

UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

PRESENTATION TO THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Subject: Fiscal Year 2026 Priorities and Posture of United States Space Command

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Introduction

Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and Distinguished Members of the Committee,

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the current strategic environment, U.S. Space Command's (USSPACECOM) accomplishments last year, and the opportunities ahead to further strengthen the Command's critical role in protecting and defending our national interests and providing the Nation a position of advantage in space. Our guiding principle is clear: to secure peace, we must be prepared for conflict extending to space, and if deterrence fails, we will fight and win. USSPACECOM will uphold this principle in the face of operational threats, which are expanding at a breathtaking pace and which are being fielded deliberately and specifically to challenge the United States, the American way of life, and hold the Joint Force at risk.

Since reestablishment in 2019, USSPACECOM has focused intensely on today's rapidly evolving and highly contested strategic environment. The increasing lethality and proliferation of space-enabled and cyber threats displayed in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the rapid advance of China's capabilities, demonstrate that winning the space fight is foundational to defending the nation, the readiness of the nation's forces, and reestablishing deterrence.

In this context, we fully leverage our authorities and resources to fulfill our Title 10 and Unified Command Plan (UCP) responsibilities. We take these missions so seriously that we talk about them in terms of moral responsibilities, of which there are three. Our first moral responsibility is to defend the Nation and the Joint Force from space-enabled attack by others. Our second moral responsibility is to deliver space capabilities to the Joint Force, our Nation, and our Allies across all levels of competition and conflict. And finally, we must protect and

defend the space systems critical to the Joint Force and our modern way of life against the threats now arrayed against us.

Despite the growing threats, the United States maintains advantages in space thanks to our unmatched commercial space sector, larger and more empowered alliances and partnerships, and, most importantly, the unified mission focus of our superb Joint warfighters. However, this position—and our ability to deter potential adversaries—cannot be taken for granted. Our opponents are rapidly delivering counterspace capabilities and new weapons that operate in, from, and to space.

Deterrence in space is consistent with other operational theaters: it requires a keen understanding and clear communication of what we are deterring against; credible acknowledged capabilities to impose unacceptable costs on those who would attack us; and resilient architectures to dissuade attack by denying the adversary the benefit they seek. We need to make clear that cost imposition need not be limited to the domain of the initial action. Achieving this level of deterrence demands not only strategic intent but also the timely development and fielding of new space capabilities.

USSPACECOM requires consistent and stable funding and effective acquisition programs to enable the rapid delivery of advanced space systems, in sufficient quantities to support deterrence and to win a conflict that starts in or extends into space. Most pressing are the delivery of integrated space fires, enhanced battlespace awareness, and integrated command and control (C2) capabilities to achieve space superiority to defend the homeland and protect and enable the Joint Force. By investing in lethality in, from, and to space, we send a clear message: the United States has the advantage, we are ready to repel all challengers, and potential adversaries will not achieve their end-states by extending conflict into space.

Game Changing Threats We Face In, From, and To Space

Today, we face concurrent and accelerating threats. These threats, extensively discussed over the years, are no longer future possibilities but operational realities. They span terrestrial, on-orbit, and cyber capabilities holding space systems in all orbital regimes at risk, capable of restricting Joint Force freedom of action in all domains and attacking the homeland with little warning. Naturally occurring threats, such as severe solar activity, also pose risks to the longevity and functionality of on-orbit assets. These risks must be considered in procurement and operational planning. I look forward to discussing these operational realities in a classified environment, but at the unclassified level, there are many developments that challenge our ability to execute our strategy.

These novel and unprecedented developments include China's space-enabled kill chains in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond; Russia's pursuit of an on-orbit nuclear anti-satellite weapon; and wide-ranging ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats. Moreover, growing bilateral cooperation and technology exchanges among China, Russia, Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) can enhance their space and missile capabilities, introduce new strategic dilemmas, and heighten risks of misperceptions or conflict escalation, creating significant challenges for the United States and our Allies and Partners.

China

China views space technologies as critical to its goal of becoming the dominant power in East Asia and a global superpower. The People's Republic of China (PRC) seeks to rival the United States in nearly all areas of space technology by 2030 and establish itself as the world's preeminent space power by 2045. Since 2015, China's on-orbit presence has grown 1000

percent, with 1094 active satellites as of January 2025. Its sophisticated space and counterspace systems enhance its ability to secure territorial claims, project power, and challenge U.S. advantages.

China integrates space capabilities with advanced missiles, enabling the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to find, fix, track, and target U.S. and Allied terrestrial forces using long-range, over-the-horizon, precision missiles to disrupt logistics and limit operational freedom in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility (AOR). The PLA relies on over 300 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites equipped with advanced sensors to detect U.S. aircraft carriers and expeditionary forces. Additionally, China's BeiDou Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) system provides precision targeting, coordination of troop movements, and advanced C2 capabilities.

China's counterspace operations seek to undermine how the U.S. military fights by disrupting or destroying space capabilities which are foundational to Joint Force operational concepts, effectively blinding and deafening friendly forces. The PLA is also developing on-orbit, maneuverable counterspace satellites to target our satellites using dual-use technologies, such as the Shijian-21 satellite, for potential offensive purposes against satellites we rely on to defend the homeland and project power. China's experimental satellites and operational ground-based systems, like direct-ascent antisatellite missiles, lasers, and jammers, give the PLA robust lethal and non-lethal counterspace options across the spectrum of conflict. Additionally, in 2024 Chinese scientists revealed efforts to develop a novel microwave weapon that could target satellites, reflecting a comprehensive counterspace approach.

China also leverages international partnerships and cutting-edge projects to challenge U.S. leadership in space. In 2024, it hosted the China-Latin America and Caribbean Space

Cooperation Forum to promote collaboration on space infrastructure and governance. China is also advancing Space Situational Awareness with tracking stations in Egypt and a space debris monitoring project in the Asia-Pacific region. China is investing in reusable launch vehicles to increase its spacelift capacity while lowering costs, and it is moving quickly in planetary exploration to potentially secure strategic advantages in key space terrain. Milestones such as the Chang'e-6 mission, which impressively returned lunar samples from the Moon's far side, further demonstrates China's growing space capabilities. These advancements, paired with international partnerships, underscore Beijing's strategy to erode U.S. leadership and establish itself as the dominant space power.

Russian Federation

Russia's space program remains a strategic priority for the Kremlin despite significant challenges from sanctions, international isolation, and funding constraints. Key efforts include developing a new Russian space station, advancing nuclear power in space, and enhancing Arctic monitoring for military operations. Despite delays and budget cuts, Russia maintains fleets of imaging satellites to support global military and paramilitary operations. Russia has also expanded its space-based support for operations in Ukraine with the launch of multiple satellites providing enhanced ISR since February 2022.

Russia has declared commercial satellites used for military operations as valid and legitimate targets. Russia continues to advance electromagnetic warfare (EW), directed energy, cyber, and both ground-based and co-orbital ASAT capabilities. In 2024 and already in 2025, Russian EW systems disrupted PNT services in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Mediterranean regions, causing flight diversions and Global Positioning System inaccuracies. These activities

underscore Moscow's ability and willingness to degrade military and civilian space systems and highlight the challenge with maintaining credible deterrence.

Most concerning, Russia is pursuing the possible placement of a nuclear weapon on-orbit. Detonating a nuclear weapon on-orbit would have indiscriminate effects, potentially disrupting the global use of space for security, economic, and scientific purposes. USSPACECOM has prepared our vital national security satellites for such a threat, and we will continue to support whole-of-government efforts and engage with likeminded nations to ensure that Russia understands the global community cannot tolerate a nuclear weapon in space.

Russia is also expanding space partnerships with its allies and U.S strategic opponents. In June 2024, Russia and the DPRK signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty that includes provisions for mutual defense and space collaboration. In October, demonstrating their growing collaboration, Iran sent two satellites to Russia for space launch services. Russia also continues to work with China on development of the International Lunar Research Station, BeiDou-GLONASS integration, and space debris monitoring. These partnerships highlight Moscow's efforts to leverage global influence in space to advance its strategic goals.

