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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

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Introduction

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of the Department's Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 budget request for missile defense. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a critical national security priority – both for the homeland and for our ability to project power abroad, prevent and deter conflicts, and defend our deployed forces and allies.

You asked for my assessment of how the programs and fiscal year 2015 budget request for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reflect missile defense policy and posture. The President's budget requests $8.5 billion in FY 2015 with $7.5 billion for the MDA to develop and deploy missile defense capabilities that protect the U.S. homeland and strengthen regional missile defenses.

As reflected in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which was submitted with the budget request, our top missile defense policy priorities have not changed. The first priority is the defense of the U.S. homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack. We are committed to maintaining an advantageous position compared to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats from North Korea and Iran. This requires continued improvement to the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system, including enhanced performance of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) and the deployment of new sensors.

DoD's budget request for FY 2015 also continues to implement regional approaches that are tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific regions. These regions vary considerably in their geography, history, and character of the threat faced, and in the military-to-military relationships on which we seek to build cooperative missile defenses. Our focus is on developing and fielding capabilities that are mobile and capable of being redeployed to different locations as necessary to address the threat. We are also encouraging our allies and partners to acquire missile defenses, and we are working to strengthen missile defense cooperation that can contribute to significantly increased performance than individual countries can achieve on their own.

I will begin with a discussion of ballistic missile threat and trends, and then focus on our progress on three key policy priorities: sustaining a strong homeland defense, strengthening regional missile defense, and fostering increased international cooperation and participation.

Ballistic Missile Threats and Trends

Ballistic missiles are becoming more survivable, reliable, and accurate at greater ranges. Regional powers are basing more missiles on mobile platforms at sea and on land. Technical and operational measures to defeat missile defenses also are increasing. China, Iran, and North Korea, for example, exercise near simultaneous salvo firings of short- and medium- range

ballistic missiles from multiple locations to saturate regional missile defenses. Countries are designing missiles to launch from multiple transporters against a broad array of targets, enhancing their mobility and effectiveness on the battlefield. Shorter launch-preparation times and smaller footprints are making new systems more survivable.

Iran

Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and today can strike targets throughout the region and into Eastern Europe. In addition to its growing missile inventories, Iran is seeking to enhance lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with improvements in accuracy and warhead designs. Iran is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile which could threaten maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. While Iran has not yet deployed an ICBM, its progress on space launch vehicles—along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies—provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including an ICBM.

Although we do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons, Iran has developed technical expertise in a number of areas – including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles – from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons.

Syria

While Syria does not pose a ballistic missile threat to the U.S. homeland, the Assad regime does possess short-range ballistic missiles, and has shown a willingness to use them repeatedly against its own people. Syria has several hundred short-range ballistic missiles, all of which are mobile and can reach much of Israel and large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country.

North Korea

North Korea's weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to East Asia. North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests. It also is seeking to develop longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the United States, and continues efforts to bring its KN08 road mobile ICBM, which it paraded most recently in July 2013, to operational capacity. While the reliability of an untested North Korean ICBM is likely to be very low, North Korea has used its Taepo-Dong-2 launch vehicle to put a satellite in orbit, thus successfully demonstrating technologies applicable to a long-range missile.

North Korea's efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security concerns, by threatening the United States' allies and partners and increasing our concerns about ballistic missile technology proliferation.

China

In the regional ballistic missile context, China is augmenting the over 1,200 conventional short-range ballistic missiles with a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles that will improve China's ability to strike regional targets. China also continues to deploy growing numbers of anti-ship ballistic missiles.

Homeland Defense

The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential limited ICBM attacks from states like North Korea and Iran by the GMD system. This system consists of GBIs, land-based early-warning radars, sea-based radar systems, and a sophisticated command and control architecture.

The Department of Defense is implementing steps to strengthen the U.S. homeland missile defense posture as announced by Secretary Hagel in March of last year. The refurbishment of Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely, Alaska, is underway and the budget includes funding for the acquisition of GBIs to support GMD operations, testing, and spares, and emplacement of additional GBIs in Missile Field 2 as we progress toward 44 deployed interceptors by the end of 2017. Secretary Hagel also announced the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan. This deployment will provide improved early warning and tracking of missiles launched from North Korea at the United States as well as its regional allies and partners. We remain on track to complete deployment of this capability by the end of the year.

The President’s budget request also includes funding to initiate the redesign of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). The redesigned EKV, in essence a next-generation kill vehicle, will not only improve the reliability and performance of the GBI, but by being designed to allow for a more standardized production process, the kill vehicle should also be easier to build, upgrade, and maintain than the previous versions. This investment in the next generation kill vehicle for the GBI is especially important considering the test problems associated with the Capability Enhancement-II (CE-II) version of the kill vehicle. Although we are committed to ensuring the effectiveness of the current kill vehicle through testing; we are also pursuing a redesigned kill vehicle that will improve the reliability and effectiveness of the GMD system.

The submitted budget also includes funding for development of a Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR). This radar will provide persistent sensor coverage and improve discrimination capabilities against threats to the homeland from North Korea and will provide the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar more geographic deployment flexibility for contingency and test use.

