

Not for Public Release until Approved by the
House Armed Services Committee

STATEMENT OF
BRIAN P. MCKEON
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

BEFORE THE HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
FEBRUARY 24, 2016

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Budget Request for Strategic Forces. I am grateful for your consistent attention to and continuing support of the critical mission of nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Earlier this month, Secretary Carter identified five current and evolving security challenges that have driven the focus of the Defense Department's planning and budgeting this year. Each has implications for our current and planned strategic capabilities and posture.

Two of these challenges reflect a return to great power competition, in regions where we face nuclear-armed potential adversaries that can pose an existential threat to the United States and our allies. China is introducing qualitative advances into its nuclear and conventional military capabilities as it continues its rise in the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia poses one of our most pressing and evolving strategic challenges – challenges felt across the strategic forces mission space. Russia has undertaken aggressive actions in Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine and adopted a pattern of reckless nuclear posturing and coercive threats. Russia remains in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated an entire class of U.S. and Russian weapons nearly three decades ago, and Russia remains unreceptive to the President's offer to negotiate further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons below the limits of the New START Treaty.

Russia's violation of the INF Treaty should not be viewed in isolation from its overall aggressive behavior and, therefore, our responses also should not focus solely on the INF Treaty. Instead, the Administration must take a holistic approach to Russia's actions, integrating

responses across all instruments of national power. On the military side, we are developing and implementing a strategy to address Russian military actions that includes modifying and expanding air defense systems to deny Russia offensive capabilities; placing an increased emphasis on working with allies and partners to improve our collective capability to counter complex cruise missile threats; working with other departments and agencies to encourage and facilitate allied acquisition of advanced capabilities by those most concerned with Russian behavior; and investing in the technologies that are most relevant to Russia's provocations.

North Korea's evolving nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a continuing threat to the United States and our allies and partners. Last month, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test, and earlier this month, it conducted a ballistic missile launch that successfully placed a satellite into orbit. In response to the evolving threat posed by North Korea, the United States and the Republic of Korea have made an alliance decision to begin formal consultations regarding improvements to the alliance missile defense posture, specifically the viability of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in the Republic of Korea.

As we work to counter Iran's malign influence against our allies and partners in the Middle East, we will remain vigilant for any reversal of course by Iran on its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran's ballistic missile program is the largest in the Middle East, and we must continue to enhance our ability to defend against the regional ballistic missile threat Iran poses today and may pose in the future. As Secretary Carter reiterated, the nuclear deal does not in any way constrain or inhibit our ability to defend the United States and our allies and partners.

Finally, denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and weapon-usable materials is an absolute imperative in the ongoing fight to defeat terrorist organizations.

FY 2017 BUDGET SUPPORTS ABILITY TO MEET CHALLENGES

The overall mission of U.S. strategic capabilities is to protect the United States and our allies and partners from attacks that would directly threaten our vital interests. This includes deterring nuclear and other WMD attacks and being prepared to respond in the event that deterrence fails. Second, it means denying States like North Korea and Iran the ability to effectively threaten ballistic missile strikes against the United States and our allies and partners. Third, it involves preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and other WMD. Finally, it includes protecting and defending our access to and use of space and cyberspace.

The President's FY 2017 budget request and Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) contain critical investments in each of these four areas. In doing so, they support our ability to meet current, emerging, and future strategic challenges and threats.

SUSTAINING EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Although the President's ultimate goal is a world without nuclear weapons, he has been consistent and clear in his commitment to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for as long as nuclear weapons exist. This is the highest priority of the Department of Defense (DoD). DoD and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) work closely together to maintain the safety and security of our nuclear forces at the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with retaining a full set of options to respond to and address current and potential threats.

To ensure the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, we must maintain the military capabilities required to implement U.S. deterrence strategy. But the nuclear deterrent is more than just a set of military capabilities, and effective deterrence is more than sustaining that set of

capabilities. Effective deterrence also requires that planning, exercises, and force posture support the U.S. deterrence strategy, preserve its credibility, and reinforce strategic stability. In addition to providing for our own defense, sustaining effective extended deterrence and assurance is necessary to honor our alliance commitments and support our nuclear nonproliferation objectives.

