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STATEMENT OF

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INTRODUCTION

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to testify today about our countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) strategy, and its relationship to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 budget request. Our increasingly interconnected world makes WMD-related knowledge, materials, and technology more readily available to those seeking to harm the United States at home and our interests abroad. It is imperative that we remain vigilant to these threats, and that we constantly assess and update our posture and approach to mitigating them. The Department of Defense, along with partners in other U.S. departments and agencies and the international community, is continually evaluating our military and civilian solutions to countering WMD threats, as well as our preparedness for mitigating any consequences of WMD use or the spread of dangerous transmissible pathogens. Last year, the Secretary of Defense issued a new Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) to reflect our evolving thinking, and to ensure that all of our components are focused on the same lines of effort, objectives, and supporting activities. I want to walk through the main elements of that strategy today; to highlight some of the key activities and efforts undertaken over the past year to reduce the threat to the United States from chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons or materials; and to relate our efforts to the FY 2016 budget request.

As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, my responsibilities include issuing policy and strategic guidance on CWMD, cyber operations, homeland defense activities, antiterrorism, continuity of government and mission assurance, defense support of civil authorities, and space-related issues. WMD are among the threats that illustrate why the new organization that I oversee, Homeland Defense and Global Security, makes sense – threats abroad may well affect the homeland, and thus it is imperative that our domestic and international CWMD efforts are synchronized. The CWMD office that reports to me is responsible for establishing policies and guidance to protect our armed forces and other U.S. citizens from a CBRN attack from a State or non-state actor; and for representing DoD's interests on counterproliferation and non-proliferation policy issues, such as concerning the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). My office for Homeland Defense Integration and Defense Support of Civil Authorities is responsible for establishing policies and guidance to support civilian agencies in response to WMD attacks.

The CWMD office also develops policy and guidance for the programs and activities of the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which is among the activities implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction and Arms Control serves as the U.S. Government’s treaty managers, and provide acquisition guidance and oversight for DTRA's work. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense oversees, integrates, and coordinates the Department’s efforts to develop

capabilities that enable the Warfighter to deter, prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from chemical and biological (CB) threats and their effects. The Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense is the advanced developer of a number of key technologies that support the CWMD strategy. I am pleased to be here today with colleagues representing each of these organizations, all of which are integral to countering the WMD threats that I will be addressing.

STRATEGIC APPROACH FOR COUNTERING TODAY'S WMD CHALLENGES

The 2015 National Security Strategy states: "No threat poses as grave a danger to our security and well-being as the potential use of nuclear weapons and materials by irresponsible states or terrorists." Preventing nuclear use by a State or non-state actor remains one of our greatest priorities. Yet the use of sarin-filled rockets by the Syrian Government in Syria in 2013 and the ongoing outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa have illustrated the imminent dangers of chemical and biological threats, whether man-made or naturally occurring. Although our office helped shape the successful DoD responses to both challenges, we know that chemical and biological threats will continue to evolve as related technology and expertise spread across the globe, enabling malicious actors to find new ways to use chemical and biological agents as weapons.

To ensure that we are postured to reduce and respond to today's threats and those of the future, the Secretary of Defense issued a new Strategy for Countering WMD in June 2014. Under this strategy, DoD will work to ensure that no additional State or non-state actors acquire WMD; those possessing WMD do not use them; and if WMD are used, the effects are minimized. We set supporting objectives of reducing incentives to pursue, possess, and employ WMD; increasing the barriers to WMD acquisition, proliferation, and use; managing WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, or failed States and safe havens; and denying the effects of current and emerging WMD threats through layered, integrated defenses.

The strategy approaches countering-WMD as a whole-of-DoD challenge, integrating military tools with defense-wide civilian infrastructure. A whole-of-DoD approach that can nest into any whole-of-government crisis response is necessary because lowered barriers to WMD acquisition makes dissuasion, detection, deterrence, and defense more difficult, and thus solutions cannot be pursued in stovepipes.

The strategy's emphasis is on taking early action to reduce threats, shaping the environment, and cooperating with partners. That last point is critically important because DoD cannot address these threats alone, particularly in these times of fiscal austerity. We know that we must use all available resources to meet our goals, including other U.S. departments and agencies, allies and partners, and international bodies. We seek to leverage and enhance, but not duplicate, capabilities resident elsewhere or best executed by others.

For the rest of my testimony I will lay out the three lines of effort set forth in the strategy – prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crises – and present what we have

done and what we are doing to achieve them. These lines of effort are underpinned by what we call the key "strategic enabler" – prepare. *Prepare* is the continuous cycle of ensuring that DoD's capabilities, expertise, and interagency and international relationships support these three CWMD lines of effort.

PREVENT ACQUISITION

Preventing acquisition focuses on ensuring that those who do not possess WMD do not obtain them. This goal is paramount to all of our work. State and non-state actors can develop, acquire, and proliferate WMD and related capabilities by using licit and illicit networks; exploiting political instability, violent extremism, and inadequate security of WMD-related materials; or taking advantage of a breakdown of infrastructure in States suffering from natural outbreaks of devastating diseases. Highly motivated non-state actors determined to obtain and employ WMD pose an exceptional risk because they are difficult to deter. This risk is heightened when non-state actors have effective control over territory, which we are witnessing in areas of the Middle East and Africa.

It is essential to deny terrorists and other non-state actors access to all sources of WMD materials. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)'s efforts and its interest in acquiring WMD, particularly chemical weapons, are of great concern. We were pleased that this threat was reduced when a former chemical weapons engineer from Saddam Hussein's regime, who had since pledged loyalty to ISIL, was killed in a January coalition airstrike. That action degraded and disrupted ISIL's WMD-related efforts. However, recent unconfirmed news reports of ISIL's use of chemicals as weapons may indicate ISIL's ongoing interest in acquiring CW to terrorize populations and gain strategic leverage over its enemies. Military operations against adversaries, and cooperative efforts to secure or eliminate vulnerable material and to build the physical and human-capacity infrastructure necessary to prevent WMD proliferation, are critical tools that must be applied to the risks that we face. Continuing to deter and mitigate the threat of ISIL and other non-state actors acquiring and using WMD is a top priority.

The DoD CTR Program remains one of the primary tools for preventing acquisition of WMD and WMD-related materials. The DoD CTR Program has a decades-long track record of working with foreign partners to destroy existing WMD; making nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons more difficult to acquire; and detecting and interdicting dangerous WMD components and materials on their own soil. Though we will close out our work this year in securing various sources of WMD material in Russia, the DoD CTR Program continues to work in other regions to eliminate dangerous materials at their source where possible, and to build the capacity of other partners to manage threats in their own territory.

The DoD CTR Program is active with longtime partners in Eurasia and Central Asia, as well as with newer partners in Southwest and Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The DoD CTR Program also leads DoD's efforts in support of the Nuclear Security Summits, which, along with more than 50 countries, contribute to the U.S. Government's objective of preventing nuclear

terrorism around the world. We are grateful for the work Congress put into streamlining the DoD CTR Program's authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2015 to enable the program to continue mitigating the evolving WMD threat most effectively. The FY 2016 budget request for the DoD CTR Program is $358.1 million, which we assess to be sufficient to meet current requirements.

Much of the CTR Program's current work is through its Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP). Scientific, economic, and demographic trends are magnifying the risks of outbreaks of infectious diseases of security concern, whether they are the result of a laboratory accident, a bioterror attack, or natural transmission. We have seen that such events threaten not only the health of our citizens due to the ease and speed of global travel, but also, potentially, geopolitical stability. Dangerous regional and global security consequences result from States that are unable to provide basic services for their citizens, potentially creating environments that enable terrorists to act with impunity and take advantage of reduced barriers to WMD acquisition.

Furthermore, the effectiveness of security forces across all mission areas relies on their staying strong and healthy. Force health protection depends upon global efforts supporting biosurveillance, advanced diagnostics, and medical-countermeasure development, both domestically and abroad. For this reason, we believe that DoD, including the CBEP and the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, is contributing to the Administration's goals outlined in the Global Health Security Agenda, which is working to bring together the assets and expertise of civilian and military agencies across some 40-plus countries to accelerate progress toward a collective ability to mitigate infectious disease threats and to ensure awareness that global health security as an international security priority. Working alongside the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other U.S. and international partners, DoD is helping to develop a worldwide capacity to detect and report diseases of security concern as part of an early warning mechanism for outbreaks, regardless of whether such diseases are found in nature or caused by biological weapons. In an increasingly interconnected world, cooperation between the health and security sectors to tackle biological threats and ensure that dangerous pathogens are not available for terrorists to acquire is no longer optional – it is essential.

DoD also continues to work to raise the barriers to acquiring WMD material through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is approaching its twelfth year. The PSI brings partners together to stop the trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from States and non-state actors. Through exercises and leadership in PSI's operational experts group, DoD works with partners to address all aspects of the proliferation threat from rapid, national-level decision-making to operational tactics and procedures. This past year, I had the opportunity to help kick off Fortune Guard, the first of what will be an annual Asia-Pacific exercise series. Fortune Guard's tabletop and live-fire exercise, which 31 nations attended, was held at the U.S. Pacific Command, and will next be held in New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. The PSI is a public endorsement of the principles of

interdiction by like-minded States that share the goal of defeating the threat posed by WMD proliferation. The PSI is an activity, not a program, and as such has no dedicated budget. In a time of increasing resource constraints, we are exploring ways to leverage other DoD programs to ensure that the exercises and training activities that are so essential to enabling the U.S. Government to meet our commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles can continue.

International regimes that bring together like-minded nations are also critical elements of the U.S Government's efforts to prevent the development and proliferation of WMD materials. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention remain essential foundations for the pursuit of common nonproliferation and disarmament goals. Protecting relevant authorities while strengthening all aspects of these regimes' implementation are critical U.S. Government goals, and should guide the approaches to the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and 2016 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conferences (RevCons), which DoD will attend in support of the Department of State. Realizing successes at these RevCons is a priority for the United States, and we will work with all parties interested in advancing realistic, achievable objectives.

We engage in other collaborative efforts with partners focused on keeping dangerous materials out of the hands of bad actors. These efforts against actors and their networks seek to delay, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise complicate the development, possession, and proliferation of WMD and related capabilities. Such activities are designed to create reinforcing layers of complex barriers to impose recurring, collectively reinforcing, and enduring costs and setbacks to those seeking to acquire or proliferate WMD or related capabilities.

CONTAIN AND REDUCE THREATS

We know that despite our best efforts to prevent bad actors from acquiring WMD, we must be prepared to confront and reduce threats posed by vulnerable WMD-related material. Our military must remain prepared to lead or support operations to locate, characterize, secure, exploit, and destroy WMD in a range of contingency environments and under varying security and political conditions. We must also continue to work to ensure that we have partners around the world capable of mitigating such threats at and within their borders.

Last year the DoD CTR Program advanced efforts with two key partners designed to enhance their ability to detect and interdict WMD material – Ukraine and Jordan. Russia's destabilizing actions in eastern Ukraine left Ukraine's State Border Guard Services (SBGS), a longtime DoD CTR partner, with new administrative boundaries to control and to protect against WMD proliferation. DoD CTR Program experts traveled last spring to assess the SBGS's primary proliferation prevention vulnerabilities, providing initial tangible support by April 2014 and delivering a substantial amount of equipment and associated training in the fall of 2014. Thus far we have provided basic engineering (earth moving equipment), communications, land transport, surveillance equipment, and detectors to enhance the ability of the SBGS to continue to carry out its WMD proliferation-prevention mission.

Jordan, meanwhile, continues to face dangerous non-state actors operating in a destabilized Syria on its northern border, and an increasingly unsecure Iraq to its east. The DoD CTR Program has worked to provide a comprehensive train, equip, and support partnership since 2013 to enable Jordanian military and civilian first responders to mitigate proliferation threats and, if necessary, operate in a contaminated environment. Phases 2 and 3 of the Jordan Border Security Program (JBSP), an integrated surveillance, WMD detection, and interdiction system that runs along a 274-mile stretch of Jordan's borders with Syria and Iraq, is the centerpiece of this support (Phase 1, which covered 68 miles of Jordan's border with Syria, was completed by the U.S. Army under a Foreign Military Sales case in March 2014). Phases 2 and 3 should be fully operational by August 2015, but the JBSP is already providing the Jordanians better visibility of their border, which has resulted in increased interdictions of drugs, weapons, and personnel smuggling. Jordan is not the only regional partner facing threats emanating from Syria and Iraq. The CTR Program is exploring an approach to enhance the WMD surveillance, detection, and interdiction capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces on their border, and is assessing ways to enhance the Iraqi Security Forces' proliferation prevention capabilities.

A key counterpart to the DoD CTR Program is DTRA's CBRN Preparedness Program (CP2), which works with partner nations to respond to and mitigate the consequences of a CBRN event. Section 1204 of the NDAA for FY 2014 authorized DoD, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide WMD consequence management and response-preparedness training and equipment to the military and civilian organizations of key international partners. This means that DTRA's CP2 may now work with both military and civilian personnel in partner nations using DTRA Operation and Maintenance funds to implement a whole-of-government approach to building WMD response capacity across a partner nation's first-responder community.

After securing the Department of State's concurrence under Section 1204(a) of the NDAA for FY 2014 to operate in the Levant, the CP2 moved out quickly in Jordan to provide support. The CP2 is also working with the Lebanese Armed Forces' WMD unit to enhance its capacity to detect, assess, and mitigate WMD threats, and is working to provide detection and response equipment to the Iraqi Armed Forces as well. DoD's efforts are now focused on enabling the CP2 to partner with countries outside of the Levant under Section 1204(b) of the NDAA for FY 2014. We look forward to notifying you when we have the approval of the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence of the Secretary of State, to do so.

As I mentioned earlier, we remain concerned about the WMD threat in the Middle East, both because ISIL recognizes no limits when it comes to terrorizing populations, and because of our continued concern about the Syrian regime's willingness to use chemicals as weapons against its population, thereby eroding all norms against the use of these weapons. The U.S. Government remains extremely troubled by the three reports from the Fact Finding Mission established by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to investigate several incidents of reported use following Syria's accession to the CWC. The evidence and conclusions of these reports provide "compelling confirmation that a toxic chemical was used as a weapon, systematically and repeatedly" in Syria between April and August 2014. This raises serious

questions about the willingness of the Syrian Government to fulfill its obligations under the CWC and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118 to prevent the use of chemical weapons. Our great fear is that this use of chemical weapons could create a normative environment for further use that we could see spread within Syria and around the region. For that reason, the DoD CTR Program and CP2 experts will continue to look for ways to work with partners around the region to prevent proliferation, and to ensure that all WMD threats can be contained and reduced.

RESPOND TO CRISES

The "respond to crises" element of the strategy focuses on activities and operations to manage and resolve complex WMD crises. This goal involves either taking kinetic action against hostile non-state actors who acquire WMD or material of concern – and who we must assume would be prepared to use them – or ensuring that we and our partners are prepared to mitigate the effects of any WMD use or spread of an infectious disease of security concern to ensure that the homeland remains safe and our operations abroad can continue.

The crisis this past year that raised the specter of a major biological threat that could have worldwide implications was the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak in West Africa. Although the outbreak affected Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea most acutely, the pathogen spread to other West African region nations, Europe, and the United States. By September 2014, Ebola had killed nearly 3,000 people, and the World Health Organization and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) warned that some 550,000 people could be infected by January 2015.

This was not just a public health crisis. We had growing concerns about the breakdown of civil society and governance in West Africa due to the immense infrastructure strain caused by the outbreak. The intense focus on reducing Ebola's spread distracted the region's governments from countering violent extremism from such groups as Boko Haram and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb. The large collection of Ebola samples from the outbreak and potential vulnerable stores of other pathogens presented a significant biological-security threat. In cooperation with other DoD offices and interagency partners, particularly the U.S. Agency for International Development, which managed the overall U.S. Government response to the Ebola crisis, the DoD CTR Program was able to respond quickly and effectively, thanks in part to $60 million reprogrammed into the DoD CTR account in Fiscal Year 2014 for this purpose. The DoD CTR program procured and staffed temporary diagnostic laboratories and supported staffing of existing laboratories to diagnose Ebola in Liberia and Sierra Leone quickly and accurately; supplied personal protective equipment, associated consumables, and laboratory equipment to the affected countries to prevent transmission to workers, including those returning to the United States; and gave the World Health Organization (WHO) a grant to train workers to detect Ebola, protect themselves from infection, and prevent its spread, including back to the United States. These efforts supported DoD's *Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE*. Along with the Department of State, our team also coordinated closely with international partners, including

France and the United Kingdom, to ensure that the assistance each country was providing was complementary and that we all accepted a share of the burden of rolling back Ebola's spread and preventing it from reaching new countries.

DoD began to transfer our lines of operation to civilian authorities in February 2015, because our efforts have been paying off. Rather than 550,000 infections by January 2015, as of March 5, 2015, there have been fewer than 24,000 infections. There have been too many deaths, but far fewer than our worst fears and CDC's initial estimates.

As the Ebola epidemic comes under control and international support efforts begin to diminish, we will work to ensure that the laboratories and repositories that are left in these countries are sustained in a safe and secure manner so that the laboratory capabilities and Ebola samples are not vulnerable to theft or diversion. The DoD CTR Program will also stay behind in the region to build a lasting capacity to help prevent another outbreak. The DoD CTR Program will transition sustainable biosurveillance and diagnostic capabilities to the governments of Ebola-affected countries; bolster preparedness levels of countries in West Africa at risk for Ebola transmission; and develop regional biosurveillance networks by leveraging the capacities of internationally accepted regional leaders. The goal will be to ensure that these partners can detect, report, and manage outbreaks on their own using the sustainable capacity we are working to provide. The DoD chemical and biological defense program will also continue to play a key role in supporting development of medical countermeasures, diagnostics, biosurveillance tools and protection systems, though I will defer to Dr. Hassell for further details.

It is important to note that this Ebola crisis was not just an international issue, but a homeland issue as well, both when individuals unknowingly infected with the virus flew to the United States, and when U.S. citizens working in affected areas became infected and the U.S. Government flew them home for treatment. Lack of full integration of our international and domestic experts across the U.S. Government resulted in international support decisions that created second-order impacts at home. Although the three main research hospitals that received the U.S. citizens flown home for treatment were prepared and capable of treating people, few other hospitals and hospital providers were prepared to provide adequate Personal Protective Equipment or manage hazardous-waste disposal. Federal, State, and local public health officials and emergency managers coordinated to develop protocols and assess hospital preparedness for both treatment and transport of infected or exposed patients. The fact that my responsibilities extend across both the international and domestic CBRN-response areas reinforced to me the need to ensure that both international and domestic experts are communicating in such a crisis, and that expertise is shared by domestic and international responders in a timely manner. We must develop biosurveillence protocols and information-sharing processes that will help us to be quicker to link the right experts when, not if, there is another crisis such as this. Infectious diseases, whether intentional or natural, do not respect borders; any international outbreak of an infectious disease is automatically a homeland concern.

This work on Ebola came on the heels of the successful international mission to eliminate Syria's declared chemical materials. The DoD CTR Program's funding and flexible authorities enabled the U.S. contribution to that effort, destroying the most dangerous chemicals from the Syrian program on board the M/V Cape Ray. The expertise and successful mission truly represented a "whole-of-DoD" effort, though. From the U.S. European Command's operational mission lead, to the expertise that the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center brought to bear in designing the Field Deployable Hydroloysis System and actually destroying the materials, to DTRA's and U.S. Strategic Command's role in synchronizing multiple streams of information and keeping all key parties informed of both challenges and progress, the Syrian CW elimination mission represented the best of what DoD had to offer in confronting a WMD crisis. The fact that the actual elimination concluded in just 42 days and the entire mission cost nearly $30 million less than the amount that the DoD CTR Program allocated were finishing touches on a successful mission.

Now our team – said and meant in the broadest sense, as far as disparate elements of DoD and our partners in the U.S. Government and international community – will work to record the lessons learned from both Syria and another recent DoD CTR Program success in eliminating Libya's chemical weapons. We want to ensure that the next such crisis we confront, whether on the Korean peninsula or elsewhere, benefits from understanding the successes and challenges that stemmed from these recent events. For example, both crises reaffirmed the need to have technology that works in unforeseen circumstances and austere conditions as may be necessary in carrying out elimination missions. It is no longer sufficient to assume that there will be a large, secure environment and the luxury of time to eliminate dangerous materials. Additionally, both crises reaffirmed the critical importance of working with foreign partners to share the burden. The DoD CTR Program benefited from the use of its external contributions authority by accepting contributions from Germany for the Libyan CW-destruction operation and from Canada for the Syria CW-elimination mission.

More broadly, the Syria mission as a whole represented what can occur when the international community joins together with shared goals. Russia, China, and the United Kingdom provided security escorts to the Danish and Norwegian ships that removed the CW material from Syria. Italy provided a port to transload the most dangerous materials to the M/V Cape Ray for destruction. Less dangerous chemicals from the Syrian arsenal were destroyed in commercial facilities in Finland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, while Germany and Finland helped dispose of the chemical waste from destruction aboard the M/V Cape Ray. I am hopeful that this sort of cooperation will become the norm for confronting WMD crises. Early outreach and sustained discussion with various partners about our shared WMD concerns enabled this success and reinforced the need to prepare for WMD crises year round – not just when they are on the immediate horizon.

CONCLUSION

Despite the excellent work that our teams have done over the past two decades to reduce WMD threats, we must continue to adapt to the evolving threat, remain prepared and agile, and never let our guard down due to the potentially catastrophic consequences of doing so. Actors of concern will continue to pursue WMD because they believe possessing WMD will result in enhanced strategic leverage; greater means for coercion; and the capability to deter, disrupt, or defeat military operations or cause mass casualty attacks. Your continued support for and funding in the areas laid out today are imperative to our success in mitigating these threats. We also will continue to work with our interagency and international partners to confront these challenges, both at home and abroad, because we cannot be successful on our own. Thank you for your time today. I look forward to answering your questions.