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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

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BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to testify today about Department of Defense (DoD) efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats both at home and abroad. The National Security Strategy (NSS) makes clear that this Administration prioritizes efforts to defend against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as essential components of the U.S. Government's efforts to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life. Countering WMD threats requires a whole-of-government approach, and DoD prioritizes areas where DoD roles, authorities, and capabilities will have the most security impact for the nation. DoD underpins the nation's political will and position of strength by ensuring that the United States and its allies and partners are not attacked or coerced by adversaries possessing WMD. I am going to focus on those capabilities, DoD's roles and responsibilities within the countering-WMD (CWMD) mission, and where DoD plays a supporting role with other departments and agencies.

## **THREAT ENVIRONMENT**

The use, threatened use, and proliferation of WMD pose a significant threat to U.S. national security, peace, and stability around the world. In the past year, North Korea has accelerated its development of nuclear and advanced missile delivery capabilities and has threatened to use nuclear weapons against the United States and our allies in the region. Further, North Korea's chemical and biological capabilities continue to threaten the United States and our allies and partners. According to recent open-source reporting, North Korea continues to seek both dual-use equipment (*i.e.*, items that can be used for both peaceful and military purposes) necessary for bioweapon production and advanced training in microbiology for its experts, which raises significant concerns about its capability and intent to use biological weapons.

Russia has expanded and improved its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces, has condoned Syria's use of chemical weapons and – most recently – is very likely responsible for an attempted assassination in the United Kingdom using a military-grade nerve agent. Russia's actions have consistently disregarded its international obligations and commitments. China's military modernization has resulted in a significant expansion of its nuclear force.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism confirmed that the Syrian regime and the Islamic State of Iraq and

Syria (ISIS) used chemical weapons in Syria. Additionally, we know ISIS has used chemical weapons in Iraq. And, although Iran has agreed to constraints on its nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it retains the technological capability and much of the capacity necessary to develop enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision to do so.

More broadly, rapid technological advancements and increased access to dual-use goods, expertise, and materials heighten the risk that adversaries will seek or acquire WMD. The same emerging technologies that may help ensure we win the wars of the future are increasingly lowering the barriers for a range of adversaries to develop WMD. For example, advances in synthetic biology, including rapid and cheap genetic sequencing, may enable DoD to understand how to produce new medical therapeutics, fuels, or other advanced materials, but may also enable an adversary to understand how to optimize a biothreat.

These diverse pathways for adversaries' acquisition of WMD and means to deliver them require multifaceted approaches that keep up with and adapt to current threats while remaining postured to mitigate future risks. Multiple departments and agencies play critical roles in detecting threats, preventing attacks on the homeland, and working with foreign partners to prevent and respond to incidents. DoD supports these efforts through both domestic and overseas activities and works closely with allies and partners to counter the wide range of WMD threats that exist today.

## **DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

As the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Homeland Defense and Global Security (HD&GS), I am responsible for the Department's CWMD strategy and policies. My office develops and oversees DoD's policies and guidance to protect the U.S. Armed Forces, the homeland, and other U.S. interests from a CBRN attack and from any type of destabilizing CBRN-related event, including the natural, accidental, or intentional spread of dangerous pathogens and toxins, and represents DoD's interests on traditional counter-proliferation and non-proliferation policy issues. I am also responsible for the coordination of DoD assistance to Federal, State, and local officials, including the response to threats involving nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons, or high-yield explosives or related materials or

technologies, and assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of these weapons and materials.

We work closely with our partners in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S), specifically the ASD for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (NCB) to ensure that DoD has the capabilities and capacity necessary to protect our forces and to leverage partners' capabilities in countering global threats.

My office also develops priorities for, and advises the Secretary on, the Department's CWMD building partner capacity programs to counter WMD proliferation and use. We develop strategic guidance for the Department's primary tool for working with partners to prevent WMD proliferation, the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which is implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). As a Title 50 program, one of the unique aspects of the DoD CTR Program that has contributed greatly to its effectiveness is the ability to work with a multitude of partners, military and civilian, to achieve DoD's threat reduction goals and to build partner capacity to do so – a key DoD objective. Additionally, we help prioritize the Department's CWMD security cooperation activities under the authority of Section 333, of title 10, U.S. Code, which focuses on building the capacity of partner nation security forces to respond to a WMD incident; and develop guidance for the Department's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) engagements to help build the political will of our partners to develop appropriate policies and sufficient capabilities to counter WMD proliferation. All of these engagements, of course, take into account the priorities of our geographic Combatant Commanders, and seek to complement the activities of other U.S. Government and international partners. We expect DTRA will remain DoD's "go-to agency" in our efforts to build partner nation CWMD capabilities.

We also work closely with the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands, including U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in its new role following the December 2016 Unified Command Plan (UCP) change, which we continue to support by providing policy guidance. USSOCOM has brought a renewed sense of enthusiasm and energy to the CWMD mission and plays a critical role in ensuring that the Combatant Commands are fully integrated into the broader CWMD mission and are taking a transregional approach to countering these challenges.

DoD's efforts to prevent, counter, and respond to WMD threats and incidents are carried out by a number of dedicated and hardworking Airmen, Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, and civilians. DoD's cadre of CWMD experts supports a diverse range of activities, including CWMD-related planning, research and development, programming, exercising, analysis, technical reach-back support, and mission execution. This mission is a team effort, and it is an honor to work with such dedicated professionals.

## **STRATEGIC APPROACH FOR COUNTERING TODAY'S WMD CHALLENGES**

The National Security Strategy prioritizes the following actions to defend against WMD: enhancing missile defense; detecting and disrupting WMD; enhancing counterproliferation measures; and targeting WMD terrorists. The NSS places additional priority on the need to detect and contain biothreats at their source, support biomedical innovation, and improve emergency response to combat biothreats and pandemics – whether as the result of deliberate attack, accident, or a natural outbreak. The National Defense Strategy identifies a key DoD objective to dissuade, prevent, or deter State adversaries and non-State actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using WMD. To meet this objective, and as key enablers for protecting the security of our nation, we pursue three general lines of effort to counter WMD threats: prevent acquisition; contain and reduce threats; and respond to crises. We enable a more lethal and resilient force by degrading WMD threats and modernizing key CWMD capabilities. Close cooperation with the other U.S. departments and agencies, and our allies and partners, enables DoD to prioritize capabilities and efforts that counter operationally significant WMD risks and activities that are best executed by the Department. We accept risk in areas where WMD use is implausible, infeasible, or would have limited effects. Ultimately, DoD seeks to ensure that the United States and its allies and partners are neither attacked nor coerced by actors with WMD. We do this by ensuring that we have a layered approach to detecting and mitigating WMD threats at the source, thereby preventing WMD threats from reaching the homeland. If we are attacked, we seek to sustain our operations and force protection with minimal limitations; to respond militarily to disrupt ongoing attacks and preclude additional attacks; and to provide authorized support to domestic and international consequence response efforts, as requested.

We are bringing together and working with DoD CWMD stakeholders to ensure that we share a common prioritization of WMD threats and an understanding of how to leverage most

effectively our unique DoD authorities and capabilities to counter them. The stakeholders include our colleagues in the Joint Staff, the Office of the USD(A&S), the Services, and USSOCOM. Priorities are being set by DoD leadership through the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, and accompanied by a robust process at all levels of stakeholders to achieve prioritized outcomes and to address resources and authorities.

## **Prevent Acquisition**

A critical element of our efforts to counter WMD threats is preventing actors that do not possess WMD from obtaining them. DoD works closely with our interagency partners to leverage DoD authorities, resources, and capabilities where they can make the most difference to prevent adversaries from acquiring the technologies, materials, and expertise needed to develop WMD. For example, DoD works closely with the intelligence community and other departments and agencies to ensure that DoD understands the threat environment and maintains situational awareness of the location, quantity, and vulnerability of global materials and stockpiles, and of the intentions and capabilities of actors of concern. This is foundational to all DoD CWMD efforts.