NUCLEAR SUSTAINMENT AND MODERNIZATION PLAN

The President's nuclear sustainment and modernization plan focuses on preserving the military capabilities of our current nuclear Triad and Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) in the face of evolving threats and a dynamic security environment. Our approach to meeting the range of challenges we now face or might face in the future includes maintaining a deterrent that is robust and stable, rather than one that is necessarily reactive to every action of potential adversaries. The Triad and DCA provide a diverse range of nuclear explosive yields and delivery modes that underwrites strategic stability and serves to convince Russia and other potential adversaries that they cannot escalate their way out of a failed conventional aggression. Sustaining this diverse range of deterrent capabilities avoids the need to respond symmetrically to every Russian provocation, or to mirror every potential adversary, system-for-system and yield-for-yield.

The FY 2017 budget request focuses on maintaining stable and robust deterrence in a time of geopolitical uncertainty while managing the transition to a modernized nuclear force via Life-Extension Programs (LEPs) for warheads, replacement of aging delivery systems, and enhancements to sustainment and operations of the current force. It also includes the funding necessary to continue addressing the findings of the Nuclear Enterprise Reviews.

Our plan is consistent with the Administration's policy of a reduced role for nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy and retains only those capabilities we need to sustain stable and effective deterrence. It is not, as some have claimed, a nuclear weapons buildup. On the contrary, the number of nuclear weapons in the United States is the smallest it has been since the Eisenhower Administration, and we continue to reduce the number of deployed strategic weapons as we approach the February 2018 deadline for adherence to the central limits of the New START Treaty. We have reduced from 23 nuclear warhead types at the end of the Cold War (in 1990) to 12 warhead types today, and the B61-12 LEP is on track to allow us to reduce further to six warhead types by the mid-2020s.

The effort to modernize our delivery systems and extend the life of our warheads across the Triad and our nonstrategic nuclear force will require significant resources over the next decade and beyond. But this critical investment is affordable if prioritized appropriately by the DoD, Congress, and the Nation.

The B61-12 LEP will provide the sole gravity bomb to sustain our strategic and nonstrategic air-delivered nuclear deterrent capability by consolidating four existing variants of the B61. In addition, the megaton-class B83 strategic gravity bomb will be retired from the stockpile once confidence in the B61-12 is attained. Along with fewer weapon types, the end result will be significantly fewer weapons and lower net explosive yield in the stockpile. The B61-12 LEP will sustain our ability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons with fighter aircraft as well as strategic bombers, and is critical for sustaining our extended deterrent commitments in Europe. It will also retain the unique flexibility for the President that gravity bombs provide through the option of redirecting or recalling up to the moment of weapon release above a target.

The Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile will replace the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) as the United States' only air-launched, long-range standoff nuclear capability. A LEP for the ALCM's W80 warhead will allow for its use in the LRSO. By ensuring the President retains credible response options across a broad spectrum of crises, the LRSO will strengthen our ability to effectively deter deliberate escalation and limited nuclear attack. Having an air-launched cruise missile complements the capability of the current and future penetrating bomber force by extending its range and severely complicating the adversary's air defense problem. Without the ALCM capability, our only air-delivered nuclear response option would require bombers to fly over their targets, bringing increased mission risk.

The Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) will preserve U.S. air dominance against next-generation capabilities and advanced air defense environments and is required for both nuclear and conventional missions. The FY 2017 budget request includes funding to continue the development of an affordable, long-range, penetrating aircraft that incorporates proven technologies. Like the LRS-B, the F-35 program will deliver capability that is needed for both the conventional and nuclear missions. The FY 2017 budget includes funding for Block 4 of the F-35 program, in addition to research and development funds for a nonstrategic nuclear capability for the aircraft.

The Air Force conducted a Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) in 2014 to study the full range of concepts to recapitalize the land-based leg of the Triad beyond the extended service life of the Minuteman III missile. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) reviewed the AoA report and validated it as sufficient to support a Milestone A decision and initiate a program of record. The FY 2017 budget continues to fund preparatory GBSD development work.

