

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
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BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
ON
UNMANNED CARRIER-LAUNCHED AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKE
(UCLASS) REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT
JULY 16, 2014

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Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss operational requirements for the Navy's Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program.

As part of my work as a CRS naval issues analyst since 1984, I have tracked developments relating to carrier-based aviation and have written a number of reports on carrier air wing composition and programs for carrier-based aircraft.¹ In support of this testimony, I received briefings on the UCLASS program from the Navy and industry and reviewed requirements documentation for the program that the Navy provided at my request. I also reviewed the trade press reporting on the UCLASS program over the last few years.

As requested, my testimony identifies some potential key issues that the subcommittee may wish to consider in assessing operational requirements for the UCLASS program. This statement presents six such issues and makes some observations in connection with them, but it does not attempt to answer them. The six issues are by no means the only ones that might be raised, but considering them might help in forming a framework of analysis for assessing operational requirements for the UCLASS program.

A July 11, 2014, press report stated that "The Pentagon has delayed the [UCLASS] program amid ongoing reviews of the program's requirements, defense officials told Military.com."² My testimony discusses the UCLASS program as defined in early July 2014.

¹ See CRS Report 89-362 F, *Navy Carrier Aircraft in the 1990s: Critical Issues for Today*; CRS Report 90-331 F, *Navy Carrier Aircraft in the 1990s: Implications of a 12-Carrier Fleet*; CRS Report 91-88 F, *A-12 Contract Cancellation: Alternative Paths for Naval Aviation*; CRS Report 91-253 F, *Navy Carrier-Based Fighter and Attack Aircraft in the FY1992 Budget: Issues for Congress*; CRS Report 91-528 F, *Navy Carrier-Based Fighter and Attack Aircraft: House Action on the Administration's Proposed Strategy*; CRS Report 93-868 F, *Navy Carrier-Based Fighter and Attack Aircraft: Modernization Options for Congress*; CRS Report RS21488, *Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan: Background and Issues for Congress* (co-authored with Christopher Bolkcom); and (during part of 2008) CRS Report RS22875, *Navy-Marine Corps Strike-Fighter Shortfall: Background and Options for Congress*. In addition, as a consequence of the sudden death in May 2009 of Christopher Bolkcom, the CRS's military aviation analyst, I restructured and maintained CRS's military aviation reports between May and November 2009—a period when Congress debated significant proposed changes to several DOD major aircraft acquisition programs. These reports covered the Air Force F-22 fighter program, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Navy F/A-18E/F strike-fighter and EA-18G electronic attack aircraft programs, tactical aircraft modernization (an overview report), the Air Force next-generation bomber program, the Air Force KC-X tanker aircraft program, the Air Force C-17 cargo aircraft program, the Navy V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor program, and the Navy VH-71/VXX presidential helicopter program.

² The article states further:

A planned competition among defense companies has been put on hold as the Pentagon examines plans for the drone and responds to criticism from lawmakers that the initial requirements have been too narrowly configured.

A formal Request For Proposal, or RFP, which had been planned for release by the Navy later this month, has been delayed by a few weeks.

(Kris Osborn, "UPDATE: Pentagon Delays Navy's Carrier Drone Program," *DOD Buzz* (www.dodbuzz.com), July 11, 2014.)

Potential Shift in Strategic Eras

One issue the subcommittee may wish to consider is whether we are currently undergoing a shift in strategic eras,³ and if so, whether and how such a shift might affect operational requirements for the UCLASS program. Actions by China starting in November 2013 that appear aimed at achieving a greater degree of control over China's near-seas region,⁴ followed by Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014, have led to a discussion among observers about whether we are currently shifting from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20 to 25 years to a new and different strategic era characterized by, among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to key aspects of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.⁵ Some observers in this discussion have used the term "post-Crimea era" or "post-Crimea world."⁶ I discussed aspects of this issue in my testimony for this

³ The term strategic era is used here to refer to a period of time during which the structure of international relations can be said to be characterized by certain basic features. The Cold War is one example of a strategic era; the post-Cold War era (also sometimes called the unipolar moment, with the United States as the unipolar power) is another.

⁴ For a summary of these actions, see CRS Report R42784, *Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

⁵ See, for example, Anna Applebaum, "China and Russia Bring Back Cold War Tactics," *Washington Post* (www.washingtonpost.com), December 25, 2013; Paul Miller, "China, the United States, and Great Power Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy* (<http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com>), December 26, 2013; Zachary Keck, "America's Relative Decline: Should We Panic? The End of the Unipolar Era Will Create New Dangers That the World Mustn't Overlook," *The Diplomat* (<http://thediplomat.com>), January 24, 2013; Dan Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, "China Is Like Russia," *The Weekly Standard* (www.weeklystandard.com), March 18, 2014; Paul D. Miller, "Crimea Proves that Great Power Rivalry Never Left Us," *New York Times* (www.nytimes.com), March 21, 2014; March Chad Pillai, "The Return of Great Power Politics: Re-Examining the Nixon Doctrine," *War on the Rocks* (<http://warontherocks.com>), March 27, 2014; Robert Killebrew, "Containing Russia and Restoring American Power," *War on the Rocks* (<http://warontherocks.com>), March 27, 2014; David Roche, "West Stumbles as Autocratic Force Trumps Economics," *Reuters* (www.reuters.com), April 1, 2014; David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, "The Outlaw Vladimir Putin," *Wall Street Journal* (<http://online.wsj.com>), April 8, 2014; Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, "The Post-Crimea World Order," *Russia and India Report* (<http://in.rbth.com>), April 14, 2014; Tom Rotnem, "10 Days That Shook the (Post-Cold War) World," *Marietta Daily Journal* (<http://mdjonline.com>), April 22, 2014; Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics," *Foreign Affairs* (www.foreignaffairs.com), May/June 2014; Eric A. Posner, "Sorry, America, the New World Order Is Dead," *Foreign Policy* (www.foreignpolicy.com), May 6, 2014; Dan Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, "China and The Age of Contempt," *Foreign Policy* (<http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com>), May 15, 2014; Robert Kagan, "Superpowers Don't Get to Retire," *New Republic* (www.newrepublic.com), May 26, 2014; Walter Russell Mead, "Putin Did Americans a Favor," *Wall Street Journal* (<http://online.wsj.com>), June 1, 2014; James R. Holmes, "5 Ways Europe Can Help the US Pivot," *The Diplomat* (<http://thediplomat.com>), June 2, 2014; Walter Russell Mead, "For the U.S., a Disappointing World," *Wall Street Journal* (<http://online.wsj.com>), June 13, 2014; James Kitfield, "The New Great Power Triangle Tilt: China, Russia Vs. U.S.," *Breaking Defense* (<http://breakingdefense.com>), June 19, 2014; Frank Hoffman, "No Strategic Success Without 21st Century Seapower: Forward Partnering," *War on the Rocks* (<http://warontherocks.com>), July 1, 2014; David Hodges, "The Only Defense," *Commentary* (www.commentarymagazine.com), July 1, 2014; Marc M. Wall, "The Great Eurasian Rebalancing Act," *PacNet* (*Pacific Forum CSIS*), Number 52, July 7, 2014.

⁶ See, for example, Jim Thomas, "How to Put Military Pressure on Russia," *Wall Street Journal* (<http://online.wsj.com>), March 9, 2014; Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, "The Post-Crimea World Order," *Russia and India Report* (<http://in.rbth.com>), April 14, 2014; Tom Rotnem, "10 Days That Shook the (Post-Cold War) World," *Marietta Daily Journal* (<http://mdjonline.com>), April 22, 2014; "Reshaping Transatlantic Defense and Security for a Post-Crimean World," Panel remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the Wrocław Global Forum (Poland), accessed July 2, 2014, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_110902.htm?selectedLocale=en; Lilia Shevtsova, "Crowning a Winner

subcommittee's December 11, 2013, hearing on U.S. Asia-Pacific strategic considerations related to PLA naval forces modernization.⁷

A shift in strategic eras can lead to a reassessment of assumptions and frameworks of analysis relating to defense funding levels, strategy, missions, plans, and programs. The shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era led to such a reassessment in the early 1990s. This reassessment (a portion of which was carried out by the House Armed Services Committee under its chairman at the time, Representative Les Aspin) led to numerous substantial changes in U.S. defense plans and programs, including substantial changes in plans for the acquisition of carrier-based aircraft.⁸ Numerous other defense programs were changed to lesser degrees or were not changed.

A shift from the post-Cold War era to a new strategic era could lead to a new reassessment of assumptions and frameworks of analysis relating to defense funding levels, strategy, missions, plans, and programs. There are some indications that elements of such a reassessment may have begun. For example, some observers, including General Philip Breedlove, the Commander of U.S. European Command, have raised the issue of whether the United States should consider halting the U.S. military drawdown in Europe, so as to respond to a more assertive Russia.⁹ As another possible example, Secretary of Defense

in the Post-Crimea World," *American Interest* (www.the-american-interest.com), June 16, 2014; Evan Braden Montgomery, "China's Missile Forces Are Growing: Is It Time to Modify the INF Treaty?" *The National Interest* (<http://nationalinterest.org>), July 2, 2014.

⁷ See Statement of Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Considerations Related to PLA Naval Forces Modernization, December 11, 2013, pp. 2 and 5-6.

⁸ The shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era led to a shift in the Navy's formal planning emphasis away from the scenario of mid-ocean operations against Soviet naval forces during a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and toward operations in littoral waters against the land- and sea-based forces of countries other than Russia. This shift was formalized in a Navy/Marine Corps strategy document entitled ...*From the Sea* (the ellipse is part of the title), which was first issued in late 1992. (The text of this document is available at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/fromsea/fromsea.txt>.) The shift in strategic eras and in the Navy's formal planning emphasis led to numerous changes in Navy plans and programs. In terms of overall Navy force structure, the planned size of the fleet was reduced considerably. In undersea warfare, changes included the truncation of the Seawolf (SSN-21) submarine program, the initiation of the successor Virginia-class submarine program, an increased emphasis on shallow-water antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations (including torpedoes with improved shallow-water performance), and a reduced emphasis on blue-water ASW operations. In surface warfare, the shift in planning emphasis led to the initiation of a program for a multimission destroyer (now known as the DDG-1000) with an emphasis on operations in littoral waters and land-attack operations, the initiation years later of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program for addressing identified capability gaps for countering mines, small boats, and diesel-electric submarines in littoral waters. In naval aviation, changes in projected mission demands, defense spending levels and (in the case of the A-12 program) development challenges led to a broad restructuring of naval aviation acquisition programs, including the termination of the A-12 program, the halting of plans or proposals for procuring other types of carrier-based aircraft, the termination of a program to develop a new long-range air-to-air missile for carrier-based fighters, and the initiation of the F/A-18E/F program. For additional discussion of the then-emerging impact on Navy plans and programs resulting from the shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, see Ronald O'Rourke, "The Future of the U.S. Navy," in Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel, editors, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation, The Road From Ogdensburg*, Edwin Mellen Press, 1992 (papers delivered at "The Road from Ogdensburg: Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation," a conference held August 16-17, 1990, at St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York), pp. 289-331.

⁹ Philip Ewing, "General: U.S. Should Stop European Drawdown," *Politico Pro Defense*, July 1, 2014. See also Steven Erlanger, "Europe Begins to Rethink Cuts to Military Spending," *New York Times* (www.nytimes.com), March 26, 2014; Andrew Tilghman, "Spotlight Back on U.S. European Command," *Military Times*

Chuck Hagel, in his February 2014 announcement regarding the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, stated in part:

The LCS was designed to perform certain missions—such as mine sweeping and anti-submarine warfare—in a relatively permissive environment. But we need to closely examine whether the LCS has the independent protection and firepower to operate and survive against a more advanced military adversary and emerging new technologies, especially in the Asia Pacific. If we were to build out the LCS program to 52 ships, as previously planned, it would represent one-sixth of our future 300-ship Navy. Given continued fiscal restraints, we must direct shipbuilding resources toward platforms that can operate in every region and along the full spectrum of conflict.¹⁰

Current operational requirements for the UCLASS program reflect capability-gap analyses and an analysis of alternatives (AOA) that were done in 2009-2011 and then updated and revalidated from 2012 through April 2013.¹¹ This activity predates the events starting in late 2013 that have led to the discussion among observers over the possible shift in strategic eras that began in late 2013. Potential questions for Congress to consider include the following:

- Are we now undergoing a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new strategic era?
- If so, should this lead to a reassessment of assumptions and frameworks of analyses relating to defense funding levels, strategy, missions, plans, and programs?
- If so, what effect, if any, might such a reassessment have on requirements for the UCLASS program?

Cost, Schedule, and Technical Risk

A second issue the subcommittee may wish to consider is how operational requirements for the UCLASS program might affect cost, schedule, and technical risk. My comments below relate to the cost portion of this question.

Cost can include development, procurement, and life-cycle operation and support (O&S) cost, and can include consideration not only of the UCLASS program itself, but also the impact of the UCLASS program on resulting development, procurement, and life-cycle O&S costs for the remainder of the air wing. The UCLASS AOA concluded that estimated costs are to some degree sensitive to operational requirements.

(*www.militarytimes.com*), March 27, 2014; Peter Apps and Adrian Croft, “Crimean Pushes NATO Back to Russian Focus,” *Reuters* (*www.reuters.com*), March 19, 2014; Karen DeYoung, “As U.S. Ponders Next Moves on Crimea, Experts Rethink NATO’s Defense Posture,” *Washington Post* (*www.washingtonpost.com*), March 18, 2014; Steven Erlanger, “Russia’s Aggression in Crimea Brings NATO Into Renewed Focus,” *New York Times* (*www.nytimes.com*), March 18, 2014.

¹⁰ Remarks by Secretary Hagel and Gen. Dempsey on the fiscal year 2015 budget preview in the Pentagon Briefing Room, February 24, 2014, accessed July 1, 2016, at: <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5377>.

¹¹ The Navy states that “Requirements for UCLASS have been fully vetted and stable since the Capabilities Development Document was approved in April 2013.” (Source: Navy information paper on UCLASS program dated April 29, 2014.)

Affordability is a key performance parameter (KPP) for the UCLASS program. When I asked the Navy about the origin of the dollar value that defines the program's affordability KPP and about the origin of the FYDP funding levels for the program, the Navy replied that they were based on the results of the UCLASS AOA update and Navy discussions with industry about potential UCLASS costs, plus lessons learned from the Navy's X-47B UCAS-D (Unmanned Combat Air System—Demonstration) effort. The AOA update reflects the program's current operational requirements, and the Navy stated that its discussions with industry about potential UCLASS program costs also reflected the program's current operational requirements. The Navy also stated that it could not locate a document showing how the dollar value for the affordability KPP was established, and that the figure appears to reflect a judgment made by senior Navy officials.

Since the AOA update and the Navy's discussions with industry both reflect the program's current operational requirements, basing the UCLASS program's affordability KPP to a large degree on these two things can help ensure that the affordability KPP and the FYDP funding levels are realistic for the program as currently defined, which in turn can reduce the likelihood of cost growth in the program as currently defined. At the same time, in the context of a debate over operational requirements for the UCLASS program, this approach to establishing the program's affordability KPP can produce a definition of affordability that can be viewed as circular to some degree, because it can be understood as saying, in essence, "What is affordable is a program with the current operational requirements." Since estimated costs for the UCLASS program are to some degree sensitive to operational requirements, a definition of affordability that is to some degree circular in nature in relation to operational requirements has the potential for being invoked as a rhetorical device for discouraging or closing down debate on operational requirements.

Other Navy acquisition programs in the past have used different approaches for defining their affordability cost targets. For example, the original unit procurement cost target for the DDG-51 destroyer program was calculated so that procuring DDG-51s at projected rates would not require more than a certain percentage of projected future shipbuilding budgets.¹² The affordability of the Seawolf (SSN-21) attack submarine program was similarly discussed by the Navy in terms of how procuring SSN-21s at projected rates would not require more than a certain percentage of projected future shipbuilding budgets.¹³ A similar approach for the UCLASS program might define affordability based on a percentage of projected funding for carrier-based aircraft acquisition.

Outcomes in Potential Operational Scenarios

A third issue the subcommittee may wish to consider is how operational requirements for the UCLASS program might affect estimated outcomes in future operational scenarios. These outcomes can be estimated through computer modeling and wargames. Key metrics to examine can include things like

¹²See Jan Paul Hope and Vernon E. Stortz, "Warships and Cost Constraints," *Naval Engineers Journal*, March 1986: 41-52, particularly the section entitled "Setting the Cost Constraints for DDG-51" on page 43.

¹³ See CRS Report 93-10 F, *Navy Centurion Attack Submarine: What is Affordable?* by Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Report 94-643 F, *Navy New Attack Submarine (NSSN) Program: Is It Affordable?* by Ronald O'Rourke. (Both reports are out of print and available from the author. Centurion and New Attack Submarine [NSSN] were early names for what is now known as the Virginia-class submarine.) See also Statement of Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, Before the House National Security Committee, Subcommittee on Military Procurement, Hearing on Submarine Acquisition Issues, March 16, 1995, pp. 20-22. The Seawolf program's affordability in terms of percentage of projected future shipbuilding budgets was mentioned by the Navy in testimony to Congress several times in the mid-1980s.

probability of victory or mission fulfillment, time needed to achieve victory or mission fulfillment, and U.S. and coalition losses incurred on the way to victory or mission fulfillment.

The specific tactical situations that were examined in the UCLASS AOA are related to the program's current operational requirements. Assessing alternative operational requirements for the UCLASS program could involve examining potential outcomes in other tactical situations that may not have been considered in the AOA. A broader analysis might examine how changes in UCLASS operational requirements might affect estimated outcomes in campaign-level, force-on-force situations, rather than in specific tactical situations.

Threat Assessments

A fourth issue the subcommittee may wish to consider is how operational requirements for the UCLASS program relate assessments of potential future adversary capabilities, including capabilities for anti-surface warfare, air warfare (e.g., fifth-generation aircraft), and air defense. Specific questions that Congress may want to consider include the following:

- How does the growth potential of the baseline UCLASS aircraft design relate to projected improvements over time in adversary capabilities?
- How sensitive are operational requirements for the UCLASS program to changes in assessments of potential future adversary capabilities? How much uncertainty or potential for change is there in these threat assessments?

Technology Paths

A fifth issue the subcommittee may wish to consider is how operational requirements for the UCLASS program might affect potential technology paths for future systems and capabilities. The Navy's current vision statement for naval aviation, entitled *Naval Aviation Vision 2014-2025*, incorporates the UCLASS program as it is currently defined.¹⁴ Specific questions that Congress may consider include the following:

- How might the Navy's current long-range vision for naval aviation be affected, if at all, by the potential shift in strategic eras discussed above?
- How might operational requirements for the UCLASS program affect the baseline UCLASS design or the technologies developed for the UCLASS program, and what effect might this in turn have on opening up, preserving, or encumbering potential pathways for achieving the Navy's current long-term vision for naval aviation or potential alternatives to that current long-term vision?

Other Countries

A sixth issue the subcommittee may wish to consider is how operational requirements for the UCLASS program might affect the behavior of other countries. Specific questions that Congress may consider include the following:

¹⁴ *Naval Aviation Vision 2014-2025*, pp. 9, 23, 36, 62 (graphic), 63, 70.

- What impact might operational requirements for the UCLASS program have in terms of imposing costs on potential adversaries, or on persuading potential adversaries from taking certain courses of action?¹⁵
- What impact might operational requirements for the UCLASS program have in terms of reassuring U.S. allies and partners regarding U.S. intentions and resolve?

In the UCLASS briefing materials provided to me by the Navy, I did not notice an analysis of how operational requirements for the UCLASS program might affect behavior of other countries. It is possible that such an analysis is presented in other UCLASS program documents.

¹⁵ Regarding cost-imposing strategies, a 2012 Marine Corps report on potential future U.S. amphibious warfare capabilities, for example, states:

The assurance of sustained littoral access presents a cost-imposing deterrent to would-be opponents, and is a hedge against unforeseen requirements in a rapidly changing security environment.... For conventional deterrence, the ability to conduct forcible entry is a cost-imposing strategy that serves to deter regional powers from provocative behavior..... Littoral maneuver enables modern amphibious doctrine by avoiding attacking frontally onto a defended beach. It presents a cost-imposing asymmetry for the enemy that forces him to defend many places at once.

(*Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st Century, Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change, Report of the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group*, April 27, 2012, pp. 12 and S-9.)

The origin of this report is explained as follows:

The January 2012 publication of *Sustaining U.S. Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* is premised on the interests of a maritime nation with global responsibilities and an imperative to lead. Simultaneously, it marks a strategic inflection point after a decade of sustained operations ashore. The U.S. will continue to lead, but will do so with new capabilities, in new places, with an eye toward new threats. Recognizing this changing tide, and the opportunities contained within it, Marine Corps senior leadership convened an Amphibious Capabilities Working Group (ACWG) to step back from the momentum created by current operations and programs. Service leadership, through the forum of the Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC), demanded a comprehensive review of Service concepts and capabilities through the lens of national strategic priorities and the newly emerging security environment.” (Page 7)

As another example, a 2013 Carnegie Endowment report on China’s military and the U.S.-Japan alliance in 2030 states that

the compounding nature of small changes is only one reason why the long-term perspective of net assessments is useful. There are several other reasons why policymakers need to consider the long term. First, of course, it puts various aspects of a particular conflict in perspective. Although the term “Cold War” certainly described one dimension of the interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union, understanding it as a “long-term competition” provided an entirely different—and sometimes very useful—strategic perspective. Some argue, for example, that while bombers were not the best and most efficient nuclear delivery mechanism during the Cold War, they played a little understood role in U.S. strategy: “By continually adding new planes and cruise missiles to the U.S. arsenal over the past three decades, Washington has forced Moscow to invest heavily in such purely defensive weapons as anti-aircraft missiles. Over the years, this investment has been expensive for the Soviet Union, and at the same time, it is less threatening to the United States than Soviet investment in tanks, ballistic missiles, or other offensive weapons.” In fact, when thinking about conflicts as a form of long-term competition, a variety of potential cost-imposing or competitive strategies becomes potentially useful. Thus, in the long-term competition in the Western Pacific, though China’s rate of military modernization might be a reason for concern, it is certainly not a reason for panic; there are both military and nonmilitary actions the United States, Japan, and others can undertake and strategies they can adopt that can improve their relative positions in the long term.

(Michael D. Swaine, *et al*, *China’s Military & the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030, A Strategic Net Assessment*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, pp. 11-12.)

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I will be pleased to respond to any questions the subcommittee may have.