DoD has the authority to work with foreign partners to secure or eliminate threats at the source and to build partner capacity to prevent proliferation. The DoD CTR Program, executed by DTRA, is an example of DoD's collaborative efforts with its partners. Secretary Mattis described the DoD CTR Program as DoD's "most comprehensive and effective tool for working cooperatively with international and interagency partners to mitigate WMD-related threats." For more than 25 years, the DoD CTR team has worked with foreign partners to destroy existing WMD stockpiles successfully; to make nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons more difficult to acquire; and to detect and interdict dangerous WMD components and materials.

In response to the changing threat environment, the DoD CTR Program has evolved in recent years. The DoD CTR Program initially focused on securing sources of WMD material in the former Soviet Union. In more recent years, as some WMD materials have become easier to acquire and proliferate; as State and non-State groups have continued to use these materials in conflict; and as various conflicts have destabilized borders and facilitated new trafficking routes, Congress expanded the DoD CTR Program's authority to address threats outside of the Former Soviet Union States in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY)

2008. With this additional flexibility to adapt the program to address the evolving threat environment, the Secretary of Defense has made determinations, with the concurrence from the Secretary of State, to expand the program geographically to address critical and emerging threats. The Program works in more than 30 countries to build our partners' capacity to secure materials within their borders, to detect WMD use and destabilizing disease outbreaks, and to prevent proliferation across borders and through maritime routes. Within the CTR Program, there are five primary lines of effort.

The DoD CTR Global Nuclear Security (GNS) Program helps prevent nuclear proliferation by facilitating the cooperative elimination of foreign nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components, supporting the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons-usable and high-threat radiological materials, and improving safety and security practices at foreign partner nuclear facilities. For example, we are working with Kazakhstan's nuclear security guard force to ensure that all nuclear material storage facilities in that country are secure.

The DoD CTR Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) prevents the proliferation of WMD materials, components, technology, and expertise by cooperatively strengthening the capability of foreign government partners to conduct surveillance of land and maritime borders, detect trafficking of WMD, and interdict illicit WMD materials. Through the PPP, we are working with the Jordanian and Lebanese Armed Forces to enhance their WMD detection and interdiction capability on the Jordanian and Lebanese borders with Syria. This helps both Jordan and Lebanon to prevent chemical weapons (CW) attacks on their soil and the trafficking of CW materials through Jordan and Lebanon. These efforts are often complementary to other DoD border or maritime security initiatives, as well as interagency efforts such as the Department of Energy's non-proliferation activities with partners at ports of entry.

Recognizing that biological threats are ubiquitous and often endemic, and that potential adversaries can use legitimate, widely available biotechnologies to manipulate dangerous pathogens, the DoD CTR Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) prevents the proliferation of biological weapons (BW), BW components, and BW-related technologies and expertise. The CBEP achieves this by securing and enhancing biosecurity and biosafety at facilities that store and handle extremely dangerous pathogens for legitimate beneficial purposes, and enhancing detection and reporting of outbreaks of dangerous diseases before they spread,

and remains postured to secure and cooperatively eliminate foreign BW stockpiles and associated infrastructure. For example, the CBEP team is partnering with Iraq to upgrade the safety and security of laboratories containing highly dangerous pathogens to prevent potential theft and use by non-State actors. The CBEP efforts also seek to stop threats “at the source” by preparing partners to detect and report disease outbreaks of security concern. The CBEP team recently collaborated with the Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute to mitigate the imminent threat of an anthrax outbreak, a disease of security concern given the historical use of *Bacillus Anthracis* as a biological weapon, by establishing mechanisms for safe and secure diagnostic work during this and future outbreaks.

CBEP efforts reduce biological threats at the source, before they affect the United States, and directly support the U.S. Government goals for the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). GHSA is a global initiative with more than 60 member nations and a 10-member Steering Group, currently chaired by Italy, and focuses on employing a whole-of-society approach to the prevention, detection, and response to infectious disease threats, including biological attacks. In an increasingly interconnected world, it is imperative to promote cooperation among health, agriculture, security, development, and other sectors to address biological threats and ensure that dangerous pathogens are not accessible to terrorists. DoD, in collaboration with partners abroad remains focused on reducing biological threats to U.S. forces and the U.S. homeland. The Department works closely with the Department of State, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), along with other domestic and international partners through frameworks like the GHSA, to ensure that assistance is provided in the most holistic, effective, and efficient manner. DoD is collaborating closely with its interagency partners to develop the National Biodefense Strategy and associated implementation plan as directed by Section 1086 of the NDAA for FY 2017. The draft strategy is forthcoming.

The DoD CTR Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) Program prevents the proliferation of CW, CW components, and CW-related materials and expertise. The DoD CTR CWD team is working with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Interpol on improving the security of source chemicals that could be used in improvised CW attacks to prevent non-State actors from replicating such attacks as have occurred in Syria and Iraq.

The CTR Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) program supports the destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems and associated infrastructure, providing



equipment and services cooperatively to destroy or dismantle foreign intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ICBM silos, road-mobile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, SLBM launchers, and related WMD infrastructure. The SOAE program will complete all planned programmatic activities by the end of calendar year 2018. The SOAE team had tremendous success eliminating strategic delivery systems previously aimed at the United States, our friends, and our allies. We plan to maintain a small technical staff to plan for potential contingencies, such as the elimination of North Korea's WMD-capable delivery systems.

Beyond the CTR Program, DoD continues to raise barriers to acquiring WMD material in cooperation with the Department of State through PSI. Through PSI, 105 nations have committed to help stop the trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials. In general, DoD works alongside the Department of State and experts from other U.S. departments and agencies to engage partners to build capacity, a willingness to act, and a whole-of-government approach to preventing the proliferation of shipments of concern. Most recently, a number of PSI States endorsed a Joint Statement supporting strong United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2375 and 2397 enforcement, particularly the maritime interdiction provisions, because these provisions are consistent with their support for PSI. UNSCRs 2375 and 2397 are focused on denying North Korea the revenue and imports it needs to advance its nuclear and missile programs. Looking forward, endorsees will mark the 15th anniversary of PSI at the High-Level Political Meeting in France in May, where we expect many of the PSI endorsees to commit to continuing to engage in efforts to mitigate the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD, particularly in the context of today's most pressing threats.

In addition, DoD supports the Department of State and other U.S. departments and agencies that lead efforts to implement and monitor international treaties and agreements, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). DoD also supports efforts to prevent the misuse of sensitive dual-use equipment through its support to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and other key regimes. As part of these efforts, DoD works with partners to monitor future threats and to consider the implications of emerging and disruptive technologies for multilateral treaties and regimes, as well as for ways to ensure that our forces remain protected in the face of what may be emerging threats.

## **Containing and Reducing Threats**

For States that already possess WMD programs, DoD seeks to deter use and contain and reduce threats. DoD is uniquely postured to counter imminent WMD threats and maintains specialized plans and capabilities to isolate, intercept, seize, and secure lost or stolen WMD or material of concern and manage WMD threats from hostile or fragile States. Defenses in depth, including passive countermeasures, enhanced border security, and missile defenses, also help to prevent the transfer and deter the use of WMD. ISIS' use of chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria and the Assad regime's use of these weapons in Syria over recent years has reinforced the importance of containing and reducing WMD threats.

