

## **HASC-SF Hearing**

Mr. John Rood

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request in support of the Department's efforts to improve our missile defense capabilities so that we remain ahead of the evolving threat while providing effective, integrated and interoperable regional missile defenses in support of our global defense strategy.

### **Security Environment and Strategic Priorities**

As the *National Defense Strategy* points out, the United States, allies, and partners confront a security environment that is more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Today, over twenty states possess offensive missiles, and potential adversaries are expanding their missile capabilities in three different directions simultaneously. They are increasing the capabilities of their existing missile systems; adding new and unprecedented types of missile capabilities to their arsenals; and, integrating offensive missiles more thoroughly in their coercive threats, military exercises, and war planning.

Over the past several years, North Korea has rapidly accelerated its ICBM development program. Iran is extending the range of its ballistic missile systems with the goal of achieving an operational ICBM capability, and through its Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) program could shorten a pathway to an ICBM because space launch vehicles use similar technologies.

Potential adversaries are also fielding an increasingly diverse, expansive, and modern range of regional offensive missile systems that can threaten U.S. forces abroad, allies, and partners. Their regional offensive missile systems include multiple types of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles intended to provide coercive political and military advantages in regional crises or conflict. These missile systems appear to be a central element of Russia's frequent and explicit coercive nuclear threats to U.S. allies and partners. For example, Russia is developing a new generation of advanced, regional ballistic and cruise missiles that support its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy intended to defeat U.S. and allied will and capability in regional crises or conflicts.

A key component of China's military modernization is its short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) arsenal designed to prevent U.S. military access to support regional allies and partners. China is augmenting this short-range missile force with a growing number of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, including sophisticated anti-ship ballistic missiles that pose a direct threat to U.S. aircraft carriers.

Russia and China are also developing advanced sea- and air-launched cruise missiles and hypersonic missile capabilities that can travel at exceptional speeds with unpredictable flight paths. These are the realities of the emerging missile threat environment that U.S. missile defense policy, strategy and capabilities must address.

### **Missile Defense Policy and Posture**

With this as the strategic context, let me turn to a discussion of the FY2019 Budget Request for missile defense and the policies, programs and capabilities it supports. The Department's budget request supports the President's direction set out in the *National Security Strategy* to deploy a layered missile defense system to protect the American homeland from North Korean and Iranian missile threats. The request also supports regional missile defenses to protect our deployed forces, allies, and partners. Our missile defense system not only protects the United States, it strengthens the deterrence of war and the assurance of allies and partners.

Today, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system provides protection for the nation. It consists of 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) deployed in Alaska and California; land-, sea, and space-based sensors; and a command and control system operated 24/7 by trained service members. We are strengthening this system and investing in technologies to ensure that we can continue to counter rogue state missile threats to our homeland.

In September 2017, DoD requested the reprogramming of FY2017 funding of more than \$400 million to counter the North Korean missile threat. Congress approved this request. A portion of these funds supports important homeland defense activities, including initiating work on the procurement of 20 additional GBIs in Alaska as early as 2023, which will bring the total to 64 fielded interceptors. The reprogramming also funded a service life extension to the COBRA DANE radar in Alaska and software upgrades to the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar – both essential elements of our homeland defense. In November 2017, the President submitted an amendment to his FY2018 budget request for \$4.0 billion for both capabilities to defeat missiles prior to launch and missile defense which includes construction of a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska, and additional procurement funding necessary for the 20 new GBIs.

The FY2019 budget request includes \$9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency and \$3 billion for air and missile defense activities in the Military Departments. This budget funds: a more capable GBI with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle; the deployment of new missile tracking and discrimination sensors in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific region; and a new Space-based Kill Assessment capability. These near term investments will enable us to obtain substantially more performance and efficiency out of the GMD systems necessary to meet the evolving threat.

We are also moving forward to bolster homeland defenses against air and cruise missile threats. In 2018, we will complete the first part of a two-phase effort to provide effective surveillance against these missile threats to the National Capital Region (NCR). Doing so will enhance our ability to detect, track, and investigate suspicious aircraft, as well as cruise missiles, and when

necessary, cue our missile defense systems against the full spectrum of air threats. We are on track to begin the second phase of this effort in FY19, which will expand our capability to detect, ID and take defensive action before air threats can strike potential targets within the NCR. We are also looking into technologies and concepts that could be used to provide scalable and deployable options for expanding this defensive capability.

The Department's FY 2019 budget request also continues deployment of regional missile defenses tailored to meet missile threats to U.S. forces abroad and allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. The budget enhances our regional missile defense capacity through additional Patriot missiles as well as Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD), SM-3 Block IB, and SM-3 Block IIA interceptors. Our focus is on developing and fielding missile defense capabilities that are mobile and relocatable, which allows us flexibility to respond to a crisis or conflict wherever it emerges. Because systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and our Aegis BMD capable ships can be surged when and where required, they make it possible to deploy layered missile defense capabilities that are responsive to regional missile threats as they arise.

We are also encouraging our allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East and Near East Asia to acquire missile defense capabilities, and to strengthen missile defense cooperation in order to move towards a more interoperable and integrated missile defense architecture against hostile ballistic and cruise missile threats.

Looking forward, it's clear potential adversaries are modernizing and expanding their missile capabilities. We must ensure that our missile defense investment strategy and priorities enable us to meet the most dangerous missile threats today, while also enabling us to counter future missile threats as they expand. Areas for work on advanced technology include improved discrimination in our missile defense system sensor architecture, lasers to intercept offensive missiles during their most vulnerable boost phase of flight, evaluating new space-based sensor concepts, and the multi-object kill vehicle.

## **Conclusion**

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that in an increasingly complex and threatening security environment, DoD must sustain the capabilities needed to deter and defend against attacks on our homeland, U.S. forces deployed abroad, allies and partners. We must make the investments needed to address the ongoing erosion of our operational advantages and remain the preeminent military power in the world.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.