Evolving Missile Threats

The U.S. homeland and national interests face growing threats from the expanding and evolving offensive missile capabilities of peer, near-peer, and rogue adversaries. These advanced systems—including hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and fractional orbital bombardment platforms (FOBS)—can launch into, transit through, or even originate from space, crossing multiple Combatant Commanders' AORs before striking their targets. The increasing diversity

and proliferation of these technologies complicate tracking, targeting, engagement, and determination of intended target location.

China continues to develop its wide-ranging missile program and is now the global leader in hypersonic payload capability. In 2021, a Chinese FOBS launch saw an HGV travel 25,000 miles within the defined space AOR before re-entering the atmosphere, aggressively maneuvering to strike a target in the Chinese mainland, which could just as easily have been a target within our homeland, like Washington, D.C., New York, or Los Angeles.

Russia's continued missile advancements strain U.S. sensors and defenses. Moscow has fielded three hypersonic systems with air, land, and sea launch options, featuring ranges over 6,000 miles carrying both conventional and nuclear capabilities, including two types of nuclear-armed HGVs. These advanced and long-range threats highlight the urgency to build the Golden Dome for America to protect our borders and skies against foreign coercion and aggression.

Elements of Victory: Achieving Integrated Success in Space

Given the scale and complexity of the threat environment we now face in space, there is no longer any doubt that space is a warfighting domain. Over the past five years, USSPACECOM has sharpened our understanding of space's contribution to modern all-domain warfare and what it will take for the United States to prevail in a war that starts in space or extends into space.

The full strength of national security space power must be harnessed as we rebuild our military to ensure credible deterrence. If called to transition from competition into crisis and conflict, the following Elements of Victory, essential to the United States, will ensure success. These elements are informed by the collective space warfighting and terrestrial warfighting

expertise of our Joint, Interagency, and Combined team, and will evolve to ensure we are fully prepared for a fight that, if it comes, we will win.

Operate Through a First Strike

Our most stressing scenario is operating through a first strike from an undeterred adversary while ensuring the space capabilities essential for victory continue to operate. We must anticipate, defend against, recover from, and immediately respond to a wide range of scenarios, conditions, and threats. Doing so will require robust defensive capabilities and resilient architectures across our integrated space enterprise.

The most consequential threat to our resilience is an attack on the United States from ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles, as well as emerging space-based weapons. Our legacy systems—Space Domain Awareness (SDA), space-based and terrestrial Missile Warning and Missile Defense, and satellite-enabled Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications—remain as vital today as ever in protecting the homeland. Recognizing this, our adversaries have developed terrestrial and on-orbit weapons designed to threaten these critical space capabilities, underscoring the urgent need to strengthen our defenses.

To counter this threat, USSPACECOM is fully supporting the Department of Defense's (DoD) implementation of the President's Executive Order (EO) to establish a Golden Dome Missile Defense Shield for America. Key efforts – as directed in the EO – include assisting in the development of capability-based requirements, reference architectures, and an implementation plan; supporting the acceleration and deployment of missile defense satellites, including the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor; supporting the development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors; enhancing non-kinetic measures to

complement kinetic missile defense; and conducting theater-based reviews to improve trans-regional missile defenses in coordination with the other Combatant Commands and key Allies and Partners.

Specifically, USSPACECOM is partnering with U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and other stakeholders to write an Initial Capabilities Document aimed at defining capability-based requirements for the Golden Dome architecture, based on forecasted threat scenarios. As these capabilities develop and deliver, we stand ready to take an active role in the operation of a next-generation space architecture which will be resident in our AOR in support of protecting American citizens from attack.

In 2024, USSPACECOM conducted our first standalone Tier-1 exercise, APOLLO GRIFFIN, which focused on executing the command's mission through competition and crisis. This exercise allowed us to conduct a Combined/Joint fires rehearsal, and it successfully validated a Crisis Intelligence Cell, which supports planning and operations by enabling senior leaders and staff to make timely decisions at the pace of relevance. This summer, we are integrating APOLLO GRIFFIN with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's (USINDOPACOM) Tier-1 exercise and the Joint Staff's ELITE CONSTELLATION exercise series to further mature the global and all-domain integration of space operations during conflict.

USSPACECOM also enhances space operations integration, interoperability, and resilience with Allies and Partners through Exercise GLOBAL SENTINEL, which explores meaningful international collaboration and contribution to space security and included 25 nations last year. Similarly, NIMBLE TITAN, led by our Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), exercises missile warning and defense policies, partnerships, and information-sharing frameworks encouraging innovation and deepening

relationships. Last year, JFCC IMD brought together 25 nations and three international organizations to address policy changes and rehearse combined operations concepts.

Quickly and Seamlessly Transition from Crisis to Conflict

Our ability to quickly and seamlessly transition from crisis to conflict is essential to providing national leadership broad options and greater flexibility. Clear understanding of authorities, international agreements, access/basing/overflight requirements, and force posture are key tools we continue to develop. Robust and persistent campaigning simultaneously enhances deterrence and postures for conflict.

In 2024, USSPACECOM published our new Campaign Plan. The plan integrates and synchronizes our operations, activities, and investments with the Joint Force and Interagency to strengthen deterrence and posture for conflict. Developed in close consultation with our six Components, fellow Combatant Commands, Interagency partners, and our closest Allies, it establishes the foundation for maintaining our advantage in space—leaving no doubt to our adversaries that we are stronger, more capable, and ready to counter any threat.

Transitioning from crisis to conflict with an advantage requires timely and actionable intelligence. Over the past five years, USSPACECOM has made significant progress in this area. Our Intelligence Directorate, in collaboration with intelligence professionals across our Components, the Services, the other Combatant Commands, and the Intelligence Community, are driving forward intelligence activities to build a deeper understanding of the threat across the national space security enterprise.

Integrate and Synchronize Joint, Interagency, Allied, and Commercial Effects

Our ability to synchronize across organizational and national boundaries is enabled by comprehensive and clearly defined command relationships; fully integrated operational plans; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and timely, secure, and resilient communications across the space enterprise. We achieve synchronization with the Joint Force through the integration of our plans and battle management capabilities with other Combatant Commands; with U.S.-led Allies and Partners through Multinational Force (MNF) Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER (OOD); with our Interagency partners in protect and defend operations through the National Space Defense Center; and with our commercial partners through the Commercial Integration Cell (CIC) and the Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) cell.

USSPACECOM is undertaking a comprehensive rewrite of our primary Operations Plan (OPLAN) to ensure space integration across Combatant Commands is seamless, and Intelligence Community and commercial capabilities are integrated timely and effectively. With our revised OPLAN, USSPACECOM will be postured to ensure no adversary can disrupt or exploit our critical capabilities to gain an advantage.

America's rapidly expanding commercial space sector provides a significant asymmetrical advantage over our strategic competitors. To maximize this advantage, USSPACECOM updated its Commercial Integration Strategy, aligning it with the DoD's Commercial Space Integration Strategy and the U.S. Space Force's (USSF) Commercial Space Strategy. Our strategy focuses on three key areas: identifying and advocating for commercial systems and innovations, incorporating and operationalizing commercial capabilities, and informing and protecting commercial partners.

The CIC and JCO cell are two practical applications of this strategy. The CIC optimizes space effects by synchronizing actions between government and Commercial Mission Partners

(CMPs) and sharing operationally relevant information. Today, the CIC has 17 CMPs, expanding our sharing of threat information and TTPs at classified levels, and bolstering operations and crisis action planning from competition to conflict. This is enabling us to operationalize the Tri-Seal Commercial Space Protection Framework with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. In addition, the JCO has 18 partner nations and NATO, who all work together to provide non-classified commercial data from 17 commercial companies to increase SDA for the United States and other partner nations.

We will continue to expand the CIC, within the Combined Space Operations Center, and JCO by adding new partners and mission sets as needed, building on recent successes. These cells demonstrated successful coordination during the Intelsat-33E anomaly and breakup event. During that event, the CIC coordinated with Intelsat (a member of the CIC), to obtain critical satellite data, while the JCO supported tracking of debris and helped assess close approaches with other satellites, providing tipping to our dedicated Space Surveillance Network. To build on this success, the CIC requires dedicated IT infrastructure at all classification levels, and a real-time CMP Common Operational Picture. The JCO also requires sufficient and predictable resourcing for all its critical missions. Congress' support for these efforts will ensure USSPACECOM can continue leveraging commercial partnerships effectively, enhancing operational capabilities and maintaining a strategic advantage in space.

One of USSPACECOM's greatest strengths is my role as head of the Multinational Force for Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER (MNF-OOD). With Germany, France, and New Zealand joining last year, the seven-nation coalition enhances space operations, mission assurance, and resilience. As MNF-OOD moves toward Initial Operational Capability, it has published its first

multinational SDA Concept of Operations and is finalizing a seven-nation Campaign Plan to unify space operations. Achieving Full Operational Capability by 2027 requires integrated intelligence and mission planning, and coordinated missile warning, defense, and protect-and-defend operations. Through strengthened partnerships, we build greater collective understanding of threats, a shared burden of space security, the ability to collectively shape norms of responsible behavior in space, and enhanced interoperability for combined space operations should they be needed in conflict.

Finally, integrating as a Joint, Combined, and partnered team is challenging when access to critical information and capabilities is unnecessarily restricted, limiting effective planning and operations. We thank Congress for passing security classification reforms in the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, which address concerns about the over classification of space-related data and select space defense acquisition programs. USSPACECOM actively supports implementation of the DoD's December 2023 policy to reduce the classification level of space systems. Taking advantage of this policy will allow us to execute improved collaboration with the Joint Force, U.S. government agencies, Allies, and industry.

Deploy, Regenerate, and Reconstitute Space Forces

Our ability to deploy, regenerate, and reconstitute space forces throughout a protracted conflict must provide the Joint and Combined Force the requisite endurance to fight beyond the initial stages of conflict with sustained access to space capabilities. On orbit, sustained space operations require the right mix of responsive launch, sustained maneuverability, and logistics to allow for the operational availability, movement, and maneuver required to achieve a position of advantage over an adversary. These sustainment activities need to occur simultaneously across all domains, ensuring resilience and survivability throughout all phases of conflict.

Achieving sustained space maneuver requires investment in purpose-built systems—on-orbit refueling, in-space assembly, modular hardware upgrades, and urgent orbital resupply—to revolutionize how USSPACECOM achieves and maintains space superiority. Legacy space systems were constrained by the technological limitations of their era, launched with finite fuel and fixed payloads that offered minimal operational maneuverability, flexibility, or defensive capability. Future systems must overcome these limitations by enabling greater flexibility through dynamic maneuver, upgradability, and resupply. Platforms designed to support space maneuver should provide the capability and capacity needed to deter adversaries, maintain initiative, and conduct operations across all phases of competition and conflict.

USSPACECOM is conducting analysis to determine which systems and missions require these enhanced capabilities and recommended timelines for their implementation. This evolution will align space operations with maneuver warfare principles already applied in all other warfighting domains. For example, the X-37B, while a test and experimentation platform, highlights the potential for maneuver in space operations. The USSF's announcement last year regarding the X-37B's aerobraking maneuver—which allowed the vehicle to bridge multiple orbital regimes—demonstrates precisely the kind of operational flexibility and maneuverability that future systems must possess. Such capabilities are critical to avoiding operational surprise and enabling innovative operational concepts.

To enhance flexibility, operational effectiveness, and resilience, USSPACECOM also requires sustained investment in terrestrial mobile and transportable capabilities. These include EW capabilities like the USSF's Counter Communications System and the U.S. Army's Mobile and Theater Integrated Ground Suites; the U.S. Marine Corps' Electromagnetic Reconnaissance System; missile warning nodes such as the Space-Based Infrared System Survivable/Endurable

Evolution; and agile SDA capabilities provided by the U.S. Navy's Aegis Combat System.

These mobile elements are critical for augmenting fixed networks, closing coverage gaps, and expanding the battlefield geometry of our space enterprise to counter evolving and dynamic threats.