Additionally, the Air Force and Navy are investigating areas for intelligent commonality between potential GBSD systems and future Navy weapons.

The OHIO Replacement Program requires adequate resources and a stable, predictable funding profile to ensure an on-time construction start in FY 2021 and to meet the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) deterrence patrol need date of FY 2031. The OHIO Replacement Program submarines will have a service life that will enable patrols into the 2080s. This new class of submarines will remain survivable even as adversary anti-submarine warfare technology advances and proliferates. I want to underscore, however, that we are stretching the current OHIO class submarines to the limit, and there is no margin left in the schedule. Simply put, we cannot let the OHIO Replacement Program system slip any further.

The FY 2017 budget funds multiple nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) upgrades. The Department continues to prioritize resources to address known capability gaps while incrementally building toward a fully modern NC3 architecture that will ensure timely and cybersecure decision-making support for the President.

MISSILE DEFENSE

The FY 2017 President's Budget funds the development and deployment of robust ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities to protect the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, and our allies and partners.

On February 7, North Korea's most recent Taepodong (TD)-2 launch provided another example of the importance of BMD in its role to protect the U.S. homeland. North Korea continues to pursue intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class ballistic missile technology that could threaten the U.S. homeland, in clear violation of multiple UN Security Council

resolutions. Its provocative behavior underscores the need to maintain our commitment to increase the number of deployed Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) to 44, develop the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), and proceed with the development of the Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR). The President's Budget for FY2017 funds all of these actions. When combined with the planned GBI reliability and system engineering improvements, they will enable the homeland missile defense system to address the maturing ICBM threat from North Korea and a potential ICBM threat from Iran.

As North Korea and potentially Iran make progress on ICBM-class missile technologies, the United States must be prepared to address new, more complex threats in the next decade. To that end, the FY 2017 President's Budget requests funding for investments in new technologies, including directed energy and Multi Object Kill Vehicle. Making progress on these technologies, as well as adapting current technologies to new purposes, will enable us to meet the advancing threat and lower the cost of intercepting ballistic missiles.

The FY 2017 President's Budget also reflects the DoD's commitment to building regional missile defenses that are interoperable with systems deployed by international partners.

The DoD continues to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is designed to protect U.S. deployed forces and allies in Europe from ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East. In December 2015, the Missile Defense Agency declared the Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Romania technically capable of defending against Iranian ballistic missiles. The budget request also supports the implementation of Phase 3 of the EPAA, including the upcoming groundbreaking at the Aegis Ashore site in Poland, which will be completed in the 2018 timeframe.

In the Middle East, the Department continues to maintain a robust missile defense posture and support the development of a regional missile defense architecture with the Gulf Cooperation Council, starting with the acquisition of an interoperable Ballistic Missile Early Warning system. This budget request supports efforts with Israel to ensure its qualitative military edge in BMD and rocket defense systems, including David's Sling, Arrow, and Iron Dome. In the Asia-Pacific region, we continue to work with our allies and partners to enhance our missile defense capabilities against the ballistic missile threats in the region in a more comprehensive and interoperable manner.

NONPROLIFERATION

Today's complex security environment has made countering WMD threats even more challenging and multi-dimensional. We face WMD threats from state and, increasingly, non-state actors with enhanced access to the knowledge and technology necessary to achieve their objectives. It is critical to prepare for these emerging challenges, including WMD-related threats evolving from the application of advanced technologies such as additive manufacturing, unmanned systems, synthetic biology, nanotechnologies, and cyber tools.

In particular, it is essential to deny terrorists and other non-state actors with malevolent intent access to WMD-related materials. Based on available information, we believe that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was likely responsible for some of the alleged attacks using sulfur mustard over the past year in Iraq. We have been working proactively with our allies and partners in the region to deny ISIL and other non-state actors access to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)-useable materials and expertise, to strengthen security at facilities containing dangerous materials that are at risk of theft or diversion, and to enhance

border security to prevent the proliferation of CBRN materials. In the nuclear and radiological areas, we work in close coordination with our colleagues at the Department of Energy.

The DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has a decades-long track record of working with foreign partners to destroy existing WMD successfully; to make nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons more difficult to acquire; and to detect and interdict dangerous WMD components and materials. Over the past year, the DoD CTR Program worked with a number of key partners to advance their capabilities to detect and interdict WMD material. Examples include train and equip programs in Ukraine, border security programs in Jordan, and implementation of an integrated command and control and surveillance system in Lebanon. The DoD CTR Program also seeks to assist partners in proactively confronting emerging WMD-proliferation risks in regions such as in North Africa. In response to the use of chemicals as weapons in Iraq and Syria, coupled with the growing encroachment of extremist groups, the DoD CTR Program has initiated proliferation-prevention cooperation with the Government of Tunisia along the Tunisia-Libya border, with plans to implement a WMD proliferation prevention border-surveillance system along the most vulnerable section of that border in late FY 2016 or early FY 2017.

In close partnership with the Department of State (DOS), we support international regimes such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to prevent the development and proliferation of WMD materials. We also complement the efforts of the State Department and other departments and agencies to engage 104 other partners in preventing WMD proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative, now in its 13th year.

Along with our efforts to prevent, reduce, and contain WMD threats; DoD must also be prepared to respond to potential WMD-related crises when and if they unfold, through a range of diplomatic and military options. DoD will also continue to support U.S. diplomatic efforts addressing WMD crisis management and response in North Korea, and will remain vigilant in supporting U.S. and international efforts to monitor and prevent Iran from acquiring WMD-related material, should Iran seek to abrogate the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE

As the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review notes: “military operations depend on freedom of access in space, making security in this domain vital to our ability to project power and win decisively in conflict.” In his worldwide threat assessment testimony earlier this month, the Director of National Intelligence said that “Russia and China understand how our military fights and how heavily we rely on space. They are each pursuing destructive and disruptive anti-satellite systems. China continues to make progress on its anti-satellite missile program.” Thus, while space offers our forces tremendous advantages, sustaining deterrence requires that we maintain levels of space mission assurance commensurate with our reliance on space and thereby deny adversaries the benefits they might otherwise hope to gain by attacking our space capabilities.

To that end, the Department conducted a portfolio-wide strategic review of our space systems focusing on how we assure U.S. space capabilities in light of current and future threats. The results included significant new adjustments in the space budget starting with last year’s space portfolio and continuing for FY 2017. Additionally, we are strengthening governance of

the DoD space enterprise by designating the Secretary of the Air Force as the Principal DoD Space Advisor, with increased oversight authorities across DoD, and with an independent voice in providing assessments and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputies' Management Action Group. Similarly, at Air Force Space Command and at U.S. Strategic Command respectively, we have established a Joint Interagency and Combined Space Operations Center and a Joint Space Doctrine and Tactics Forum that are allowing us to experiment with new operational concepts across the national security space enterprise, establish a culture within the DoD space community that recognizes that terrestrial conflict will extend into space, and develop new operational concepts and associated tactics, techniques and procedures required for future space operations.

Our national security is inextricably linked to long-term sustainability of outer space for military as well as commercial space mission assurance. We must continue our efforts to deter a conflict that extends to space as well as be prepared to defeat efforts to attack our space systems in such a conflict if deterrence fails. To that end, in fiscal year 2016, we added over \$5 billion in new investments over the FYDP to posture for a contested space environment. In the FY 2017 budget request, we are sustaining that commitment by strengthening our ability to identify, attribute and negate threats to our space systems; improving the resilience and mission assurance of U.S. space assets through all phases of conflict; and protecting our forces and our allies from intentional and irresponsible acts in space.

CONCLUSION

The President's FY 2017 Budget Request supports our nuclear, nonproliferation, and space strategies for protecting U.S. vital interests. It increases funding for sustaining and modernizing our nuclear forces to ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent for as long as

nuclear weapons exist. Those same capabilities that provide for our defense also extend deterrence to and assure U.S. allies and partners, contributing in turn to our nonproliferation policy objectives. Sustaining stable and robust nuclear deterrence and missile defense capabilities allows a steady approach to the persistent and evolving strategic challenges we face today and will face in the years to come. We request the Committee's support for this budget.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions.