 or 163 percent (table 1.A).
- Of the 12 NCES locales, the two locales with the highest total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child were the most densely and least densely populated areas: large cities (\$1,466) and remote rural areas (\$1,313) (table 1.B; figure 1.2).
- The highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,381) (table 1.B; figure 1.2).
- Districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had the highest total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,442) compared with districts of larger sizes. Districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 had the lowest final allocation (\$1,107) (table 1.B; figure 1.2).
- Nationally, 21.4 percent of 5- to 17-year-olds were eligible for Title I funds. Puerto Rico (55.9 percent), the District of Columbia (32.5 percent), and Mississippi (32.2 percent) had the highest percentages of formula-eligible children, while New Hampshire (9.9 percent) and North Dakota (11.8 percent) had the lowest percentages (table 1.C).
- Twenty-five states and Puerto Rico had smaller percentages of the Title I funds than their percentages of the formula-eligible population, while 25 states and the District of Columbia had larger percentages of the funds than their percentages of the formula-eligible population (table 1.C; figure 1.7).
- The smallest and largest districts were both allocated higher percentages of the Title I funds than their percentages of the formula-eligible population (table 1.D; figure 1.8).
- The state range for the Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child (\$659) was smaller than the range for Concentration Grants (\$761) but larger than the range for Targeted Grants (\$481) and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG) (\$465) (table 1.A).
- Overall, large cities received higher Targeted Grant and EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child than all other locales. However, for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants, remote rural areas had higher final allocations.
- The highest poverty quarter had the highest final allocations per formula-eligible child for Targeted Grants (\$336) and EFIG (\$352). In contrast, the lowest poverty quarter had the highest final allocations per formula-eligible child for Basic Grants (\$604) and Concentration Grants (\$217) (table 1.B; figures 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6).
- For Targeted Grants and EFIG, districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had the highest final allocations per formula-eligible child (\$332 and \$338, respectively), and districts with a population of less than 300 had the second-highest final allocations (\$323 and \$333, respectively) (table 1.B; figures 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6).

The total Title I allocation to a district is the sum of the Basic Grant, Concentration Grant, Targeted Grant, and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocations. These amounts are derived from four independent formulas that are not necessarily based on the same number of formula-eligible children. The total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child is the sum of the four allocations divided by the maximum number of formula-eligible children in the district or state. The amount allocated to each state is the sum of all funding allocated to districts in that state.

Basic Grants were the largest of the four Title I grants, amounting to \$6.4 billion or 45 percent of the total Title I allocation in FY 15. The Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$550 (table 1.A; figure 1.1). Basic Grants had the highest number of formula-eligible children (11.6 million). Targeted Grants and EFIG had the second-highest number of formula-eligible children (both round to 11.6 million). Combined, the funds allocated to Targeted Grants (\$3.3 billion) and EFIG (\$3.3 billion) were roughly equivalent to the amount that flowed through Basic Grants. The allocation per formula-eligible child was \$282 each for Targeted Grants and for EFIG. Concentration Grants were the smallest of the four grant types and represented 9 percent (\$1.3 billion) of all Title I funds. The number of Concentration Grant formula-eligible children (10.1 million) was smaller than the number of formula-eligible children for the other Title I grants.

Total Title I Allocation

Title I allocations to districts totaled \$14.3 billion in FY 15 (table 1.A; figure 1.1). There were 11.6 million Title I formula-eligible children in the United States, which amounted to 21 percent of all 5- to 17-year-olds (table 1.C). The Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was \$1,227 (table 1.A; figure 1.1).


The total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$984 in Idaho and \$996 in Utah to \$2,579 in Wyoming and \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,606 or 163 percent (table 1.A). Both Idaho and Utah were limited by the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision (not less than 80 percent of the U.S. average). Four states were allocated more than \$2,000 per formula-eligible child: Alaska (\$2,121), North Dakota (\$2,481), Wyoming (\$2,579), and Vermont (\$2,590). These four states had the fewest number of formula-eligible children and were all state minimum states for at least one grant. The two states with the highest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child that did not

receive state minimum allocations under any of the Title I grant components were New York (\$1,611) and Maryland (\$1,588). Even though New York had the highest allocation for a state not eligible for the state minimum provision, its allocation was affected by its high SPPE value, which was capped at 120 percent of the U.S. average.

Large cities and remote rural areas tended to receive relatively large final allocations (table 1.B; figure 1.2). Overall, large cities had a higher total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,466) than all other locales. The final allocations among the other locales ranged from \$1,070 for fringe rural areas and \$1,088 for fringe towns to \$1,313 for remote rural areas. The difference between large cities and fringe rural areas was \$396 or 37 percent. Chapter 2 contains a more detailed discussion of the range in locales across states.

There are many different measures to examine the Title I final allocations in high- and low-poverty school districts. One metric that can be used is poverty quarters. These poverty quarters were developed by ranking all districts, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children (which includes the children in poverty as well as other child populations determined by Title I legislation to be “formula eligible”). Districts were then divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter included districts serving 25 percent of the school-age children in the United States (including Puerto Rico). In FY 15, each quarter had roughly 13.6 million 5- to 17-year-olds (table 1.D). Although each quarter comprised districts that served 25 percent of all school-age children in the United States, the highest poverty quarter served 43 percent of all formula-eligible children. In contrast, the lowest poverty quarter served less than 10 percent of all formula-eligible children. Within poverty quarters, about 37 percent of the children in the highest poverty quarter were considered Title I formula eligible, compared with 8 percent of children in the lowest poverty quarter.

The highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,381) (table 1.B; figure 1.2). For the total Title I final allocation, districts with lower poverty rates had lower final allocations. For example, the lowest total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child were for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,023) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$1,097). The final allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$357 or 35 percent higher than the final allocation for the lowest poverty quarter.

Figure 1.1. Title I, Part A total final allocation, number of formula-eligible children, and allocation per formula-eligible child, by grant type: 2015

¹ Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.

² The allocation for each of the four grant types is based on a different number of formula-eligible children. Thus, the total allocation per formula-eligible child does not equal the sum of the allocations per formula-eligible child for each grant type.


SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a (table 1.A).

The largest districts (based on population size) consistently had higher total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts within each poverty quarter. For example, in the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher final allocation (\$1,540) than districts of smaller sizes; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes (table 3.B). Within the highest poverty quarter, the second-largest districts had the second-highest final allocation (\$1,414), while the smallest districts had the lowest final allocation (\$1,280). The range in the Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations in the highest poverty quarter was \$260 or 20 percent.

The largest districts in the second-highest, second-lowest, and lowest poverty quarters consistently had the highest total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child within each quarter, but the smallest districts did not receive the lowest final allocations, which was the pattern for the highest poverty quarter. For example, within the

second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had the highest Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,256), the smallest districts had the second-lowest final allocation (\$1,125), and the second-smallest districts had the lowest final allocation (\$1,082). Within the lowest poverty quarter, there was a similar pattern, and the second-smallest districts received the lowest final allocation (\$931), which was also the lowest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes.

Districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had a higher total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,442) than districts of other population sizes (table 1.B; figure 1.2). The second-highest final allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (\$1,323). Districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 had the lowest final allocation (\$1,107). The difference in the Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest final allocations was \$334 or 30 percent.

Figure 1.2. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Basic Grant Final Allocation

The Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child in FY 15 ranged from \$462 in Utah and \$465 in Florida to \$1,105 in Wyoming and \$1,121 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$659 or 143 percent (table 1.A). Among those states not subject to the state minimum provision, the state with the highest Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child was Maine (\$715), which was \$253 higher than the allocation in Utah. The difference in Basic Grant final allocations between these two states was minimized by the fact that Maine's SPPE was capped at the maximum while Utah's SPPE was raised to the minimum.

Overall, remote rural areas received a higher Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$583) than all other locales (table 1.B; figure 1.3). The final allocations among the other locales ranged from \$532 for midsize cities and \$534 for fringe rural areas to \$563 for small suburban areas. The difference between remote rural areas and midsize cities was \$52 or 10 percent.

The Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child varied for each of the locales across the states (table 2.B). The pattern of remote rural areas receiving a higher final allocation than all other locales was reflected within many states: there were 15 states in which remote rural areas had the highest final allocation. Distant rural areas had the highest final allocation in 9 states, and fringe rural areas had the highest final allocation in 5 states. Large cities had the highest final allocation in 5 states and the lowest final allocation in 3 states. Within states, the differences in the Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations ranged from \$9 in Rhode Island and Utah to \$297 in Wyoming. Altogether, there were 6 states (Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, and Wyoming) with differences of over \$100.


There were also differences across states for each of the locales. For large cities, the difference between the states with the highest and lowest Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child was \$451 (Alaska had an allocation of \$912 and Florida, North Carolina, and Tennessee had allocations of \$461) (table 2.B). For fringe rural areas and

distant rural areas, the differences between the states with the highest and lowest Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child were \$700 or more. Large suburban areas had the smallest differences between the states with the highest and lowest final allocations (\$363).

The lowest poverty quarter received the highest Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$604) (table 1.B; figure 1.3). Districts with higher poverty rates had lower final allocations. For example, the final allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$558, and the allocation for the second-highest poverty quarter was \$521. The Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter was \$84 or 16 percent higher than the final allocation for the second-highest poverty quarter.

There was no consistent pattern regarding Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. In the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher final allocation (\$574) than smaller districts, which ranged from \$551 for the smallest districts to \$555 for the second-largest districts, but this pattern contrasted with the pattern for the other poverty quarters (table 4.B). In the other poverty quarters, the largest districts had the lowest Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child. For example, in the lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a lower final allocation (\$557) than smaller districts, which ranged from \$581 for the second-largest districts to \$662 for the smallest districts.

The Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$672) was higher than the allocations for districts of other population sizes (table 1.B; figure 1.3). The final allocations decreased as district population size increased, and districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had the lowest final allocation. For example, the final allocations ranged from \$533 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more to \$672 for districts with a population of less than 300. The difference in the Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the lowest and the highest allocations was \$139 or 26 percent.

Figure 1.3. Title I, Part A Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Concentration Grant Final Allocation

The Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child in FY 15 ranged from \$110 in Florida and \$112 in Tennessee, Nevada, Utah, and North Carolina to \$588 in North Dakota and \$871 in Wyoming, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$761 or 691 percent (table 1.A).

Overall, remote rural areas received a higher Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$151) than all other locales (table 1.B; figure 1.4). The final allocations among the other locales ranged from \$127 for midsize cities and midsize suburban areas to \$145 for small suburban areas and fringe towns. The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and midsize suburban areas and midsize cities was \$24 or 19 percent.


The Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child also varied for each of the locales across the states. In 17 states, suburban areas (large, midsize, or small) (10 states) and fringe towns (7 states) received a higher final allocation than all other locales (table 2.C). In 8 states, cities (large, midsize, or small) received a higher final allocation than all other locales. In 20 states, rural areas received a higher final allocation than all other locales. Each locale received the highest Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child in at least 2 states.

Within states, the differences in the Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations varied widely. For example, midsize cities had the smallest difference in Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations (\$93), ranging from \$109 in Florida, Idaho, Mississippi, and Utah to \$202 in New Hampshire (table 2.C; figure 1.4). The differences between the states with the lowest and highest final allocations were under \$200 for fringe towns (\$157) and midsize suburban areas (\$164); the differences were over \$500 for large cities (\$27,548), distant rural areas (\$2,138), fringe rural areas (\$839), remote towns (\$701), small suburban areas (\$667), and remote rural areas (\$574).

The lowest poverty quarter received the highest Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$217). School districts with higher poverty rates had lower final allocations. For example, the final allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$134, and the final allocation for the second-highest poverty quarter was \$124. The Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter was \$93 or 75 percent higher than the final allocation for the second-highest poverty quarter.

There was no consistent pattern regarding Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. In the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher final allocation (\$140) than smaller districts, which ranged from \$132 for the second-smallest districts to \$133 for both the smallest and second-largest districts, but this pattern was not consistent for districts in lower poverty quarters (table 5.B). In contrast, in both the second-highest and second-lowest poverty quarters, the largest districts had the lowest Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child. In the lowest poverty quarter, only the largest districts were able to participate through the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision, since the poverty rates were too low for Concentration Grant participation for smaller districts.

The Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$194) was higher than the final allocations for districts of other population sizes (table 1.B; figure 1.4). Districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had the lowest final allocation (\$129), and the final allocations decreased as district population size increased. The difference in the Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$65 or 50 percent.

Figure 1.4. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Targeted Grant Final Allocation

The Targeted Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child in FY 15 ranged from \$196 in Idaho to \$676 in Vermont, a difference of \$481 or 245 percent (table 1.A). Among the states not subject to the state minimum provision, the highest Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child was in New York (\$422), which was \$226 higher than the final allocation in Idaho.


Overall, large cities received a higher Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$377) than all other locales (table 1.B; figure 1.5). The final allocations among the other locales ranged from \$218 for fringe towns and \$219 for fringe rural areas to \$290 for remote rural areas. The difference between large cities and fringe towns was \$159 or 73 percent.

The Targeted Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child also varied for each of the locales across the states. In 35 states, large cities (or midsize cities in states where large cities were not applicable) received higher final allocations than all other locales (table 2.D). There were 6 states in which remote rural areas received the highest final allocations compared with all other locales. Within states, the differences in the Targeted Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest final allocations ranged from \$51 in West Virginia to \$355 in Michigan. Altogether, there were 44 states with differences of over \$100.

The highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$336)

(table 1.B; figure 1.5). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower final allocations. For example, the final allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$119 or 54 percent higher than the final allocation for the lowest poverty quarter (\$218). Within each poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child than the smallest districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher final allocation (\$406) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$178 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$347 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (table 6.B). Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child of \$406, compared with a final allocation of \$294 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$112 or 38 percent).

Targeted Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) and for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) were generally higher than the final allocations for districts of other population sizes. For example, the Targeted Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$229 for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 to \$323 for districts with a population of less than 300 to \$332 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (table 1.B; figure 1.5). The difference in the final allocations between the district population sizes with the lowest and highest allocations was \$103 or 45 percent.

Figure 1.5. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Education Finance Incentive Grant Final Allocation

The EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child in FY 15 ranged from \$219 in Idaho to \$684 in Vermont, a difference of \$465 or 212 percent (table 1.A). Among the states not subject to the state minimum provision, the highest EFIG final allocation per formula-eligible child was in Connecticut (\$390), which was \$171 higher than the final allocation in Idaho.

Overall, large cities received a higher EFIG final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$395) than the other locales (table 1.B; figure 1.6). The final allocations among the other locales ranged from \$207 for fringe towns to \$309 for remote rural areas. The difference between large cities and fringe towns was \$189 or 91 percent. In 35 states, large cities (or midsize cities in states where large cities were not applicable) received higher EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child than all other locales (table 2.E). There were 4 states (Arkansas, Maine, Montana, and South Dakota) in which remote rural areas received the highest final allocations compared with all other locales.


The EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child also varied for each of the locales across the states. For example, large suburban areas had the smallest difference between the states with the lowest and highest final allocations (\$305 or 192 percent), ranging from \$159 in New Mexico to \$463 in Delaware to. The differences between the states with the lowest and highest final allocations were over \$500 for distant rural areas (\$795 or 936 percent), remote rural areas (\$711 or 855 percent), midsize cities (\$682 or 396 percent), fringe rural areas (\$669 or 584 percent), small cities (\$650 or 675 percent), midsize suburban areas (\$637 or 538 percent), distant towns (\$629 or 711 percent), and remote towns (\$528 or 659 percent).

Overall, large cities received higher final allocations per formula-eligible child for both EFIG and Targeted Grants than all other locales, with remote rural areas receiving the

second-highest allocations. In contrast, for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants, remote rural areas received higher final allocations than all other locales, followed by small suburban areas.

The highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$352) (table 1.B; figure 1.6). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower final allocations. For example, the final allocation for the lowest poverty quarter was \$209. The final allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$352, which was \$143 or 68 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter. Within each poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher EFIG final allocation per formula-eligible child than the smallest districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher EFIG final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$420) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$162 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$378 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (table 7.B). Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG final allocation per formula-eligible child of \$420, compared with a final allocation of \$302 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$118 or 39 percent).

The EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) and for those with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) were generally higher than the final allocations for districts of other population sizes. For example, the final allocations ranged from \$222 for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 to \$333 for districts with a population of less than 300 to \$338 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (table 1.B; figure 1.6). The difference in the EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the lowest and highest allocations was \$115 or 52 percent.

Figure 1.6. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Comparisons Between Grants: Basic, Concentration, Targeted, and EFIG

The difference in the total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations (\$1,606) was higher than the differences for the individual grants: Basic Grants (\$659), Concentration Grants (\$761), Targeted Grants (\$481), and EFIG (\$465). Despite the different formulas, the prevailing pattern was for certain states to have among the highest or lowest Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child across all of the grants. In percentage terms, the difference between the states with the highest and lowest total final allocations was 163 percent, which was higher than the difference for Basic Grants (143 percent) but lower than the differences for Concentration Grants (691 percent), Targeted Grants (245 percent), and EFIG (212 percent). This pattern reflects the relatively large final allocation for Basic Grants and the relatively small final allocation for Concentration Grants. For each of the four grants, the majority of the differences between the lowest and highest allocations per formula-eligible child by state were driven by the state minimum provision.

The locales receiving relatively low and relatively high final allocations per formula-eligible child were similar for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants but differed from the pattern for Targeted Grants and EFIG. For Basic Grants and Concentration Grants, remote rural areas received a higher final allocation than all other locales, followed by small suburban areas. For Targeted Grants and EFIG, large cities received a higher final allocation than all other locales, followed by remote rural areas. Chapter 2 contains a more detailed discussion of the range in locales across states.

The highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,381) (table 1.B; figure 1.2), which was the general pattern for Targeted Grants and EFIG but not for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. The distribution of Targeted Grant and EFIG allocations favoring districts in the highest poverty quarter resulted in higher total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter, even though the highest poverty quarter received lower allocations than the lowest poverty quarter for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. For the total Title I final allocation, as well as for Targeted Grants and EFIG, districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations.

For Targeted Grants and EFIG, within each poverty quarter, districts with the largest 5- to 17-year-old populations consistently had higher final allocations per formula-eligible


child than smaller districts (tables 3.B, 4.B, 5.B, 6.B, and 7.B), but this pattern was not true for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts did have the highest final allocations per formula-eligible child in all four grants.

Districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had a higher total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,442) than districts of other population sizes; this pattern was consistent for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants (table 1.B; figure 1.2). Similar to the pattern for Targeted Grants and EFIG, where districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had the highest final allocations, the second-highest total Title I final allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (\$1,323).

Percentage Distribution of Title I Total Allocations and Formula-Eligible Children, by State

Comparing the distribution of Title I allocations and the distribution of Title I formula-eligible children by state provides a reference point for analyzing the distribution of the Title I funds (table 1.C). Nationally, 21.4 percent of 5- to 17-year-olds were eligible for Title I in FY 15. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico had eligibility rates that were higher than the national average (figure 1.7). Puerto Rico (55.9 percent), the District of Columbia (32.5 percent), and Mississippi (32.2 percent) had the highest percentages of formula-eligible children. Conversely, 32 states had eligibility rates that were lower than the national average. New Hampshire (9.9 percent) and North Dakota (11.8 percent) had the lowest percentages of formula-eligible children in the United States.

The federal allocation formulas use a series of provisions that adjust eligibility such that there is not a 1:1 correspondence between the percentage of the formula-eligible population in a state and the percentage of federal funds allocated to that state. For example, 13.1 percent of formula-eligible children were in California and 5.9 percent of formula-eligible children were in New York. However, California was allocated 11.8 percent of all Title I funds—1.3 percentage points lower than its percentage of the formula-eligible population. This is in contrast to New York, which was allocated 7.7 percent of all Title I funds—1.8 percentage points higher than its percentage of the formula-eligible population. The difference between the percentage of the formula-eligible population and the percentage of Title I funds allocated to each state is due to the federal funding formulas.

Figure 1.7. Difference between the percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-olds and the percentage of total Title I, Part A allocations, by state or jurisdiction: 2015

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Twenty-five states and Puerto Rico had smaller percentages of the total Title I funds than their percentages of the formula-eligible population. The states with the lowest allocations relative to their percentages of the formula-eligible population were Texas (1.3 percentage points lower), California (1.3 percentage points lower), and Florida (0.5 of a percentage point lower). Conversely,

25 states and the District of Columbia had allocations that were higher than their percentages of the formula-eligible population. The states with the largest share of funding relative to their percentages of the formula-eligible population were New York (1.8 percentage points higher), Illinois (0.9 of a percentage point higher), and Pennsylvania (0.7 of a percentage point higher).

Percentage Distribution of Title I Total Allocations and Formula-Eligible Children, by School District Characteristics


School districts in most locales had lower percentages of the total Title I funds than their percentages of the formula-eligible population (table 1.D). In contrast to this general pattern, large cities received a higher percentage of the Title I funds (28.1 percent) than their percentage of the formula-eligible population (23.5 percent), a difference of 4.6 percentage points. Although they have 2.3 percent of the formula-eligible children in the United States, remote rural areas received an allocation of 2.5 percent of the total Title I funds, a difference of 0.2 of a percentage point. The locales with the smallest shares of Title I funds relative to their percentages of the formula-eligible population were large suburban areas, which had 29.7 percent of the formula-eligible children and received 27.7 percent of the funds (2.0 percentage points lower), and fringe rural areas, which had 6.4 percent of the formula-eligible population and received 5.6 percent of the funds (0.8 of a percentage point lower).

As might be expected, higher poverty districts received a higher percentage of Title I funds than lower poverty districts. Districts in the highest poverty quarter had 43.0 percent of the formula-eligible population and received 48.4 percent of the Title I funds (5.4 percentage points higher). In contrast, districts in the second-highest

poverty quarter had 28.3 percent of the formula-eligible population and received 26.5 percent of the funds (1.8 percentage points lower). Also, districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter had lower percentages of the Title I funds compared with their percentages of the formula-eligible population (2.0 and 1.6 percentage points lower, respectively).

Districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) and districts with populations under 600 had higher percentages of Title I funds than their percentages of the formula-eligible population, while districts of intermediate sizes had smaller percentages of the funds compared with their percentages of formula-eligible children (figure 1.8). For example, districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) received 0.8 percent of the Title I funds but had 0.7 percent of the formula-eligible population (0.1 of a percentage point higher). Districts with a population of 25,000 or more received 48.7 percent of the Title I funds but had 45.1 percent of the formula-eligible population (3.6 percentage points higher). This difference was even higher for the 100 largest districts (4.1 percentage points higher). In contrast, districts with a population of 600 to 999, districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499, districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999, districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999, and districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 received allocations that were less than their percentages of the formula-eligible population.

Figure 1.8. Difference between the percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-olds and the percentage of total Title I, Part A allocations, by school district population size: 2015



[#] Rounds to zero.

¹ These districts are defined as the 100 largest based on the size of their 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Variations Within School Districts

The congressional mandate requested that this report look at allocations within school attendance areas. This analysis was not feasible based on currently available information. However, it was possible to conduct some analyses on how the Title I funds were distributed within school districts. Table I.A shows that 95 percent of children who received Title I services participated through schoolwide programs in 2014–15. Table I.E shows the distribution of students by the proportion of schools within their district that had schoolwide Title I programs in 2015–16. In low-poverty districts (i.e., those with less than 10 percent poverty), relatively few students were in districts that had high percentages of schools that were eligible for schoolwide programs. There were no schools eligible for schoolwide programs for more than half the students (52 percent) in low-poverty districts. On the other hand, in very high-poverty districts (those with 30 percent poverty or more), only 2 percent of students were in districts where no schools were eligible for schoolwide programs.

In low-poverty districts, 0.9 percent of students were in districts where 75 percent or more of the schools were eligible for schoolwide programs, and 0.5 percent of students were in districts where all schools were eligible for schoolwide programs. In contrast, in very high-poverty districts, 66 percent of students were in districts where 75 percent or more of the schools were eligible for schoolwide programs, and 22 percent of students were in districts where all schools were eligible for schoolwide programs. Note that, in general, small districts tended to cluster at either having zero or all schools eligible for schoolwide programs because of the small number of schools (e.g., if there is one school in the district, it will either have no schools eligible or all schools eligible).

Overall, 60 percent of the students were in districts where at least 50 percent of the schools were eligible for schoolwide programs. So, while high- and low-poverty rates in districts do translate to proportionally more or less schools eligible for schoolwide programs, many low-poverty districts do have at least some schoolwide programs.

Cost Adjustment Using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI)

When the total Title I final allocations were adjusted by the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI), the value of allocations provided to states and school districts increased from \$14.3 billion to \$15.1 billion (table 1.AA). Since the cost adjustment increased the relative value of federal funding overall, this means that Title I funding was disproportionately allocated to states and districts with lower costs of living. After applying the ACS-CWI, the cost-adjusted total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child was \$1,299, which was about \$73 higher than the unadjusted final allocation. The cost adjustment had the largest impact on states with relatively low and high costs of living. Idaho and Utah—two states with relatively low costs of living—no longer had the lowest total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child after the cost adjustment. Instead, states with higher costs of living, like California (\$1,028) and Colorado (\$1,112), had the lowest final allocations. Many states subject to the state minimum provision also had lower costs of living, so the total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child for some states increased by relatively large amounts after the cost adjustment; for example, the unadjusted

final allocation per formula-eligible child in Vermont was \$2,590, and the cost-adjusted final allocation was \$3,016.

Applying the ACS-CWI to the total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child resulted in the largest change for districts in remote rural areas. Due to the relatively lower cost of living in these areas, the total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child in remote rural areas increased by \$307 when cost adjusted (from \$1,313 to \$1,620) (table 1.BB). Similarly, the total Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child in remote towns was \$252 higher after applying the cost adjustment. Conversely, large cities were the only locale to have a decrease (of \$45) in the final allocation when cost adjusted (from \$1,466 to \$1,421).

The differences in the cost-adjusted total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child among the poverty quarters were larger than the differences for the unadjusted final allocations. After the cost adjustment, the highest poverty quarter received a final allocation of \$1,440, compared with \$1,381 before the cost adjustment. The lowest poverty quarter received a final allocation of \$1,044 after the cost adjustment, compared with \$1,023 before the cost adjustment. The difference between the highest and lowest poverty quarters after applying the ACS-CWI (\$396) was larger than the difference for the unadjusted final allocations (\$357).

The pattern of the smallest districts having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than larger districts persisted when the ACS-CWI was applied. For example, the difference in the total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child between the smallest and largest districts was \$119 before the cost adjustment and \$402 after the cost adjustment. This indicates that the purchasing power of the allocations for the smallest districts was greater than it was for the largest districts.

When the ACS-CWI was applied, 18 states and Puerto Rico had smaller percentages of total Title I final allocations than their percentages of the formula-eligible population (table 1.CC). The states with the lowest final allocations relative to their percentages of the formula-eligible population were California (2.7 percentage points lower), Texas (1.3 percentage points lower), and Arizona (0.3 of a percentage point lower). In contrast, 32 states and the District of Columbia had higher percentages of total Title I final allocations than their percentages of the formula-eligible population using the cost-adjusted data. The states with the highest percentages of the Title I funds relative to their percentages of the formula-eligible population were New York (1.1 percentage point higher), Pennsylvania (0.8 of a percentage point higher), Ohio (0.6 of a percentage point higher), and Illinois (0.6 of a percentage point higher). Ten states and the District of Columbia had a difference of less than 0.05 of a percentage point between their percentages of Title I funds and their percentages of the formula-eligible population.

Applying the ACS-CWI increased the relative difference of the allocations in low-cost areas compared with high-cost areas. After the cost adjustment, large cities received a higher percentage of the total Title I final allocations (25.7 percent) than their share of formula-eligible children (23.5 percent), a difference of 2.2 percentage points (table 1.DD). This difference is less than the difference prior to the adjustment (4.6 percentage points). In contrast, with 2.3 percent of the formula-eligible population, remote rural areas received 2.9 percent of the Title I funds when

cost adjusted, a difference of 0.6 of percentage point. This difference is larger than before the adjustment (0.2 of a percentage point). After the adjustment, large suburban areas had the largest difference between their percentage of the Title I funds (26.6 percent) and their share of the formula-eligible population (29.7 percent)—a difference of 3.2 percentage points.

When the ACS-CWI was applied, the highest poverty quarter still received a higher percentage of Title I funds than the lowest poverty quarter, but the difference was smaller after the cost adjustment. The highest poverty quarter had 43.0 percent of the formula-eligible population and received 47.6 percent of the cost-adjusted Title I funds (4.6 percentage points higher than the formula-eligible population). In contrast, the second-highest poverty quarter had 28.3 percent of the formula-eligible population and received 27.3 percent of the cost-adjusted Title I funds (1.0 percentage point lower). Also, the second-lowest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter had lower percentages of the cost-adjusted Title I funds compared with their percentages of the formula-eligible population (1.8 and 1.9 percentage points lower, respectively).

Many of the larger districts are located in higher cost areas. After the cost adjustment, the largest districts (those with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more) had 45.1 percent of the formula-eligible population and received 46.1 percent of the cost-adjusted Title I funds, a difference of 1.0 percentage point; the unadjusted difference of 3.6 percentage points was larger. Districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had 0.7 percent of the formula-eligible population and received 0.9 percent of the cost-adjusted Title I funds, a difference of 0.2 of a percentage point; the unadjusted difference was 0.1 of a percentage point. Conversely, districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 and districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 had lower percentages of the cost-adjusted Title I funds compared with their percentages of the formula-eligible population (0.8 of a percentage point and 1.6 percentage points lower, respectively).

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Title I Funds by Locale and State

This chapter focuses on state-level fiscal year 2015 (FY 15) average Title I and individual grant allocations per formula-eligible child across the 12 National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) geographic locales (all allocations herein are averages). Data are presented by locale nationally (i.e., for all states) and by locale within each state. It is important to note that not every state has school districts representing all the locales. Although 18 states have at least one district representing each of the locales, the majority of states do not. The District of Columbia has only a large city locale and Puerto Rico has only a large suburban area locale. For this reason, this chapter excludes both the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico when discussing differences

among the states. States will show as not applicable for specific locales that are not present within the state. It should be noted that there are relatively large ranges in the allocations per formula-eligible child among locales within some states. In some cases, these relatively large ranges may be affected by hold harmless amounts for specific districts. States receiving state minimum allocations will typically have larger allocations per formula-eligible child than states not receiving a minimum allocation. The allocations are also adjusted to reflect local variations in purchasing power (using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index), and these adjusted allocations are compared with the unadjusted allocations (in current dollars).

Highlights

- In 26 of the 32 states with large cities, large cities received a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales (table 2.A; table 2.1). In 8 of the 43 states with remote rural areas, remote rural areas received a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales. In the majority of states (42), either suburban areas or towns of any type received the lowest Title I allocation per formula-eligible child.
- The pattern of remote rural areas receiving the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child compared with all other locales was reflected across many states; in 15 of the 43 states with remote rural areas, remote rural areas received the highest allocation (table 2.B; table 2.2). Distant rural areas received the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child in 9 of the 47 states with distant rural areas, and fringe rural areas received the highest allocation in 5 of the 48 states with fringe rural areas.
- In 17 states, suburban areas (large, midsize, or small) (10 states) and fringe towns (7 states) received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales (table 2.C; table 2.3). In 8 states, cities (large, midsize, or small) received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales. In 20 states, rural areas received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales.
- In 28 of the 32 states with large cities, large cities received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales (table 2.D; table 2.4). In 6 of the 43 states with remote rural areas, remote rural areas received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales.
- In 28 of the 32 states with large cities, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales (table 2.E; table 2.5).

Total Title I

Large cities had a higher national total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,466) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,070 in fringe rural areas to \$1,313 in remote rural areas (table 2.A). The general pattern of large cities and remote rural areas having the highest total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was reflected across many states. In the majority of states, large cities had higher allocations than all other locales. In 26 of the 32 states with large cities, large cities had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child compared with all other locales; there was no state in which large cities had the lowest allocation (table 2.A; table 2.1). In 8 states, remote rural areas had the highest allocation; however, 7 of these states had no large cities. Only in Hawaii did remote rural areas have the lowest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child compared with all other locales within the state.

Within states, the differences in the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the lowest and highest allocations ranged from \$154 in West Virginia to \$2,146 in Wyoming (excluding those

states with only one locale type) (table 2.A; figure 2.1). For example, in Wyoming the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$1,390 in fringe rural areas to \$3,536 in distant rural areas, a difference of \$2,146. The differences in the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations within a state exceeded \$1,000 in Michigan, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. This difference within states was between \$500 and \$999 in 20 states and was under \$200 in 2 states (West Virginia and South Carolina).


The difference in the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations was \$1,606 (ranging from \$984 in Idaho to \$2,590 in Vermont). The difference in the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations was smallest for large suburban areas (\$954), ranging from \$803 in New Mexico to \$1,757 in Delaware (table 2.A; figure 2.2). The largest differences were for distant rural areas (\$2,864), remote rural areas (\$2,089), and distant towns (\$1,900).

Table 2.1. Number of states in which each school district locale received the highest and lowest total Title I, Part A allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district locale: 2015

School district locale		Number of states in which locale is present	Number of states in which locale had the highest allocation	Number of states in which locale had the lowest allocation
City	Large	32	26	0
	Midsized	37	8	0
	Small	49	0	1
Suburban	Large	41	2	5
	Midsized	42	0	10
	Small	39	2	10
Town	Fringe	42	0	14
	Distant	43	1	1
	Remote	43	1	2
Rural	Fringe	48	0	4
	Distant	47	2	2
	Remote	43	8	1

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.


Figure 2.1. Title I, Part A total allocation per formula-eligible child and difference between school district locales with the highest and lowest allocations, by state or jurisdiction: 2015



NOTE: The school district locales receiving the highest and lowest allocations vary by state or jurisdiction. The total reflects the weighted average of the locale types.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Figure 2.2. Range of average Title I, Part A total allocations per formula-eligible child, by locale type: 2015



NOTE: This figure plots the allocation for each school district locale for every state or jurisdiction with that locale.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Basic Grants

Basic Grants amounted to \$6.4 billion or 45 percent of all Title I funds in FY 15, and the allocation per formula-eligible child was \$550. Although large cities received the highest national total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child, this was not true for Basic Grants. Remote rural areas received the highest national Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$583) (table 2.B). Midsized cities received the lowest allocation (\$532). The pattern of remote rural areas receiving a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales was reflected in many states: there were 15 states in which remote rural areas had the highest allocation (table 2.B; table 2.2). There were 9 states in which distant rural areas had the highest allocation and 5 states in which fringe rural areas had the highest allocation. Large cities had the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child in 5 states and the lowest allocation in 3 states.

The difference in the national Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations was \$52, which was smaller than the difference for the total Title I allocations (\$396) (table 2.B). In percentage terms, the difference in the national Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations

was 10 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the national total Title I allocations (37 percent). Within states, the differences in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations ranged from \$9 in Rhode Island and Utah to \$297 in Wyoming (table 2.B; figure 2.3). Altogether, there were 6 states (Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, and Wyoming) with differences of over \$100.


The Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child varied for each of the locales across the states. For example, for remote rural areas, the difference between the states with the highest and lowest allocations was \$691 (Vermont had an allocation of \$1,152, and Florida and Nevada had allocations of \$461) (table 2.B; figure 2.4). For large cities, the difference between the states with the highest and lowest allocations was \$451 (Alaska had an allocation of \$912, and Florida, North Carolina, and Tennessee had allocations of \$461). This state range for large cities was smaller than the range for the total Title I allocations (\$1,151). For fringe rural areas and distant rural areas, the differences in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the highest and lowest allocations were \$773 or more. Large suburban areas had the smallest differences between the states with the highest and lowest allocations (\$363).

Table 2.2. Number of states in which each school district locale received the highest and lowest Title I, Part A Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district locale: 2015

School district locale		Number of states in which locale is present	Number of states in which locale had the highest allocation	Number of states in which locale had the lowest allocation
City	Large	32	5	3
	Midsized	37	4	8
	Small	49	4	4
Suburban	Large	41	0	3
	Midsized	42	1	9
	Small	39	4	10
Town	Fringe	42	2	6
	Distant	43	1	1
	Remote	43	0	2
Rural	Fringe	48	5	1
	Distant	47	9	0
	Remote	43	15	3


SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Figure 2.3. Title I, Part A Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child and difference between school district locales with the highest and lowest allocations, by state or jurisdiction: 2015



NOTE: The school district locales receiving the highest and lowest allocations vary by state or jurisdiction. The total reflects the weighted average of the locale types.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Figure 2.4. Range of average Title I, Part A Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child, by locale type: 2015



NOTE: This figure plots the allocation for each school district locale for every state or jurisdiction with that locale.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Concentration Grants

Concentration Grants amounted to \$1.3 billion or 9 percent of all Title I funds in FY 15, and the allocation per formula-eligible child was \$134. Nationally, remote rural areas had the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$151), while midsize cities and midsize suburban areas had the lowest allocations (both \$127) (table 2.C). The difference in the national Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations was \$24, which was smaller than the differences for the national Basic Grant allocations (\$52) and the national total Title I allocations (\$396). In percentage terms, the difference in the national Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations was 19 percent, which was larger than the difference for the Basic Grant allocations (10 percent) and smaller than the difference for the Total Title I allocations (37 percent).

Compared with Basic Grants, the differences in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations were more varied across the states. There were 10 states in which suburban areas (large, midsize, or small) had the highest Concentration Grant allocation compared with all other locales; 7 states in which fringe towns had the highest allocation; 8 states in which cities (large, midsize, or small) had the highest allocation; and 20 states in which rural areas (fringe, distant, or remote) had the highest allocation (table 2.C; table 2.3). Unlike with Basic Grants, each locale received the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child in at least 2 states.

Within states, the differences in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations ranged from \$2 in Hawaii to \$27,335 in Alaska (table 2.C; figure 2.5). This large difference in Alaska was due to a Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child of \$27,658 for large cities, arising from unusual circumstances related to the hold harmless provision.¹ If Alaska were excluded from the analysis of the range within states, the largest range would be in Wyoming (\$1,564). Altogether, there were 14 states with differences of over \$100, compared with 6 states for Basic Grants.

The difference in the Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations was \$761 (ranging from \$110 in Florida to \$871 in Wyoming) (table 2.C). The Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child also varied for each of the locales across the states. For example, the difference in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations was smallest for midsize cities (\$93), ranging from \$109 in Florida, Idaho, and Utah to \$202 in New Hampshire (table 2.C; figure 2.6). The differences between the states with the lowest and highest allocations were over \$500 for about half of the locales: distant rural areas (\$2,138), fringe rural areas (\$839), remote towns (\$701), small suburban areas (\$667), and remote rural areas (\$574) (if Alaska is included, large cities would also have a difference of \$27,548).


¹ One large city school district in Alaska (Anchorage) received a Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child of \$651,321 due to the “4 year grand-father” provision in the Title I hold harmless procedures, although no students were eligible for Concentration Grants in Anchorage in 2015. Another large city school district (Chugach) had a small number of formula-eligible children and was combined with Anchorage, creating an unusually high computation.

Table 2.3. Number of states in which each school district locale received the highest and lowest Title I, Part A Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district locale: 2015

School district locale		Number of states in which locale is present	Number of states in which locale had the highest allocation	Number of states in which locale had the lowest allocation
City	Large	32	3	3
	Midsize	34	3	9
	Small	44	2	6
Suburban	Large	39	3	4
	Midsize	36	2	8
	Small	32	5	7
Town	Fringe	37	7	4
	Distant	42	3	2
	Remote	43	2	1
Rural	Fringe	44	6	0
	Distant	46	7	2
	Remote	42	7	4

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), “Local Education Agency Universe Survey,” 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Figure 2.5. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child and difference between school district locales with the highest and lowest allocations, by state or jurisdiction: 2015




¹ Data for Alaska and some data for Wyoming have been excluded from this figure because these states have outliers.

NOTE: The school district locales receiving the highest and lowest allocations vary by state or jurisdiction. The total reflects the weighted average of the locale types.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Figure 2.6. Range of average Title I, Part A Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child, by locale type: 2015



NOTE: This figure plots the allocation for each school district locale for every state or jurisdiction with that locale.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Targeted Grants

Targeted Grants amounted to \$3.3 billion or 23 percent of all Title I funds in FY 15, and the allocation per formula-eligible child was \$282. The locales receiving relatively high Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were different from those for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. Large cities had a higher national Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$377) than all other locales (table 2.D), in contrast to Basic Grants and Concentration Grants, where remote rural areas had the highest allocations. The Targeted Grant formula employs a percentage weighting component, which increases the allocations for school districts with high poverty rates, as well as a number weighting component, which increases the allocations for large districts regardless of poverty percentage. The national Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child among the other locales ranged from \$218 for fringe towns to \$290 for remote rural areas. The difference in the national Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations was \$159, which was larger than the differences for the national Basic Grant allocations (\$52) and national Concentration Grant allocations (\$24) but smaller than the difference for the national total Title I allocations (\$396). In percentage terms, the difference in the national Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations was 73 percent, which was larger than the differences for the national Basic Grant allocations (10 percent), national Concentration Grant allocations (19 percent), and national total Title I allocations (37 percent).

In 28 of the 32 states with large cities, large cities had higher Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child than any of the other locales (table 2.D; table 2.4). There were 6 states in which remote rural areas had the highest Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child compared with all other locales.

Within states, the differences in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations ranged from \$51 in West Virginia to \$355 in Michigan (table 2.D; figure 2.7). Altogether, there were 44 states with differences of over \$100, compared with 14 states for Concentration Grants and 6 states for Basic Grants.


The difference in the Targeted Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations was \$481 (ranging from \$196 in Idaho to \$676 in Vermont) (table 2.D). The Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child also varied for each of the locales across the states. For example, the difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations was smallest for large suburban areas (\$308), ranging from \$151 in Iowa to \$460 in Delaware (table 2.D; figure 2.8). The differences between the states with the lowest and highest allocations were over \$500 for more than half the locales: distant rural areas (\$731), remote rural areas (\$611), fringe rural areas (\$590), small cities (\$584), midsize suburban areas (\$554), distant towns (\$537), and midsize cities (\$508).

Table 2.4. Number of states in which each school district locale received the highest and lowest Title I, Part A Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district locale: 2015

School district locale		Number of states in which locale is present	Number of states in which locale had the highest allocation	Number of states in which locale had the lowest allocation
City	Large	32	28	0
	Midsize	37	9	0
	Small	49	0	0
Suburban	Large	41	2	1
	Midsize	42	0	9
	Small	39	1	10
	Fringe	42	1	15
Town	Distant	43	0	1
	Remote	43	1	3
	Fringe	47	0	4
Rural	Distant	47	2	6
	Remote	43	6	1


SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Figure 2.7. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child and difference between school district locales with the highest and lowest allocations, by state or jurisdiction: 2015



NOTE: The school district locales receiving the highest and lowest allocations vary by state or jurisdiction. The total reflects the weighted average of the locale types.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Figure 2.8. Range of average Title I, Part A Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child, by locale type: 2015



NOTE: This figure plots the allocation for each school district locale for every state or jurisdiction with that locale.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Education Finance Incentive Grants

Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG) amounted to \$3.3 billion or 23 percent of all Title I funds in FY 15, and the allocation per formula-eligible child was \$282. The locales receiving relatively low and relatively high EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were different from those for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants but similar to those for Targeted Grants. Large cities had a higher national EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$395) than all other locales (table 2.E). The national EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child among the other locales ranged from \$207 for fringe towns to \$309 for remote rural areas. In 28 of the 32 states with large cities, large cities had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than all other locales (table 2.E; table 2.5). There were 4 states (Arkansas, Maine, Montana, and South Dakota) in which remote rural areas received the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child compared with all other locales.

Comparisons Among Title I Grants

The difference in the national EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations was \$189 (table 2.E), which was larger than the differences for the national Basic Grant allocations (\$52), national Concentration Grant allocations (\$24), and national Targeted Grant allocations (\$159) but smaller than the difference for the difference for the national total Title I allocations (\$396). In percentage terms, the difference in the national EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations was 91 percent, which was larger than the differences for the national Basic Grant allocations (10 percent), national

Concentration Grant allocations (19 percent), national total Title I allocations (37 percent), and national Targeted Grant allocations (73 percent).

Within states, the differences in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations ranged from \$78 in West Virginia to \$541 in Michigan (table 2.E; figure 2.9). These were the same states that had the highest and lowest allocations for Targeted Grants. West Virginia was the only state with a difference of less than \$100. Altogether, there were 49 states with differences of over \$100, compared with 44 states for Targeted Grants, 14 states for Concentration Grants, and 6 states for Basic Grants.


The overall difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations was \$465 (ranging from \$219 in Utah to \$684 in Vermont) (table 2.E). This difference was lower than the difference for the Concentration Grant final allocations (\$761), the Basic Grant final allocations (\$659), and the Targeted Grant final allocations (\$481). The EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child also varied for each of the locales across the states. For example, the difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the highest and lowest allocations was smallest for large suburban areas (\$305), ranging from \$463 in Delaware to \$159 in New Mexico (table 2.E; figure 2.10). The differences between the states with the highest and lowest allocations were over \$500 for distant rural areas (\$795), remote rural areas (\$711), midsize cities (\$682), fringe rural areas (\$669), small cities (\$650), midsize suburban areas (\$637), distant towns (\$629), and remote towns (\$528).

Table 2.5. Number of states in which each school district locale received the highest and lowest Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district locale: 2015

School district locale		Number of states in which locale is present	Number of states in which locale had the highest allocation	Number of states in which locale had the lowest allocation
City	Large	32	28	0
	Midsize	37	9	0
	Small	49	0	0
Suburban	Large	41	2	0
	Midsize	42	0	9
	Small	39	1	9
Town	Fringe	42	1	16
	Distant	43	0	1
	Remote	43	1	4
Rural	Fringe	47	1	5
	Distant	47	3	5
	Remote	43	4	1

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.


Figure 2.9. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocation per formula-eligible child and difference between school district locales with the highest and lowest allocations, by state or jurisdiction: 2015



NOTE: The school district locales receiving the highest and lowest allocations vary by state or jurisdiction. The total reflects the weighted average of the locale types.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Figure 2.10. Range of average Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocations per formula-eligible child, by locale type: 2015



NOTE: This figure plots the allocation for each school district locale for every state or jurisdiction with that locale.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Cost Adjustment Using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI)

Applying the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) generally resulted in relatively higher purchasing power for Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for rural areas and relatively lower purchasing power for large cities. The purchasing power of the allocation is referred to as the cost-adjusted allocation.² For example, compared to the unadjusted allocations, the cost-adjusted national Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was \$307 higher for remote rural areas, while the cost-adjusted allocation was \$45 lower for large cities (table 2.AA). When using the ACS-CWI, remote rural areas had a higher cost-adjusted national Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,620) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,161 for large suburban areas to \$1,421 for large cities. Across states, the cost-adjusted total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$1,028 in California to \$3,016 in Vermont, a difference of \$1,988. This difference was \$381 larger than the difference between the states with the lowest and highest unadjusted allocations.

After the ACS-CWI was applied, remote rural areas (or distant rural areas in states where remote rural areas were not applicable) received the highest cost-adjusted Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child in 27 states, compared with 16 states without application of the ACS-CWI (table 2.BB). After the ACS-CWI was applied, large cities (or midsize cities in states where large cities were not applicable) did not receive the highest allocation in any state but received the lowest allocation in 26 states. Compared with the unadjusted allocations, applying the ACS-CWI generally increased the differences in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations, both across and within states. Across states, the largest cost-adjusted difference was for fringe rural areas (\$1,243), which ranged from \$503 in California to \$1,746 in Wyoming. Cost-adjusted differences of over \$800 were also observed for remote towns (\$811), remote rural areas (\$855), small suburban areas (\$882), and distant rural areas (\$882). The smallest difference was for large cities (\$384). Within states, the differences in the cost-adjusted Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations were over \$100 in 43 states, compared with only 6 states without the cost adjustment.

After applying the ACS-CWI, the national Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$131 for large cities to \$186 for remote rural areas (table 2.CC). There were 10 states in which distant rural areas received the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child and 8 states in which remote rural areas received the highest allocation. There were no states in which midsize suburban areas had the highest allocation and only 1 state (Alaska) in which large cities had the highest allocation. The differences in the cost-adjusted Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child across the states were smaller for large cities and remained about the same for midsize cities, compared with the unadjusted allocations. In the other 10 locales, the differences increased after the cost adjustment, ranging from an increase of \$29 for midsize suburban areas to an increase of \$230 for distant rural areas.

Applying the ACS-CWI increased the difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the highest and lowest allocations to \$562 (the difference without the adjustment was \$481) (table 2.DD). Since some of the highest Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in high-cost areas, such as large cities, the differences between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations decreased in many states after the cost adjustment. The cost-adjusted national Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$243 for fringe towns to \$364 for large cities, a difference of \$121, which was smaller than the difference for the unadjusted national allocations (\$159).

Similar to the patterns for other grants, applying the ACS-CWI increased the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child in lower cost areas and decreased them in higher cost areas. Applying the ACS-CWI increased the difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the highest and lowest allocations to \$577 (the difference without the adjustment was \$465) (table 2.EE). Since some of the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were in high-cost areas, such as large cities, the differences between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations decreased in many states after the cost adjustment. The cost-adjusted national EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$231 for fringe towns to \$383 for large cities, a difference of \$152, which was smaller than the difference for the unadjusted national allocations (\$189).

² Districts and states do not actually receive different allocations based on the ACS-CWI.

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
Total Title I Allocations—Formula Analyses

This chapter includes analyses of the total fiscal year 2015 (FY 15) Title I allocations per formula-eligible child across all four of the grants by comparing the final allocations overall to hypothetical allocations that were computed with the removal of single or multiple provisions from the formulas. Similar analyses of each of the Title I grant programs are presented in subsequent chapters. Some of the provisions affect all four of the Title I grants, while some only affect individual grants. For example, the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, and hold harmless provisions affect all four grants. The

Concentration Grant formula includes two allocation eligibility requirements that are different from the other Title I grant requirements. There are two types of formula-eligible child weighting provisions that affect only Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The EFIG formula has two additional provisions that are not included in the other Title I grant formulas: the state effort provision (the measure of state effort to provide financial support compared with its relative wealth) and the state equity provision (the degree to which education expenditures within a state are equalized).

Highlights

- The total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$984 in Idaho to \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference of \$1,606 (table 3.A). The difference in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations remained above \$1,500, unless the state minimum provision was removed from the formulas. The smallest difference in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations (\$310) resulted from the removal of the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions in combination.
- Large cities had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for most alternatives involving the removal of single or multiple provisions (table 3.B). For example, when the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed in combination, large cities (\$1,319) had the highest Title I allocation per formula-eligible child and remote rural areas (\$1,292) had the second-highest allocation; small suburban areas had the lowest allocation (\$1,122) (figure 3.14).
- For both the final allocations and each of the formula alternatives that were analyzed, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child and the lowest poverty quarter had the lowest allocations (table 3.B). For example, when the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed in combination, the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was \$1,395 for the highest poverty quarter, compared with \$921 for the lowest poverty quarter (figure 3.14).
- Compared with districts of other sizes in other poverty quarters, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child both for the final allocations and for most of the alternatives that were examined (table 3.B). The second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter had the lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child in most of the alternatives that were examined. For example, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formulas, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,541) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$829 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,421 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter.
- For most of the alternatives, the smallest and largest districts had the highest total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child, while districts with midsize populations generally had the lowest allocations (table 3.B). Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formulas, the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,442) was higher than for districts of other population sizes (figure 3.5). The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$1,323), and the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,108).

Figure 3.1. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation when only formula-eligibility criteria were considered, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

² Only the eligibility criteria for each of the four Title I, Part A grant formulas are included. For Basic Grants, funds are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 and at least 2 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population. Concentration Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 6,500 or 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population. Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children (without the application of the formula weights) is at least 10 and at least 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

The average total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was \$1,227 in FY 15 (all allocations herein are averages) (table 3.A; figure 3.1). This allocation does not change after removing single or multiple provisions from the formulas because the total amount of allocations and the number of formula-eligible children (the numerator and denominator) do not change for the U.S. total. There are differences in the Title I allocations by state, poverty quarter, National

Center for Education Statistics (NCES) geographic locale, poverty and population size quarter, and population size after removing single or multiple provisions from the formulas. The allocations are also adjusted to reflect local variations in purchasing power (using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index), and these adjusted allocations are compared with the unadjusted allocations (in current dollars).

Formula Alternatives

In this chapter, a larger range of formula alternatives are examined, compared with subsequent chapters that focus on individual grant allocations: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Some allocation provisions affect each of the grant programs, such as the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, and hold harmless provisions, while other provisions apply only to specific grants (see Introduction, Methodology for Allocating Federal Title I Funds). The formulas are analyzed by systematically showing the allocation per formula-eligible child after excluding single and multiple provisions from the formulas. These alternatives provide a perspective on the relative impact of each of the provisions on the distribution of the funds. An alternative using only the formula-eligibility criteria was also presented to provide a baseline to compare to the allocations with provisions removed. The allocation based only on the formula-eligibility criteria focuses on just the counts of children and the weighting provisions and does not take into consideration other formula provisions, such as the SPPE, state minimum, and hold harmless provisions.

When individual provisions were excluded from the formulas, the individual grants were affected in different ways, but there were some general patterns. When the SPPE provision was removed from the formulas, each state was treated the same in expenditures per student, and there were no minimum and maximum thresholds. In general, removal of the SPPE provision meant that states with lower expenditures per student received higher allocations per formula-eligible child, while states with higher expenditures per student received lower allocations. Excluding the state minimum provision meant that some small population states had lower allocations since there was no lower bound on funding levels. Removal of the hold harmless provision allowed current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocations. Since the underlying parameters for the individual grants were different, the impact on the total Title I allocation did not always follow these expected patterns.

It is important to note that unless a formula provision is removed in conjunction with the hold harmless provision, the long-term impact of removing the other provision may not be fully reflected in the resulting allocation. So, when a provision such as the state minimum is removed from the formula, the school districts in the state are limited to a reduction of no more than 15 percent per year. The hold harmless provision moderates the long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of

its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions are fully met for a district. In FY 15, the national Title I allocation was the same across all alternatives. Since the allocation was based on a fixed appropriation amount, increases or decreases for some districts had to be matched by increases or decreases for others. For example, under the hold harmless provision, maintaining the hold harmless amounts for some districts meant that some other districts with increases in formula-eligible children did not receive additional funding.

The Concentration Grant formula includes two allocation eligibility criteria that are different from the other Title I grant provisions. Rather than requiring 5 percent or more (as is the case for Targeted Grants and EFIG) or 2 percent or more (as is the case for Basic Grants) of the 5- to 17-year-old population to be formula eligible, Concentration Grants require more than 15 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old population or at least 6,500 children to be formula eligible in order to receive an allocation. If the provision that provides eligibility if the percentage of formula-eligible children exceeds 15 percent of total 5- to 17-year-old population (herein referred to as the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision) is met, Concentration Grant allocations have no minimum number of students required to receive an allocation, while the other Title I grant programs also require a minimum number of students (10) in order to receive an allocation. These two eligibility criteria, which are specific to Concentration Grants, are examined in the alternatives presented in this chapter. In FY 15, removal of the provision that provides eligibility if the number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 (herein referred to as the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision) reduced the allocations for large districts with relatively low poverty levels (and slightly increased allocations for districts with higher poverty levels). Removal of the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision results in decreased allocations for smaller high-poverty districts but increased allocations for large districts that benefited from the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision. Removal of the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision would result in only districts with 6,500 or more formula-eligible children receiving a full allocation; smaller districts, even those with high levels of poverty, would receive only a hold harmless allocation. Since the Title I funding level is a fixed sum, increases for some districts mean that amounts for others must be reduced.

The number weighting and percentage weighting provisions are unique to Targeted Grants and EFIG. When the number weighting provision is removed, districts only receive additional funding from high percentages of formula-eligible children, which favors districts in the highest

poverty quarter regardless of size. When the percentage of formula-eligible children provision is removed, the additional funding allotments are based only on the actual number of formula-eligible children, which favors larger districts.

EFIG funds are distributed to states based on two unique variables that are not part of the formulas for the other three grants: the state effort provision (the measure of state effort to provide financial support compared with its relative wealth) and the state equity provision (the degree to which education expenditures within a state are equalized) (see Introduction, Methodology for Allocating Federal Title I Funds). In FY 15, when the state effort provision was removed, states no longer benefited or were penalized for spending relatively high or low percentages of their per capita income on education. Removing the state equity provision benefited states with larger variations in spending within the state. Unlike the other three types of Title I grants, EFIG are first computed at the state level and then distributed to districts within each state. The other district-level calculations, such as the hold harmless provision, only pertain to districts within a state, since the overall state amount is fixed. EFIG allocations are made to states based on state total eligibility (unweighted) and SPPE. EFIG provide funds to districts according to number weighting and percentage weighting provisions that are the same as those for Targeted Grants. The hold harmless and weighting provisions are applied only at the district level. Due to the nature of the state-level allocations in EFIG, hold harmless amounts could not be maintained for all districts in some states when certain provisions were removed from the formulas.

Five combinations of formula exclusions are analyzed in this chapter; each combination includes the removal of the hold harmless provision. This provides an example of the immediate and long-term impact of removing other provisions. One combination looks at removal of the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions. The second combination looks at removal of the hold harmless and state equity provisions. The third combination looks at removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions. The fourth combination looks at removal of the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions. The fifth combination looks at removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions. These combinations are only examples of different provision removals to provide a general perspective of the sensitivity of the funding distributions after accounting for various formula provisions.

Formula-Eligibility Criteria Only

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocation range across states was smaller than the range when most provisions were removed, whether individually or in combination. For Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG), the number weighting and percentage weighting provisions were retained. These provisions contributed to differences across school district characteristics, such as locale, poverty quarter, and population size, which were all larger than those for the final allocations.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered (in conjunction with weighting provisions), the range in the state-level total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was narrower than the range for the final allocations. When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocations ranged from \$1,033 in North Dakota and \$1,036 in Wyoming to \$1,338 in the District of Columbia and \$1,368 in Nevada (table 3.A), a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$335 or 32 percent (the range for the final allocations was \$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the largest decreases were in Vermont (-\$1,535) and Wyoming (-\$1,543); the largest increases were in Florida (+\$213) and Nevada (+\$226). Overall, 28 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 22 states and Puerto Rico had increases.

In contrast to the relatively small range in the total Title I allocations across the states, there were relatively wide ranges for some district characteristics. For example, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered (in conjunction with the weighting provisions), the range across the locales was wider than the range for the final allocations. Large cities had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,513) (table 3.B; figure 3.1). The allocations for the other locales ranged from \$999 for fringe towns to \$1,315 for midsize cities. Compared with the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, midsize cities had the largest increase in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child (+\$92), and large cities had the second-largest increase (+\$47). The locales with the largest decreases were remote towns (-\$114) and remote rural areas (-\$311).

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered (in conjunction with the weighting provisions), the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,333). Districts with lower

poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$938) and second-lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$1,123). Compared with the final allocations, when using only the formula-eligibility criteria and weighting provisions, the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for the second-highest poverty quarter was \$84 higher, and the allocation for the second-lowest poverty quarter was \$25 higher. In contrast, the allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$48 lower, and the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter was \$85 lower. The difference between the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter was \$395 or 42 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were used (in conjunction with the weighting provisions), the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,553) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$817 in the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,486 in the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a Title I allocation per formula-eligible child of \$1,553, and the smallest districts had an allocation of \$1,043 (a range of \$510 or 49 percent). This range between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was nearly twice as wide as the range for the final allocations (\$260 or 20 percent). Compared with the final allocations, applying only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in the largest increases in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (+\$204) and the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$203). In contrast, the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (-\$237) and the smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-\$204) had the largest decreases.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were used (in conjunction with the weighting provisions), districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,429) than districts of smaller population sizes. In contrast to the pattern for the final allocations, districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had lower allocations (\$953) than districts of other population sizes. Compared with the final allocations,

applying only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in decreases of over \$250 for districts with populations of less than 1,000: -\$489 for districts with a population of less than 300, -\$303 for districts with a population of 300 to 599, and -\$262 for districts with a population of 600 to 999. In contrast, the allocation for districts with a population of 25,000 or more was \$106 higher than the final allocation. When only the formula-eligibility criteria were used, the difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$476 or 50 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent).

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE)

When the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision was removed from the FY 15 formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child increased in lower spending states and decreased in higher spending states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

After removal of the SPPE provision from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$1,063 in Idaho and \$1,067 in Iowa to \$2,578 in Wyoming and \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,526 or 144 percent (table 3.A). This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the allocations when the SPPE provision was removed were in Florida (+\$110) and Nevada (+\$103), and the largest decreases were in Massachusetts (-\$242) and New Jersey (-\$217). Overall, 27 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 23 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formulas, the range in the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child across the locales was slightly wider than the range for the final allocations. Similar to the final allocation,


large cities had the highest allocation when the SPPE provision was removed (\$1,476) (table 3.B; figure 3.2). The allocations for other locales ranged from \$1,067 for fringe towns to \$1,317 for remote rural areas. Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, remote towns and fringe rural areas had the largest increases in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child (both +\$14), and the largest decreases were for small suburban areas (-\$28) and fringe towns (-\$21).

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formulas, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,383). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$951). The allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$433 or 45 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, after removing the SPPE provision, the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was \$72 lower for the lowest poverty quarter and \$4 lower for the second-lowest poverty quarter; in contrast, there was an increase of \$23 for the second-highest poverty quarter and an increase of \$3 for the highest poverty quarter.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formulas, there was a systematic pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,541) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes,

which ranged from \$829 in the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,421 in the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts (\$1,330) had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child than smaller districts in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,086 to \$1,185. There were similar patterns for districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in the largest increase in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$74) and the largest decrease for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-\$102).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,426) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$1,350), and the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,082). When the SPPE provision was removed, the difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$344, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$334). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in lower allocations for districts with populations under 25,000, ranging from a decrease of \$41 for districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499 to a decrease of \$3 for districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999. In contrast, there was an increase of \$27 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more.

Figure 3.2. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

² A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE. For Education Finance Incentive Grants, however, these rules differ slightly: 34 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the minimum (instead of 32 percent), and 46 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the maximum (instead of 48 percent).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Removal of State Minimum

The state minimum provision provides a minimum dollar allocation threshold for each state. In FY 15, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in relatively large decreases for some states with small population sizes receiving the state minimum allocation. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$978 in Idaho and \$1,001 in Utah to \$2,042 in Vermont and \$2,078 in Wyoming (table 3.A). Since there was a substantial reduction for states with the highest allocations, this range between the lowest and the highest allocations of \$1,100 or 112 percent was smaller than the range for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child did not increase by more than \$6 in any state but decreased substantially for many states receiving the state minimum allocation under one or more of the grant formulas (figure I.3). For example, North Dakota's allocation decreased by \$590, Vermont's decreased by \$548, and Wyoming's decreased by \$501 (table 3.A). Overall, 12 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 38 states and Puerto Rico had increases.


Similar to the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formulas, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,470) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,071 for fringe rural areas and \$1,088 for fringe towns to \$1,276 for remote rural areas (table 3.B; figure 3.3). The difference between the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$400 or 37 percent, which was nearly the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$396 or 37 percent). Compared with the

final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, the largest change was for remote rural areas, which had a reduction of \$37. There were increases of \$4 for large cities and large suburban areas.

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formulas, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,383). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,012). The Title I allocation per formula-eligible child in the highest poverty quarter was \$371 or 37 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, after removing the state minimum provision, the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was \$11 lower for the lowest poverty quarter and \$4 lower for the second-lowest poverty quarter. In contrast, there was an increase of \$2 for the second-highest poverty quarter and an increase of \$3 for the highest poverty quarter.

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formulas, there was a systematic pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,547) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$926 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,416 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,262) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,085 to \$1,141. There were similar patterns for districts in the second-lowest and the lowest poverty quarters. Compared with the final allocations, removing the state minimum provision resulted in the largest increase in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (+\$7) and the largest decrease for the smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-\$24).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,379) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. The second-highest

Figure 3.3. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state minimum provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$1,327), and the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,108). When the state minimum provision was removed, the difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$271, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$334). Compared

with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in decreases of \$16 or more for districts with populations under 1,000. The largest decrease in the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$63); the largest increase was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$4).

Removal of Hold Harmless

Removal of the hold harmless provision allows current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocation, rather than be limited by maximum yearly reductions. For example, removal of the hold harmless provision would permit reductions of over 15 percent for school districts that may have had relatively large decreases in the number of formula-eligible children compared with other districts.

When the hold harmless provision was removed from the FY 15 formulas, the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$988 in Idaho and \$1,018 in Utah to \$2,567 in Wyoming and \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,601 or 162 percent (table 3.A). Since there was no substantial change for states with the lowest and highest allocations compared with the final allocations, this difference was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were in Maryland (+\$28) and New York (+\$26). The largest decreases were in Michigan (-\$74) and Puerto Rico (-\$121). Overall, 24 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 26 states had increases.


Similar to the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formulas, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,474) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,066 for fringe rural areas and \$1,078 for fringe towns to \$1,247 for remote rural areas (table 3.B; figure 3.4). The difference between the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$408 or 38 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocation (\$396 or 37 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, the largest decreases were for remote rural areas (-\$67) and distant rural areas (-\$29), and the largest increases were for midsize cities (+\$23) and midsize suburban areas (+\$14).

When the hold harmless provision was removed from the formulas, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,361). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,037). The Title I allocation per formula-eligible child in the highest poverty quarter was \$325 or 31 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, after removing the hold harmless provision, the

Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was \$19 lower for the highest poverty quarter. In contrast, there was an increase of \$21 for the second-highest poverty quarter, an increase of \$5 for the second-lowest poverty quarter, and an increase of \$13 for the lowest poverty quarter.

When the hold harmless provision was removed from the formulas, there was a systematic pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,539) than smaller districts; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$952 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,408 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,288) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,102 to \$1,170. There were similar patterns for districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless provision resulted in the largest increase for the second-largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$35) and the largest decrease for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (-\$56).

In contrast to the pattern for the final allocations and most allocations with other single provisions removed, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$1,336) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,238), and the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,107). When the hold harmless provision was removed, the difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$229 or 21 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in decreases of \$63 or more for districts with populations under 1,000. The largest decrease in the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$204), and the largest increase was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$13).

Figure 3.4. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Removal of Number of Formula-Eligible Children Exceeds 6,500

Removal of the eligibility requirement for school districts to have more than 6,500 formula-eligible children to participate in Concentration Grants reduced the allocations for large districts with relatively low poverty levels (and tended to slightly increase allocations for districts with higher poverty levels). It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

When the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$984 in Idaho and \$995 in Utah to \$2,579 in Wyoming and \$2,591 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,607 or 163 percent (table 3.A). Since there was no substantial change for states with the lowest and highest allocations compared with the final allocations, this difference was nearly the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, after removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision, the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child did not increase by more than \$1 in any state, and the largest decrease was in Maryland (-\$13). Overall, 6 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 44 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formulas, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,466) than all other locales, similar to the final allocation (table 3.B; figure 3.5). The allocation for other locales ranged from \$1,071 for fringe rural areas and \$1,089 for fringe towns to \$1,314 for remote rural areas. The difference between the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$396 or 37 percent, which was the same as the range for the final allocations (\$396


or 37 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed, the largest change was for large suburban areas, which had a reduction of \$1; the changes for other locales were less than \$1.

When the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formulas, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,381). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,021). The allocation in the highest poverty quarter was \$360 or 35 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was about the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed, the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child decreased by \$2 for the lowest poverty quarter; districts in other poverty quarters had changes of less than \$1.

After removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision from the formulas, there was a systematic pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,540) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$931 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,414 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,257) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,082 to \$1,136. There were similar patterns for the second-lowest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision resulted in the largest increase for the second-largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$1) and the largest decrease for the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-\$8).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,442) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population

Figure 3.5. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$1,323), and the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,108). When the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed, the difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$334 or

30 percent, which was the same as the difference for the final allocations. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision resulted in no differences in the allocations by district size of more than \$1.

Removal of Percentage of Formula-Eligible Children Exceeds 15 Percent

Removal of the eligibility requirement for 15 percent or more of the population to be formula eligible increased the allocations for large school districts that benefited from the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the 15 percent eligibility provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

When the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$976 in Idaho and \$998 in Utah to \$2,574 in Vermont and \$2,575 in Wyoming, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,599 or 164 percent (table 3.A). Since there was no substantial change for states with the lowest and highest allocations, this difference was nearly the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child were in Hawaii (+\$16) and Maryland (+\$12), and the largest decreases were in South Dakota (-\$18) and Vermont (-\$16). Overall, 35 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 15 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formulas, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,479) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,062 for fringe rural areas and \$1,077 for fringe towns to \$1,305 for remote rural areas (table 3.B; figure 3.6). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$417 or 39 percent, which was slightly larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$396 or 37 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children


provision was removed, there were increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for large cities (+\$13) and midsize cities (+\$6), and the largest decreases were for small suburban areas, fringe towns, remote towns, and distant rural areas (all -\$11).

When the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formulas, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,384). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for districts in the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,025). The allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$359 or 35 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was about the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed, there were increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter (+\$2) and the highest poverty quarter (+\$4). In contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$8) and the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$1).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, after removal of the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision from the formulas, there was a systematic pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,552) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$931 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,427 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,271) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,069 to \$1,144. There were similar patterns for districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision resulted in the largest increase for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$15) and the largest decrease for the smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$16).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old

Figure 3.6. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with percentage of formula-eligible children exceeds 15 percent of total 5- to 17-year-old population provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,429) was higher than the allocations for districts of other population sizes. The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$1,335), and the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,098). When the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed, the difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per

formula-eligible child was \$331 or 30 percent, which was nearly the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision resulted in an increase for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$12) and decreases for districts with smaller population sizes; the largest decrease was for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$13).

Removal of Number Weighting

Removal of the number weighting provision decreased the Targeted Grant and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocations per formula-eligible child for larger school districts relative to smaller districts since some large but low-poverty districts benefited from the number weighting provision. Due to the allocation procedure for the final allocation for EFIG, removal of the number weighting provision did not change the state-level allocations compared with the final allocations. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.


When the number weighting provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$983 in Utah and \$984 in Idaho to \$2,579 in Wyoming and \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,607 or 163 percent (table 3.A). This difference was nearly the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were in New Jersey (+\$24) and Mississippi (+\$21), and the largest decreases were in Maryland (-\$36) and Nevada (-\$34). Overall, 22 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 28 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed from the formulas, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,435) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,099 for fringe rural areas and \$1,121 for small suburban areas to \$1,356 for remote rural areas (table 3.B; figure 3.7). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$336 or 31 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$396 or 37 percent).

Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were for distant towns (+\$44) and remote rural areas (+\$43), and the largest decreases were for large cities (-\$31) and large suburban areas (-\$12).

When the number weighting provision was removed from the formulas, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,394). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. The allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,017). The allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$377 or 37 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was slightly larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was \$14 higher for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$13), the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$10), and the lowest poverty quarter (-\$6).

After removal of the number weighting provision from the formulas, there was a general pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,504) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$941 for the second-largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,410 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,205) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,093 to \$1,165. There was a similar pattern for districts in the lowest poverty quarter. The one exception to the general pattern was in the second-lowest poverty quarter, where the largest districts had a lower allocation (\$1,105) than the smallest districts (\$1,151) but a higher allocation than districts of other population sizes in that quarter. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the number weighting provision resulted in the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the second-smallest districts (+\$49) and the smallest districts (+\$47) in the highest poverty quarter; the largest decreases were for the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-\$68) and the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$51).

Figure 3.7. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with number weighting provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,474) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$1,308), and the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,143). When the number weighting provision was removed, the difference between

the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$331 or 29 percent, which was nearly the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the number weighting provision resulted in an increase of \$42 for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and increases of more than \$30 for districts with populations under 10,000; there was a decrease was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (-\$34).

Removal of Percentage Weighting

Removal of the percentage weighting provision decreased the Targeted Grant and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocations per formula-eligible child for school districts with relatively large percentages of formula-eligible children since some large low-poverty districts had higher allocations due to the number weighting provision. Due to the EFIG final allocation procedure, removal of the percentage weighting provision did not change the state-level allocations compared with the final allocations. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the percentage weighting provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the percentage weighting provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

When the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$984 in Idaho and \$1,003 in Utah to \$2,579 in Wyoming and \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,606 or 163 percent (table 3.A). Since there was no substantial change for states with the lowest and highest allocations, this difference was the same as the difference for the final allocations. Compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child after removal of the percentage weighting provision were in Maryland (+\$8) and Nevada (+\$8), and the largest decreases were in Mississippi (-\$15) and New Jersey (-\$10). Overall, 25 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 25 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.


Similar to the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formulas, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,482) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,063 for fringe rural areas and \$1,075 for fringe towns to \$1,283 for remote rural areas (table 3.B; figure 3.8). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$419 or 39 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$396

or 37 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were for large cities (+\$16) and midsize cities (+\$6), and the largest decreases were for remote rural areas (-\$31) and remote towns (-\$28).

When the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formulas, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,372). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,036). The Title I allocation per formula-eligible child in the highest poverty quarter was \$336 or 32 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child increased for the lowest poverty quarter (+\$13), the second-lowest poverty quarter (+\$9), and the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$2); in contrast, there was a decrease for the highest poverty quarter (-\$8).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, after removal of the percentage weighting provision from the formulas, there was a consistent pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,556) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$942 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,428 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,271) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,090 to \$1,151. There was a similar pattern for districts in the lowest and second-lowest poverty quarters. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the percentage weighting provision resulted in the largest increase in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (+\$16). The largest decreases were for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (-\$45) and the smallest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$30).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible

Figure 3.8. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with percentage weighting provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,409) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$1,338), and the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,098). The difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$311 or

28 percent, which was slightly smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the percentage weighting provision resulted in an increase for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$15); in contrast, there were decreases for districts with populations under 10,000, and the largest decrease was for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$32).

Removal of State Effort

The state effort provision only affected the state-level allocations for Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG), unlike some other provisions, which primarily affected school district-level allocations within states. Removal of the EFIG state effort provision resulted in higher EFIG allocations for states with lower effort factors and lower allocations for states with higher effort factors. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state effort provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state effort provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

When the state effort provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$993 in Idaho and \$1,007 in Utah to \$2,579 in Wyoming and \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,597 or 161 percent (table 3.A). This difference was very similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child after removal of the state effort provision were in Minnesota (+\$13) and Iowa, Kansas, Puerto Rico, Virginia, and Washington (all +\$12). The largest decreases were in Maryland (-\$21) and Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania (all -\$20). Overall, 20 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 30 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.


Similar to the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed from the formulas, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,467) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,071 for fringe rural areas and \$1,084 for fringe towns to \$1,313 for remote rural areas (table 3.B; figure 3.9). The difference between the allocation for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$396 or 37 percent, which was the same as the difference for the final allocations. Compared with the final allocations, when the state effort provision was

removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were for large cities, large suburban areas, and fringe rural areas (all +\$1); the largest decreases were for small suburban areas and fringe towns (both -\$4).

When the state effort provision was removed from the formulas, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,379). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,020). The Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter was \$359 or 35 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was about the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed, the allocations increased for the second-lowest poverty quarter (+\$1) and the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$2); in contrast, there were decreases for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$3) and the highest poverty quarter (-\$1).

After removal of the state effort provision from the formulas, there was a consistent pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,542) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$924 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,413 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,261) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,082 to \$1,142. There was a similar pattern for the lowest and second-lowest poverty quarters. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state effort provision resulted in the largest increase in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (+\$8) and the largest decreases for the second-smallest districts (-\$7) and smallest districts (-\$6) in the lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,442) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the

Figure 3.9. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state effort provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

largest districts) (\$1,327), and the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,104). The difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$338 or 31 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent).

Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state effort provision resulted in an increase of \$3 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and an increase of less than \$1 for districts with a population of less than 300; in contrast, there were decreases of \$1 to \$5 for districts of all other population sizes.

Removal of State Equity

The state equity provision increases the Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocation per formula-eligible child in states with smaller variations in spending by school districts within their states. Removing this factor increased the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for states with larger variations of spending by districts within their states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state equity provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state equity provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

When the state equity provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$997 in Utah and \$1,005 in Idaho to \$2,579 in Wyoming and \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,593 or 160 percent (table 3.A). Since there were relatively small changes for states with the lowest and highest allocations, this difference was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were in Illinois (+\$32) and Idaho (+\$22), and the largest decreases were in Puerto Rico (-\$27) and Maryland (-\$19). Overall, 26 states and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 24 states and the District of Columbia had no changes or increases.


Similar to the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed from the formulas, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,482) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,060 for fringe rural areas and \$1,081 for fringe towns to \$1,309 for remote rural areas (table 3.B; figure 3.10). The difference between the allocation for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$422 or 40 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$396 or 37 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed, there were increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for large cities (+\$16)

and midsize cities (+\$4), and the largest decreases were for midsize suburban areas and fringe rural areas (both -\$11).

When the state equity provision was removed from the formulas, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,387). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,014). The Title I allocation per formula-eligible child in the highest poverty quarter was \$373 or 37 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was slightly larger than difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed, the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child increased for the highest poverty quarter (+\$6) and decreased for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$9), the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$5), and the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$3).

After removal of the state equity provision from the formulas, there was a consistent pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,553) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$915 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,424 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,256) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,079 to \$1,134. There was a similar pattern for districts in the lowest and second-lowest poverty quarters. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state equity provision resulted in the largest increases in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the largest districts (+\$13) and second-largest districts (+\$10) in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decreases for the second-smallest districts (-\$17) and smallest districts (-\$15) in the lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocation, when the state equity provision was removed from the formulas, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for school districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,438) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$1,329), and the lowest allocation was

Figure 3.10. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state equity provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$1,101). The difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$337 or 31 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent).

Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state equity provision resulted in an increase of \$6 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more; in contrast, there were decreases of less than \$1 to \$8 for districts of other population sizes.

Removal of Hold Harmless, Number of Formula-Eligible Children Exceeds 6,500, and Number Weighting

Removal of multiple formula provisions can lead to a better understanding of the interaction between those provisions and enable a more complete analysis of the implications of individual provisions. In FY 15, removal of the number weighting provision decreased the Targeted Grant and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocations per formula-eligible child for larger school districts relative to smaller districts since some large but low-poverty districts benefit from the number weighting provision. Removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision reduced the allocations for large districts with relatively low poverty levels (and tended to slightly increase allocations for districts with higher poverty levels). Removal of the hold harmless provision allowed current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocation, rather than be limited by maximum yearly reductions due to hold harmless provisions. Removal of the hold harmless provision in combination with the number weighting and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions provides information on the long-term impact of removing the number weighting and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions.

When the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$959 in Utah and \$991 in Idaho to \$2,567 in Wyoming and \$2,591 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,632 or 170 percent (table 3.A). Since there were changes for states with the lowest and highest allocations, this difference was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child after removal of the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions were in New Jersey (+\$78) and Massachusetts (+\$59); the largest decreases were in Maryland (-\$152) and Nevada (-\$113). Overall, 21 states and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 29 states and the District of Columbia had increases.


When the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, large cities had a lower total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,353) than remote rural areas (\$1,358) (table 3.B; figure 3.11); this pattern contrasted with the pattern for the final allocations and allocations with single provisions removed. The

allocations for other locales ranged from \$1,129 for large suburban areas and \$1,143 for fringe rural areas to \$1,273 for small cities. The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and large suburban areas was \$229 or 20 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$396 or 37 percent). When the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were for distant towns (+\$97) and remote towns (+\$92), and there were decreases for large cities (-\$113) and large suburban areas (-\$15).

When the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,397). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,021). The allocation in the highest poverty quarter was \$376 or 37 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was slightly larger than difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions were removed, the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child increased for the highest poverty quarter (+\$17) and decreased for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$2), the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$36), and the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$1).

After the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, there was a general pattern of larger districts in each poverty quarter having lower total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than some smaller districts; this contrasts with the pattern for the final allocations, where larger districts generally had higher allocations. For example, when the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a lower Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,401) than the second-largest districts (\$1,421) and second-smallest districts (\$1,407) in that quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts also had a lower allocation (\$1,100) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,115 to \$1,223. In the lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts (\$990) had a lower allocation than the second-smallest districts (\$1,023) and the smallest districts (\$1,092) but a higher allocation than the second-largest districts (\$982). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increases in the

Figure 3.11. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless, number weighting, and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (+\$122) and the smallest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$97). In contrast, the largest decreases were for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$188) and the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-\$164).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number

weighting provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$1,335) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$1,297), and the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 (\$1,197). The difference between the district population sizes with

the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$138 or 11 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless, 6,500 formula-eligible children, and number weighting provisions resulted in increases for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 (+\$96) and districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (+\$95); in contrast, there were decreases for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$107) and districts with a population of 25,000 or more (-\$90).

Removal of Hold Harmless and State Equity


Removal of multiple formula provisions can lead to a better understanding of the interaction those provisions and enable a more complete analysis of the implications of individual provisions. In FY 15, removal of the hold harmless provision allowed current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocations; with the hold harmless provision, the allocations would be limited by the maximum yearly reductions. Removal of the hold harmless provision in combination with the state equity provision provided information on the long-term impact of removing the state equity provision. The state equity provision is designed to increase the Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocation per formula-eligible child in states with smaller variations in spending by school districts within their states. Removing this provision increased the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for states with larger variations of spending by districts within states.

When the hold harmless and state equity provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$1,010 in Idaho and \$1,018 in Utah to \$2,567 in Wyoming and \$2,590 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,579 or 156 percent (table 3.A). Since there were increases for states with the lowest allocations, this difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and state equity provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were in Illinois (+\$54) and New York (+\$38), and the largest decreases were in Puerto Rico (-\$149) and Michigan (-\$72). Overall, 29 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 21 states had increases.

Similar to the final allocations and most other allocations with provisions removed, when the hold harmless and state equity provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,497) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,046 for fringe rural areas and \$1,062 for fringe towns to \$1,254 for midsize cities (table 3.B; figure 3.12). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$450 or 43 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$396 or 37 percent). When the hold harmless and state equity provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were for large cities and midsize cities (both +\$31), and the largest decreases were for remote rural areas (-\$76) and distant rural areas (-\$47).

When the hold harmless and state equity provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,371). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,022). The Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter was \$349 or 34 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was slightly smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child increased for the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$18) and decreased for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$2), the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$4), and the highest poverty quarter (-\$10).

After removal of the hold harmless and state equity provisions from the formulas in combination, there was a consistent pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,554) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$927 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,429 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts also had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,294) than districts of smaller population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,095 to \$1,172. There were similar patterns for districts of different population sizes within the

Figure 3.12. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless and state equity provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

second-lowest and lowest poverty quarters. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless and state equity provisions resulted in the largest increases in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the second-lowest poverty quarters (both +\$37). The largest decreases were for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (-\$58) and the smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$54).

Unlike the pattern for the final allocations, when the hold harmless and state equity provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was lower than the allocation for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts). The allocation for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (\$1,347) was higher than the allocation for districts of all other

population sizes, which ranged from \$1,096 for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 to \$1,228 for districts with a population of less than 300. The difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$251 or 23 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless and state equity provisions resulted in increases for districts with a population of 25,000 (+\$24) and districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 (+\$7); in contrast, the largest decreases were for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$214) and districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-\$93).

Removal of Hold Harmless and Number of Formula-Eligible Children Exceeds 6,500

Removal of multiple factors can lead to a better understanding of the interaction of various Title I formula provisions and enable a more complete analysis of the implications of specific formula provisions. In FY 15, removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision reduced allocations for large districts with relatively low poverty levels (and slightly increased allocations for other districts). Removal of the hold harmless provision allowed current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocation; with the hold harmless provision, the allocations would be limited by maximum yearly reductions. Removal of both the hold harmless provision and 6,500 formula-eligible children provision provided information on the long-term impact of removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision.


When the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$991 in Idaho and \$999 in Utah to \$2,567 in Wyoming and \$2,591 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$1,600 or 162 percent (table 3.A). Since there were relatively small changes for the states with the lowest and highest allocations, this difference was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were in New York (+\$29) and New Jersey (+\$26), and the largest decreases were in Puerto Rico (-\$119) and Michigan (-\$71). Overall, 20 states and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 30 states and the District of Columbia had increases.

Similar to the final allocations and most other allocations with provisions removed, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,475) than the other locales, which ranged from \$1,068 in fringe rural areas and \$1,081 in fringe towns to \$1,249 in remote rural areas (table 3.B; figure 3.13). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$407 or 38 percent, which was slightly larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$396 or 37 percent). When the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were for midsize cities (+\$24) and midsize suburban areas (+\$16), and the largest decreases were for remote rural areas (-\$64) and distant rural areas (-\$26).

When the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,364). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,022). The Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter was \$342 or 34 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was slightly smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed, the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child increased for the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$24) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (+\$2) and decreased for the highest poverty quarter (-\$16) and the lowest poverty quarter (-\$2).

After removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions from the formulas in combination, there was a consistent pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,542) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$952 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,411 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts also had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,290) than districts of other population sizes in

Figure 3.13. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

that quarter, which ranged from \$1,105 to \$1,175. There were similar patterns for districts of different population sizes within the second-lowest and lowest poverty quarters. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions resulted in the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the largest districts (+\$34) and second-largest districts (+\$39) in the second-highest poverty quarter; the largest decreases were for the smallest

districts in the highest poverty quarter (-\$53) and the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-\$28).

In contrast to the pattern for the final allocations, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was lower than the allocation for

districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts). The allocation for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (\$1,333) was higher than the allocation for districts of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$1,110 for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 to \$1,240 for districts with a population of less than 300. The difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$224 or 20 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions resulted in the largest increases for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$10) and districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 (+\$9); in contrast, the largest decreases were for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$202), districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-\$77), and districts with a population of 600 to 999 (-\$61).

Removal of State Per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE), State Minimum, Hold Harmless, Number Weighting, and State Effort


In FY 15, removal of multiple provisions produced patterns that differed from those for the final allocations or allocations when single provisions were removed. Removal of the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) factor from the formula generally increased the allocations per formula-eligible child in lower spending states and decreased the allocations in higher spending states. Removal of the state minimum provision resulted in relatively large decreases for some states with smaller population sizes receiving the state minimum allocation. Removal of the number weighting provision had a greater negative impact on larger school districts than on smaller districts since some large but low-poverty districts benefited from the number weighting provision. Removal of the Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) state effort provision resulted in higher EFIG allocations for states with lower state effort factors and lower allocations for states with higher effort factors. Removal of the hold harmless provision allowed current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocation; with the hold harmless provision, the allocations would be limited by the maximum yearly reductions. Removal of the hold harmless provision in combination with the SPPE, state minimum, number weighting, and state effort provisions provided information on the long-term impact of removing those provisions, as the initial decreases for some districts were not restricted to the hold harmless amounts.

When the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$1,033 in New Hampshire and \$1,047 in Wyoming to \$1,320 in Mississippi and \$1,343 in Puerto Rico, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$310 or 30 percent (table 3.A). Since there were relatively large changes for the states with the lowest and highest allocations, this difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Removal of the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions resulted in large changes in the distribution of funds among states. For example, Wyoming had the second-lowest allocation with these provisions removed but had one of the highest allocations in most of the other provision removal analyses. Compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child after removal of the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were in Mississippi (+\$221) and Alabama (+\$198); the largest decreases were in Wyoming (-\$1,532), Vermont (-\$1,514), North Dakota (-\$1,409), and Alaska (-\$1,023). Overall, 26 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 24 states and Puerto Rico had increases.

Similar to the final allocations and most other allocations with provisions removed, when the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,319) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,122 for small suburban areas and \$1,151 for large suburban areas to \$1,292 for remote rural areas (table 3.B; figure 3.14). The difference between the allocations for large cities and small suburban areas was \$198 or 18 percent, which was smaller than the difference between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations for the final allocations (\$396 or 37 percent). When the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were for distant towns (+\$120), fringe rural areas (+\$110), and remote towns (+\$110); there were decreases for large cities (-\$147) and remote rural areas (-\$22).

When the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the general pattern of large cities having the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was reflected across some states,

Figure 3.14. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

but there were many exceptions (table 3.C). In 9 of the 32 states with large cities and multiple locales, large cities had the highest allocation compared with all other locales (in contrast, without the removal of these provisions, large cities had the highest allocation in 26 states). No state with multiple locales had large cities receiving the lowest Title I allocation per formula-eligible child. Midsize cities had the highest allocation in 9 states, and small cities had the highest allocation in 3 states. Similar to the final allocations,

there were relatively few states (4) in which suburban areas of any type had the highest Title I allocation per formula-eligible child compared with all other locales in the state. There were 14 states in which towns of any type had the highest allocation compared with all other locales in the state, and 11 states in which rural areas of any type had the highest allocation. In 7 of these 11 states, the highest Title I allocation per formula-eligible child was in remote rural areas.

The differences in the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations within states were generally higher for the final allocations than for the allocations when the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed from the formulas in combination. For the final allocations, the differences between the locales with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child exceeded \$1,000 in Michigan (\$1,062), New Hampshire (\$1,232), and Wyoming (\$2,146) (table 2.A). When the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed, there were no differences this large. For the final allocations, there were 20 additional states with differences of over \$500 and 2 states with differences of under \$200; when the provisions were removed, there were 12 states with differences of over \$500 and 6 states with differences of under \$200 (figure 3.15).

When the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,395) (table 3.B; figure 3.14). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$921). The Title I allocation per formula-eligible child in the highest poverty quarter was \$474 or 51 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was a larger difference than for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed, the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child increased for the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$41) and the highest poverty quarter (+\$15) and decreased for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$102) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$43).

After removal of the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions from the formulas in combination, there was a general pattern of larger districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. However, there was an exception to this pattern for districts in the highest poverty quarter. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a lower Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,360) than districts of other sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,400 to \$1,411. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had higher allocations (\$1,202) than


districts with smaller population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,176 to \$1,201. There were similar patterns for the second-lowest and lowest poverty quarters. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions resulted in the largest increases in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the second-smallest districts (+\$127) and smallest districts (+\$120) in the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, the largest decreases were for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (-\$180) and the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-\$163).

Unlike the pattern for the final allocations, when the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was lower than the allocation for districts of most other population sizes. The allocation for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$1,265) was higher than the allocation for districts of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$1,182 for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 and districts with a population of less than 300 to \$1,205 for districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999. The difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest Title I allocations per formula-eligible child was \$83 or 7 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions resulted in the largest increases in Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (+\$75), districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 (+\$65), and districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 (+\$61); in contrast, the largest decreases were for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$260), districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-\$74), and districts with a population of 25,000 or more (-\$58).

Removal of State Minimum and Hold Harmless

Removal of multiple provisions produced patterns that differed from those for the final allocations with single provisions removed. The state minimum provision provided a minimum dollar allocation threshold for each state. Removal of the state minimum provision resulted in relatively large decreases for some states with small population sizes receiving the state minimum allocation.

Figure 3.15. Title I, Part A total allocation per formula-eligible child and difference between school district locales with the highest and lowest allocations after removal of state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions, by state or jurisdiction: 2015



NOTE: The school district locales receiving the highest and lowest allocations vary by state or jurisdiction.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Removal of the hold harmless provision allowed current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocation; with the hold harmless provision, the allocations would be limited by the maximum yearly reductions. Removal of the hold harmless in conjunction with the state minimum provision also allowed the state minimum provision removal to reflect a long-term perspective.

When the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$982 in Idaho and \$988 in South Dakota to \$1,651 in New York and \$1,746 in the District of Columbia, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$763 or 78 percent (table 3.A). Since there were relatively large changes for the states with the highest allocations, this difference was less than half of the difference for the final allocations (\$1,606 or 163 percent). Compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child after removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were in Maryland (+\$42) and New York (+\$39), and the largest decreases were in North Dakota (-\$1,358), Wyoming (-\$1,250), and Vermont (-\$1,247). Overall, 20 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 30 states had increases.


Similar to the final allocations and most other allocations with provisions removed, when the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, large cities had a higher total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,484) than all other locales, which ranged from \$1,066 for fringe rural areas and \$1,079 for fringe towns to \$1,248 for midsize cities (table 3.B; figure 3.16). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$417 or 39 percent, which was slightly larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$396 or 37 percent). When the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were for midsize cities (+\$25) and large cities (+\$18), and the largest decreases were for remote rural areas (-\$159) and remote towns (-\$48).

When the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the highest poverty quarter had the highest total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,368). School districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$1,014). The Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter was \$354 or 35 percent

higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was about the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$357 or 35 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed, the Title I allocation per formula-eligible child increased for the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$25); in contrast, there were decreases for the highest poverty quarter (-\$13), the lowest poverty quarter (-\$10), and the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$4).

After removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions from the formulas in combination, there was a consistent pattern of the largest districts in each poverty quarter having higher total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which was similar to the pattern for the final allocations. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$1,553) than smaller districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all population sizes, which ranged from \$942 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$1,417 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. In the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Title I allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,299) than smaller districts in that quarter, which ranged from \$1,107 to \$1,180. There were similar patterns for districts of different population sizes in the second-lowest and lowest poverty quarters. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions resulted in the largest increases in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child for the second-largest districts (+\$44) and largest districts (+\$42) in the second-highest poverty quarter; in contrast, the largest decreases were for the smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-\$67) and the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (-\$62).

Unlike the pattern for the final allocations, when the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the total Title I allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was lower than for districts of other population sizes. The allocation for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$1,345) was higher than the allocations for districts of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$1,098 for districts with a population of less than 300 to \$1,150 for districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999. The difference between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations per formula-eligible child was \$247 or 23 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$334 or 30 percent). Compared

Figure 3.16. Title I, Part A total final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state minimum and hold harmless provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions resulted in the largest increase for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$22) and the largest decreases for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$344), districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-\$149), and districts with a population of 600 to 999 (-\$102).

Cost Adjustment Using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI)

When the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) was applied, the relative total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child in low-cost areas increased and the allocations in high-cost areas decreased. Applying the ACS-CWI increased the difference in the Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the highest and lowest allocations. The cost-adjusted final allocations ranged from \$3,016 in Vermont to \$1,028 in California, a difference of \$1,988, which was \$381 more than the difference for the unadjusted final allocations (table 3.AA).

Applying the ACS-CWI increased the relative value of the funding for areas with lower costs of living. After the cost adjustment, the total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$1,161 in large suburban areas to \$1,620 in remote rural areas; the second-highest cost-adjusted allocation was in large cities (\$1,421) (table 3.BB). When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the cost-adjusted allocations ranged from \$1,119 in fringe towns to \$1,473 in large cities.

Applying the ACS-CWI resulted in a larger difference in the total Title I final allocations per formula-eligible child between the highest and lowest poverty quarters. After cost adjustment, the Title I final allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$1,044 for the lowest poverty quarter to

\$1,440 for the highest poverty quarter, a difference of \$396 (compared with a difference of \$357 for the unadjusted allocations). When the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, the difference in the Title I allocations between school districts in the lowest poverty quarter (\$941) and the highest poverty quarter (\$1,472) was \$531 (compared with a difference of \$474 for the unadjusted allocations).

Across most of the formula analyses, the cost-adjusted total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were higher for smaller districts than for larger districts. For example, when the hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 provisions were removed from the formulas in combination, districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had the highest cost-adjusted allocation (\$1,495), and districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 had the lowest cost-adjusted allocation (\$1,216).

The total Title I allocations per formula-eligible child were analyzed by locale and state after the SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort provisions were removed from the formulas in combination. After applying the ACS-CWI, the changes in patterns across the locales were reflected across many states. In 15 of the 43 states with remote rural areas, remote rural areas had the highest cost-adjusted Title I allocation per formula-eligible child compared with any other locale (table 3.CC). Large cities had the highest cost-adjusted allocation in 2 states (compared with 9 states for the unadjusted allocations). Applying the ACS-CWI also increased the differences in the Title I allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations in many states. The number of states with differences of \$500 or more increased from 12 to 29.

Basic Grants—Formula Analyses

Basic Grants are the largest of the four Title I grants and accounted for 45 percent of Title I funds in fiscal year 2015 (FY 15) (table 1.A). Basic Grants are less targeted to the highest poverty districts than the other Title I grants. To qualify for a Basic Grant, a district must have at least 10 formula-eligible children ages 5–17, and that number

must exceed 2 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population. In FY 15, Basic Grants had the highest number of formula-eligible children (11.6 million), and the average Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$550 (all allocations herein are averages) (table 4.A).