We are also requesting funding to improve the discrimination capabilities of the existing GMD system. These investments will lead to a GMD system more capable of discriminating and destroying reentry vehicles with a high degree of confidence and will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our homeland missile defenses.

As directed by Congress, the Missile Defense Agency is also currently evaluating four potential locations for an additional GBI site in the continental United States. An additional missile field in the Eastern portion of the United States would increase the overall survivability of the GMD system, provide more time to conduct missile defense engagements, and would allow for the deployment of additional interceptors.

That said, the cost of building an additional missile defense site in the United States is very high. Given that the ICBM threat from Iran has not yet emerged, and due to the recent test failures associated with the current GBI kill vehicles, the highest priorities for the protection of the homeland are in improving the reliability and effectiveness of the GBI and improving the GMD sensor architecture. The current GMD system provides coverage of the entire United States from North Korean and potential Iranian ICBMs. No decision has been made to deploy an additional missile field in the United States. If an ICBM threat were to emerge in numbers that necessitated the deployment of additional interceptors, the steps being taken now, to include conducting an environmental impact statement, will shorten the construction timelines associated with deployment of a new missile defense site.

Regional Missile Defense

The Department's budget request for FY 2015 also continues to implement regional approaches that are tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific regions.

Europe

We are continuing to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and we are working in close collaboration with our NATO Allies to develop an advanced network of sensors and interceptors – on land and at sea – to protect NATO European territory and our forces and military facilities.

The United States has operated a forward-based radar in Turkey and maintained a sea-based missile defense presence in Europe since 2011. The Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB was deployed on Aegis BMD ships as an operational interceptor for the first time in 2013. The Block IB version of the interceptor uses an improved seeker and signal processor that allows for greater on-board discrimination and area coverage than the SM-3 IA. In October of 2013, a ground-breaking ceremony was held at the land-based SM-3, or Aegis Ashore, site in Romania. The site is planned to be operational by the end of 2015.

We have also taken steps to meet the requirement for sea-based BMD capabilities by establishing a home-port for four U.S. Aegis BMD destroyers at the naval facility at Rota, Spain. These multi-mission ships will support the missile defense mission, as well as other U.S. European Command and NATO maritime missions. The first of the four ships to be stationed at Rota, USS

DONALD COOK, has already deployed to Europe, and the USS ROSS will arrive this summer. The final two ships, the USS CARNEY and USS PORTER, will arrive in 2015.

The President's budget request also supports the Aegis Ashore site that will be deployed in Poland in the 2018 timeframe and the development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor that will be deployed on land and at sea. These capabilities will extend coverage to all NATO European countries.

As Secretary Hagel emphasized in his announcement in March of last year, our commitment to NATO missile defense "remains ironclad" as demonstrated by our strong support for the BMD capabilities either already deployed, or being developed for Phases 1 through 3 of the EPAA.

Our NATO Allies are also making significant contributions to the European missile defense mission. Romania, Spain, and Turkey are hosting U.S. missile defense assets and provide the external security for the facilities. Beyond hosting the second Aegis Ashore site in Europe, Poland has also announced its intention to spend up to $10 billion to acquire increased air and missile defense capabilities. DoD is engaging directly with Poland to assist in the development of its missile defense requirements and is promoting U.S. systems to meet these requirements.

Several Allies have modern surface combatant ships that could be equipped with a BMD sensor or interceptor capability. The United States will continue to encourage its NATO Allies to do even more to cooperate and invest in missile defenses that will contribute to Alliance security.

The Netherlands has committed to spend up to 250 million Euro to upgrade the SMART-L radars on four of their frigates and it, along with Germany, has committed Patriot PAC-3 systems to NATO missile defense as demonstrated through the ongoing NATO deployment in defense of Turkey.

France is planning to provide its Spirale satellite detection system and a long-range radar for NATO territorial missile defense and has contributed the SAMP/T air and missile defense system, which became operational in 2013, to NATO BMD. Despite the U.S. decision to forgo production of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), development will be completed in 2014. Germany and Italy are considering the system a possible future national contribution to NATO BMD.

The United States conducts exercises designed to hone our Alliance missile defense capabilities. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is engaged with NATO in the development of a biennial NATO-led BMD exercise event that serves to reinforce and expand upon other, routine BMD training evolutions that take place on a quarterly and semi-annual basis.

Many NATO Allies also participate in NIMBLE TITAN, a series of exercises designed to understand how the missile defenses of many participant can work together in a crisis or conflict.

The NIBLE TITAN 14 campaign, which began last year with regional tabletop exercises, has 21 participant nations, and NATO participates as an alliance. The final exercise of NIMBLE TITAN 14 is a capstone event that will take place in April involving all participants in a cross-regional wargame.

Asia-Pacific

The cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in the region has been our strong bilateral alliances, including with South Korea, Japan, and Australia. All three of these nations play an important role in our regional efforts to achieve effective missile defense.

