STATEMENT BY

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BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 119TH CONGRESS

ON FISCAL YEAR 2026 BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT PROGRAMS

APRIL 30, 2025

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Introduction

Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, it is my distinct pleasure to submit my second written testimony for record as commanding general of the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) and the Joint Forces Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD). I also serve as the enterprise integrator for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) for our Army, and I am the senior commander for both U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll and Fort Greely, Alaska, in close coordination with U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC).

At USASMDC, we provide trained and ready forces to U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). We also provide the Army headquarters—or Army service component command (ASCC)—to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). In addition to keeping these combatant commands integrated by way of our space and missile defense forces we also synchronize missile defense efforts globally at JFCC IMD.

Our vision is *ONE TEAM!*—that achieves our shared objectives via collaboration, feedback, assessment, and smart adaptation to continue demonstrating value. We reach these goals by integrating new and existing space, missile defense, and high-altitude capabilities to create all-domain advantages for our Army, the joint force, and our Nation.

Indeed, there are few organizations in the Army that approach the breadth and depth of our requirements and responsibilities to secure our homeland and to ensure warfighters are in position to fight and win in any location, across any domain. Our global force posture keeps us ready and vigilant in competition, crisis, and—should deterrence fail—conflict.

Threat

Our competitors continue to grow in capability and capacity, particularly in the areas of space and missile systems. In the forefront, ballistic missile threats will continue to increase in complexity, accuracy, and combat effectiveness. Competitors' ballistic missiles are ever more mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate. Far-reaching

hypersonic glide vehicles delivered by ballistic missiles are a developing threat that will inevitably challenge current missile defense systems. Adversaries are fielding more advanced missiles in greater numbers to not only deter the United States from intervening in a regional conflict but also to target the U.S. homeland.

Adversary prelaunch survivability is also likely to increase as they strengthen their denial and deception measures and increasingly base missiles on mobile platforms. Furthermore, ever-improving technical and operational countermeasures continue to challenge U.S. defensive systems against ballistic missiles. Some techniques that complicate missile defenses include separating payloads, multiple reentry vehicles, depressed trajectories, and evasive maneuvers during any phase of flight. The proliferation of systems and technologies fuels and draws out conflicts, potentially expanding them into other regions.

The cruise missile threat to U.S. forces is also increasing. While most current land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) remain subsonic, supersonic and hypersonic missiles have already been deployed. Future LACMs will also have increased survivability due to minimized radar signatures and the use of countermeasures. Cruise and ballistic missiles pose an expanding threat to the homeland and to U.S. forces abroad.

Russia maintains about 1,550 deployed-strategic nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and as well as a force of nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Russia is expected to retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles outside of the United States. Development of hypersonic missiles and a heavy-lift ICBM capable of flying trajectories to approach the United States from the south are just a few examples of Russia’s continued modernization.

In the Indo-Pacific, China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program, producing technologically advanced systems, selling ballistic missile technology, and expanding the reach of its ballistic missiles to deter foreign powers in future conflict. China is our most consequential opponent in strategic competition. The U.S. intelligence community assesses that China will have more than 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, many of which will be deployed at higher

readiness levels. Given their continued expansion and modernization of nearly every aspect of the People's Liberation Army and the expansion of its global footprint, DoD will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence to restore peace through strength.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to expand its missile capability and unlawful nuclear weapons program to threaten the United States, deployed U.S. forces, and allies in the region. They continue testing new ICBMs, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), an SLBM, and a medium-range ballistic missile while maintaining a large SRBM inventory.

In the Middle East, Iran has ballistic missile and space launch development programs, which will result in increased ballistic missile force lethality. Iran's ballistic missile forces are extensively honing their wartime operational skills and tactics, while simultaneously building and exporting missile forces and supporting terrorist groups and military proxies. Iran's space program could accelerate their path to achieving ICBM capabilities given the inherently similar technologies. Although Iran does not possess a nuclear weapon today, it continues concerning enrichment activities alongside its missile developments.