Highlights

- Utah and Florida had the lowest Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the final allocations and had among the lowest allocations when single or multiple provisions were removed from the formula (table 4.A). Vermont received the highest or among the highest allocations both for the final allocations and for most allocations when single or multiple provisions were removed. For example, when the state minimum provision was removed, the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$463 in Utah and \$466 in Florida to \$978 in Wyoming and \$995 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$532 or 115 percent.
- The Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was higher for remote rural areas than all other locales in most formula analyses, except when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula or the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed in combination (table 4.B). Similar to the final allocations, when the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) and hold harmless provisions were removed in combination, remote rural areas received a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$577) than all other locales, which ranged from \$546 in large suburban areas to \$562 in remote towns (figure 4.5).
- In most of the analyses where single or multiple provisions were removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter had the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, and the second-highest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation (table 4.B). When the state minimum provision was removed, the lowest poverty quarter received the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$601). The allocation was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$521) (figure 4.3).
- Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than smaller districts in that quarter, except when the SPPE and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination (table 4.B). In other poverty quarters, the smallest districts generally had the highest allocations in each quarter. For example, when the state minimum provision was removed, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$575) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$551 for the smallest districts to \$555 for the second-largest districts. In contrast, in the other poverty quarters, the largest districts had a lower allocation than districts of other population sizes in each quarter.
- The highest Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child was in the smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (\$662), while the lowest allocation was in the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$491), a difference of \$171 (table 4.B). This general pattern of the highest and lowest allocations was consistent across all formula analyses.
- Districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than districts with larger population sizes for most allocations involving the removal of single or multiple provisions. Except when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had the lowest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (table 4.B; figure 4.2). For example, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was highest for the smallest districts (\$661) and lowest for the largest districts (\$534) (figure 4.3).

Formula Alternatives

Basic Grants have fewer formula provisions than other Title I grants (see Introduction, Methodology for Allocating Federal Title I Funds). Since there are fewer provisions in the Basic Grant formula, a smaller range of formula alternatives are examined in this chapter compared with Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Similar to other Title I grants, Basic Grant allocations were computed using the formula-eligibility criteria only as well as alternatives that exclude the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, and hold harmless provisions. When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocation computations were essentially made on a per eligible child basis, so the differences in Basic Grant allocations and Concentration Grant allocations among school districts of various types were smaller than those observed under other alternatives. There are no weighting provisions for Basic Grants as there are for Targeted Grants and EFIG. When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the same expenditure per student was used for each state, and there were no minimum and maximum thresholds. In general, removal of the SPPE provision meant that states with lower expenditures per student received higher allocations, while states with higher expenditures per student received lower allocations. Excluding the state minimum provision meant that states with smaller population sizes typically received lower allocations since there was no minimum threshold on funding levels.

The hold harmless provision limits the amount of a decrease for a district from one year to the next due to population changes. It is important to note that unless a formula provision is removed in conjunction with the hold harmless provision, the long-term impact of removing the other provision may not be fully reflected in the resulting allocation. So, when a provision such as the state minimum is removed from the formula and the hold harmless provision is maintained, the districts in the state are limited to a reduction of no more than 15 percent per year. The national Title I funding level was the same across all alternatives. Since the allocation was based on a fixed appropriation amount, increases or decreases for some districts had to be matched by increases or decreases for others. For example, maintaining hold harmless amounts for some districts meant that some other districts with increases in formula-eligible children did not receive additional funding.

Two combinations of provision removals are analyzed in this chapter, both including removal of the hold harmless provision, which provides an example of the long-term

impact of removal of other provisions. One combination looks at removal of the SPPE and hold harmless provisions, and the other combination looks at removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions.

Formula-Eligibility Criteria Only


In FY 15, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered for Basic Grants, the ranges across most school district characteristics remained small (similar to the pattern for Concentration Grants) compared with the larger differences for Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). For the formula-eligibility criteria for Targeted Grants and EFIG, the number weighting and percentage weighting provisions were retained, which contributed to larger differences for these grants. When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the range in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child across states was narrower than the range for the final allocations. The hold harmless provision was not applied when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$550 for all states (table 4.A). Compared with the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the largest decreases were in Vermont (-\$571) and Wyoming (-\$555); the largest increases were in Utah (+\$88) and Florida (+\$85), the two states with the lowest final allocations and also the two states with the largest increases resulting from removal of the SPPE provision. Overall, 27 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 23 states and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$550 for all locales (table 4.B; figure 4.1). Compared with the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, midsize cities had the largest increase (+\$18), and remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$34).

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$550 for districts of every population size in every poverty quarter. Compared with the final allocations, applying only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in the largest increase (+\$59) for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$112) for the smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

Figure 4.1. Title I, Part A Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation when only formula-eligibility criteria were considered, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

² Basic Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 and at least 2 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$550 for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of all sizes. This range of less than \$1 contrasts with the range of \$139 among the districts of different population sizes for the final allocations. Compared with the final allocations, applying only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in

the largest decrease (-\$123) for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts); other districts with populations under 10,000 had smaller decreases. In contrast, districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 had an increase of \$8 in their Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, and districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had an increase of \$17.

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE)

When the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision was removed from the formula, the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child increased in lower spending states and decreased in higher spending states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline were redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the Basic Grant allocations ranged from \$512 in Tennessee and Utah to \$1,105 in Wyoming and \$1,121 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$609 or 119 percent (table 4.A). This difference was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$659 or 143 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the largest increases in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in Utah (+\$50) and Florida (+\$48), and the largest decreases were in Massachusetts (-\$113) and New Jersey (-\$97). Overall, 26 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 24 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, remote rural areas received a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$584) than all other locales, which ranged from \$537 for midsize cities to \$570 for large cities (table 4.B; figure 4.2). The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and midsize cities was \$47 or 9 percent, which was slightly smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$52 or 10 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child increased by \$8 for large cities and by \$6 for remote towns; the largest decreases were for small suburban areas (-\$15) and fringe towns (-\$11).


When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the highest and lowest poverty quarters received the highest

Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child (both \$563). This pattern contrasted with the patterns for the final allocations and allocations with most other provisions removed, where the lowest poverty quarters had the highest allocations. The Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$531). When the SPPE provision was removed, the allocation for both the highest and lowest poverty quarters was \$32 or 6 percent higher than the allocation for the second-highest poverty quarter, which was smaller than the difference between the poverty quarters with the highest and lowest allocations for the final allocations (\$84 or 16 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, there were decreases in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$42) and for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$5); in contrast, there were increases for the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$10) and for the highest poverty quarter (+\$5).

Similar to the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, there was no consistent pattern regarding Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$577) than districts of all other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$555 in the second-smallest districts to \$561 in the second-largest districts. In contrast, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a lower Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$518) than districts of all other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$530 in the second-largest districts to \$576 in the smallest districts. In the lowest poverty quarter, the smallest districts had a higher allocation (\$602) compared with districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$32) for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$64) for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. Similar to the final allocations, districts with populations under 5,000 had higher allocations than districts with populations of 5,000 or more. The highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 (\$664), and the

Figure 4.2. Title I, Part A Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

² A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$597). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 (\$542). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in lower allocations for districts with populations of under 10,000, with the largest decrease being for districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499 (-\$22). There was an

increase of \$13 for districts with populations of 25,000 or more (the largest districts). The difference in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$123 or 23 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$139 or 26 percent).

Removal of State Minimum

The state minimum provision provides a minimum allocation threshold for each state. When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child did not increase by more than \$2 in any state but decreased substantially for the 6 states—and the District of Columbia—receiving state minimum allocations (figure I.3; table 4.A). It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, North Dakota's Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child decreased by \$151, Wyoming's decreased by \$127, Vermont's decreased by \$126, Alaska's decreased by \$97, South Dakota's decreased by \$71, New Hampshire's decreased by \$67, and the District of Columbia's decreased by \$39 (table 4.A). The allocations ranged from \$463 in Utah and \$466 in Florida to \$978 in Wyoming and \$995 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$532 or 115 percent, which was less than the difference for the final allocations (\$659 or 143 percent).


Similar to the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, remote rural areas received a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$577) than all other locales, which ranged from \$532 for midsize cities to \$563 for small suburban areas (table 4.B; figure 4.3). The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and midsize cities was \$44 or 8 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$52 or 10 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, remote rural areas (-\$7) and remote towns (-\$4) had the largest decreases in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child; the changes for all other locales were \$1 or less.

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter received the

highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$601). Districts with higher poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$521). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, there was a decrease of \$3 in the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter, while the changes for all other poverty quarters were \$1 or less. When the state minimum provision was removed, the difference between the allocations for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$521) and lowest poverty quarter (\$601) was \$80 or 15 percent, which was slightly smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$84 or 16 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, there was no consistent pattern regarding Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$575) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$551 for the smallest districts to \$555 for the second-largest districts. In contrast, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a lower allocation (\$492) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$519 for the second-largest districts to \$609 for the smallest districts. Also, the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter had lower allocations than districts of other population sizes within each quarter. Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, there were differences of \$1 or less in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for every population size in both the highest and second-highest poverty quarters. Within the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest difference was a decrease of \$3 for the smallest districts, and within the lowest poverty quarter, there were decreases ranging from \$1 for the largest districts to \$7 for the smallest districts. The range in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child (\$24 or 4 percent) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was nearly the same as the range for the final allocations (\$23 or 4 percent).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$661), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$604). Also similar to the pattern for the final allocations, districts of larger population sizes had

Figure 4.3. Title I, Part A Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with minimum provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

progressively lower allocations; the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$534). After removal of the state minimum provision, the difference in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$128 or 24 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$139 or 26 percent). Compared with the

final allocations, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in lower allocations for districts with populations under 5,000, ranging from a decrease of less than \$1 for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 to a decrease of \$11 for districts with a population of less than 300. Increases for districts with populations of 5,000 or more were \$1 or less.

Removal of Hold Harmless

Removal of the hold harmless provision allows current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocations; with the hold harmless provision, the allocations are limited by the maximum yearly reductions. Removal of the hold harmless provision permits reductions of over 15 percent for school districts that may have decreases or smaller increases in the number of formula-eligible children compared with other districts.

After removal of the hold harmless provision from the formula, the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$472 in 12 states and Puerto Rico to \$1,105 in Wyoming and \$1,121 in Vermont, a difference of \$649 or 137 percent (table 4.A). This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$659 or 143 percent) because the value for Utah and Florida at the bottom of the range increased. Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, the largest increases in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in Rhode Island (+\$14) and New York (+\$12), and the largest decreases were in Puerto Rico (-\$64) and Michigan (-\$31). Overall, 20 states and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 30 states and the District of Columbia had no changes or increases.

When the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, small suburban areas received a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$568) than all other locales, which ranged from \$535 for fringe rural areas and \$538 for midsize cities to \$562 for large cities and remote rural areas (table 4.B; figure 4.4). The difference between the allocations for small suburban areas and fringe rural areas was \$33 or 6 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$52 or 10 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, midsize suburban areas had the largest increase in the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (+\$7), and midsize cities had the second-largest increase (+\$6); in contrast, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$21), and distant rural areas had the second-largest decrease (-\$6).


When the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter received the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$613). Districts with higher poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$528) and second lowest for the highest poverty quarter (\$548). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was

removed, there were increases in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter (+\$8), the second-lowest poverty quarter (+\$6), and the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$8). In contrast, there was a decrease for the highest poverty quarter (-\$10). When the hold harmless provision was removed, the difference between the allocations for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$528) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$613) was \$84 or 16 percent, which was the same as the difference for the final allocations.

Similar to the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, there was no consistent pattern regarding Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$565) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$530 in the smallest districts to \$551 in the second-largest districts. In contrast, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a lower Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$500) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$528 in the second-largest districts to \$611 in the smallest districts. Also, the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter had lower allocations than districts of other population sizes within each quarter.

Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the largest decreases in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were for the smallest districts (-\$21) and largest districts (-\$9) in the highest poverty quarter. The largest increases were for the largest districts and second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (both +\$12). The range in Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$36 or 7 percent) was larger than the range for the final allocations (\$23 or 4 percent).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. Similar to the final allocations, districts of larger population sizes had progressively lower allocations. The highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 (\$599), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$585).

Figure 4.4. Title I, Part A Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$535). After removal of the hold harmless provision, the difference in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$64 or 12 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$139 or 26 percent). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold

harmless provision resulted in lower allocations for districts with smaller population sizes. The largest decreases were for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$74) and districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-\$24), and the largest increases were for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 and districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 (both +\$3).

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE) and Hold Harmless

Removal of multiple provisions produces results that differ in pattern or magnitude from those for the final allocations or allocations with single provisions removed. Removal of the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision increased the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child in lower spending states and decreased the allocation in higher spending states. Removal of the hold harmless provision allowed the removal of the SPPE provision to have a full impact on the allocations and enabled the full impact of current provisions and recent changes in the number of formula-eligible children that had been limited by the hold harmless provision. Removal of the hold harmless provision permitted reductions of over 15 percent for school districts that may have had decreases or smaller increases in the number of formula-eligible children compared with other districts.

When removing the SPPE and hold harmless provisions from the formula in combination, the Basic Grant allocations ranged from \$546 in 39 states and Puerto Rico to \$1,105 in Wyoming and \$1,121 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$575 or 105 percent (table 4.A). This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$659 or 143 percent) because of the increase for districts at the bottom of the range. Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE and hold harmless provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in Utah (+\$84) and Florida (+\$81), and the largest decreases were in Pennsylvania (-\$162) and Connecticut (-\$161). Overall, 27 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 23 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.


Similar to the final allocations, when the SPPE and the hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas received a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$577) than all other locales, which ranged from \$546 for large suburban areas to \$562 for remote towns (table 4.B; figure 4.5). The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and large suburban areas was \$30 or 6 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$52 or 10 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE and hold harmless provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were for remote towns (+\$21) and midsize cities (+\$16), and the largest decreases were for large cities (-\$13) and small suburban areas (-\$10).

The Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were analyzed by locale and state, after the SPPE and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, leaving only the state minimum provision in the formula. Thus, every eligible district that was not in a state minimum state received a Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child of \$546, regardless of locale (table 4.C; figure 4.6). States that were eligible for the state minimum allocation had higher Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child than states that were not eligible, but no differences by locale existed among states receiving the state minimum allocation. As a result, every locale within the same state had the same allocation. Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$546 in the majority of states to \$1,076 in North Dakota, \$1,105 in Wyoming, and \$1,121 in Vermont.

When the SPPE and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$547) and highest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$562) (table 4.B; figure 4.5). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE and hold harmless provisions were removed, there were decreases in the allocations for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$43) and the highest poverty quarter (-\$10); in contrast, there were increases for the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$27) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (+\$6). After the removal of the SPPE and hold harmless provisions, the difference between the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the poverty quarters with the highest and lowest allocations was \$14 or 3 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$84 or 16 percent). This smaller difference was primarily due to the decrease in the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter compared with the final allocation (-\$43) and the increase in the allocation for the second-highest poverty quarter compared with the final allocation (+\$27).

When the SPPE and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, there was a general pattern regarding Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. The smallest districts in each of the poverty quarters generally had a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than districts of other population sizes in each quarter. The only exception was in the highest poverty quarter, where the second-largest districts had a slightly higher allocation (\$550) than the smallest districts (\$549), and districts of other sizes in the poverty quarter had lower allocations. The smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter had the highest allocation

Figure 4.5. Title I, Part A Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) and hold harmless provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).


SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

(\$574) compared with districts of other sizes in that quarter or across any of the other poverty and population size quarters.

Compared with the final allocations, after removal of the SPPE and hold harmless provisions from the formula in combination, there were a variety of changes affecting the largest and smallest districts within the poverty quarters differently. Within the highest poverty quarter, there were decreases for districts of all population sizes, with the

largest districts having the largest decrease (-\$28); within the lowest poverty quarter, there were also decreases for districts of all population sizes, but the smallest districts had the largest decrease (-\$87). Within the second-highest and second-lowest poverty quarters, there were increases for districts of some population sizes and decreases for others. Within the second-highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had the largest increase (+\$52); within the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts also had the largest increase (+\$55). After removal of the

Figure 4.6. Title I, Part A Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child and difference between school district locales with the highest and lowest allocations after removal of state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) and hold harmless provisions, by state or jurisdiction: 2015



¹ Data for North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming have been excluded from this figure because these states have outliers.
NOTE: The school district locales receiving the highest and lowest allocations vary by state or jurisdiction.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

SPPE and hold harmless provisions, the range in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$4 or 1 percent) was smaller than the range for the final allocations (\$23 or 4 percent).

When the SPPE and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. Similar to the final allocations, districts with populations of 2,500 or more had lower allocations than districts with populations under 2,500. The highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 (\$598), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$573). The lowest allocations were for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$547). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE and hold harmless provisions resulted in decreases for districts with populations under 10,000 and increases for districts with populations of 10,000 or more. The largest increase in the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$14), and the largest decrease was for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$74). After removal of the SPPE and hold harmless provisions, the difference in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$50 or 9 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$139 or 26 percent).


Removal of State Minimum and Hold Harmless

Removal of multiple provisions produces patterns that differ from those for the final allocations or allocations with single provisions removed. The state minimum provision provides a minimum allocation threshold for each state. When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child did not increase by more than \$1 in any state but decreased substantially for the 7 jurisdictions receiving state minimum allocations (table I.D; table 4.A). Removal of the hold harmless provision allowed removal of the state minimum provision to have a full impact on the allocations, and it enabled the full impact of current provisions and recent changes in the number of formula-eligible children that had been limited by the hold harmless provision. Removal of the hold harmless provision permitted reductions of over 15 percent for school districts that may have had decreases or smaller increases in the number of formula-eligible children compared with other districts.

When the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, North Dakota's Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child decreased by \$476, Vermont's decreased by \$409, Wyoming's decreased by \$393, South Dakota's decreased by \$206, Alaska's decreased by \$205, New Hampshire's decreased by \$141, the District of Columbia's decreased by \$63, and Puerto Rico's decreased by \$62. The allocations ranged from \$474 in 14 states to \$712 in 14 states and the District of Columbia (table 4.A). This range of \$237 or 50 percent was smaller than the range for the final allocations (\$659 or 143 percent). Overall, 17 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 33 states had no changes or increases.

When the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, small suburban areas received a higher Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$567) than all other locales, which ranged from \$527 for remote towns to \$564 for large cities (table 4.B; figure 4.7); this pattern contrasted with the pattern for the final allocations. The difference between the allocations for small suburban areas and remote towns was \$40 or 8 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$52 or 10 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were for midsize cities and midsize suburban areas (both +\$7), and the largest decreases were for remote rural areas (-\$45) and remote towns (-\$14).

When the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$530) and highest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$605). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed, there was a decrease in the allocation for the highest poverty quarter (-\$8); in contrast, there were increases for the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$9), the second-lowest poverty quarter (+\$4), and lowest poverty quarter (less than +\$1). After the removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions, the difference between the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the poverty quarters with the highest and lowest allocations was \$75 or 14 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$84 or 16 percent). This smaller difference was primarily due to the increase in the allocation for the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$9).

Figure 4.7. Title I, Part A Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with minimum and hold harmless provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Similar to the final allocations and most other allocations with provisions removed, when the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, there was a general pattern regarding Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the second-highest, second-lowest, and lowest poverty quarters with respect to district population size. In the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a higher allocation (\$568) than districts of other population sizes within that quarter, which ranged from \$529 for the smallest districts to \$553 for the second-largest districts. In the second-highest,

second-lowest, and lowest poverty quarters, the smallest districts had the highest allocations. For example, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the smallest districts had a higher allocation (\$603) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$503 for the largest districts to \$572 for the second-largest districts. The smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter had the highest allocation (\$641) compared with districts of other sizes in that quarter or across any of the other poverty and population size quarters.

Compared with the final allocations, after removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions from the formula in combination, there were a variety of changes affecting large and small districts within the poverty quarters differently. Within the highest poverty quarter, there were decreases for districts of all sizes, with the smallest districts having the largest decrease (-\$22); within the lowest poverty quarter, the smallest districts also had the largest decrease (-\$21), but districts of other population sizes had increases. Within the second-highest and second-lowest poverty quarters, there were increases for districts of some population sizes and decreases for others. Within the second-highest poverty quarter, the second-largest districts had the largest increase (+\$13); within the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts had the largest increase (+\$12). After removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions, the range in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$39 or 7 percent) was larger than the range for the final allocations (\$23 or 4 percent).

When the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was highest for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 1,000 to 2,499 (\$576), in contrast to the pattern of the smallest districts receiving the highest allocation in the final allocation and allocations with other provisions removed. The second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 600 to 999 (\$571). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$537). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions resulted in decreases for districts with populations under 5,000 and increases for districts with populations of 5,000 or more. The largest increases in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 and districts with a population of 25,000 or more (both +\$4), and the largest decrease was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (-\$112). After removal of the state minimum and hold harmless provisions, the difference in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$39 or 7 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$139 or 26 percent).

Cost Adjustment Using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI)

Adjusting the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) increased the relative value of allocations in low-cost areas and decreased the relative value of allocations in high-cost areas. Vermont continued to receive the highest Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$1,302) after the cost adjustment, but the state with the lowest cost-adjusted final allocation was California (\$461), a difference of \$841 (the difference between the highest and lowest allocations before the cost adjustment was \$659, with Utah receiving the lowest allocation (\$462) (table 4.AA). Removing the state minimum and hold harmless provisions from the formula in combination resulted in a difference of \$380 between the states with the highest and lowest cost-adjusted Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child (from \$468 in California to \$848 in Maine), the smallest difference of any of the formula analyses (except when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered) after the cost adjustment.

When the allocations were cost adjusted and the state minimum and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter had the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$616), and the highest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation (\$576) (table 4.BB). However, when these provisions were removed, the \$41 difference between the cost-adjusted allocations was smaller than the difference for the unadjusted allocations (\$55).

Applying the ACS-CWI increased the differences in the Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations. For example, the cost-adjusted Basic Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$719 for remote rural areas to \$545 for large cities, a difference of \$174 (compared with a difference of \$52 for the unadjusted final allocations, with midsize cities receiving the lowest allocation). When the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the difference was \$148 (compared with a difference of \$33 for the unadjusted allocations).

The difference in the Basic Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the smallest and largest districts (\$268) increased after the ACS-CWI was applied (the difference between the unadjusted allocations was \$139). This increase was primarily because of the relative increase in the cost-adjusted final allocation for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts), due to their relatively lower cost of living. After removing the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) and hold harmless provisions, the difference was \$167 (districts with a population of less than 300 had an allocation of \$721 and districts with a population of 25,000 or more [the largest districts] had an allocation of \$554).

When the allocations were cost adjusted, the smallest districts in each of the poverty quarters had the highest Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child in all of the formula analyses. For example, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the smallest districts in the

second-lowest poverty quarter had the highest Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$666), compared with the lowest allocation of \$527 for the largest districts in that quarter.

When analyzed by locale and state, the majority of states had an unadjusted Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child of \$546 when the SPPE and hold harmless provisions were removed from the formula in combination (table 4.C). However, after applying the ACS-CWI, there was substantial variation in the allocations. The cost-adjusted Basic Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$506 in California, \$510 in New Jersey, and \$511 in Connecticut to \$1,231 in North Dakota, \$1,260 in Wyoming, and \$1,302 in Vermont (table 4.CC). In 22 states, the highest cost-adjusted Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for remote rural areas; large or midsize cities did not receive the highest allocations in any states.

Concentration Grants—Formula Analyses

The Concentration Grants program is the smallest of the four Title I grants. To qualify for a Concentration Grant, a school district must meet the Basic Grant eligibility requirements and have at least 6,500 formula-eligible children ages 5–17, or more than 15 percent of its 5- to 17-year-old population must be formula eligible. Concentration Grants accounted for approximately

\$1.3 billion (9 percent) of Title I funds in fiscal year 2015 (FY 15) (table 1.A). Concentration Grants had the smallest number of formula-eligible children (10.1 million), and the average Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$134 in FY 15 (all allocations herein are averages).

Highlights

- Florida had the lowest or among the lowest Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child both for the final allocations and for most allocations when single or multiple provisions were removed from the formula (table 5.A). Wyoming received the highest or among the highest allocations both for the final allocations and for most allocations when single or multiple provisions were removed. For example, after removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision, the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$110 in Utah and \$111 in Florida and North Carolina to \$590 in North Dakota and \$871 in Wyoming, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$761 or 692 percent.
- The Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was higher for remote rural areas than all other locales in most allocation analyses involving the removal of single or multiple provisions (table 5.B); this pattern contrasted with the pattern for Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Similar to the final allocations, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, remote rural areas received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$151) than all other locales, which ranged from \$127 for midsize suburban areas and \$128 for midsize cities to \$146 for small suburban areas (figure 5.5).
- In all the analyses involving the removal of single provisions, the lowest poverty quarter had the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, and the second-highest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation (table 5.B). For example, when the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision was removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter had the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$200), and the second-highest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation (\$125) (figure 5.2).
- Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts, with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more, had a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than smaller districts in that quarter, except when the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula (table 5.B). This pattern was not consistent in other poverty quarters. In the majority of the formula analyses, the smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter had the highest allocations across all of the poverty and population size quarters. For example, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$176 for the smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter to \$117 for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter.
- Districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than districts with larger population sizes for all allocations involving the removal of single or multiple provisions. Except when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had the lowest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (table 5.B). For example, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was highest for the smallest districts (\$191) and lowest for the largest districts (\$131) (figure 5.2).

Formula Alternatives

Concentration Grants share some of the same formula provisions as Basic Grants but have additional eligibility provisions designed to provide higher levels of funding to school districts with large numbers or large percentages of formula-eligible children (see Introduction, Methodology for Allocating Federal Title I Funds). In this chapter, a larger range of formula alternatives are examined compared with the Basic Grants chapter due to the additional eligibility provisions in the Concentration Grant formula. Similar to Basic Grants and the other Title I grants, allocations were computed using the formula-eligibility criteria only as well as alternatives that exclude the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, and hold harmless provisions. When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocation computations were essentially made on a per eligible child basis, so the differences in Basic Grant allocations and Concentration Grant allocations among districts of various types were smaller than those observed under other alternatives. There are no weighting provisions for Concentration Grants as there are for Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the same expenditure per student was used for each state, and there were no minimum and maximum thresholds. In general, removal of the SPPE provision meant that states with lower expenditures per student received higher allocations, while states with higher expenditures per student received lower allocations. Removing the state minimum provision meant that states with smaller populations typically received lower allocations since there was no minimum threshold on funding levels.

The Concentration Grant formula includes two eligibility criteria that are different from the other Title I grants. The Concentration Grant formula has no minimum number of students required to receive an allocation, while the other grant formulas require a minimum number of students (10) in order to receive an allocation. For Concentration Grants, districts with more than 6,500 formula-eligible children receive an allocation regardless of their poverty level. Rather than requiring 5 percent or more (as is the case for Targeted Grants and EFIG) or 2 percent or more (as is the case for Basic Grants) of the 5- to 17-year-old population to be formula eligible, Concentration Grants require more than 15 percent of the population to be formula eligible in order to receive an allocation. These two eligibility criteria, which are specific to Concentration Grants, are examined in this chapter. Removal of the provision that requires the number of formula-eligible children to exceed 6,500 (herein referred to as the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision) reduced the allocations for large districts with relatively low

poverty levels (and slightly increased allocations for districts with higher poverty levels). Removal of the provision that requires the percentage of formula-eligible children to exceed 15 percent of total 5- to 17-year-old population (herein referred to as the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision) increased allocations for large districts that benefited from the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision.

The hold harmless provision limits the amount of a decrease for a district from one year to the next due to population changes. It is important to note that unless a formula provision is removed in conjunction with the hold harmless provision, the long-term impact of removing the other provision may not be fully reflected in the resulting allocation. So, when a provision such as the state minimum provision is removed from the formula and the hold harmless provision is maintained, the districts in the state are limited to a reduction of no more than 15 percent per year. The national Title I funding level was the same across all alternatives. Since the allocation was based on a fixed appropriation amount, increases or decreases for some districts had to be matched by increases or decreases for others. For example, maintaining hold harmless amounts for some districts meant that some other districts with increases in formula-eligible children did not receive additional funding.

Two combinations of provision removals are analyzed in this chapter, both including removal of the hold harmless provision. The first combination looks at removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions. The second combination looks at removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions.

Formula-Eligibility Criteria Only

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered for Concentration Grants, the ranges across most school district characteristics remained small compared with the larger differences for Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). For the formula-eligibility criteria for Targeted Grants and EFIG, the number weighting and percentage weighting provisions were retained, which contributed to larger differences for these grants. When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the range in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child across states was narrower than the range for the final allocations. The hold harmless provision was not considered for the formula-eligibility criteria only allocation.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$134 for most states, with slightly higher allocations for some states (up to \$137) (table 5.A). Compared with the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the largest decreases were in North Dakota (-\$454) and Wyoming (-\$736); the largest increases were in Tennessee (+\$22), Utah (+\$22), and Florida (+\$23), the three states with the lowest final allocations. Overall, 29 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 21 states had no changes or increases.


When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$134 for most locales, with a slightly higher allocation of \$136 for fringe towns (table 5.B; figure 5.1). Compared with the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, midsize suburban areas had the largest increase (+\$7), and remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$17).

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, districts of almost every population size in every poverty

quarter received the same Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$134). The allocation was slightly higher for the second-smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$135). Compared with the final allocations, applying only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in the largest increase (+\$17) for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$41) for the smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$134 for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of all sizes. This range of less than \$1 among the districts of different population sizes contrasts with the range of \$65 for the final allocations. Compared with the final allocations, applying only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in the largest decrease (-\$60) for districts with population of less than 300 (the smallest districts); other districts with populations under 10,000 had smaller decreases. In contrast, districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 had an increase of \$1 in their Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, and districts with a population of 25,000 or more had an increase of \$5.

Figure 5.1. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation when only formula-eligibility criteria were considered, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

² Concentration Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 6,500 or 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE)

When the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision was removed from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child increased in lower spending states and decreased in higher spending states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline were redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the largest increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in Utah (+\$10) and Florida (+\$9), and the largest decreases were in Massachusetts (-\$25) and New Jersey (-\$19) (table 5.A). The allocations ranged from \$120 in Florida and Nevada to \$588 in North Dakota and \$865 in Wyoming, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$746 or 623 percent. This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$761 or 691 percent). Overall, 29 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 21 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.


When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, remote rural areas received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$150) than all other locales, which ranged from \$127 for midsize cities and \$128 for midsize suburban areas to \$143 for fringe towns (table 5.B; figure 5.2). The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and midsize cities was

\$23 or 18 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$24 or 19 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, the differences in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child by locale were relatively small, with no differences over \$4.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter received the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$200). Districts with higher poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$125). The allocation for the lowest poverty quarter was \$76 or 61 percent higher than the allocation for the second-highest poverty quarter, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$93 or 75 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$16 lower for the lowest poverty quarter and \$2 lower for the second-lowest poverty quarter; in contrast, there was an increase of \$1 for the second-highest poverty quarter and an increase of less than \$1 for the highest poverty quarter.

Similar to the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, there was no consistent pattern regarding Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$141) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$131 for the second-smallest districts to \$134 for the second-largest districts. In contrast, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts (\$124) had a lower Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$140 for the second-largest districts to \$167 for the smallest districts. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$6) for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$16) for the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

Figure 5.2. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

² A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, districts of larger population sizes had progressively lower allocations. The highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts

with a population of less than 300 (\$191), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$158). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$131). The difference in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$60, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$65). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE

provision resulted in lower allocations for districts with populations under 10,000 (ranging from -\$2 to -\$4) and a higher allocation for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$2).

Removal of State Minimum

The state minimum provision provides a minimum allocation threshold for each state. When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child did not increase by more than \$1 in any state but decreased substantially for the 3 states receiving state minimum allocations (figure I.3). It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, North Dakota's Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child decreased by \$37, South Dakota's decreased by \$26 and Vermont's decreased by \$19 (table 5.A). The allocations ranged from \$110 in Florida and \$112 in Tennessee, Nevada, Utah, and North Carolina to \$871 in Wyoming, a difference of \$761 or 690 percent, which was nearly the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$761 or 691 percent). Overall, 3 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 47 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.


Similar to the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, remote rural areas received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$150) than the other locales, which ranged from \$127 for midsize suburban areas and midsize cities to \$145 for small suburban areas (table 5.B; figure 5.3). The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and midsize suburban areas and cities was \$23 or 18 percent, which was nearly the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$24 or 19 percent). Compared with the final allocations, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$1); the changes for all other locales were less than \$1.

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter received the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$217). Districts with higher poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$124). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, changes in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for all the poverty quarters were less than \$1. When the state minimum provision was removed, the difference between the allocation for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$124) and lowest poverty quarter (\$217) was \$93 or 75 percent, which was the same as the difference for the final allocations.

Similar to the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, there was no consistent pattern regarding Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$140) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$132 in the second-smallest districts to \$133 in the smallest and second-largest districts. In contrast, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a lower Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$120) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$139 in the second-largest districts to \$175 in the smallest districts.

Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, there was a less than \$1 difference in the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for almost every population size in every poverty quarter. The only exception was a reduction of \$1 in the allocation for the smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter. The range in Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child (\$8) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was the same as the range for the final allocations.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$192), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$161). Also similar to the pattern for the final allocations, districts of larger population sizes had progressively lower allocations; the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$129). After removal of the state

Figure 5.3. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state minimum provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

minimum provision, the difference in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$63, which was slightly smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$65). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in slightly lower allocations for districts with populations under 5,000 (ranging from decreases of \$1 to \$2). Districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 and districts with a population of 25,000 or more had increases of less than \$1.

Removal of Hold Harmless

Removal of the hold harmless provision allows current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocations; with the hold harmless provision, the allocations are limited by the maximum yearly reductions. Removal of the hold harmless provision permits reductions of over 15 percent for school districts that may have relatively large decreases (or smaller increases) in the number of formula-eligible children compared with other districts.

After removal of the hold harmless provision from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$116 in 12 states and Puerto Rico to \$588 in North Dakota and \$805 in Wyoming, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$689 or 594 percent (table 5.A). This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$761 or 691 percent) because the value for Wyoming at the top of the range was reduced. Compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child when the hold harmless provision was removed were in Maryland (+\$8) and New Jersey (+\$7), and the largest decreases were in New Hampshire (-\$75) and Wyoming (-\$67). Overall, 27 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 23 states had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocation, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, remote rural areas received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$145) than all other locales, which ranged from \$127 for fringe rural areas and \$129 for midsize cities to \$138 for large cities (table 5.B; figure 5.4). The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and fringe rural areas was \$18 or 14 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$24 or 19 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, midsize cities had the largest increase (+\$5) and large cities had the second-largest increase (+\$3); in contrast, small suburban areas and fringe towns had the largest decreases (both -\$9).


When the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter received the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$156). Districts with higher poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$130); the allocations were \$135 for both the highest poverty quarter and the second-lowest poverty quarter. Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, there were decreases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$61) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$10). In contrast, there was an increase of \$6 for the second-highest poverty quarter. When the hold harmless provision was removed, the difference between the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$130) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$156) was \$25 or 20 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$93 or 75 percent). This smaller

difference was primarily due to the decrease in the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, there was no consistent pattern regarding Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$139) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$132 in the smallest districts to \$135 in the second-largest districts. In contrast, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a lower allocation (\$123) than districts of other sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$130 in the second-largest districts to \$153 in the smallest districts.

Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, there were decreases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child of \$10 or more in several of the district population sizes in the second-lowest poverty quarter. The largest decreases were for the smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$23) and the second-smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$14), and the largest increase was for the second-largest districts (+\$7) in the second-highest poverty quarter. The range in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the smallest and largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$7) was slightly lower than the range for the final allocations (\$8).

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. Also similar to the pattern for the final allocations, districts of larger population sizes had progressively lower allocations. The highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 (\$155), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$147). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$131). After removal of the hold harmless provision, the difference in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$23, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$65). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless provision resulted in lower allocations for districts with smaller population sizes. The largest decreases were

Figure 5.4. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$39) and districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-\$14), and the largest increase was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$2).

Removal of Number of Formula-Eligible Children Exceeds 6,500

Removal of the Concentration Grant eligibility provision that required school districts to have more than 6,500 formula-eligible children in order to receive funding reduced the allocations for large districts with relatively low poverty levels (and tended to slightly increase allocations for districts with higher poverty levels). It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

After removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$110 in Utah and \$111 in Florida and North Carolina to \$590 in North Dakota and \$871 in Wyoming, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$761 or 692 percent (table 5.A). This difference was about the same as the difference for the final allocations (\$761 or 691 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed, the largest increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in South Dakota, Vermont, and North Dakota (all +\$2). The largest decreases were in Maryland (-\$15) and Virginia (-\$6). Overall, 6 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 44 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.


Similar to the final allocations, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, remote rural areas received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$151) than all other locales, which ranged from \$127 for midsize suburban areas and \$128 for midsize cities to \$146 for small suburban

areas (table 5.B; figure 5.5). The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and midsize suburban areas was \$24 or 19 percent, which was the same as the difference for the final allocations. Compared with the final allocations, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed, the only change of \$1 or more in the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for large suburban areas (-\$1).

When the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter received the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$195). Districts with higher poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$124). Compared with the final allocations, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed, there were decreases in the allocations for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$21) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$1). The increases in the allocations for the highest and second-highest poverty quarters were under \$1. After the removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision, the difference between the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the second-highest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter was \$71 or 57 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$93 or 75 percent). This smaller difference was partly due to the reduction in allocations for large districts in the second-lowest and lowest poverty quarters that no longer qualified for Concentration Grants through the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision.

Similar to the final allocations, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, there was no consistent pattern regarding Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$140) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$132 for the second-smallest districts to \$134 for the second-largest districts. In contrast, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts (\$117) had a lower allocation than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$140 for the second-largest districts to \$176 for the smallest districts. After removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision, there were no changes of more than \$1 in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for most of the poverty and population size quarters, compared with the final allocations. The two exceptions were a decrease of \$21 in the allocation for the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter and a decrease of \$3 in the allocation for the largest districts in the second-lowest

Figure 5.5. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

poverty quarter. When the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed, the difference in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the districts in the highest poverty quarter with the highest and lowest allocations was \$8, which was the same as the difference for the final allocations.

When the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, districts of larger population sizes had progressively lower allocations. The highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population

of less than 300 (\$194), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$162). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$129). After removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision, there was no change exceeding \$0.50 in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for any of the district population sizes, compared with the final allocations. When the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed, the difference in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$66, which was slightly larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$65).

Large Districts

There were 19 large school districts in FY 15 that benefited from the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision (table 5.1). Eight of these districts were in Maryland and Virginia, but there were examples in 7 other states as well (California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, North Carolina, Texas, and Utah). In Maryland, the majority of students were in districts that participated in Concentration Grants through the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision. Four large districts in Maryland (Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Montgomery, and Prince George's Counties) received Concentration Grants based on the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision. These 4 districts accounted for 56 percent of Maryland's Concentration Grant allocations and for 56 percent of the state's Concentration Grant eligible-child count (table 1.A).

In Virginia, 4 districts (Fairfax, Henrico, and Prince William Counties and Virginia Beach City) were also eligible for Concentration Grants through the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision. Of the 19 districts participating through the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision, Fairfax County had the lowest eligibility rate at 7 percent, which was lower than the average for the 19 districts (11 percent) or the average for all districts receiving Concentration Grants (19 percent). These 19 large districts collectively received a total of \$28.5 million, or about 2.1 percent of the total Concentration Grant allocations.

Table 5.1. Population and Concentration Grant allocation for school districts that receive Concentration Grants from the number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 provision only: 2015

School district locale	State	Population			Concentration Grant allocation
		All 5- to 17-year-olds	Formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-olds	Formula-eligibility percentage rate	
Total		1,891,575	212,134	11.2	\$28,467,029
Corona-Norco Unified School District	California	55,882	7,767	13.9	901,740
San Francisco Unified School District	California	73,913	10,726	14.5	1,245,276
Jefferson County School District R-1	Colorado	88,260	10,950	12.4	1,216,021
Henry County School District	Georgia	45,460	6,793	14.9	808,197
Honolulu County	Hawaii	149,165	17,733	11.9	2,724,064
Anne Arundel County Public Schools	Maryland	91,526	7,589	8.3	1,244,083
Baltimore County Public Schools	Maryland	128,226	15,417	12.0	2,527,347
Montgomery County Public Schools	Maryland	173,396	15,426	8.9	2,528,822
Prince George's County Public Schools	Maryland	142,561	18,622	13.1	3,052,750
Wake County Schools	North Carolina	181,251	24,318	13.4	2,657,673
Conroe Independent School District	Texas	56,948	7,580	13.3	828,405
Fort Bend Independent School District	Texas	82,427	10,335	12.5	1,129,495
Klein Independent School District	Texas	49,135	7,215	14.7	788,515
Alpine School District	Utah	82,407	8,185	9.9	894,525
Davis School District	Utah	78,643	6,899	8.8	753,980
Fairfax County Public Schools	Virginia	195,333	13,766	7.0	1,944,204
Henrico County Public Schools	Virginia	54,985	6,762	12.3	955,013
Prince William County Public Schools	Virginia	88,432	7,649	8.6	1,080,286
Virginia Beach City Public Schools	Virginia	73,625	8,402	11.4	1,186,634

NOTE: Concentration Grants flow to school districts where the number of formula-eligible children is at least 6,500 or 15 percent of the school district's 5- to 17-year-old population. Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Removal of Percentage of Formula-Eligible Children Exceeds 15 Percent

Removal of the Concentration Grant eligibility provision that required more than 15 percent of a school district's population to be formula eligible increased the allocations for large districts that did not qualify for allocations through the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. Nearly all of the states receiving Concentration Grant funds received them through the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision. There were only 19 large districts that received funding through the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

After removal of the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$107 in Idaho and \$110 in Alabama to \$565 in North Dakota and \$984 in Wyoming, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$877 or 823 percent (table 5.A). This difference was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$761 or 691 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed, the largest increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in Hawaii (+\$19) and Wyoming (+\$112), and the largest decreases were in South Dakota (-\$29) and North Dakota (-\$23). Overall, 31 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 19 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

In contrast to the final allocations or allocations with other single provisions removed, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$149) than all other locales, which ranged from \$121 for rural fringe areas, remote towns, distant towns, and midsize suburban areas


to \$142 for remote rural areas (table 5.B; figure 5.6). The difference between the allocations for large cities and those locales with the lowest allocations was \$28 or 23 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$24 or 19 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed, the largest increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were for large cities (+\$13) and midsize cities (+\$7). The largest decrease was for small suburban areas (-\$12), and there were decreases of \$9 to \$11 for each of the town and rural locales.

When the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, the lowest poverty quarter received the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$236). Districts with higher poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$123). Compared with the final allocations, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed, there were decreases in the allocations for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$5) and the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$1). There were increases in the allocations for the highest poverty quarter (+\$4) and the lowest poverty quarter (+\$19). After the removal of the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision, the difference between the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the second-highest poverty quarter and the lowest poverty quarter was \$113 or 92 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$93 or 75 percent). This larger difference was primarily due to the increase in the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the final allocations, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, there was no consistent pattern regarding Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$152) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$125 in the smallest districts to \$146 in the second-largest districts. In contrast, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts (\$135) had a lower Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than the second-smallest districts (\$140) and smallest districts (\$163) in that quarter.

After removal of the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision from the formula, there were increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the largest districts in each of the poverty quarters, compared with the final allocations. There were decreases

Figure 5.6. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with percentage of formula-eligible children exceeds 15 percent of total 5- to 17-year-old population provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

in the allocations for the smallest and second-smallest districts in the highest, second-highest, and second-lowest poverty quarters. The largest increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were for the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (+\$19), the second-lowest poverty quarter (+\$15), and the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$15). The largest decreases in the allocations were for the smallest districts in the

second-highest poverty quarter and the second-smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (both -\$14). After the removal of the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision, the range in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$26) was larger than the range for the final allocations (\$8).

When the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. Districts of larger population sizes had progressively lower allocations until the population size reached 10,000. The highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 (\$182), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$150). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$123). Compared with the final allocations, when the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision was removed, only districts with a population of 25,000 or more had an increase (+\$12). Districts of other population sizes had decreases ranging from \$8 for districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 to \$12 for districts with a population of less than 300, districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499, and districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999. After removal of the 15 percent formula-eligible children provision, the difference in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$59, which was slightly smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$65).

Removal of Hold Harmless and Number of Formula-Eligible Children Exceeds 6,500


Removal of multiple formula provisions can lead to a better understanding of the interaction of those provisions and enable a more complete analysis of the implications of individual provisions. In particular, removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions in combination provides information on the long-term impact of removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision. Removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision alone affects the initial allocations, but it also has a long-term impact when the decreases for some school districts are not restricted to the one-year hold harmless reduction limits (-15 percent). Removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision reduced allocations for large districts with relatively low poverty levels (and slightly increased allocations for other districts). Removal of the

hold harmless provision allowed current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocation; with the hold harmless provision, the allocations were limited by the maximum yearly reductions. Removal of the hold harmless provision permitted reductions of over 15 percent for districts that may have had decreases or smaller increases in the number of formula-eligible children compared with other districts (figure 5.7).

After the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$118 in 12 states and Puerto Rico to \$590 in North Dakota and \$807 in Wyoming, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$688 or 581 percent (table 5.A). This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed because of the decrease for Wyoming. Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in Hawaii (+\$150) and Maryland (+\$12), and the largest decreases were in Wyoming (-\$64) and New Hampshire (-\$73). Overall, 15 states and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 35 states and the District of Columbia had no changes or increases.


Similar to the final allocations, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$148) than all other locales, which ranged from \$130 for fringe rural areas and \$132 for midsize suburban areas to \$141 for large cities (table 5.B; figure 5.8). The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and fringe rural areas was \$18 or 14 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$24 or 19 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were for midsize cities (+\$8) and large cities (+\$6), and the largest decreases were for small suburban areas and fringe towns (both -\$6).

Figure 5.7. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child and difference between school district locales with the highest and lowest allocations after removal of hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 provisions, by state or jurisdiction: 2015



NOTE: The school district locales receiving the highest and lowest allocations vary by state or jurisdiction.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Figure 5.8. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



† Not applicable.

[†] To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

When the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within most states did not vary by locale (table 5.C; figure 5.7). There was a difference in the allocations between the locales with the highest and lowest allocations in 8 states: South Dakota (\$168), Wyoming (\$58), Pennsylvania (\$56), Montana (\$24), Minnesota (\$22), Michigan (\$8), Ohio (\$6), and New York (\$2).

After the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for large cities (or midsize cities in states where large cities were not applicable) ranged from \$118 in 12 states to \$423 in Alaska (table 5.C; figure 5.8). Across each of the locales, except for fringe towns, the difference between the lowest and the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was over \$200. The largest range in the allocations was for remote rural areas, where the allocations ranged from \$118 in 11 states to \$857 in Wyoming (a difference of \$739).

When the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the lowest poverty quarter did not receive a Concentration Grant allocation. Among the other poverty quarters, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was lowest for the second-highest poverty quarter (\$133) and highest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$139). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed, there were decreases in the allocations for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$217) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$6). In contrast, there were increases for the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$10) and the highest poverty quarter (+\$3). After the removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions, the difference between the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the second-lowest and second-highest poverty quarters was \$139, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$93 or 75 percent). This larger difference was primarily due to the lowest poverty quarter not being eligible for Concentration Grants in this formula alternative.

Similar to the final allocations, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, there was no consistent pattern regarding Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size. The largest districts in the

highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$142) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$134 in the smallest districts to \$138 in the second-largest districts. In contrast, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a lower allocation (\$124) than districts of other population sizes in that quarter, which ranged from \$133 for the second-largest districts to \$156 for the smallest districts.

Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, there were increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for districts of all population sizes in the highest and second-highest poverty quarters, and there were decreases for the second-largest, second-smallest, and smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter. Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed, the largest increase was for the second-largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$11), and the largest decrease for the districts receiving allocations was for the smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$19). There was no allocation for districts in the lowest poverty quarter, so the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter had a decrease of \$159 compared with the final allocation. After removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions, the range in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$7) was about the same as the range for the final allocations (\$8).

When the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was higher than for districts of other sizes. Similar to the final allocations, districts of larger population sizes had progressively lower allocations. The highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 (\$158), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$150). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$134). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions resulted in decreases for districts of smaller population sizes and increases for districts of larger population sizes. While the removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision tended to benefit smaller districts, only a small

number of districts benefited from this provision. On the other hand, there were many districts that benefited from the hold harmless provision, so removing this provision had a disproportionate impact on small districts and outweighed the impact of removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision. The largest increase in the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$5), and the largest decrease was for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$36). After removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions, the difference in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$24, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$65).

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE), Hold Harmless, and Number of Formula-Eligible Children Exceeds 6,500

Removal of multiple provisions produces patterns that differ from those for the final allocations or allocations with single provisions removed. Removal of the hold harmless provision in conjunction with the removal of the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision provides information on the long-term impact of removing these provisions. Removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision alone affects the initial allocations, but it also has a long-term impact when the decreases for some school districts are not restricted to the one-year hold harmless reduction limits (-15 percent). Removing the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision reduced allocations for large districts with relatively low poverty levels (and slightly increased allocations for other districts). Removal of the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision increased the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child in lower spending states and decreased the allocation in higher spending states. Removal of the hold harmless provision allowed current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocation; with the hold harmless provision, the allocations would be limited by the maximum yearly reductions. Removal of the hold harmless provision permitted reductions of over 15 percent for school districts that may have had decreases or smaller increases in the number of formula-eligible children compared with other districts.


When the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Concentration Grant allocations ranged from \$135 in 35 states and Puerto Rico to \$590 in North Dakota and \$807 in Wyoming, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$672 or 496 percent (table 5.A).

This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed partly because of the decrease in Wyoming and partly because of the increase in Florida. Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in Hawaii (+\$150) and Florida (+\$25), and the largest decreases were in Wyoming (-\$64) and New Hampshire (-\$73). Overall, 25 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 25 states had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas received a higher Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$151) than all other locales, which ranged from \$135 for large cities to \$140 for remote towns (table 5.B; figure 5.9). The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and large cities was \$16 or 12 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$24 or 19 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed, the largest increases in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were for midsize cities, midsize suburban areas, and remote towns (all +\$9), and the largest decreases were for small suburban areas (-\$9) and fringe towns (-\$7).

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the lowest poverty quarter did not receive a Concentration Grant allocation. Among the other poverty quarters, the allocation was lowest for the highest poverty quarter (\$136) and highest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$138). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed, there were decreases in the allocations for the lowest poverty quarter (-\$217) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$7). In contrast, there were increases for districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (+\$13) and the highest poverty quarter (+\$2). After the removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions, the difference between the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest and lowest poverty quarters was \$138, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$93 or 75 percent). This larger difference was primarily due to the lowest poverty quarter not being eligible for Concentration Grants in this formula alternative.

Figure 5.9. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), hold harmless, and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



† Not applicable.

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, there was a consistent pattern regarding Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child within the poverty quarters with respect to district population size; for the final allocations and allocations with most other provisions removed, there was not a consistent pattern. The smallest districts in each of the three poverty quarters that received allocations had higher allocations than districts of other population sizes in each quarter. For example, in the highest poverty quarter, the smallest districts had the highest allocation (\$138), while districts of other population sizes in that quarter ranged from \$135 to \$136. Also, in the second-lowest poverty quarter, the smallest districts had the highest allocation (\$142), while districts of other population sizes in that quarter ranged from \$135 to \$138.

Compared with the final allocations, after removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions from the formula in combination, the changes for the largest and smallest districts differed by poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, there was a decrease in the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for the largest districts (-\$5); there were increases of \$2 to \$5 for districts of other population sizes. Within the second-highest poverty quarter, there were increases for districts of all population sizes, with the largest increase being for the second-largest districts (+\$19). Within the second-lowest poverty quarter, there was an increase for the largest districts (+\$16), but there were decreases for districts of other population sizes, with the largest decrease being for the smallest districts (-\$33). There was no allocation for districts in the lowest poverty quarter. After removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions, the range in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$2) was smaller than the range for the final allocations (\$8).

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) was higher than for districts of other sizes. Similar to the final allocations, districts with larger population sizes had lower allocations than districts with populations under 5,000. The highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 (\$158), and the second-highest allocation

was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$148). The lowest allocations were for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999, districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999, and districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (all \$136). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions resulted in decreases for districts of smaller population sizes and increases for districts of larger population sizes. The largest increase in the Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$7), and the largest decrease was for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$36). After removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions, the difference in the Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$22, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$65).

Cost Adjustment Using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI)

After applying the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI), the FY 15 Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$112 in Nevada to \$984 in Wyoming (a difference of \$873) (table 5.AA). This difference was larger than the difference without the cost adjustment (\$761). Increases in the range between the states with the lowest and highest Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child when applying the ACS-CWI were also observed when various provisions were removed. After removing the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions from the formula in combination, the difference in the cost-adjusted Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the lowest and highest allocations was \$776 (the difference without the cost adjustment was \$688). The 7 states with the highest cost-adjusted Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed in combination also had the highest cost-adjusted allocations when the SPPE, hold harmless, and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed in combination.

Applying the ACS-CWI to the Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child reduced some of the ranges by poverty quarter, but the same general patterns prevailed. The highest poverty quarter received a lower cost-adjusted final allocation (\$141) than both

the lowest poverty quarter (\$216) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$157) (table 5.BB). Removal of the hold harmless provision from the formula reduced the difference in the cost-adjusted Concentration Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the poverty quarters with the highest and lowest allocations to \$7 (ranging from \$141 for the highest poverty quarter to \$148 for the lowest poverty quarter). Similarly, removal of the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions in combination reduced the difference in the cost-adjusted allocations between the poverty quarters with the highest and lowest allocations to \$6 (ranging from \$144 for the highest poverty quarter to \$151 for the second-lowest poverty quarter). There was no allocation for the lowest poverty quarter.

When the ACS-CWI was applied, remote rural areas had the highest Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child across all the formula analyses. For example, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, the cost-adjusted allocations ranged from \$132 for large cities to \$187 for remote rural areas. When both the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed in combination, the cost-adjusted allocations ranged from \$135 for large suburban areas to \$183 for remote rural areas.

Applying the ACS-CWI resulted in larger differences between the districts with the smallest and largest population sizes. Districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) had a cost-adjusted Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child of \$230, while districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had a cost-adjusted final allocation of \$130. This difference (\$101) was larger than the difference for the unadjusted final allocations (\$65). Similar to the allocations without the cost adjustment, removing the 6,500 formula-eligible

children provision resulted in the largest difference between the smallest and largest districts (\$102), compared with the differences when other provisions were removed (districts with a population of less than 300 had a cost-adjusted allocation of \$231, and districts with a population of 25,000 or more had a cost-adjusted allocation of \$129).

Applying the ACS-CWI increased the difference in the Concentration Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child between the smallest and largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter by \$26 (to \$82). Across all poverty and population size quarters, the cost-adjusted final allocations ranged from \$121 for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter to \$203 for the smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter. This pattern of smaller districts having higher allocations was also observed for the highest poverty quarter, after applying the ACS-CWI. Within the highest poverty quarter, the smallest districts received a higher cost-adjusted Concentration Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child (\$155) than the largest districts (\$132), a difference of \$23.

In contrast to the pattern for the allocations without the cost adjustment, when the 6,500 formula-eligible children provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter received a lower cost-adjusted Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$132) than the smallest districts in that quarter (\$155). Also, when the hold harmless and 6,500 formula-eligible children provisions were removed in combination, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter received a lower cost-adjusted allocation (\$134) than the smallest districts in that quarter (\$157). In all but two of the formula analyses, the smallest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter received the highest cost-adjusted Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, compared with all other poverty and population size quarters.

Targeted Grants—Formula Analyses

Targeted Grants provide additional funds to school districts based on a system that allocates proportionately more funds to districts with higher numbers or percentages of formula-eligible children. To qualify for a Targeted Grant, a district must have at least 10 formula-eligible children ages 5 to 17, and that number must represent at least 5 percent of the

district's 5- to 17-year-old population. Targeted Grants accounted for approximately \$3.3 billion (23 percent) of Title I funds in fiscal year 2015 (FY 15) (table 1.A), and the average Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$282 (all allocations herein are averages).

Highlights

- Idaho, Iowa, and Utah received the lowest or among the lowest Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child both for the final allocations and for most allocations when single or multiple provisions were removed from the formula (table 6.A). Vermont and Wyoming had the highest allocations when single or multiple provisions were removed, except when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed in combination. For example, after removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions in combination, the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$182 in Utah to \$659 in Wyoming and \$676 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$495 or 272 percent.
- The Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was higher for large cities than all other locales in all analyses involving the removal of single or multiple provisions, except when the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination (table 6.B); this contrasted with the pattern for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. For example, when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed in combination, large cities received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$330) than all other locales, which ranged from \$252 for small suburban areas and \$253 for large suburban areas to \$297 for midsize cities (figure 6.10).
- The pattern of the highest and second-highest poverty quarters receiving the highest Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child persisted in all analyses involving the removal of single or multiple provisions (table 6.B). For example, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$350); the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$204) and second lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$208) (figure 6.9).
- The Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was highest for either the largest or second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter in all analyses involving the removal of single or multiple provisions (table 6.B); this contrasted with the pattern for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. Similar to the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$414) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$184 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$353 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter.
- The Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was highest for either the smallest districts (those with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300) or for the largest districts (those with a population of 25,000 or more) in all analyses involving the removal of single or multiple provisions (table 6.B). For example, after removal of the percentage weighting provision from the formula, the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (\$340), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (\$307) (figure 6.6).

Formula Alternatives

Targeted Grants have some of the same formula provisions as the other grant formulas but have additional factors designed to provide higher levels of funding to school districts with large numbers or large percentages of formula-eligible children (see Introduction, Methodology for Allocating Federal Title I Funds). In this chapter, several unique formula alternatives are examined, compared with Basic Grants and Concentration Grants, because of the additional provisions in the Targeted Grant formula. Similar to the other grants, Targeted Grant allocations were computed using the formula-eligibility criteria only, as well as alternatives that exclude the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, and hold harmless provisions. When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocation computations were essentially made on a per eligible child basis, so the differences in Basic Grant allocations and Concentration Grant allocations among districts of various types were smaller than those observed under other alternatives. For Targeted Grants—and for Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG)—the number and percentage weighting provisions were retained. Therefore, in contrast to the patterns for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants, substantial variations existed for allocations based only on the formula-eligibility criteria. When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the same expenditure per student was used for each state, and there were no minimum and maximum thresholds. In general, removal of the SPPE provision meant that states with lower expenditures per student received higher allocations, while states with higher expenditures per student received lower allocations. Excluding the state minimum provision meant that small population states typically received lower allocations since there was no minimum threshold on funding levels.

The hold harmless provision limits the amount a district's allocation can decrease from one year to the next due to population changes. It is important to note that unless a formula provision is removed in conjunction with the hold harmless provision, the long-term impact of removing the other provision may not be fully reflected in the resulting allocation. So, when a provision such as the state minimum is removed from the formula and the hold harmless provision is maintained, the districts in the state are limited to a reduction of no more than 15 percent per year. The hold harmless provision moderates the long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions are fully met for a district. The national Title I funding level was the same across all alternatives.

Since the allocation was based on a fixed appropriation amount, increases or decreases for some districts had to be matched by increases or decreases for others. For example, maintaining hold harmless amounts for some districts meant that some other districts with increases in formula-eligible children did not receive additional funding.

The number weighting and percentage weighting provisions are unique to Targeted Grants and EFIG. When the number weighting provision was removed, districts only received additional funding if they had high percentages of formula-eligible children, which favored the highest-poverty districts, regardless of size. When the percentage weighting provision was removed, the allocations were based only on the actual number of formula-eligible children, which favored larger districts regardless of poverty level. Three combinations of provision removals are analyzed in this chapter, all including removal of the hold harmless provision. One combination looks at removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions, which provides an example of the long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision by not limiting the annual reductions. Another combination looks at removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions, and the third combination looks at removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions.

Formula-Eligibility Criteria Only


The formula-eligibility criteria for Targeted Grants (as well as for Education Finance Incentive Grants) retained the number weighting and percentage weighting provisions. Thus, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered in the allocation computations, the differences between the highest and lowest Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child across most school district characteristics remained relatively large compared with the smaller differences for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. The exception to the relatively wide ranges in Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered was for the state-level allocations, when the range was narrower than the range for the final allocations. The allocations ranged from \$165 in Vermont and \$170 in Maine to \$408 in Nevada, a range between the lowest and the highest of \$243 or 147 percent (table 6.A). The narrowness of this range, when compared with the final allocation range (\$481 or 245 percent), was primarily due to lower allocations for states at the top of the range. For example, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocations were \$511 lower in Vermont and \$477 lower in Wyoming, compared with the final allocations. Overall, 30 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations

compared with the final allocations, while 20 states and Puerto Rico had increases.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, large cities received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$394) than all other locales, which ranged from \$173 for remote rural areas to \$308 for midsize cities (table 6.B; figure 6.1). The difference

between the allocations for large cities and remote rural areas was \$221 or 128 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$159 or 73 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, midsize cities had the largest increase (+\$24), and remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$117).

Figure 6.1. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation when only formula-eligibility criteria were considered, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

² Targeted Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children (without the application of the formula weights) is at least 10 and that number constitutes at least 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$315), which was \$22 lower than the final allocation. Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$210), which was \$8 lower than the final allocation. The Targeted Grant allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$105 or 50 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$418) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$165 for the smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter and the smallest districts in the second-lowest population quarter to \$405 for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child of \$418, compared with an allocation \$191 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$227 or 118 percent). This range (\$227) between the largest and smallest districts was more than twice as wide as the range for the final allocations (\$112). Compared with the final allocations, applying only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in the largest increase (+\$71) for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$103) for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$368) than districts of other population sizes. The lowest allocations were for districts with a population of less than 300 and districts with a population of 300 to 599 (both \$165). This pattern contrasts with the pattern for the final allocations, where districts with a population of less than 300 had the second-highest allocation. The difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$203, which was about twice the difference for the final allocations (\$103). Compared with the final allocations, using only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in the largest increase (+\$36) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and the largest decrease (-\$158) for districts with a population of less than 300. Districts with a population of 300 to 599 had a decrease of \$100 in their Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, and districts with a population of 600 to 999 had a decrease of \$86.

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE)


When the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision was removed from the formula, the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child tended to increase in lower spending states and decrease in higher spending states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline were redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the largest increases in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in Florida and Nevada (both +\$27), and the largest decreases were in Massachusetts (-\$49) and New Jersey (-\$43) (table 6.A). The allocations ranged from \$184 in Iowa and \$199 in Idaho to \$659 in Wyoming and \$676 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$493 or 268 percent. This range was larger than the range for the final allocations (\$481 or 245 percent). Overall, 21 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 29 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, large cities (\$381) received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales, which ranged from \$214 for fringe towns to \$291 for remote rural areas (table 6.B; figure 6.2). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was \$167 or 78 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$159 or 73 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, the differences in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child by locale were relatively small, with no differences over \$7.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$337). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$204). The allocation for the highest poverty quarter

Figure 6.2. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

² A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

was \$132 or 65 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$119 or 54 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$14 lower for the lowest poverty quarter and \$1 lower for the second-lowest poverty quarter; in contrast, there was an increase of \$5 for the second-highest poverty quarter and an increase of less than \$1 for the highest poverty quarter.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$408) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$160 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$352 for the largest districts in second-highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty

quarter, the largest districts had a Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child of \$408, compared with an allocation of \$295 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$114 or 39 percent). This range (\$114) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was similar to the range for the final allocations (\$112 or 38 percent). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$18) for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$18) for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. In contrast to the pattern when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered but similar to the pattern for the final allocations, both districts with the largest and districts with the smallest population sizes had the highest Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child. The highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (\$338), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$321). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$223). The difference in the allocations between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$115, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$103). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in lower Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for smaller districts (ranging from -\$2 to -\$7) and a higher allocation for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$6).

Removal of State Minimum


The state minimum provision provides a minimum allocation threshold for each state. When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child increased slightly for many states but decreased substantially for many of the states receiving state minimum allocation. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision by limiting the impact on a district to

a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

Removal of the state minimum provision from the formula had an impact of less than \$3 per formula-eligible child for the majority of states, but it reduced the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child by more than \$50 in 5 of the 13 states that received the state minimum allocation (table 6.A). For example, when the state minimum provision was removed, North Dakota's allocation decreased by \$89, Wyoming's decreased by \$80, Vermont's decreased by \$80, South Dakota's decreased by \$60, and Alaska's decreased by \$59. The Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$188 in Idaho to \$597 in Vermont, a difference of \$409 or 218 percent. This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$481 or 245 percent). Overall, 12 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 38 states and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$378) than all other locales, which ranged from \$218 for fringe towns and \$219 for rural fringe areas to \$285 for remote rural areas (table 6.B; figure 6.3). The difference between the allocation for large cities and fringe towns was \$160 or 74 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$159 or 73 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$6) and remote towns had the second-largest decrease (-\$3); in contrast, large cities had the largest increase (+\$1).

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$337). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$215). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was \$2 lower for the lowest poverty quarter and \$1 lower for the second-lowest poverty quarter; in contrast, there was an increase of \$1 for the highest poverty quarter and an increase of less than \$1 for the second-highest poverty quarter. When the state minimum provision was removed, the difference

Figure 6.3. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state minimum provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

between the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (\$337) and lowest poverty quarter (\$215) was \$122 or 56 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$119 or 54 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter

had a higher allocation (\$407) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$177 in the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$348 in the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an allocation of \$407, compared with an allocation of \$294 in the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$113 or 38 percent). This range (\$113) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was about the same as the range for the final allocations (\$112) but narrower than

the range when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered (\$227). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$2) for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$5) for the smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the state minimum provision from the formula, the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$333), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$312). In contrast to the pattern when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered but similar to the pattern for the final allocations, both districts with the largest and districts with the smallest population sizes had the highest allocations. Similar to the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, the lowest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$228). After removal of the state minimum provision, the difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$104, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$103). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in the largest decreases for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$11) and districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-\$4). The only increase was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$1).

Removal of Hold Harmless

Removal of the hold harmless provision allows current formula provisions and current distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocations; with the hold harmless provision, the allocations are limited by the maximum yearly reductions. Removal of the hold harmless provision permits reductions of over 15 percent for school districts that may have relatively large decreases (or smaller increases) in the number of formula-eligible children compared with other districts.


After removal of the hold harmless provision from the formula, the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$196 in Idaho and \$203 in Iowa to \$659 in Wyoming and \$676 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$481 or 245 percent (table 6.A). This range was the same as the range for the final allocations because the states at the bottom and top of the range were not substantially impacted by the hold harmless provision. Compared with the final allocations, when the

hold harmless provision was removed, the largest increases in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in Maryland and New Jersey (both +\$11), and the largest decreases were in Puerto Rico (-\$37) and Michigan (-\$32). Overall, 22 states and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 28 states and the District of Columbia had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$381) than all other locales, which ranged from \$216 for fringe towns to \$289 for midsize cities (table 6.B; figure 6.4). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was \$165 or 76 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$159 or 73 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$19) and distant rural areas had the second-largest decrease (-\$8); in contrast, midsize cities had the largest increase (+\$6).

When the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$331). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$224). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, there was an increase of \$6 in the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter, an increase of \$3 for the second-lowest poverty quarter, and an increase of \$5 for the second-highest poverty quarter. In contrast, there was a decrease of \$6 for the highest poverty quarter. When the hold harmless provision was removed, the difference between the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (\$331) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$224) was \$107 or 48 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$119 or 54 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$407) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$184 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$346 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest

Figure 6.4. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

poverty quarter, the largest districts had a Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child of \$407, compared with an allocation of \$277 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$129 or 47 percent). This range (\$129) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was larger than the range for the final allocations (\$112) but narrower than the range when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered (\$227). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold

harmless provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$11) for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$17) for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter.

After removal of the hold harmless provision from the formula, the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$336), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a

population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$276). In contrast to the pattern when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered but similar to the pattern for the final allocations, both districts with the largest and districts with the smallest population sizes had the highest Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child. Similar to the final allocations, the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$227). The difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$109, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$103). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless provision resulted in lower allocations for districts with populations under 10,000 and an increase of \$4 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more. The largest decreases in Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$48), districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-\$20), and districts with a population of 600 to 999 (-\$17).

Removal of Number Weighting

Removal of the number weighting provision from the formula decreased the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for larger school districts, compared with the final allocations, since some large but low-poverty districts benefited from the number weighting provision. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.


After removal of the number weighting provision from the formula, the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$196 in Idaho and \$200 in Utah to \$659 in Wyoming and \$676 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$481 or 245 percent (table 6.A). This range was the same as the range for the final allocations and allocations with some other provisions removed because the states at the bottom and top of the range were not substantially impacted by the number

weighting provision. Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, the largest increases in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in New Jersey (+\$25) and Mississippi (+\$21), and the largest decreases were in Maryland (-\$36) and Nevada (-\$34). Overall, 21 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 29 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other single provisions removed, when the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$362) than all other locales, which ranged from \$233 for fringe rural areas and \$235 for small suburban areas to \$313 for remote rural areas (table 6.B; figure 6.5). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe rural areas was \$129 or 55 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$159 or 73 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, large cities had the largest decrease (-\$15); in contrast, remote rural areas had the largest increase (+\$22).

When the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$344). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$214) and second-lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$219). Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, there was an increase of \$8 in the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were decreases of \$4 to \$7 for districts in lower poverty quarters. When the number weighting provision was removed, the difference between the allocations for the highest poverty quarter (\$344) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$214) was \$130 or 61 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$119 or 54 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$390) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$195 for both the second-smallest districts in the second-lowest

Figure 6.5. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with number weighting provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

poverty quarter and the second-largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$346 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had a Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child of \$390, compared with an allocation of \$319 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$71 or 22 percent). This range (\$71) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest

poverty quarter was narrower than the range for the final allocations (\$112) and allocations with any other single provision removed. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the number weighting provision resulted in the largest increases (both +\$25) for the second-smallest districts and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$39) for the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the number weighting provision from the formula, the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$339), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$314). Removal of the number weighting provision was the one exception to the general pattern of the largest districts having the highest Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child when removing a single provision. Similar to the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$247). The difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$92, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$103).

Removal of the number weighting provision from the formula resulted in higher Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for smaller districts and a decrease of \$18 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more. For districts with populations under 10,000, the allocations with the removal of the number weighting provision were between \$16 and \$23 higher than the final allocations. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the number weighting provision resulted in the largest increase (both +\$23) for districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499 and districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-\$18) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more.


Removal of Percentage Weighting

Removal of the percentage weighting provision tended to reduce allocations for school districts with relatively large percentages of formula-eligible children and tended to increase allocations for large low-poverty districts, which may have received higher allocations due to the number weighting provision. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the percentage weighting provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the percentage weighting provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

After removal of the percentage weighting provision from the formula, the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$196 in Idaho and \$198 in Iowa to \$659 in Wyoming and \$676 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$481 or 245 percent (table 6.A). This range was the same as the range for the final allocations and allocations with some other provisions removed because the states at the bottom and top of the range were not substantially impacted by the percentage weighting provision. Compared with the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed, the largest increases in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were in Maryland and Nevada (both +\$8) and the largest decreases were in Mississippi (-\$15) and New Jersey (-\$11). Overall, 28 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 22 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocation and allocations with other provisions removed, when the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$385) than all other locales, which ranged from \$211 for fringe towns to \$286 for midsize cities (table 6.B; figure 6.6). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was \$174 or 82 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$159 or 73 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed, large cities had the largest increase (+\$8); in contrast, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$15).

When the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$332). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$224) and second-lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$231). Compared with the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed, there was a decrease of \$4 in the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were increases of \$1 to \$7 for the lower poverty quarters. When the percentage weighting provision was removed, the difference between the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (\$332) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$224) was \$108 or 48 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$119 or 54 percent).

Figure 6.6. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with percentage weighting provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Similar to the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$414) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$184 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$353 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest

poverty quarter, the largest districts had a Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child of \$414, compared with an allocation of \$272 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$142 or 52 percent). This range (\$142) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was larger than the range for the final allocations (\$112) and the allocations for any of the other formula alternatives, except for when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered (\$227). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the percentage weighting

provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$10) for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$22) for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter.

After removal of the percentage weighting provision from the formula, the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$340), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$307). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 (\$222), and the allocations for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$223) and districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499 (\$224) were slightly higher. The difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$118, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$103). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the percentage weighting provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$8) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and the largest decrease (-\$16) for districts with a population of less than 300.

Removal of Hold Harmless and Number Weighting

Removal of multiple formula provisions can lead to a better understanding of the interaction between those provisions and enable a more complete analysis of the implications of individual provisions. In particular, removal of both hold harmless and number weighting provisions in combination provides information on the long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision. Removing the number weighting provision alone affects the initial allocations, but it also has a long-term impact when the decreases for some school districts are not restricted to the one-year hold harmless reduction limits (-15 percent). Removing the number weighting provision resulted in a decrease in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for large districts because some large but low-poverty districts received additional funding due to the number weighting provision.

After removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination, the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from a low of \$182 in Utah to a high of \$659 in Wyoming and \$676 in Vermont, a difference between the lowest and the highest of \$495 or 272 percent (table 6.A). This range was wider than the range for the final allocation and allocations with some other provisions removed because of the decrease

for Utah, which was already lower than the national average. Compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child after removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were in New Jersey (+\$65) and Ohio (+\$48), and the largest decreases were in Nevada (-\$123) and Maryland (-\$90). Overall, 19 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 31 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas (\$327) received a Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child that was nearly as high as the allocation for large cities (\$328) (table 6.B; figure 6.7); this pattern contrasted with the pattern for the final allocations and allocations with single provisions removed. The allocations for other locales ranged from \$250 for large suburban areas to \$295 for midsize cities and small cities. The difference between the allocation for large cities and large suburban areas was \$77 or 31 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$159 or 73 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increases were for fringe towns and remote towns (both +\$45), and the largest decrease was for large cities (-\$50).


Large cities (or midsize cities in states where large cities were not applicable) received higher Targeted Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child than all other locales in 35 states (table 2.D); when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, large cities (or midsize cities where large cities were not applicable) received higher allocations than all other locales in only 13 states (table 6.C). After removing the hold harmless and number weighting provisions, remote rural areas had higher allocations than all other locales in 9 states, and there was only one state each where large and midsize suburban areas and fringe towns had the highest allocations. For example, only in Idaho did midsize suburban areas have a higher allocation (\$235) than all other locales within the state. The states with the smallest ranges in Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child among the locales were Iowa and Utah (both \$50), while the states with the largest ranges among the locales were New York (\$285) and Michigan (\$274) (figure 6.8).

When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant

allocation per formula-eligible child (\$352) (table 6.B; figure 6.7). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$208) and second lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$221). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, there were increases in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (+\$15) and for the lowest

poverty quarter (+\$3); in contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$18) and the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$12). When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, the difference between the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (\$352) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$208) was \$144 or 69 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$119 or 54 percent).


Figure 6.7. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless and number weighting provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Figure 6.8. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child and difference between school district locales with the highest and lowest allocations after removal of hold harmless and number weighting provisions, by state or jurisdiction: 2015



NOTE: The school district locales receiving the highest and lowest allocations vary by state or jurisdiction. The total reflects the weighted average of the locale types.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

In the final allocations, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. However, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest districts within each poverty quarter no longer had higher allocations than smaller districts. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a lower allocation (\$353) than districts of some smaller population sizes in that quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the second-largest districts had a Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child of \$358, compared with an allocation of \$342 in the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$16 or 5 percent). This range (\$16) between the second-largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was smaller than the range for the final allocations (\$112). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the number weighting and hold harmless provisions resulted in the largest increase (+\$57) in the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter; in contrast the largest decreases were for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$103) and the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$99).

After removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination, the highest Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 300 or less (the smallest districts) (\$321) and districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$294). The lowest allocations were for districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 (\$272) and districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$273). The difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$48, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$103). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+\$48) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-\$45) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more.

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE), Hold Harmless, and Number Weighting

Removal of multiple provisions produced patterns that differed from those for the final allocations or allocations with single provisions removed. Removal of the number weighting provision had a greater negative impact on larger


school districts than on smaller districts since some large but low-poverty districts benefited from the number weighting provision. When the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision was removed, the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child generally increased in lower spending states and decreased in higher spending states. Removing the hold harmless provision in conjunction with the SPPE and number weighting provisions provided information on the long-term impact of removing these two provisions, since the reductions in the district-level allocations were no longer limited to 15 percent.

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$209 in Utah to \$676 in Vermont, a difference of \$468 or 224 percent (table 6.A). This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$481 or 245 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increases were in Mississippi (+\$91) and Puerto Rico (+\$66), and the largest decreases were in Maryland (-\$156) and New York (-\$121). Overall, 22 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 28 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$339) than all other locales, which ranged from \$249 for small suburban areas and \$253 for large suburban areas to \$316 for large cities (table 6.B; figure 6.9); this pattern contrasted with the pattern for the final allocations and allocations with single provisions removed. The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and small suburban areas was \$90 or 36 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$159 or 73 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increase was for remote towns (+\$61), and the largest decrease was for large cities (-\$61).

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$350). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$204) and second lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$208). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting

Figure 6.9. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), hold harmless, and number weighting provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

provisions were removed, there was an increase (+\$13) in the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$18), the lowest poverty quarter (-\$14), and the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$4). When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the difference between the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible

child for the highest poverty quarter (\$350) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$204) was \$146 or 72 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$119 or 54 percent).

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the largest districts within each poverty quarter did not

consistently have higher Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts; for the final allocations, the largest districts did consistently have higher allocations than smaller districts. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a lower allocation (\$338) than smaller districts in that quarter, which ranged from \$353 in the second-smallest districts to \$355 in the second-largest districts. The range (\$16) between the districts with the highest and lowest allocations was smaller than the range for the final allocations (\$112). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+\$60) for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decreases (both -\$83) for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter and the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter. The largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter also had a relatively large decrease (-\$75).

After removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination, the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$325), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$291). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$269). The difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the districts with the highest and lowest allocations was \$56, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$103). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+\$44) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-\$41) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts).

Removal of State Minimum, Hold Harmless, and Number Weighting

Removal of multiple provisions produced patterns that differed from those for the final allocations or allocations with single provisions removed. Removal of the number weighting provision had a greater negative impact on larger school districts than on smaller districts, since some large but low-poverty districts benefited from the number weighting provision. When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child increased in many states and decreased in many of the state minimum states. Removal of the hold harmless provision in conjunction


with the state minimum and number weighting provisions provided information on the long-term impact of removing these two provisions since the reductions in the district-level allocations were no longer limited to 15 percent.

Removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination increased the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for 28 states and Puerto Rico, but it decreased the allocations by more than \$100 in 7 of the 13 states that received the state minimum allocation (table 6.A). For example, North Dakota's allocation decreased by \$405, Wyoming's decreased by \$404, and Vermont's decreased by \$385. After removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions, the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$184 in Utah to \$418 in the District of Columbia, a difference of \$234 or 127 percent. This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$481 or 245 percent) or for allocations with any other provisions removed.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with single provisions removed, when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, large cities received a higher Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$330) than all other locales, which ranged from \$252 for small suburban areas and \$253 for large suburban areas to \$297 for midsize cities (table 6.B; figure 6.10). The difference between the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for large cities and small suburban areas was \$78 or 31 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$159 or 73 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increases were for distant towns (+\$44) and fringe towns (+\$43), and the largest decrease was for large cities (-\$47).

When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter received the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$355). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$205) and second lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$210). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, there was an increase in the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (+\$19); in contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$22), the second-highest poverty quarter

Figure 6.10. Title I, Part A Targeted Grants final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

(-\$11), and the lowest poverty quarter (-\$8). When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the difference between the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (\$355) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$205) was \$150 or 74 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$119 or 54 percent).

When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the largest districts within each poverty quarter did not consistently have higher Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, which contrasted with the consistent pattern for the final allocations. Within the highest poverty quarter, the second-largest districts had a Targeted Grant allocation per

formula-eligible child of \$362, compared with an allocation of \$358 for the largest districts and an allocation of \$341 for the smallest districts (a range of \$21 or 6 percent). This range (\$21) between the districts with the highest and lowest allocations was smaller than the range for the final allocations (\$112). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase in the Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (+\$62) for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$100) for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter. There were also relatively large decreases for the largest districts in the other poverty quarters, ranging from -\$48 in the highest poverty quarter to -\$96 in the second-lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination, the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$290), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499 (\$281). Districts of other population sizes had allocations that ranged from \$272 for districts with a population of 300 to 599 to \$280 for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999. The difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the districts with the highest and lowest allocations was \$18, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$103) or allocations with any other provisions removed. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+\$46) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decreases for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$49) and districts with a population of 25,000 or more (-\$42).

Cost Adjustment Using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI)

When applying the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI), the FY 15 Targeted Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$226 in Washington to \$788 in Vermont (a difference of \$562) (table 6.AA). This difference was larger than the difference without the cost adjustment (\$481). This increase in the difference in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the states with the highest and lowest allocations when applying the

ACS-CWI was also observed when various provisions were removed from the formula. For example, the cost-adjusted allocations when the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed in combination ranged from \$211 in Maryland to \$788 in Vermont (a difference of \$577); without the cost adjustment, the difference was \$468.

Applying the ACS-CWI resulted in lower Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child in high-cost areas, which generally reduced the allocations for large cities relative to other locales. As a result, most of the ranges in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between large cities and other locales were reduced. Large cities had the highest cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child in all analyses involving the removal of a single provision, except for the removal of number weighting. For example, removal of the percentage weighting provision resulted in the highest cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child for large cities (\$372) and the lowest cost-adjusted allocation for fringe towns (\$236) (table 6.BB). Similar to the allocation without the cost adjustment, removal of the number weighting provision resulted in the lowest cost-adjusted allocation for large cities (\$350) among all single provision removals.

Removing multiple provisions from the formula in combination resulted in a significant pattern shift compared with the allocations without the ACS-CWI applied. When multiple provisions were removed, remote rural areas had the highest cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, while large suburban areas had the lowest cost-adjusted allocation. For example, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed in combination, the highest cost-adjusted allocation was for remote rural areas (\$418), while the lowest cost-adjusted allocation was for large suburban areas (\$257).

When the ACS-CWI was applied and the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, large cities (or midsize cities in states where large cities were not applicable) received the highest cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child in 6 states (table 6.CC). Remote rural areas had a higher cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child than all other locales in 19 states (compared with 9 states for the unadjusted allocations). There was only one state each in which large and midsize suburban areas had the highest cost-adjusted allocation within the state. There were no states for which fringe towns

had the highest cost-adjusted allocation. After applying the ACS-CWI and removing the hold harmless and number weighting provisions, the states with the smallest differences in the Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child between the locales were Iowa and Wyoming (both \$74), while the states with the largest differences were Alaska (\$425) and South Dakota (\$364).

The cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were higher than the unadjusted allocations for many smaller school districts because they were often in low-cost areas. For example, the cost-adjusted final allocations ranged from \$251 for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 5,000 to 9,999 to \$389 for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (table 6.BB). When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered or when only the hold harmless provision was removed, districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) received the highest cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child compared with other district population sizes. For example, when the hold harmless provision was removed, districts with a population of 25,000 or more received the highest cost-adjusted allocation (\$337), while districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 received the lowest cost-adjusted allocation (\$250). In all the other single provision removals, applying the ACS-CWI resulted in districts with a population of less than 300 having the highest Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child. For example, when the number weighting provision was removed, the highest cost-adjusted allocation (\$408) was for districts with a population of less than 300. Removal of multiple provisions consistently resulted in districts with a population of less than 300 having the highest cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child and districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 having the lowest cost-adjusted allocation. For example, after removing the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions in combination, the cost-adjusted allocation for

districts with a population of less than 300 was \$393, and the cost-adjusted allocation for districts with a population of 10,000 to 24,999 was \$291.

Applying the ACS-CWI increased the relative value of Targeted Grant final allocations per formula-eligible child in low-cost areas and reduced some of the range in allocations. The cost-adjusted final allocation continued to be highest for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$381) and lowest for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (\$182); however, the range between the cost-adjusted allocations (\$199) was smaller than the range for the unadjusted allocations (\$228). When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the highest cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child was for the largest districts in the second-highest poverty quarter (\$424), while the lowest cost-adjusted allocation continued to be for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (\$171).

Another shift was observed in the cost-adjusted allocations with multiple provisions removed. The highest cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocations per formula-eligible child were consistently for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter, while the lowest cost-adjusted allocations were for the largest districts in either the second-lowest poverty quarter or the lowest poverty quarter. For example, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed in combination, the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter received the highest cost-adjusted Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child (\$400), while the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter received the lowest cost-adjusted allocation (\$188). When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed in combination, the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter received the highest cost-adjusted allocation (\$416), while the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter received the lowest cost-adjusted allocation (\$200).

Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG)—Formula Analyses

Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG) are made to states to provide school districts with additional funding for low-income and disadvantaged children. EFIG accounted for approximately \$3.3 billion (23 percent) of

the total Title I funds allocated in fiscal year 2015 (FY 15) (table 1.A), and the average EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was \$282 (all allocations herein are averages).

Highlights

- Arizona and Idaho received the lowest or among the lowest Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocations per formula-eligible child for both the final allocations and for most allocations when single or multiple provisions were removed from the formula (table 7.A). For example, when the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed in combination, the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$241 in Idaho to \$684 in Vermont, a difference of \$443 or 184 percent.
- The EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was higher for large cities than all other locales in all analyses involving the removal of single provisions; this contrasted with the pattern for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. However, when multiple provisions were removed (involving the hold harmless and number weighting provisions), the highest allocation was for remote rural areas, and the second-highest allocation was for large cities (table 7.B). For example, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$341) than all other locales, which ranged from \$243 for small suburban areas and \$245 for large suburban areas to \$328 for large cities (figure 7.9).
- In all the analyses involving the removal of single provisions, the highest poverty quarter had the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child, and the lowest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation (table 7.B). For example, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter had the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$357); the allocation was lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$201) and second lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$205) (figure 7.10).
- Within each poverty quarter, the largest districts generally had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, except when multiple provisions were removed from the formula (table 7.B). For example, when the SPPE provision was removed, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$414) than all other districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$138 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$378 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter.
- Districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) generally had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child than districts of smaller population sizes, except when the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, either alone or in combination (table 7.B). For example, after removal of the percentage weighting provision, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (\$344), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$315) (figure 7.6). In contrast, after removal of the number weighting provision, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 (\$350), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (\$322) (figure 7.5).

Formula Alternatives

This chapter examines several unique formula alternatives compared with the other grant types due to the complexity of the EFIG formula. Similar to the other grants, EFIG allocations were computed using the formula-eligibility criteria only, as well as alternatives that exclude the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, and hold harmless provisions. When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocation computations were essentially made on a per eligible child basis, so the differences in Basic Grant allocations and Concentration Grant allocations among districts of various types were smaller than those observed under other alternatives. For EFIG—and Targeted Grants—the number and percentage weighting provisions were retained. Therefore, in contrast to the patterns for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants, substantial variations existed for allocations based only on the formula-eligibility criteria. When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the same expenditure per student was used for each state, and there were no minimum and maximum thresholds. In general, removal of the SPPE provision meant that states with lower expenditures per student received higher allocations, while states with higher expenditures per student received lower allocations. Excluding the state minimum provision meant that small population states typically received lower allocations since there was no minimum threshold on funding levels.

The hold harmless provision limits the amount a district's allocation can decrease from one year to the next due to population changes. It is important to note that unless a formula provision is removed in conjunction with the hold harmless provision, the long-term impact of removing the other provision may not be fully reflected in the resulting allocation. So, when a provision such as the state minimum is removed from the formula and the hold harmless provision is maintained, the districts in the state are limited to a reduction of no more than 15 percent per year. The hold harmless provision moderates the long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions are fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

EFIG funds are distributed to states based on two unique variables that are not part of the formulas for the other three grants: the state effort provision (the measure of state

effort to provide financial support compared with its relative wealth) and the state equity provision (the degree to which education expenditures within a state are equalized) (see Introduction, Methodology for Allocating Federal Title I Funds for more information). Unlike the other three types of Title I grants, EFIG are first computed at the state level and then distributed to districts within each state. The other district-level calculations, such as the hold harmless provision, only pertain to districts within a state, since the overall state amount is fixed. EFIG allocations are made to states based on state total eligibility (unweighted) and SPPE. EFIG provide funds to districts according to number weighting and percentage weighting provisions that are the same as those for Targeted Grants. The hold harmless and weighting provisions are applied only at the district level.

When the number weighting provision was removed, districts only received additional funding if they had high percentages of formula-eligible children, which favored the highest poverty districts, regardless of size. When the percentage weighting provision was removed, the allocations were based only on the actual number of formula-eligible children, which tended to favor larger districts regardless of poverty level. When the state effort provision was removed, states no longer benefited or were penalized for spending relatively high or low percentages of their per capita income on education. Removing the state equity provision benefited states with larger variations in spending within the state.

Three combinations of provision removals are analyzed in this chapter, all including removal of the hold harmless provision. One combination looks at removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions, which provides an example of the long-term impact of removal of the number weighting provision by not limiting the annual reductions. Another combination looks at removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions, and the third combination looks at removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting provisions.

Formula-Eligibility Criteria Only

For the formula-eligibility criteria for EFIG (as well as for Targeted Grants) retained the number weighting and percentage weighting provisions. Thus, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered in the allocation computations, the differences between the highest and lowest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child across most school district characteristics remained relatively large compared with the smaller differences for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. The exception to the relatively wide

ranges in EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered was for the state-level allocations, when the range was narrower than the range for the final allocations. The allocations ranged from \$280 in 17 states to \$312 in New Hampshire, a range of \$31 or 11 percent (table 7.A). The narrowness of this range, when compared with the final allocation range (\$465 or 212 percent), was primarily due to lower allocations for states at the top of the range. For example, the allocation was \$392 lower in Vermont and \$377 lower in Wyoming, compared with the final allocations. Overall, 27 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 23 states and Puerto Rico had increases.


Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$439) than all other locales, which ranged from \$159 for fringe towns to \$335 for midsize cities (table 7.B; figure 7.1). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was \$280 or 177 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, large cities and midsize cities had the largest increase (both +\$44), and remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$145).

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, districts in the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$335), which was \$17 lower than the final allocation. Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$193), which was \$16 lower than the final allocation. The EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child in the highest poverty quarter was \$142 or 73 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter (\$193).

Similar to the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the largest districts in

the highest poverty quarter had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$452) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$131 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$434 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of \$452, compared with an allocation of \$169 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$283 or 168 percent). This range (\$283) between the largest and smallest districts was more than twice as wide as the range for the final allocations (\$118). Compared with the final allocations, applying only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in the largest increase (+\$68) for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$134) for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$386) than districts of other sizes, similar to the pattern for the final allocations. The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499 (\$139). Also, the allocations for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$158), districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$145), and districts with a population of 600 to 999 (\$143) were lower than for districts with larger population sizes. The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$248, which was more than twice the difference for the final allocations (\$115). Compared with the final allocations, using only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in the largest increase (+\$49) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and the largest decrease (-\$175) for districts with a population of less than 300. Districts with a population of 300 to 599 had a decrease of \$121 in their EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child, and districts with a population of 600 to 999 had a decrease of \$111.

Figure 7.1. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation when only formula-eligibility criteria were considered, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

² EFIG are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children (without the application of the formula weights) is at least 10 and that number constitutes at least 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE)

When the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision was removed from the formula, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child increased in lower spending states and decreased in higher spending states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline were redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds. Contrary to the formula for Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, and Targeted Grants, the determination of EFIG state allocations preceded the distribution to individual districts within each state. While there was an attempt to limit reductions of more than 15 percent of the prior year's allocation to each eligible district, if a state's allocation dropped below a certain level (and since there was no state hold harmless provision), there was not sufficient funding to preserve the legislated hold harmless amounts for the state's districts. In this formula alternative, 11 states—either at the maximum SPPE amount or at least significantly above the national average SPPE—had their district hold harmless allocations reduced to some fraction of the statutory amounts.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child increased in lower spending states and decreased in higher spending states. For example, compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the allocations when the SPPE provision was removed were in Arkansas and Puerto Rico (both +\$27), and the largest decreases were in Connecticut (-\$73) and Maryland (-\$71) (table 7.A). The allocations ranged from \$241 in Idaho to \$684 in Vermont, a difference of \$443 or 184 percent. This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$465 or 212 percent). Overall, 19 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 31 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG


allocation per formula-eligible child (\$391) than all other locales, which ranged from \$201 for fringe towns to \$312 for remote rural areas (table 7.B; figure 7.2). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was \$190 or 94 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, the differences in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child by locale were relatively small, with differences under \$7.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$349). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$192). The allocation for the highest poverty quarter was \$157 or 82 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$143). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was \$17 lower for the lowest poverty quarter and \$2 lower for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there was an increase of \$8 for the second-highest poverty quarter and an increase of \$2 for the second-lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$414) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$138 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$378 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of \$414, compared with an allocation of \$304 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$110 or 36 percent). This range (\$110) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was narrower than the range for the final allocations (\$118). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$19) for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$24) for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more

Figure 7.2. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

² A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE. For EFIG, however, these rules differ slightly: 34 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the minimum (instead of 32 percent) and 46 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the maximum (instead of 48 percent).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

(the largest districts) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. In contrast to the pattern when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered but similar to the pattern for the final allocations, both districts with the largest and districts with the smallest population sizes had the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child. The highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (\$343), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$329). The difference in the allocations between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$127, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in lower EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for smaller districts (ranging from less than -\$1 to -\$9) and a higher allocation for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$6).

Removal of State Minimum

The state minimum provision provides a minimum allocation threshold for each state. When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child increased slightly for many states but decreased substantially for many of the states receiving the state minimum allocation. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

Nine states and the District of Columbia met the EFIG state minimum provision (figure I.3). Removal of the state minimum provision from the formula had an impact of less than \$5 per formula-eligible child for the majority of states, but it reduced the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child by more than \$100 in 6 of the 10 states that received the state minimum allocation (table 7.A). For example, when the state minimum provision was removed, Vermont's allocation decreased by \$352, North Dakota's decreased by \$348, Wyoming's decreased by \$296, South


Dakota's decreased by \$187, New Hampshire's decreased by \$176, and Alaska's decreased by \$161. The states ranged from \$221 in Idaho to \$405 in the District of Columbia, a difference of \$184 or 83 percent. This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$465 or 212 percent). Overall, 9 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 41 states and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$398) than all other locales, which ranged from \$207 for fringe towns to \$292 for midsize cities (table 7.B; figure 7.3). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was \$191 or 92 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$24) and remote towns had the second-largest decrease (-\$9); in contrast, large cities had the largest increase (+\$3).

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$353). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$203). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, there was a decrease of \$6 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter and a decrease of \$2 for the second-lowest poverty quarter; in contrast, there was an increase of \$2 for the highest poverty quarter and an increase of \$1 for the second-highest poverty quarter. When the state minimum provision was removed, the difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (\$353) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$203) was \$150 or 74 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$425) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$159 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$379 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty

Figure 7.3. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state minimum provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of \$425, compared with an allocation of \$300 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$125 or 42 percent). This range (\$125) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was wider than the range for the final allocations (\$118) but narrower than the range when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered (\$283). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$4) for the largest districts

in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$14) for the smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the state minimum provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$340), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$291). In contrast

to the pattern when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered but similar to the pattern for the final allocations, both districts with the largest and districts with the smallest population sizes had the highest allocations. Similar to the final allocations, the lowest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$223). After removal of the state minimum provision, the difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$117, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in the largest decreases in allocations for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$41), districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-\$18), and districts with a population of 600 to 999 (-\$11). The largest increase was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+\$2).

Removal of Hold Harmless

Removal of the hold harmless provision allows the current formula provisions and distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocations; with the hold harmless provision the allocations are limited by the maximum yearly reductions. Removal of the hold harmless provision permits reductions of over 15 percent for school districts that may have relatively large decreases in the number of formula-eligible children compared with other districts. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure, removal of the hold harmless provision did not change the FY 15 state-level allocations compared with the final allocations.

Similar to the final allocation and allocations with other provisions removed, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$396) than all other locales, which ranged from \$204 for fringe towns to \$298 for midsize cities (table 7.B; figure 7.4). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was \$192 or 94 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$22) and distant rural areas had the second-largest decrease (-\$9); in contrast, midsize cities had the largest increase (+\$7).


When the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$347). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter

(\$215). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, there was an increase of \$6 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter, an increase of \$4 for the second-lowest poverty quarter, and an increase of \$2 for the second-highest poverty quarter. In contrast, there was a decrease of \$4 for the highest poverty quarter. When the hold harmless provision was removed, the difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the highest poverty quarter (\$347) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$215) was \$133 or 62 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$428) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$168 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$375 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of \$428, compared with an allocation of \$286 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$143 or 50 percent). This range (\$143) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was larger than the range for the final allocations (\$118) but smaller than the range when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered (\$283). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$9) for the second-largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$16) for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter.

After removal of the hold harmless provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$342), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$275). In contrast to the pattern when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered but similar to the pattern for the final allocations, both districts with the largest and districts with the smallest population sizes had the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child. Similar to the final allocations, the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$220). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between

Figure 7.4. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$122, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless provision resulted in lower allocations for districts with populations under 10,000 and an increase of \$4 for districts with

a population of 25,000 or more. The largest decreases in EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$57), districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-\$24), and districts with a population of 600 to 999 (-\$20).

Removal of Number Weighting

Removal of the number weighting provision from the formula decreased the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child compared with the final allocations, since some large but low-poverty districts benefited from the number weighting provision. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure to states, removal of the number weighting provision did not change the state-level allocations compared with the final allocations.

Similar to the final allocations and other allocations with single provisions removed, when the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$379) than all other locales, which ranged from \$219 for small suburban areas to \$330 for remote rural areas (table 7.B; figure 7.5). The difference between the allocations for large cities and small suburban areas was \$160 or 73 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, large cities had the largest decrease (-\$16); in contrast, distant towns had the largest increase (+\$23).

When the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$358). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$206) and second lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$207). Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, there was an increase of \$6 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were decreases of \$3 to \$6 for lower poverty quarters. When the number weighting provision was removed, the difference in the allocations between the highest poverty quarter (\$358) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$206) was


\$151 or 73 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$401) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$178 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$376 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of \$401, compared with an allocation of \$325 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$76 or 23 percent). This range (\$76) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was narrower than the range for the final allocations (\$118) and allocations with any other single provision removed. Compared with the final allocation, removal of the number weighting provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$24) for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$31) for the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the number weighting provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$350), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$322). Removal of the number weighting provision was the one exception to the general pattern of the largest districts having the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child when removing a single provision. Similar to the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$240). The difference in the allocations between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$110, which was slightly smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$115).

Removal of the number weighting provision from the formula resulted in higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for smaller districts and a decrease of \$16 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more. For districts with populations under 10,000, the allocations with the removal of the number weighting provision were between \$17 and \$19 higher than the final allocations. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the number weighting provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$19) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-\$16) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more.

Figure 7.5. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with number weighting provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Removal of Percentage Weighting

Removal of the percentage weighting provision from the formula generally resulted in decreases in EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for high-poverty, smaller school districts, while districts with populations of 10,000 or more received higher allocations, because of the number weighting provision. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the percentage weighting provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the percentage weighting provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure, removal of the percentage weighting provision did not change the state-level allocations compared with the final allocations.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$403) than all other locales, which ranged from \$200 for fringe towns to \$294 for remote rural areas and midsize cities (table 7.B; figure 7.6). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was \$203 or 101 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed, large cities had the largest increase (+\$8); in contrast, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-\$16).


When the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$347). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$216) and second-lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$218). Compared with the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed, there was a decrease of \$4 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were increases of \$1 to \$7 for lower

poverty quarters. When the percentage weighting provision was removed, the difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the highest poverty quarter (\$347) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$216) was \$131 or 61 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$428) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$169 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$386 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of \$428, compared with an allocation of \$279 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$149 or 53 percent). This range (\$149) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was larger than the range for the final allocations (\$118) and the allocations for any of the other formula alternatives, except for when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered (\$283). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the percentage weighting provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$8) for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$23) for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter.

After removal of the percentage weighting provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$344), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$315). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 (\$216), and the allocations for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$218) and districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499 children (\$249) were slightly higher. The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$128, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the percentage weighting provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$7) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and the largest decrease (-\$17) for districts with a population of less than 300.

Figure 7.6. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with percentage weighting provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Removal of State Effort

The state effort provision (the measure of state effort to provide financial support compared with its relative wealth) affected the state-level EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child, unlike some other provisions that affected only the school district-level allocations within states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state effort provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state effort provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

Compared with the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed from the formula, the largest decreases in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were in Connecticut (-\$22), Maryland (-\$21), and New Jersey (-\$21), and the largest increases were in Minnesota (+\$13) and Iowa, Virginia, Kansas, Washington, and Puerto Rico (all +\$12) (table 7.A). Overall, 20 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 30 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.


Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the state effort provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$396) than the other locales, which ranged from \$203 for fringe towns and \$204 for small suburban areas to \$309 for remote rural areas (table 7.B; figure 7.7). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was \$193 or 95 percent, which was slightly larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed, small suburban areas and fringe towns had the largest decreases (both -\$14); in contrast, large suburban areas had the largest increase (+\$1).

When the state effort provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$351). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter

(\$206) and second lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$215). Compared with the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed, there was a decrease of \$3 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter and a decrease of \$1 for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were increases of \$2 for the second-highest poverty quarter and \$1 for the second-lowest poverty quarter. When the state effort provision was removed, the difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (\$351) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$206) was \$145 or 70 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$422) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$154 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$378 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of \$422, compared with allocations of \$300 in both the smallest and second-smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$123 or 41 percent). This range (\$123) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was slightly larger than the range for the final allocations (\$118). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state effort provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$8) for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$8) for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the state effort provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$341), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$333). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$219). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$122, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state effort provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$3) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and the largest decrease (-\$5) for districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499.

Figure 7.7. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state effort provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Removal of State Equity

The state equity provision (the degree to which education expenditures within a state are equalized) is designed to increase the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child in states with smaller variations in spending by school districts within the states. Removing this factor increased the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for states with larger variations of spending by districts within the states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state equity provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state equity provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year's decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

Compared with the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed from the formula, the largest increases in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were in Illinois (+\$33) and Idaho (+\$22); the largest decreases were in Puerto Rico (-\$27) and Maryland (-\$19) (table 7.A). Across the states, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from \$241 in 9 states and Puerto Rico to \$684 in Vermont, a difference of \$443 or 184 percent. This was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$465 or 212 percent). Overall, 26 states and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 24 states and the District of Columbia had no changes or increases.


Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the state equity provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$411) than all other locales, which ranged from \$199 for fringe towns and \$203 for fringe rural areas to \$305 for remote rural areas (table 7.B; figure 7.8). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was \$212 or 107 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed, fringe rural areas and midsize suburban areas had the largest decreases (both -\$11); in contrast, large cities had the largest increase (+\$16).

When the state equity provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest

EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$358). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$199) and second lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$208). Compared with the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed, there was an increase of \$6 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were decreases of \$3 to \$10 for lower poverty quarters. When the state equity provision was removed, the difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the highest poverty quarter (\$358) and the lowest poverty quarter (\$199) was \$159 or 80 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation (\$433) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from \$143 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to \$388 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of \$433, compared with an allocation of \$301 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of \$132 or 44 percent). This range (\$132) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was larger than the range for the final allocations (\$118). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state equity provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$13) for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$19) for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the state equity provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$343), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$329). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$216). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$127, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state equity provision resulted in the largest increase (+\$6) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and the largest decrease (-\$8) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999.

Figure 7.8. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state equity provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Removal of Hold Harmless and Number Weighting

Removal of multiple formula provisions can lead to a better understanding of the interaction of those provisions and enable a more complete analysis of the implications of individual provisions. In particular, removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions in combination provides information on the long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision. Removing the number weighting provision alone affects the initial allocations, but it also has a long-term impact when the initial decreases for some school districts are not restricted to the one-year hold harmless reduction limits (-15 percent). Removing the number weighting provision resulted in a decrease in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for large districts because some large but low-poverty districts received additional funding from the number weighting provision. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure, removal of the number weighting provision did not change the state-level allocations compared with the final allocations. Since removing the number weighting provision had no impact on the state-level allocations, removing the hold harmless provision also did not result in any additional changes at the state level compared with the final allocations.


When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$341) than all other locales, which ranged from \$243 for small suburban areas and \$245 for large suburban areas to \$328 for large cities (table 7.B; figure 7.9); this pattern contrasted with the pattern for the final allocations and allocations with single provisions removed. The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and small suburban areas was \$98 or 41 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increase was for distant towns (+\$50), and the only decrease was for large cities (-\$67).

Although there was no difference between the national EFIG allocation and the national final allocation when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, there were differences within states. Large cities (or midsize cities in states where large cities were not applicable) received higher EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child than all other locales in 35 states (table 2.E); when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, large cities (or midsize cities in states where large cities were not applicable) received higher allocations than all other locales

in only 13 states (table 7.C). Remote rural areas received higher EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child than all other locales in 4 states (table 2.E); when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, remote rural areas received higher allocations than any of the other locales in 9 states (table 7.C). After removing the hold harmless and number weighting provisions, there was only one state each where large and midsize suburban areas and fringe towns had the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child within the state. For example, only in West Virginia did fringe towns have a higher allocation (\$403) than all other locales within the state. The states with the smallest ranges in EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child among the locales were Wyoming (\$62), Iowa (\$64), and Utah (\$64), while the states with the largest ranges among the locales were Michigan (\$355) and New York (\$351).

When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$359) (table 7.B; figure 7.9). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$201) and second lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$217). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, there were increases of \$8 in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter and for the lowest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$13) and the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$6). When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, the difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (\$359) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$201) was \$158 or 79 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$143 or 68 percent).

When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the largest districts within each poverty quarter did not have higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts; for the final allocations, the largest districts consistently had higher allocations than smaller districts. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a lower allocation (\$341) than smaller districts in that quarter, which ranged from \$354 for the smallest districts to \$373 for the second-largest districts. Within the highest poverty quarter, the second-largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of \$373, compared with an allocation of \$341 for the largest districts in that quarter (a range of \$32 or 9 percent). This range (\$32) between the largest and smallest districts in

Figure 7.9. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless and number weighting provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

the highest poverty quarter was smaller than the range for the final allocations (\$118). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (+\$65) and the largest decreases for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$80) and the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (-\$79).

After removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$328), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$297). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$269). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district

population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$59, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+\$50) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-\$47) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts).

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE), Hold Harmless, and Number Weighting

Removal of multiple provisions generally produced patterns that differed from those for the final allocations or allocations with single provisions removed. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure, removal of these three provisions in combination resulted in the same state-level allocations as when the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision was removed individually. When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child increased in lower spending states and decreased in higher spending states.

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$241 in Idaho to \$684 in Vermont, a difference of \$443 or 184 percent (table 7.A). This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$465 or 212 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increases were in Arkansas and Puerto Rico (both +\$27), and the largest decreases were in Connecticut (-\$73) and Maryland (-\$71). Overall, 22 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 28 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$350) than all other locales, which ranged from \$240 for small suburban areas and \$247 for large suburban areas to \$319 for large cities (table 7.B; figure 7.10); this contrasted with the pattern for the final allocations and allocations with single provisions removed. The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and small suburban areas was \$110 or 46 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting


provisions were removed, the largest increase was for remote towns (+\$58), and the only decrease was for large cities (-\$76).

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$357). School districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$201) and second lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$205). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, there were increases in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (+\$5) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (+\$1); in contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$12) and the lowest poverty quarter (-\$4). When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (\$357) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$201) was \$156 or 78 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$143 or 68 percent).

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the largest districts within each poverty quarter did not consistently have higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts; for the final allocations, the largest districts did consistently have higher allocations than smaller districts. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a lower allocation (\$328) than smaller districts in that quarter, which ranged from \$364 in the smallest districts to \$369 in the second-largest districts. The range (\$41) between the districts with the highest and lowest allocations was smaller than the range for the final allocations (\$118). Compared with the final allocations, the removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+\$63) for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$92) for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. There were also decreases for the largest districts for the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$57) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$68).

After removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$332), and the second-highest

Figure 7.10. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), hold harmless, and number weighting provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 (\$296). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$267). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$65, which was smaller than the difference

for the final allocations (\$115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+\$48) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-\$45) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts).

Removal of State Minimum, Hold Harmless, and Number Weighting

Removal of multiple provisions produced patterns that differed from those for the final allocations or allocations with single provisions removed. When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child increased slightly in many states and decreased in state minimum states. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure, removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions had no impact on the state-level allocations; however, removing these two provisions in combination with the state minimum provision produced the same state-level results as when the state minimum provision was removed individually.

Removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination had an impact of less than \$5 per formula-eligible child for the majority of states, but it reduced the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child by more than \$100 in 6 of the 10 states that received the state minimum allocation (table 7.A). For example, Vermont's EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child decreased by \$352, North Dakota's decreased by \$348, Wyoming's decreased by \$296, South Dakota's decreased by \$187, New Hampshire's decreased by \$176, and Alaska's decreased by \$161. Overall, the states ranged from \$221 in Idaho to \$405 in the District of Columbia, a difference of \$184 or 83 percent. This difference was the same as the difference when the state minimum provision was removed and smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$465 or 212 percent). Overall, 9 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 41 states and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.


Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$330) than all other locales, which ranged from \$241 for small suburban areas and \$247 for large suburban areas to \$315 for remote rural areas (table 7.B; figure 7.11). The difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for large cities and small suburban areas was \$89 or 37 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increases were for distant towns and fringe towns (both +\$50), and the only decrease was for large cities (-\$65).

When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$361). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$199) and second lowest for the lowest poverty quarter (\$211). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, there were increases in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (+\$9) and for the lowest poverty quarter (+\$2); in contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-\$15) and the second-highest poverty quarter (-\$5). When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (\$361) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (\$199) was \$162 or 82 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations (\$143 or 68 percent).

When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the largest districts within each poverty quarter did not consistently have higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts; for the final allocations, the largest districts did consistently have higher allocations than smaller districts. Within the highest poverty quarter, the second-largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of \$375, compared with an allocation of \$344 for the largest districts and an allocation of \$352 for the smallest districts (a range of \$31 or 9 percent). This range (\$31) between the districts with the highest and lowest allocations was smaller than the range for the final allocations (\$118). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+\$69) in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-\$78) for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter. There were also relatively large decreases for the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-\$54) and the highest poverty quarter (-\$76).

After removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) (\$293), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) (\$292).

Figure 7.11. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015



¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 (\$270). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was \$23, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations (\$115). Compared with the final allocations,

removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+\$49) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-\$45) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more. The second-largest decrease was for districts with a population of less than 300 (-\$41).

Cost Adjustment Using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI)

Applying the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) increased the relative value of the EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child in low-cost areas and affected the differences between allocations using the various formula alternatives. When adjusted by the ACS-CWI, the EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$221 in California to \$798 in Vermont (a difference of \$577) (table 7.AA). This difference was larger than the difference without the cost adjustment (\$465). This increase in the difference between the highest and lowest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child when applying the ACS-CWI was also observed when various provisions were removed. For example, the cost-adjusted allocations when the SPPE provision was removed ranged from \$243 in California to \$798 in Vermont (a difference of \$555); without the cost adjustment, the difference was \$443.

When the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were cost adjusted, large cities (\$383) and remote rural areas (\$382) still had the highest allocations, but the difference between the two locales decreased from \$86 to \$1 due to the relatively low cost of living in rural areas (table 7.BB). In addition, there were some circumstances where the removal of a single provision resulted in remote rural areas having the highest cost-adjusted allocation. For example, when the number weighting provision was removed, remote rural areas (\$407) had the highest cost-adjusted EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child and large cities (\$368) had the

second-highest cost-adjusted allocation; large suburban areas had the lowest cost-adjusted allocation (\$244).

Since many of the small school districts were in low-cost areas, their EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were higher after applying the ACS-CWI. For example, the cost-adjusted EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from \$245 for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 5,000 to 9,999 to \$402 for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts). Removing only the hold harmless provision resulted in districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) receiving the highest cost-adjusted EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child (\$342), while districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 received the lowest cost-adjusted allocation (\$243). In all other formula alternatives, applying the ACS-CWI resulted in the smallest districts having the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child.

The cost-adjusted EFIG final allocation per formula-eligible child continued to be highest for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$394) and lowest for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (\$166), but the difference between the highest and lowest cost-adjusted allocations was smaller than the difference for the unadjusted allocations (\$258). When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the highest cost-adjusted EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (\$445), and the lowest cost-adjusted allocation continued to be for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (\$134).

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Title I Expert Panel

Bruce Baker

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Bruce Baker's primary areas of research are education finance and the economics of education. He has written extensively on issues concerning educational equity and adequacy and has testified as an expert witness on issues surrounding school funding equity in state and federal courts. Baker's current research interest is making research accessible to policymakers. He teaches courses in data analysis at the doctoral level and education law at the master's level.

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Sandy Brown served in the Department of Education's Student Achievement and School Accountability (SASA) program office and was responsible for administering several programs, including Title I, Part A grants to local education agencies. Brown was responsible for overseeing the financial aspects of SASA's programs, including the allocation and distribution of funds to states, school districts, and individual schools and the administration of the law's fiscal requirements.

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David Figlio conducts research on a wide range of education and health policy issues, from school accountability and standards to welfare policy and policy design. He is also leading a National Science Foundation-sponsored national network to facilitate the use of matched administrative datasets to inform and evaluate education policy. Figlio is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a member of the executive board for the National Center for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Education Research.

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Stephen Frank advises on research, methodology, and data analytics as well as state practices for Education Resource Strategies, a national nonprofit. Over the past 14 years, Frank has led strategy development projects in school systems across the country. He also led a 2-year project, funded by Race to the Top (RTT), with the Georgia Department of Education to help it refine a strategy for school district support in resource allocation, including ways to increase resource flexibilities for local education agencies. Most recently, he directed a similar RTT-funded multiyear project with the New York State Education Department and helped to launch the Partnership for Strategic School Management.

Nora Gordon

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Nora Gordon's research focuses on American education policy, with an emphasis on the federal role in elementary and secondary education. She has studied the distributional impacts of Title I, fiscal rules governing federal education grants, the Community Eligibility Provision, state school finance reforms, causes and consequences of school desegregation, and school district consolidation. Her research has been published in various journals—including the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, the *Journal of Public Economics*, and the *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*—and has been funded by the National Science Foundation, the Spencer Foundation for Education Research, the American Educational Research Association, and the Smith Richardson Foundation. Her popular writing appears in outlets including the *New York Times*, *Education Week*, and *TheAtlantic.com*.

Gordon has testified before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions and the House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education on implementation of the Every Student Succeeds Act. She has served on DC's State Title I Committee of Practitioners and currently serves on the Professional Advisory Board of the National Center for Learning Disabilities and as associate editor of the *Journal of Human Resources*. Prior to her appointment at Georgetown, Gordon was on the faculty of the Department of Economics at the University of California, San Diego.

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Wayne Riddle is an independent nonpartisan consultant on federal elementary and secondary education policy, specifically with respect to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). He consults with a variety of education and public policy organizations and associations, especially on Title I accountability policies and allocation formulas. From 1978 to 2008, Riddle was the lead analyst on ESEA overall, and Title I in particular, for the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. He was closely involved in CRS's initial efforts to develop the capability to estimate the impact of alternative allocation formulas for Title I, as well as other federal elementary and secondary education programs.

R. Anthony Rolle

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R. Anthony Rolle is a past president of the National Education Finance Academy. His academic research interests contribute to knowledge of organizational productivity and public finance equity by investigating their undercultivated dimensions. Specifically, Rolle's theoretical policy research explores and improves relative measures of economic efficiency for public schools, and his empirical policy research explores and applies concepts of vertical equity to efficacy analyses of state education finance mechanisms.

Lori L. Taylor

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Lori L. Taylor is professor and head of the Department of Public Service and Administration in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. She also currently serves as a member of the editorial board for AERA Open; as a member of the board of directors for the Association for Education Finance and Policy; as a member of the board of governors for the Regional Education Laboratory (REL) Southwest; and as the principal investigator for the Texas Smart Schools Initiative. Taylor developed the National Center for Education Statistics' Comparable Wage Index and has written extensively on variations in the cost of education, the determinants of school district efficiency, and teacher compensation.

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Kenneth Wong has conducted extensive research in the politics of education and governance redesign (including city and state takeover, management reform, and Title I schoolwide reform). His research has received support from the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Education, the Social Science Research Council, the Spencer Foundation, the Joyce Foundation, the Broad Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the British Council, and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Wong has advised Congress, the Secretaries of Education and Interior, state legislatures, governors, mayors, and the leadership in several large urban school systems on how to redesign accountability frameworks.

Documentation for the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI): 2013–15

The ACS-CWI was developed and produced by the U.S. Census Bureau in collaboration with Lori L. Taylor, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Stephen Q. Cornman, National Center for Education Statistics; Laura C. Nixon and Matthew J. Spence, Education Demographic, Geographic, and Economic Statistics (EDGE) Branch, Economic Reimbursable Surveys Division (ERD) provided direct assistance in this collaborative effort.

Introduction

The Comparable Wage Index (CWI) was initially created by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to facilitate comparison of educational expenditures across locales, principally school districts or local education agencies (LEAs) and states or state education agencies (SEAs).¹ The CWI is a measure of the systematic regional variations in the wages and salaries of college graduates who are not prekindergarten through grade 12 educators (in this context, those with occupations or employers in elementary or secondary education). It can be used by researchers to adjust district-level finance data at different levels and ultimately make better comparisons across geographic areas.

This documentation describes the creation of a CWI based primarily on the American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS, an ongoing survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, has replaced the decennial census as the primary source of detailed demographic information about the U.S. population. It provides information about the earnings, age, occupation, industry, and other demographic characteristics of millions of U.S. workers. The American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) measures wage and salary differences of college graduates using an analysis that is modeled on the baseline analysis used to construct the original CWI released by NCES in 2006.

The remainder of this documentation includes background information, detailed information about the ACS-CWI, a user guide, and a glossary of terms.

Background

Geographic cost data for states, metropolitan areas, and school districts are frequently and widely requested by policymakers, practitioners, the school finance research community, and the public. In response, NCES has engaged in a long tradition of publishing research and analysis on geographic cost indexes.² This report documents the newly developed American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI).

The goal of any geographic cost index is to measure uncontrollable differences in the purchasing power of school districts so that comparisons among districts or across time can be based on real educational resources. Where costs are high, districts are unable to purchase as many real resources for each dollar of expenditure; where costs are low, districts have greater purchasing power and are able to purchase more real resources. In other words, districts in high-cost environments must spend more than districts in low-cost environments to provide the same level of educational services. A geographic cost index describes how much more. The cost of labor, particularly the wages paid to teachers, is one of the primary costs for districts. For this reason, NCES has focused on measuring the variation in labor costs by geographic location.

The ACS-CWI is designed to identify geographic variation in wages of college-educated workers outside the education field after controlling for job-related and demographic characteristics.³ The basic premise of any CWI is that all types of workers demand higher wages in areas where the cost of living is high or desirable local amenities (such as

¹ The CWI was initially developed by Lori L. Taylor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, and William J. Fowler Jr. at NCES. Taylor's research was supported by a contract with NCES. The complete description of the research is provided in the NCES Research and Development report *A Comparable Wage Approach to Geographic Cost Adjustment* (NCES 2006-321).

² For example, see Barrow (1994), Brazer and Anderson (1983), Chambers (1998), Fowler and Monk (2001), Goldhaber (1999), Taylor and Fowler (2006), and Taylor and Keller (2003).

³ The ACS asks respondents questions related to income in the past 12 months. If respondents report receiving income from "[w]ages, salary, commissions, bonuses, or tips from all jobs," they are asked to "[r]eport [the] amount before deductions for taxes, bonds, dues, or other items" for the 12 months prior to the response date. Any future reference to "wage(s)" or "wage(s) and salary(ies)" in this documentation includes all of the income items contained in the questions.

good climate, low crime rates, or access to beaches, museums, and restaurants) are lacking. As a result, it should be possible to measure most of the geographic variation in the cost of hiring teachers and other prekindergarten (preK) through grade 12 educators by observing systematic regional variations in the wages of comparable workers who are not preK–12 educators.⁴

In theory, if accountants, nurses, and computer programmers, for example, all earn 5 percent more than the national average for their professions in Houston, then it is reasonable to expect that the cost of hiring teachers in Houston would also be 5 percent more than the national average for teachers.

The ACS-CWI has been developed as a special tabulation of restricted-use data from the three most recent years of the ACS. The ACS-CWI measures local differences in the prevailing wage for college graduates in all jobs, except education.

The ACS-CWI updates and improves on the baseline analysis used to estimate the initial CWI developed by NCES (Taylor and Fowler 2006). The initial CWI was based on public-use data from the 2000 Census. The initial CWI based labor market definitions on Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs), which are “special non-overlapping areas that partition each state into congruous geographic units containing no fewer than 100,000 people each.”⁵ In constructing the ACS-CWI, U.S. Census Bureau researchers have access to the restricted-use files and are therefore able to base the labor market definitions on counties, which are the units of analysis most commonly used by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to define labor markets.⁶ As a result, in stark contrast to the initial CWI released by NCES that provided labor cost estimates for 800 labor market areas, the ACS-CWI provides labor cost estimates for 1,570 labor market areas.

The ACS-CWI incorporates the recommendations of a panel of experts on the CWI, which was convened by NCES in January 2012. The panel recommended that NCES annually produce and release geographic adjustment factors

for educational expenditures.⁷ The panel recommended that the factors be based on 1 year of restricted-access data produced by the ACS but also recognized that it may be desirable to base the estimation on multiple years. The ACS-CWI uses 3 years of restricted-access data to contain sufficient sample sizes in optimally sized labor markets for high data quality. Going forward, a rolling sample of the 3 most recent years of the ACS will be utilized to update the ACS-CWI each year.

Strengths and weaknesses of the Comparable Wage Index

A CWI offers many advantages over other geographic cost adjustment methodologies.⁸ A CWI can be estimated from existing data, making it more cost effective to estimate and update than other approaches.

A CWI clearly measures costs that are beyond the control of school district administrators. Unlike cost adjustments that are based on analyses of school district expenditures (as in Chambers 1998 and Taylor, Chambers, and Robinson 2004) there is no risk that a CWI confuses high-spending school districts with high-cost school districts and no need to rely on statistical techniques and researcher judgment to separate controllable from uncontrollable costs.

A CWI is also appropriate regardless of the competitiveness of teacher labor markets. If a lack of competition in the teacher market distorts teacher compensation patterns, then cost indexes based on teacher compensation will be biased, but a CWI will not (Goldhaber 1999; Hanushek 1999).

A CWI reflects differences in amenities as well as the cost of living. As such, it is a more complete price index than the cost of living indexes used for regional cost adjustments in the Colorado and Wyoming school funding formulas (Taylor 2015). Cost of living indexes, like the Wyoming Cost of Living Index, have been criticized for overestimating labor costs in locations where attractive amenities make those locations desirable places to live and work (Rothstein and Smith 1997; Stoddard 2005; Taylor 2015).

⁴ For example, see Alexander et al. (2000), Goldhaber (1999), Guthrie and Rothstein (1999), Rothstein and Smith (1997), Stoddard (2005), Taylor (2006), Taylor (2015), and Taylor et al. (2002).

⁵ For the full PUMA definition, go to <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/technical-documentation/pums/about.html>.

⁶ The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics provides wage and employment data for counties, metropolitan areas, and nonmetropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas “consist of one or more counties (or towns and cities in New England) and contain a core area with a substantial population that has a high degree of economic and social integration with the surrounding areas.” For more information, go to <https://stats.bls.gov/bls/blswage.htm>.

⁷ The panel made the following recommendations:

- NCES should annually produce and release geographic adjustment factors for educational expenditures (GAFEEs).
- GAFEEs should (a) support both cross-sectional and temporal comparisons and (b) be accompanied by detailed documentation of the data sources, methodology, and statistical uncertainties in their values.
- GAFEEs should be based on 1 year of restricted-access data produced by ACS and be reported as rapidly as possible once data become available.
- GAFEEs should be calculated using a modification of the current CWI base-year methodology that (a) accounts properly for the state-level random effects and estimates these effects correctly, (b) does not exclude industry and occupation classifications related to education, (c) includes the ACS degree field variable as a predictor, and (d) properly includes weights in the mixed model as well as in mean calculations across geographic localities.
- GAFEEs should be reported to no more than two decimal places (x.yy).

⁸ For a more detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the CWI approach, see Taylor (2015) and Taylor and Fowler (2006).

Another advantage of a CWI is its general applicability. Because the resulting cost index is based on systematic differences in the general wage level, it can be used to measure labor costs not only for public elementary and secondary education but also for private schools, job training programs, and postsecondary institutions.

There are also several limitations to using a CWI to measure variations in the cost of education. First, a CWI is a labor cost index, and labor cost is only part of the total cost of education—albeit a very large part. It could be problematic to apply a labor cost index, such as NCES’s initial CWI or the ACS-CWI, to school district expenditures that are not affected by labor cost differentials, such as energy costs (Smith et al. 2003).

Second, the labor cost model underlying any CWI presumes that workers are mobile. If moving costs or other barriers to moving slow worker migration, then “labor cost may temporarily diverge from what would be expected given local amenities and the local cost of living. Employers in fast-growing industries and school districts in fast-growing areas may need to pay a temporary premium to attract workers. [A] CWI cannot capture this effect” (Taylor 2006, p. 352).

Third, a CWI is constructed with the assumption that educators and the noneducator population under analysis are comparable with respect to their tastes for amenities and the cost of living. If comparability breaks down, then a CWI becomes a poor proxy for the cost of educator labor. Another aspect of this limitation exists when there are teacher preferences for teaching in certain types of schools rather than others, and local schools offer higher wage rates for specific types of schools or in certain subjects. For example, in some areas, teachers are offered higher salaries as an incentive to teach in high-poverty schools. These relatively higher salaries for teachers may not be reflected in the ACS-CWI model.

Fourth, a CWI is an estimate from a sample survey and is subject to the usual criticisms of sample-based research, including sampling error.⁹ As a result, data users will need to account for this variability when making claims about differences between estimated means. The ACS-CWI estimates are reported along with standard errors to facilitate this review.

⁹ The ACS-CWI is also subject to nonsampling error such as nonresponse error, coverage error, measurement error, and processing error. For more information on ACS methodology, go to <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/>.

Finally, a CWI is based on labor markets, not school districts. It is not designed to capture variations in cost across school districts within a single labor market, such as those cost differences that might be attributable to working conditions in specific school districts. It is also not designed to map perfectly onto school district boundaries. When school districts operate in multiple labor markets (as may be the case when districts cross county lines), researchers must develop strategies for matching index values to school districts. Such strategies may introduce measurement error.

The ACS-CWI

The ACS-CWI is derived from a regression analysis of individual wage data. The data for the analysis come from the 2013, 2014, and 2015 survey years of the ACS because a 3-year span yields a much larger sample and more precise estimates of wages by location than could be generated using a single year of data. The larger sample also permits a much finer geographic breakdown than would be possible in an analysis based on a single year of data.

The ACS asks respondents about employment characteristics, including location of workplace. Geography contributes to and is involved in ACS sampling, data collection, weighting, and data tabulation activities. The place of work geographies are derived from the respondents’ answers to the survey and are not based on where the surveys are sent, which helps reduce the possibility of disclosure. The place of work geographies for this tabulation are counties.

The ACS collects respondents’ total wages and not wages by job. Respondents with more than one job are identified by their primary occupation and industry, but their total wages and hours worked may be based on more than one job. If hourly earnings differ between a respondent’s primary and secondary job, this introduces a possible source of measurement error because the ACS-CWI regression model attributes all wages to the primary occupation and industry.¹⁰ The estimated coefficients for specific occupations or industries in which multiple job holding is more common, such as firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and dental hygienists, may be particularly affected. (Teachers are another occupation with relatively high rates of multiple job holding, but they are excluded from the estimation of the ACS-CWI.)

¹⁰ Hirsch, Husain, and Winters (2016) “guestimate” that the difference in wages between primary and secondary jobs is approximately 6 percent. However, their estimates include all levels of educational attainment and include teachers, who are among the most common types of workers to hold secondary jobs. We have no data on the extent of wage differentials among college graduates who are not educators (the CWI population).

The sample

The estimation sample has been constructed to ensure that the noneducator population is comparable to teachers with respect to their sensitivity to housing costs and local amenities.

The sample consists of people who

1. Are employed in private for-profit, private nonprofit, or government industries (excludes unemployed and self-employed or unpaid family workers).
2. Are between the ages of 18 and 80.
3. Work at least 20 but fewer than 90 hours per week.
4. Worked between 27 and 52 weeks in the past 12 months.
5. Have at least a bachelor's degree.
6. Have annual wage and salary earnings above \$5,000.
7. Work in one of the 50 states or Washington, D.C.
8. Do not work in the elementary or secondary education industry and are not education administrators, teachers, librarians, teaching assistants, or miscellaneous other education workers (see Taylor and Fowler 2006).

Individuals who are self-employed are excluded because their reported wage and salary earnings may not represent the market value of their time. Individuals who report working less than half time or for more than 90 hours a week are excluded, as are workers under the age of 18 and over the age of 80 and workers without a bachelor's degree, because they are unlikely to be comparable to teachers. Individuals who report earning less than \$5,000 in the past year (despite working at least half time) are excluded because their responses are improbable, at least in the context of fully compensated work. Workers for whom the Census Bureau has to allocate key attributes of their job (e.g., wages, occupation, industry, hours worked) from donor sample cases are excluded for statistical reasons. Finally, individuals employed outside the United States are excluded because their wages may represent compensation for foreign travel or other working conditions not faced by domestic workers.

The estimation sample does not include anyone who has a teaching or education administration occupation or who is employed in the elementary or secondary education industry.¹¹ Such persons are excluded from the analysis

¹¹ The expert panel on the initial CWI released by NCES recommended that the geographic cost adjustment factors should not exclude industry and occupation classifications related to education, arguing that the original CWI was not very sensitive to the occupation and industry exclusions and that including the education sector would increase the sample size. However, the fact that the CWI reflects wage differences outside of education is crucially important conceptually and one of the major reasons why this approach appeals to researchers. Including educators in the estimation sample would fundamentally change the nature of the wage index.

because it is conceptually important that the wages and salaries reflected in the ACS-CWI are outside of school district control (i.e., are independent of school district hiring practices or the influences of unionization).

All other occupations and industries have been included in the analysis. Retaining all noneducator occupations and industries greatly increases the sample size and reduces the noise in the estimates of local wage levels. Furthermore, as discussed in Taylor and Fowler (2006), a CWI is not influenced by differences in pay levels or job characteristics from one occupation or industry to another because it is based on demographically adjusted pay differentials within each occupation or industry. Without evidence that differences in job descriptions imply differences in tastes for housing or local amenities, there would be no gain from restricting the sample to a subset of occupations or industries.

The variables

The dependent variable is the log of reported wage and salary earnings in the past year. Ideally, the dependent variables would reflect total compensation and include not only wages and salaries but also fringe benefits. Unfortunately, survey respondents are not asked about the value of their fringe benefits¹² (if any) so more complete data on worker compensation are not available.¹³

The independent variables describe the workers and the jobs they held. The worker characteristics include continuous variables for age, age squared, and the number of hours worked per week; a categorical variable for weeks worked per year; and indicator variables for gender, race, English-speaking ability, educational attainment, and undergraduate degree field.¹⁴ The model includes the interaction between

¹² The only question about fringe benefits included in the ACS was a yes/no question that did not differentiate between health insurance tied to the respondent's current job and health insurance tied to a family member's job or to the respondent's previous job. The question asks, "Is this person covered by any of the following types of health insurance or health coverage plans: Insurance through a current or former employer or union (of this person or another family member?)."

¹³ To the extent that fringe benefits differ systematically across industries or occupations, they will be captured by regression fixed effects and have no impact on the ACS-CWI. However, as discussed in Taylor and Fowler (2006), systematic differences in benefits across states—such as those that might arise if workers take more of their compensation in the form of benefits in states with income tax than they do in states without income tax—could bias the ACS-CWI.

¹⁴ The degree fields are aggregated to the two-digit level and include the following: agricultural sciences; environmental sciences; architecture; area ethnic and civilization studies; communications; communication technologies; computer and information sciences; cosmetology and culinary arts; education; engineering; engineering technologies; languages; family and consumer sciences; prelaw and legal studies; literature; liberal arts and humanities; library science; biological sciences; mathematics and statistics; military technologies; multidisciplinary studies; physical fitness, parks, recreation, and leisure; philosophy and religious studies; theology; physical and related sciences; applied biotechnology; psychology; criminal justice and fire protection; public administration, public policy, and social work; social science; construction services; electrical and mechanical repairs and technologies; precision production; transportation sciences and technologies; visual and performing arts; healthcare; business; and history.

sex and age to allow for the possibility that men and women have different career paths and, therefore, different age-earnings profiles.¹⁵ The job characteristics include indicator variables for occupation and industry for each year. This specification allows wages to rise (or fall) more slowly in some occupations or industries than they do in others. Such flexibility is particularly important because the analysis period includes the period immediately after the “Great Recession,” and some industries and occupations are recovering more slowly than others.

Finally, the regression includes indicator variables for each labor market area. The labor market indicators¹⁶ capture the effect on wages of all market-specific characteristics, including the price of housing, the crime rate, and the climate.¹⁷

The regression model is produced using ACS person data collected from 2013 through 2015. The models are produced for “labor market” geographic areas. Data are produced for 1,570 labor markets in the United States. The 1,570 labor market areas are based on counties or county equivalents and an individual’s reported place of work, not place of residence. As such, it is possible for an individual to live in one county but work in another. Each individual’s compensation contributes to the estimate of the prevailing wage in his or her place of work, regardless of his or her place of residence.

NCES requested a minimum number of sample cases to help improve data quality and prediction accuracy. Each labor market must contain at least 100 unweighted universe cases per county based on data collected from 2013 through 2015. Those that do not meet the minimum are successively combined with the neighboring county within the same state that has the fewest cases until every labor market has at least 100 unweighted universe cases. The neighboring counties are determined by a county adjacency file that was created from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2015 TIGER geographic shapefiles. Counties must share a least one mile of border to be considered “neighboring.”

¹⁵ This is a change from Taylor and Fowler (2006) and represents an enhancement in the modeling. The estimation suggests that the age-earnings profiles of men and women are different in statistically and analytically meaningful ways.

¹⁶ The labor market indicators, which are also known as labor market fixed effects, capture both measurable and unmeasurable characteristics of labor markets.

¹⁷ In contrast to the current ACS-CWI, the baseline model for the original CWI also included random effects for states. Although the expert panel recommended that the predicted wages used to generate the CWI incorporate the average state-level random effects, this would have been particularly consequential for index values in metropolitan areas that straddle state lines (such as Kansas City or New York City). The ACS-CWI labor markets do not cross state lines, which removes the need for any state-level random effects.

The estimation

Table B.1 presents selected coefficients from generalized least-squares estimation of the ACS-CWI wage model. The estimation sample contains 1,391,896 survey respondents, and the regression is weighted using the person weights provided by the Census Bureau. Replicate weights are used to incorporate known sampling error into adjusted standard errors for the coefficients.¹⁸ ACS implements a replication method for variance estimation. An advantage of this method is that the variance estimates can be computed without consideration of the form of the statistics or the complexity of the sampling or weighting procedures, such as those being used by the ACS.¹⁹ The ACS replicate weights were applied to the CWI model using SAS PROC SURVEYREG to help account for known sampling error.²⁰

As the table illustrates, the estimated model is consistent with reasonable expectations about labor markets. Wages and salaries increase with the amount of time worked per week and the number of weeks worked per year. Wages and salaries also rise as workers get older, but the increase is more rapid for men than for women (perhaps because age is not as good an indicator of experience for women as it is for men). Workers with advanced degrees systematically earn more than workers with bachelor’s degrees. Non-Hispanic whites systematically earn more than comparable individuals from other racial or ethnic groups. Workers who do not speak English earn substantially less than other college-educated workers, all other things being equal.

¹⁸ Replicate weights were used to adjust the standard errors of the CWI for survey error in addition to model error. The use of replicate weights has no effect on the CWI values themselves. For more information on ACS design and methodology, go to <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/methodology/design-and-methodology.html>. Information on replicate weights and variance estimation can be found in chapters 11 and 12. For more information on ACS variance estimation, see chapter 12 of *American Community Survey Design and Methodology* (https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/methodology/design_and_methodology/acs_design_methodology_ch12_2014.pdf).

¹⁹ Since the start of the survey, the ACS has used the Successive Differences Replication (SDR) method to calculate estimates of variance.

²⁰ The model incorporated ACS replicate weights to estimate sampling errors of the estimators using SAS PROC SURVEYREG. For more information on the SAS SURVEYREG procedure, go to https://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63347/HTML/default/viewer.htm#statug_surveyreg_sect001.htm.

The construction of market-level index values

The predicted wage level in each labor market area captures systematic variations in labor earnings while controlling for demographics, industry and occupation mix, and amount of time worked. Using the coefficient estimates from the regression analysis, the researchers predicted the log wage and salary that a person with average characteristics would earn in each location.²¹ Using those local predictions, they also predicted the log wage and salary for each state and for the nation as a whole.²² The predicted wage level for each location is the exponent of the corresponding predicted log wage and salary. In turn, the ACS-CWI for each location is the predicted wage level for that location divided by \$62,655, which was the national average predicted wage. The ACS-CWI ranges from 0.649 in rural Montana to 1.377 in New York County (Manhattan), New York.

When predicting the log wage and salary for each local labor market, the researchers also calculated the standard error of

the prediction, incorporating both model and survey error. The standard error for the ACS-CWI in each local labor market area is calculated by dividing one standard error of the predicted wage by the national average predicted wage.²³ Among the 1,570 local labor market areas in the United States, the standard error for the ACS-CWI ranges from 0.004 in Los Angeles, California, to 0.160 in rural Colorado.

The construction of LEA-level index values

As a general rule, the ACS-CWI for a school district is the ACS-CWI for the corresponding county. However, some LEAs span multiple counties. In those cases, the ACS-CWI for the LEA is a population-weighted average of the ACS-CWIs for each county in the LEA. The weights reflect the shares of school-age children in each LEA who live in each county.²⁴ For example, Abernathy Independent

²¹ Formally, the predicted log wage level in each labor market area (i.e., the least-squares mean or population marginal mean) is the mean wage level that would be expected from a balanced design holding all continuous variables at their means and all indicator variables at their population frequencies.

²² At the state and national levels, the predicted log wage is a weighted average of the local predicted log wages, where the weights are the local employment shares among the college graduates in the regression sample, adjusted for differences in sampling weights.

²³ In other words, the dollar value of one standard error of the predicted wage divided by \$62,655 is the ACS-CWI standard error. The dollar value of one standard error of the predicted wage is calculated by adding one standard error of the predicted log wage to the log wage, taking the exponent, and then subtracting the predicted wage.

²⁴ Data on the population ages 5–17 come from the U.S. Census Bureau's Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) for school districts for income year 2013. Of the estimates available for county pieces of school districts, the shares of the population ages 5–17 are most correlated with the shares of teachers.

Table B.1. Selected coefficient estimates from the ACS model of log annual wage and salary income: 2013, 2014, and 2015

Variable	Estimate	Standard error
Usual hours worked per week (in logs)	0.9166	0.0030 **
50 to 52 weeks worked per year	0.5545	0.0045 **
48 to 49 weeks worked per year	0.4486	0.0063 **
40 to 47 weeks worked per year	0.3045	0.0058 **
27 to 39 weeks worked per year	0.0000	0.0000
Female	0.3105	0.0137 **
Male	0.0000	0.0000
Age	0.0847	0.0005 **
Age squared	-0.7861	0.0056 **
Female* age	-0.0161	0.0007 **
Female* age squared	0.1275	0.0074 **
Not an English speaker	-0.5075	0.0242 **
Bachelor's degree	-0.2696	0.0028 **
Master's degree	-0.1561	0.0027 **
Professional degree	-0.0519	0.0038 **
Doctoral degree	0.0000	0.0000
Hispanic	-0.1077	0.0022 **
White	0.0617	0.0039 **
Black or African American	-0.0734	0.0043 **
American Indian/Alaska Native	-0.0195	0.0089 *
Asian	-0.0390	0.0041 **
Pacific Islander	-0.0395	0.0209
Some other race	-0.0111	0.0079
Two or more races	0.0000	0.0000
Undergraduate degree field indicators?	Yes	
Industry* year indicators?	Yes	
Occupation* year indicators?	Yes	
Labor market indicators?	Yes	
Number of observations	1,391,896	

* Indicates a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.

** Indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.

NOTE: Due to Office of Management and Budget guidelines, respondents are asked separately about race and Hispanic origin. Respondents who identify as Hispanic will also have a race identified. For this data, 73 percent of Hispanic respondents identified as White, 15 percent identified as Some Other Race, 5 percent identified as Two or more races, 3 percent identified as Asian, 3 percent identified as Black or African American, and the remainder identified as American Indian/Alaska Native or Pacific Islander.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, special tabulation.

School District (ISD) straddles the border between Hale County, Texas, and Lubbock County, Texas. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 71 percent of Abernathy ISD's students live in Hale County and the remaining 29 percent live in Lubbock County. Thus, because the ACS-CWI for Hale County is 0.813 and the ACS-CWI for Lubbock County is 0.866, the ACS-CWI for Abernathy ISD is 0.828 ($0.71 \times 0.813 + 0.29 \times 0.866$).

Changes from the initial CWI

Although the ACS-CWI is modeled after the baseline specification used to estimate the initial CWI, there are key differences beyond simple updating. Some of the differences arise from differences between the decennial census and the ACS. Others arise from the differences between restricted-use and public-use data files. Still other differences arise from enhancements in the modeling technique.

The most obvious difference is the geography: the ACS-CWI provides labor cost estimates for 1,570 labor market areas based on counties and clusters of counties. In contrast, the initial CWI was based on 800 census-defined place of work areas. The increased geographic detail in the ACS-CWI—which is only possible with the restricted-use data—provides better representations of local labor market conditions than were possible with the initial CWI.

The improved geographic detail of the ACS-CWI also facilitates the construction of more finely grained index values for LEAs. With the initial CWI, school districts were matched to the labor market areas according to the county of record. Thus, an LEA that spanned more than one county typically had the CWI of the county where the head office was located. In contrast, the ACS-CWI for an LEA is a population-weighted average of the ACS-CWIs for each county in the LEA. Because LEAs may cross county lines, this change means that it is no longer necessarily the case that all the LEAs in a metropolitan area have the same index values. In addition, changes from one year to the next in the ACS-CWI for a specific LEA could now arise from changes in the population weights as well as changes in the wage levels.

Differences in the survey questions between the decennial census and the ACS have led to changes in the specification of the hedonic wage model. The ACS measure of weeks worked per year is categorical rather than continuous (as was the case with the decennial census) so the wage model changed accordingly. The ACS also contains data on the undergraduate degree field that were not available with the decennial census. As was recommended by the expert panel convened by NCES to review the initial CWI, indicators for degree fields have been incorporated into the ACS hedonic wage model. Finally, the ACS collects data on occupations

and industries that are based on more recent coding schemes than those used in the 2000 Census; those updated codes are used in the estimation of the ACS hedonic wage model.

Additional changes in the specification represent enhancements in modeling technique. The revised model includes the interaction between sex and age to allow for age-earnings profile differences between men and women. It also includes indicators for whether or not the worker is Hispanic or speaks English. Because the ACS model incorporates data from multiple years, it also incorporates the interaction between year indicators and the occupation or industry fixed effects. Whereas the initial hedonic wage model included random effects for states in the estimation but did not include those random effects in the construction of the wage predictions, the ACS model does not include random effects at either stage (estimation or prediction), making the wage predictions more consistent with the underlying model. Unlike the initial model, the ACS model also incorporates replicate weights, which is consistent with the recommendations of the expert review panel for the initial CWI.

User Guide

CWI estimates for three geographic levels

1. The **school district ACS-CWIs** are created for each local education agency (LEA) in the FY15 Title I Database. The ACS-CWI for each LEA is either the ACS-CWI for the corresponding county or a school-age child population weighted average of the ACS-CWIs for the corresponding counties when the LEA straddles county lines.
2. The **county ACS-CWIs** are created for each of the 3,143 counties or county equivalents in the United States. The 1,570 labor market areas used to construct the ACS-CWI are based on counties or county equivalents.²⁵ The ACS-CWI ratio is created by dividing the exponent of the log wage of the labor market area by the national average wage (\$62,6455).
3. The **state ACS-CWIs** are based on the state's average predicted log wage for each state (including Washington, D.C.). The state average predicted log wage is a weighted average of the county-level predicted log wages, where the weights are the local employment shares among the college graduates in the regression sample adjusted for differences in sampling weights. The state's ACS-CWI ratio is the exponent of the state's average predicted log wage divided by the national average wage (\$62,655).

²⁵ Contiguous counties in sparsely populated areas have been aggregated into labor market areas containing at least 100 survey respondents that meet the estimation sample criteria.

Using the index to make geographic adjustments

One important reason for the development of the ACS-CWI is to enable more meaningful comparisons across school districts. To normalize dollar amounts and make them comparable, divide the dollar amounts by the district-level ACS-CWI, which are already normalized to the national average wage. For example, suppose one wished to make an adjustment to current expenditure data from the Elementary and Secondary Information (ELSI) system for the 2013–14 school year. The ACS-CWI for the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) is 1.129. So, the \$6,137 total current expenditures on salary per pupil in LAUSD in 2013–14,²⁶ when normalized, are equal to \$5,436 ($\$6,137 / 1.129$). In comparison, the ACS-CWI for Palm Beach County (Florida) School District (PBCSD) is 0.957, and the 2013–14 total current expenditures on salary per pupil²⁷ were \$5,433. Normalized to reflect the lower cost of hiring in this area, they are the equivalent of \$5,677 ($\$5,433 / 0.957$). In other words, even though LAUSD spent more than PBCSD in nominal terms, once the two dollar figures were adjusted for the difference in purchasing power between the two districts, PBCSD effectively spent \$241 more per pupil than did LAUSD.

Geographic adjustments applied to state aid

Since one of the great advantages of the ACS-CWI is that it is outside of school district control, another application of the ACS-CWI is to adjust state aid to a school district for differences in wages. For example, consider a program intended to provide an additional \$100 per pupil, adjusted for geographical variations in the cost of education. The ACS-CWI for New Rochelle, New York, in 2015 is 1.16, or 16 percent higher than the national average; the ACS-CWI for Buffalo, New York, is 0.902, or 10 percent lower than the national average. Therefore, to receive the same increase in purchasing power as a \$100 increase in Buffalo City School District, New Rochelle City School District would need to receive \$128.94 ($\$100 \times (1.163 / 0.902)$).

²⁶ U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), “Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey Directory Data,” 2014–15 v.1a; “School District Finance Survey (F-33),” 2013–14 (FY 2014) v.1a.

²⁷ Current expenditures for salary comprise expenditures for the day-to-day operation of schools and school districts for public elementary and secondary education. General administration expenditures and school administration expenditures are included in current expenditures. Expenditures associated with repaying debts and capital outlays (e.g., purchases of land, school construction, and equipment) are excluded from current expenditures. Programs outside the scope of public preK–12 education, such as community services and adult education, are excluded from current expenditures. Payments to private schools and charter schools outside of the school district are also excluded from current expenditures.

Standard errors

The standard error of each predicted wage level indicates the precision with which it was measured. Dividing one standard error of each predicted wage by the national average wage (\$62,655) yields the standard error of the ACS-CWI, which ranges from 0.004 in Los Angeles, California, to 0.160 in rural Colorado.

Glossary

American Community Survey (ACS)

An ongoing survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. It has replaced the decennial census as the primary source of detailed demographic information about the U.S. population.

Elementary/Secondary Education

Programs providing instruction, or assisting in providing instruction, for students in grades preK–12 and ungraded programs.

Fiscal Year (FY)

The 12-month period to which the annual operating budget applies. At the end of the fiscal year, the agency determines its financial condition and the results of its operations.

Labor Market

An economically integrated area within which individuals can reside and find employment within a reasonable distance or can readily change jobs without changing their place of residence (as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: <https://www.bls.gov/lau/laufaq.htm#Q06>). Labor markets are the units of analysis for the Comparable Wage Index study. They are geographic regions (either individual counties or groupings of neighboring counties) that have the same value for a comparable wage index.

Local Education Agency (LEA)

Often called a school district; primary responsibility is to operate public schools or to contract for public school services.

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Analytic Tables

Table I.A. Title I revenues and EDFacts number of Title I recipients, by state or jurisdiction: 2014–15

State	Number of school districts reporting Title I revenues	Title I revenues for school districts, in thousands of dollars	Title I receipts per student participant	Student participants				
				Total	Neglected and delinquent	Private schools	Schoolwide programs	Targeted assistance
Total	14,282	\$13,629,896	\$546	24,968,858	86,929	180,028	23,718,192	983,709
Alabama	133	228,606	469	487,217	1,589	3,483	480,658	1,487
Alaska	51	46,570	976	47,713	31	#	46,387	1,295
Arizona	197	301,180	970	310,391	2,586	9,121	285,089	13,595
Arkansas	253	165,903	556	298,583	1,040	1,652	291,862	4,029
California	918	1,787,665	489	3,652,473	2,177	21,451	3,399,341	229,504
Colorado	147	155,402	646	240,738	848	471	231,274	8,145
Connecticut	186	109,062	790	138,013	332	806	93,377	43,498
Delaware	38	45,181	529	85,472	#	#	85,472	#
District of Columbia	46	43,355	560	77,418	270	8,620	66,807	1,721
Florida	67	787,571	578	1,363,281	1,085	6,816	1,353,446	1,934
Georgia	205	544,574	507	1,074,386	2,200	2,826	1,062,712	6,648
Hawaii	1	41,788	389	107,378	#	395	106,983	#
Idaho	139	60,515	419	144,450	86	358	135,565	8,441
Illinois	829	625,703	638	980,728	30,696	18,563	862,508	68,961
Indiana	352	262,800	786	334,194	1,317	5,061	289,335	38,481
Iowa	340	88,422	772	114,469	1,742	1,399	94,856	16,472
Kansas	283	108,748	680	159,991	4,237	160	150,474	5,120
Kentucky	170	220,682	447	493,819	681	2,132	490,083	923
Louisiana	128	305,796	636	480,638	329	8,470	465,210	6,629
Maine	172	49,624	1,312	37,833	#	181	23,226	14,426
Maryland	24	192,341	964	199,527	623	1,312	193,289	4,303
Massachusetts	295	194,602	553	351,853	2,411	3,448	319,403	26,591
Michigan	744	490,238	770	636,486	1,234	3,727	590,638	40,887
Minnesota	465	145,094	294	493,674	1,293	9,799	450,734	31,848
Mississippi	146	182,833	362	505,196	676	5,224	485,629	13,667
Missouri	553	239,660	594	403,418	4,719	960	376,631	21,108
Montana	257	54,120	899	60,186	486	365	49,252	10,083
Nebraska	229	83,536	726	114,996	1,629	1,095	107,664	4,608
Nevada	17	118,633	434	273,168	306	1,317	271,311	234
New Hampshire	131	39,991	1,468	27,251	66	249	20,238	6,698
New Jersey	567	293,203	661	443,485	1,147	19,182	311,530	111,626
New Mexico	135	114,730	471	243,794	168	17	241,143	2,466
New York	678	622,679	352	1,767,919	663	#	1,759,832	7,424
North Carolina	190	444,498	635	699,945	1,454	484	696,012	1,995
North Dakota	157	35,961	1,202	29,912	225	182	24,567	4,938
Ohio	952	596,640	700	852,495	382	854	824,646	26,613
Oklahoma	535	159,649	370	431,417	2,382	764	416,138	12,133
Oregon	187	161,191	781	206,301	417	1,174	198,773	5,937
Pennsylvania	654	591,265	893	662,037	4,123	12,922	584,855	60,137
Rhode Island	56	54,048	885	61,043	9	752	57,183	3,099
South Carolina	83	227,259	741	306,658	2,716	202	300,771	2,969
South Dakota	151	42,192	929	45,438	326	650	40,239	4,223
Tennessee	141	272,651	470	580,435	4,554	1,813	569,392	4,676
Texas	1,151	1,395,913	390	3,580,348	2,235	9,289	3,557,415	11,409
Utah	123	66,752	440	151,705	#	120	141,092	10,493
Vermont	58	31,091	582	53,449	202	249	51,888	1,110
Virginia	132	230,387	753	305,797	#	#	291,042	14,755
Washington	295	225,720	614	367,587	120	893	349,391	17,183
West Virginia	56	94,225	766	123,054	#	298	122,299	457
Wisconsin	418	211,852	636	333,297	1,117	10,722	276,453	45,005
Wyoming	47	37,795	1,359	27,802	#	#	24,077	3,725

Rounds to zero.

NOTE: Puerto Rico is excluded from the analysis because the data are not collected for this jurisdiction in the F-33 survey.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, EDFacts Data Collection, 2014–15; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), “Local Education Agency (School District) Finance Survey (F33),” 2014–15.

Table I.B. Current and instruction expenditures per student in public elementary and secondary schools, by school district locale and number of 5- to 17-year-olds: 2014–15

School district locale and number of 5- to 17-year-olds in district	Expenditures per student in fall enrollment		Instruction expenditures as a percentage of current expenditures	Expenditures per student in fall enrollment adjusted for local costs using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index	
	Current expenditures	Instruction expenditures		Current expenditures	Instruction expenditures
Total	\$11,121	\$6,799	61.1	\$11,630	\$7,090
School district locale					
City ¹	11,469	7,097	61.9	11,506	7,088
Large	12,149	7,692	63.3	11,642	7,336
Midsize	10,625	6,317	59.5	11,123	6,602
Small	10,822	6,568	60.7	11,573	7,017
Suburban ²	11,265	6,918	61.4	11,344	6,960
Large	11,382	7,001	61.5	11,326	6,961
Midsize	10,485	6,364	60.7	11,381	6,909
Small	10,563	6,418	60.8	11,594	7,035
Town ³	10,115	6,070	60.0	11,833	7,101
Fringe	10,417	6,292	60.4	11,534	6,966
Distant	10,087	6,051	60.0	11,884	7,130
Remote	9,919	5,924	59.7	11,989	7,161
Rural ⁴	10,772	6,410	59.5	12,560	7,468
Fringe	10,504	6,325	60.2	11,866	7,141
Distant	10,585	6,277	59.3	12,575	7,454
Remote	12,251	7,083	57.8	14,986	8,670
School district population size⁵					
Less than 300	12,844	7,395	57.6	15,297	8,809
300 to 599	12,030	7,195	59.8	14,072	8,410
600 to 999	11,683	7,030	60.2	13,520	8,133
1,000 to 2,499	11,697	7,040	60.2	13,102	7,877
2,500 to 4,999	11,846	7,199	60.8	12,755	7,736
5,000 to 9,999	11,600	7,087	61.1	12,184	7,429
10,000 to 24,999	10,449	6,307	60.4	10,811	6,519
25,000 or more	10,750	6,682	62.2	10,722	6,642

¹ Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.

² Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.

³ Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.

⁴ Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

⁵ These districts are defined according to the size of their 5- to 17-year-old population.

NOTE: The American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) is a measure of the systematic, regional variations in the salaries of college graduates who are not educators. It can be used to adjust district-level finance data in order to make better comparisons across geographic areas. Excludes districts for which no Census Bureau data on poverty are available.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency (School District) Finance Survey (F33)," 2014–15; American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) 2013–15.

Table I.C. State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) and adjustments for Title I allocations, by state or jurisdiction: 2012–13

State	Total SPPE	SPPE adjusted for Basic, Concentrated, and Targeted Grants	SPPE adjusted for Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG)
Total	\$10,936	\$4,374.40	\$4,374.40
Alabama	8,685	3,499.52	3,718.24
Alaska	19,432	5,249.28	5,030.56
Arizona	7,828	3,499.52	3,718.24
Arkansas	9,195	3,678.00	3,718.24
California	9,294	3,717.60	3,718.24
Colorado	8,890	3,556.00	3,718.24
Connecticut	17,447	5,249.28	5,030.56
Delaware	13,660	5,249.28	5,030.56
District of Columbia	19,638	5,249.28	5,030.56
Florida	8,212	3,499.52	3,718.24
Georgia	8,860	3,544.00	3,718.24
Hawaii	12,127	4,850.80	4,850.80
Idaho	6,923	3,499.52	3,718.24
Illinois	13,209	5,249.28	5,030.56
Indiana	9,435	3,774.00	3,774.00
Iowa	10,421	4,168.40	4,168.40
Kansas	10,244	4,097.60	4,097.60
Kentucky	9,716	3,886.40	3,886.40
Louisiana	10,535	4,214.00	4,214.00
Maine	13,802	5,249.28	5,030.56
Maryland	14,637	5,249.28	5,030.56
Massachusetts	15,669	5,249.28	5,030.56
Michigan	10,953	4,381.20	4,381.20
Minnesota	11,123	4,449.20	4,449.20
Mississippi	7,945	3,499.52	3,718.24
Missouri	9,876	3,950.40	3,950.40
Montana	10,638	4,255.20	4,255.20
Nebraska	11,596	4,638.40	4,638.40
Nevada	8,142	3,499.52	3,718.24
New Hampshire	13,997	5,249.28	5,030.56
New Jersey	18,394	5,249.28	5,030.56
New Mexico	8,679	3,499.52	3,718.24
New York	20,604	5,249.28	5,030.56
North Carolina	8,439	3,499.52	3,718.24
North Dakota	11,065	4,426.00	4,426.00
Ohio	11,444	4,577.60	4,577.60
Oklahoma	7,743	3,499.52	3,718.24
Oregon	9,781	3,912.40	3,912.40
Pennsylvania	13,703	5,249.28	5,030.56
Puerto Rico	6,946	3,499.52	3,718.24
Rhode Island	15,632	5,249.28	5,030.56
South Carolina	9,507	3,802.80	3,802.80
South Dakota	8,440	3,499.52	3,718.24
Tennessee	8,578	3,499.52	3,718.24
Texas	8,420	3,499.52	3,718.24
Utah	6,497	3,499.52	3,718.24
Vermont	17,556	5,249.28	5,030.56
Virginia	11,306	4,522.40	4,522.40
Washington	9,981	3,992.40	3,992.40
West Virginia	11,192	4,476.80	4,476.80
Wisconsin	11,192	4,476.80	4,476.80
Wyoming	16,537	5,249.28	5,030.56

NOTE: The total SPPE primarily reflects the state and local education costs and excludes large federal revenue items from the current expenditure total, including Title I and the Department of Agriculture's National School Lunch Program amounts. The denominator of the SPPE calculation is the number of public school students in attendance (average daily attendance) as defined by state law. A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE. There is one exception to these rules. For EFIG, the formula is the same except that 34 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the minimum (instead of 32 percent) and 46 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the maximum (instead of 48 percent).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, National Public Education Financial Survey, school year 2012–13.

Table I.D. States receiving minimum or maximum state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) status or receiving state minimum status in Title I, Part A allocations, by grant type: 2015

State	States receiving SPPE minimum or maximum status ¹									States receiving state minimum status			
	Total			Basic Grant/Concentration Grant/Targeted Grant			Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG)			Basic Grant	Concentration Grant	Targeted Grant	EFIG
	Minimum	Maximum	Neither	Minimum	Maximum	Neither	Minimum	Maximum	Neither				
Number of states ..	18	15	19	14	15	23	17	15	20	7	3	13	10
Alabama	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Alaska	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Arizona	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Arkansas	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
California	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Colorado	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Connecticut	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Delaware	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
District of Columbia	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Florida	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Georgia	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Hawaii	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Idaho	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Illinois	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Indiana	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Iowa	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Kansas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Kentucky	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Louisiana	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Maine	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Maryland	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Massachusetts	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Michigan	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Minnesota	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Mississippi	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Missouri	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Montana	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Nebraska	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Nevada	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
New Hampshire	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
New Jersey	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
New Mexico	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
New York	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
North Carolina	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
North Dakota	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ohio	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Oklahoma	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Oregon	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Pennsylvania	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Puerto Rico	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Rhode Island	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
South Carolina	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
South Dakota	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tennessee	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Texas	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Utah	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Vermont	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Virginia	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Washington	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
West Virginia	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Wisconsin	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Wyoming	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

¹A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE. The one exception to this rule is EFIG, for which the minimum is 34 percent of the U.S. average SPPE and the maximum is 46 percent of the U.S. average SPPE.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 1.A. Title I, Part A total allocation, number of formula-eligible children, and allocation per formula-eligible child, by grant type and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Allocation [in thousands of dollars]					Number of formula-eligible children					Allocation per formula-eligible child				
	Total	Basic Grant	Concentration Grant	Targeted Grant	Education Finance Incentive Grant	Total	Basic Grant	Concentration Grant	Targeted Grant	Education Finance Incentive Grant	Total	Basic Grant	Concentration Grant	Targeted Grant	Education Finance Incentive Grant
Total	\$14,261,760	\$6,390,863	\$1,348,678	\$3,261,110	\$3,261,110	11,627,157	11,624,433	10,088,385	11,551,266	11,551,266	\$1,227	\$550	\$134	\$282	\$282
Alabama	221,717	99,019	22,275	48,654	51,769	209,104	209,104	196,863	209,104	209,104	1,060	474	113	233	248
Alaska	37,335	16,123	2,378	9,424	9,410	17,602	17,585	5,261	17,555	17,555	2,121	917	452	537	536
Arizona	322,898	145,066	31,453	77,018	69,361	303,206	303,149	270,432	303,149	303,149	1,065	479	116	254	229
Arkansas	154,447	69,408	15,774	32,541	36,724	136,326	136,326	128,712	136,326	136,326	1,133	509	123	239	269
California	1,684,686	754,864	162,782	405,606	361,434	1,520,020	1,519,648	1,345,655	1,514,893	1,514,893	1,108	497	121	268	239
Colorado	150,078	69,630	12,375	32,709	35,363	143,464	143,408	102,188	139,692	139,692	1,046	486	121	234	253
Connecticut	116,022	56,616	8,736	21,502	29,167	80,137	80,108	49,189	74,848	74,848	1,448	707	178	287	390
Delaware	44,353	17,882	4,292	11,107	11,072	25,504	25,504	22,438	25,504	25,504	1,739	701	191	436	434
District of Columbia	42,820	17,744	3,994	10,557	10,525	22,905	22,905	22,905	22,905	22,905	1,869	775	174	461	460
Florida	775,554	321,477	75,295	201,637	177,144	692,039	692,039	683,292	692,039	692,039	1,121	465	110	291	256
Georgia	499,203	217,854	50,035	116,825	114,489	452,015	452,015	428,753	452,015	452,015	1,104	482	117	258	253
Hawaii	47,116	19,490	4,588	11,414	11,624	30,031	30,031	25,044	30,031	30,031	1,569	649	183	380	387
Idaho	57,316	27,277	5,862	11,414	12,763	58,277	58,250	51,081	58,250	58,250	984	468	115	196	219
Illinois	663,984	305,173	60,453	155,200	143,157	436,422	436,310	358,230	432,592	432,592	1,521	699	169	359	331
Indiana	258,377	120,236	24,892	51,372	61,877	236,018	236,010	197,442	233,974	233,974	1,095	509	126	220	264
Iowa	91,238	44,774	7,731	15,854	22,879	80,935	80,935	51,818	80,257	80,257	1,127	553	149	198	285
Kansas	104,106	49,545	9,384	20,494	24,683	90,388	90,388	66,344	89,117	89,117	1,152	548	141	230	277
Kentucky	211,846	94,540	21,504	45,836	49,965	177,244	177,242	163,837	177,242	177,242	1,195	533	131	259	282
Louisiana	284,165	124,799	29,677	65,125	64,564	216,933	216,933	206,461	216,933	216,933	1,310	575	144	300	298
Maine	50,093	22,798	4,467	11,414	11,414	32,097	31,883	23,313	31,701	31,701	1,561	715	192	360	360
Maryland	195,893	86,104	16,806	46,210	46,772	123,348	123,348	101,435	123,348	123,348	1,588	698	166	375	379
Massachusetts	231,804	111,685	18,595	46,028	55,131	159,811	159,748	112,647	154,341	154,341	1,450	699	168	298	357
Michigan	498,675	225,457	46,813	113,378	113,027	362,502	362,433	293,632	359,482	359,482	1,376	622	159	315	314
Minnesota	148,615	73,946	10,297	28,304	36,067	125,143	125,139	65,155	122,209	122,209	1,188	591	158	232	295
Mississippi	190,695	83,683	19,720	44,462	42,829	173,520	173,520	168,546	173,520	173,520	1,099	482	117	256	247
Missouri	240,760	112,722	23,710	49,417	54,911	212,100	212,089	180,755	210,753	210,753	1,135	531	131	234	261
Montana	45,469	18,499	4,142	11,414	11,414	32,333	31,839	26,114	31,825	31,825	1,406	581	159	359	359
Nebraska	68,852	32,348	6,196	13,472	16,837	52,331	52,294	40,523	51,822	51,822	1,316	619	153	260	325
Nevada	116,721	47,967	11,108	32,648	24,998	102,245	102,245	99,402	102,245	102,245	1,142	469	112	319	244
New Hampshire	39,727	17,187	2,994	9,571	9,975	20,292	20,165	7,443	18,249	18,249	1,958	852	402	524	547
New Jersey	330,357	159,208	25,966	64,624	80,559	227,692	227,549	155,513	217,433	217,433	1,451	700	167	297	371
New Mexico	116,229	50,218	11,635	26,894	27,482	106,403	106,387	103,387	106,255	106,255	1,092	472	113	253	259
New York	1,104,439	477,496	102,036	286,454	238,454	685,509	685,453	601,427	678,429	678,429	1,611	697	170	422	351
North Carolina	417,089	182,689	42,431	94,050	97,918	391,404	391,404	378,285	391,404	391,404	1,066	467	112	240	250
North Dakota	33,486	14,385	2,037	8,519	8,546	13,497	13,369	3,466	13,281	13,281	2,481	1,076	588	641	643
Ohio	558,321	256,815	52,373	117,355	131,778	413,971	413,951	337,122	412,252	412,252	1,349	620	155	285	320
Oklahoma	156,295	71,486	15,347	32,210	37,252	152,339	152,305	132,473	152,253	152,253	1,026	469	116	212	245
Oregon	140,325	64,801	14,365	27,737	33,421	122,311	122,236	99,239	122,236	122,236	1,147	530	145	227	273
Pennsylvania	544,123	253,202	48,010	117,513	125,398	357,731	357,727	267,842	351,347	351,347	1,521	708	179	334	357
Puerto Rico	118,495	184,398	46,822	95,001	92,274	343,733	343,733	343,733	343,733	343,733	1,217	536	136	276	268
Rhode Island	49,345	22,228	4,240	11,414	11,463	32,014	32,014	24,984	31,871	31,871	1,541	694	170	358	360
South Carolina	225,766	99,851	23,333	49,144	53,437	197,947	197,944	190,992	197,944	197,944	1,141	504	122	248	270
South Dakota	43,470	17,744	3,327	11,199	11,200	26,113	26,084	16,016	25,939	25,939	1,665	680	208	432	432
Tennessee	283,710	124,544	28,386	64,427	66,353	267,394	267,394	254,031	265,454	265,454	1,061	466	112	243	250
Texas	1,320,732	577,049	128,452	313,846	301,385	1,224,933	1,224,814	1,124,703	1,223,670	1,223,670	1,078	471	114	256	246
Utah	87,212	40,408	7,005	18,722	21,077	87,521	87,521	62,511	87,521	87,521	996	462	112	214	241
Vermont	33,196	14,036	2,450	8,307	8,403	12,818	12,523	7,596	12,280	12,280	2,590	1,121	323	676	684
Virginia	243,580	116,984	21,977	50,668	53,950	194,445	194,441	149,241	191,537	191,537	1,253	602	147	265	282
Washington	230,248	108,606	21,311	45,356	54,975	204,119	204,050	159,628	202,606	202,606	1,128	532	134	224	271
West Virginia	89,240	40,630	9,180	16,801	22,629	66,808	66,808	64,317	66,808	66,808	1,336	608	143	251	339
Wisconsin	208,477	96,016	17,207	41,850	53,404	161,344	161,323	114,568	158,324	158,324	1,292	595	150	264	337
Wyoming	33,060	14,154	2,092	8,410	8,403	12,819	12,810	2,401	12,768	12,768	2,579	1,105	871	659	658

NOTE: The allocation for each of the four grant types is based on a different number of formula-eligible children. Thus, the total allocation per formula-eligible child does not equal the sum of the allocations per formula-eligible child for each grant type.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 1.B. Title I, Part A total allocation, number of formula-eligible children, and allocation per formula-eligible child, by grant type and school district characteristics: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Allocation [in thousands of dollars]					Number of formula-eligible children					Allocation per formula-eligible child				
	Total	Basic Grant	Concentration Grant	Targeted Grant	Education Finance Incentive Grant	Total	Basic Grant	Concentration Grant	Targeted Grant	Education Finance Incentive Grant	Total	Basic Grant	Concentration Grant	Targeted Grant	Education Finance Incentive Grant
Total	\$14,261,760	\$6,390,863	\$1,348,678	\$3,261,110	\$3,261,110	11,627,157	11,624,433	10,088,385	11,551,266	11,551,266	\$1,227	\$550	\$134	\$282	\$282
School district locale															
City ¹	6,246,875	2,536,316	582,148	1,533,054	1,595,357	4,573,379	4,573,360	4,341,386	4,565,485	4,565,485	1,366	555	134	336	349
Large	4,001,062	1,532,381	361,916	1,029,118	1,077,647	2,729,205	2,729,198	2,673,870	2,727,766	2,727,766	1,466	561	135	377	395
Midsize	1,181,440	513,582	114,233	273,139	280,487	965,733	965,733	896,629	963,927	963,927	1,223	532	127	283	291
Small	1,064,373	490,353	105,999	230,798	237,223	878,441	878,429	770,887	873,792	873,792	1,212	558	138	264	271
Suburban ²	4,592,385	2,198,468	410,818	1,018,850	964,250	4,026,552	4,026,355	3,114,777	3,968,527	3,968,527	1,141	546	132	257	243
Large	3,956,206	1,885,964	351,915	884,953	833,375	3,456,571	3,456,424	2,670,348	3,401,669	3,401,669	1,145	546	132	260	245
Midsize	430,927	207,696	39,165	91,857	92,209	383,767	383,745	308,620	381,423	381,423	1,123	541	127	241	242
Small	205,252	104,808	19,738	42,040	38,666	186,214	186,186	135,809	185,435	185,435	1,102	563	145	227	209
Town ³	1,566,709	754,251	164,074	327,201	321,183	1,384,525	1,384,399	1,231,087	1,382,877	1,382,877	1,132	545	133	237	232
Fringe	283,824	145,418	28,239	56,586	53,581	260,791	260,766	195,172	259,398	259,398	1,088	558	145	218	207
Distant	720,156	346,684	77,119	149,539	146,815	639,236	639,207	588,622	639,053	639,053	1,127	542	131	234	230
Remote	562,730	262,150	58,717	121,076	120,787	484,498	484,426	447,293	484,426	484,426	1,161	541	131	250	249
Rural ⁴	1,855,790	901,828	191,638	382,005	380,319	1,642,642	1,640,319	1,401,135	1,634,377	1,634,377	1,130	550	137	234	233
Fringe	794,378	396,465	78,848	161,617	157,448	742,252	741,942	610,358	736,773	736,773	1,070	534	129	219	214
Distant	703,359	347,078	75,619	141,620	139,043	627,777	627,058	544,655	626,342	626,342	1,120	554	139	226	222
Remote	358,053	158,285	37,172	78,768	83,828	272,613	271,319	246,122	271,262	271,262	1,313	583	151	290	309
Poverty quarter ⁵															
Highest poverty quarter	6,898,933	2,788,574	671,997	1,681,326	1,757,036	4,997,366	4,997,039	4,997,039	4,997,039	4,997,039	1,381	558	134	336	352
Second-highest poverty quarter	3,782,506	1,713,168	407,354	849,735	812,249	3,290,644	3,290,238	3,290,238	3,290,238	3,290,238	1,149	521	124	258	247
Second-lowest poverty quarter	2,430,369	1,210,568	245,978	501,386	472,437	2,215,310	2,214,565	1,693,280	2,214,565	2,214,565	1,097	547	145	226	213
Lowest poverty quarter	1,149,952	678,552	23,350	228,662	219,388	1,123,837	1,122,591	107,828	1,049,424	1,049,424	1,023	604	217	218	209
School district population size															
Less than 300	113,954	51,401	12,477	24,677	25,399	79,038	76,452	64,386	76,371	76,371	1,442	672	194	323	333
300 to 599	204,213	97,995	21,234	42,405	42,579	160,702	160,665	131,499	160,037	160,037	1,271	610	161	265	266
600 to 999	337,849	165,069	34,151	69,044	69,586	275,444	275,396	223,280	274,216	274,216	1,227	599	153	252	254
1,000 to 2,499	1,227,373	613,278	124,594	248,292	241,208	1,051,757	1,051,704	858,587	1,044,011	1,044,011	1,167	583	145	238	231
2,500 to 4,999	1,523,046	765,306	147,485	310,495	299,761	1,346,835	1,346,835	1,080,538	1,327,421	1,327,421	1,131	568	136	234	226
5,000 to 9,999	1,592,140	802,726	150,180	323,989	315,245	1,437,674	1,437,674	1,115,936	1,417,568	1,417,568	1,107	558	135	229	222
10,000 to 24,999	2,323,714	1,099,885	220,059	504,183	499,586	2,031,439	2,031,439	1,663,993	2,016,714	2,016,714	1,144	541	132	250	248
25,000 or more	6,939,471	2,795,203	638,499	1,738,024	1,767,745	5,244,268	5,244,268	4,950,166	5,234,928	5,234,928	1,323	533	129	332	338
100 largest districts ⁶	4,629,567	1,788,586	424,848	1,197,095	1,219,040	3,298,772	3,298,772	3,249,828	3,293,561	3,293,561	1,403	542	131	363	370

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.

²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.

³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.

⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

⁵This category ranks, from the highest to the lowest, all districts according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

⁶These districts are defined as the 100 largest based on the size of their 5- to 17-year-old population.

NOTE: The allocation for each of the four grant types is based on a different number of formula-eligible children. Thus, the total allocation per formula-eligible child does not equal the sum of the allocations per formula-eligible child for each grant type.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 1.C. Population, Title I, Part A formula eligibility and allocation, and percentage distribution of each grant type, by state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Population			Formula eligibility and allocation			Percentage distribution of each grant type			
	All 5- to 17-year-olds	Formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-olds	Formula-eligibility percentage rate	Percentage distribution		Difference between percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-olds and percentage of all allocations	Basic Grant	Concentration Grant	Targeted Grant	Education Finance Incentive Grant
				Formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-olds	All allocations					
Total	54,402,840	11,627,157	21.4	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Alabama	816,018	209,104	25.6	1.8	1.6	-0.2	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.6
Alaska	132,921	17,602	13.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3
Arizona	1,185,962	303,206	25.6	2.6	2.3	-0.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.1
Arkansas	517,539	136,326	26.3	1.2	1.1	-0.1	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.1
California	6,679,508	1,520,020	22.8	13.1	11.8	-1.3	11.8	12.1	12.4	11.1
Colorado	903,610	143,464	15.9	1.2	1.1	-0.2	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.1
Connecticut	593,720	80,137	13.5	0.7	0.8	0.1	0.9	0.6	0.7	0.9
Delaware	147,239	25,504	17.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
District of Columbia	70,507	22,905	32.5	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Florida	2,954,450	692,039	23.4	6.0	5.4	-0.5	5.0	5.6	6.2	5.4
Georgia	1,821,352	452,015	24.8	3.9	3.5	-0.4	3.4	3.7	3.6	3.5
Hawaii	216,496	30,031	13.9	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Idaho	315,119	58,277	18.5	0.5	0.4	-0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Illinois	2,225,486	436,422	19.6	3.8	4.7	0.9	4.8	4.5	4.8	4.4
Indiana	1,167,492	236,018	20.2	2.0	1.8	-0.2	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.9
Iowa	530,250	80,935	15.3	0.7	0.6	-0.1	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.7
Kansas	524,777	90,388	17.2	0.8	0.7	#	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.8
Kentucky	740,517	177,244	23.9	1.5	1.5	#	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.5
Louisiana	805,763	216,933	26.9	1.9	2.0	0.1	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.0
Maine	196,279	32,097	16.4	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4
Maryland	977,491	123,348	12.6	1.1	1.4	0.3	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.4
Massachusetts	1,028,581	159,811	15.5	1.4	1.6	0.3	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.7
Michigan	1,675,727	362,502	21.6	3.1	3.5	0.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Minnesota	933,158	125,143	13.4	1.1	1.0	#	1.2	0.8	0.9	1.1
Mississippi	539,544	173,520	32.2	1.5	1.3	-0.2	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.3
Missouri	1,021,760	212,100	20.8	1.8	1.7	-0.1	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.7
Montana	163,020	32,333	19.8	0.3	0.3	#	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Nebraska	334,609	52,331	15.6	0.5	0.5	#	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5
Nevada	484,108	102,245	21.1	0.9	0.8	-0.1	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.8
New Hampshire	205,497	20,292	9.9	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3
New Jersey	1,489,409	227,692	15.3	2.0	2.3	0.4	2.5	1.9	2.0	2.5
New Mexico	369,368	106,403	28.8	0.9	0.8	-0.1	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8
New York	3,071,208	685,509	22.3	5.9	7.7	1.8	7.5	7.6	8.8	7.3
North Carolina	1,673,418	391,404	23.4	3.4	2.9	-0.4	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.0
North Dakota	114,025	13,497	11.8	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
Ohio	1,963,407	413,971	21.1	3.6	3.9	0.4	4.0	3.9	3.6	4.0
Oklahoma	683,545	152,339	22.3	1.3	1.1	-0.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.1
Oregon	628,452	122,311	19.5	1.1	1.0	-0.1	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.0
Pennsylvania	2,004,460	357,731	17.8	3.1	3.8	0.7	4.0	3.6	3.6	3.8
Puerto Rico	614,723	343,733	55.9	3.0	2.9	#	2.9	3.5	2.9	2.8
Rhode Island	159,355	32,014	20.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
South Carolina	787,604	197,947	25.1	1.7	1.6	-0.1	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.6
South Dakota	148,771	26,113	17.6	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3
Tennessee	1,093,230	267,394	24.5	2.3	2.0	-0.3	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.0
Texas	5,108,193	1,224,933	24.0	10.5	9.3	-1.3	9.0	9.5	9.6	9.2
Utah	642,722	87,521	13.6	0.8	0.6	-0.1	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6
Vermont	92,250	12,818	13.9	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
Virginia	1,353,198	194,445	14.4	1.7	1.7	#	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.7
Washington	1,153,234	204,119	17.7	1.8	1.6	-0.1	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.7
West Virginia	279,671	66,808	23.9	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.7
Wisconsin	964,300	161,344	16.7	1.4	1.5	0.1	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.6
Wyoming	99,797	12,819	12.8	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3

#Rounds to zero.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 1.D. Population, Title I, Part A formula eligibility and allocation, and percentage distribution of each grant type, by school district characteristics: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Population				Percentage of districts	Formula eligibility and allocations			Percentage distribution of each grant type			
	All 5- to 17-year-olds	Formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-olds	Percentage of 5- to 17-year-olds	Formula-eligibility percentage rate		Percentage distribution		Difference between percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-olds and percentage of all allocations	Basic Grant	Concentration Grant	Targeted Grant	Education Finance Incentive Grant
						Formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-olds	All allocations					
Total	54,402,840	11,627,157	100.0	21.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
School district locale												
City ¹	17,199,742	4,573,379	31.6	26.6	5.7	39.3	43.8	4.5	39.7	43.2	47.0	48.9
Large	9,456,387	2,729,205	17.4	28.9	1.5	23.5	28.1	4.6	24.0	26.8	31.6	33.0
Midsize	3,864,708	965,733	7.1	25.0	1.3	8.3	8.3	#	8.0	8.5	8.4	8.6
Small	3,878,647	878,441	7.1	22.6	2.9	7.6	7.5	-0.1	7.7	7.9	7.1	7.3
Suburban ²	23,420,228	4,026,552	43.0	17.2	22.9	34.6	32.2	-2.4	34.4	30.5	31.2	29.6
Large	20,335,796	3,456,571	37.4	17.0	18.4	29.7	27.7	-2.0	29.5	26.1	27.1	25.6
Midsize	2,034,014	383,767	3.7	18.9	2.5	3.3	3.0	-0.3	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.8
Small	1,050,418	186,214	1.9	17.7	1.9	1.6	1.4	-0.2	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.2
Town ³	5,987,535	1,384,525	11.0	23.1	18.3	11.9	11.0	-0.9	11.8	12.2	10.0	9.8
Fringe	1,411,094	260,791	2.6	18.5	4.0	2.2	2.0	-0.3	2.3	2.1	1.7	1.6
Distant	2,673,490	639,236	4.9	23.9	7.9	5.5	5.0	-0.4	5.4	5.7	4.6	4.5
Remote	1,902,951	484,498	3.5	25.5	6.4	4.2	3.9	-0.2	4.1	4.4	3.7	3.7
Rural ⁴	7,794,823	1,642,642	14.3	21.1	53.0	14.1	13.0	-1.1	14.1	14.2	11.7	11.7
Fringe	3,783,316	742,252	7.0	19.6	11.7	6.4	5.6	-0.8	6.2	5.8	5.0	4.8
Distant	2,935,410	627,777	5.4	21.4	23.1	5.4	4.9	-0.5	5.4	5.6	4.3	4.3
Remote	1,076,097	272,613	2.0	25.3	18.2	2.3	2.5	0.2	2.5	2.8	2.4	2.6
Poverty quarter ⁵												
Highest poverty quarter	13,587,383	4,997,366	25.0	36.8	19.9	43.0	48.4	5.4	43.6	49.8	51.6	53.9
Second-highest poverty quarter	13,612,290	3,290,644	25.0	24.2	22.9	28.3	26.5	-1.8	26.8	30.2	26.1	24.9
Second-lowest poverty quarter	13,597,013	2,215,310	25.0	16.3	29.8	19.1	17.0	-2.0	18.9	18.2	15.4	14.5
Lowest poverty quarter	13,606,154	1,123,837	25.0	8.3	27.4	9.7	8.1	-1.6	10.6	1.7	7.0	6.7
School district population size												
Less than 300	385,278	79,038	0.7	20.5	19.7	0.7	0.8	0.1	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8
300 to 599	799,489	160,702	1.5	20.1	13.4	1.4	1.4	#	1.5	1.6	1.3	1.3
600 to 999	1,354,276	275,444	2.5	20.3	12.6	2.4	2.4	#	2.6	2.5	2.1	2.1
1,000 to 2,499	5,254,117	1,051,757	9.7	20.0	23.8	9.0	8.6	-0.4	9.6	9.2	7.6	7.4
2,500 to 4,999	7,072,084	1,346,835	13.0	19.0	14.6	11.6	10.7	-0.9	12.0	10.9	9.5	9.2
5,000 to 9,999	7,866,802	1,437,674	14.5	18.3	8.3	12.4	11.2	-1.2	12.6	11.1	9.9	9.7
10,000 to 24,999	10,131,997	2,031,439	18.6	20.0	4.9	17.5	16.3	-1.2	17.2	16.3	15.5	15.3
25,000 or more	21,538,797	5,244,268	39.6	24.3	2.6	45.1	48.7	3.6	43.7	47.3	53.3	54.2
100 largest districts ⁶	12,755,710	3,298,772	23.4	25.9	0.7	28.4	32.5	4.1	28.0	31.5	36.7	37.4

#Rounds to zero.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.⁵This category ranks, from the highest to the lowest, all districts according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).⁶These districts are defined as the 100 largest based on the size of their 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 1.E. Number and percentage distribution of public school students, by percentage of district schools that are eligible for schoolwide Title I programs, school district poverty rate, and school district enrollment size: 2015–16

School district enrollment size and poverty rate	Number of students, by percent of district schools eligible for schoolwide Title I programs							Percentage distribution of students, by percent of district schools eligible for schoolwide Title I programs						
	Total	No schools ¹	Less than 25.0 percent	At least 25.0 percent, but less than 50.0 percent	At least 50.0 percent, but less than 75.0 percent	At least 75.0 percent, but not all	All schools have schoolwide programs	Total	No schools ¹	Less than 25.0 percent	At least 25.0 percent, but less than 50.0 percent	At least 50.0 percent, but less than 75.0 percent	At least 75.0 percent, but not all	All schools have schoolwide programs
Total	50,115,178	7,881,644	4,480,319	7,880,102	10,521,690	12,849,023	6,502,400	100.0	15.7	8.9	15.7	21.0	25.6	13.0
School district enrollment size														
1 to 299	629,287	232,211	711	10,968	63,488	1,634	320,275	100.0	36.9	0.1	1.7	10.1	0.3	50.9
300 to 599	1,259,891	408,938	4,625	53,079	175,611	9,550	608,088	100.0	32.5	0.4	4.2	13.9	0.8	48.3
600 to 999	1,779,202	564,204	7,268	150,650	288,885	52,686	715,509	100.0	31.7	0.4	8.5	16.2	3.0	40.2
1,000 to 2,499	5,589,218	1,676,301	119,813	554,436	901,420	674,498	1,662,750	100.0	30.0	2.1	9.9	16.1	12.1	29.7
2,500 to 4,999	6,847,013	2,103,006	418,339	704,644	1,249,197	1,089,391	1,282,436	100.0	30.7	6.1	10.3	18.2	15.9	18.7
5,000 to 9,999	7,344,231	1,655,479	806,346	1,084,663	1,252,105	1,530,068	1,015,570	100.0	22.5	11.0	14.8	17.0	20.8	13.8
10,000 to 24,999	9,463,818	929,555	1,011,044	2,061,569	2,055,686	2,777,049	628,915	100.0	9.8	10.7	21.8	21.7	29.3	6.6
25,000 or more	17,202,518	311,950	2,112,173	3,260,093	4,535,298	6,714,147	268,857	100.0	1.8	12.3	19.0	26.4	39.0	1.6
School district poverty rate ²														
Less than 10.0 percent	9,231,917	4,791,691	2,649,909	1,477,919	184,233	84,621	43,544	100.0	51.9	28.7	16.0	2.0	0.9	0.5
1 to 299	59,448	45,759	185	1,095	5,403	#	7,006	100.0	77.0	0.3	1.8	9.1	#	11.8
300 to 599	127,046	105,775	#	3,943	9,923	356	7,049	100.0	83.3	#	3.1	7.8	0.3	5.5
600 to 999	234,476	209,336	#	7,576	13,149	609	3,806	100.0	89.3	#	3.2	5.6	0.3	1.6
1,000 to 2,499	1,032,312	871,416	18,898	58,000	41,287	20,189	22,522	100.0	84.4	1.8	5.6	4.0	2.0	2.2
2,500 to 4,999	1,929,314	1,535,415	201,207	132,017	45,101	12,413	3,161	100.0	79.6	10.4	6.8	2.3	0.6	0.2
5,000 to 9,999	2,004,810	1,208,258	459,505	285,941	20,003	31,103	#	100.0	60.3	22.9	14.3	1.0	1.6	#
10,000 to 24,999	1,547,356	696,260	597,305	212,359	21,481	19,951	#	100.0	45.0	38.6	13.7	1.4	1.3	#
25,000 or more	2,297,155	119,472	1,372,809	776,988	27,886	#	#	100.0	5.2	59.8	33.8	1.2	#	#
10.0 percent to less than 15.0 percent	7,716,241	1,240,215	1,291,636	2,780,864	1,828,058	276,024	299,444	100.0	16.1	16.7	36.0	23.7	3.6	3.9
1 to 299	76,187	38,077	273	1,889	13,352	#	22,596	100.0	50.0	0.4	2.5	17.5	#	29.7
300 to 599	193,117	88,417	1,308	15,050	48,351	325	39,666	100.0	45.8	0.7	7.8	25.0	0.2	20.5
600 to 999	309,163	125,828	2,843	50,315	80,564	3,607	46,006	100.0	40.7	0.9	16.3	26.1	1.2	14.9
1,000 to 2,499	1,008,325	388,873	57,436	200,898	179,623	95,730	85,765	100.0	38.6	5.7	19.9	17.8	9.5	8.5
2,500 to 4,999	1,081,270	300,067	153,211	249,382	229,832	93,491	55,287	100.0	27.8	14.2	23.1	21.3	8.6	5.1
5,000 to 9,999	1,153,707	179,928	254,660	417,584	203,448	47,963	50,124	100.0	15.6	22.1	36.2	17.6	4.2	4.3
10,000 to 24,999	1,713,008	119,025	248,910	910,142	400,023	34,908	#	100.0	6.9	14.5	53.1	23.4	2.0	#
25,000 or more	2,181,464	#	572,995	935,604	672,865	#	#	100.0	#	26.3	42.9	30.8	#	#
15.0 percent to less than 20.0 percent	7,935,022	550,191	329,051	2,120,179	3,027,891	1,110,027	797,683	100.0	6.9	4.1	26.7	38.2	14.0	10.1
1 to 299	73,812	21,725	#	2,497	14,232	582	34,776	100.0	29.4	#	3.4	19.3	0.8	47.1
300 to 599	170,360	40,695	1,336	15,318	46,120	1,306	65,585	100.0	23.9	0.8	9.0	27.1	0.8	38.5
600 to 999	306,493	63,532	2,495	40,121	74,117	14,774	111,454	100.0	20.7	0.8	13.1	24.2	4.8	36.4
1,000 to 2,499	1,008,924	138,396	22,182	136,721	265,752	142,548	303,325	100.0	13.7	2.2	13.6	26.3	14.1	30.1
2,500 to 4,999	994,520	94,479	33,904	154,767	365,354	189,774	156,242	100.0	9.5	3.4	15.6	36.7	19.1	15.7
5,000 to 9,999	1,128,398	94,757	50,539	196,052	363,623	315,897	107,530	100.0	8.4	4.5	17.4	32.2	28.0	9.5
10,000 to 24,999	1,724,930	29,584	128,539	488,097	698,098	361,841	18,771	100.0	1.7	7.5	28.3	40.5	21.0	1.1
25,000 or more	2,527,585	67,023	90,056	1,086,606	1,200,595	83,305	#	100.0	2.7	3.6	43.0	47.5	3.3	0.0
20.0 percent to less than 25.0 percent	7,677,856	260,694	159,540	803,272	3,113,965	2,249,791	1,090,594	100.0	3.4	2.1	10.5	40.6	29.3	14.2
1 to 299	66,578	12,348	#	2,905	11,831	#	39,494	100.0	18.5	#	4.4	17.8	#	59.3
300 to 599	144,626	14,342	#	6,297	33,333	3,644	87,010	100.0	9.9	#	4.4	23.0	2.5	60.2
600 to 999	207,583	16,945	965	24,894	41,979	9,446	113,354	100.0	8.2	0.5	12.0	20.2	4.6	54.6
1,000 to 2,499	743,300	60,353	11,692	67,754	164,151	135,081	304,269	100.0	8.1	1.6	9.1	22.1	18.2	40.9
2,500 to 4,999	951,263	43,423	19,684	72,081	281,167	265,829	269,079	100.0	4.6	2.1	7.6	29.6	27.9	28.3
5,000 to 9,999	1,072,509	51,386	28,813	125,141	287,373	371,260	208,536	100.0	4.8	2.7	11.7	26.8	34.6	19.4
10,000 to 24,999	1,528,545	23,827	22,073	228,206	499,804	685,783	68,852	100.0	1.6	1.4	14.9	32.7	44.9	4.5
25,000 or more	2,963,452	38,070	76,313	275,994	1,794,327	778,748	#	100.0	1.3	2.6	9.3	60.5	26.3	#

See notes at end of table.