South Korea obviously has an immediate, proximate stake in preventing missile strikes from North Korea. We have worked very closely with South Korea to ensure that our Alliance maintains the capacity to do just that. The United States deploys Patriot PAC-3 batteries in South Korea to defend U.S. and South Korean forces. In addition, South Korea is taking steps to enhance its own air and missile defense systems, which include sea- and land-based sensors and Patriot PAC-2 batteries. DoD has been consulting closely with South Korea about how it can upgrade its missile defense capabilities and we are mutually committed to sustain and strengthen protection against the North Korean missile threat.

Japan has its own layered missile defense system, which includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile-3 interceptors, PAC-3 batteries, early-warning radars, and sophisticated command-and-control systems. Japan is upgrading two ATAGO-class Aegis destroyers to BMD capability with certification scheduled for FY 2018 and FY 2019 and has recently expressed interest in purchasing two additional Aegis BMD ships, which would increase its inventory to a total of eight BMD-capable ships. As mentioned earlier, Japan also hosts a U.S. missile defense radar and has agreed to host a second radar.

Japan is also a critical international partner for BMD development. One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-development of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 Block IIA.

The United States and Australia have forged a long-standing partnership on missile defense research and development – most notably with regard to sensors. In addition, Australia is involved in a trilateral discussion on missile defense in the Pacific involving the United States, Australia, and Japan.

Going forward, we will continue to emphasize the importance of developing a regional ballistic missile defense system that includes the sharing of sensor data among Allies.

Middle East

The United States maintains a strong defense relationship with Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in a comprehensive missile defense architecture. Israeli programs

such as Iron Dome, the David's Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United States, create a multi-layered architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats. Missile defense figured prominently in the AUSTERE CHALLENGE exercise we conducted with Israel in the fall of 2012, the largest U.S.-Israeli military exercise in history. A similar exercise, JUNIPER COBRA, is scheduled to take place in May of this year.

The United States is also working with a number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries on missile defense, including supporting the purchase of missile defense systems through the Foreign Military Sales program. The United Arab Emirates is procuring the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, with the first delivery expected next year. This is in addition to the UAE's earlier purchase of Patriot systems, which have been delivered. Saudi Arabia is in the process of upgrading its existing Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the PAC-3 configuration. Kuwait is also purchasing Patriot PAC-3 batteries.

U.S. Air Force Central Command maintains a series of regular exchanges between United States and GCC air defense officers at the Combined Air Operations Center located at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. These exchanges provide an opportunity for increased situational awareness of missile threats in the region as well as the potential for future BMD planning and operational cooperation.

As the GCC states begin to field more capable systems, the United States and its Gulf partners must work toward greater integration of those capabilities across the region. The desired end state is a regional missile defense architecture in which GCC member states participate and contribute to the extent practical, leading to a networked, layered defense of key strategic centers that strengthens deterrence and increases our collective ability to defeat a ballistic missile attack.

Russia

This Administration, in keeping with previous Administrations, has sought cooperation with Russia on missile defense. Genuine missile defense cooperation would be in the security interests of all parties by strengthening the defensive capabilities of the United States, NATO, and Russia. It would also help to remove missile defense as a source of tension in the bilateral relationship, and send a powerful signal to potential adversaries that ballistic missile threats will be ineffective as a tool of coercion.

The United States has pursued missile defense cooperation with Russia with the clear understanding that we will not accept constraints on our missile defense systems, we will implement the EPAA, and Russia will not have command and control over the ballistic missile defense of NATO territory.

The United States has been open and transparent with Russia about our plans for European missile defenses, and explained in detail why U.S. missile defense systems in Europe will not negate the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent. We have made a number of proposals that would have laid the groundwork for meaningful cooperation, including a proposal to establish missile defense cooperation centers in Europe, and more recently, a proposal that would provide for reciprocal transparency about our respective missile defense plans and programs. These proposals would allow for the better understanding of the purpose of our missile defenses and for predictability about our missile defense plans for the future.

Russia has not reacted positively to the U.S. proposals and has instead continued to seek legally-binding restrictions and limitations on our missile defense deployments to Europe. In the course of our bilateral dialogue, we have continuously rejected any limitations on our missile defenses. Our missile defense deployments to Europe address the regional ballistic missile threat posed by Iran and Syria, and cannot be subject to limits imposed by a third party.

Russia's intervention into the crisis in Ukraine, in violation of international law, led to the suspension of our military to military dialogue and we have not continued to engage Russia on the topic of missile defense. As Russia's violation of international law continues, we will review any future bilateral engagements on missile defense to ensure that they are in the security interests of the United States and our allies.

Conclusion

The ballistic missile threat – to the United States, to our Allies and partners, and to our forces overseas – is evolving, and we continue to grow and adapt our homeland and regional missile defense posture and international cooperation to address it.

We have had some very significant progress over the last several years, but this Administration has emphasized from the beginning that we cannot afford to stand still. The President's budget request for FY 2015 reflects DoD's goals of retaining the flexibility to adjust, and to enhance our defenses as the threat and technologies evolve. Missile defense is crucial to maintaining our most vital security commitments – the defense of the United States and the protection of our allies and partners and our forces around the world.

I want to thank you for having me here today, and I look forward to your questions.