

STATEMENT BY
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BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2018 PRIORITIES FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

May 25, 2017

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Introduction

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today on the Department's nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system, and the risks, challenges, and opportunities within the system and related programs; priorities and plans for modernization and recapitalization of the NC3 system. I am John Zangardi, the Acting Department of Defense (DoD) Chief Information Officer (CIO). I am the senior civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for information technology (IT) and the DoD information enterprise, including communications; spectrum management; network policy and standards; cybersecurity; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) policy; and the DoD information enterprise that supports DoD command and control (C2). I am also responsible for policy, oversight, guidance, and coordination for the Department's NC3 systems.

Fiscal Year 2018 Guidance

My office's Fiscal Year 2018 Capabilities Planning Guidance states that we need to strengthen our National Leadership Command Capabilities (NLCC) to meet changing threats and help the President and National Leadership command U.S. forces. I believe this budget will help both areas as we identify threats and ways to mitigate them, which in turn helps our Nation's leaders maintain positive control of the U.S. nuclear forces.

This preeminent issue area is a continuous focus for the Department and more specifically my office. This effort is led by the Congressionally-mandated Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System.

Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System

The Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System, (the Council), had a productive year. Highlights include:

- Continuous focus on identified issues. For example, the Council is acting on recommendations from the NC3 Enterprise Review, tri-chaired by the Joint Staff, USSTRATCOM and my office. We closed out a couple of the easy, short-term findings like E-6B availability in support of operational missions. However, there are some findings, such as manpower, training, and expertise, which we will actively track for years to ensure we fully address these requirements. This is not a "launch and leave" effort - we will continue to provide Senior Leadership guidance until the problems are resolved.

- Adopting a mission focus theme. Since the Council's inception, we have been heavily focused on NC3 modernization and sustainment programs. We will continue that focus but bring it into perspective based upon what our main customers, USSTRATCOM, Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM and the White House require to accomplish their mission over the short- and

long-term. So, working with USSTRATCOM, the enterprise is developing a NC3 mission area risk analysis across the five NC3 functions: planning, situation monitoring, decision making, force management and force development. Additionally, the enterprise is working on a methodology to provide the Council members a clear understanding of NC3 system readiness.

- Maintaining responsiveness with Congress. I believe our team's communication with your team has increased the capability and readiness of our NLCC enterprise. This communication has helped increase clarity of the NC3 mission area and its acquisition process, provided stability for NC3 program offices, and ensured warfighter capabilities. A good example of this teamwork in action is during the last couple of years during the unfunded requirements phase. We have helped EUCOM and NORTHCOM with their high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) requirements.

Risks

The types of risks and challenges are much the same as they've been for the past decade. We have an antiquated NC3 system that we are progressively modernizing, while at the same time ensuring we have a robust sustainment program in place for our older systems. My team is constantly working with the enterprise team to identify problems and resolve them in a timely manner. For example, over the next year the Strategic Automated Command and Control System (SACCS) digital modernization program will enable the Air Force to jettison those large 8-inch floppy disks after 30 plus years. Next, we are working with the Air Force to ensure we have Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) terminal parts for the next two decades as we field Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites' family of beyond line-of-sight terminals (FAB-T) over the next 15-20 years. These are only two examples within the greater NC3 enterprise that we are addressing at this time.

Additionally, we are utilizing the Council's dedicated Defense Threat Reduction Agency team to help identify NC3 vulnerabilities across a broad area of potential threat vectors. I would be happy to discuss that team's activities and the Council's work in our classified session.

Conclusion

DoD recognizes the importance of modernization and the security implications of our NC3 systems. We have more work to do and are not where we want to be. We are, however, making investments in our existing NC3 systems and balancing modernization against the sustainment and improvement of these critical systems. The Department is actively pursuing modernization while operating within the confines of a constrained budget environment. The Department appreciates the support of the Subcommittee on these important matters. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward to your questions.