Recent Developments

USASMDC continues innovation in space control and high-altitude capabilities. Our capability developers work closely with operational commanders to rapidly get solutions back to them, receive their feedback, and make further updates to better meet the needs of the warfighter. For example, we are working with mission partners across the Army to deliver high-altitude solutions that will allow commanders to reconstitute many capabilities in the stratosphere, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), positioning, and long-range communications to ensure dominance in deep sensing and communications, while increasing the survivability and capability of our own sensing systems.

Several conflicts around the world in the last 18 months have shown that modern warfare has undergone a seismic shift with the widespread adoption of small-unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) or drones. Their availability, low cost, ease of development,

small radar cross section, low-altitude flight profiles, and increasing autonomy make neutralizing them problematic with conventional kinetic weapon systems like surface-to-air missiles or aerial weapon systems. Additionally, firing expensive missiles against inexpensive drones provides an unsustainable economic exchange.

In contrast to traditional missile solutions for air and missile defense (AMD) missions, directed energy (DE) weapons offer great potential to reduce cost-per-kill, expand magazine depths, and simplify logistics by eliminating the use and transport of munitions altogether. USASMDC has supported the Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office in fielding Palletized High Energy Laser and the Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense systems. The Army is learning about capabilities and limitations of DE systems in an operational environment. Capability against sUAS is currently one of the most mature application areas. The ability to have lethal effects against sUAS with high-energy lasers (HEL) and high-power microwave (HPM) weapons have largely been proven.

Support to Army and Joint Forces

The Army Space Vision Supporting Multidomain Operations, signed over a year ago, serves as our guidepost and warrants continued investment to expand space integration and space interdiction capabilities, grow capacities, and increase joint and coalition interoperability. USASMDC continues moving forward with our responsibilities articulated by our service's senior leaders: to interdict adversary space capabilities to protect terrestrial forces. Army space interdiction forces, within and outside USASMDC, continue fielding the Tactical Integrated Ground Suite while the Army Space and Missile Defense Center of Excellence and Technical Center simultaneously develop counter surveillance and reconnaissance and navigation warfare capabilities. Additionally, the Army approved an initial theater strike effects group (TSEG), the first formation organized around these space interdiction capabilities that will possess theater-level capacities. The Army also established an enlisted military occupational specialty to retain and grow Army space interdiction professionals in the multi-domain task forces (MDTFs), the 1st Space Brigade, space support elements, and the future TSEG slated for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) theater.

Triad

The Army triad of cyber, space interdiction, and special operations forces continues to develop operational utility through multi-domain experimentation that integrates exercises to leverage existing and new capabilities to meet the joint force commanders' needs. The Army Space Vision articulates the service's roles and missions in support of Army and joint operations and objectives. But the Army does not act alone on the world security stage. To develop and improve combined operations, USASMDC serves as a rallying point for allies and partners to develop relationships, initiate or expand their own space interdiction capabilities, and increase interoperability to extend friendly capacity across coalitions.

Exercises

USASMDC also continues to support multiple exercises with both missile defense and space support. Providing missile defense support, the 100th Missile Defense Brigade (MDB), operating the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD), successfully integrated into USNORTHCOM's Tier I event, Vigilant Shield 24, in March 2024. This was USASMDC's first integration with USNORTHCOM in a Tier I exercise as the ASCC for GMD. This Tier I exercise also allowed USASMDC to conduct the 100th MDB external evaluation, resulting in a successful evaluation of the command. In addition to Vigilant Shield 24, USASMDC and 100th MDB supported the following exercises to enhance the team's missile defense capability: Spartan Shield (April 2024); Guardian Strike (May 2024); and Guardian Watch (May 2024). From 11-18, March 2025, USASMDC supported USNORTHCOM's Ardent Sentry 25 and homeland defense exercise objectives under the joint staff's Elite Constellation 25-1 exercise. Additionally, the 100th MDB will conduct internal exercises as part of Spartan Shield (April 2025), Guardian Strike (May 2025), and Guardian Watch (May 2025).

Providing space support to multiple exercises, USASMDC supported USSTRATCOM's Tier I exercises by successfully providing space support to Global Lightning (March 2024), and Global Thunder (October 2024). Furthermore, USASMDC supported USSPACECOM's Tier I exercises with Apollo Griffin 24-1 (April 2024), and Apollo Griffin 24-2 (September 2024). USASMDC also provided space support to U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) Austere Challenge (March 2024). In the future,

USASMDC will provide space support to the following Tier 1 exercises: USSPACECOM's Apollo Griffin 25-1; USSTRATCOM's Global Lightning 25-1 under the joint staff's Elite Constellation 25-1 (March 11-18, 2025); Apollo Griffin 25-2; Global Lightning 25-2; USINDOPACOM's Pacific Sentry 25 under Elite Constellation 25-2 (June 2-9, 2025); and USSTRATCOM's Global Thunder 26.

Missile Defense – Already Leading the "Golden Dome"

The need for Golden Dome to protect Americans is urgent and a top priority for USASMDC, JFCC IMD, the joint force, and our Nation. Clearly, the DoD needs to reestablish deterrence capabilities to protect our homeland borders and skies against foreign coercion and aggression. Our existing efforts in our Army and joint force will, therefore, be amplified and aligned with this administration in achieving peace through strength with the Golden Dome. USASMDC and JFCC IMD are actively reviewing options for Golden Dome for America to protect the homeland through development of cutting-edge, next-generation, kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities—space, cyber, and other categories of missile defeat including left- and right-of-launch—to augment the kinetic defeat of ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles.

As a result of the changes to the Unified Command Plan last year, USASMDC assumed greater responsibility for GMD system asset management from USNORTHCOM and works closely with the Missile Defense Agency to coordinate GMD system maintenance and upgrades. The 100th MDB operates the GMD System and functions as a component of the missile defense enterprise of USASMDC. The GMD mission is the ultimate defense of the homeland, conducted in support of the USNORTHCOM commander, and manned by Army National Guard and active-component Soldiers from Colorado, Alaska, New York, and California. The 100th MDB is tasked with conducting the presidentially directed national security mission to defend the United States against the threat of intercontinental ballistic missile attack 24/7/365.

Missile Defeat

Even as we manage these missile defense systems, USASMDC has also leaned forward to champion the development of a missile defeat approach as the critical next step after transregional missile defense. Missile defeat is defined as transregional

missile defense providing attack operations; active defense; passive defense; and battle management/command, control, communications, computers, ISR support to the regional combatant commands. It also includes left-of-launch operations, providing deny, delay, disrupt and degrade missile defeat effects in coordination with global combatant commands, the Intelligence Community, Joint Staff, interagency, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Offensive missile threats challenge traditional U.S. military and diplomatic strengths. Hit-to-kill interceptors have increasing limitations in capacity, coverage, maneuverability, and cost, and we will never have enough interceptor capacity for a significant conflict. We must look for other innovative solutions to create efficiencies for our active defenses and to expand our protection capabilities.

National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System

USASMDC also continues to support operations of the National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System (NCR IADS). On October 1, 2024, USASMDC established the NCR IADS Management and Integration Cell to assume responsibilities from PEO Missiles & Space and provide more focused maintenance and sustainment support for all NCR IADS mission systems. Additionally, USASMDC is preparing to accept delivery of a new National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System MK1 launcher that will improve readiness and magazine depth of the NCR IADS mission.

Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)

The Army is moving toward a single, integrated command and control system known as the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), which incorporates 360-degree radar capabilities for our warriors on the battlefield. Modernization programs like IBCS will provide the ability to accomplish more theater mission sets with our organic AMD capabilities.

System integration efforts leverage legacy and future sensors and shooters, allowing for a single integrated air picture and coordination between fielded assets. The fusion between existing joint systems and future developmental programs with IBCS increases overall effectiveness, dramatically enhancing the ability to track, identify, engage, and defend against diverse threats across composite tracking networks.

Eventually, by 2030, DoD plans to use the IBCS to seamlessly integrate from a C-UAS capability in maneuver forces to tactical ballistic missiles.

The Army Air and Missile Defense Strategy for 2040

IAMD 2040 moves concurrently with our Army Air and Missile Defense Strategy 2040, which provides an opportunity to think about and design the type of force we will need to assure, deter, and, if necessary, fight to win on tomorrow's battlefield. This force must have the ability to operate under constant observation and in continuous contact. It must be built on open architecture, enabled by AI, and capable of deploying and employing its capabilities quickly, being informed by the "cost-curve" and adaptable to myriad situations. As such, we must build toward 360-degree composite coverage against advanced threats; integrate our fire control with necessary authorities and with resiliency; operate dispersed and disaggregated to optimize coverage potential and produce an omnipresent effect; increase capacity through modernized capability; and maximize lethality, survivability, and affordability.

Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft System (C-sUAS)

In my capacity as the Army's Air and Missile Defense Enterprise Integrator, I am engaged in the Army's efforts to C-sUAS as the chair of the AMD Governance Process for key enterprise-level decisions. The proliferation of UAS across modern battlefields has also prompted continued development and procurement efforts to ensure critical C-sUAS capabilities exist across all echelons. The Army requires a tiered and layered system capable of defeating the evolving and complex threats from UAS. Current Army operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and the conflict in Ukraine demonstrate the speed at which sUAS technology and associated tactics are evolving. The Army requires capabilities for C-sUAS missions that prevent threat sUAS (groups 1-3) from detecting, surveilling, targeting, attacking, and disrupting.

Current C-sUAS efforts are focused on joint urgent operational need, homeland fixed sites, C-sUAS batteries, and Soldier/unit common solutions, supporting the whole-of-Army transformation strategy across our force. Toward this end, any new C-sUAS development must integrate into all networks, including joint all-domain command and control, IBCS, and Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control to facilitate a common operating picture and provide inputs into the targeting cycle. Fixed site-low,

slow, sUAS integrated defeat systems and mobile-low, slow, small-unmanned aircraft integrated defeat systems are scalable systems for fixed and mobile missions, incorporating sensors, EW, and kinetic defeat systems.

The Army also plans to decouple Coyote from the Ku-band Radio Frequency System family of sensors for cost-effective solutions and is currently developing a handheld version with UAS defeat capabilities. The Coyote missile is the primary missile for C-sUAS systems; however, efforts are underway on a new variant with HPMs. Furthermore, low-collateral effects interceptors are also employed to reduce ancillary damage. Many of our future decisions will be informed by the continual development of DE capabilities such as HEL and HPM systems, and human-machine integration is also being explored within air defense missions to enhance efficiency.

The Army's ongoing investments in C-sUAS capabilities are critical to maintaining operational superiority against evolving threats while ensuring readiness and efficiency. It's imperative that we continue developmental and procurement efforts to expand magazine depth, improve cost efficiency, and minimize redundancies as we collaborate with the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense partners, and the science and technology community to address evolving threats and ensure C-sUAS readiness at all echelons.

Kwajalein Atoll and Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site

The multiple large waves that hit U.S. Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands, in January 2024 brought visibility to the vulnerable infrastructure and unique requirements of the island installation and the vital space domain awareness and test missions it supports. Recovery efforts to bring life functions back to the island of Roi-Namur and bring the critical sensors back online took approximately 60 days, restoring to the United States the irreplaceable space awareness mission of the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site (RTS) with recovery efforts still ongoing. That visibility prompted the Army to designate the USARPAC commander as the senior commander for Kwajalein Atoll, who then designated the commanding general of USASMDC as the senior responsible officer for executing the missions on Kwajalein Atoll.

That mission is irreplaceable. RTS is a world-class range and test facility located 2,300 miles west-southwest of Hawaii. Its unique instrumentation, including high-fidelity metric and signature radars as well as optical and telemetry sensors, play a vital role in the research, development, testing, and evaluation required to support America's defense and space programs. Kwajalein Atoll is ideally located for observation of new foreign launches and low-inclination satellite orbits, allowing the RTS to serve a vital role in space operations in support of USSPACECOM.