Table 1.E. Number and percentage distribution of public school students, by percentage of district schools that are eligible for schoolwide Title I programs, school district poverty rate, and school district enrollment size: 2015–16—Continued

School district enrollment size and poverty rate	Number of students, by percent of district schools eligible for schoolwide Title I programs							Percentage distribution of students, by percent of district schools eligible for schoolwide Title I programs						
	Total	No schools ¹	Less than 25.0 percent	At least 25.0 percent, but less than 50.0 percent	At least 50.0 percent, but less than 75.0 percent	At least 75.0 percent, but not all	All schools have schoolwide programs	Total	No schools ¹	Less than 25.0 percent	At least 25.0 percent, but less than 50.0 percent	At least 50.0 percent, but less than 75.0 percent	At least 75.0 percent, but not all	All schools have schoolwide programs
25.0 percent to less than 30.0 percent	6,535,238	251,098	22,668	427,418	1,470,049	3,117,242	1,246,763	100.0	3.8	0.3	6.5	22.5	47.7	19.1
1 to 299	50,392	6,184	253	1,131	9,883	#	32,941	100.0	12.3	0.5	2.2	19.6	#	65.4
300 to 599	78,225	3,920	#	5,245	15,817	1,358	51,885	100.0	5.0	#	6.7	20.2	1.7	66.3
600 to 999	151,844	8,955	#	14,012	32,000	9,859	87,018	100.0	5.9	#	9.2	21.1	6.5	57.3
1,000 to 2,499	622,167	32,968	2,174	46,288	117,854	105,229	317,654	100.0	5.3	0.3	7.4	18.9	16.9	51.1
2,500 to 4,999	720,271	34,782	#	44,127	158,924	175,417	307,021	100.0	4.8	#	6.1	22.1	24.4	42.6
5,000 to 9,999	777,828	66,486	6,024	17,706	160,563	297,204	229,845	100.0	8.5	0.8	2.3	20.6	38.2	29.5
10,000 to 24,999	1,248,945	10,418	14,217	114,008	264,862	663,734	181,706	100.0	0.8	1.1	9.1	21.2	53.1	14.5
25,000 or more	2,885,566	87,385	#	184,901	710,146	1,864,441	38,693	100.0	3.0	#	6.4	24.6	64.6	1.3
30.0 percent or more	9,016,632	192,300	17,442	161,395	760,873	5,929,693	1,954,929	100.0	2.1	0.2	1.8	8.4	65.8	21.7
1 to 299	55,322	8,178	#	1,049	6,136	536	39,423	100.0	14.8	#	1.9	11.1	1.0	71.3
300 to 599	112,011	4,516	348	4,019	16,174	1,448	85,506	100.0	4.0	0.3	3.6	14.4	1.3	76.3
600 to 999	180,570	5,491	#	11,986	36,983	12,571	113,539	100.0	3.0	#	6.6	20.5	7.0	62.9
1,000 to 2,499	777,588	54,281	3,056	27,775	111,812	167,161	413,503	100.0	7.0	0.4	3.6	14.4	21.5	53.2
2,500 to 4,999	987,017	69,915	7,233	26,704	136,543	329,829	416,793	100.0	7.1	0.7	2.7	13.8	33.4	42.2
5,000 to 9,999	1,037,399	25,226	6,805	19,668	181,565	456,125	348,010	100.0	2.4	0.7	1.9	17.5	44.0	33.5
10,000 to 24,999	1,519,429	24,693	#	70,194	142,181	974,370	307,991	100.0	1.6	#	4.6	9.4	64.1	20.3
25,000 or more	4,347,296	#	#	#	129,479	3,987,653	230,164	100.0	#	#	#	3.0	91.7	5.3
Poverty rate not available ...	2,002,272	595,455	10,073	109,055	136,621	81,625	1,069,443	100.0	29.7	0.5	5.4	6.8	4.1	53.4
1 to 299	247,548	99,940	#	402	2,651	516	144,039	100.0	40.4	#	0.2	1.1	0.2	58.2
300 to 599	434,506	151,273	1,633	3,207	5,893	1,113	271,387	100.0	34.8	0.4	0.7	1.4	0.3	62.5
600 to 999	389,073	134,117	965	1,746	10,093	1,820	240,332	100.0	34.5	0.2	0.4	2.6	0.5	61.8
1,000 to 2,499	396,602	130,014	4,375	17,000	20,941	8,560	215,712	100.0	32.8	1.1	4.3	5.3	2.2	54.4
2,500 to 4,999	183,358	24,925	3,100	25,566	32,276	22,638	74,853	100.0	13.6	1.7	13.9	17.6	12.3	40.8
5,000 to 9,999	169,580	29,438	#	22,571	35,530	10,516	71,525	100.0	17.4	#	13.3	21.0	6.2	42.2
10,000 to 24,999	181,605	25,748	#	38,563	29,237	36,462	51,595	100.0	14.2	#	21.2	16.1	20.1	28.4
25,000 or more	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	†	†	†	†	†	†	†

†Not applicable.

#Rounds to zero.

¹Includes students enrolled in districts that did not report information on Title I programs.²Poverty is defined based on the number of related 5- to 17-year-olds and their family income. For information on poverty thresholds, see <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/saipe.html>.

NOTE: Schools with a schoolwide Title I program include those participating in a schoolwide program as well as those eligible for a schoolwide program but not providing a program during the current school year. This table includes operational schools and school districts only. Puerto Rico is not included in this table. Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2015–16, Provisional Version 0f; "Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey," 2015–16, Provisional Version 0f.

Table 2.A. Title I, Part A total allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district locale and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Total	City ¹			Suburban ²			Town ³			Rural ⁴		
		Large	Midsize	Small	Large	Midsize	Small	Fringe	Distant	Remote	Fringe	Distant	Remote
Total	\$1,227	\$1,466	\$1,223	\$1,212	\$1,145	\$1,123	\$1,102	\$1,088	\$1,127	\$1,161	\$1,070	\$1,120	\$1,313
Alabama	1,060	†	1,138	1,023	969	964	1,069	933	1,120	1,238	1,033	1,007	1,144
Alaska	2,121	2,276	†	1,821	†	†	2,370	†	1,834	1,664	†	†	2,256
Arizona	1,065	1,126	906	981	920	859	905	932	973	1,115	1,027	1,448	1,381
Arkansas	1,133	†	1,126	1,102	1,084	1,114	1,105	943	1,122	1,220	1,110	1,120	1,275
California	1,108	1,279	1,028	958	1,000	1,013	962	1,048	1,103	1,011	1,071	1,134	1,144
Colorado	1,046	1,172	985	959	995	990	888	783	927	922	795	876	1,061
Connecticut	1,448	†	1,757	1,341	1,260	1,506	†	1,279	†	†	1,070	1,201	†
Delaware	1,739	†	†	1,808	1,757	1,854	2,040	1,555	1,576	†	1,589	†	†
District of Columbia	1,869	1,869	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Florida	1,121	1,125	1,028	1,013	1,152	1,052	1,066	894	1,029	1,025	1,022	979	934
Georgia	1,104	1,486	1,097	1,107	1,117	†	938	1,010	1,135	1,148	1,000	996	1,155
Hawaii	1,569	1,657	†	†	1,470	†	†	1,471	†	†	†	†	1,260
Idaho	984	†	1,089	956	967	1,079	928	876	926	904	938	1,086	1,061
Illinois	1,521	1,994	1,437	1,416	1,292	1,094	1,232	1,159	1,252	1,296	1,183	1,238	1,289
Indiana	1,095	1,249	1,170	1,203	1,021	891	890	911	1,041	965	910	970	945
Iowa	1,127	†	1,312	1,168	882	974	917	968	1,070	1,103	978	1,007	1,110
Kansas	1,152	1,424	1,343	1,062	939	844	1,028	1,071	1,028	1,057	887	985	1,040
Kentucky	1,195	1,382	†	1,175	1,004	1,002	1,088	941	1,113	1,162	1,224	1,128	1,329
Louisiana	1,310	1,675	1,342	1,256	1,268	1,178	1,236	1,227	1,321	1,354	1,248	1,196	1,329
Maine	1,561	†	†	1,617	†	1,449	1,393	1,393	1,506	1,633	1,415	1,556	1,795
Maryland	1,588	1,780	†	1,422	1,644	1,356	1,198	†	1,363	†	1,202	1,361	†
Massachusetts	1,450	1,863	1,708	1,284	1,332	1,418	1,452	1,433	1,347	†	1,131	1,088	†
Michigan	1,376	2,092	1,413	1,375	1,177	1,120	1,058	1,092	1,143	1,087	1,030	1,133	1,219
Minnesota	1,188	1,559	1,056	1,129	1,069	969	936	924	1,006	1,096	1,059	1,074	1,234
Mississippi	1,099	†	1,162	1,089	914	913	926	†	1,157	1,187	1,017	1,016	1,192
Missouri	1,135	1,374	1,157	1,047	1,025	†	914	983	1,066	1,131	1,080	1,136	1,209
Montana	1,406	†	1,268	1,262	†	1,152	1,342	1,024	†	1,388	1,358	1,374	1,630
Nebraska	1,316	1,488	†	1,232	1,055	1,167	†	968	1,099	1,135	1,052	1,231	1,224
Nevada	1,142	1,183	1,151	831	†	†	†	†	783	748	883	673	793
New Hampshire	1,958	†	2,625	2,174	1,421	1,393	1,809	1,608	2,143	2,154	1,598	2,044	2,533
New Jersey	1,451	1,818	†	1,790	1,328	1,313	1,298	1,581	†	†	1,172	1,213	†
New Mexico	1,092	1,179	†	1,004	803	†	957	977	961	1,061	1,147	916	1,173
New York	1,611	1,843	1,636	1,423	1,198	1,138	1,138	1,182	1,303	1,349	1,150	1,281	1,359
North Carolina	1,066	1,167	1,115	1,032	1,062	1,063	†	1,085	1,146	864	1,003	1,019	1,032
North Dakota	2,481	†	2,252	2,296	†	2,133	2,089	†	†	2,163	2,599	2,679	2,882
Ohio	1,349	1,663	1,535	1,623	1,171	1,324	1,271	1,238	1,219	1,337	1,200	1,194	1,443
Oklahoma	1,026	1,158	†	1,019	854	953	†	883	1,000	980	902	1,031	1,084
Oregon	1,147	1,230	1,262	1,085	1,144	1,073	1,027	1,064	1,104	1,101	1,228	1,216	1,222
Pennsylvania	1,521	2,032	1,627	1,620	1,266	1,114	1,344	1,298	1,302	1,356	1,276	1,300	1,313
Puerto Rico	1,217	†	†	†	1,217	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Rhode Island	1,541	†	1,777	1,192	1,450	1,104	†	†	†	†	1,135	1,313	†
South Carolina	1,141	†	1,206	1,097	1,145	1,135	1,106	1,017	1,173	1,107	1,103	1,146	†
South Dakota	1,665	†	1,528	1,691	†	1,204	†	1,343	1,344	1,313	1,530	1,404	1,945
Tennessee	1,061	1,208	1,115	955	1,007	956	†	944	1,000	1,039	963	980	1,040
Texas	1,078	1,196	1,062	1,026	1,030	1,011	883	981	975	1,062	938	952	1,046
Utah	996	†	1,021	1,016	1,033	†	798	†	787	880	869	857	881
Vermont	2,590	†	†	2,621	†	2,491	†	2,076	2,683	2,510	2,668	2,512	2,735
Virginia	1,253	1,372	1,430	1,264	1,269	1,081	1,015	1,031	1,184	1,270	1,076	1,120	1,219
Washington	1,128	1,276	1,199	1,114	1,068	1,056	1,034	1,038	1,179	1,129	1,164	1,201	1,276
West Virginia	1,336	†	†	1,264	†	1,334	1,251	1,399	1,405	1,342	1,402	1,286	1,361
Wisconsin	1,292	1,642	1,360	1,215	964	1,186	981	972	1,079	1,208	1,062	1,177	1,283
Wyoming	2,579	†	†	2,664	†	†	†	†	†	2,485	1,390	3,536	2,581

† Not applicable.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 2.B. Title I, Part A Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district locale and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Total	City ¹			Suburban ²			Town ³			Rural ⁴		
		Large	Midsized	Small	Large	Midsized	Small	Fringe	Distant	Remote	Fringe	Distant	Remote
Total	\$550	\$561	\$532	\$558	\$546	\$541	\$563	\$558	\$542	\$541	\$534	\$554	\$583
Alabama	474	†	464	475	466	461	505	465	477	488	473	477	502
Alaska	917	912	†	912	†	†	912	†	912	912	†	†	925
Arizona	479	475	461	486	464	461	468	476	477	491	492	588	549
Arkansas	509	†	485	495	508	514	508	495	501	523	512	519	549
California	497	499	495	495	492	497	494	503	510	514	507	536	540
Colorado	486	492	471	469	488	469	469	477	469	477	469	490	512
Connecticut	707	†	716	692	702	718	†	692	†	†	701	758	†
Delaware	701	†	†	702	692	787	726	692	692	†	696	†	†
District of Columbia	775	775	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Florida	465	461	461	470	465	461	493	461	461	477	461	461	461
Georgia	482	576	467	484	474	†	467	494	499	485	474	471	507
Hawaii	649	649	†	†	639	†	†	676	†	†	†	†	639
Idaho	468	†	461	462	461	466	461	461	471	463	470	494	513
Illinois	699	692	692	721	702	692	695	697	697	694	699	721	712
Indiana	509	511	497	520	509	498	497	497	509	497	501	513	514
Iowa	553	†	555	549	549	549	549	549	553	550	553	558	559
Kansas	548	540	565	546	542	540	540	544	540	542	544	556	550
Kentucky	533	540	†	524	513	512	539	512	536	522	540	536	546
Louisiana	575	683	555	557	565	557	561	556	599	581	572	558	605
Maine	715	†	†	692	†	737	698	692	701	715	724	711	757
Maryland	698	707	†	692	696	698	692	†	692	†	692	692	†
Massachusetts	699	692	692	693	702	697	771	724	693	†	707	695	†
Michigan	622	687	616	625	610	600	588	611	590	579	590	599	594
Minnesota	591	586	586	586	593	586	586	588	589	593	590	597	599
Mississippi	482	†	461	461	461	464	466	†	482	491	478	479	518
Missouri	531	548	521	521	526	†	521	530	523	525	528	537	539
Montana	581	†	561	561	†	561	584	561	†	568	594	592	624
Nebraska	619	612	†	615	624	611	†	611	616	613	659	631	642
Nevada	469	463	513	461	†	†	†	†	461	461	461	461	461
New Hampshire	852	†	853	824	824	825	845	826	861	845	874	885	873
New Jersey	700	692	†	727	696	693	702	693	†	†	697	710	†
New Mexico	472	462	†	465	461	†	461	485	461	484	471	468	490
New York	697	696	692	693	695	694	693	696	701	693	703	709	702
North Carolina	467	461	464	467	462	465	†	486	481	461	468	470	464
North Dakota	1,076	†	1,039	1,045	†	1,039	1,065	†	†	1,039	1,154	1,122	1,121
Ohio	620	627	603	636	615	604	638	620	613	615	622	626	603
Oklahoma	469	462	†	461	461	464	†	465	469	464	469	489	496
Oregon	530	516	522	518	548	517	533	528	527	526	578	581	562
Pennsylvania	708	709	692	714	712	692	698	702	704	695	704	713	694
Puerto Rico	536	†	†	†	536	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Rhode Island	694	†	692	692	696	692	†	†	†	†	701	692	†
South Carolina	504	†	501	501	504	503	501	501	506	501	507	511	†
South Dakota	680	†	669	669	†	673	†	669	674	670	669	695	693
Tennessee	466	461	510	462	462	461	†	461	472	471	463	472	467
Texas	471	471	467	466	465	475	463	485	472	493	475	482	502
Utah	462	†	461	461	461	†	461	†	470	461	461	466	462
Vermont	1,121	†	†	1,152	†	1,114	†	1,081	1,084	1,098	1,120	1,138	1,152
Virginia	602	596	618	596	600	596	596	596	599	596	596	596	597
Washington	532	526	526	527	529	530	526	536	542	526	558	570	568
West Virginia	608	†	†	590	†	593	590	605	646	590	647	597	613
Wisconsin	595	591	590	592	594	591	594	595	594	604	598	610	615
Wyoming	1,105	†	†	1,093	†	†	†	†	†	1,097	1,390	1,234	1,132

† Not applicable.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsized cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsized suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 2.C. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district locale and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Total	City ¹			Suburban ²			Town ³			Rural ⁴		
		Large	Midsize	Small	Large	Midsize	Small	Fringe	Distant	Remote	Fringe	Distant	Remote
Total	\$134	\$135	\$127	\$138	\$132	\$127	\$145	\$145	\$131	\$131	\$129	\$139	\$151
Alabama	113	†	110	118	113	109	119	110	114	116	114	113	117
Alaska	452	27,658	†	†	†	†	333	†	†	483	†	†	323
Arizona	116	113	156	117	115	109	111	113	117	118	118	148	138
Arkansas	123	†	115	118	125	122	138	182	119	123	125	124	129
California	121	119	119	132	120	119	120	123	122	129	126	153	168
Colorado	121	117	112	111	129	141	†	117	111	115	111	142	143
Connecticut	178	†	170	195	175	193	†	164	†	†	185	476	†
Delaware	191	†	†	278	164	184	289	194	215	†	164	†	†
District of Columbia	174	174	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Florida	110	109	109	112	110	109	117	109	109	113	109	109	109
Georgia	117	141	111	116	115	†	111	147	120	116	115	113	123
Hawaii	183	154	†	†	151	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Idaho	115	†	109	109	†	110	109	154	121	110	111	128	141
Illinois	169	164	164	176	169	164	164	167	172	166	190	213	176
Indiana	126	125	118	125	121	144	134	135	122	118	142	138	149
Iowa	149	†	131	181	130	130	†	130	155	132	136	204	161
Kansas	141	128	135	339	344	†	128	137	139	139	129	160	152
Kentucky	131	128	†	125	155	121	218	187	128	125	130	129	132
Louisiana	144	173	132	132	143	132	255	132	144	136	136	133	144
Maine	192	†	†	180	†	274	226	264	166	172	238	187	199
Maryland	166	168	†	164	165	170	†	†	164	†	†	164	†
Massachusetts	168	164	164	165	171	167	183	187	164	†	257	169	†
Michigan	159	175	150	152	159	172	139	206	142	150	157	158	144
Minnesota	158	139	†	189	168	†	†	139	150	171	153	184	172
Mississippi	117	†	109	109	160	110	110	†	117	117	114	115	123
Missouri	131	143	123	123	133	†	123	126	126	125	129	134	128
Montana	159	†	167	161	†	133	142	†	†	146	289	173	169
Nebraska	153	145	†	156	150	145	†	†	152	148	†	203	182
Nevada	112	110	121	109	†	†	†	†	109	146	109	†	109
New Hampshire	402	†	202	†	171	†	776	†	338	416	948	458	443
New Jersey	167	164	†	169	167	170	167	164	†	†	173	164	†
New Mexico	113	110	†	110	†	†	109	113	109	116	113	111	117
New York	170	170	164	164	168	172	173	171	170	168	184	180	166
North Carolina	112	109	110	111	111	110	†	116	115	109	115	112	110
North Dakota	588	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	811	587	516	478
Ohio	155	151	143	151	154	144	165	161	148	150	173	177	143
Oklahoma	116	109	†	109	135	110	†	134	112	110	125	125	128
Oregon	145	122	124	223	190	122	164	164	126	125	157	153	137
Pennsylvania	179	168	164	172	194	164	169	266	174	169	186	201	193
Puerto Rico	136	†	†	†	136	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Rhode Island	170	†	171	†	169	†	†	†	†	†	†	164	†
South Carolina	122	†	119	119	126	119	119	119	120	119	127	122	†
South Dakota	208	†	†	185	†	†	†	185	336	185	325	251	207
Tennessee	112	109	120	109	120	109	†	109	112	111	110	112	111
Texas	114	113	112	110	114	118	110	120	114	117	117	120	124
Utah	112	†	109	109	109	†	†	†	154	129	109	112	158
Vermont	323	†	†	338	†	264	†	†	303	284	324	339	371
Virginia	147	141	150	141	151	141	141	141	178	141	141	141	142
Washington	134	125	134	131	130	146	125	130	131	126	136	184	140
West Virginia	143	†	†	140	†	141	140	143	153	140	146	141	141
Wisconsin	150	140	140	147	143	144	†	214	176	181	156	188	154
Wyoming	871	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	685	†	2,248	683

† Not applicable.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 2.D. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district locale and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Total	City ¹			Suburban ²			Town ³			Rural ⁴		
		Large	Midsized	Small	Large	Midsized	Small	Fringe	Distant	Remote	Fringe	Distant	Remote
Total	\$282	\$377	\$283	\$264	\$260	\$241	\$227	\$218	\$234	\$250	\$219	\$226	\$290
Alabama	233	†	264	219	213	199	222	183	253	294	221	207	255
Alaska	537	617	†	469	†	†	561	†	476	361	†	†	541
Arizona	254	281	209	204	216	170	180	189	219	258	224	349	336
Arkansas	239	†	248	236	230	227	224	165	236	264	227	226	273
California	268	335	237	217	227	228	206	237	257	213	246	254	258
Colorado	234	276	218	207	226	205	210	139	180	181	136	158	213
Connecticut	287	†	364	241	240	297	†	246	†	†	197	216	†
Delaware	436	†	†	418	460	449	502	368	343	†	385	†	†
District of Columbia	461	461	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Florida	291	295	244	230	308	256	244	172	243	231	240	217	193
Georgia	258	361	266	255	273	†	185	208	258	276	213	213	265
Hawaii	380	421	†	†	345	†	†	304	†	†	†	†	247
Idaho	196	†	233	184	228	226	174	156	172	168	175	221	212
Illinois	359	538	340	311	273	229	239	237	244	259	232	236	247
Indiana	220	269	252	253	203	175	161	153	194	179	157	172	161
Iowa	198	†	258	210	151	159	151	161	171	182	160	162	184
Kansas	230	318	300	190	187	148	181	201	180	190	156	169	181
Kentucky	259	322	†	253	218	191	217	173	223	253	264	230	304
Louisiana	300	421	317	283	285	254	277	270	309	308	272	255	302
Maine	360	†	†	383	†	315	308	307	328	379	320	359	438
Maryland	375	450	†	281	395	304	251	†	252	†	253	251	†
Massachusetts	298	426	375	228	264	275	241	269	248	†	204	198	†
Michigan	315	545	336	319	254	236	212	212	234	222	190	223	263
Minnesota	232	341	216	214	212	172	161	163	170	182	181	183	229
Mississippi	256	†	293	263	197	185	191	†	280	290	224	222	273
Missouri	234	312	246	200	207	†	174	174	206	230	215	229	256
Montana	359	†	307	299	†	250	315	242	†	348	344	358	454
Nebraska	260	324	†	222	200	199	†	168	181	190	181	232	214
Nevada	319	341	304	164	†	†	†	†	160	146	197	127	147
New Hampshire	524	†	716	542	422	422	472	424	525	494	454	516	661
New Jersey	297	406	†	381	262	247	266	327	†	†	212	217	†
New Mexico	253	291	†	222	184	†	203	198	218	233	271	180	277
New York	422	518	433	330	262	222	223	228	270	294	222	257	300
North Carolina	240	293	265	226	247	240	†	235	268	144	208	214	224
North Dakota	641	†	620	587	†	559	515	†	†	518	640	736	758
Ohio	285	390	355	379	232	282	253	237	235	281	227	220	315
Oklahoma	212	259	†	212	170	184	†	159	199	193	169	204	221
Oregon	227	263	270	219	219	203	178	192	209	208	228	234	240
Pennsylvania	334	517	372	364	252	207	266	236	238	259	236	235	242
Puerto Rico	276	†	†	†	276	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Rhode Island	358	†	443	263	321	219	†	†	†	†	229	247	†
South Carolina	248	†	276	235	252	246	237	201	259	237	229	245	†
South Dakota	432	†	442	432	†	280	†	303	288	300	410	334	519
Tennessee	243	313	242	190	236	190	†	184	205	223	192	196	227
Texas	256	302	254	236	245	230	173	205	209	239	196	196	229
Utah	214	†	215	213	232	†	167	†	148	157	152	141	158
Vermont	676	†	†	625	†	702	†	529	685	633	726	657	738
Virginia	265	304	317	258	290	202	199	179	224	258	209	205	239
Washington	224	283	253	215	216	198	173	192	229	216	219	218	262
West Virginia	251	†	†	228	†	261	223	274	256	261	266	234	256
Wisconsin	264	400	276	228	172	223	167	167	174	204	180	206	232
Wyoming	659	†	†	748	†	†	†	†	†	602	†	858	654

† Not applicable.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsized cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsized suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 2.E. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, by school district locale and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Total	City ¹			Suburban ²			Town ³			Rural ⁴		
		Large	Midsized	Small	Large	Midsized	Small	Fringe	Distant	Remote	Fringe	Distant	Remote
Total	\$282	\$395	\$291	\$271	\$245	\$242	\$209	\$207	\$230	\$249	\$214	\$222	\$309
Alabama	248	†	300	226	215	195	222	175	277	341	227	210	269
Alaska	536	629	†	440	†	†	565	†	446	337	†	†	552
Arizona	229	260	172	174	169	118	146	153	198	249	195	370	365
Arkansas	269	†	279	260	258	251	253	166	267	309	253	251	324
California	239	331	195	173	182	185	161	197	219	164	207	213	217
Colorado	253	315	227	212	240	204	209	129	172	179	126	152	225
Connecticut	390	†	524	299	310	410	†	315	†	†	243	275	†
Delaware	434	†	†	410	463	433	523	355	327	†	374	†	†
District of Columbia	460	460	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Florida	256	260	214	201	271	225	213	151	216	204	211	191	170
Georgia	253	408	253	252	267	†	175	198	257	272	201	202	260
Hawaii	387	433	†	†	334	†	†	331	†	†	†	†	239
Idaho	219	†	286	202	278	277	184	154	173	170	182	257	225
Illinois	331	600	285	247	204	153	162	160	163	180	152	154	170
Indiana	264	347	302	319	240	185	179	163	219	190	166	191	167
Iowa	285	†	371	302	218	229	217	232	247	263	230	234	266
Kansas	277	438	384	204	207	156	179	224	191	206	167	182	196
Kentucky	282	392	†	274	218	178	205	166	226	262	290	235	347
Louisiana	298	398	337	284	288	236	266	269	269	329	268	250	279
Maine	360	†	†	378	†	312	298	296	312	391	316	353	476
Maryland	379	455	†	285	400	308	255	†	255	†	257	254	†
Massachusetts	357	582	477	245	298	315	257	296	264	†	219	213	†
Michigan	314	685	321	300	220	208	167	169	184	173	143	179	223
Minnesota	295	493	254	255	253	202	189	191	198	208	210	212	284
Mississippi	247	†	298	255	166	155	159	†	279	289	202	201	278
Missouri	261	388	267	203	219	†	173	173	217	252	230	249	286
Montana	359	†	281	269	†	226	300	221	†	347	342	350	492
Nebraska	325	432	†	249	220	212	†	189	200	211	202	285	241
Nevada	244	269	213	96	†	†	†	88	80	115	85	83	†
New Hampshire	547	†	854	626	400	400	444	400	519	491	426	523	765
New Jersey	371	557	†	514	309	288	310	428	†	†	236	242	†
New Mexico	259	317	†	207	159	†	183	182	203	228	292	156	290
New York	351	459	347	236	178	140	141	142	173	198	141	162	203
North Carolina	250	304	276	236	257	249	†	248	281	149	217	223	234
North Dakota	643	†	593	562	†	535	490	†	†	492	623	806	794
Ohio	320	494	434	457	235	314	258	244	236	296	229	217	382
Oklahoma	245	328	†	237	181	196	†	167	221	213	178	225	251
Oregon	273	330	345	258	261	232	201	221	243	243	283	283	307
Pennsylvania	357	637	399	377	235	187	255	215	210	238	213	209	211
Puerto Rico	268	†	†	†	268	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Rhode Island	360	†	472	237	310	194	†	†	†	†	205	210	†
South Carolina	270	†	310	242	275	267	249	196	288	250	247	268	†
South Dakota	432	†	418	406	†	251	†	265	256	264	412	313	558
Tennessee	250	324	241	194	244	196	†	190	210	234	197	200	236
Texas	246	313	238	215	229	208	138	176	182	213	168	168	203
Utah	241	†	236	233	270	†	170	†	151	158	146	139	165
Vermont	684	†	†	576	†	755	†	466	718	608	784	642	769
Virginia	282	331	354	269	319	196	192	174	229	275	204	200	241
Washington	271	342	306	260	261	239	210	231	280	262	266	266	322
West Virginia	339	†	†	306	†	350	298	377	351	350	359	315	351
Wisconsin	337	512	354	289	220	285	214	213	222	261	229	262	293
Wyoming	658	†	†	746	†	†	†	†	†	599	†	880	661

† Not applicable.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsized cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsized suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 3.A. Title I, Part A total allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formulas, by state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Final allocation	Formula-eligibility criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision								Removal of multiple provisions					
			All four grant types			Concentration Grant		Targeted Grant and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG)		EFIG		Hold harmless, number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500, and number weighting	Hold harmless and state equity	Hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort	State minimum and hold harmless
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	Number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	Percentage of formula-eligible children exceeds 15 percent of total 5- to 17-year-old population	Number weighting	Percentage weighting	State effort	State equity					
Total	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227
Alabama	1,060	1,202	1,150	1,064	1,059	1,061	1,058	1,065	1,057	1,070	1,054	1,085	1,053	1,061	1,258	1,067
Alaska	2,121	1,090	2,121	1,804	2,112	2,121	2,121	2,121	2,121	2,121	2,121	2,113	2,112	2,113	1,098	1,435
Arizona	1,065	1,220	1,157	1,069	1,054	1,065	1,065	1,072	1,059	1,075	1,077	1,076	1,066	1,056	1,249	1,063
Arkansas	1,133	1,162	1,186	1,137	1,107	1,133	1,128	1,146	1,125	1,118	1,130	1,151	1,104	1,110	1,256	1,116
California	1,108	1,255	1,161	1,113	1,119	1,109	1,111	1,104	1,112	1,119	1,112	1,108	1,123	1,120	1,229	1,129
Colorado	1,046	1,194	1,124	1,050	1,035	1,044	1,048	1,028	1,049	1,057	1,041	1,007	1,030	1,028	1,166	1,044
Connecticut	1,448	1,132	1,272	1,453	1,449	1,448	1,445	1,461	1,448	1,428	1,444	1,493	1,446	1,452	1,158	1,461
Delaware	1,739	1,177	1,718	1,628	1,731	1,740	1,724	1,739	1,739	1,739	1,739	1,734	1,731	1,734	1,171	1,520
District of Columbia ...	1,869	1,338	1,869	1,763	1,869	1,869	1,881	1,869	1,869	1,869	1,869	1,873	1,869	1,873	1,317	1,746
Florida	1,121	1,334	1,231	1,126	1,143	1,121	1,131	1,100	1,128	1,132	1,106	1,064	1,128	1,146	1,235	1,153
Georgia	1,104	1,246	1,187	1,108	1,100	1,105	1,107	1,108	1,104	1,110	1,097	1,097	1,092	1,100	1,257	1,109
Hawaii	1,569	1,268	1,547	1,552	1,556	1,569	1,585	1,569	1,569	1,562	1,562	1,503	1,549	1,503	1,179	1,550
Idaho	984	1,162	1,063	978	988	984	976	984	984	993	1,005	991	1,010	991	1,147	982
Illinois	1,521	1,225	1,337	1,528	1,543	1,522	1,519	1,522	1,522	1,503	1,554	1,533	1,576	1,546	1,188	1,556
Indiana	1,095	1,176	1,130	1,099	1,093	1,095	1,091	1,103	1,093	1,090	1,093	1,128	1,091	1,095	1,215	1,101
Iowa	1,127	1,120	1,067	1,132	1,135	1,128	1,115	1,132	1,128	1,140	1,115	1,160	1,123	1,137	1,148	1,144
Kansas	1,152	1,159	1,120	1,156	1,155	1,152	1,152	1,166	1,148	1,164	1,144	1,181	1,148	1,157	1,189	1,164
Kentucky	1,195	1,184	1,208	1,199	1,175	1,195	1,193	1,205	1,190	1,180	1,192	1,194	1,171	1,178	1,237	1,184
Louisiana	1,310	1,244	1,263	1,315	1,295	1,310	1,313	1,309	1,311	1,293	1,314	1,305	1,300	1,298	1,248	1,306
Maine	1,561	1,092	1,509	1,514	1,541	1,561	1,553	1,561	1,561	1,561	1,565	1,544	1,546	1,544	1,132	1,415
Maryland	1,588	1,261	1,388	1,594	1,616	1,575	1,600	1,552	1,596	1,567	1,569	1,436	1,598	1,537	1,176	1,630
Massachusetts	1,450	1,162	1,208	1,457	1,471	1,451	1,441	1,462	1,452	1,431	1,466	1,509	1,486	1,474	1,170	1,483
Michigan	1,376	1,188	1,320	1,380	1,302	1,376	1,371	1,388	1,372	1,358	1,378	1,356	1,304	1,304	1,247	1,312
Minnesota	1,188	1,122	1,081	1,193	1,198	1,188	1,184	1,188	1,191	1,200	1,188	1,207	1,198	1,200	1,119	1,208
Mississippi	1,099	1,180	1,185	1,103	1,081	1,099	1,091	1,120	1,084	1,110	1,093	1,136	1,075	1,083	1,320	1,090
Missouri	1,135	1,161	1,131	1,139	1,134	1,135	1,127	1,147	1,127	1,135	1,143	1,176	1,142	1,136	1,214	1,143
Montana	1,406	1,106	1,375	1,317	1,388	1,407	1,391	1,406	1,406	1,406	1,406	1,391	1,388	1,391	1,168	1,195
Nebraska	1,316	1,173	1,203	1,321	1,329	1,316	1,315	1,317	1,319	1,308	1,316	1,316	1,328	1,331	1,151	1,339
Nevada	1,142	1,368	1,245	1,146	1,156	1,142	1,152	1,108	1,150	1,152	1,138	1,028	1,152	1,158	1,193	1,166
New Hampshire	1,958	1,038	1,957	1,702	1,930	1,958	1,957	1,958	1,958	1,958	1,958	1,931	1,930	1,931	1,033	1,309
New Jersey	1,451	1,148	1,234	1,457	1,474	1,451	1,443	1,474	1,441	1,431	1,457	1,529	1,481	1,477	1,185	1,486
New Mexico	1,092	1,237	1,193	1,097	1,096	1,093	1,093	1,088	1,089	1,093	1,085	1,111	1,089	1,099	1,278	1,105
New York	1,611	1,293	1,443	1,618	1,637	1,611	1,615	1,615	1,611	1,592	1,624	1,601	1,649	1,640	1,240	1,651
North Carolina	1,066	1,251	1,164	1,070	1,078	1,065	1,067	1,057	1,067	1,077	1,056	1,058	1,069	1,074	1,236	1,087
North Dakota	2,481	1,033	2,481	1,891	2,481	2,482	2,470	2,481	2,481	2,481	2,481	2,482	2,481	2,482	1,072	1,123
Ohio	1,349	1,178	1,256	1,353	1,338	1,349	1,346	1,368	1,342	1,331	1,358	1,394	1,348	1,341	1,227	1,349
Oklahoma	1,026	1,174	1,121	1,030	1,028	1,026	1,022	1,033	1,022	1,037	1,022	1,054	1,024	1,030	1,223	1,036
Oregon	1,147	1,170	1,153	1,151	1,129	1,148	1,146	1,152	1,145	1,140	1,146	1,142	1,128	1,131	1,183	1,138

See notes at end of table.

Table 3.A. Title I, Part A total allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formulas, by state or jurisdiction: 2015—Continued

State or jurisdiction	Final allocation	Formula-eligibility criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision								Removal of multiple provisions					
			All four grant types			Concentration Grant		Targeted Grant and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG)		EFIG		Hold harmless, number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500, and number weighting	Hold harmless and state equity	Hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort	State minimum and hold harmless
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	Number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	Percentage of formula-eligible children exceeds 15 percent of total 5- to 17-year-old population	Number weighting	Percentage weighting	State effort	State equity					
Pennsylvania	1,521	1,186	1,377	1,526	1,515	1,521	1,518	1,537	1,518	1,502	1,531	1,536	1,525	1,518	1,190	1,527
Puerto Rico	1,217	1,264	1,244	1,220	1,096	1,217	1,217	1,217	1,217	1,229	1,190	1,156	1,069	1,099	1,343	1,105
Rhode Island	1,541	1,184	1,457	1,522	1,559	1,542	1,537	1,541	1,541	1,540	1,544	1,594	1,561	1,562	1,235	1,533
South Carolina	1,141	1,228	1,173	1,145	1,159	1,141	1,138	1,134	1,139	1,126	1,143	1,168	1,162	1,162	1,237	1,169
South Dakota	1,665	1,107	1,665	1,332	1,665	1,666	1,647	1,665	1,665	1,665	1,665	1,666	1,665	1,666	1,172	988
Tennessee	1,061	1,246	1,161	1,065	1,075	1,061	1,062	1,045	1,063	1,072	1,054	1,067	1,068	1,078	1,239	1,084
Texas	1,078	1,253	1,172	1,082	1,080	1,078	1,081	1,074	1,080	1,089	1,073	1,079	1,075	1,080	1,255	1,089
Utah	996	1,202	1,098	1,001	1,018	995	998	983	1,003	1,007	997	959	1,018	999	1,137	1,026
Vermont	2,590	1,055	2,590	2,042	2,590	2,591	2,574	2,590	2,590	2,590	2,590	2,591	2,590	2,591	1,076	1,343
Virginia	1,253	1,178	1,119	1,258	1,269	1,248	1,250	1,249	1,252	1,265	1,268	1,241	1,285	1,243	1,156	1,279
Washington	1,128	1,166	1,112	1,133	1,135	1,128	1,115	1,117	1,130	1,140	1,117	1,142	1,124	1,137	1,180	1,144
West Virginia	1,336	1,179	1,223	1,341	1,338	1,336	1,322	1,354	1,328	1,317	1,318	1,379	1,320	1,342	1,239	1,349
Wisconsin	1,292	1,178	1,192	1,298	1,306	1,293	1,289	1,290	1,297	1,274	1,282	1,327	1,295	1,308	1,193	1,316
Wyoming	2,579	1,036	2,578	2,078	2,567	2,579	2,575	2,579	2,579	2,579	2,579	2,567	2,567	2,567	1,047	1,329

¹Only the eligibility criteria for each of the four Title I, Part A grant formulas are included in this column. Basic Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 and more than 2 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible. Concentration Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 6,500 or more than 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible. Targeted Grants and EFIG are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children (without the application of the formula weights) is at least 10 and more than 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible.

²A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE. There is one exception to these rules. For EFIG, the formula is the same except that 34 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the minimum (instead of 32 percent) and 46 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the maximum (instead of 48 percent).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 3.B. Title I, Part A total allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formulas, by school district characteristics: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Final allocation	Formula-eligibility criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision								Removal of multiple provisions					
			All four grant types			Concentration Grant		Targeted Grant and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG)		EFIG		Hold harmless, number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500, and number weighting	Hold harmless and state equity	Hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort	State minimum and hold harmless
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	Number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	Percentage of formula-eligible children exceeds 15 percent of total 5- to 17-year-old population	Number weighting	Percentage weighting	State effort	State equity					
Total	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227	\$1,227
School district locale																
City ³	1,366	1,406	1,370	1,368	1,375	1,366	1,374	1,349	1,375	1,366	1,376	1,318	1,390	1,376	1,296	1,380
Large	1,466	1,513	1,476	1,470	1,474	1,466	1,479	1,435	1,482	1,467	1,482	1,353	1,497	1,475	1,319	1,484
Midsize	1,223	1,315	1,228	1,225	1,246	1,224	1,230	1,216	1,229	1,224	1,227	1,260	1,254	1,248	1,280	1,248
Small	1,212	1,174	1,198	1,208	1,210	1,212	1,204	1,228	1,206	1,209	1,211	1,273	1,209	1,211	1,242	1,202
Suburban ⁴	1,141	1,172	1,133	1,143	1,144	1,140	1,139	1,131	1,144	1,141	1,135	1,135	1,139	1,141	1,153	1,151
Large	1,145	1,183	1,139	1,148	1,147	1,144	1,144	1,133	1,149	1,146	1,139	1,129	1,143	1,143	1,151	1,155
Midsize	1,123	1,132	1,116	1,122	1,137	1,123	1,117	1,123	1,126	1,122	1,112	1,173	1,124	1,139	1,179	1,136
Small	1,102	1,055	1,074	1,102	1,101	1,103	1,091	1,121	1,101	1,098	1,098	1,166	1,091	1,103	1,122	1,095
Town ⁵	1,132	1,032	1,131	1,125	1,119	1,132	1,121	1,174	1,109	1,130	1,125	1,226	1,106	1,122	1,239	1,106
Fringe	1,088	999	1,067	1,088	1,078	1,089	1,077	1,126	1,075	1,084	1,081	1,179	1,062	1,081	1,160	1,079
Distant	1,127	1,033	1,124	1,125	1,113	1,127	1,117	1,170	1,103	1,125	1,120	1,223	1,099	1,116	1,246	1,112
Remote	1,161	1,048	1,176	1,145	1,150	1,162	1,151	1,204	1,134	1,161	1,155	1,254	1,140	1,153	1,271	1,114
Rural ⁶	1,130	1,025	1,135	1,122	1,106	1,130	1,121	1,165	1,113	1,130	1,121	1,196	1,089	1,108	1,203	1,087
Fringe	1,070	1,048	1,084	1,071	1,066	1,071	1,062	1,099	1,063	1,071	1,060	1,143	1,046	1,068	1,181	1,066
Distant	1,120	1,007	1,118	1,116	1,092	1,121	1,110	1,159	1,100	1,119	1,112	1,188	1,074	1,094	1,192	1,082
Remote	1,313	1,003	1,317	1,276	1,247	1,314	1,305	1,356	1,283	1,313	1,309	1,358	1,237	1,249	1,292	1,154
Poverty and population size quarter ⁷																
Highest poverty quarter	1,381	1,333	1,383	1,383	1,361	1,381	1,384	1,394	1,372	1,379	1,387	1,397	1,371	1,364	1,395	1,368
Largest population	1,540	1,553	1,541	1,547	1,539	1,540	1,552	1,504	1,556	1,542	1,553	1,401	1,554	1,542	1,360	1,553
Second-largest population	1,414	1,486	1,421	1,416	1,408	1,414	1,427	1,410	1,428	1,413	1,424	1,421	1,429	1,411	1,411	1,417
Second-smallest population	1,285	1,245	1,278	1,288	1,269	1,285	1,283	1,333	1,265	1,281	1,287	1,407	1,273	1,272	1,411	1,279
Smallest population	1,280	1,043	1,289	1,278	1,224	1,280	1,272	1,327	1,235	1,278	1,279	1,360	1,222	1,227	1,400	1,218
Second-highest poverty quarter	1,149	1,234	1,173	1,152	1,171	1,150	1,148	1,140	1,151	1,151	1,147	1,149	1,167	1,174	1,191	1,175
Largest population	1,256	1,460	1,330	1,262	1,288	1,257	1,271	1,205	1,271	1,261	1,256	1,100	1,294	1,290	1,202	1,299
Second-largest population	1,136	1,313	1,185	1,141	1,170	1,136	1,144	1,093	1,151	1,142	1,134	1,115	1,172	1,175	1,201	1,180
Second-smallest population	1,082	1,155	1,086	1,085	1,102	1,082	1,069	1,096	1,090	1,082	1,079	1,159	1,095	1,105	1,185	1,107
Smallest population	1,125	1,007	1,091	1,121	1,125	1,126	1,111	1,165	1,096	1,122	1,119	1,223	1,110	1,128	1,176	1,115
Second-lowest poverty quarter	1,097	1,123	1,093	1,093	1,103	1,097	1,089	1,084	1,107	1,098	1,092	1,061	1,093	1,099	1,054	1,093
Largest population	1,153	1,357	1,218	1,159	1,183	1,151	1,167	1,105	1,167	1,162	1,155	965	1,190	1,161	1,086	1,193
Second-largest population	1,075	1,165	1,098	1,067	1,088	1,076	1,062	1,029	1,088	1,079	1,075	1,019	1,087	1,090	1,050	1,074
Second-smallest population	1,042	1,018	1,004	1,041	1,048	1,042	1,027	1,049	1,053	1,039	1,033	1,089	1,033	1,051	1,041	1,044
Smallest population	1,118	949	1,052	1,106	1,090	1,118	1,101	1,151	1,118	1,113	1,106	1,172	1,064	1,092	1,040	1,061

See notes at end of table.

Table 3.B. Title I, Part A total allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formulas, by school district characteristics: 2015—Continued

State or jurisdiction	Final allocation	Formula-eligibility criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision								Removal of multiple provisions					
			All four grant types			Concentration Grant		Targeted Grant and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG)		EFIG		Hold harmless, number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500, and number weighting	Hold harmless and state equity	Hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	SPPE, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort	State minimum and hold harmless
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	Number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	Percentage of formula-eligible children exceeds total 5- to 17-year-old population	Number weighting	Percentage weighting	State effort	State equity					
Lowest poverty quarter	1,023	938	951	1,012	1,037	1,021	1,025	1,017	1,036	1,020	1,014	1,021	1,022	1,022	921	1,014
Largest population	1,155	1,158	1,107	1,152	1,182	1,147	1,161	1,086	1,168	1,156	1,154	990	1,184	1,126	991	1,177
Second-largest population	955	919	905	943	978	955	955	941	969	953	949	982	967	978	905	950
Second-smallest population	931	817	829	926	952	931	931	965	942	924	915	1,023	927	952	882	942
Smallest population	1,036	831	940	1,012	1,018	1,036	1,036	1,070	1,048	1,030	1,020	1,092	989	1,018	898	968
School district population size																
Less than 300	1,442	953	1,426	1,379	1,238	1,442	1,429	1,474	1,409	1,442	1,438	1,335	1,228	1,240	1,182	1,098
300 to 599	1,271	968	1,245	1,242	1,191	1,271	1,259	1,308	1,245	1,269	1,265	1,297	1,178	1,194	1,197	1,121
600 to 999	1,227	965	1,189	1,210	1,163	1,227	1,216	1,262	1,200	1,223	1,222	1,265	1,150	1,166	1,187	1,125
1,000 to 2,499	1,167	963	1,126	1,163	1,147	1,167	1,156	1,208	1,141	1,162	1,161	1,252	1,133	1,149	1,193	1,137
2,500 to 4,999	1,131	1,001	1,100	1,129	1,120	1,131	1,121	1,172	1,110	1,127	1,123	1,227	1,105	1,122	1,196	1,116
5,000 to 9,999	1,107	1,057	1,082	1,108	1,107	1,108	1,098	1,143	1,098	1,104	1,101	1,203	1,096	1,110	1,182	1,109
10,000 to 24,999	1,144	1,177	1,141	1,144	1,151	1,144	1,136	1,149	1,147	1,143	1,144	1,197	1,150	1,153	1,205	1,150
25,000 or more	1,323	1,429	1,350	1,327	1,336	1,323	1,335	1,289	1,338	1,327	1,329	1,233	1,347	1,333	1,265	1,345
100 largest districts ³	1,403	1,491	1,427	1,408	1,412	1,403	1,417	1,364	1,418	1,406	1,410	1,263	1,426	1,406	1,283	1,423

¹Only the eligibility criteria for each of the four Title I, Part A grant formulas are included in this column. Basic Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 and more than 2 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible. Concentration Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 6,500 or more than 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible. Targeted Grants and EFIG are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children (without the application of the formula weights) is at least 10 and more than 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible.

²A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE. There is one exception to these rules. For EFIG, the formula is the same except that 34 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the minimum (instead of 32 percent) and 46 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the maximum (instead of 48 percent).

³Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.

⁴Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.

⁵Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.

⁶Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area or 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area or more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

⁷To create the poverty and population size quarters, all school districts are first ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. From this ranking, districts are divided into quarters of the 5- to 17-year-old population. Then, within each quarter, districts are ranked, from highest to lowest, according to their 5- to 17-year-old population to create a second set of quarters. Each of the subgroups represents one-sixteenth of the 5- to 17-year-old population of the United States (including Puerto Rico).

⁸These districts are defined as the 100 largest according to the size of their 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 3.C. Title I, Part A total allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing state per pupil expenditure, state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting, and state effort, by school district locale and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Total	City ¹			Suburban ²			Town ³			Rural ⁴		
		Large	Midsize	Small	Large	Midsize	Small	Fringe	Distant	Remote	Fringe	Distant	Remote
Total	\$1,227	\$1,319	\$1,280	\$1,242	\$1,151	\$1,179	\$1,122	\$1,160	\$1,246	\$1,271	\$1,181	\$1,192	\$1,292
Alabama	1,258	†	1,305	1,243	1,106	1,076	1,159	1,184	1,398	1,512	1,214	1,233	1,405
Alaska	1,098	984	†	982	†	†	1,393	†	982	1,003	†	†	1,282
Arizona	1,249	1,334	1,079	1,126	1,054	1,095	1,125	1,187	1,137	1,353	1,210	1,384	1,477
Arkansas	1,256	†	1,223	1,262	1,105	1,218	1,235	1,052	1,299	1,377	1,234	1,219	1,320
California	1,229	1,311	1,185	1,134	1,149	1,241	1,132	1,304	1,352	1,175	1,320	1,282	1,266
Colorado	1,166	1,241	1,218	1,100	1,058	1,116	969	1,018	1,270	1,204	1,063	1,087	1,260
Connecticut	1,158	†	1,392	1,080	1,025	1,154	†	1,095	†	†	884	903	†
Delaware	1,171	†	†	1,211	1,143	1,146	1,328	1,177	1,174	†	1,166	†	†
District of Columbia	1,317	1,317	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Florida	1,235	1,195	1,235	1,179	1,219	1,245	1,348	1,157	1,463	1,355	1,338	1,392	1,313
Georgia	1,257	1,392	1,387	1,364	1,146	†	1,230	1,206	1,359	1,446	1,244	1,296	1,365
Hawaii	1,179	1,163	†	†	1,322	†	†	1,029	†	†	†	†	1,029
Idaho	1,147	†	1,107	1,103	938	1,294	1,099	1,074	1,155	1,146	1,165	1,246	1,145
Illinois	1,188	1,348	1,217	1,161	1,109	900	1,074	1,039	1,104	1,156	1,033	1,027	1,086
Indiana	1,215	1,360	1,298	1,341	1,120	965	1,049	1,059	1,183	1,153	1,043	1,073	1,046
Iowa	1,148	†	1,240	1,161	951	1,056	995	1,049	1,132	1,188	1,053	1,048	1,154
Kansas	1,189	1,269	1,459	996	942	948	1,155	1,158	1,134	1,146	977	1,044	1,111
Kentucky	1,237	1,118	†	1,291	1,130	1,188	1,029	1,012	1,196	1,368	1,329	1,246	1,469
Louisiana	1,248	1,433	1,215	1,224	1,181	1,140	1,110	1,306	1,311	1,448	1,303	1,279	1,340
Maine	1,132	†	†	1,219	†	1,025	1,048	1,045	1,152	1,167	1,021	1,142	1,180
Maryland	1,176	1,398	†	1,214	1,119	1,030	994	†	1,254	†	994	1,268	†
Massachusetts	1,170	1,272	1,455	1,049	1,098	1,209	1,065	1,134	1,151	†	926	921	†
Michigan	1,247	1,635	1,337	1,272	1,114	1,066	1,049	1,014	1,153	1,109	1,020	1,096	1,225
Minnesota	1,119	1,331	982	1,064	1,003	942	982	961	1,038	1,113	1,099	1,068	1,243
Mississippi	1,320	†	1,515	1,403	953	1,145	1,147	†	1,379	1,414	1,241	1,225	1,360
Missouri	1,214	1,412	1,153	1,136	1,090	†	978	1,076	1,196	1,268	1,194	1,211	1,310
Montana	1,168	†	1,057	1,153	†	1,069	1,117	940	†	1,206	1,114	1,096	1,201
Nebraska	1,151	1,176	†	1,174	1,000	1,188	†	989	1,088	1,139	989	1,208	1,143
Nevada	1,193	1,202	1,157	1,186	†	†	†	†	1,132	1,075	1,389	990	1,177
New Hampshire	1,033	†	1,188	1,005	884	860	997	978	1,134	1,168	897	1,079	1,235
New Jersey	1,185	1,398	†	1,491	1,094	1,089	1,074	1,346	†	†	956	1,003	†
New Mexico	1,278	1,182	†	1,224	902	†	1,267	1,143	1,274	1,289	1,486	1,172	1,478
New York	1,240	1,314	1,563	1,300	1,044	1,014	1,015	1,040	1,150	1,222	993	1,101	1,203
North Carolina	1,236	1,195	1,228	1,243	1,116	1,292	†	1,301	1,452	1,134	1,218	1,315	1,363
North Dakota	1,072	†	986	986	†	986	986	†	†	1,014	1,092	1,142	1,183
Ohio	1,227	1,476	1,473	1,467	1,073	1,286	1,112	1,144	1,143	1,267	1,087	1,066	1,344
Oklahoma	1,223	1,328	†	1,279	1,003	1,103	†	1,108	1,252	1,256	1,119	1,209	1,246
Oregon	1,183	1,222	1,227	1,057	1,130	1,228	1,130	1,189	1,257	1,247	1,185	1,193	1,240
Pennsylvania	1,190	1,379	1,478	1,344	1,045	963	1,164	1,077	1,094	1,176	1,062	1,059	1,111
Puerto Rico	1,343	†	†	†	1,343	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Rhode Island	1,235	†	1,446	895	1,152	895	†	†	†	†	895	1,067	†
South Carolina	1,237	†	1,228	1,217	1,118	1,223	1,323	1,232	1,402	1,357	1,295	1,347	†
South Dakota	1,172	†	929	1,117	†	929	†	1,032	1,028	1,007	1,124	1,015	1,383
Tennessee	1,239	1,319	1,131	1,231	1,088	1,223	†	1,190	1,253	1,335	1,234	1,245	1,359
Texas	1,255	1,290	1,307	1,286	1,201	1,254	1,116	1,221	1,262	1,292	1,169	1,175	1,256
Utah	1,137	†	1,203	1,263	1,098	†	997	†	1,014	1,180	1,204	1,149	1,193
Vermont	1,076	†	†	1,043	†	1,026	†	937	1,180	1,096	1,119	1,018	1,061
Virginia	1,156	1,078	1,300	1,312	1,041	1,061	996	1,022	1,156	1,318	1,064	1,141	1,265
Washington	1,180	1,112	1,194	1,217	1,114	1,112	1,195	1,156	1,281	1,290	1,211	1,187	1,322
West Virginia	1,239	†	†	1,188	†	1,199	1,239	1,351	1,200	1,335	1,256	1,263	1,317
Wisconsin	1,193	1,504	1,155	1,103	936	1,085	951	938	1,035	1,134	1,022	1,098	1,194
Wyoming	1,047	†	†	1,014	†	†	†	†	†	1,061	550	1,093	1,057

† Not applicable.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 4.A. Title I, Part A Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formula, by state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Final allocation	Formula-eligibility criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision			Removal of multiple provisions	
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	SPPE and hold harmless	State minimum and hold harmless
Total	\$550	\$550	\$550	\$550	\$550	\$550	\$550
Alabama	474	550	515	474	472	546	474
Alaska	917	550	917	820	917	917	712
Arizona	479	550	522	479	472	546	474
Arkansas	509	550	527	510	496	546	499
California	497	550	516	498	502	546	504
Colorado	486	550	520	486	480	546	482
Connecticut	707	550	637	708	708	546	712
Delaware	701	550	696	702	708	696	712
District of Columbia	775	550	775	735	775	775	712
Florida	465	550	513	466	472	546	474
Georgia	482	550	517	483	478	546	480
Hawaii	649	550	637	649	655	591	658
Idaho	468	550	515	469	472	546	474
Illinois	699	550	624	701	708	546	712
Indiana	509	550	520	510	509	546	512
Iowa	553	550	519	554	562	546	565
Kansas	548	550	528	549	553	546	556
Kentucky	533	550	533	534	524	546	527
Louisiana	575	550	553	576	569	546	571
Maine	715	550	671	716	708	557	712
Maryland	698	550	622	699	708	546	712
Massachusetts	699	550	587	701	708	546	712
Michigan	622	550	599	623	591	546	594
Minnesota	591	550	534	592	600	546	603
Mississippi	482	550	521	483	472	546	474
Missouri	531	550	524	532	533	546	536
Montana	581	550	557	582	574	557	577
Nebraska	619	550	570	620	626	546	629
Nevada	469	550	513	470	472	546	474
New Hampshire	852	550	852	785	852	852	712
New Jersey	700	550	603	701	708	546	712
New Mexico	472	550	517	473	472	546	474
New York	697	550	633	698	708	546	712
North Carolina	467	550	513	468	472	546	474
North Dakota	1,076	550	1,076	925	1,076	1,076	600
Ohio	620	550	583	621	618	546	621
Oklahoma	469	550	515	470	472	546	474
Oregon	530	550	527	531	528	546	530
Pennsylvania	708	550	654	709	708	546	712
Puerto Rico	536	550	536	536	472	546	474
Rhode Island	694	550	622	696	708	554	712
South Carolina	504	550	514	505	513	546	516
South Dakota	680	550	680	610	680	680	474
Tennessee	466	550	512	467	472	546	474
Texas	471	550	514	472	472	546	474
Utah	462	550	512	463	472	546	474
Vermont	1,121	550	1,121	995	1,121	1,121	712
Virginia	602	550	535	603	610	546	613
Washington	532	550	520	533	539	546	541
West Virginia	608	550	558	609	604	546	607
Wisconsin	595	550	549	596	604	546	607
Wyoming	1,105	550	1,105	978	1,105	1,105	712

¹Basic Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 and more than 2 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible.

²A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 4.B. Title I, Part A Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formula, by school district characteristics: 2015

School district characteristic	Final allocation	Formula-eligibility criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision			Removal of multiple provisions	
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	SPPE and hold harmless	State minimum and hold harmless
Total	\$550	\$550	\$550	\$550	\$550	\$550	\$550
School district locale							
City ³	555	550	560	555	556	549	557
Large	561	550	570	562	562	549	564
Midsize	532	550	537	532	538	548	538
Small	558	550	555	558	560	552	558
Suburban ⁴	546	550	539	547	547	547	549
Large	546	550	539	547	545	546	548
Midsize	541	550	538	541	549	550	548
Small	563	550	548	563	568	553	567
Town ⁵	545	550	544	543	543	554	540
Fringe	558	550	547	558	559	550	560
Distant	542	550	541	542	541	550	541
Remote	541	550	547	537	538	562	527
Rural ⁶	550	550	551	549	544	555	540
Fringe	534	550	539	535	535	549	536
Distant	554	550	551	553	548	552	546
Remote	583	550	584	577	562	577	538
Poverty and population size quarter⁷							
Highest poverty quarter	558	550	563	559	548	548	550
Largest population	574	550	577	575	565	546	568
Second-largest population	555	550	561	555	551	550	553
Second-smallest population	552	550	555	553	546	546	549
Smallest population	551	550	558	551	530	549	529
Second-highest poverty quarter	521	550	531	521	528	547	530
Largest population	494	550	526	495	503	546	505
Second-largest population	498	550	519	499	509	546	511
Second-smallest population	528	550	531	529	535	547	538
Smallest population	563	550	547	563	566	551	565
Second-lowest poverty quarter	547	550	542	546	553	552	551
Largest population	491	550	518	492	500	546	503
Second-largest population	520	550	530	519	528	554	526
Second-smallest population	564	550	544	564	573	551	572
Smallest population	612	550	576	609	611	560	603
Lowest poverty quarter	604	550	563	601	613	562	605
Largest population	557	550	541	557	570	555	569
Second-largest population	581	550	549	577	592	563	583
Second-smallest population	624	550	560	623	637	554	633
Smallest population	662	550	602	655	658	574	641
School district population size							
Less than 300	672	550	664	661	599	598	560
300 to 599	610	550	597	604	585	573	567
600 to 999	599	550	581	596	581	561	571
1,000 to 2,499	583	550	562	582	578	552	576
2,500 to 4,999	568	550	552	568	567	550	566
5,000 to 9,999	558	550	546	558	562	549	562
10,000 to 24,999	541	550	542	542	545	550	545
25,000 or more	533	550	546	534	535	547	537
100 largest districts ⁸	542	550	554	543	542	547	544

¹Basic Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 10 and more than 2 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible.

²A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE.

³Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.

⁴Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.

⁵Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.

⁶Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area or 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area or more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

⁷To create the poverty and population size quarters, all school districts are first ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. From this ranking, districts are divided into quarters of the 5- to 17-year-old population. Then, within each quarter, districts are ranked, from highest to lowest, according to their 5- to 17-year-old population to create a second set of quarters. Each of the subgroups represents one-sixteenth of the 5- to 17-year-old population of the United States (including Puerto Rico).

⁸These districts are defined as the 100 largest according to the size of their 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 4.C. Title I, Part A Basic Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing state per pupil expenditure and hold harmless from the formula, by school district locale and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Total	City ¹			Suburban ²			Town ³			Rural ⁴		
		Large	Midsize	Small	Large	Midsize	Small	Fringe	Distant	Remote	Fringe	Distant	Remote
Total	\$550	\$549	\$548	\$552	\$546	\$550	\$553	\$550	\$550	\$562	\$549	\$552	\$577
Alabama	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Alaska	917	917	†	917	†	†	917	†	917	917	†	†	917
Arizona	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Arkansas	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
California	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Colorado	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Connecticut	546	†	546	546	546	546	†	546	†	†	546	546	†
Delaware	696	†	†	696	696	696	696	696	696	†	696	†	†
District of Columbia	775	775	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Florida	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Georgia	546	546	546	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Hawaii	591	591	†	†	591	†	†	591	†	†	†	†	591
Idaho	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Illinois	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Indiana	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Iowa	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Kansas	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Kentucky	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Louisiana	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Maine	557	†	†	557	†	557	557	557	557	557	557	557	557
Maryland	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	†	546	†	546	546	†
Massachusetts	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	†	546	546	†
Michigan	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Minnesota	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Mississippi	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	546
Missouri	546	546	546	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Montana	557	†	557	557	†	557	557	557	†	557	557	557	557
Nebraska	546	546	†	546	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546
Nevada	546	546	546	546	†	†	†	†	546	546	546	546	546
New Hampshire	852	†	852	852	852	852	852	852	852	852	852	852	852
New Jersey	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	†	†	546	546	†
New Mexico	546	546	†	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
New York	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
North Carolina	546	546	546	546	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546
North Dakota	1,076	†	1,076	1,076	†	1,076	1,076	†	†	1,076	1,076	1,076	1,076
Ohio	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Oklahoma	546	546	†	546	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546
Oregon	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Pennsylvania	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Puerto Rico	546	†	†	†	546	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Rhode Island	554	†	554	554	554	554	†	†	†	†	554	554	†
South Carolina	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	†
South Dakota	680	†	680	680	†	680	†	680	680	680	680	680	680
Tennessee	546	546	546	546	546	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546
Texas	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Utah	546	†	546	546	546	†	546	†	546	546	546	546	546
Vermont	1,121	†	†	1,121	†	1,121	†	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121
Virginia	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Washington	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
West Virginia	546	†	†	546	†	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Wisconsin	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	546
Wyoming	1,105	†	†	1,105	†	†	†	†	†	1,105	1,105	1,105	1,105

† Not applicable.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 5.A. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formula, by state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Final allocation	Formula-eligible criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision					Removal of multiple provisions	
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	Number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	Percentage of formula-eligible children exceeds 15 percent of total 5- to 17-year-old population	Hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	SPPE, hold harmless, number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500
Total	\$134	\$134	\$134	\$134	\$134	\$134	\$135	\$137	\$137
Alabama	113	134	121	113	116	114	110	118	135
Alaska	452	134	451	452	421	452	451	423	423
Arizona	116	134	124	116	116	117	117	118	135
Arkansas	123	134	125	123	122	123	118	125	135
California	121	134	124	121	123	121	124	126	135
Colorado	121	134	127	121	118	119	126	120	135
Connecticut	178	134	166	178	174	178	177	178	135
Delaware	191	134	174	191	174	192	174	178	151
District of Columbia	174	134	174	174	174	174	186	178	147
Florida	110	134	120	110	116	111	121	118	135
Georgia	117	134	123	117	117	117	120	120	135
Hawaii	183	134	181	183	161	183	202	333	333
Idaho	115	134	124	115	116	115	107	118	135
Illinois	169	134	152	169	174	169	168	178	135
Indiana	126	134	127	126	125	126	122	128	135
Iowa	149	134	139	149	138	150	132	141	135
Kansas	141	134	136	142	136	142	142	139	135
Kentucky	131	134	130	131	129	132	129	132	135
Louisiana	144	134	138	144	140	144	147	143	135
Maine	192	134	181	192	174	192	181	178	145
Maryland	166	134	148	166	174	150	181	178	135
Massachusetts	168	134	144	168	174	169	160	178	135
Michigan	159	134	155	159	145	160	154	149	136
Minnesota	158	136	146	158	150	159	155	153	138
Mississippi	117	134	124	117	116	117	112	118	135
Missouri	131	134	128	131	131	132	123	134	135
Montana	159	137	149	159	144	159	141	148	139
Nebraska	153	134	141	153	154	153	158	157	135
Nevada	112	134	120	112	116	112	123	118	135
New Hampshire	402	134	401	402	327	402	402	329	329
New Jersey	167	134	148	167	174	168	160	178	135
New Mexico	113	134	121	113	116	113	113	118	135
New York	170	134	159	170	174	170	177	178	136
North Carolina	112	134	121	112	116	111	113	118	135
North Dakota	588	134	588	551	588	590	565	590	590
Ohio	155	134	148	155	152	156	153	155	136
Oklahoma	116	134	125	116	116	116	111	118	135
Oregon	145	134	143	145	130	145	143	132	135
Pennsylvania	179	135	169	179	175	180	178	179	136
Puerto Rico	136	134	136	136	116	136	136	118	135
Rhode Island	170	134	157	170	174	170	164	178	135
South Carolina	122	134	123	122	126	123	119	129	135
South Dakota	208	136	208	181	208	210	179	210	210
Tennessee	112	134	121	112	116	112	113	118	135
Texas	114	134	122	114	116	114	118	118	135
Utah	112	134	122	112	116	110	114	118	135
Vermont	323	134	323	303	323	325	308	325	325
Virginia	147	134	131	147	150	142	144	153	135
Washington	134	134	129	134	132	134	123	135	135
West Virginia	143	134	130	143	148	143	128	152	135
Wisconsin	150	134	142	150	148	151	150	152	135
Wyoming	871	135	865	871	805	871	984	807	807

¹Concentration Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 6,500 or more than 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible.

²A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 5.B. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formula, by school district characteristics: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Final allocation	Formula-eligible criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision					Removal of multiple provisions	
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	Number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	Percentage of formula-eligible children exceeds 15 percent of total 5- to 17-year-old population	Hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500	SPPE, hold harmless, number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500
Total	\$134	\$134	\$134	\$134	\$134	\$134	\$135	\$137	\$137
School district locale									
City ³	134	134	135	134	136	134	142	139	136
Large	135	134	137	135	138	136	149	141	135
Midsize	127	134	127	127	132	128	134	135	136
Small	138	134	136	137	136	138	130	139	136
Suburban ⁴	132	134	131	132	131	131	132	133	136
Large	132	134	131	132	131	131	133	133	136
Midsize	127	134	128	127	129	127	121	132	136
Small	145	134	142	145	137	146	134	140	136
Town ⁵	133	134	133	133	133	134	123	136	138
Fringe	145	136	143	145	136	145	133	139	138
Distant	131	134	130	131	132	131	121	135	136
Remote	131	134	132	131	132	132	121	135	140
Rural ⁶	137	134	137	137	132	137	127	135	139
Fringe	129	134	131	129	127	130	121	130	136
Distant	139	134	138	139	133	139	128	136	137
Remote	151	134	150	150	145	151	142	148	151
Poverty and population size quarter ⁷									
Highest poverty quarter	134	134	135	135	135	135	138	138	136
Largest population	140	134	141	140	139	140	152	142	135
Second-largest population	133	134	134	133	135	134	146	138	136
Second-smallest population	132	134	131	132	134	132	130	137	135
Smallest population	133	134	133	133	132	133	125	134	138
Second-highest poverty quarter	124	134	125	124	130	124	123	133	137
Largest population	117	134	123	117	124	117	132	126	135
Second-largest population	118	134	121	118	125	119	126	129	137
Second-smallest population	125	134	124	125	131	126	112	134	136
Smallest population	135	134	130	135	141	135	120	144	138
Second-lowest poverty quarter	145	134	144	145	135	145	141	139	138
Largest population	120	134	124	120	123	117	135	124	135
Second-largest population	139	134	140	139	130	140	127	133	138
Second-smallest population	154	135	149	154	140	155	140	143	137
Smallest population	176	134	167	175	153	176	163	156	142
Lowest poverty quarter	217	134	200	217	156	195	236	†	†
Largest population	159	134	143	159	155	137	178	†	†
Second-largest population	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Second-smallest population	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Smallest population	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
School district population size									
Less than 300	194	134	191	192	155	194	182	158	158
300 to 599	161	134	158	161	147	162	150	150	148
600 to 999	153	134	149	153	142	153	142	145	141
1,000 to 2,499	145	134	141	145	140	146	134	143	138
2,500 to 4,999	136	134	134	136	135	137	125	138	137
5,000 to 9,999	135	134	133	135	134	135	123	137	136
10,000 to 24,999	132	134	132	132	132	133	124	135	136
25,000 or more	129	134	131	129	131	129	141	134	136
100 largest districts ⁸	131	134	133	131	133	130	144	135	135

† Not applicable.

¹Concentration Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children is at least 6,500 or more than 15 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible.²A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE.³Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.⁴Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.⁵Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁶Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area or 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area or more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.⁷To create the poverty and population size quarters, all school districts are first ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. From this ranking, districts are divided into quarters of the 5- to 17-year-old population. Then, within each quarter, districts are ranked, from highest to lowest, according to their 5- to 17-year-old population to create a second set of quarters. Each of the subgroups represents one-sixteenth of the 5- to 17-year-old population of the United States (including Puerto Rico).⁸These districts are defined as the 100 largest according to the size of their 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 5.C. Title I, Part A Concentration Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing hold harmless and number of formula-eligible children exceeds 6,500 from the formula, by school district locale and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Total	City ¹			Suburban ²			Town ³			Rural ⁴		
		Large	Midsize	Small	Large	Midsize	Small	Fringe	Distant	Remote	Fringe	Distant	Remote
Total	\$137	\$141	\$135	\$139	\$133	\$132	\$140	\$139	\$135	\$135	\$130	\$136	\$148
Alabama	118	†	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
Alaska	423	423	†	†	†	†	423	†	†	423	†	†	423
Arizona	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
Arkansas	125	†	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125
California	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126
Colorado	120	120	120	120	120	120	†	120	120	120	120	120	120
Connecticut	178	†	178	178	178	178	†	178	†	†	178	178	†
Delaware	178	†	†	178	178	178	178	178	178	†	178	†	†
District of Columbia	178	178	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Florida	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
Georgia	120	120	120	120	120	†	120	120	120	120	120	120	120
Hawaii	333	†	†	†	333	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Idaho	118	†	118	118	†	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
Illinois	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	178
Indiana	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128
Iowa	141	†	141	141	141	141	†	141	141	141	141	141	141
Kansas	139	139	139	139	139	†	139	139	139	139	139	139	139
Kentucky	132	132	†	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132
Louisiana	143	143	143	143	143	143	143	143	143	143	143	143	143
Maine	178	†	†	178	†	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	178
Maryland	178	178	†	178	178	178	†	†	178	†	†	178	†
Massachusetts	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	†	178	178	†
Michigan	149	148	148	148	148	148	148	156	148	148	148	148	148
Minnesota	153	151	†	151	151	†	†	151	151	173	151	151	151
Mississippi	118	†	118	118	118	118	118	†	118	118	118	118	118
Missouri	134	134	134	134	134	†	134	134	134	134	134	134	134
Montana	148	†	144	168	†	144	144	†	†	144	144	144	144
Nebraska	157	157	†	157	157	157	†	†	157	157	†	157	157
Nevada	118	118	118	118	†	†	†	†	118	118	118	†	118
New Hampshire	329	†	329	†	329	†	329	†	329	329	329	329	329
New Jersey	178	178	†	178	178	178	178	178	†	†	178	178	†
New Mexico	118	118	†	118	†	†	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
New York	178	178	178	178	180	178	178	178	178	178	178	178	178
North Carolina	118	118	118	118	118	118	†	118	118	118	118	118	118
North Dakota	590	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	590	590	590	590
Ohio	155	155	155	155	155	155	155	161	155	155	155	155	155
Oklahoma	118	118	†	118	118	118	†	118	118	118	118	118	118
Oregon	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132
Pennsylvania	179	178	178	178	178	178	178	234	178	178	178	178	178
Puerto Rico	118	†	†	†	118	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Rhode Island	178	†	178	†	178	†	†	†	†	†	†	178	†
South Carolina	129	†	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	†
South Dakota	210	†	†	206	†	†	†	206	373	206	206	206	206
Tennessee	118	118	118	118	118	118	†	118	118	118	118	118	118
Texas	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	119
Utah	118	†	118	118	118	†	†	†	118	118	118	118	118
Vermont	325	†	†	325	†	325	†	†	325	325	325	325	325
Virginia	153	†	153	153	153	153	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
Washington	135	135	135	135	135	135	135	135	135	135	135	135	135
West Virginia	152	†	†	152	†	152	152	152	152	152	152	152	152
Wisconsin	152	152	152	152	152	152	†	152	152	152	152	152	152
Wyoming	807	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	799	†	799	857

† Not applicable.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 6.A. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formula, by state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Final allocation	Formula-eligible criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision					Removal of multiple provisions		
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	Number weighting	Percentage weighting	Hold harmless and number weighting	SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting	State minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting
Total	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282
Alabama	233	246	249	233	230	238	229	253	291	257
Alaska	537	221	537	477	537	537	537	537	537	288
Arizona	254	271	273	255	250	261	248	269	310	273
Arkansas	239	206	244	239	227	252	230	267	293	271
California	268	307	275	269	272	263	272	260	281	263
Colorado	234	276	248	235	231	216	237	209	237	212
Connecticut	287	235	254	288	290	302	287	334	256	339
Delaware	436	229	436	388	436	436	436	436	436	285
District of Columbia	461	374	461	448	461	461	461	461	461	418
Florida	291	372	318	293	300	271	299	219	252	222
Georgia	258	289	274	259	257	262	258	253	288	257
Hawaii	380	327	380	359	380	380	380	380	380	248
Idaho	196	215	199	188	196	196	196	196	222	196
Illinois	359	288	324	361	368	359	360	354	272	359
Indiana	220	236	222	220	219	228	218	252	269	256
Iowa	198	205	184	199	203	202	198	226	218	229
Kansas	230	234	222	231	233	244	227	257	253	261
Kentucky	259	230	257	259	250	268	253	266	275	270
Louisiana	300	287	290	301	296	300	301	303	290	308
Maine	360	170	360	320	360	360	360	360	360	291
Maryland	375	321	336	376	386	338	383	285	219	289
Massachusetts	298	246	249	300	306	311	300	343	263	348
Michigan	315	251	307	316	284	328	311	336	308	340
Minnesota	232	226	211	233	237	232	235	244	221	247
Mississippi	256	220	272	257	249	277	242	302	348	306
Missouri	234	218	230	235	232	247	226	271	277	275
Montana	359	176	359	326	359	359	359	359	359	266
Nebraska	260	242	243	261	265	262	263	250	220	253
Nevada	319	408	346	321	326	285	328	196	226	199
New Hampshire	524	181	524	490	524	524	524	524	524	261
New Jersey	297	237	254	299	308	322	287	362	278	367
New Mexico	253	277	274	254	253	249	249	266	306	269
New York	422	349	392	424	432	426	423	393	301	398
North Carolina	240	291	259	241	244	231	242	228	263	231
North Dakota	641	177	641	552	641	641	641	641	641	237
Ohio	285	240	269	286	280	304	278	333	292	337
Oklahoma	212	228	228	212	210	218	208	234	269	237
Oregon	227	232	225	228	223	231	225	234	241	237
Pennsylvania	334	260	316	335	331	351	331	349	268	354
Puerto Rico	276	300	276	276	240	276	276	297	342	301
Rhode Island	358	250	358	334	358	358	358	390	358	396
South Carolina	248	269	250	250	255	242	247	261	276	264
South Dakota	432	195	432	371	432	432	432	432	432	226
Tennessee	243	291	262	244	247	227	245	236	271	239
Texas	256	300	275	257	256	252	258	254	293	258
Utah	214	277	234	215	222	200	220	182	209	184
Vermont	676	165	676	597	676	676	676	676	676	292
Virginia	265	249	236	266	271	261	264	268	239	272
Washington	224	233	217	225	225	213	225	230	232	234
West Virginia	251	220	230	253	253	269	244	290	261	294
Wisconsin	264	257	245	266	270	262	269	289	260	293
Wyoming	659	181	659	579	659	659	659	659	659	254

¹Targeted Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children (without the application of the formula weights) is at least 10 and more than 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible.

²A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 6.B. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formula, by school district characteristics: 2015

School district characteristic	Final allocation	Formula-eligibility criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision					Removal of multiple provisions		
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	Number weighting	Percentage weighting	Hold harmless and number weighting	SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting	State minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting
Total	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282
School district locale										
City ³	336	348	337	336	339	328	341	314	307	316
Large	377	394	381	378	381	362	385	328	316	330
Midsize	283	308	281	284	289	280	286	295	298	297
Small	264	250	260	263	263	273	262	295	289	293
Suburban ⁴	257	275	256	257	258	251	259	251	253	253
Large	260	281	259	261	261	254	263	250	253	253
Midsize	241	249	239	241	244	237	243	254	257	254
Small	227	216	221	227	227	235	226	255	249	252
Town ⁵	237	192	236	235	231	257	225	281	290	277
Fringe	218	191	214	218	216	238	211	263	260	261
Distant	234	193	232	234	227	255	222	278	286	278
Remote	250	191	252	247	245	272	235	295	311	284
Rural ⁶	234	193	235	232	227	251	225	270	278	264
Fringe	219	209	222	219	218	233	215	253	263	253
Distant	226	183	225	225	218	246	215	265	270	262
Remote	290	173	291	285	272	313	275	327	339	295
Poverty and population size quarter⁷										
Highest poverty quarter	336	315	337	337	331	344	332	352	350	355
Largest population	406	418	408	407	407	390	414	353	338	358
Second-largest population	347	369	348	348	346	346	353	358	355	362
Second-smallest population	297	279	294	297	291	322	288	354	353	359
Smallest population	294	191	295	294	277	319	272	342	354	341
Second-highest poverty quarter	258	283	263	259	263	252	259	246	255	247
Largest population	334	405	352	335	345	305	344	231	250	234
Second-largest population	260	313	268	261	269	235	268	239	255	241
Second-smallest population	219	241	218	219	223	227	223	250	254	251
Smallest population	221	175	214	220	217	244	204	265	259	263
Second-lowest poverty quarter	226	242	226	225	230	219	231	208	208	205
Largest population	284	348	297	285	293	257	292	185	201	187
Second-largest population	232	258	235	230	238	208	238	201	210	196
Second-smallest population	191	196	184	191	195	195	196	214	206	212
Smallest population	198	165	188	196	192	217	197	233	215	223
Lowest poverty quarter	218	210	204	215	224	214	224	221	204	210
Largest population	278	290	267	276	288	239	286	208	203	199
Second-largest population	204	202	194	202	211	195	210	212	203	203
Second-smallest population	178	167	160	177	184	199	184	223	196	220
Smallest population	199	165	183	194	201	220	206	241	213	223
School district population size										
Less than 300	323	165	321	312	276	339	307	321	325	274
300 to 599	265	165	260	261	245	284	252	294	291	272
600 to 999	252	166	245	249	235	271	238	285	279	273
1,000 to 2,499	238	168	230	237	231	261	224	284	277	281
2,500 to 4,999	234	186	228	233	229	257	222	282	278	280
5,000 to 9,999	229	213	223	228	227	247	223	273	269	274
10,000 to 24,999	250	261	248	250	252	252	252	272	274	273
25,000 or more	332	368	338	333	336	314	340	287	291	290
100 largest districts ⁸	363	398	370	365	367	343	372	297	296	300

¹Targeted Grants are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children (without the application of the formula weights) is at least 10 and more than 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible.

²A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE.

³Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.

⁴Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.

⁵Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.

⁶Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area or 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area or more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

⁷To create the poverty and population size quarters, all school districts are first ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. From this ranking, districts are divided into quarters of the 5- to 17-year-old population. Then, within each quarter, districts are ranked, from highest to lowest, according to their 5- to 17-year-old population to create a second set of quarters. Each of the subgroups represents one-sixteenth of the 5- to 17-year-old population of the United States (including Puerto Rico).

⁸These districts are defined as the 100 largest according to the size of their 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 6.C. Title I, Part A Targeted Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing hold harmless and number weighting from the formula, by school district locale and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Total	City ¹			Suburban ²			Town ³			Rural ⁴		
		Large	Midsize	Small	Large	Midsize	Small	Fringe	Distant	Remote	Fringe	Distant	Remote
Total	\$282	\$328	\$295	\$295	\$250	\$254	\$255	\$263	\$278	\$295	\$253	\$265	\$327
Alabama	253	†	269	252	206	180	215	226	301	339	234	243	303
Alaska	537	464	†	463	†	†	730	†	463	471	†	†	656
Arizona	269	299	224	218	203	202	217	241	236	306	250	318	354
Arkansas	267	†	255	269	216	253	264	201	281	311	260	252	290
California	260	287	243	239	232	265	221	286	302	238	293	280	285
Colorado	209	229	226	188	183	186	166	169	232	216	175	185	234
Connecticut	334	†	415	279	289	332	†	317	†	†	250	253	†
Delaware	436	†	†	466	414	398	540	457	428	†	440	†	†
District of Columbia	461	461	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Florida	219	203	218	196	213	222	263	188	309	266	259	281	249
Georgia	253	309	307	297	208	†	238	242	294	333	246	269	297
Hawaii	380	352	†	†	468	†	†	352	†	†	†	†	352
Idaho	196	†	179	177	166	235	176	182	196	195	198	224	199
Illinois	354	423	377	341	321	247	296	303	307	326	293	284	294
Indiana	252	299	278	296	226	181	208	194	234	230	196	203	192
Iowa	226	†	245	232	195	205	195	207	217	231	206	203	228
Kansas	257	278	361	191	191	191	234	245	230	234	198	207	222
Kentucky	266	217	†	287	246	246	198	196	248	314	298	268	351
Louisiana	303	381	288	289	276	255	263	327	330	383	327	316	343
Maine	360	†	†	398	†	319	325	324	344	369	322	362	393
Maryland	285	394	†	293	245	245	245	†	315	†	245	323	†
Massachusetts	343	375	461	265	317	350	249	312	318	†	252	252	†
Michigan	336	504	371	345	284	268	249	237	284	273	230	261	317
Minnesota	244	306	208	229	215	208	208	210	215	225	233	221	277
Mississippi	302	†	378	335	166	230	233	†	326	339	271	263	318
Missouri	271	348	239	232	234	†	194	210	259	287	263	267	304
Montana	359	†	290	333	†	283	309	272	†	368	354	341	402
Nebraska	250	257	†	254	220	256	†	216	222	239	216	285	248
Nevada	196	199	179	192	†	†	†	†	187	176	255	163	190
New Hampshire	524	†	544	498	498	498	501	498	528	551	501	540	649
New Jersey	362	445	†	490	323	308	336	421	†	†	262	280	†
New Mexico	266	230	†	246	163	†	262	213	281	268	338	225	336
New York	393	424	559	416	311	285	287	286	336	375	274	311	367
North Carolina	228	210	223	233	185	249	†	253	315	184	221	259	278
North Dakota	641	†	567	567	†	567	567	†	†	582	648	758	735
Ohio	333	443	441	438	270	357	283	287	286	347	269	256	380
Oklahoma	234	266	†	251	178	183	†	201	240	241	205	228	240
Oregon	234	237	244	204	222	245	219	236	254	252	232	238	256
Pennsylvania	349	432	480	412	296	257	330	283	286	327	281	275	297
Puerto Rico	297	†	†	†	297	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Rhode Island	390	†	496	245	345	245	†	†	†	†	245	276	†
South Carolina	261	†	258	252	217	256	293	259	321	306	284	301	†
South Dakota	432	†	316	370	†	316	†	341	324	336	462	357	550
Tennessee	236	265	187	228	193	225	†	211	238	272	229	234	281
Texas	254	266	272	262	237	257	200	240	256	266	225	226	256
Utah	182	†	196	213	171	†	163	†	164	194	196	172	204
Vermont	676	†	†	576	†	684	†	576	740	665	742	636	689
Virginia	268	211	323	325	227	232	225	211	266	328	242	256	307
Washington	230	187	231	241	218	209	222	228	261	265	236	231	285
West Virginia	290	†	†	261	†	272	288	345	268	337	304	300	328
Wisconsin	289	425	244	237	214	235	209	211	216	249	223	247	269
Wyoming	659	†	†	643	†	†	†	†	†	661	†	705	673

† Not applicable.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 7.A. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formula, by state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Final allocation	Formula-eligibility criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision							Removal of multiple provisions		
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	Number weighting	Percentage weighting	State effort	State equity	Hold harmless and number weighting	SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting	State minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting
Total	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282
Alabama	248	280	272	250	248	248	248	258	242	248	272	250
Alaska	536	281	536	375	536	536	536	536	536	536	536	375
Arizona	229	281	252	231	229	229	229	239	241	229	252	231
Arkansas	269	280	296	272	269	269	269	254	266	269	296	272
California	239	281	263	241	239	239	239	249	242	239	263	241
Colorado	253	288	279	255	253	253	253	264	247	253	279	255
Connecticut	390	300	317	393	390	390	390	368	386	390	317	393
Delaware	434	280	434	370	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	370
District of Columbia	460	280	460	405	460	460	460	460	460	460	460	405
Florida	256	280	282	258	256	256	256	267	241	256	282	258
Georgia	253	280	279	256	253	253	253	259	246	253	279	256
Hawaii	387	280	380	391	387	387	387	380	380	387	380	391
Idaho	219	281	241	221	219	219	219	229	241	219	241	221
Illinois	331	283	269	334	331	331	331	313	364	331	269	334
Indiana	264	283	287	267	264	264	264	260	262	264	287	267
Iowa	285	283	280	288	285	285	285	298	272	285	280	288
Kansas	277	284	277	279	277	277	277	289	269	277	277	279
Kentucky	282	280	297	284	282	282	282	266	278	282	297	284
Louisiana	298	280	289	300	298	298	298	281	302	298	289	300
Maine	360	284	360	352	360	360	360	360	365	360	360	352
Maryland	379	280	308	383	379	379	379	358	360	379	308	383
Massachusetts	357	290	291	360	357	357	357	337	373	357	291	360
Michigan	314	283	294	317	314	314	314	297	316	314	294	317
Minnesota	295	287	271	298	295	295	295	308	295	295	271	298
Mississippi	247	280	272	249	247	247	247	258	241	247	272	249
Missouri	261	282	270	263	261	261	261	261	269	261	270	263
Montana	359	285	359	299	359	359	359	359	359	359	359	299
Nebraska	325	283	287	328	325	325	325	317	325	325	287	328
Nevada	244	280	269	247	244	244	244	255	241	244	269	247
New Hampshire	547	312	547	371	547	547	547	547	547	547	547	371
New Jersey	371	294	301	374	371	371	371	350	377	371	301	374
New Mexico	259	281	285	261	259	259	259	259	252	259	285	261
New York	351	283	286	355	351	351	351	332	364	351	286	355
North Carolina	250	280	275	252	250	250	250	261	241	250	275	252
North Dakota	643	285	643	295	643	643	643	643	643	643	643	295
Ohio	320	282	286	323	320	320	320	302	329	320	286	323
Oklahoma	245	281	269	247	245	245	245	255	241	245	269	247
Oregon	273	281	286	276	273	273	273	266	272	273	286	276
Pennsylvania	357	286	290	360	357	357	357	337	367	357	290	360
Puerto Rico	268	280	295	271	268	268	268	280	241	268	295	271
Rhode Island	360	282	358	363	360	360	360	358	362	360	358	363
South Carolina	270	280	290	272	270	270	270	255	272	270	290	272
South Dakota	432	282	432	245	432	432	432	432	432	432	432	245
Tennessee	250	283	275	252	250	250	250	261	243	250	275	252
Texas	246	281	271	249	246	246	246	257	241	246	271	249
Utah	241	280	265	243	241	241	241	251	241	241	265	243
Vermont	684	293	684	332	684	684	684	684	684	684	684	332
Virginia	282	285	255	284	282	282	282	294	298	282	255	284
Washington	271	283	278	274	271	271	271	283	261	271	278	274
West Virginia	339	280	310	342	339	339	339	320	321	339	310	342
Wisconsin	337	286	308	340	337	337	337	319	327	337	308	340
Wyoming	658	282	658	362	658	658	658	658	658	658	658	362

¹EFIG are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children (without the application of the formula weights) is at least 10 and more than 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible.

²A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE. There is one exception to these rules. For EFIG, the formula is the same except that 34 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the minimum (instead of 32 percent) and 46 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the maximum (instead of 48 percent).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 7.B. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing single and multiple provisions from the formula, by school district characteristics: 2015

School district characteristic	Final allocation	Formula-eligibility criteria ¹	Removal of a single provision							Removal of multiple provisions		
			State per pupil expenditure (SPPE) ²	State minimum	Hold harmless	Number weighting	Percentage weighting	State effort	State equity	Hold harmless and number weighting	SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting	State minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting
Total	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282	\$282
School district locale												
City ³	349	383	347	351	351	340	354	349	360	318	312	319
Large	395	439	391	398	396	379	403	396	411	328	319	330
Midsize	291	335	293	292	298	287	294	291	295	304	305	305
Small	271	260	267	269	270	279	268	269	271	301	296	300
Suburban ⁴	243	252	244	245	246	239	244	244	237	247	249	249
Large	245	257	247	247	248	239	247	246	240	245	247	247
Midsize	242	229	240	242	243	246	243	241	231	267	269	267
Small	209	194	204	208	209	219	208	204	205	243	240	241
Town ⁵	232	171	234	229	227	254	221	230	225	281	288	278
Fringe	207	159	201	207	204	225	200	203	199	256	256	256
Distant	230	167	231	229	223	253	219	228	223	280	287	280
Remote	249	183	256	241	245	270	236	249	243	296	307	287
Rural ⁶	233	170	236	228	225	250	225	233	224	270	277	265
Fringe	214	182	218	214	212	229	211	215	203	252	260	253
Distant	222	160	223	219	213	241	213	221	213	260	264	258
Remote	309	164	312	285	287	330	294	309	305	341	350	315
Poverty and population size quarter⁷												
Highest poverty quarter	352	335	349	353	347	358	347	351	358	359	357	361
Largest population	420	452	414	425	428	401	428	422	433	341	328	344
Second-largest population	378	434	378	379	375	376	386	378	388	373	369	375
Second-smallest population	304	283	299	307	298	328	294	300	307	369	368	373
Smallest population	302	169	304	300	286	325	279	300	301	354	364	352
Second-highest poverty quarter	247	267	255	248	249	243	248	249	244	241	248	242
Largest population	312	371	329	315	316	290	316	316	312	240	255	242
Second-largest population	260	317	277	263	268	241	267	266	258	238	251	240
Second-smallest population	210	231	213	211	212	217	214	210	206	239	243	240
Smallest population	207	150	200	205	201	225	194	203	200	248	244	246
Second-lowest poverty quarter	213	229	215	211	217	207	218	215	208	201	201	199
Largest population	269	337	288	272	277	248	274	277	270	190	201	191
Second-largest population	221	259	231	217	228	200	228	225	221	193	200	190
Second-smallest population	179	178	172	178	183	182	185	176	170	202	197	201
Smallest population	184	140	171	177	180	199	185	179	172	219	206	212
Lowest poverty quarter	209	193	192	203	215	206	216	206	199	217	205	211
Largest population	280	289	266	279	286	249	285	282	279	226	218	225
Second-largest population	192	192	182	184	200	185	200	190	184	204	197	197
Second-smallest population	162	131	138	159	168	178	169	154	143	208	188	205
Smallest population	189	142	166	176	190	206	197	183	173	231	211	217
School district population size												
Less than 300	333	158	329	291	275	350	315	333	329	328	332	292
300 to 599	266	145	261	248	242	285	253	265	261	297	296	279
600 to 999	254	143	245	243	234	270	241	250	249	283	279	272
1,000 to 2,499	231	139	223	229	226	249	219	227	225	277	272	275
2,500 to 4,999	226	163	219	225	222	245	216	222	218	276	274	275
5,000 to 9,999	222	196	216	223	220	240	218	219	216	269	267	270
10,000 to 24,999	248	261	247	247	250	251	249	247	247	273	275	274
25,000 or more	338	386	343	340	342	322	344	341	343	291	293	293
100 largest districts ⁸	370	413	373	373	374	352	376	373	377	300	299	303

¹EFIG are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children (without the application of the formula weights) is at least 10 and more than 5 percent of the district's 5- to 17-year-old population is formula eligible.

²A state's adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE. There is one exception to these rules. For EFIG, the formula is the same except that 34 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the minimum (instead of 32 percent) and 46 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the maximum (instead of 48 percent).

³Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.

⁴Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.

⁵Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.

⁶Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area or 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area or more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

⁷To create the poverty and population size quarters, all school districts are first ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. From this ranking, districts are divided into quarters of the 5- to 17-year-old population. Then, within each quarter, districts are ranked, from highest to lowest, according to their 5- to 17-year-old population to create a second set of quarters. Each of the subgroups represents one-sixteenth of the 5- to 17-year-old population of the United States (including Puerto Rico).

⁸These districts are defined as the 100 largest according to the size of their 5- to 17-year-old population.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

Table 7.C. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant allocation per formula-eligible child, after removing hold harmless and number weighting from the formula, by school district locale and state or jurisdiction: 2015

State or jurisdiction	Total	City ¹			Suburban ²			Town ³			Rural ⁴		
		Large	Midsize	Small	Large	Midsize	Small	Fringe	Distant	Remote	Fringe	Distant	Remote
Total	\$282	\$328	\$304	\$301	\$245	\$267	\$243	\$256	\$280	\$296	\$252	\$260	\$341
Alabama	248	†	265	242	195	157	194	204	314	373	224	230	317
Alaska	536	450	†	448	†	†	759	†	448	453	†	†	678
Arizona	229	261	183	162	159	151	161	191	191	269	203	289	332
Arkansas	269	†	243	273	210	241	261	183	288	331	257	244	298
California	239	272	219	217	202	245	195	274	293	206	285	269	268
Colorado	253	279	280	214	219	212	197	199	280	265	204	218	293
Connecticut	390	†	513	305	323	378	†	363	†	†	272	277	†
Delaware	434	†	†	447	411	400	569	459	420	†	436	†	†
District of Columbia	460	460	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Florida	256	237	255	229	249	260	308	219	361	311	303	328	291
Georgia	253	309	307	297	208	†	238	242	294	333	246	269	297
Hawaii	387	358	†	†	477	†	†	358	†	†	†	†	358
Idaho	219	†	188	185	170	293	183	192	222	212	219	275	225
Illinois	331	432	358	310	285	182	237	259	257	284	241	228	239
Indiana	264	330	290	328	231	175	205	187	233	224	186	197	182
Iowa	285	†	309	293	247	258	245	262	274	291	260	256	287
Kansas	277	292	438	197	197	197	226	251	231	236	202	211	228
Kentucky	282	205	†	304	272	244	192	190	250	352	330	281	414
Louisiana	298	409	272	280	261	225	253	329	332	423	326	312	350
Maine	360	†	†	400	†	320	325	324	338	360	322	362	400
Maryland	379	524	†	390	326	326	326	†	419	†	326	429	†
Massachusetts	357	382	530	255	322	364	242	306	307	†	246	246	†
Michigan	314	539	354	320	251	236	202	196	238	227	185	214	280
Minnesota	295	377	249	268	258	249	249	251	255	263	275	263	354
Mississippi	247	†	335	282	115	166	165	†	271	288	207	201	262
Missouri	261	366	212	203	215	†	170	186	239	276	249	252	299
Montana	359	†	274	316	†	269	286	262	†	372	379	330	417
Nebraska	325	330	†	318	288	320	†	285	290	309	285	411	323
Nevada	244	246	228	240	†	†	†	†	236	229	351	214	241
New Hampshire	547	†	567	506	506	506	510	506	552	583	509	579	759
New Jersey	371	473	†	550	317	300	327	464	†	†	242	263	†
New Mexico	259	205	†	227	144	†	248	189	276	262	365	202	362
New York	351	386	571	377	265	230	230	227	275	322	219	252	313
North Carolina	250	230	244	256	202	273	†	277	345	202	242	284	305
North Dakota	643	†	553	553	†	553	553	†	†	563	637	813	757
Ohio	320	465	462	459	240	352	249	256	252	325	237	220	376
Oklahoma	245	288	†	260	176	178	†	202	249	251	205	235	253
Oregon	273	283	281	233	259	281	250	283	302	292	267	283	305
Pennsylvania	357	462	541	445	290	244	331	271	265	311	265	257	277
Puerto Rico	268	†	†	†	268	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†
Rhode Island	360	†	484	199	304	199	†	†	†	†	199	216	†
South Carolina	270	†	260	256	209	257	315	263	363	335	305	331	†
South Dakota	432	†	288	321	†	288	†	304	293	303	473	333	594
Tennessee	250	281	198	242	204	238	†	224	252	288	243	248	298
Texas	246	258	271	256	230	254	171	227	244	257	208	209	246
Utah	241	†	250	284	227	†	221	†	221	255	250	229	279
Vermont	684	†	†	525	†	703	†	525	800	653	809	612	695
Virginia	282	213	350	351	237	230	226	213	278	355	243	258	318
Washington	271	220	272	284	257	246	262	269	308	312	278	272	336
West Virginia	339	†	†	304	†	317	336	403	312	394	355	350	383
Wisconsin	337	495	285	276	249	274	244	245	252	290	260	288	314
Wyoming	658	†	†	647	†	†	†	†	†	659	†	709	670

† Not applicable.

¹Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city. Large cities have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize cities have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small cities have a population of less than 100,000.²Defined as a territory inside an urbanized area but outside a principal city. Large suburban areas have a population of 250,000 or more; midsize suburban areas have a population of at least 100,000 but less than 250,000; and small suburban areas have a population of less than 100,000.³Defined as a territory located inside an urban cluster but outside an urbanized area. Fringe towns are 10 miles or less from an urbanized area; distant towns are more than 10 miles but less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area; and remote towns are more than 35 miles from an urbanized area.⁴Defined as a territory that is outside any urban cluster or urbanized area. Fringe rural areas are 5 miles or less from an urbanized area and 2.5 miles or less from an urban cluster; distant rural areas are more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster; and remote rural areas are more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and more than 10 miles from an urban cluster.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency Universe Survey," 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.



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