Achieve Space Superiority

Our ability to achieve space superiority is foundational to Joint Force success. To deter strategic competitors, defend U.S., Allied, Partner, commercial interests, and protect the Nation and Joint Force, the Services require funding for three essential space superiority capabilities: Integrated Space Fires, Enhanced Battlespace Awareness for Space Operations, and Resilient, Timely Operational Space C2.

Integrated Space Fires are our most pressing need and are reflected as such in our Integrated Priority List. The UCP directs USSPACECOM to protect and defend U.S., Allied, and commercial space capabilities through necessary offensive and defensive space operations. Like all other Combatant Commands, USSPACECOM requires combat-credible lethal and non-lethal capabilities to deter and counter adversary actions. Interweaving space, cyber, special operations, and traditional maneuver force fires provides national leadership with the widest and most effective range of options and enables the greatest Joint Force lethality. Consistent and persistent funding and acquisition accountability are necessary to deliver integrated fires capabilities on an accelerated timeline—by 2027—to counter growing threats and ensure the Joint and Combined Force's freedom of action in space and on Earth.

USSPACECOM requires the requisite near-real-time domain awareness to close our kill chains, interdict adversary kill chains, and to outpace adversaries in today's increasingly

congested and contested space environment. Legacy SDA systems lack agility, making investment in interoperable sensors and dynamic architectures critical for timely detection, tracking, and characterization of space objects. Once operational, Silent Barker, Space C2 programs of record, and the future Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability will enhance our domain awareness. However, more advanced space-based and terrestrial systems are needed to dynamically track spacecraft in nonstandard orbits and, eventually, in farther regions beyond geostationary earth orbit out to Cislunar orbit. Continued investment is essential to ensure USSPACECOM's awareness keeps pace with rapidly advancing space systems and emerging challenges in space, enabling timely and informed decisions to protect critical space assets in this increasingly complex domain.

Resilient and timely space C2 is essential to closing friendly kill chains, deterring hostile actions, and defending U.S., Allied, and Partner interests. A modernized C2 capability is critical for managing space domain operations and supporting terrestrial operations in which space effects are vital. Last year, USSPACECOM identified four high-priority classified systems that require integrated C2 networks for connecting sensors to effectors. We are working with the Department of the Air Force, USSF, the Missile Defense Agency, and the NRO to ensure we have the necessary integration across multiple acquisition programs to field a more agile C2 capability, increasing kill chain speed and lethality by 2027. Investment in this and other C2 systems is essential for enabling the use of new space systems which the Services and Agencies are producing, building the resilience and integration needed to outpace adversaries, and achieving space superiority.

The robust and demonstrable ability to operate through a first strike, quickly and seamlessly transition from crisis to conflict, integrate and synchronize effects, deploy/regenerate/reconstitute

space forces, and achieve space superiority are key to credible deterrence and critical to victory in combat.

Conclusion

The threats we face in space are becoming increasingly lethal and widespread, demanding that we continually adapt to – and shape – a rapidly evolving strategic environment to strengthen our advantage and maintain deterrence. These challenges demand the full strength of the Joint Force, reinforcing USSPACECOM as we ensure their success in return.

We are at a critical juncture. Our most pressing threat, China, is marching towards General Secretary Xi Jinping's directed timeline for his armed forces to be ready to militarily reunite with Taiwan, a date that is now less than two years away. Though this is not a prediction of conflict, it is a reality that must be taken seriously. Furthermore, we are being threatened terrestrially and on-orbit with capabilities that seek to not only dull our ability to support the Joint Force, but also our ability to defend the homeland.

Armed conflict in space is not inevitable, and USSPACECOM remains committed to preserving space as a domain for peaceful exploration and use. Should deterrence fail, however, the integrated space power of our Joint, Interagency, Combined, and commercial team will provide a decisive advantage in any conflict. By realizing the full potential of our integrated space enterprise and elements of victory, we will prevail. With Congress' continued support, USSPACECOM will remain prepared to address the evolving threat landscape, deter aggression, counter adversary actions, and safeguard America's interests in space today and for generations to come.