However, this unique place and its one-of-a-kind capabilities have suffered from unprecedented challenges following years of inadequate contractor oversight and lackluster contracting practices and performance. Kwajalein is too valuable to America to allow it to fail. Its unique position on the globe brings joint value, and joint value requires joint investment. Therefore, USASMDC is committed to leading this effort for the joint force and is actively evaluating command relationships and resourcing processes for efficiencies to revitalize this important multi-domain operations mission in the Pacific for the challenging decades ahead.

Over the past six decades, the radars at RTS have continuously evolved to provide irreplaceable data for development of our missile defense, space, and strategic weapon systems. Although the current RTS radars are among the most sophisticated in the world, many critical parts of these systems have weathered 50, 60, or—in some cases—even more years in some of the harshest conditions across the DoD. These radars were originally designed to last five years. As we face a new era of peer competition, we need to modernize RTS' world-class instrumentation and ensure the unique capabilities remain available for decades to come.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency Lincoln C-band Observables Radar (ALCOR) was the world's first radar that could image objects at long range. Now, we need to design a new generation of radar matched to the needs of advanced U.S. and adversary systems in geosynchronous orbit and beyond. ALCOR provides unique data necessary to validate the performance of new weapons acquisitions such as Sentinel. These programs have price tags in excess of $100 billion, but the degradation of the radar now places critical flight test objectives in jeopardy. Replacement of the ALCOR radar with a modern, more-capable, multistatic radar system could be achieved for less

than one-tenth of a percent of that figure. That next generation radar could provide an enduring capability that lasts many decades and serves the entire spectrum of RTS space and test missions.

The Ground Based Radar-Kwajalein (GBR-K) requires modernization to transform from a 1990s-era prototype for a missile defense asset to a highly digital instrumentation radar that can support the breadth and depth of testing and space challenges at RTS over the coming decades. GBR-K will be the only radar in the RTS suite that can capture critical X-band radar signatures and provide simultaneous tracking of multiple targets across a broad field of view. These capabilities are critical for the joint forces of the future to test and train with and against. Without a commitment to fully fund GBR-K, the radar is in jeopardy of remaining trapped in mothball status.

Space and High Altitude

The global disposition of my command and my 1st Space Brigade provides unique missile defeat contributions from space and high-altitude capabilities. The ground-based space electronic warfare formations in 1st Space Brigade—along with those in the MDTFs supporting USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM—are postured to interdict satellite communications and data pathways between adversary ISR drones and their missile targeting or command and control nodes to impose multiple dilemmas and delay or prevent activities left-of-launch.

To increase our effectiveness, we work in cooperation with our joint and allied partners to ensure full coverage of the geographic battle space and all required segments of the electromagnetic spectrum, mitigating gaps and seams that our adversaries seek to exploit. USASMDC also provides a unique contribution to the targeting enterprise through our intelligence division and 1st Space Brigade's Space Control Planning Center which provides target development expertise to Army, joint, and allied stakeholders. Finally, we integrate our joint partners into our reconnaissance and forward observation mission to measure our performance and effectiveness, ensuring our contributions to missile defeat meet commanders' requirements.

Our team actively works to integrate Army space operations and capability development across and in concert with our Army, joint, and coalition partners. This

integrated approach is both cost effective and mission effective in order to prepare the force to fight, and win, in a contested multi-domain environment.

Space Professionals

Developing trained professional Soldiers to deliver space-based effects for Army maneuver forces is critical to multi-domain operations. Army space professionals support unique assets to interdict, or disrupt, adversaries' use of space capabilities, ensuring Army forces gain and maintain the initiative to fight from positions of relative advantage in all domains. To date, the preponderance of expertise and experience in space operations resides in the officer corps, vice the non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, prohibiting the development of expert trainers upon which other branches rely. The Army currently uses approximately 900 enlisted Soldiers from three branches (air defense, signal, and military intelligence) to execute space operations. The establishment of a new military occupational specialty (MOS) for enlisted personnel supporting Army space – 40D, Space Operations Specialist – will be open for E-4 to E-9 billets alleviating the burden on these branches to provide personnel for positions in space formations across the Army.

The new enlisted space MOS will include a healthy career progression grade plate analysis in accordance with Army Regulation 611-1 and will provide upward movement, retention, and growth of the 40D NCO Corps across active, reserve, and guard components, ensuring that specialists through command sergeants major will arrive at space formations with experience and expertise in space operations. The Army integrates hundreds of thousands of space-enabled systems to enhance maneuver and enable multi-domain operations. The 40D MOS will allow the Army to keep pace with the growing space operations force structure within the MDTFs and TSEGs.

Additionally, select systems and formations provide close space support, enabling commanders to interdict adversary space capabilities protecting terrestrial forces while amplifying the lethality and deterrent effect of the Army globally.

Programs of Record

The Army Capability Manager for Space and High Altitude continues to work closely with the USASMDC Technical Center and the Army’s Program Executive Office – Intelligence, Electronic Warfare & Sensors to ensure Army space warfighters are

provided doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions to meet commander and operator requirements for space, high-altitude, missile defense, and navigation warfare.

The team material development community fielded two Tactical Integrated Ground Suite space superiority systems in FY24 and are projected to field 1 more in FY25 and 2 in FY26. The team forward fielded 13 smaller modules of the system in FY24 and is on schedule to begin fielding additional smaller modules in FY26 to meet warfighter multi-domain and transformation requirements.

Friendly Force Tracking

USASMDC continues to manage the Force Tracking Mission Management Center (FT MMC), executing its joint force tracking (FT) mission on behalf of USSPACECOM, which provides continuous FT data services to combatant commanders, U.S. government agencies, and designated coalition partners in support of command and control, situational awareness, and fratricide reduction. The FT MMC receives data from over 70 different tracking device manufacturers, converts that data into a common message format, and disseminates a tailored data feed out to authorized end users across the DoD and U.S. government. This allows end users to concentrate on their mission sets while the FT MMC concentrates on force tracking data at an enterprise level. The FT MMC currently processes friendly force tracking, tagging, tracking and locating, as well as personnel recovery data with over 300,000 devices under management, generating approximately 21 million messages per day.

NC3 – Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

Nuclear deterrence and its supporting platforms, particularly the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system, remain critical in securing U.S. strategic dominance and maintaining global stability.

NC3 provides the President the ability to command and control U.S. nuclear forces under all conditions. Effective nuclear deterrence demands an assured, resilient, and reliable NC3 system that performs critical functions across all relevant Detect, Decide, and Direct mission threads. The NC3 system must ensure timely and cost-effective fielding, end-to-end capability, and advancement to stay ahead of evolving threats.

As the ASCC to USSTRATCOM, the command has been tasked to report on all Army assets performing NC3 missions. With that, USASMDC has recently taken responsibility for synchronizing efforts across all Army NC3 sites for readiness reporting. USASMDC will assess readiness through triennial Integrated CBRN Survivability and Endurability Certification and Assessment Program (ICSECAP) inspections. We will partner with Installation Management Command and Army Cyber Command to facilitate upgrades and compliance with ICSECAP findings and will report to Army senior leaders on the current readiness posture of Army NC3 assets and resource requirements to ensure USSTRATCOM NC3 mission objectives are being met.

Conclusion

Esteemed members of this committee, all that SMDC and JFCC IMD do, we do on behalf of the people of this great Nation under the direction of its leaders, and with an amazing team of men and women across the globe. Our indispensable Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, civilians, and contractors are engaged in a no-fail mission to protect our homeland. They, and their families, sacrifice and relocate to make that happen. Under my “ONE TEAM!” vision, we are leaning forward to secure our homeland through our GMD mission and Golden Dome initiatives; championing breakthroughs in transregional missile defense and defeat; developing and advancing our technological edge; marshalling efforts to repair and improve our vital and only holistic testing site on Kwajalein; and ensuring our warfighters are trained, equipped, and positioned to fight and win in any location and across any domain. Concerning this growing, evolving, and global missile threat, we intend—with this stewardship supported, funded, and granted to us by the American people and Congress—to win.