One of Secretary Mattis's top three priorities for the Department is to strengthen alliances and develop new partners. DoD engages multilaterally through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and bilaterally with many other countries such as the United Kingdom on a number of CWMD issues. We are the permanent co-chair for the NATO Committee on Proliferation in the Defense Format (CP(D)), NATO's senior advisory body to the North Atlantic Council on countering the proliferation of WMD and CBRN defense. Through this committee, we increase allies' awareness of WMD threats, enhance our collective CBRN preparedness, and ensure that NATO is strategically and operationally prepared to counter WMD. This year the committee is focusing on training and exercises to raise awareness of NATO's role in crisis response during a potential CBRN event. We also work with partners to strengthen their ability to detect, interdict, and mitigate threats at and within their borders. For example, the DoD CTR Program works with partners in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as along vulnerable borders in Eastern Europe, to prevent the proliferation of WMD.

Other U.S. Government departments and agencies have key roles preventing illicit trade and technology transfers relevant to WMD, including the Department of State's role in negotiating and implementing export control regimes, the Department of Treasury's authorities to sanction proliferators, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) responsibilities to prevent and screen for dangerous exports, and the Department of Commerce's efforts to ensure that U.S. goods are not available to dangerous actors. We also engage with domestic interagency partners including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to leverage unique DoD capabilities in support of U.S. Government efforts to prevent and, if necessary, interdict CBRN weapons and materials from

crossing our nation's borders into the homeland. These capabilities include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as well as the capacity to interdict at sea.

Despite adoption of multiple UNSCRs prohibiting North Korea from exporting a majority of its key exports, including sectoral goods such as coal and ore, and from importing refined petroleum through ship-to-ship transfers, North Korea has continued to try to evade these sanctions through deceptive practices. DoD provides support by taking imagery of possible violations in order to help the Department of State engage flag States and insurance companies to take actions against their offending vessels and engage port States to seize assets involved in UNSCR violations when ships pull into port. DoD's efforts also enable the Department of Treasury to pursue sanctions and law enforcement agencies to open cases on violators.

Where hostile actors persist in making significant progress towards acquiring WMD, DoD remains prepared to undertake or support kinetic and non-kinetic actions to prevent such capabilities from being fully realized. DoD maintains the ability to conduct specialized pathway and WMD defeat missions. This involves developing and fielding tailored kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to neutralize or destroy weapons and agents; delivery systems; and materials, facilities, and processes, including the functional or structural defeat of hardened targets. DoD also has the authority to work cooperatively with foreign partners to dismantle and dispose of WMD weapons and materials. This includes deliberate technical processes that reduce or dismantle production methods, materials, stockpiles, and technical infrastructure; the redirection of an actor's capabilities and expertise towards peaceful productive activities; and the establishment of monitoring regimes to ensure that a WMD program is not reconstituted.

Finally, a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to contain and reduce threats is our ability to deter coercion or use. The United States maintains a range of capabilities, both conventional and strategic, to deter adversaries and ensure that those actors that already possess WMD do not use them against the United States or its allies, partners, and interests. Although strategic deterrence and missile defense are not a function of the ASD (HD&GS), building resilient capabilities both overseas and in the homeland supports deterrence, and my office helps ensure that we are prepared to respond to an attack.

To decrease incentives for retention and employment of WMD arsenals, DoD supports the creation and implementation of effective arms-control initiatives, including measures to enhance security and safety practices. As noted in the recently released Nuclear Posture Review

(NPR), the United States intends to work to create the conditions for disarmament by pursuing transparency measures, engaging in confidence and security-building measures with adversaries, and pursuing new arms-control measures, when conditions permit, that would improve the security of the United States and its allies and partners.

## **Responding to Crises**

DoD remains prepared with unique and flexible capabilities to manage and resolve WMD crises rapidly and decisively, whether at home in support of civil authorities or abroad. The National Defense Strategy makes clear that, should deterrence or efforts to contain and reduce threats fail, the Joint Force must be prepared to prevail. One of our top military CWMD priorities is to target the source of a WMD attack to prevent ongoing or further threats. To guarantee DoD's warfighting capabilities, DoD must safeguard the force and mitigate the hazards and effects of WMD use. DoD must also enable force projection into contested CBRN environments. This includes recovering casualties rapidly, decontaminating personnel, equipment, and points of embarkation, and establishing a protective posture while continually monitoring the force.

DoD works closely with allies and partners to ensure that we are prepared to respond to international WMD incidents. For example, supported by other U.S. departments and agencies, DoD works closely with our Republic of Korea and Japanese counterparts to ensure that U.S. regional alliances are prepared to respond to WMD contingencies on, or emanating from, the Korean Peninsula. This includes the conduct of semi-annual CWMD-focused bilateral engagements, support to regional exercises, and providing policy guidance to enable effective CWMD operations. The U.S. Army's 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Command also continues to develop and refine the extensive capabilities and technical expertise necessary to deploy rapidly in support of U.S. forces around the world and conducts regular training exercises to operate in highly challenging realistic operational environments.

Although our CWMD efforts prioritize early action, and rightly so, prudence dictates that we and our partner nations have the capability to respond to and mitigate the effects of WMD incidents. Building partner nation capabilities promotes regional security cooperation and interoperability, reduces the potential for a large U.S. Government requirement to support

international CBRN incident-response operations, and maximizes the effectiveness of a combined response.

Section 333 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides DoD a consolidated authority to build partner nation capability. Building on the work the Department has done over the past four years under other authorities, Section 333 enables DoD to train and equip foreign national security forces to conduct CWMD operations. In Fiscal Year 2018, DoD plans to develop CBRN incident-response capacity in 21 foreign countries, including Ukraine, the Philippines, Jordan, Panama, and Kenya. The Department is taking full advantage of this authority to mitigate the consequences of a CBRN crisis and to ensure that our partners are able to contain the threat. I thank you for providing us the authority to execute this important mission.

From the homeland perspective, in accordance with Section 2313 of Title 50, U.S. Code, I am the DoD official responsible for coordinating DoD assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in responding to threats involving CBRN weapons or high-yield explosives, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of such weapons and explosives.

I work closely with the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) to ensure that DoD forces remain ready to deter, defend against, and, when required, defeat nation-State or terrorist WMD attacks on the homeland in the air, maritime, and land domains. As noted, DoD's primary responsibility is to employ our warfighting capabilities to prevent, interdict, and respond militarily to preclude further WMD attacks; however, DoD also plays an important supporting role in the national response system.

DoD supports its Federal- and State-partner preparedness efforts to respond to CBRN incidents in the homeland, such as integrated regional planning, training, and exercises in coordination with DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, HHS, FBI, and other Federal partners. DoD is postured to assist civil authority efforts to detect, identify, neutralize, dismantle, and dispose of CBRN threats before they can reach our nation's borders and, if they succeed in penetrating our borders, before they can be employed against our nation. DoD has developed a wide range of CBRN-response capabilities and continuously plans, trains and exercises so that DoD is prepared to employ these capabilities rapidly in support to civil authorities to help save and sustain lives in the aftermath of a CBRN incident.

The DoD CBRN Response Enterprise – approximately 18,735 Active, Guard, and Reserve military personnel – is postured to respond within hours of a CBRN incident with critical capabilities such as detection and assessment of CBRN hazards; casualty search and extraction; casualty decontamination; emergency medical, patient triage, trauma care, and surgical and intensive medical care; fatality recovery; ground and rotary-wing air patient movement; security; command and control; engineering; logistics; transportation; and aviation lift.

## **CONCLUSION**

We must anticipate that our adversaries will continue to evolve and develop increasingly sophisticated methods to pursue, develop, or deploy WMD. The diversity of these threats makes it imperative that DoD be rigorous in prioritizing its efforts and work closely with other U.S. departments and agencies and international partners to confront the threats posed by WMD at home and abroad. As WMD-related crises continue to emerge, your continued support in the areas described today will be critical to DoD’s ability to understand, anticipate, and mitigate these threats.

Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee: We appreciate your leadership and your continued support for the Department of Defense. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions.